The tribunal, in its Procedural Order No. 2, decided on the Claimant’s request for a separate award compelling the Kyrgyz Republic to reimburse the share of the advance on costs that the Claimant had paid on its behalf. The Respondent had failed to pay its €225,000 portion, which the Claimant subsequently covered to allow the arbitration to proceed. The Claimant sought immediate repayment plus interest, arguing the tribunal had authority under the Swedish Arbitration Act, the lex arbitri, to issue such an award. The Respondent countered that the applicable 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provided an exhaustive and exclusive remedy for non-payment—namely, the other party paying the share or termination of the proceedings—which the tribunal had already followed. The tribunal navigated this issue by analyzing its authority under both the UNCITRAL Rules and the Swedish Arbitration Act. It agreed that the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules were silent on this specific power. Acknowledging the Rules’ flexible nature, the tribunal turned to the Swedish Act as the complementary lex loci arbitri. It dismissed the Claimant’s reliance on Section 29 of the Act, which governs "separate awards," finding that the procedural matter of costs was not an issue "of significance to the resolution of the dispute" on the merits. However, the tribunal affirmed its authority under the Act's broader principles, which grant arbitrators wide discretion over procedural matters. It distinguished between "awards," which decide the merits, and "decisions," which address other procedural determinations. The tribunal concluded it was empowered to order the reimbursement, but in the form of a procedural "decision" rather than a separate "award." On the appropriateness of the order, the tribunal emphasized that the obligation to pay advances stems from the parties' consent to arbitrate and that a claimant should not be forced to finance a respondent's participation. It noted that the Respondent provided no justification for its default. Regarding interest, the tribunal rejected the Claimant’s request for a rate based on Swedish law. It clarified that under Swedish arbitration law, interest is governed by the law applicable to the merits (lex causae), not the law of the seat. As the applicable law on the merits was likely public international law and had not been pleaded, the tribunal applied a rate more consistent with investment treaty practice, ordering interest at the US prime rate plus 2%.