• the relevance and materiality of the Requested Documents be decided jointly by the Parties at the appropriate time.

• Respondent will share with Claimant the categories of Documents that the parties agreed to produce in the Orlandini discovery proceedings. Claimant and Respondent will try to come to a joint agreement with respect to what categories of Documents would be relevant to the present case and material to its outcome.
• In the event that Claimant and Respondent cannot reach an

• Respondent will inform the Tribunal if documents are subject to a protective order and the Tribunal will address this in due course.

• Opportunity overview from Argent Partners to Glencore attached to Letter from Argent Partners to Chris Eskdale, 30 April 2004.

Documents assessing and/or recommending and/or implementing the assignment of the Assets by Glencore International to Claimant subsequent to their acquisition in 2005, including, but not limited to:

1. Documents describing the rationale for, discussing and/or implementing the choice of Claimant

Statement of Defence, Sections 2.5.4, 4.2; Statement of Claim, ¶ 37; C-64; Eskdale, ¶ 20.

The Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome.

First, the Requested Documents will show that Glencore International’s assignment of the Assets to Claimant took place at a time when it was evident that the State would take action against such Assets. Further, the assignment was carried

and is contradicted by evidence on the record (C-13; C-14; C-15; C-16; C-17; C-18).

***

Notwithstanding and without prejudice to the above, in the spirit of cooperation, Claimant hereby voluntarily produces its register of shareholders and register of members from 1993 to the present.

Claimant objects to this request for the following two reasons:

(a) The Documents requested are irrelevant and immaterial to the outcome of this arbitration and should therefore be excluded pursuant to Article 9.2(a) of the IBA Rules.

The issue before the Tribunal in relation to this request is whether Claimant

commercially confidential information,” it has not, in fact, objected to the production of the Requested Documents on such basis. In any event and in the spirit of cooperation, Bolivia is willing to execute a non-disclosure agreement in connection with the Requested Documents.

For all these reasons, Bolivia moves to compel production of all the Requested Documents.

Bolivia moves to compel production of all the Requested Documents.

In limine, Bolivia takes note of the disclosure of certain correspondence purportedly “evidencing consideration paid by Claimant in the acquisition of the investment.” Such Documents only show that a certain amount was transferred by Claimant into an “Attorney Trust Account” on 3 March 2005. This does not constitute proof of

2. the conditions underpinning such assignment, including, but not limited to any consideration paid by Claimant in this connection; and
3. any Documents evidencing the actual payment of such consideration.

out in exchange for no consideration (or, at best, in exchange for a symbolic consideration). Second, and as a result, the Requested Documents will dispose of Claimant’s claims in this arbitration, insofar as they will demonstrate that Claimant committed an abuse of process by receiving the investment from Glencore International when the dispute was foreseeable, which places such dispute outside the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and/or renders the claims inadmissible (Statement of Defence, Section 4.2).

Bolivia confirms that the Requested Documents are not in its possession, custody or control.

Bolivia reasonably believes that the

made a qualifying investment under the Treaty.

Specifically, Bolivia has requested this category of documents to argue that Claimant paid no consideration for its investment and committed an abuse of process by receiving the investment from Glencore International when the dispute was foreseeable (SoD, Sections 4.1.2 and 42.2).

Bolivia’s assertions are based on unsupported Treaty interpretation that an investor must make an “active investment” to qualify for protection (SoD, Section 4.1.1). This requirement simply does not exist under the Treaty.

Moreover, as explained above, Claimant acquired the Assets on 7 March 2005, five days after the original acquisition by Glencore International and almost two

payment of consideration by Claimant to Glencore International in connection with the assignment of the rights, titles and interests acquired as a result of the acquisition of the Panamanian Companies.

Further, Bolivia notes that the correspondence disclosed by Claimant is not in native format, as requested under paragraph 4 above.

Claimant’s objections to the Request are misplaced, for the following reasons.

First, on Claimant’s own case, the Requested Documents are neither irrelevant to Bolivia’s case nor immaterial to its outcome. As Claimant recognizes, “[t]he issue before the Tribunal in relation to this request is whether Claimant made a qualifying investment under the Treaty.”

In the present case, as Bolivia has explained at length, the protection of the Treaty

Requested Documents exist and are in the possession, custody or control of Claimant and/or of the Glencore Group. The Requested Documents would have been generated internally by Glencore International and/or the Glencore Group following the acquisition of the Assets by Glencore International.

years prior to the State’s measures (SoC, ¶¶ 36-37). Bolivia’s abuse of process claims are therefore unfounded, rendering Bolivia’s request irrelevant to the case.

(b) Bolivia’s Request 10 as a whole is excessively broad and fails to identify a “narrow and specific . . . category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist," as required by Article 3.3(a) of the IBA Rules.

Bolivia’s request seeks a category of documents that dates back to 2005 without establish a temporal limit as required by Article 3.3(a) of the IBA Rules. It goes without saying that complying with such a broad and temporally indeterminate request would also be excessively burdensome.

extends only to those foreign nationals and companies having made an active investment (Statement of Defence, Section 4.1.1). Claimant did not participate in the acquisition of the Assets by Glencore International, but instead was only assigned such Assets, for no apparent consideration. Further, the Requested Documents will show that Claimant was absent from the daily management of the Assets, that role reverting to Glencore International and its staff (Statement of Defence, ¶¶ 286-290). Claimant has never been more than an empty shell and, as such, cannot be a protected investor under the Treaty. In all likelihood, Claimant is simply a smokescreen designated to conceal Sánchez de Lozada’s continued interest in the Assets.

The mere fact that Claimant has put forth what it considers to be “the applicable legal test

***

Notwithstanding and without prejudice to the above, in the spirit of cooperation, Claimant hereby voluntarily produces correspondence from 2005 implementing the assignment and evidencing consideration paid by Claimant in the acquisition of the investment.

for what constitutes a protected investor under the Treaty” does not make such test ipso facto correct. Nor does it render irrelevant or material to Bolivia’s case the Requested Documents.

Second, Claimant’s reliance on the timing of the acquisition and assignment of the Assets in relation to the adverse State measures as purported evidence that it did not carry out an abuse of process is a non sequitur. It is irrelevant to a finding of abuse of process that the assignment to Claimant would have been carried out only five days following the acquisition of the Assets by Glencore International. Corporate restructuring such as the one carried out in the present case requires advance planning, but takes little time to execute. Likewise, it is irrelevant that the assignment took place almost two years prior to the State’s first measure. At the

time, Glencore International knew (or should have known) there was an imminent risk of State action against the Assets. If anything, it is Claimant’s insistence on such timing that is irrelevant to the case and immaterial to its outcome.

Third, the Request is neither excessively broad nor unspecific. The Requested Documents record specific details of a clearly-identified transaction, which is at the heart of this dispute. Documents recommending, assessing and implementing the assignment – and, in particular, its rationale, conditions and any consideration underpinning it – are specific and narrow. Indeed, without access to the Requested Documents, Bolivia is not in a position to be more specific in its Request.

For all these reasons, Bolivia moves to compel production

Documents reflecting any funds invested by Claimant in the Assets between 2005 and 2012, including, but not limited to:

1. minutes of meetings of Claimant’s board of directors discussing and/or approving such investments;
2. minutes of meetings of Claimant’s shareholders assembly discussing and/or approving such investments;
3. Documents recording the funds funneled into the Assets by Claimant;
4. Documents reflecting any transfer of technology and/or technical assistance from Claimant to

Statement of Claim, ¶¶ 127-132; Statement of Defence, Section 4.1; R-243.

The Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome.

First, the Requested Documents will show that Claimant is a shell company that only exists in a nearly empty room that “held a filing cabinet, a computer, a telephone, a fax machine and a checkbook” (R-243) and apparently nothing more (Statement of Defence, ¶ 365). The Requested Documents will thus prove that Claimant made no active contribution of assets to Bolivia and/or, at most, holds an indirect investment. Second, and as a result, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over this dispute, as (i) Treaty requires an active

Claimant objects to this request for the following two reasons:

(a) The Documents requested are irrelevant and immaterial to the outcome of this arbitration and should therefore be excluded pursuant to Article 9.2(a) of the IBA Rules.

The issue before the Tribunal in relation to this request is whether Claimant is a qualified investor and made a qualified investment under the Treaty.

Claimant has set out the applicable legal test for what constitutes a protected investor under the Treaty (SoC, ¶¶ 127-128) and has offered evidence to show that it meets the Treaty’s requirements (ie, incorporation in the UK or a UK territory) (C-1).

of all the Requested Documents.

Bolivia moves to compel production of all the Requested Documents.

Claimant’s objections to the Request are misplaced, for the following reasons.

First, on Claimant’s own case, the Requested Documents are neither irrelevant to Bolivia’s case nor immaterial to its outcome. As Claimant recognizes, “[t]he issue before the Tribunal in relation to this request is whether Claimant made a qualifying investment under the Treaty.”

In the present case, as Bolivia has explained at length, the protection of the Treaty extends only to those foreign nationals and companies having made an active investment (Statement of Defence, Section 4.1.1). Claimant did not participate in the acquisition of the Assets

5. Colquiri, Sinchi Wayra and/or their affiliates; and
6. financial statements of Claimant reflecting any investment made in the Assets.

investment by a protected investor, (ii) the tainted corporate veil of an empty shell company such as Claimant cannot be the basis to assert jurisdiction over the claims of the concealed true party in interest and, (iii) under international law, Claimant may not bring claims for its indirect investment (Statement of Defence, Sections 4.1, 4.4).

Bolivia confirms that the Requested Documents are not in its possession, custody or control.

Bolivia reasonably believes that the Requested Documents exist and are in the possession, custody or control of Claimant and/or of the Glencore Group, as they relate to

Claimant has also demonstrated that it indirectly holds investments (the Assets) that are expressly protected by the Treaty (NoA, ¶¶ 21, 43-44; SoC, ¶¶ 36-38, 131). In fact, Article 5(2) of the Treaty specifically provides that the expropriated assets of any Bolivian company owned by a foreign company (such as Glencore Bermuda) are to be treated for compensation purposes as if they were owned by the foreign shareholder (SoC, ¶ 132).

Bolivia seeks to argue that different standards to the Treaty should apply (SoD, Sections 4.1, 4.4), and thereby seeks to create additional requirements in the Treaty.

Pursuant to this wrongful interpretation, Bolivia has submitted a wish list of broad categories of document from which it

by Glencore International, but instead was only assigned such Assets, for no apparent consideration. Further, the Requested Documents will show that Claimant did not make any investments in the Assets. Claimant has never been more than an empty shell and, as such, cannot be a protected investor under the Treaty. In all likelihood, Claimant is simply a smokescreen designated to conceal Sánchez de Lozada’s continued interest in the Assets.

The mere fact that Claimant has put forth what it considers to be “the applicable legal test for what constitutes a protected investor under the Treaty” does not make such test ipso facto correct. Nor does it render irrelevant or material to Bolivia’s case the Requested Documents.

In any event, Claimant’s reliance on Article 5(2) of the

Claimant’s operations as a company.

hopes to manufacture an argument for relevance and materiality, despite the clear language of the Treaty.

(b) Bolivia’s Request 11 as a whole is excessively broad and fails to identify a “narrow and specific . . . category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist," as required by Article 3.3(a) of the IBA Rules.

Bolivia request is excessively broad in scope, seeking “Documents reflecting any funds invested by Claimant in the Assets” in a period of over seven years, relating to three different investments. This is clearly not a “narrow and specific” request compliant with Article 3.3(a) of the IBA Rules.

Responding to this request would therefore be excessively burdensome for Claimant as it would have to

Treaty is unavailing. Article 5 concerns “Expropriation,” i.e., a substantive protection under the Treaty. It does not address jurisdictional matters and cannot be validly invoked by Claimant, which is not a protected investor.

Second, Claimant’s assertion that the Request is excessively broad and unspecific is misleading. The Request seeks “Documents reflecting any funds invested by Claimant” in each of the three Assets which are the subject of this dispute, over a period of time corresponding to the ownership of such Assets by Claimant. It bears recalling that is Claimant who brought this dispute to the Tribunal and articulated its claims in the manner it saw fit. It cannot now invoke the subject matter and temporal breadth of its own claims to resist disclosure.

Documents recording operations of management of the Assets by Claimant’s employees, including, but not limited to:

1. organizational charts of Claimant’s top

Statement of Claim, ¶¶ 127-132; Statement of Defence, Section 4.1; R-243.

The Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome for the same reasons underpinning Request 11 above.

Bolivia confirms that the Requested Documents

search through a vast number of documents to locate this information which would be scattered across the files of many individuals at Claimant and its subsidiaries. The time and cost of producing them significantly outweighs their expected probatory value, especially in light of the fact that Bolivia has failed to establish the relevance and materiality of the requested documents.

Claimant objects to this request for the following two reasons:

(a) The Documents requested are irrelevant and immaterial to the outcome of this arbitration and should therefore be excluded

Likewise, Claimant knew (or should reasonably have known) the requirements in order to qualify as a protected investor under the Treaty. It thus knew (or reasonably should have known) that it would have to demonstrate it had actively made an investment in Bolivia. Claimant cannot now seek to elude such demonstration merely under the pretext that searching for the Requested Documents would allegedly be burdensome.

For all these reasons, Bolivia moves to compel production of all the Requested Documents.

Bolivia moves to compel production of all the Requested Documents.

Claimant’s objections to the Request are misplaced, for the following reasons.

First, on Claimant’s own case, the Requested Documents are

2. executives between 2005 and 2012;
3. travel documents to Bolivia of Claimant’s executives; and
4. reports of the projects discussed and/or implemented by such executives for the management and development of the Assets.

are not in its possession, custody or control.

Bolivia reasonably believes that the Requested Documents exist and are in the possession, custody or control of Claimant and/or of the Glencore Group, as they relate to Claimant’s operation as a company.

pursuant to Article 9.2(a) of the IBA Rules.

The issue before the Tribunal in relation to this request is whether Claimant is a qualifying investor that holds a qualifying investment under the Treaty.

As with Request 9 and 11 above, the Claimant has set out the applicable legal test for what constitutes a protected investor under the Treaty (SoC, ¶¶ 127-128) and has offered evidence to show that it meets the Treaty’s requirements (ie, incorporation in the UK or a UK territory) (C-1).

Furthermore, Claimant does not deny that it indirectly holds the Assets protected by the Treaty (NoA, ¶¶ 21, 43-44; SoC, ¶¶ 36-38, 131) and, as mentioned above, Article 5(2) of the Treaty expressly protects against the expropriation of

neither irrelevant to Bolivia’s case nor immaterial to its outcome. As Claimant recognizes, “[t]he issue before the Tribunal in relation to this request is whether Claimant is a qualifying investor that holds a qualifying investment under the Treaty.”

In the present case, as Bolivia has explained at length, the protection of the Treaty extends only to those foreign nationals and companies having made an active investment (Statement of Defence, Section 4.1.1). Claimant did not participate in the acquisition of the Assets by Glencore International, but instead was only assigned such Assets, for no apparent consideration. Further, the Requested Documents will show that Claimant did not make any investments in the Assets. Claimant has never been more than an empty shell and, as such, cannot be a protected investor under the

indirectly held investments (SoC, ¶ 132).

Bolivia seeks to argue (wrongly in Claimant’s view) that a different standard should apply (SoD, Sections 4.1, 4.4), and thereby seeks to create additional requirements that are not provided for in the Treaty. Pursuant to this wrongful interpretation, Bolivia has submitted a wish list of broad categories of documents from which it hopes to manufacture an argument for relevance and materiality, despite the clear language of the Treaty.

(b) Bolivia’s Request 12 as a whole is excessively broad and fails to identify a “narrow and specific category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist," as required by Article 3.3(a) of the IBA Rules.

Treaty. In all likelihood, Claimant is simply a smokescreen designated to conceal Sánchez de Lozada’s continued interest in the Assets.

The mere fact that Claimant has put forth what it considers to be “the applicable legal test for what constitutes a protected investor under the Treaty” does not make such test ipso facto correct. Nor does it render irrelevant or material to Bolivia’s case the Requested Documents.

In any event, Claimant’s reliance on Article 5(2) of the Treaty is unavailing. Article 5 concerns “Expropriation,” i.e., a substantive protection under the Treaty. It does not address jurisdictional matters and cannot be validly invoked by Claimant, which is not a protected investor.

Second, Claimant’s assertion that the Request is excessively broad and unspecific is

Bolivia request is excessively broad in scope, seeking “Documents recording operations of management of the Assets by Claimant’s employees” in a period of over seven years, relating to three different investments. This is clearly not a “narrow and specific” request compliant with Article 3.3(a) of the IBA Rules.

As with Request 11, responding to this request would therefore be excessively burdensome for Claimant as it would have to search through a vast number of documents to locate this information which would be scattered across the files of many individuals at Claimant and its subsidiaries. The time and cost of producing them significantly outweighs their expected probatory value, especially in light of the fact that Bolivia has failed to

misleading. The Request seeks “Documents recording operations of management of the Assets by Claimant’s employees” in each of the three Assets which are the subject of this dispute, over a period of time corresponding to the ownership of such Assets by Claimant. It bears recalling that is Claimant who brought this dispute to the Tribunal and articulated its claims in the manner it saw fit. It cannot now invoke the subject matter and temporal breadth of its own claims to resist disclosure.

Likewise, Claimant knew (or should reasonably have known) the requirements in order to qualify as a protected investor under the Treaty. It thus knew (or reasonably should have known) that it would have to demonstrate it had made an active investment in Bolivia. Claimant cannot now seek to elude such demonstration merely under

Agreements entered into by Sinchi Wayra, Colquiri, and/or their affiliates, on the one hand, and the Cooperativas, on the other hand, for the assignment of areas of the Mine and/or the production of tin or zinc concentrates at the Mine, including, but not limited to:

1. the agreement(s) that followed the Cooperativas’ demand “a la empresa [para] que se les entregue más áreas de trabajo” in 2007 and 2008 (R-

Statement of Claim, ¶87; Statement of Defence, ¶¶ 170-182, R-208; R-209; R-197; R-179; R-198; R-199; R-200; R-201; R-202; R-203; R-204; R-205.

The Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome as they prove that Claimant’s portrayal of the Cooperativas and cooperativistas as “private groups of miners who carry out mining activities for their own benefit in the area” with no relation to Sinchi Wayra’s operation at the Mine is inaccurate (Statement of Defence, ¶ 171).

The Requested Documents further prove

establish the relevance and materiality of the requested documents.

Claimant objects to this request for the following three reasons:

(a) the Requested Documents are irrelevant and immaterial to the outcome of this arbitration and should therefore be excluded pursuant to Article 9.2(a) of the IBA Rules.

Contrary to Bolivia’s allegation, Claimant does not argue that the cooperativistas have “no relation to Sinchi Wayra’s operation at the Mine.” It is particularly telling that

the pretext that searching for the Requested Documents would allegedly be burdensome.

For all these reasons, Bolivia moves to compel production of all the Requested Documents.

Bolivia moves to compel production of the Requested Documents.

First, contrary to Claimant’s assertion, the Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome. While Claimant purports to minimize the role of the conflicts with the Cooperativas in the events that led to the Mine Lease Reversion Decree (Statement of Claim, ¶ 87), it is Bolivia’s submission that such reversion was the result of Colquiri’s mismanagement of its relations with the Cooperativas under both

Request partially granted. Claimants will produce such documents in which Comibol or any government entity had no direct involvement or which are not likely part of Colquiri’s internal files.

2. 208; R-209) and the agreement through which “se tiene el apoyo a la Cooperativa 26 de Febrero para rehabilitar infraestructura independiente de extracción de minerales y la creación de incentivos para concentrar su producción en el zinc” in 2007 (R-208);
3. the agreements that enabled the Cooperativas to be present in the areas shown in the plan of the Colquiri Mine produced as exhibit R-179; and
4. the agreements that authorized the Cooperativa 26 de Febrero to operate at

that Sinchi Wayra’s and Colquiri’s permissive attitude with the presence of Cooperativas at the Mine ignited a social conflict of great magnitude that left the State with no choice but to revert the Mine Lease (Statement of Defence, Section 2.6.3.3).

Bolivia confirms that the Requested Documents are not in its possession, custody or control.

Bolivia reasonably believes that the Requested Documents exist and are in the possession, custody or control of Claimant and/or of the Glencore Group. After conducting a reasonable search through Colquiri’s Documents, Bolivia discovered that the Cooperativas were authorised to operate in

Bolivia makes this assertion by reference to its own Statement of Defence, instead of the Statement of Claim, showing that Claimant has in fact not argued this.

In any event, this is just Bolivia’s attempt to shift the blame to Claimant for Bolivia’s own failures, distracting from the issues relevant to the instant dispute. Bolivia was well-aware of the existence of agreements with the Cooperativas since they were generally signed or approved by Comibol, yet failed to appropriately intervene either before the 30 May 2012 takeover or thereafter. In fact, any agreements between Sinchi Wayra / Colquiri and the Cooperativas do not affect Bolivia’s obligation to protect Claimant’s investment.

Comsur and Sinchi Wayra’s administration (Statement of Defence, sections 2.5.1, 2.6.3, and ¶ 956).

Moreover, the fact that Claimant denies Bolivia’s characterisation of these events underscores the relevance of the Requested Documents.

Second, Claimant’s allegations that category # 13 is not sufficiently narrow and specific are unavailing.

One, the agreements between Colquiri and/or Sinchi Wayra, on the one hand, and the Cooperativas, on the other, are identified by documents from Colquiri (R-197; R-208; R-199).

Two, Claimant contends that Bolivia’s request is not sufficiently narrow and specific because “the referenced language [in R-208 and R-209] does not indicate that the Cooperativas’ demands necessarily resulted

level -285 of the Mine (R-199).

The Requested Documents do not comprise the assignments agreed with COMIBOL and registered as public deeds (R-39; R-92; R-93; R-94; R-210).

areas covering almost the entire area of the Mine (R-179). Bolivia also discovered that, prior to formally assigning areas to the Cooperativa 26 de Febrero as deep as level -325 in 2009 (R-210), Sinchi Wayra and/or Colquiri had authorized the Cooperativas to operate at level -285 in 2008 (R-199 to R-205).

Bolivia did not find any agreement authorizing the Cooperativas (i) to operate at level -285 or (ii) through which, in 2007, Colquiri secured “el apoyo a la Cooperativa 26 de Febrero para rehabilitar infraestructura independiente de extracción de minerales y la creación de incentivos para concentrar su producción en el zinc” (R-208). Claimant (and

(b) Request 13 as a whole is excessively broad and fails to identify a “narrow and specific... category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist," as required by IBA Rule 3.3(a). Bolivia failed to frame its request by reference to any date range, therefore requesting documents in relation to a time period that spans over a decade between Colquiri’s establishment and Colquiri’s expropriation. Such a broad request is unduly burdensome.

With respect to Request 13(i), Bolivia premises the first part of its Request on language from Colquiri’s 2007 and 2008 annual reports. Bolivia generally requests the “agreements that followed the cooperativas’ demand ‘a la empresa [para] que se les

in agreements.” Claimant’s position is misguided. The references to potential agreements in R-208 and R-209 are sufficient to establish the putative existence of agreements between Colquiri and the Cooperativas. If those agreements were not concluded, Claimant could simply assert that such agreements do not exist. Claimant, however, does not assert that the Requested Documents do not exist. It must, therefore, produce them. Three, it is a non sequitur to assert that Bolivia would not be entitled to request Documents because such documents are related to an exhibit it has marshalled into the record (R-197). In no way do the applicable procedural rules set forth such a requirement.

To the contrary, Bolivia’s request meets the standards of specificity and relevance required by the applicable

the Glencore Group) are in a better position to produce the Requested Documents.

entregue más áreas de trabajo’ in 2007 and 2008 (R-208; R-209).” However, the referenced language does not indicate that the Cooperativas’ demands necessarily resulted in agreements. The relevant paragraph goes on to state that “[l]as acciones implementadas permitieron resolver los conflictos que se presentaron y prevenir el escalonamiento de los mismos.” It follows that Bolivia’s request is clearly not based on a “narrow and specific . . . category of documents that are reasonably believed to exist.” This request instead amounts to a fishing expedition by Bolivia in an attempt to construct a case on the basis of documents that it hopes to find in Claimant’s files.

With respect to Request 13(ii), Bolivia has asked for “the agreements that enabled

procedural rules. If Claimant is in possession, custody or control of the agreements reflected in the map exhibited as R-197, it must accordingly produce them.

Moreover, Claimant does not contend that such documents would not be in its possession, custody or control.

Third, as Bolivia specified in its original request, the Requested Documents do not comprise the assignments agreed with COMIBOL and registered as public deeds (R-39; R-92; R-93; R-94; R-210). The Requested Documents are those agreements concluded without COMIBOL’s intervention. Claimant itself admits the existence of “agreements that are not likely to be in Bolivia’s possession”.

Fourth, it is true that Colquiri lost control of the Mine on 19 June 2012. It is, however, undisputed, that Bolivia did

the Cooperativas to be present in the areas shown in the plan of the Colquiri Mine produced as exhibit R-179.” Claimant notes that Bolivia has likely referred to exhibit R-179 in error, as the relevant document would appear to be exhibit R-197. Exhibit R-197 is a document that has been introduced by Bolivia. It is Bolivia’s responsibility to substantiate any representations purportedly made through exhibits it has itself chosen to introduce.

(c) More importantly, Request 13 as a whole covers documents that are, or would reasonably be, in Bolivia’s possession, custody or control, contrary to the requirements of Article 3.3(c) of the IBA Rules.

First, the agreements with the Cooperativas for the

not seize all the Documents pertaining to the Mine operation that were in Claimant’s possession custody or control.

In particular, it is remarkable that Claimant does not raise this objection in relation to all of Bolivia’s requests that relate to the operation and/or social conflicts at the Colquiri Mine (see requests Nos. 16 and 17 below).

While Bolivia has conducted reasonable searches through Colquiri’s files, it has been unable to locate the Requested Documents. Claimant must therefore produce such Documents.

assignment of areas of the Mine were generally entered into under the supervision and with the express approval of Comibol (Bolivia’s mining State entity and lessor of the Colquiri Mine) and / or the Ministry of Mines. In fact, Bolivia itself, through Comibol and / or the Ministry of Mines, was often a signatory or a party to such agreements with the Cooperativas (see, e.g., SoD, ¶ 173; R-93; R-94). Moreover, Bolivia’s own statements and evidence show that Comibol communicated regularly with both Sinchi Wayra / Colquiri and the Cooperativas, indicating that it was aware and kept informed of the situation and relevant agreements (see, e.g., SoD, ¶ 179; R-196; R-206; R-207).

Second, with respect to agreements signed by

Colquiri, Bolivia would have access to such documents by reason of having nationalized the Colquiri Mine. Bolivia has in fact produced several documents from Colquiri’s internal files, showing that it indeed does have access to such information (see, e.g., SoD, ¶¶ 174-75; R-194; R-195; R-198; R-199; R-200; R-201; R-202; R-203; R-204; R-205; R-208; R-209; R-212). Furthermore, Bolivia even recognized that it has “search[ed] through Colquiri’s Documents.” Claimant, on the other hand, lost control of the Mine on 30 May 2012.

The documents requested by Bolivia are therefore plainly within its possession, custody and control.

***

If anything, Request 13 should be limited to the two categories of documents

Bolivia specifically states it was not able to find after searching Colquiri’s internal files, namely (i) “any agreement authorizing the Cooperativas to operate at level -285” between 2004 and 2012 and (ii) “any agreement through which, in 2007, Colquiri secured ‘el apoyo a la Cooperativa 26 de Febrero para rehabilitar infraestructura independiente de extracción de minerales y la creación de incentivos para concentrar su producción en el zinc’ (R-208).”

In a good faith effort to collaborate and without prejudice to the above, Claimant has conducted a reasonable search of documents within its possession and hereby voluntarily produces documents responsive to these two categories, as well as agreements that are not likely to be in Bolivia’s

Documents reflecting the “inversiones en proyectos de responsabilidad social” (Lazcano, ¶ 41) made by Colquiri, Sinchi Wayra and/or their affiliates during the time they were in control of the Mine, including, but not limited to:

1. Documents discussing “la construcción de viviendas para las familias de los trabajadores que vivían en las comunidades aledañas de la Mina de Colquiri” (Lazcano, ¶ 41), including:

Lazcano, ¶¶ 41-45; C-97; Moreira, ¶ 22; Statement of Defence, ¶ 283; Section 2.6.3.

The Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome as they prove that Colquiri and Sinchi Wayra, under the Glencore Group’s control, poorly managed social relations at Colquiri. Such mismanagement led to increasing tensions within the local communities and, in particular, between the Cooperativas and the workers of the Mine (Statement of Defence, Section 2.6.3).

The Requested Documents further prove that, contrary to

possession by reason of either (i) Comibol’s and / or the government’s direct involvement; or (ii) the fact that they would be a part of Colquiri’s internal files.

Claimant objects to this request because it relates to documents which would be in Bolivia’s possession, custody, or control.

First, this request pertains to documents that were kept in Colquiri and over which Bolivia would have access by reason of having expropriated the Mine.

Second, the Requested Documents largely involve arrangements with local authorities, which would also be within Bolivia’s custody, possession or control.

Finally, Claimant has already produced relevant and supportive documents in its possession with its

Bolivia moves to compel production of the Requested Documents.

In limine, Claimant does not dispute the relevance or specificity of Bolivia’s request.

That said, Bolivia confirms that the Requested Documents are not in its possession, custody or control.

First, it is true that Colquiri lost control of the Mine in 19 June 2012. It is, however, undisputed, that Bolivia did not seize all the Documents pertaining to the Mine operation that were in Claimant’s possession custody or control.

In particular, it is remarkable that Claimant does not raise

1. the number of houses built; and
2. the amounts invested by the Glencore Group, Sinchi Wayra and/or Colquiri for such purpose.

2. Documents reflecting the investments for “la prestación de servicios públicos tales como el suministro de agua potable y el tratamiento de efluentes cloacales, la construcción y mantenimiento vial, y telefonía celular a las comunidades circundantes” (Lazcano, ¶ 42);

Claimant’s assertion, Glencore Bermuda did not invest in a diverse range of social initiatives (Statement of Defence, ¶ 283).

The Requested Documents further confirm that Colquiri’s and Sinchi Wayra’s mismanagement of social relations at the Mine encourage the Cooperativas to take over the Mine (first, on or around 1 April 2012 and second, on or around 30 may 2012) (Statement of Defence, ¶¶ 187-194). The unprecedented violence at the Mine in mid-2012 fostered by Sinchi Wayra left the State with no choice but to revert the Mine Lease (Statement of Defence, Section 2.6.3.3).

Bolivia confirms that the Requested Documents

Statement of Claim (C-97; C-160).

***

Notwithstanding and without prejudice to the above, in the spirit of cooperation, Claimant hereby voluntarily produces the responsive documents from the lifetime of Claimant’s investment in the Colquiri Lease that it was able to locate following a reasonable search of documents within its possession.

this objection in relation to all of Bolivia’s requests that relate to the operation and/or social conflicts at the Colquiri Mine (see requests Nos. 16 and 17 below).

While Bolivia has conducted reasonable searches through Colquiri’s files, it has been unable to locate the Requested Documents. Claimant must therefore produce such Documents.

Second, Claimant fails to prove that the Requested Documents are in possession, custody or control of “local authorities”. Rather, the evidence in the record suggest that such Documents relate to agreements concluded with: “comunidades circundantes” of the Mine or “organizaciones civiles y sindicales del municipio de Colquiri” (Lazcano, ¶ 42) (and not the local authorities under the State’s control).

3. Documents reflecting the investments made in order to “ayudar al desarrollo económico y cultural de las comunidades, [...] con sistemas de riego, dotación de insumos y equipos agropecuarios, construcción de escuelas y campos deportivos, equipamiento escolar y apoyo a actividades culturales y deportivas” (Lazcano, ¶ 42);
4. the “plan quinquenal” proposed by Colquiri to the local communities in order to “crear fuentes de trabajo para la población del Cantón Colquiri” (C-97, p. 14).
5. the “convenio suscrito entre las autoridades

are not in its possession, custody or control.

Bolivia reasonably believes that the Requested Documents exist and are in the possession, custody or control of Claimant and/or of the Glencore Group, as they relate to projects identified by Mr Lazcano (Claimant’s witness in these proceedings) and in exhibit C-97.

Third, and, in any event, the Requested Documents pertain to the amounts invested by Colquiri in social responsibility projects and not only to agreements with the local communities pursuant to which those expenditures were made. Those Documents are not in Bolivia’s possession, custody or control. The fact that Mr Lazcano, a witness for Claimant, testifies about these investments confirms these Documents are within Claimant’s control.

6. y organizaciones civiles y sindicales del municipio de Colquiri con la Universidad Nacional Siglo XX” (Lazcano, ¶ 42);
7. Documents reflecting the the commitments to “contratar locales para mano de obra no calificada, y a preferir a los comunitarios locales para la mano de obra especializada o calificada” (Lazcano, ¶ 43); and
8. Documents reflecting the investments made in “proyectos para la construcción de caminos, incluyendo la realización de la ingeniería y suministro de equipos y materiales del proyecto para asfaltar la vía que conduce de Colquiri a Caracollo, una población

principal a medio camino de Cochabamba” (Lazcano, ¶ 43).

Documents sent, received, or reviewed by Colquiri and/or Sinchi Wayra discussing the tensions and conflicts between the Cooperativas and the workers of the Mine, including, but not limited to:

1. the “amenazas [...], intervenciones y presiones de parte de las dos cooperativas que trabajan, una en la mina y la otra en las colas antiguas” between 1 January and 30 November 2005 (R-194);
2. the “amenazas [...], intervenciones y presiones de parte de las dos cooperativas que trabajan, una en la mina y la otra en

Statement of Claim, ¶¶ 87-98; Eskdale, ¶¶ 74-80; Statement of Defence, Sections 2.6.3.1 and 2.6.3.2; Cachi, ¶¶ 12-31; Mamani, ¶¶ 18-27; R-194; R-195; R-208; R-209; C-30.

The Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome.

In its Statement of Defence, Bolivia explained that Glencore International inherited the problems created by Comsur’s mismanagement of the social conflicts at Colquiri. In addition, after Glencore International acquired the Assets from Sánchez de Lozada, the social conflicts at the Mine worsened and the ambitions of the Cooperativas to take over the Mine gradually increased (Statement of Defence, Section 2.6.3.1).

Claimant objects to this request for the following three reasons:

(a) the Documents requested are irrelevant and immaterial to the outcome of this arbitration and should therefore be excluded pursuant to Article 9.2(a) of the IBA Rules.

The question before the Tribunal is whether Bolivia took all reasonable and appropriate measures to protect Claimant’s investment in the Colquiri Lease when, as Bolivia itself recognizes, the Cooperativas’ invasion resulted in “unprecedented violence at the Mine.” Specific instances of tension or conflict in the several

Bolivia moves to compel production of the Requested Documents.

First, contrary to Claimant’s assertion, the Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome. While Claimant purports to minimize the role of the conflicts with the Cooperativas in the events that led to the Mine Lease Reversion Decree (Statement of Claim, ¶ 87), it is Bolivia’s submission that such reversion was the result of Colquiri’s mismanagement of its relations with the Cooperativas under both Comsur and Sinchi Wayra’s administration (i.e. from 2001 to 2012) (Statement of Defence, sections 2.5.1, 2.6.3, and ¶ 956). Moreover, the fact that Claimant denies

Request partially granted. Claimants will produce such documents in which Comibol or any government entity had no direct involvement or are not likely part of Colquiri’s internal files.

3. las colas antiguas” between 1 December 2005 and 27 November 2006 (R-195);
4. the “conflictos que se presentaron” between the workers of the Mine and the Cooperativas between 28 November 2006 and 18 December 2007 (R-208);
5. the “conflictos que se presentaron” involving the Cooperativas and the workers of the Mine between 19 December 2007 and 22 January 2009 (R-209);
6. the “conflictos entre el personal de Sinchi Wayra y los cooperativistas” between 23 January 2009 and 31

The Requested Documents prove that neither Sinchi Wayra nor Colquiri made significant efforts to solve the social tensions at the Mine. On the contrary, under Sinchi Wayra’s administration, the Cooperativas gained access to new areas of the Mine and, “[p]ara finales de 2011, los cooperativistas teníamos prácticamente el control de la Mina” (Cachi, ¶ 31) (See Statement of Defence, ¶¶ 170-186).

The Requested Documents further confirm that Colquiri’s and Sinchi Wayra’s mismanagement of social relations at the Mine encouraged the Cooperativas to take over the Mine (first, on or around 1 April 2012 and second, on or around 30 may 2012) (Statement

years prior to such “unprecedented” violence are not material to this determination.

(b) Request 15 as a whole is excessively broad and fails to identify a “narrow and specific ... category of Documents that are reasonably believed to exist," as required by Article 3.3(a) of the IBA Rules. Bolivia failed to frame its Request by reference to any date range, therefore requesting documents in relation to a time period that spans over a decade between Colquiri’s establishment and Colquiri’s expropriation. Such a broad request is unduly burdensome for Claimant, as Bolivia also requests all documents “sent, received or reviewed” by an unspecified number of employees working for “Colquiri and/or Sinchi

Bolivia’s characterisation of these events underscores the relevance of the Requested Documents.

Second, Claimant’s allegations that category # 15 is not sufficiently narrow and specific are unavailing.

One, every sub-category of Requested Documents pertains to a 12-month or shorter period of time.

Two, the Requested Documents relate to:

• events narrowly identified in Colquiri’s annual reports (R-194; R-195; R-208; R-209);
• specific events described by Mr Eksdale (¶¶ 74 and 80), Claimant’s own witness.
• specific events described by Mr Cachi (¶ 30) and Mr Mamani (¶ 20) over specific periods of time; and

6. December 2009 (Mamani, ¶ 20);
7. the “enfrentamiento con el personal de seguridad y los ingenieros de la empresa” in early 2011 (Cachi, ¶ 30);
8. the “ataques a nuestros compañeros [i.. the workers of the Mine]” by the members of the Cooperativas during 2011 (Mamani, ¶ 20);
9. the incident in 2011 in which “un conductor de una volqueta quiso atropellar a los cooperativistas que estaban saliendo de la Mina por la rampa blanca” and “[l]os cooperativistas agarraron al operador y lo querían dinamitar” (Cachi, ¶ 30);

of Defence, ¶¶ 187-194). The unprecedented violence at the Mine in mid-2012 created by Sinchi Wayra left the State with no choice but to revert the Mine Lease (Statement of Defence, Section 2.6.3.3).

Bolivia confirms that the Requested Documents are not in its possession, custody or control.

Bolivia reasonably believes that the Requested Documents exist and are in the possession, custody or control of Claimant and/or of the Glencore Group. In fact, Colquiri often reported in its annual reports about the “conflictos” involving the Cooperativas and the workers of the Mine (R-208; R-209). Colquiri also reported on the “amenazas [...],

Wayra,” during a time period that spans over a decade. A search for such documents would be costly, inefficient and would not materially aid the Tribunal in resolving the matters in dispute.

Notably, Bolivia goes so far as to request documents in support of statements made by its own witnesses (see Request 15(v) to 15(viii)). Clearly, it cannot be Claimant’s burden to support Bolivia’s own assertions. Bolivia’s request therefore amounts to a fishing expedition, asking for a broad swathe of documents in the hopes of creating a case where it has none.

(c) Request 15 as a whole covers documents that are, or would reasonably be, in Bolivia’s possession, custody or control, contrary

• events described in correspondence sent by Colquiri at the time Sinchi Wayra operated the Mine (C-30).

Therefore, it would not be burdensome for Claimant to search for and produce the Requested Documents.

Third, contrary to Claimant’s assertion, the Requested Documents are not in Bolivia’s possession, custody or control.

One, Bolivia confirms that this request does not cover correspondence between Bolivia and the Cooperativas. Nor does this request cover correspondence between Claimant and/or its affiliates and Bolivia.

Two, it is true that Colquiri lost control of the Mine in 19 June 2012. It is, however, undisputed, that Bolivia did not seize all the Documents pertaining to the Mine operation that were in

10. the “perturbaciones al desenvolvimiento de la operación minera” by the Cooperativas during the first three months of 2012 (C-30);
11. the events in which “a group of about one hundred people [i.e., cooperativistas] violently and unlawfully entered the Colquiri Mine” on or around 1 April 2012 (Eskdale, ¶ 74; C-30); and
12. the events in which, “in the early hours of 30 May 2012, at around 4:30 am, the Colquiri Mine was violently taken over by more than one thousand members of a local cooperative known as Cooperativa 26 de

intervenciones y presiones de parte de las dos cooperativas que trabajan, una en la mina y la otra en las colas antiguas” (R-194; R-195) to which its workers were subjected. In addition, in April 2012, Colquiri confirmed to COMIBOL that the social tensions at the Mine “han sido atendidas en gran medida y hasta el momento por nuestra empresa” (C-30). Claimant or its affiliates must be in a position to produce the Documents related to those incidents.

to the requirements of Article 3.3(c) of the IBA Rules.

First, Comibol (Bolivia’s mining State entity and lessor of the Colquiri Mine) and / or the Ministry of Mines were generally kept apprised of the Cooperativas’ activities within the Mine. Bolivia’s own statements and evidence show that Comibol communicated regularly with both Sinchi Wayra / Colquiri and the Cooperativas (see, e.g., SoD, ¶ 179; R-196; R-206; R-207).

Second, Bolivia would have access to the Requested Documents by reason of having expropriated the Colquiri Mine. Bolivia has in fact produced several documents from Colquiri’s internal files, showing that it indeed does have access to such information (see, e.g.,

Claimant’s possession, custody or control.

In particular, it is remarkable that Claimant does not raise this objection in relation to all of Bolivia’s requests that relate to the operation and/or social conflicts at the Colquiri Mine (see Requests 16 and 17 below).

While Bolivia has conducted reasonable searches through Colquiri’s files, it has been unable to locate the Requested Documents. Claimant must therefore produce such Documents.

Febrero” (Eskdale, ¶ 80).

SoD, ¶¶ 174-75; R-194; R-195; R-198; R-199; R-200; R-201; R-202; R-203; R-204; R-205; R-208; R-209; R-212). Furthermore, in its Request 13 Bolivia even recognized that it has “search[ed] through Colquiri’s Documents.” Claimant, on the other hand, lost control of the Mine on 30 May 2012.

***

Notwithstanding and without prejudice to the above, in the spirit of cooperation, Claimant has conducted a reasonable search of documents within its possession and hereby voluntarily produces responsive documents from the lifetime of Claimant’s investment in the Colquiri Lease that are not likely to be in Bolivia’s possession by reason of either (i) Comibol’s and / or the government’s direct

Documents describing the rationale for, discussing and/or implementing Sinchi Wayra’s, Colquiri’s and/or any or their affiliates’ decision to “ced[e] the San Antonio to the mining cooperatives” and to “undertak[e] to create 200 additional jobs and to provide the Cooperativa 26 de febrero with the necessary technical and financial support to exploit the San Antonio vein” (Eskdale, ¶ 88), including, but not limited to:

1. Documents discussing the “several areas” that Colquiri considered to cede to the Cooperativas prior to offering the San Antonio vein

Statement of Claim, ¶¶ 101-102; Eskdale, ¶ 88; Statement of Defence, ¶¶ 199-200; Cachi, ¶ 35; Mamani, ¶ 33; C-120.

The Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome, as they show that the Government worked closely with Glencore and the unions at Colquiri in order to prepare a proposal that could satisfy all of the parties involved in the conflict that arose after 30 May 2012 (Statement of Defence, ¶ 198).

The Requested Documents are also relevant to prove that Claimant’s assertion that the Cooperativas did not accept the San Antonio Vein “because the government had failed to respond to their requests in a timely manner”

involvement; or (ii) the fact that they would be a part of Colquiri’s internal files.

Claimant objects to this request because it relates to documents that would be in Bolivia’s possession, custody, or control, contrary to the requirements of Article 3.3(c) of the IBA Rules.

Bolivia admittedly is seeking documents that would “show that the Government worked closely with Glencore and the unions at Colquiri in order to prepare a proposal that could satisfy all of the parties involved in the conflict that arose after 30 May 2012.” By definition, since any such documents would relate to the Government’s actions, they would be within Bolivia’s possession, custody or control.

Bolivia moves to compel production of the Requested Documents.

First, Claimant does not allege that Bolivia’s request lacks specificity. Neither does Claimant dispute the relevance and materiality of Bolivia’s request. Nor could Claimant dispute it, as the Requested Documents are relevant to assess Claimant’s (and its affiliates’) views on the conduct and actions undertaken by the State in order to solve the social crisis that erupted at Colquiri in mid-2012.

Second, Claimant’s assertion that the Requested Documents are in Bolivia’s possession, custody or control is incorrect. Bolivia did not request documents reflecting the

Request denied on grounds of lack or relevance and specificity.

2. (Statement of Claim, ¶ 101); and
3. Documents sent, received, or reviewed by Colquiri, Sinchi Wayra or their affiliates during the period they “were vigorously working to find a resolution that would have de-escalated the situation” (Eskdale, ¶ 87); and
4. Documents discussing the “several proposals” advanced by the Sinchi Wayra representatives to the Cooperativas (Eskdale, ¶ 87).

(Statement of Claim, ¶ 102) is incorrect.

Bolivia confirms that the Requested Documents are not in its possession, custody or control.

Bolivia reasonably believes that the Requested Documents exist and are in the possession, custody or control of Claimant and/or of the Glencore Group. It is, in fact, undisputed that, “[a]fter considering several areas, Colquiri accepted ceding the San Antonio vein to the cooperative” and it “also undertook to create 200 additional jobs and to provide the Cooperativa 26 de Febrero with financing, as well as with the necessary technical support to exploit the San Antonio vein”

Bolivia also argues that the requested documents are “relevant to prove that Claimant’s assertion that the Cooperativas did not accept the San Antonio Vein ‘because the government had failed to respond to their requests in a timely manner’ (Statement of Claim, ¶ 102) is incorrect.” However, any such documentation would be squarely within Bolivia’s possession, custody, or control.

Specifically, in its Statement of Defence Bolivia explains that “the Government first suggested to hand over the San Antonio vein to the Cooperativa 26 de Febrero” during a meeting held between Comibol, officers from the Ministries of Mines and Labour and leaders of the Cooperativa 26 de Febrero (SoD, ¶ 199). It is undisputed that neither Claimant nor any of its

Government’s actions prior to Sinchi Wayra’s proposal to cede the San Antonio vein to the Cooperativa 26 de Febrero (as Claimant wrongly implies). Rather, Bolivia requested Documents describing the rationale for, discussing and/or implementing Sinchi Wayra’s, Colquiri’s and/or any or their affiliates’ decision to “ced[e] the San Antonio vein to the mining cooperatives” and to “undertak[e] to create 200 additional jobs and to provide the Cooperativa 26 de febrero with the necessary technical and financial support to exploit the San Antonio vein” (Eskdale, ¶ 88). The Requested documents are, inter alia, internal correspondence and Documents reflecting internal discussions within Sinchi Wayra, Colquiri and/or any or their affiliates. Bolivia is not in possession, custody or control of such Documents.

(Statement of Claim, ¶ 101).

affiliates attended this meeting. Bolivia then explains that it relayed Colquiri’s specific proposals to the cooperativa and summoned its leaders for another meeting in which, again, Colquiri did not participate (SoD, ¶ 200; R-216). Documentation relating to why the Cooperativas did not accept the San Antonio proposal would therefore be within Bolivia’s possession, custody or control, since it was Bolivia that met with the Cooperativas’ leaders to present and discuss such proposal.

Instead, Claimant has already included in the record relevant documentation showing the efforts it engaged in to find a solution to the conflict and the proposals it put forth (see C-119; C-120).

Documents describing the rationale for, discussing and/or implementing Sinchi Wayra’s, Colquiri’s and/or any or their affiliates’ decision to enter into the Rosario Agreement (C-35), including, but not limited to:

1. Documents discussing any potential contradiction and/or difficulty to implement the Rosario Agreement due to other agreements concluded by the Government with the Cooperativas, the FSTMB, the STMC, or the workers of the Mine;
2. Documents discussing the outcome (or potential outcome) of the Government’s

Statement of Claim, ¶ 105; Eskdale, ¶¶ 92-93; Statement of Defence, ¶¶ 213-214; Cachi, ¶¶ 41-42; Mamani, ¶ 41; C-35.

The Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome.

As Bolivia explained in its Statement of Defence, on 7 June 2012, a section of the Cooperativas, the civil society and the workers of the Mine convened a Gran Cabildo in the village of Colquiri. That Cabildo adopted a resolution endorsing the Government’s proposal to revert the Mine Lease (R-17; R-223; Statement of Defence, ¶¶ 210-211).

The Requested Documents prove that Sinchi Wayra, Colquiri, and/or their affiliates— who were aware of the efforts to settle the dispute undertaken by the Government, and of the probable outcome of the Gran Cabildo—

Claimant objects to this request because the Documents requested are irrelevant and immaterial to the outcome of this arbitration and should therefore be excluded pursuant to Article 9.2(a) of the IBA Rules.

The pertinent questions before the Tribunal are whether Bolivia took all reasonable and appropriate measures to protect Claimant’s investment in the Colquiri Lease and whether Bolivia unlawfully expropriated Claimant’s investment.

Bolivia itself admits that it had already decided to “revert” the Colquiri Lease by the time the Gran Cabildo took place. Claimant’s decision to enter into the Rosario Agreement—which was executed by the government itself after the Gran

Bolivia moves to compel production of the Requested Documents.

In limine, Claimant does not dispute the specificity of Bolivia’s request. Nor does Claimant contend that the Requested Documents are in Bolivia’s possession, custody or control.

That said, and contrary to Claimant’s assertion, the Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome. While Claimant purports to minimize the role of the conflicts with the Cooperativas in the events that led to the Mine Lease Reversion Decree (Statement of Claim, ¶ 87), it is Bolivia’s submission that such reversion was the result of Colquiri’s mismanagement of its relations with the Cooperativas under both Comsur and Sinchi Wayra’s administration (Statement of

Request denied on grounds of lack of relevance.

3. negotiation with the Cooperativas, the FSTMB, the STMC and the workers of the Mine on or around the date the Rosario Agreement was executed (7 June 2012);
4. Documents discussing the effect of the Rosario Agreement on the public order at Colquiri; and
5. Documents discussing the effect of the Rosario Agreement on the tensions between the workers of the Mine and the Cooperativas.

decided to capitalize on the divisions among the Cooperativas and to engage in the Rosario Agreement, a contradictory agreement. In order to achieve this goal, Sinchi Wayra, Colquiri, and/or their affiliates took advantage of the fact that the Federación Nacional de Cooperativas Mineras (FENCOMIN) actively opposed the reversion, and convened a meeting in La Paz with the faction of the Cooperativa 26 de Febrero members that opposed the reversion (Statement of Defence, ¶ 212).

The Requested Documents further prove that, by executing the Rosario Agreement, Sinchi Wayra, Colquiri and their affiliates created significant unrest

Cabildo—has no bearing on whether Bolivia acted lawfully when it decided to “revert” the Colquiri Lease following the invasion of the Mine by the cooperativistas.

Defence, sections 2.5.1, 2.6.3, and ¶ 956).

Put differently, in order to assess whether “Bolivia took all reasonable and appropriate measures” in relation to the Colquiri Mine Lease, the Tribunal will also have to assess the relations between Colquiri, Sinchi Wayra and the Cooperativas and their incidence in the events that led to the Mine Lease Reversion Decree. The Requested Documents are relevant to this dispute and material to its outcome as they confirm that the violence at Colquiri was caused by Claimant’s and its affiliate’s actions (in particular, Sinchi Wayra’s decision to enter into the Rosario Agreement), rather than Bolivia’s.

Moreover, the fact that Claimants denies Bolivia’s characterisation of these events underscores the

among the mining workers. This unrest lead to unprecedented levels of violence at Colquiri and left the State with no choice but to revert the Mine Lease (Statement of Defence, ¶¶ 212-217).

Bolivia confirms that the Requested Documents are not in its possession, custody, or control.

Bolivia reasonably believes that the Requested Documents exist and are in the possession, custody or control of Claimant and/or of the Glencore Group. As Mr Eskdale confirms, Colquiri decided to offer the Rosario vein to a fraction of the Cooperativas on 7 June 2012, despite being aware that, on 6 June 2012, the Government had proposed to the workers of the Mine to

relevance of the Requested Documents.

explore the possibility of reverting the Mine Lease (Eskdale, ¶ 91).