This HTML version is machine-generated. Always consult the original document.Original document (PDF), opens in new tab

PRIVILEGED

COMPASS
LEXECON

Omega Engineering LLC and Mr. Oscar Rivera v.
Republic of Panama

Pablo D. López Zadicoff
Direct Presentation

February 28, 2020

[Page 2]

CONTENTS

  1. Valuation Purpose
  2. Claimants’ Losses on New Contracts
  3. Claimants’ Losses on Existing Contracts
  4. Conclusions

[Page 3]

I. Valuation Purpose

[Page 4]

Full Compensation Requires Valuing all Investments

Claimants' Investments in Panama:
Omega Consortium

Omega Panama

  • Local Organization
  • Operational ability

Intangible assets
Through Omega US

  • Experience & Reputation
  • Financial Standing
  • Business Relations

Existing Contracts

  • Won 10 contracts for US$ 141 MM (amended to US$ 159 MM)
  • 8 ongoing projects

New Contracts

  • Omega Consortium's ability to continue as Going concern

Source: Letter of Instructions to Compass Lexecon (C-0228); CL First Report, Section IV and Table VI

[Page 5]

Valuation Standard to Compute Losses

How do we value?

Fair Market Value Standard

“[T]he price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which property would change hands between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at arms length in an open and unrestricted market, when neither is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts" (see American Society of Appraisers, C-0392, pp. 4-5)

Compass Lexecon

Dr. Flores

Hypothetical transaction

Specific Buyer

Willing Buyer and Willing Seller

Only Willing Buyer

Source: CL First Report, Section III.1; Dr. Flores’ Second Report, ¶¶ 39-43; CL Second Report, ¶ 89

[Page 6]

II. Losses on New Contracts

[Page 7]

New Contracts: Assumptions and Valuation Results

Compass Lexecon Dr. Flores Standalone impact of each of Dr. Flores' assumptions*
Losses on New Contracts US$ 42.5 million US$ 1.1 million
1. Valuation Horizon Cash Flows beyond 2019 Cash Flows until 2019 - US$ 31 MM
2. Major Cash Flows Assumptions Bid Target Market ~US$ 251 MM/year
Success Rate: 25%
Gross Margin: 13%
Bid Target Market ~US$ 159 MM/year
Success Rate: 9.4%
Gross Margin: 10.7%
- US$ 35 MM
3. Cost of Equity 11.65% 20.84% - US$ 23 MM
4. Other Assumptions Projects Length: 18
Adjusted G&A
Project Length: 30
Non-Adjusted G&A
- US$ 5 MM

Note: [*] The combined impact of all Dr. Flores' assumptions is US$ 41.4 million, and not the sum of each standalone impact
Source: CL Second Report, ¶¶ 6, 95; Dr. Flores Second Report, Figure 14; slide 25 (Target Market); slide 29 (standalone impact)

[Page 8]

The value of Omega Consortium extends beyond 2019

Omega Consortium Intangibles are Valuable and not Easily Replicable

Figure 4
A Willing Buyer's View Assuming No Cash Flows for Five Years59

[CHART]

Y-Axis: US$ Millions (from 1 to 7)

X-Axis: 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030

Legend:

  • Additional Cash Flow
  • Omega Panama
  • New Company

Dr. Flores’ 5-year “ramp-up period” is:

  1. Arbitrary
  2. Inconsistent with Willing Seller theory
  3. Inconsistent with Start-up risks

Source: Compass Lexecon based on Dr. Flores Second Report, Figure 4; CL Second Report, ¶¶ 88-92

[Page 9]

Omega Consortium was Profitable before 2014

Concept Total
1. Awarded Public Sector Contracts US$ 159 MM
2. Public Sector Bids Won 10 out of 42
3. Achieved Maximum Score Financial Capacity 32 out of 35
4. Achieved Maximum Score Experience 26 out of 35
5. Total Net Income in Awarded Projects ~US$ 10 MM

Source: [1] CL First Report, Table VI; [2] CL First Report, ¶ 60; [3] CL Second Report, Table III; [4] CL Second Report, Table IV; [5] slide 24 (Total Net Income in Awarded Projects)

[Page 10]

2015-16 Target Market more than doubled our estimate

Our Target Market is limited to public works. Figures expressed in US$ million

[CHART]

Y-Axis: Market Size for the Omega Consortium (US$ million) (from 0 to 800)

X-Axis: 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016

Data Points (approximate values from bars):

Legend:

Source: slide 25 and slide 26

[Page 11]

A 25% Success Rate is adequate

Bidding participation follows a strategic behavior

Omegas' Bid History in Panama

[CHART]

Data Points (Number of Bids):

Legend: Number of Bids

Text Box: Public Sector Success Rate = 23.8% (10/42) (21.4% if measured by value)

Success Rate (# Bids) 0% 29%
(6 of 21)
100%
(3 of 3)
25%
(1 of 4)
0%
Awarded contracts value (US$ MM)[+] 0 52 87 3 17

[+] Awarded value includes new contracts and change orders on existing contracts
Source: CL First Report, Table VI; McKinnon First Report, Annex 1; Omega Engineering, Inc. Financial Statements and Supplementary Information as of 31 December 2013 and 2012 and Independent Auditors' Report, p. 18 (C-0136)

[Page 12]

A 13% Profitability is reasonable

Consistent with available evidence

1. McKinnon Analysis

Expected profitability when bidding (w/o change orders): 21%
Expected profitability at completion: 13.2%

2. Sectoral evidence

Evidence of the construction sector reports gross margins of 16%-20% for construction companies (Damodaran)

3. Tocumen Airport

The Omega Consortium had already achieved a 15% profitability in “Aeropuerto Tocumen” project

Source: (1) McKinnon First Report, Annex 3 and Annex 2, Table 1 (see also CL First Report, Table VIII); (2) CL Second Report, ¶ 122; (3) slide 28 (Tocumen Airport profitability)

[Page 13]

A 11.65% Cost of Equity is reasonable

Panama is recognized as having one of the lowest financing costs

[CHART]

Title: Reduction due to Panama's Country Risk

Y-Axis: Losses on New Contracts (US$ million) (from 0 to 60)

Data Points (Bars):

Text Box:

Hausmann (C-0390, p.29)
"The cost of credit in Panama not only is among the lowest in the region, but also displays a decreasing trend over the previous 15 years."

Source: CL First Report, Appendix B; CL Second Report, Appendix B; slide 30 (impact)

[Page 14]

III. Losses on Existing Contracts

[Page 15]

Existing Contracts: Assumptions and Valuation Results

Compass Lexecon Dr. Flores Standalone impact of each of Dr. Flores' assumptions*
Losses on Existing Contracts US$ 8.69 million US$ 3.77 million
Economic Issues
Time Value & Risks of Cash Flows Consistent treatment of financial costs (single rate) Inconsistent treatment of financial costs (arbitrary multiple rates) - US$ 1.6 MM
Legal/Factual Issues
Change Orders All Included Challenges validity of some change orders - US$ 3.2 MM

Notes: There is a subsidiary criticism regarding the use of Addenda N°4 for MINSA CAPSI Kuna Yala project
[*] The combined impact of all Dr. Flores' assumptions is US$ 4.92 million, and not the sum of each standalone impact
Source: CL Second Report, Table II; Dr. Flores' Second Report, Figure 16; slide 31 (standalone impact)

[Page 16]

Cash Flows have to be Treated Consistently

Dr. Flores' treatment of cash flows from Existing Contracts is asymmetric

[FLOW CHART]

Past Period Date of Valuation Future Period

1. Unpaid Progress Billings

Updated by Financial Cost

No Financial Cost (Dr. Flores)

Discounted by Financial Cost

2. Expected Profits

Discounted by Financial Cost

Asymmetric Treatment (Dr. Flores)

3. Deduction of Net Advance Payments from future invoices

Source: Compass Lexecon based on CL Second Report, Figure I

[Page 17]

Advance Payments need to reflect timing of cash flows

Dr. Flores' application produces inconsistent results. Figures expressed in US$ million

Nominal Compass Lexecon Dr. Flores
Net Advance Payments 14.30 13.51 14.56
Advance Payments
($ owed by Omega Consortium)
15.76 14.81 15.76
(Face value)
less less less
Withheld Payments
($ owed to Omega Consortium)
1.46 1.30 1.20

Source: CL Revised Valuation Model (C-0438), tab “III. Advance Balance”, cells F23:H23 and F39:H39; Dr. Flores' Model (QE-0052), tab “III. Advance Balance”, cells F39:H39

[Page 18]

IV. Conclusions

[Page 19]

CoE is the only rate that recognizes the economic harm to Claimants

Cost of Equity

  • Achieves Full Compensation (financing cost already incurred)
  • Independent from Claimants’ Identity
  • Commercially reasonable

Risk Free Rate

  • Lower than Inflation
  • Not commercially reasonable

Source: CL First Report, ¶¶ 109-112

[Page 20]

Compass Lexecon's Damages Assessment

Figures expressed in US$ million

Total Losses as of December 23, 2014
Existing Contracts
Unpaid progress billings 20.13
Expected Profits until Completion 2.06
Less Cash Advances for Completion -13.51
Total Losses on Existing Contracts 8.69
New Contracts
2015-2019 Cash Flows 11.78
Beyond 2019 30.75
Total Losses on New Contracts 42.53
Total Losses (US$ million) 51.22
Total Losses as of April 1, 2020 US$ 91.62 MM

Source: CL Second Report, Table VI; Compass Lexecon based on CL Revised Valuation Model (C-0438)

[Page 21]

COMPASS
LEXECON

www.compasslexecon.com

[Page 22]

Back Up & Demonstratives

[Page 23]

Omega Consortium was Successful Against Competitors

The Omega Consortium had Competitive Advantages

Contender # Bids
Evaluated
[a]
# of wins Financial Capacity Experience
Max Score
[b]
Ratio
[b] / [a]
Max Score
[c]
Ratio
[c] / [a]
OMEGA 35 10 32 91% 26 74%
COMSA 3 2 2 67% 3 100%
SEMI 16 2 10 63% 6 38%
ELECNOR 7 0 3 43% 7 100%

Note: The Omega Consortium participated in 42 public works bids, but was evaluated in 35

Source: Compass Lexecon based on CL Second Report, Table III and Table IV

[Page 24]

Total Net Income in Awarded Projects

Concept
Gross profit of existing contracts
Contracts amount
Estimated cost at completion
Gross profit of Tocumen Airport project
G&A Expenses 2010-2014
G&A Expenses 2010
G&A Expenses 2011
G&A Expenses 2012
G&A Expenses 2013
G&A Expenses 2014
Future G&A Expenses
Earning (loss) from operations
Income tax (25%)
Total Net Income in Awarded Projects
Amount (US$)
20,288,195
[1]
154,012,234
[1]
133,724,039)
[2]
682,434
(4,896,341)
[3]
37,226)
[3]
713,362)
[4]
885,736)
[4]
1,028,188)
[5]
2,231,829)
[1]
(2,755,098)
13,319,190
3,329,798
9,989,393

Note: G&A Expenses for year 2013 exclude “Gastos de intereses” and “Pérdida de venta de valores”
Sources: [1] McKinnon First Report, Annex 2, Table 1; [2] Omega Engineering, Inc. Financial Statements and Supplementary Information as of 31 December 2013 and 2012 and Independent Auditors' Report, p. 18 (C-0136); [3] Audited Financial Statements of Omega Engineering Inc. as of December 31 2011, p. 8 (C-0311); [4] Omega Engineering, Inc. Financial Statements as of 31 December 2013, p. 7 (C-0135); [5] Omega Engineering, Inc. Interim Balance Sheets for the Year Ended 31 December 2014, tab “EARNINGS”, cell F16 (C-0138)

[Page 25]

Target Market

Concept 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Central Government Capital Expenditure (US$ MM) [1] 1,482 2,013 2,655 3,315 3,676 3,859
Market Size for Omega Consortium (% Central Gov Capex) [2] 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Normalized Market Size for Omega Consortium (US$ MM) 74 101 133 166 184 193
Concept 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Average
Market Size for the Omega Consortium (US$ MM)
Compass Lexecon [3] 209 230 251 272 294 251
Dr. Flores [4] 155 160 157 154 167 159

Sources: [1] Republic of Panama's Fiscal Budgets for the period 2009-2014, pp. 1-4, C-0391; [2] CL First Report, ¶ 90; [3] CL Revised Valuation Model (C-0438), tab “IV. New Contracts”, cells E33:133; [4] Dr. Flores' Model (QE-0052), tab “IV. New Contracts”, cells E33:133

[Page 26]

2015-16 Target Market more than doubled our estimate

Concept 2015 2016
Awarded Bids 36 48
Total Contract Value Awarded (US$ million) 517 674
Market Size for the Omega Consortium (US$ million)
Compass Lexecon 209 230
Dr. Flores 155 160

Note: Potential projects were selected based on the following criteria: i) belonging to a sector where the Omega Consortium had prior experience; and ii) Bid reference price was within ±15% of the Omega Consortium's historical bid range of US$ 0.8 million - US$ 126.5 million
Source: Compass Lexecon based on CL First Report, Table XIV

[Page 27]

A 25% Success Rate is Adequate

Resources allocation varies by year due to strategic behavior

Calculation
Methodology
Bid Count Bid Value (US$ MM)
# Bids
[a]
# Awarded
[b]
Success Rate
[b]/[a]
Bid US$
[c]
Awarded US$
[d]
Success Rate
[d]/[c]
Total 42 10 23.8% 662 142 21.4%
2010 14 0 0% 176 0 0%
2011 21 6 29% 337 53 16%
2012 3 3 100% 87 87 100%
2013 4 1 25% 61 2 3%

Dr. Flores' Average: 9.4%

Source: Compass Lexecon based on CL Second Report, Table V; CL First Report, Table VI; Omega Historical Bids (C-0388); CL Revised Valuation Model (C-0438), tab “V. Historical Information”

[Page 28]

Tocumen Airport had a Profitability of 15%

Gross Margin
15%

=

Gross Profit
US$ 682,434


Revenues
US$ 4,645,282

The Tocumen Airport project was started on February 2012 and completed in 2013
(See C-0006 and C-0007)

Source: Omega Engineering, Inc. Financial Statements and Supplementary Information as of 31 December 2013 and 2012 and Independent Auditors' Report, p. 18 (C-0136)

[Page 29]

Standalone Impacts on New Contracts

See CL Revised Valuation Model (C-0438), tab "Summary"

See Dr. Flores Updated Valuation Model (QE-0052 XLS), tab “Summary"

[Page 30]

Standalone Impact of Cost of Equity

See CL Revised Valuation Model (C-0438), tab "Summary"

[Page 31]

Standalone Impacts on Existing Contracts

See CL Revised Valuation Model (C-0438), tab "Summary"

See Dr. Flores Updated Valuation Model (QE-0052 XLS), tab "Summary"

[Page 32]

COMPASS
LEXECON

www.compasslexecon.com