[Page 1]
BLASKET RENEWABLE
INVESTMENTS, LLC,
Petitioner, Case No. 22-cv-02403 (APM)
v.
KINGDOM OF SPAIN,
Respondent.
On May 20, 2026, the court denied Respondent Kingdom of Spain’s Motion to Dismiss this ICSID arbitral award enforcement action brought by Petitioner Blasket Renewable Investments, Inc. See Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 46. The court ordered the parties to meet and confer and advise whether summary judgment briefing would be needed to confirm the award. See id. at 11–12. The parties now represent that “the merits of confirmation are now resolved,” obviating the need for further briefing. Joint Status Report, ECF No. 53, at 2. All that remains then is to enter judgment. Id. The parties, however, disagree about two of its components: the applicable rates of prejudgment and post-judgment interest. Id. The court resolves those disputes below.
Prejudgment interest. The court agrees with Respondent that prejudgment interest should be, as proscribed by the ICSID tribunal, “computed at the six-month EURIBOR rate, compounded semi-annually, from 13 July 2013 up to the date of payment,” even during such time as when that rate dipped below zero and was negative. See Joint Status Report at 7 ¶ 15; Pet. to Enforce Arbitral Award, ECF No. 1, Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter Award], ¶¶ 62, 76. To adopt a 0% rate floor
[Page 2]
as Petitioner requests would be to rewrite the Award. As Respondent argues, the tribunal surely was cognizant of a negative rate environment “[g]iven that the EURIBOR rate had been negative for years when the Award was issued.” Joint Status Report at 8 ¶ 17. Yet it elected not to guard against a negative rate, as apparently other tribunals have done. See id. at 7–8 ¶ 16. Petitioner’s argument that negative prejudgment interest would undercut the purposes of prejudgment interest, see id. at 5–6 ¶¶ 12–13, cannot overcome the plain text of the Award. Accordingly, consistent with the parties’ calculations as of June 29, 2026, the court will enter a final judgment in the amount of $28,185,672.48, which includes $2,447,995.80 in prejudgment interest.
Post-judgment interest. As for post-judgment interest, the court agrees with Petitioner that it should accrue at the rate specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a): “the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.” As Petitioner notes, courts in this District consistently have applied that statutory rate to ICSID awards. Joint Status Report at 9 ¶¶ 19–20 (citing cases). The court is not persuaded by Respondent’s assertion that the Award dictates that the prejudgment interest rate apply. See id. at 15–16 ¶¶ 34–36. Respondent urges that “by agreeing to arbitrate under the ICSID Convention . . . the parties agreed to apply the post-award interest rate on the terms set by the tribunal until the award is paid.” Id. at 18–19 ¶ 41. But as the court in Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador explained, while parties may contract for a different post-judgment award rate, they must do so in “clear, unambiguous and unequivocal language.” No. 19-cv-2943 (JMC), 2023 WL 2536368, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2023) (quoting Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso, 371 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2004)). Here, Respondent points only to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate before the ICSID and the terms of the Award itself, not to any “clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal” agreement to depart from the
[Page 3]
statutory rate. The court therefore will enter a final judgment that includes a post-judgment interest rate consistent with § 1961(a).
A separate, final judgment accompanies this Order.
Dated: June 29, 2026
Signature
Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge