italaw180973.pdf

This HTML version is machine-generated. Always consult the original document.

[Page 1129]

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BEFORE A TRIBUNAL
CONSTITUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TRADE PROMOTION
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF PERÚ AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNCITRAL RBITRATION RULES 2013

PCA Case No. 2019-46

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- x

In the Matter of Arbitration Between:	:
THE RENCO GROUP, INC.,	:
Claimants,	:
and	:
THE REPUBLIC OF PERÚ,	:
Respondent.	:

- AND -

IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION BEFORE A TRIBUNAL
CONSTITUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONTRACT OF STOCK
TRANSFER BETWEEN EMPRESA MINERA DEL CENTRO DEL PERU S.A.
AND DOE RUN PERU S.R. LTDA, DOE RUN RESOURCES, AND RENCO,
DATED 23 OCTOBER 1997, AND THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT BETWEEN
PERU AND DOE RUN PERU S.R. LTDA, DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1997 AND
THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 2013

PCA Case No. 2019-47

In the Matter of Arbitration Between:	:
THE RENCO GROUP, INC. AND	:
DOE RUN RESOURCES CORP.,	:
Claimants,	:
and	:
THE REPUBLIC OF PERÚ AND	:
ACTIVOS MINEROS S.A.C.,	:
Respondents.	:

[Page 1130]

(Continued)

HEARING ON JURISDICTION AND LIABILITY

Wednesday, March 13, 2024

The World Bank Group
1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
C Building
Conference Room C1 450
Washington, D.C. 20036

The hearing in the above-entitled matter came on

at 8:57 a.m. before:

JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, President of the Tribunal

DR. HORACIO GRIGERA NAÓN, Co Arbitrator

MR. J. CHRISTOPHER THOMAS KC, Co Arbitrator

[Page 1131]

ALSO PRESENT:

Registry, Permanent Court of Arbitration:

MR. MARTIN DOE RODRIGUEZ
Deputy Secretary General and Principal Legal
Counsel

MR. JAVIER COMPARINI CUETTO
Assistant Legal Counsel

MS. MAGDALENA LEGRIS
Case Manager (remotely)

Assistant to the Tribunal:

DR. HEINER KAHLERT

Realtime Stenographers:

MS. DAWN K. LARSON
Registered Diplomate Reporter (RDR)
Certified Realtime Reporter (CRR)
Worldwide Reporting, LLP
529 14th Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003
United States of America

MS. MARÍA ELENA DA SILVA
MS. MARTA RINALDI
D.R. Esteno
Colombres 566
Buenos Aires 1218ABE
Argentina
(5411) 4957 0083
[email protected]

Interpreters:

MR. DANIEL GIGLIO

MS. SILVIA COLLA

[Page 1132]

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Claimant:

MR. ADAM SCHIFFER
MR. MURRAY FOGLER
MS. JENNIFER CORDELL
MR. BUFORD NEELY
Schiffer Hicks Johnson PLLC
700 Louisiana Street
Houston, Texas 77002
United States of America

MS. SARAH WARBURG KOECHLIN
King & Spalding
Dallas, Texas
United States of America

Claimants' Representatives:

MR. JOSH WEISS
MR. ARI RENNERT
MS. CRYSTAL SALING

[Page 1133]

APPEARANCES: (Continued)

On behalf of the Respondent:

MR. DANTE AGUILAR ONOFRE
MR. ENRIQUE JESÚS CABRERA GÓMEZ
MR. OSCAR LECAROS JIMENEZ
MR. ANTONIO MONTENEGRO CRIADO
MS. VANESSA DEL CARMEN RIVAS PLATA SALDARRIAGA
Republic of Perú

MS. GAELA K. GEHRING FLORES
MR. PATRICK W. PEARSALL

MR. BRIAN A. VACA
MS. AGUSTINA ÁLVAREZ OLAIZOLA
MR. KELBY BALLENA
MS. INÉS HERNÁNDEZ SAMPELAYO
MS. TATIANA OLAZÁBAL RUIZ DE VELASCO
MR. MICHAEL RODRÍGUEZ MARTÍNEZ
Allen & Overy
1101 New York Avenue NW
Washington D.C. 2005
United States of America

MR. RICHARD ALLEMANT
MS. VANESSA LAMAC
MS. ROMINA GARIBALDI DEL RISCO
Lazo Abogados
Av. Pardo y Aliaga 699
San Isidro 15073
Perú

[Page 1134]

APPEARANCES: (Continued)

Nondisputing Party:

MS. LISA J. GROSH
MR. JOHN D. DALEY
Assistant Legal Advisers
Office of International Claims and
Investment Disputes
Office of the Legal Adviser
U.S. Department of State
Suite 203, South Building
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037 2800
United States of America

MR. DAVID M. BIGGE
Chief of Investment Arbitration
Office of International Claims and
Investment Disputes
Office of the Legal Adviser
U.S. Department of State
Suite 203, South Building
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037 2800
United States of America

MR. DAVID STUTE
Attorney Adviser
Office of International Claims and
Investment Disputes
Office of the Legal Adviser
U.S. Department of State
Suite 203, South Building
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037 2800
United States of America

[Page 1135]

C O N T E N T S

	PAGE
PRELIMINARY MATTERS..................................	.1136
WITNESSES:
DEBORAH M. PROCTOR (Continuing)
Cross examination by Mr. Fogler...................	.1136
Redirect examination by Ms. Gehring Flores........	.1194
Questions from the Tribunal.......................	.1205
WIM DOBBELAERE
Direct examination by Ms. Gehring Flores..........	.1217
Direct presentation...............................	.1218
Cross examination by Mr. Weiss....................	.1237

[Page 1136]

P R O C E E D I N G S

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Good morning. It looks like we are can even start 3.5 minutes before time. If that is no problem, I think, au contraire.

So I open the hearing in the Renco case. This is Day 7 of our Hearing. We have had the direct of Ms. Proctor last night; and so I give the floor to Mr. Fogler for the cross-examination. If there are no organizational things. It doesn't seem to be the case.

Mr. Fogler, you have the floor.

DEBORAH M. PROCTOR, RESPONDENTS' WITNESS, CALLED

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Good morning, Ms. Proctor.

THE WITNESS: Good morning.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. FOGLER:

Q. Ms. Proctor, have you ever been to La Oroya?

A. I have not.

Q. So you have never seen the plant?

A. I've only seen it in pictures and looking at Google Earth.

Q. You've never seen the community of La Oroya up close and personal?

A. No, I have not.

Q. You have not participated in collecting any data in La Oroya, have you?

[Page 1137]

A. No.

Q. You have prepared your two Reports by relying on data from others; correct?

A. Absolutely, yes.

Q. Do you know anything about the weather in La Oroya, Ms. Proctor?

A. Well, that it's at high altitude; so it's like high desert weather, cold and can be quite bright and sunny.

Q. Does it have wind in La Oroya?

A. I understand that it does.

Q. And rain?

A. It does not have a large amount of precipitation, but it does rain there, yes.

Q. All right. I think there's one thing that we can all agree on, and that is that there was, and likely still is, a public health crisis in La Oroya.

Can we agree on that?

A. We can agree that there clearly was a public health crisis. I haven't seen any data regarding the current conditions. I know that the Plant no longer operates. So, for example, if I use Google Maps and walk around the town with the little yellow person, it's obvious that there is no smoke coming out of the stacks, or smoke coming out of, like, fugitive sources any more.

[Page 1138]

Q. In your colorful presentation yesterday, you likened the situation to a house on fire.

Do you remember that?

A. I was -- just to be clear, I was talking about air quality specifically, which is extremely important to public health.

Q. All right. You understand that Doe Run didn't start the fire?

A. I absolutely understand that. That's why I made the analogy.

Q. Okay. When Doe Run came in to operate the Plant in 1997, the house had been on fire for decades, had it not?

A. Yes. That's my understanding.

Q. Okay. You also had some colorful gas cans in your initial slides that indicated that you felt that Doe Run had exacerbated the fire, as I understand it; is that correct?

A. Yes. That's a correct interpretation.

Q. Just so I understand, obviously I know you're a very experienced toxicologist, but you've never operated a plant before, have you?

A. No, but I have done a large number of risk-reduction plans, air toxics risk assessments, and I'm very familiar with putting on baghouses for metallurgical

[Page 1139]

operations and other types of things, and I recognize that the smelter was a very special -- like, there's not very many pyrometallurgical smelters in the world; so I have never worked on a plant like that, but I have worked on many metallurgical facilities, foundries, forges, smelters of other kind.

Q. As a toxicologist, but not as the Operator of the Plant?

A. Certainly not. I have directed the remediation operations, but as a manager, I had to hire the engineers to do the work to clean up one particular Facility, but, no, definitely never as an Operator.

Q. By way of example, in operating a plant there are a number of ways to increase production. You can put more feedstock into the plant. That would be one way; right?

A. That would, then -- yes.

Q. But you could also make the plant more efficient. That could increase production?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. But those are issues, that is, the physical configuration, the processes of the plant, those are outside of your area of expertise, are they not?

A. That is true, but I show that one figure from Mr. Connor's tool. I certainly am very familiar with putting baghouses on dusty operations, and that was one

[Page 1140]

figure that just completely stuck out to me, because that is not the most difficult fix, but yet -- and it was clearly not modernized in any way until 2006. It is generating half a megaton of lead emissions per day.

That's just unbelievable to me.

Q. All right. And obviously, we're going to spend a little time here this morning talking about what I perceive to be your principal point, which is Doe Run did not do what it should have done soon enough. That's basically it, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So -- but before we get there, another one of your gas cans in your presentation was something new to me. I had not -- I had looked through your Reports before you came on, and you had a gas can that said "failure to modernize."

Do you remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. That struck me as a little odd because I had read your Report, so I went back -- and you can actually do word searches these days, and there's only one time in any of your two Reports that the word "modernize" is even used because it's true, isn't it, that you never complained in your Reports about a failure on Doe Run's part to modernize?

[Page 1141]

A. That is correct.

Q. All right. So let's look -- I want to look at what you -- there is one reference in your First Report, if we could look at Page 42.

A. Oh, you know, I'm going to have to grab my glasses real quick. Give me a second.

Q. Oh, please. Sure.

A. I can see.

Q. Okay. Good. Good.

So we're looking at a chart. We might -- I don't know if you can make it a little bit smaller so we can see what the figures -- this is a page out of your First Report, Figure 15, and it's dealing with air concentrations, but what you have done is post some flags, by date, of actions that Doe Run Perú had taken along the way; right?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. And if we see in the little box up at the top that says the year 2000, here we see the only time you mention the word "modernize" in your Report -- and I don't know if we can blow that little box up so that we can all see it. This was curious to me.

In your presentation yesterday with the gas cans, you wanted to say that Doe Run had done other Projects, but they were not helpful, and so you had just, as your

[Page 1142]

examples, the sprinkler truck and CCTV; right? Because you wanted to downplay any of the other things that Doe Run Perú had done in the initial years, didn't you?

A. I added those because I thought those were particularly good examples of activities that don't have an impact on air quality, and I added the failure to modernize, really specifically, when I looked hard at that baghouse that was added 2006-2007. So, it took them a year, a year and a half to put on a baghouse.

Baghouse is not extremely significant technology. Granted, that was a very large baghouse. I'm not saying I could have done it, but to have waited for so long, nine years, to put on a baghouse, just felt incredible to me. And with that change the blood-lead levels in the children dropped.

Q. You didn't see fit in your presentation to include these items that that we're seeing on the screen that were done earlier, for example, in 2000, modernize central Cottrell, repair and monitor baghouses, automated furnace controls for sinter, and lead blast-furnace.

And the irony here, you sat through Mr. Connor's testimony yesterday, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And we were about to go through 27 Projects that Doe Run Perú had completed before the year 2000. We got

[Page 1143]

through only four or five of them. But there were a whole host of Projects that were started immediately, and continued in the first few years that Doe Run had the Plant.

You know that, don't you?

A. Yes, but what I also know from Mr. Connor is that very little money was spent in the first years of operation. So it felt to me like Doe Run Perú were doing things that were less expensive, and holding off on repairs that were more expensive. And the failure to build all three of the Acid Plants, it might be technically very challenging, but to me, that was ignoring public health and the air quality problem, which clearly existed at the time.

Q. We're going to hear a whole lot more with our last Witness, who's a Financial Expert for Respondents, but you're aware, aren't you, that the Contract between Centromín and Doe Run Perú required Doe Run Perú to spend $120 million to modernize and expand production in the first five years of operation, aren't you?

A. I know they were required to spend money, but I don't know the exact amount.

Q. All right. And, by the way, Ms. Proctor, since you were retained by Counsel for the State of Perú and Activos Mineros, did they provide you with an opportunity to speak with anyone who had been with Centromín?

[Page 1144]

A. No, that had not happened, but I didn't request that either.

Q. Okay. All right. Well, if we want to compare what the standards and practices of Centromín were with what the standards and practices of Doe Run Perú, wouldn't it be a good idea to actually talk with people who were around at the time?

A. Yes, but my Report is focused on, like, air quality and public health.

Q. I get that, but, you know, we actually have someone in this very room right here today who was with Centromín and Doe Run Perú, who has personal knowledge about what the standards and practices were.

Have you ever met Pepe Mogrovejo?

A. No, I have not.

Q. So you've never spoken to him or anybody else about what Centromín did compared to what Doe Run has done, have you?

A. I did speak with Mr. Dobbelaere, and in my First Report you can see I put together a timeline that covers from 1922 through, I think, 2019, with all significant activities.

Q. I might be mistaken, but I don't believe Mr. Dobbelaere worked for Centromín before Doe Run took over operations.

[Page 1145]

A. No. I just wanted to clarify that I had talked to someone regarding the operations of Centromín.

Q. Yesterday you made a Statement about the PAMA, and so I'm guessing that you have had an opportunity to actually look at the PAMA?

A. Yes.

Q. I'd like to do that with you a little bit this morning.

A. Okay.

Q. It's Exhibit C-90.

(Overlapping speakers.)

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Sorry. Before we leave the document that we had here, a question to Ms. Proctor. At the lower part of the document, which you didn't see, just in the last couple of minutes, that it speaks of -- could we see the -- yes. It speaks of complimentary services, and I just wonder, could it be "complementary services" or "complimentary services"? The -- on top of the green --

THE WITNESS: I don't actually see the word. I'm sorry.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: On top of the green arrow.

THE WITNESS: Oh.

MR. FOGLER: Can you blow that up, Mr. Neely; so that we can all see it.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Complimentary practices.

[Page 1146]

THE WITNESS: You know, right now I'm not entirely sure what I was referring to with that, but I think I might have been talking about the street cleaning activities and other public health activities that were ongoing, but I can't right now think about it.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: They were not complimentary; right? Like in a cleaning of my room in the hotel is complimentary, but street cleaning there might rather be complementary, would you agree? That is additional to what you -- the upgrade, et cetera, et cetera, that are more the day-to-day things like sweeping the floor, et cetera, and that I would -- I don't want to insist on that. I just wanted to be sure because --

THE WITNESS: Well, I think that, you know, there are certainly -- maybe I'm misunderstanding you, but, I mean, there is some cost associated with having a sprinkler truck and driving around the city. There's probably not much cost associated with having members of the community clean up dust.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Okay. Well, okay. Thank you. Fine.

Back to you.

MR. FOGLER: Any time.

BY MR. FOGLER:

Q. We're going to go back to the PAMA, Exhibit C-90,

[Page 1147]

and this is a very long document, obviously, and it covers a whole lot of subjects about the Plant.

You understand that this was written before Doe Run Perú was ever in the picture?

A. I understand that, yeah.

Q. This was prepared by Centromín.

You understand that?

A. My understanding that it was prepared by Centromín with the MEM, but I don't know exactly.

Q. All right. And it was -- it was Centromín that decided what Projects were going to be part of the PAMA; right?

A. I assume so.

Q. Centromín estimated how much those Projects were going to cost; right?

A. I actually don't know.

Q. And Centromín decided the order in which those Projects were to be implemented, didn't they?

A. They created a Schedule.

Q. Right. It was Centromín's Schedule.

A. Okay. I'll -- I don't know whether it was Centromín's or not, but if you say so, I will accept that position.

Q. All right. Well, we know that this document was approved in January of 1997, which was before there ever

[Page 1148]

was a Doe Run Perú.

Do you know that?

A. Yes, I do know that.

Q. Okay.

A. But my understanding was that it could be the MEM who set the Schedule or identified the Projects. I didn't know that it was all Centromín.

Q. Fair enough. But it was not Renco or DRRC or DRP that set the Schedule?

A. That, I'm sure of, yes.

Q. Okay. So let's go to -- first to Page 83. Here, we have a section on gas and particles emissions, and this is, at least in part, what you're concerned about with the air quality, isn't it?

A. My major concern with air quality is the fugitive emissions.

Q. All right. Well, this actually discusses fugitive emissions. So here, we're talking about the main chimney and the 95 secondary chimneys, and it goes through the quantities of gases and particulate matter that were being discharged in 1995. But if -- let's go to the next page because I want to focus on what you're interested in.

Page 84. It also -- the PAMA talks about fugitive emissions, doesn't it?

A. It does, specifically regarding -- I think that

[Page 1149]

most of the discussion was with regard to the Coking Plant, but there does obviously seem to be emission sources that are fugitive.

Q. Well, it's clear from just this portion -- and I can show you others, but this portion says the emission of fugitive gases also impacts the air, but it is difficult to quantify these impacts as they are irregular and disperse quickly, and then you see in the table, "gas sources and dust." It has "fugitive emissions" right at the bottom, with no treatment equipment.

So it's obvious, isn't it, that Centromín and the MEM understood that there was a fugitive emissions problem, and that there was nothing being done at the time to solve it; right?

A. So is this Table the current conditions? I'm not sure. Or is this the planned conditions?

Q. Well, this is current. This is what they were talking about what was in existence at the time the PAMA was developed?

A. Okay.

Q. But -- so understanding that there was a fugitive emissions problem, Centromín and the MEM did not put any specific Projects other than the Coke Plant to solve the fugitive emissions problem, did they?

A. It's not clear to me that this is -- is this a

[Page 1150]

list of things that need to be done, or a list of things that will be done as part of the PAMA? I will say that I do know that, had they put on the Sulfuric Acid Plants, that would have reduced fugitive emissions.

Q. Let's go to the part of the PAMA that talks about that. Page 157. Here is the Project 1, the new Sulfuric Acid Plants with the objectives to fix the SO2 of emissions due to the metallurgical operations, and reach the maximum permissible level.

That's what you're just talking about; right?

A. Yes. I mean, that's a relatively vague statement, but my understanding is that the Sulfuric Acid Plants do reduce both fugitives and SO2 emissions.

Q. Well, I didn't write this. I'm just reading what they put in the PAMA.

A. Okay.

Q. The Statement that you made yesterday was that these Plants were priority number one.

Do you remember that?

A. They were Project Number 1. If I said "priority number one," I think that they were the most valuable PAMA Project for improving air quality. So if I said "priority," I recognize that they weren't -- I mean, look at the execution Schedule, it starts in 2000 -- I mean, it's 2003-2004, but they were a priority to improve public

[Page 1151]

health.

Q. You've already focused on what I was going to ask you. It wasn't Renco or Doe Run Resources or Doe Run Perú that selected when the Sulfuric Acid Plants were to be implemented. That was Centromín and MEM.

You understand that, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Can I add?

Q. And they put -- they put the Sulfuric Acid Plants after the other Projects in the PAMA?

A. I didn't see the full Schedule of the PAMA. I did not look at it. What stood out to me here is that the Copper Plant was to be done in 2004, according to how the money was allocated. Execution Schedule is a -- you know, is a phrase that I'm not sure if it means they were supposed to be done by then, or if they were supposed to start by then, but the flow of money for these Plants was, like, 2003, 2004, but in 2009 the Copper Plant still wasn't done.

Q. You understand that Doe Run Perú asked for and received modifications to the PAMA that dealt specifically with the Sulfuric Acid Plants?

A. I understand that Doe Run Perú hired Fluor Daniel in 1998 to create a master plan. That master plan changed

[Page 1152]

the Sulfur Acid Plants, but they still had a completion date -- I'd have to check my notes -- around 2006, I would say. And then they didn't meet that plan. And so in 2006, the MEM brought in an Expert panel, and -- including Dr. Partelpoeg -- probably killed that, but -- and there was a new Schedule. And that new Schedule was said to be aggressive, but it needed to be.

There was extremely high blood levels among the children in the community. It was a public health disaster, and they set the completion date for the Sulfuric Acid Plants as the fourth quarter of 2009, but it was never finished either.

Q. Do you remember my question, Ms. Proctor?

A. Your question is if they received a permission to extend the Schedule, and the answer is yes.

Q. Thank you.

A. I'm not entirely sure, maybe you can tell me what the Extension was? Was it to the fourth quarter of 2009?

Q. There were actually several Extensions. There were initial Extensions because the estimate for the Sulfuric Acid Plants was shown to be understated. So they had to plan for more money. And it was extended in 2006 as a result of a request, and the Panel that you mentioned, and then it was extended again, so, yes.

A. Okay.

[Page 1153]

Q. But my point simply was, Doe Run Perú requested and received Extensions with the permission and approval of the MEM, and that's true?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Let's now talk about issues that are closer to your work.

A. Thank you.

Q. I know you'll be happy about that.

I want to talk to you about the Integral studies, the Health Risk Assessments that were done in 2005 and 2008 because you rely heavily on the data from those studies for your analysis, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. So I take it that you read those two Reports very carefully?

A. I did, but I read them very carefully a couple years ago.

Q. All right. This proceeding has been going on for a while, so I understand that, and if you need to take some time, that's fine. We'll go slowly. But let's look first at the 2005 Report, Exhibit C-60.

I want to go right to the conclusions that are on Page 37. And here's a paragraph. We may have even seen this before in this proceeding. Let's go sentence by sentence and look at what Integral and Dr. Schoof are

[Page 1154]

saying in 2005.

The first sentence says: "Many actions have already been undertaken by the community, the Ministry of Health, and by Doe Run Perú to reduce both lead exposures and releases of sulfur dioxide."

You have no reason to dispute that statement, do you?

A. No.

Q. Many additional actions are planned for the future. That too was true; wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. "The results of this Risk Assessment indicate that implementation of the planned technological changes to reduce fugitive emissions and stack emissions will reduce sulfur dioxide concentrations to levels that will greatly reduce health effects."

That was the plan, wasn't it?

A. Yes, but the primary PAMA Project to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions was the Sulfuric Acid Plants.

Q. Right. And you understand that they did two of the Plants. The lead Plant and the zinc Plant were actually built and in operation?

A. Yes. I'm not sure if they actually built a zinc plant or if they modernized the Plant that was there, but -- and then reduced production of zinc, but this gets

[Page 1155]

outside of my area of expertise.

Q. But you know they did something to improve the sulfur dioxide issue for the zinc circuit?

A. They did something, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. But, you know, if I look at the emission -- like the levels of SO2 in air, they do not really come down until the lead Sulfuric Acid Plant is on-line.

Q. It continues, here in this paragraph: "While lead emissions will also be greatly reduced, blood-lead levels are still predicted to exceed health-based goals in 2011."

And the goal was to get at least 95 percent of the children to have a blood-lead level below 10; right?

A. I've never seen that as a goal specifically in the PAMA, but I will attest that that is the standard -- is to be 95 percent below 10.

Q. And here, it states the reason, in the next sentence, why even the improvements that were planned might not achieve that goal. It says: "This is due to the fact that dust and soil in La Oroya will still have high residual concentrations of lead from historical emissions."

You believe that too, don't you?

A. Yes. I think that that is true, that there will be high levels of lead in dust and in soil. I haven't done

[Page 1156]

a risk assessment of current conditions, nor have I seen one, but I do understand that there should be lead in the environment still because it does not go away.

Q. Well, you even have a chart in your presentation that shows the effect over time of the percentage of contribution of dust and soil to the blood-lead levels over time?

A. Yes.

Q. And your own chart shows that soil is going to have a much greater impact on the blood-lead levels if the emissions go down?

A. That is absolutely correct.

Q. Okay. And the paragraph concludes: "For that reason, Integral recommends continuing and expanding many of the community-based programs that help to reduce lead exposures and the associated health burden."

So we'll visit this again in the 2008 Report, but you know that there were continuing efforts, not just at the Plant, but in the community to try to ameliorate the problem; right?

A. I know that there were efforts, but I don't know how effective they were. As the American CDC said: "Until you control emissions, no other activity is going to make a big difference in the blood-lead levels."

Q. All right. In this 2005 Integral Report, there

[Page 1157]

are a number of charts and graphs, just like in your Report, but I'd like to show you a chart on Page 50. At the top, it is a chart about predicted child blood-lead levels, and it talks about different communities in the area. 2004, that would be measured data; right?

A. I think so, yes.

Q. And then, 2007 and '11, which obviously had not yet occurred, are just predicted data?

A. Yes.

Q. So this bar chart looks familiar because it's similar to one in your Report, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. So what it shows is that, while -- it was high in 2004, above the standard; right? And it's predicted to come down, but, even so, still, particularly in La Oroya Antigua, was going to be over the limit; right?

A. That's what the figure shows, yes.

Q. What the Integral Report spends a lot of time discussing is the reason why they were predicting the steady decline over the years in the various areas, in the child blood levels, was because they were predicting a decline in the emissions.

A. That's correct. And, therefore, the lead in dust, in particular.

Q. Let's look at Page 103 of the Report. This

[Page 1158]

paragraph goes into some detail, maybe too much detail for our purposes, but they tried to predict -- "they" meaning Integral -- tried to predict what the percentage of decrease would be in the lead emissions, didn't they?

A. It does appear that they did that, yes.

Q. Okay. In La Oroya Antigua, the concentrations of lead in the air are predicted to fall by 80 percent in 2007 and by 85 percent in 2011, and it goes on to have other statistics as well, but this is an example of the kinds of work -- the kinds of predictions that Integral was making in their Report to get to the predicted blood-lead levels; right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Before we go to the next Report, I want to ask you about the contribution that historical contamination might play in the child blood levels. Okay. That's the subject we're going to talk about.

A. Okay.

Q. And you know the Plant has been operating since 1922; right?

A. Yes.

Q. It operated for decades without any Environmental Regulations or oversight.

You know that?

A. That's my understanding.

[Page 1159]

Q. And you agree that the historical emissions, including the emissions under Centromínín's operations, played and continue to play a role in the health of the community and the workers in La Oroya; right?

A. That is my understanding, yes.

Q. Okay. And this Integral Report, by the way, speaks to that in several places. Let's look on Page 57. And we heard a lot about this in the cross-examination of Dr. Schoof, and I think you were around for that.

A. Yes.

Q. This paragraph here explains why the focus of the Integral Report was on current operations. It says: "According to the PAMA and the Transfer Agreement, Centromín, backed by the Government of Perú, is responsible for chemical contamination from historical operation of the Complex and continuing emissions through the period of the PAMA."

I understand you're not here as a contract Expert. Have you actually looked at the Contract between the Parties?

A. The STA.

Q. The STA?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Good. "The exceptions are the slag pile and ferrites for which Doe Run Perú agreed to take back the

[Page 1160]

historical liability." Then, it says: "Soil and dust in La Oroya may be affected both by current operations of the Complex and continuing emissions through the period of the PAMA and by historical operations."

You agree with that, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. "For that reason, this Risk Assessment does not strictly distinguish between current and future chemical releases, but the focus is on air and dust because these are the exposure media that are most affected by current operations."

A. Yes.

Q. "Due to the focus on current operations of the Complex, this Risk Assessment also does not provide an assessment of the full extent of environmental contamination due to the operation of the Complex in La Oroya since 1922."

A. That's correct, because they were trying to evaluate the current conditions. They did include soil data, but the -- they were not trying to reconstruct what had happened since 1922.

Q. One of the key features of your analysis was to try to demonstrate that the contribution of the soil was relatively low compared to the current emissions; right?

A. Dr. Schoof found that as well.

[Page 1161]

Q. Okay. You're not suggesting that the soil and the historical contamination plays no role?

A. No.

Q. In fact, when Mr. Connor accused you of that in one of his Reports, you wrote in your Second Report that's not your Opinion; correct?

A. I take your word for it.

Q. Have you seen Reports from others who have attempted to quantify the contribution of the emissions by Centromínín for the problems in La Oroya?

A. No.

Q. I'm going to show you a couple.

A. Okay.

Q. First, I'm going to show you GBM-73, and let me explain to you what this is because I'm not sure you've seen it.

A. I have not.

Q. We have heard, in our Hearing this week, about a report prepared by a company called "SVS."

Have you ever heard of them?

A. I have heard several times about the SVS Report, but I have not looked at it in a lot of detail.

Q. There are actually two SVS Reports. There's one that was commissioned to look at Doe Run Perú's compliance with the PAMA, but this Report that I'm showing you here,

[Page 1162]

GBM-73, is a report about -- that was commissioned by the Government of Perú to look at Centromín's compliance with its obligations under the PAMA.

You've never seen this, though?

A. No.

Q. Let's look at Page 24. So SVS says: "Centromín and Doe Run would be responsible by about 78 percent and 22 percent respectively of the total mass of pollutants released by the La Oroya smelter in form of liquid effluent, solid wastes, and fugitive air emissions, from 1975 to 2002."

And we've seen a number of statistics like this, and this includes more than air emissions, but the point here is they're trying to quantify how much came on Centromín's watch versus Doe Run Perú's watch.

A. Yes, but I'd like to make sure we all understand that "total mass" is not equivalent to "dose" or "exposure," but that is -- I just want to make it clear. But that is what it says.

Q. It goes on to say: "In general, the stack emissions rates during the Doe Run operations were reduced when compared to the Centromín operations, in spite of increase in lead production rate."

That's a factor of efficiency that we mentioned just a little while ago.

[Page 1163]

Do you recognize that?

A. Yes.

Q. "Although this suggests an improvement on the environmental performance of the La Oroya Smelter, it does not address fugitive emissions." And then, I should have highlighted this next sentence because this is your point: "Until fugitive emissions are addressed, it is not possible to fully resolve whether the overall emissions have improved."

You agree with that, don't you?

A. Yes, very much so.

Q. The conclusion here, at the end, is that Centromín should be responsible to a higher degree for cumulative environmental impacts while Doe Run has the main responsibility to the instantaneous environmental impacts caused by the La Oroya smelter activities.

So, I mean, this is a relative issue and may be in the eyes of the beholder, but the point here is both Parties bear some responsibility, don't they?

A. To the total amount of contamination that exists in La Oroya? Absolutely.

Q. Okay. Now, let's look at -- actually, there's one more reference on Page 26 of this Report. And this is to the same effect: "Soil quality at the area influenced by the La Oroya smelter would be mainly affected by the

[Page 1164]

cumulative impacts of both periods of operations."

Agreed?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Now, let's look at a document that you actually have seen. And I apologize for springing this on you unannounced, but there's one that's in your Report. In fact, it's your first exhibit, DBM-001. So let's take a look at it.

A. Can you show me the first page? I can't --

Q. Yeah. I'm sorry, Mr. Neely, I'm skipping R-161 here for -- trying to move it along here. This is the -- that's not it either. DMP-001.

A. It's also Mr. Gino --

Q. Bianchi.

A. Bianchi. Thank you, I was spacing. His Report, if that helps.

So since we have some time, I think it's important to consider that this total soil contamination will be, I'm sure, greater from Centromín's long-term operation or that dating back to pre-Centromín, but the most important exposures for children are to surface soil. Because that's mostly the dirt in which kids play in.

Q. All right.

If there's anything else that you would like to explain or expound on, I want you to feel free to do so.

[Page 1165]

Okay?

A. Thank you.

Q. All right. So this -- and I think I slipped this in on Mr. Neely without him knowing, and he's cursing me under his breath. This a document that you referenced in your Report. This is -- this happens to be a -- I'll call it a "pleading." It's from Activos Mineros, the Party that hired you in this Arbitration, and they have sent -- this is a pleading in 2010 to the bankruptcy organization, INDECOPI. And I'm not sure -- I can't remember why it was that you cited it, but, if we could go --

A. Me either. But it's -- I might have cited it -- I just wanted to look and see what I wrote that I cited that Report.

Q. While you're looking, I'm going to ask Mr. Neely to put up Page 7.

You tell me when you're ready.

A. Just give me one second. I want to see where I cited it, and I have never been in international arbitration before, so I didn't understand the numbering of references, and so I had to do the numbering at the last second, so I might have cited it incorrectly. But we'll review it. I'm sorry.

Q. That's -- it's quite all right. I actually think somebody put your exhibits in alphabetical order, and this

[Page 1166]

one happened to be titled "Activos Mineros," so it became the first exhibit. But that's just my theory.

So let's look at the chart at the bottom of the page.

A. Okay.

Q. And let me just -- I'll give you a little background. What Activos Mineros is doing with this document is trying to allocate responsibility between Activos Mineros and Doe Run Perú for the remediation of the soil. Okay.

A. Okay.

Q. So what they are doing here in this chart is trying to establish the various quantities, much like we saw in the last exhibit, as between -- and the last one only went back from 1975 to -- through Doe Run's work, but this one goes back from 1922. And it has the actual percentages of sulfur dioxide, lead, and arsenic emitted into the environment by, first, Cerro de Pasco and Centromín, on the one hand, and then Doe Run Perú on the other. And you see the numbers there, 84 percent for Cerro de Pasco and Centromín, and 16 percent for Doe Run Perú. And that's for all three of them put together.

A. I understand.

Q. But lead, it's really kind of a 90/10, if you look at the 61,000 versus 6,000.

[Page 1167]

A. I see that.

Q. Okay. So there's another chart on Page 9. And this chart takes the same emission factor percentages, which we saw on Page 7, 84 percent and 16 percent, and it has soil concentration factors and health risk factors, ultimately coming into a percentage of liability as between Centromín and Doe Run Perú. And I'm not sure -- these numbers are --

A. I don't remember ever seeing these numbers. I don't really know where they come from or what they're based on.

Q. The numbers themselves aren't that important, but what is important is the fact that even Activos Mineros, the Party in this very Arbitration, acknowledges that they have a contribution to the problem that exists in La Oroya.

A. I think that that is probably true. I think, though, that, during the timeframe when Doe Run Perú was operating, their fraction of the health risk was -- it was primarily their emissions. So I don't know, like, the reference for this, but all of the risk assessors point to emissions during that time period, not overall from the beginning of time. It's for the people who were there at that time period.

Q. I'm going to change subjects with you.

A. Okay.

[Page 1168]

Q. I'm going to violate a cardinal rule of cross-examination.

A. I didn't know there were rules. If I break any, let me know.

Q. They're not hard and fast, but one of the cardinal rules is: Don't get in the cage with the bear when you're cross-examining an expert, but I'm now going to ask you about some of the specifics of your analysis.

A. Okay.

Q. And you're the Expert here. I'm not a toxicologist, I don't know anything about this subject other than what I've read.

A. I will be happy to explain.

Q. So I understand that one of your main Opinions is that, if we consider only the lead that's in the soil, then the blood-lead levels would be predicted to be below 10.

A. I reproduced Dr. Schoof's modeling and the mean -- at the mean, at the average, the levels are below 10, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. But I haven't done my own risk assessment, per se. I've just reproduced Integral's Risk Assessment.

Q. All right.

A. And that is also, just to be clear, specific to when Doe Run Perú was operating, those two points in time

[Page 1169]

when she did that Risk Assessment.

Q. What I want to try to understand, because I've seen in the materials, including your materials, that you can determine the percentage or amount of lead that are in various different factors, not just soil but outdoor dust and indoor dust and drinking water, those kinds of things.

A. Right. So what we do is we measure concentrations in soil and in dust, like milligrams per kilogram, parts per million, and then we incorporate that data into a model, a blood kinetic model. So, basically, the model was -- these types of models were originally designed for pharmaceuticals, but what they do is they predict how -- for lead -- how lead will move through the body, and then what the blood-lead level will be in association because we have, in this case, an internal metric, the level of lead in blood that is used as the measure of potential toxicity.

Q. Was there a reason, by the way, that you didn't provide us with a copy of your actual analysis?

A. I -- not really, I guess. You wanted the output from the blood-lead model?

Q. Well, I was trying to figure out what assumptions and parameters you used to come up with your numbers, and we had no way to determine that.

A. I used exactly the same parameters at the mean as

[Page 1170]

Dr. Schoof did in her 2004 and -- well, 2005 and 2008 Risk Assessments.

Q. And I'm assuming here -- and you correct me if I'm wrong -- that the reason why you came out with a different conclusion than Dr. Schoof is you considered only the contribution from soil and ignored indoor dust and outdoor dust.

A. No, that's not right. First, I did have the same conclusion as Dr. Schoof. She found that 5 percent of blood lead came from soil in the 2005 Risk Assessment and 12 percent of blood lead came from soil in the 2008 Risk Assessment. So I didn't have a different conclusion.

And then, the second part of your question? I'm sorry, I got distracted.

Q. You decided to consider only the contribution from soil and not indoor dust and outdoor dust.

A. No. I did indoor dust, outdoor dust, diet, air, all of the same inputs as Dr. Schoof did. What I did, though, is, because she associated indoor dust, outdoor dust, and air, with ongoing emissions, I put those together, and I had like separate -- like if you looked at that bar chart from my presentation -- I'll show it again. Okay.

Q. It's on Page 18?

A. 22. So each of the colored bars are for a

[Page 1171]

different age group, like 0 to half a year through 6 -- through 7 years, 6 to 7 years. And I separated out soil because the soil is mostly affected by historical emissions based on the Risk Assessment that Dr. Schoof did, but the air, the indoor and the outdoor dust are primarily associated with ongoing emissions. That's her conclusion. She said that the air, obviously, is pretty much 100 percent because dust falls to the ground. So the dust that's in the air is from the ongoing emissions.

The outdoor dust, which is the most significant source of exposure, was assumed to be 100 percent due to emissions. So when Dr. Schoof predicted the future, like the future blood-lead levels that are in her assessment, she assumed that decreased emissions would have a direct 100 percent impact on outdoor dust. Now, would there be a little bit of dust from historical emissions? Dust is hard to get rid of. It's probably there.

Q. Well, even if the emissions stop, you're still going to have dust; right?

A. That's right.

Q. You're going to have both indoor dust and outdoor dust; right?

A. I think it's really important to note that this -- her Risk Assessment and my Risk Assessments -- my evaluation of the assessments is based on when Doe Run was

[Page 1172]

operating. So it doesn't evaluate the Facility shutting down.

Q. Well, but if -- if the emissions are controlled -- and we covered this earlier. If the emissions are controlled, the contribution from historical operations increases?

A. The percent contribution most definitely increases, and that's why -- what was the page you cited earlier?

Q. 18. That's where I thought you were going, but --

A. Oh, I was trying to show -- the percent contribution, that is because the ongoing emissions were the driver for blood-lead levels in La Oroya in this timeframe. So as the contribution from the emissions goes down, the contribution from soil which -- lead in soil is not going anywhere -- go up; right? Because it's a percent contribution.

Q. And if you took into account the lead in the soil and the lead in the outdoor dust and indoor dust, even after emissions stopped, you're still going to have a significant lead problem in the area, aren't you?

A. Now, I haven't done a risk assessment for La Oroya under current conditions because -- you know, after Doe Run left, there were a few years of

[Page 1173]

non-operation, I understand, and then Doe Run in liquidation -- which I do not understand what that is -- operated the Plant for a while. I don't know how long.

I do know that -- I believe, anyways, that it is not operating today.

Q. Let's look at what a couple of other experts have said about the contribution of soil.

A. Okay.

Q. Okay. There's one from your Report in Exhibit -- it's DMP-45. This is a -- it's actually a presentation --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- made by Mr. Hamilton, I believe.

A. I feel much better that I recognize my own exhibit.

Q. There was a report done by GWI Intrinsik in 2009.

A. I'm familiar with that, yes.

Q. Okay. So let's go to Page 20, here, of this presentation. There's a statement here that, "there is a significant likelihood between 24 and 96 percent that a child will have blood-lead levels above 10 µg/dL in all communities of interest assessed, based only on exposure to contaminated soils."

Now, that's contrary to what you concluded, isn't

[Page 1174]

it?

A. No, it isn't actually. What they did is they used the IUEBK model, which predicts a distribution of blood-lead data, and what I predicted was the mean. So what I showed on my charts is the mean.

Q. So you agree with this statement?

A. I haven't done the math to follow this, but I don't see any reason to question it. I think that soil would be significant, but, if I were to do a risk assessment today, I think one thing that would be really important is to understand how bioavailable the lead is because lead weathers with time in soil, which means it gets bound up, and it's not as easily absorbed. So in the United States, we measure what we call "bioaccessibility," how accessible is lead for absorption from soil samples, and we utilize this information as part of risk assessments.

So I don't believe that Intrinsik did that type of work. There is an assumption about bioavailability built into the IUEBK model, but I don't know that, you know, at this point in time when he did this work, which I believe is 2009 -- 2008-2009, I don't know that he did it in a way that I would do it today, but I'm not challenging what he says. I think that that is what the model would clearly predict at the levels of lead in the soil. And

[Page 1175]

then, just a final note is that he used the 0 to 2 cm cut of soil. So he used the very surface soil to do his Risk Assessment. So I think that the very, very near-surface soil, which was more contaminated than the deeper soil -- deeper soil, I'm sure, was contaminated too -- had higher concentrations of lead than the deeper soil, which had been put down from earlier years.

Q. I'm going to show you one other Report. This is JAC-59. It's a 2012 article by a Mr. Reuer, R-e-u-e-r, and others, entitled: "Lead, arsenic, and cadmium contamination and its impacts on children's health in La Oroya, Perú."

A. Oh, 2011. Okay.

Q. Have you ever seen this?

A. I might have, but it doesn't strike me as familiar.

Q. On Page 6 of this Report, there is a lot of data. And I want to talk about the paragraph there. It is hard to read. Here it is. This is under "Indoor Dust Concentrations." And, of course, as we discussed, indoor dust is not going away, even if emissions stop; right?

A. That's true, but I believe Integral allocated 70 or 80 percent of indoor dust to ongoing emissions because windows are open, dust blows in. Anyone who has lived near a freeway knows that that is the case.

[Page 1176]

Q. Actually, what my understanding -- and don't take my word for it -- but my understanding is that they used 70 percent of the soil concentration because the indoor dust is mostly soil that gets tracked in from the environment?

A. I don't think that's correct.

Q. Okay. So the Reuer Report says: "Elevated and variable metal concentrations follow the soil pattern as most indoor mineral dust would be derived from local soils."

So I take it you disagree with that?

A. Indoor dust concentrations. I have to read it. Give me a second. Okay.

Q. My question simply is: Do you disagree with this conclusion that indoor dust is largely derived from the soil?

A. I think what he's saying is the mineral content of indoor dust is mostly derived from soil.

Q. Do you agree?

A. I mean, not -- I mean, I agree with Dr. Schoof's risk assessment that most of the indoor dust, while the Facility was operating, was from emissions.

And, you know, if -- maybe you haven't had this experience. I live in Southern California, where there is air pollution. If you live near a freeway, you have got to

[Page 1177]

clean the dust -- you know, especially back in the day, you have to clean the dust off every day because it flies in through the windows.

So my understanding, from Dr. Schoof's risk assessment, is that she assumed 70 or 80 percent of indoor dust comes from the emissions. And then when she reduces emissions, she reduces the lead contribution in indoor dust.

Q. I live in Houston. We don't dare open the windows, it is too hot.

A. Okay.

Q. Let's go to the table at the top of Page 10 of this Report. It is hard to read, but I want to make sure we understand what is being shown here, and it refers to the IEUBK model. That is what you and Dr. Schoof have tried to explain to us; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And lead estimates by site and age. "For each site, the median lead concentration for all three media was included in a model run; all other media were set to zero to evaluate the impact of indoor dust, soil, and drinking water."

So they are trying to isolate the impact of those three things but you agree that the lead in drinking water is a very small part of picture?

[Page 1178]

A. Yes. That's what Dr. Schoof found.

Q. Okay. So if we focus on the La Oroya Antigua, what this is showing is that the blood-lead levels, just from indoor dust, soil, and drinking water, are still pretty high?

A. Why does it say the 95 percent confidence interval is 6.9? Because it doesn't make sense to me.

I guess I kind of have to read the whole thing, but I do agree -- in 2011, which, I assume, is what he's evaluating -- I showed in my -- I call it a "rainbow" figure -- that the vast majority of blood-lead levels are less than 20 in that timeframe because the emissions from the Facility had stopped.

But I mean -- the 21 for a mean seems kind of high. The upper 95 percent confidence limit should be higher than the mean, so I would have to get, I think, read the Report to understand.

Q. Let me just show you the conclusion of the Report on Page 11. It says: "In the absence of point source emissions" -- we're talking about the plant here.

A. Yeah.

Q. -- "contaminated soil and indoor dust pose a significant health risk to the children of La Oroya Antigua. Reduced atmospheric pollution from the metallurgical complex will not necessarily return pediatric

[Page 1179]

risk blood-lead levels below the 10-microgram limit."

A. I think that is most likely true.

Q. Okay. And so, I mean, the point of all this, really, is to try to say that, even if you stop the emissions all together, the historical contamination is still a problem?

A. Yeah, but it's much less of a problem than when the facility was operating.

Q. All right. I want to go to the 2008 Integral Report.

A. Okay.

Q. And, obviously, this is another Report that you have read; right?

A. Oh, absolutely.

Q. It is C-139. There's the front page. Let's start at Page 36. We actually looked at this a little bit with Dr. Schoof, but you recognize that between 2005 and 2008, when Integral came back, that Doe Run Perú had done a number of things to improve the emissions issue at the plant; true?

A. Yes. And I think the most significant one for blood lead was the baghouses on the lead furnace, because that made a really significant drop in blood-lead levels.

Q. And we don't need to go through all these Projects, but, Mr. Neely, if you could scroll up a little

[Page 1180]

bit to the conclusion here.

You don't dispute that there were notable declines in both stack and fugitive emissions by 2008, do you?

A. So there were notable declines in fugitive emissions by 2008, in particular, because they put the baghouse on the lead furnaces, which, as I've said several times, reduced the emissions. There were fugitive of half a megaton a day of lead, according to Mr. Connor.

Q. Okay.

A. That's huge.

Q. And I think you noted that that had an immediate effect, or --

A. I mean, it is blood lead -- lead leaves the body of children relatively quickly. It depends on their age and their nutritional status, but, you know, within a matter of months, you can see a decline.

Q. If we go to Page 38 of the 2008 Report, we see here there's another long list of community programs implemented by Doe Run Perú before 2005.

And we had this discussion before you arrived, at the difference between trying to prevent exposure on the one hand versus reducing emissions on the other, but reducing the exposure is also good for the public health too, isn't it?

[Page 1181]

A. Reducing the emissions would have had the most significant impact, but when you take kids that have very high blood-lead levels and take them out of the environment, it is almost -- it is like emergency response. You need to get them out of the environment so that their blood-lead levels drop as quickly as possible.

And, obviously, I was not there in 2006 or even in 2024, but I understood from that Expert Report that they would move the kids -- the Expert Report of 2006 -- they would move the kids to schools and give them better nutrition, so they absorbed less lead. But they would -- once they got to 45 mcg/dL, they would send them back to their regular school.

Which Dr. Clark, who was the toxicologist in that Expert Panel, was not impressed by. Which I also can't understand why you would send a child back with 45 micrograms per deciliter back to the environment they were in.

Q. My question simply was, instituting these kinds of community efforts helps the problem, doesn't hurt it?

A. It doesn't hurt it. But as the CDC said, none of this will have a significant impact until the lead emissions are curtailed.

Q. Okay. Let's turn to Page 22 of the Report. Here's a discussion about lead. And which is -- now we're

[Page 1182]

in 2008 with this Report, and they are talking about, again, trying to predict what will happen if further improvements are made.

And they are expecting that the operational changes are to cause lead emissions to decline by 91 percent. That is exactly what you want to happen; right?

A. Absolutely. That is -- you know, I kind of think that is my point. I mean, that makes such a big difference if you could -- if the final PAMA Project would have been finished, that's a huge reduction.

Q. And the point, that we've been talking about throughout the morning here, is that there were things that were done. They weren't the main things in your Opinion that should have been done sooner.

A. That's correct. I think PAMA Project 1 should have been done sooner.

Q. Okay. So I want to now go to your Report, the chart we have seen before. It is Page 16 of your First Report. We will get there. 16. There we go.

This is the key for you. You want to see reduction in the blood-lead levels, don't you?

A. That's right.

Q. And they were bad when they were first measured, weren't they?

[Page 1183]

A. They were bad pretty much till 2007.

Q. We don't have any historical blood-lead information back when Centromín was operating the plant, do we?

A. I have not seen any, no.

Q. Okay. So we don't have any basis to compare the bars in the chart, that you show us here in your Figure 2, to what they would have been in the '90s, before 1997, do we?

A. No.

Q. But what we do see here is that there were declines at La Oroya Antigua and La Oroya Nuevo from 1999 to 2004 to 2007, don't we?

A. Well, you know, if you look at my figure that I presented the other day, yesterday --

Q. I'm happy to do that, but can you answer my question first? You see declines.

A. Yes. There were declines.

Q. Okay. And that's a good thing; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Now, let's go to -- I know you want to show me the rainbow.

A. I actually wanted to show you the one with all the dots.

Q. Okay. Tell us which slide you want us to look

[Page 1184]

at.

A. 14.

Q. I think we are all there.

A. Okay. My point is that the levels in blood were very high, starting back when they first collected a sample through about 2007. Then they put in the baghouse control and pretty much immediately you can see that blood-lead levels drop.

And this is not going to be a precise measure because, you know, you could have a different mix of kids in each one of these samples. And then when the plant shut down, it went down further.

Now, the other thing I wanted to show you is Slide 27. And -- so in 1999, the airborne concentrations of lead -- and these are kind of spiky because they are monthly measures -- and they are going to be affected by weather -- are higher than they were when Centromín was operating the Facility.

And I looked through all this data, every single month there was a report for every single monitor. And I think it is possible -- but it is entirely -- I don't know for sure, but it could be that the lead in air was lower than during Centromín's operations there from '94 to mid-1997 than after, until 1999 when Doe Run was operating. So the lead in air goes up.

[Page 1185]

And so I would assume the lead in blood also goes up because there a very direct correlation between lead in air, which ends up it being lead in dust, and potential for exposure. So we don't know. But I think it helps to look at the air data because that is one measure.

Q. I want to go back to the primary data in your Report at Page 16.

A. Okay.

Q. What we can see from the data you refer to, the key indicator for public health in the community is improving over time during Doe Run's operations?

A. I think that -- I mean, I'd have to look, again, at my conclusion, but in that same Report is -- in Figure 16 -- is the dots that show that it didn't improve really until 2007. 2004 was a bit of a fluke. Lower than the rest of them because 2005 was higher, 2006 was higher, early 2007 was higher, so --

Q. I'm just using what you put in your Report, and what we see is an overall progressive decline in the blood-lead levels over time during Doe Run's operation, don't we?

A. I just want to make sure we're clear, though, that my opinion in the same Report shows that they stayed high until about 2007, when they first came down because of fixing the baghouse, the lead baghouse. So that's my

[Page 1186]

opinion. They were high the whole time Doe Run was operating the Facility.

Q. Ms. Proctor, you're --

A. Until 2007, they did decline.

Q. You understand, Ms. Proctor, that the baghouses were not part of the PAMA projects?

A. I do.

Q. Okay. And you're not here to offer any Opinions about whether Doe Run Perú complied or not with the PAMA, are you?

A. Oh, I think I made my Opinion that they did not comply with the PAMA because they didn't finish the Sulfuric Acid Plants, and they did not meet the air quality standards, which were requirements of the PAMA. I think. That's how I understand the PAMA, but I'm not a Peruvian Environmental Law Expert. So...

Q. All right. But -- well, and you're -- in fact, you make a statement in your Second Report, that you understand that the Claims of the Missouri Plaintiffs are that -- are based on the fact that Doe Run Perú didn't build the Sulfuric Acid Plants soon enough?

A. Well, I read the Plaintiffs' filing, and what I see is them citing lead, other metals, sulfuric acid in dust and air -- they never mentioned soil -- as driving their Complaints. And those would have -- there would have

[Page 1187]

been a lot less lead in dust and SO2 if they had built the plants.

Q. So I want to look at two things then. First, let's look at your Second Report.

A. Okay.

Q. And you make a statement on Page 9. You state: "I understand the Missouri Plaintiffs' claims are directly related to DRP's failure to complete PAMA Project 1."

Those are your words; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Maybe I should have said in a more general fashion, because I haven't looked at any of the exact claims that they were making. Like, I haven't looked at what they -- what each individual in the Missouri Litigation is claiming.

Q. Well, let's look at what the Expert, Environmental Expert hired by those Plaintiffs testified to in his deposition, which is an exhibit in this case. C-235.

A. I didn't read this before, just so you know.

Q. I'm going to show it to you. It's on PDF Page 12, but it's Page 47 of the deposition.

This is Jack Matsun. He's an environmental guy

[Page 1188]

hired by the plaintiffs.

A. Okay.

Q. You talked a lot in your Direct Presentation about sulfur dioxide, and we haven't talked at all about that yet, but I want to show you this because the plaintiffs Expert in the Missouri cases was asked: "So are you offering any opinions in this case, with respect to emissions of sulfur dioxide or practices to control the emissions of sulfur dioxide?"

And he said: "Only if you ask questions about it."

A. Okay.

Q. So -- but is it -- so the general proposition, "your focus was not on sulfur dioxide."

"Answer: Correct."

And then he goes on to say it wasn't on arsenic and cadmium.

The focus of the Plaintiffs' Claims in the Missouri Litigation is lead.

Do you understand that?

A. I do know that the filing specifically identifies sulfur dioxide as well.

Q. Okay. But according to their Expert, his focus, at least, was lead?

A. But he's not the toxicologist. The toxicologist

[Page 1189]

is Jill Ryer-Powder, and I did not read her Report either, but I did see it.

Q. Well, you agree even that lead is a more serious issue than sulfur dioxide?

A. The most polluted places in the world are listed that way because of air pollution, and PM2.5, the very tiny particles that cause increased mortality. Sulfur dioxide is a very serious problem. They are both serious. I don't rank one over the other.

Q. Do you agree that the most serious time period for lead exposure to humans is early childhood?

A. Yes. And prenatal.

Q. So for -- were you aware that there are plaintiffs in the Missouri Litigation who were born years before Doe Run Perú took over operations?

A. I don't know anything about the individual plaintiffs.

Q. Well, if there are individual plaintiffs who were born in the early '90s, their exposure to lead was much more serious from Centromín's operations than from Doe Run Perú's operations?

A. Well, then the Experts in the case should be able to discern that on an individual basis.

Q. All right.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Excuse me, just wondering if

[Page 1190]

we could have a humanitarian break, if possible.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: I did a calculation according to the new schedule. Our coffee break would be due in 10 minutes. But for humanitarian reasons we can have it --

MS. GEHRING FLORES: I don't want to interrupt.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Perfect. So we have a coffee break until 10:50.

(Brief recess.)

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Before, just -- Ms. Proctor, there is going to be a short interruption in the -- in your examination. So because you need to announce that for the record.

MR. SCHIFFER: I'm the -- in Texas, there are a number of cases that are set on a trial docket, a two-week trial docket, and right now we are the number two case on a two-week trial docket, and the case before us is going to take maybe one or two days, if it goes at all.

So there's a very high degree of likelihood that I will be called to trial next week, and that'll be anticipated to be a two-week trial. And so I will personally be completely -- you know, it's like this arbitration, I'm all consumed by it, so -- and the timing couldn't be worse, actually, coming off this, but I digress.

So -- and I can let the Tribunal know next week.

[Page 1191]

For example, if my case isn't going to get reached, I'm happy to let the Tribunal know that and abide by an earlier schedule, since I've been the principal briefer in the case, you know, I would just like to have time. Thank you.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Mr. Schiffer, I thought that what you just said would relate to the appearance -- sorry?

(Comments off microphone.)

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Of Mr. -- of the -- and because we discussed how should we handle what you are probably going to announce because it is not on the record yet. At least, all I heard was this short one. And then the question is, what are we supposed to allow in that regard, and if the reaction would be or the next step would be submissions, then I thought then that what you just said would come in with regard to the deadline for these submissions; is that correct?

MR. SCHIFFER: Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: So what is going to happen, officially?

MR. SCHIFFER: Okay. So Josh Weiss, who is General Counsel -- I believe General Counsel of Renco, is also a Counsel in this case -- one of the Counsel in this case, and it's my understanding from him that he can tell the Tribunal the status of the Missouri Litigation as it is today, and answer more detailed questions than I could do.

[Page 1192]

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Could I have Mr. Pearsall's view on the -- let's say, what he thinks about that? Because it's a change in Schedule.

MR. PEARSALL: Sure. Thank you, Mr. President.

We are happy to answer any of the Tribunal's questions on the status of the Missouri Litigation. We think that, for the good of the order and because of the Schedule that we have this week, it's best to address those points in writing. I don't see the need for an oral back and forth from the General Counsel of Doe Run at this point -- of Renco at this point.

But if that's what the Tribunal wants, we would just want to have sufficient time to make an oral presentation in rebuttal, if necessary. We hope that a rebuttal wouldn't be necessary. The facts are the facts, as we've heard many times, but we'd prefer it in writing, if this is okay with the Tribunal. I don't think an oral presentation is necessary.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: So your, let's say, opposition to oral also relates to the appearance and the possibility for this gentleman to give us a statement?

MR. PEARSALL: Yes. Mr. Weiss has been here all last week. He was here for part of this week as well. He sits right next to Mr. Fogler during the presentations. I don't think an oral presentation is needed. We can address

[Page 1193]

these points in writing, as anticipated by the President's statements just yesterday about the Tribunal will have written questions for us at the end of the Closings.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Okay. Thank you.

(Tribunal conferring.)

PRESIDENT SIMMA: So the Tribunal has decided that it has a preference for written statements in respect of the submissions on that matter. The -- we will decide about the deadline a little later, but I think we'll take into consideration what you said about your -- the commitments within the next weeks, and that is, I think, taken care of the matter.

MR. SCHIFFER: Thank you.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Okay. So the floor goes back to Mr. Fogler.

BY MR. FOGLER:

Q. Ms. Proctor?

A. Yes.

Q. It has been a pleasure speaking with you this morning.

MR. FOGLER: I have no further questions.

See, that's another rule of cross-examination, during the break you decide to give up.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Okay. Well, thanks for the spirit of this and the mood. That's always maybe a little

[Page 1194]

surprising, but great. So thank you very much, and I give the floor to -- is it going to Ms. Gehring Flores for the redirect?

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. GEHRING FLORES:

Q. I like Mr. Fogler's rules.

Ms. Proctor, you mentioned baghouses quite a bit, and I'm not sure any of us necessarily has a good idea of what a baghouse is.

And I think, Kelby, could you pull up Slide 33 of Ms. Proctor's presentation?

Could you please explain to the Tribunal what a baghouse is?

A. Thanks. Sorry about that.

A baghouse pulls dusty air. It doesn't capture gases. It pulls dusty air through a large number of bags. We're talking -- this one has thousands and thousands of bags in it, and as it pulls always the air through, the dust gets caught in the bags; so that it doesn't go out the stacks. So ultimately, this, the pipes go to what you see is, like, basically a stack, and it blows out the top, down the left side.

And then sometimes for baghouses, if you have to

[Page 1195]

get the particle, like, get more particles, you need to capture the big particles first in a cyclone or another -- a first stage, and then you can put on more and more tighter filters to get the particles out of the air.

So it's basically an extremely fancy vacuum cleaner, that works much better than a vacuum cleaner; so it just captures dust.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: I confess when I first heard the term, I had never heard of it before. I thought of something else. I thought of my wife shopping, looking for the best bag houses in Washington. So -- but now I know better, and I'm more relaxed about the question.

(Laughter.)

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Okay. So but -- yes.

ARBITRATOR GRIGERA NAÓN: Seizing on the opportunity that the President put in a question, technically speaking --

(Interruption.)

ARBITRATOR GRIGERA NAÓN: Technically speaking, when baghouses came to life in the daily precautions that one has to take when running this kind of operation, is it a rocket science? Is it something that has been along since 1997?

THE WITNESS: Oh, it's been something that's been -- it depends on the size of the operation. In the

[Page 1196]

United States, there were baghouses, I'm sure, in the 1970s. A baghouse this sophisticated, many of my clients have this type of level of baghouse on their operation in the United States. But this is not rocket science to build a baghouse, for sure.

ARBITRATOR GRIGERA NAÓN: Okay. Thank you.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: You haven't finished.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Correct.

BY MS. GEHRING FLORES:

Q. Ms. Proctor, Mr. Fogler stated that yesterday we were about to go through 27 Projects that Mr. Connor had identified in his Second Report.

Do you remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. And I believe Mr. Fogler said that all 27 of those Projects had been completed before the year 2000.

Do you remember that?

A. Not specifically. I'm sorry.

Q. Okay. Could you explain your understanding of when all 27 of Mr. Connor's Projects were completed?

A. Well, PAMA 1 is not completed, to date. There is still no Sulfuric Acid Plant on the copper circuit. So they did finally probably meet the air quality standards, but they didn't finish PAMA Project 1. So I don't know about the rest of the dates. But definitely, for Number 1,

[Page 1197]

it's still pending, may never happen unless the smelter gets completely revamped and put back online.

Q. So that was or wasn't before 2000?

A. The current day is clearly after 2000.

Q. Okay. And then I believe that one of the Projects -- one of the 27 Projects that Mr. Connor identified was the Baghouse Project.

Did that happen? Did that -- was that complete before 2000?

A. That was completed in 2007, according to his Report. I think it was actually finished December 2006, but I'm not going to argue with him.

Q. And so do you think that you would agree with Mr. Fogler's statement that all of the 27 Projects were finished before 2000?

A. I do not agree.

Q. And what would you have to do to verify whether or not they were all completed before the year 2000?

A. I guess I would have to go to Perú in 2000, and go through the list.

Q. Mr. Fogler asked you about whether you have been to La Oroya.

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think you've told us that you've reviewed

[Page 1198]

Dr. Schoof's risk assessments from the year 2005 and her risk assessment from 2008, which was about her visit in 2007, I believe. And you've stated that you agree with Dr. Schoof's conclusions in her Reports?

A. Yes.

Q. And could you explain what the value might be in visiting La Oroya today, with respect to what conditions may have been two decades ago?

A. Well, that's exactly the point. I did consider going to La Oroya, but when I realized that the operation was not running, I didn't think there was anything to look at. Now, if there was an airplane that could take me back in time to the mid-1990s through 2000, that would be very informative, but, no, that technology doesn't exist.

Q. Mr. Fogler showed you a calendar where he claimed that this was a Schedule of deadlines with respect to Project 1 or the Sulfuric Acid Plants, which had a deadline that started in 2003.

A. Yes.

Q. Are you familiar with all of the investment or other deadlines that pertain to the construction of the Sulfuric Acid Plants?

A. No. I'm just -- really had focused on the PAMA -- you know, the ones in the PAMA, and I do believe the Lead and Zinc Plant were supposed to be done in 2005

[Page 1199]

in the original PAMA. But I would need to check my notes to be certain. And I think that a Project as big as a Sulfuric Acid Plant is going to take a lot of engineering to get it even close to being -- to be completed; right?

It's going to take a lot of work to solve this problem. So even though they set the deadline 2003, 2005, I would think that they would have planned to start on it right away, but I don't think that that is what happened.

And then, you know, they came up with a new plan which they called the master plan in 1998 by Fluor Daniel, which is an American consulting firm, very smart engineers, very experienced, and they came up with a plan that pushed it forward in time to 2006, completion of -- I think they were only going to build one big Acid Plant for all three circuits, and it was going to be done in 2006, and you could correct me if I'm wrong -- I think I'm -- it's, probably, I think, about 2006, but that didn't happen either.

So then they have a new restart date, pushes it out to -- with an aggressive Schedule to the fourth quarter of 2009. So -- and they did do the Lead Acid Plant in that time frame. I think they finished it in 2008 or 2009, I can't remember. But bottom line is, it was never finished.

Q. Are you familiar with the affiliation of Fluor Daniel, the parent Company that owns Fluor Daniel?

[Page 1200]

A. I am not. They have a really big building in my -- near the airport that I fly in and out of. But other than that, I couldn't tell you.

Q. I'm going to show you Exhibit C-60, which is the Integral Report from 2005, at PDF Page 37. And I believe Mr. Fogler read to you from Dr. Schoof's conclusions about historical emissions in this document, but I believe a little bit further down the page, that part was cut off, the part about recommendations.

Could you review -- and Kelby, if you could -- yeah.

Could you review that part on recommendations, and then, once you've reviewed it, give your understanding of Dr. Schoof's prioritization of historical emissions?

A. I'm sorry. I don't really see that she prioritizes anything in this text, but I believe that she is prioritize -- she would prioritize reduced emissions, which is also what the CDC said.

Q. Do you want to read the first line, the first sentence?

A. Yeah, but it says "reduce exposures." It doesn't say "reduce emissions," and it -- she attributes it to CDC, but it's clear from everything I've read, every risk assessment Expert, the CDC, the Intrinsik Risk Assessment, all say the priority is to reduce emissions. And, in fact,

[Page 1201]

you can't really clean up soil or revegetate when you have sulfur acid rain coming down on the plants you might plant. They won't grow, obviously. And the -- and any, like, soil cleanup you do would just get recontaminated. So what you have to do, first and foremost, is reduce emissions.

Q. And let me just read it. It says: "The CDC's recent Report on La Oroya, (CDC 2005) recommends that all stakeholders in La Oroya collaborate in a coordinated program to reduce emissions, reduce exposures, and to eventually remediate historic contamination."

But I think you just said that it doesn't mention "reduce emissions." Does that--

A. I'm sorry. I didn't -- I read it too quickly.

Q. Okay.

A. It does say that. I mean, that's an Opinion.

Q. So do you -- could you explain how Dr. Schoof prioritizes historical emissions versus active emissions?

A. Active emissions are the priority.

ARBITRATOR GRIGERA NAÓN: Excuse me, a question.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

ARBITRATOR GRIGERA NAÓN: You mentioned acid rain.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

ARBITRATOR GRIGERA NAÓN: One thing is -- I am not an Expert, obviously, but one thing is acid rain,

[Page 1202]

another thing is particles that are falling.

Do we have evidence that there is acid rain?

THE WITNESS: There is no doubt that there was acid rain, because what happens is water in the air reacts with the sulfur dioxide and forms the acid rain. It forms sulfuric acid, and that is what comes down. So I don't think anybody measured it, but it is a known fact that that is where acid rain comes from.

ARBITRATOR GRIGERA NAÓN: Thank you.

THE WITNESS: That's fine.

BY MS. GEHRING FLORES:

Q. Could you please describe the difference in health impacts at blood-lead levels above 10 mcg/dL?

A. The health impacts can be quite serious, even at 10 mcg/dL, 10-20 we have neurocognitive effects in children, that's observed. So that means they can't learn as fast as they normally would, they tend to have behavior issues, anger issues, and then the effects -- stunting of growth, hearing loss, and it proceeds. At some point, you could get to a dose that is fatal.

Q. And I believe you've explained that in the sampling of Dr. Schoof's risk assessments, there were some children who had blood-lead levels 20, 30, 40, even some at 70.

A. Yes.

[Page 1203]

Q. What was, from your analysis, and from Dr. Schoof's analysis -- what was the greatest cause, or the principal cause of blood-lead levels at 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70?

A. It was in her risk assessments, which is during the time period when Doe Run was operating, it was from the ongoing emissions.

Q. Mr. Fogler asked you questions about DRP's efficiency, and if it's true that its stack emissions were reduced, that that would mean that they were efficient.

Do you remember that?

A. Well, I thought that was a general question, like you can -- if you become more efficient, then you can have reduced stack emissions and increased production, which is generally possible, but I don't know enough about the efficiency that was included to have an opinion about the efficiency of emission controls.

Q. If DRP were actually able to reduce its stack emissions -- just let's assume that's true -- but had a fugitive emissions problem, or maybe fugitive emissions increase, would you -- do you think that that would be efficient?

A. No. Fugitive emissions are the primary problem, in my Opinion, and they go unmeasured. So you can't really use stack emissions as a measure of total efficiency. Or

[Page 1204]

maybe -- you can't use stack emissions to judge the impact on air quality because the fugitive emissions have a greater impact. And fugitive emissions are emissions that just fly out with no filter.

Q. And I think this is my last question. Mr. Fogler asked you about -- I think maybe he was asking about your native files from your analysis, like whether or not you turned over all of your native files.

Do you remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Are you aware if Counsel for Claimants, for Doe Run and Renco, requested your native files?

A. No. And -- I mean, there weren't spreadsheets of lead output in Doctor -- you know, blood-lead in Dr. Schoof's Expert Report; so my assumption was that that kind of information wasn't necessary.

Q. And would you have had any problem turning over your native files, if you were -- if that was requested of you?

A. No problem.

Q. Okay. All right.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: No further questions. Thank you.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Okay. Thank you, Miss Gehring. The floor goes to my colleagues as to questions.

[Page 1205]

Mr. Thomas?

QUESTIONS FROM THE TRIBUNAL

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: You're going to have to go back to the very beginning of your presentation yesterday because I'm afraid I still don't quite understand one point, and it was about the IEUBK Version 2.0 program that you used.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: And you had distinguished that from, as I understand it, an earlier version of the program that Dr. Schoof had used?

THE WITNESS: No. Dr. Schoof did her work when 2.0 wasn't available.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Right.

THE WITNESS: And so in the old version of IEUBK, .99 -- and there was actually like .99A through D, you could only input like a total soil and dust value. And she said that the reason why she chose not to use the IEUBK model and to use a different model, which is called ISE, was because of this limitation within the old version of the model. So I wanted to make it clear that that limitation went away in the intervening 19 years.

So I was able to input outdoor dust, indoor dust, and soil as independent exposure matrices, just like she did with the ISE model. So I just wanted to -- I know it's

[Page 1206]

kind of confusing, but I just wanted to say that I could use IEUBK to reproduce her numbers, and I showed that I basically did in my figure with the bar charts.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Okay. But do I understand that your ability to differentiate between these different substances, did that lead -- how did that change the findings that you were able to reach, having used a more sophisticated or more modern model?

THE WITNESS: It did not change them. I was able to predict exactly what Dr. Schoof predicted. It's just that the ISC model could direct them in 2004, the IEUBK couldn't have done in 2004. But the IEUBK caught up. So that is why.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: All right. Okay. All right. Thank you. Next question.

You had a discussion with Mr. Fogler this morning about the issue of Centromín versus DRP and the creation of contamination. And he had put an exhibit to you. It was GBM-73, and it was where there was a 78 percent Centromín, 22 percent of total mass of pollutants was the point that came up in the examination. Now, the -- you then went on to say "total mass is not equivalent to dose or exposure."

Can you elaborate on what you were -- the point that you were trying to make?

THE WITNESS: So the contamination over time has

[Page 1207]

definitely built up in La Oroya. The contamination that is 3 feet down is not contamination that an individual is going to come into contact with. People come into contact with their immediate environment: The dust on the table, the soil on the surface. That is how people become exposed. And it's not the mass in those -- in the particles of dust, if you will. It's the amount that you're able to take in and absorb.

So total mass, in my opinion, doesn't really mean anything with regard to dose. You could be exposed to a hundred times higher concentration but a very small mass, and that dose would be much higher than a large mass at dilute concentrations.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Okay. And this takes me to the next question I had, which was, you had discussed the question of soil binding with lead over time.

THE WITNESS: Umm-hmm.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Can you explain that process? For example -- well, can you explain that in temporal terms? How long does it take soil to bind with lead; so as to make it less bioavailable?

THE WITNESS: It depends on the type of soil. So it binds with time. I think the upper bound of bioaccessibility for lead, or the lower bound of bioaccessibility for lead that I have seen in the work I've

[Page 1208]

done is about 5 percent. So lead that falls on the ground becomes less available for absorption than it was when it was initially emitted.

But it's going to depend on the soil and the organic content, and so EPA, federal EPA of the U.S. has a test to collect a sample and measure how accessible the lead is for absorption. And it's kind of like a simulated stomach test, because it uses hydrochloric acid, which is the type of acid in our stomach, at the right pH, add some additional materials that are -- what's in our stomach normally, and measures how much lead can come out of that test. So it's a measured value.

Now, that -- what the federal EPA has done, they take that measured value and they plug it into an equation, and what comes out of that equation is a measure of bioavailability, the total amount you can absorb, that goes into risk assessments in the United States.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Okay. But can you just take me a little bit further on this one?

THE WITNESS: Okay.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Would -- let me give you a period of, say, five years. For a lead deposit on soil, would one expect as in terms of evaluating an exposure pathway that, if it were to be sitting on soil for a period of, say, five years, is there a minor diminishment in

[Page 1209]

bioavailability, a significant diminishment? Can you give
me a sense of that?

THE WITNESS: It can be quite significant.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: But it depends upon the type
of soil --

THE WITNESS: It depends on the type of soil.

(Overlapping speakers.)

(Interruption.)

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: I'm sorry. I interrupted.
Please continue.

THE WITNESS: Yes, it depends on the type of
soil. But it's a very important parameter for evaluating
risk at the mining sites in the United States. So it
becomes standard practice, and what the federal EPA has
done is to check how well their measure of bioaccessibility
is with actual data where they feed soil to an animal, and
then measure how much lead is in their blood.

So they can see, yes, bioaccessibility is
5 percent, and then they run it through their calculation.
And they say it's 3 percent is the predicted value in a
human. So it's usually that bioaccessibility, how much you
can extract in those tests, is higher than the calculated
value for the amount that can be absorbed in a human.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Okay.

THE WITNESS: But five years is a reasonable time

[Page 1210]

to make -- to have decreased bioavailability or
bioaccessibility. I do think at some point -- it's not
like it's going to go down forever. It's going to plateau,
you know. There's going to be a plateau, and then it's
basically not going to change any more with time. But that
would be -- I mean, I think that would be a valuable piece
of information to try to address the residual cleanup in
La Oroya too.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Okay. Last question, I
think. At two points during your examination this morning,
there was a discussion about lead moving through the body,
and then later on you made a comment that lead leaves the
blood of children relatively quickly. And the question I
had is this: Can you describe, in layperson's terms, the
process by which the body reacts to a dose? And I try to
make this a little bit clearer. I always had the
impression that once it's in your body, it's in your body.
Is that erroneous? Because you made it sound as
if it actually can be eliminated over time, but, obviously,
that depends on the chronic exposure of an individual to --

(Overlapping speakers.)

THE WITNESS: Yes.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Can you, perhaps, elaborate
upon this for my --

(Overlapping speakers.)

[Page 1211]

THE WITNESS: Certainly. So lead is a
bone-seeking element. It likes to bind to bone. So lead
that I'm exposed to is probably going to be hanging out for
a long time in my bones, because I'm old. But children are
growing and their bones are growing. So as that occurs,
blood -- lead is released into the blood, but once it's
released into the blood, it can be excreted.

So lead in your body does leave. It's not a
sink, if you will, it will leave with time. It'll leave
much slower in adults than children, and then, of course,
it's very important if you're considering whether exposure
is continuing, because if you're continuing to be exposed,
you will continue to have lead in your system.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Right. Thank you very much.
That was very helpful. Thank you.

THE WITNESS: Sure.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: I think I have two, I think,
not terribly comprehensive questions that don't need to be
answered in a very comprehensive manner. The first one is
just latching on to what Mr. Thomas said, this blood can be
excreted. Now, that's a medical question. Excretion of
blood from children. How is that done? I mean, just,
it's --

(Overlapping speakers.)

THE WITNESS: It's not. Let me clarify.

[Page 1212]

It -- the blood is cleaned by the kidneys, and then the
lead is taken out of the blood and is excreted in urine.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: And how is the lead taken out
of the blood?

THE WITNESS: It's cleaned by the kidneys. The
kidneys clean your blood.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Oh, it's done without any
intervention by medicine. Okay.

THE WITNESS: There's no medical device involved.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Right. The other thing is away
from the kids. I just wonder, would the La Oroya Plant be
too big -- wouldn't for a, what I would call some kind of a
log? Does a plant not have a log? This is my reaction to
the questions you were asked, and you said you would need
an airplane to take you back in time.

I just wondered, isn't somewhere in La Oroya a
big book, I mean, in which you could see that at a certain
age, date -- not Project 18, but a certain machine by name,
et cetera, was installed. And -- I don't know. Maybe a
bottle of champagne was opened because it was important. I
mean, what I call a logbook.

THE WITNESS: I understand what you're saying. I
don't know if there's a logbook.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Could -- maybe in the course of
the time that's left, somebody try to answer on that,

[Page 1213]

because...

MR. FOGLER: Yes, there are clearly records that
indicate exactly when these Projects were done, yes. And
that's in evidence. It is in Mr. Connor's Report and
others.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: So when the Claimant says that
for these 27 Projects, at least -- a certain number of them
were actually finished, that could be proven by
documentation?

MR. FOGLER: Oh, yes. Absolutely.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Okay. Okay. Thank you very
much.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Judge Simma, if I just might
follow up.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Yes, please. You have the
floor.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Many of my questions to
Mr. Connor regarded whether or not there was actual
documentation of the dates that he was representing. So if
that documentation is presented, we would have to see what
it says.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: That means it is not yet
presented?

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Mr. Connor has dates in his
interactive tool. It's not clear where those dates are

[Page 1214]

coming from.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Okay.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: And -- oh, sorry.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: That answers my question.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Just with respect to
Mr. Thomas's question, I don't know if it would be helpful
for Ms. Proctor to explain why or how, how it is that when
children grow, why it is that lead gets released into the
blood.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Okay.

ARBITRATOR THOMAS: I mean, I thought I
understood the general concept. I don't know whether I
need a further elaboration. It may be getting to the
limits of my technical comprehension. So if you have a
Cole's Notes version, I suppose you can elaborate upon it,
but you described the process enough to my satisfaction.
Thank you.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: That was a reply sufficient for
the purpose of this remark by Ms. Gehring Flores. And if I
am up to date, this brings to an end the Expert examination
of Ms. Proctor. Thank you very much for coming here and
sharing your experience with us. You are released from all
the commitments that go with being an Expert. Thank you,
and have a good trip home to wherever you want to go.

[Page 1215]

THE WITNESS: California. Thank you.

(Witness steps down.)

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Okay. So we have about more
than an hour to go to the lunch, time for lunch; so I would
suggest that we have the direct for Mr. Dobbelaere. Yes.
Is that?

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Yes. We'll bring him up.

MR. WEISS: Mr. President, it's Josh Weiss.
That's me.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Is the Transcript ready? Okay.
Thank you very much.

WIM DOBBELAERE, RESPONDENTS' WITNESS, CALLED

PRESIDENT SIMMА: We have before us
Mr. Dobbelaere.

Mr. Dobbelaere, welcome. Good morning. Would
you please read out the Declaration that you have in front
of you.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

I solemnly declare, upon my honor and conscience,
that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Thank you very much.

So you will be directed by Ms. Gehring Flores.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Thank you, Mr. President.
Members of the Tribunal, President, I present, to

[Page 1216]

you, Mr. Wim Dobbelaere, the independent Expert in
pyrometallurgy that Respondents proffer in this proceeding.

Mr. Dobbelaere has a bachelor's in applied
science and a master's in civil engineering from the
university --

SECRETARY DOE: I'm sorry, Ms. Gehring Flores.
We're having some sort of a technical issue, so we might
just pause before we proceed with the direct.

(Pause.)

SECRETARY DOE: I think it's there. So we can
continue now.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: You have the floor again. The
problem is solved.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Do I need to restart, or was
what I said before recorded?

PRESIDENT SIMMА: I think, for technical reasons,
I would be in favor of you starting anew because you have
just kind of introduced Mr. Dobbelaere and not much more.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Okay. Thank you,
Mr. President.

Members of the Tribunal, President, I present, to
you, Mr. Wim Dobbelaere, the independent Expert in
pyrometallurgy that Respondents proffer in this proceeding.

Mr. Dobbelaere has a bachelor's in applied
science and a master's in civil engineering from the

[Page 1217]

University of Ghent. Mr. Dobbelaere, after that education,
was then educated at the University of Leuven and Umicore
in pyrometallurgy.

Mr. Dobbelaere started his professional career as
a civil engineer in the 1980s, and then, in 1987, he
started working at Umicore, the Umicore smelter in Hoboken,
Belgium. The Umicore smelter, like the La Oroya smelter,
is one of the very few complex poly-metallic smelters in
the world. At Umicore, Mr. Dobbelaere eventually became
the Operations Manager and Senior Manager of Operations
Development. He retired in 2018 and still serves as a
consultant to Umicore.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. GEHRING FLORES:

Q. Mr. Dobbelaere, good morning.

A. Thank you. Good morning. Thank you very much
for the introduction.

Q. And Mr. Dobbelaere, you presented two Expert
Reports in this proceeding; correct?

A. Yes. Correct.

Q. Do you have any corrections or clarifications to
those Reports?

A. Not really, no.

Q. Okay. Thank you.

Please proceed.

[Page 1218]

A. Okay. Thank you.

DIRECT PRESENTATION

THE WITNESS: So it's a little bit
unfortunate -- or a little bit difficult, I notice that I
am maybe the only pyrometallurgical knowledgeable person in
the room. If we are talking about a complex model, then
maybe even more. But I will try to give you an overview of
my presentation which is mainly -- which mainly consists of
four parts.

So first, a general overview of the Facility;
then the specifications for Project 1, the most important
Project of the PAMA, the Sulfuric Acid Plant Project; then
DRP abandoned the only meaningful measures that would have
abated fugitive emissions; and DRP did not implement any
effective project that abated increased emissions.

So the La Oroya Plant was a multi-metal facility
producing primarily copper, lead, and zinc. And each of
these metals have their own circuit at the Facility. Such
a multi-stream or multiply-circuit facilities are rare.
They are even very rare. With most smelting plants around
the world processing only one major stream of metal
concentrate. While the circuits were run separately,
cross-flow existed between them. The La Oroya Facility was
designed to permit these cross-flows, but only up to their
limits, cross-flows that were caused by the significant

[Page 1219]

impurities in the feedstock.

When I say "feedstock," I mean the concentrate
that is inserted into each production stream. La Oroya's
copper and lead circuits were the main sources of emissions
in this case. So I will focus on the copper and lead
circuits. The copper circuit processed copper concentrates
into refined copper. Copper concentrates are the product
of mining copper ore and come in fine powder form. They
consist of a mixture of copper and other metals. In
addition to copper, La Oroya's concentrates contain
significant amounts of sulfur and lead, as well as sand,
lime, and iron. They also contained unusually high levels
of arsenic. The copper circuit had four main components,
which are shown on your screen.

To the right of your screen, on the top, you will
find a table of Mr. Partelpoeg's First Expert Report, which
I agree accurately shows how these components of the
circuit work. I don't have time in this short presentation
to explain each component of the process, but the four main
components of the copper circuit are shown on the slide,
which are roasters, reverberatory furnace, all type
converters, and the copper refinery. Outdated equipment.

It is important to understand that the
concentrate starts at the roasters and works its way
through these components, changing states along the way and

[Page 1220]

producing emissions at each step. The copper circuit was
the main pollutant for lead and SO2, which can be very
surprising, but it was.

With respect to the lead circuit, it processed
lead concentrate into unrefined lead. Similar to copper
concentrate, lead concentrate is a fine powder. It
contains mostly lead sulfide, along with other metals and
minerals.

To the right of your screen, on the bottom, you
will find a table from Mr. Partelpoeg's First Expert
Report, which I also agree accurately shows how these
components work. Again, I don't have time in this short
presentation to explain each component of the process, but
the three main components are shown on the slide, which
are, first, a sinter plant named "La Sinter machine" on the
slide, a blast-furnace, and a reverberatory furnace.

It is helpful to understand that the lead
concentrate starts at the Sinter Plant and works its way
through these components, changing states along the way and
producing emissions, again, at each step.

Now, the copper and the lead circuit produced
both SO2 and lead air emissions. These gases either were
captured and funneled through a filter, which was called
the "main Cottrell." It's a brand name of an
electrofilter, and then released to the environment through

[Page 1221]

the main stack, or they escaped the circuit as fugitive
emissions, entering the environment directly without
filtration at ground level, which is shown by a picture
from Dr. Partelpoeg in 2006.

Fugitive emissions are gases that escape into the
environment from sources other than the main stack or the
secondary stacks.

In addition to being unfiltered, because fugitive
emissions were emitted at ground level, they impacted air
quality eight times more than main-stack emissions. The
copper circuit could send the same amount of lead and
higher amount of SO2 out of the main stack compared to the
lead circuit. It emitted nearly double the amount of
fugitive emissions compared to the lead circuit.

The copper circuit was especially prone to
polluting because it treated materials with the highest
temperatures in nearly-open vessels. The hot material was
transported between the main components of the circuit with
fugitive emissions escaping between the journeys.

And the receiving vessels of the outdated copper
converters were very much smaller than modern receiving
vessels, generating the need for additional transportation.
And, again, every transport generated emissions.

The mattes that DRP old technologies produced
only contained 30 percent copper. With new technologies,

[Page 1222]

copper mattes are produced with 60-70 percent copper. This
reduces the number of transports that need to take place by
more than 50 percent, and, thus, reduces fugitive emissions
by definition. Mattes, by the way, are an intermediate
product of smelting that are made out of copper, iron, and
lead sulfides.

Imagine if the produced mattes had only
30 percent, like in the old technologies, that means that
the mattes also had a much higher level of lead sulfides.

In Centromín times, about 50 percent of the lead
input in the copper circuit was expelled via gas emissions.
The rest was fixed into the copper slag, which is a waste.
In DRP times, because they took in more lead but did not
make more slag, every extra ton of lead treated in the
copper circuit went into the gas emissions, which could
lead to a much higher amount of lead expelled.

Now, let us go to the Project 1 of the PAMA. The
construction of the Sulfuric Acid Plants, and the
modernization that had to be done before their
construction, was the most important Project of the PAMA
for lowering both fugitive and main-stack emissions.

On the right of the screen, I have included the
PAMA's introduction for Project 1, which shows clearly that
modernization was required in order to execute Project 1.
Project 1 of the PAMA recommended modernizing the copper

[Page 1223]

and lead circuits. For the copper circuit, the PАМА
recommended executing a Modernization Plan to replace the
old roasters and the reverb furnace with new technologies,
followed by the installation of a Sulfuric Acid Plant. For
the lead circuit, the PAMA recommended executing a
Modernization Plan to replace the old sinter plant and the
blast-furnaces with new technologies, followed by the
installation of a Sulfuric Acid Plant that could either be
separate from the zinc circuit or be shared.

The modernization was essential as it would have
allowed the Sulfuric Acid Plants to capture the 83 percent
of SO2 as was required by the PAMA.

Modernization also would have had a variety of
indirect positive effects on emissions, for example, it
would have replaced the old roasters, which were a
problematic source of SO2 and arsenic emissions.

The specifications of the PAMA were suggested
methods. The way in which DRP executed the PAMA Projects
was left to DRP's experienced judgment.

Now, the modernization was a prerequisite to
construct Sulfuric Acid Plants. I have been here since
last week, listening to the Parties' Opening Arguments and
testimony, and I have heard that the Claimants say that
they did not have to start the PAMA Project 1 until 2003.
However, this is not exactly right, and it demonstrates a

[Page 1224]

lack of understanding of how the Facility circuits work
with acids -- with Sulfuric Acid Plants.

In the cross-examination of Bruce Neil, I heard
him agree to the undeniable fact that the modernization of
the three circuits had to be made before the construction
of the Sulfuric Acid Plants. The old technologies of the
circuits had to be replaced by modern technology in order
to complete the design of the Sulfuric Acid Plants. The
timing of the investments outlined in the PAMA just
confirmed this.

If you look at the table on the top of the
screen, the PAMA suggested that investment in modernization
of the three circuits occur before the construction of
Sulfuric Acid Plants.

Mr. Connor stated yesterday that the circuits
could be modernized at the same time as the Sulfuric Acid
Plants were being constructed. That is not exactly right.
The design of the Sulfuric Acid Plants required the design
of the modernization to be completed first.

Now, modernizing the circuits would have enabled
DRP to capture more SO2 to treat in the Sulfuric Acid
Plants.

Old technologies did not capture enough SO2 to be
treated and transformed in the Sulfuric Acid Plants.
Because of this, the SO2 produced in the circuits was

[Page 1225]

released into the environment.

Without the modernization of the three circuits,
it would be impossible for DRP to comply with the PAМА
requirement of capturing 83 percent of the SO2 produced by
the three circuits.

As shown in the graphic, old technologies could
only capture gases with a concentration of SO2 between 3
and 5 percent. Gases with such a low concentration could
not be treated in a Sulfuric Acid Plant except if you were
looking for some cherries to find some gases that could go
to the small Sulfuric Acid Plants, which they tried to
do -- which DRP tried to do.

The installation of new technologies, therefore,
needed to obtain gases with a sufficient concentration of
SO2, at least 6 percent, to be processed in the Sulfuric
Acid Plant. The modernization was, thus, needed to capture
the 83 percent of SO2 required by the PАМА. Without the
modernization, SO2 could not be captured. It is important
to understand that Sulfuric Acid Plants do not only -- do
not simply abate SO2. When the concentrated SO2 is
captured, the SO2 gas is first passed to a filter that
removes more than 99 percent of particulate matter, mostly
lead, to recover the lead. Then, the filtered SO2 is
scrubbed before it is converted into Sulfuric Acid. The
scrubbing process removes more than 99 percent of any

[Page 1226]

remaining impurities from the SO2. In this way, Sulfuric
Acid Plants not only reduce SO2 but also lead and
particulates to nearly 0, because making sulfuric acid,
they hate dust. You cannot make sulfuric acid with a gas
with dust. It is impossible.

Now, DRP knew before 2004 that the CMLO had a
fugitive emissions problem. It had to know because the
technical documents of the PAMA indicated so, as well as
the PAMA itself. Fugitive emissions were addressed in the
PAMA more generally, but any metallurgist, after reading
the PAMA, would have immediately known and understood that
the modernization of the three circuits, along with the
construction of the Sulfuric Acid Plants, was designed to
abate both main-stack and fugitive emissions.

DRP also ignored the warning regarding fugitive
emissions given by environmental consultant Knight Piésold
already in 1996. Instead of following what the PAMA
recommended and giving the necessary attention to the
fugitive emissions, in April 1998, DRP instructed Fluor
Daniel, a Renco affiliate, to produce a 10-year Master Plan
to save money on all the PAMA Projects.

Fluor Daniel's study suggested to abandon the
installation of new technologies and to build a sole
Sulfuric Acid Plant for the three circuits.

DRP did not comply with this new design and, in

[Page 1227]

2004, stated that it had just discovered that there were
fugitive emission problems at the CMLO. DRP claimed that
the PAMA was flawed and did not address fugitive emissions.
DRP had to modify its own PAMA design from 1998 and go back
to the Modernization Plan and the construction of three
Sulfuric Acid Plants. DRP had to go back to a plan much
more like the original PAMA, after having wasted nearly
seven years and, I think, a lot of money.

If DRP had implemented the Modernization Plan and
built the Sulfuric Acid Plants at the right moment,
main-stack and fugitive emissions would have decreased
significantly. The modernization project would have
enabled DRP to increase the SO2 concentrations, to capture
it, and to recover it as sulfuric acid. And the Sulfuric
Acid Plants would have brought down SO2 emissions by at
least the required 83 percent and even more, and they would
have also eliminated other contaminants.

These are the main reasons why Project 1 of the
PAMA should have always been the most urgent and top
priority for the new owner of the Facility. The other
Projects of the PAMA, by themselves, could not turn around
the environmental situation of La Oroya.

In fact, Mr. Partelpoeg, Claimants' metallurgist,
criticized DRP in the Report that he prepared for the
Ministry of Mines in relation to the extended PAMA Project

[Page 1228]

dated 10 May 2006, for failing to modernize, failing to
solve the maintenance problem, and failing to address the
known fugitive emissions.

I very much urge the Tribunal to review
Mr. Partelpoeg's Report, which is my WD-017, to confirm
that DRP did not make things better, and that even
Claimants' own metallurgist stated so in 2006.

Now, instead of doing Project 1 and prioritizing,
DRP increased production and used dirtier concentrates
without first having modernized the old equipment of the
three circuits.

Between 1997 and 2008, DRP increased production
of the Facility. It means that it introduced more metal
concentrates into this Facility, more lead, more sulfur.
It is important to clarify here that, as heard during the
last days, what goes into the Facility must come out. "Was
hineingeht muss herauskommt," meaning that, if more metal
concentrates are put into the Facility, more will come out
of it, in the different possible forms; meaning, in metals,
slag, gases, and, eventually, a little bit in fluids.

On the table you'll see on the screen, you can
appreciate how DRP increased the copper and lead
concentrates introduced in each of the circuits. DRP
treated nearly 30 percent more lead concentrate on the lead
circuit than Centromín treated between 1990 and 1997.

[Page 1229]

DRP also chose to input into the Facility
concentrates with higher impurities, what we call "dirtier
concentrates." The most harmful and concerning dirty
concentrates were the copper concentrates that had the
higher concentration of lead, and, therefore, much more
lead was introduced and had to be processed in the copper
circuits, the highest polluting circuit.

Now, DRP's decisions to maintain old equipment,
to increase production, and to use dirtier concentrates,
had serious consequences. According to DRP's main-stack
emissions monitoring, the lead emissions through the main
stack went up. They came down in 2000, and back up again
in 2004.

SX-EW, an independent analyst engaged by Right
Business, DRP's bankruptcy administrator, and the Ministry
of Mines, conducted a mass balancing of the Facility's
emission which demonstrated that the increase of lead
production, the lead transfers to the copper circuit, and
the use of impure concentrates, caused the Facility to
release greater amounts of lead into the environment than
Centromín.

As SX-EW used data regarding the CMLO's
operations that was reported in detail since 1990, one of
the documents that remained, data that was reported by DRP
itself, including seven years of Centromín data, as

[Page 1230]

Mr. Buckley testified last week, DRP retained the same mass
balanced team as Centromín. The mass balancing analysis
derives from a fundamental scientific principle, the law of
conservation of mass.

According to this principle, mass can neither be
created nor destroyed. Mass balancing calculates a
smelter's total emissions by accounting for the quantity
and composition of the smelter's inputs which are the
concentrates and fluxes fed into the smelter, and the
outputs which are the refined materials produced by the
smelter and the impurities and other byproducts captured
during the smelting progress.

By subtracting the outputs from the inputs, it is
possible to determine the quantity of any substances that
were lost during the production process, either converted
into slag captured by the process or released into the
environment.

A mass balancing approach allows one to determine
both main-stack emissions, which are recorded, and fugitive
emissions, which are not recorded. DRP increased the
average of annual lead losses by 22 percent in the period
between 1997 and 2009. Annual lead losses are determined
by mass balancing. The indeterminate or unexplained lead
losses are calculated by subtracting the known lead losses
from the total lead losses. The known lead losses are the

[Page 1231]

monitored air emissions emitted through the stack, the
slag, and the effluence.

Indeterminate lead losses include fugitive
emissions and, under DRP's ownership, increased by
137 percent.

By dramatically increasing fugitive lead
emissions, DRP's operations dramatically increased the
amount of lead in the air in La Oroya.

From 1997 until 2007, DRP did not implement any
meaningful emissions controls. The Projects that were
implemented before 2007, before the end of the PAMA Period,
were not sufficiently effective to reduce air emissions. I
will briefly explain why none of the Projects, that
Mr. Connor claims that reduce the main-stack emissions of
lead, were effective.

However, as I do not have the time to go through
each of them right now, I would very much encourage the
Tribunal to look at Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of my Second
Expert Report where I provided a detailed and developed
explanation.

Though, I must say that I was very surprised that
Mr. Connor, instead of Mr. Partelpoeg, answered my First
Expert Report, because Mr. Connor is not a
pyrometallurgist, and the CMLO is one of the more complex
and rare facilities in the world.

[Page 1232]

Mr. Connor classified the Projects implemented by
DRP in two categories: Projects claimed to reduce
main-stack emissions of lead; and Projects claimed to
reduce fugitive emissions. None of them, none, abated the
alarming fugitive emissions problem of La Oroya within the
PAMA Period.

From the Projects claimed to reduce the
main-stack emissions of lead, only the repairs of the
Cottrell would have reduced main-stack emissions during the
PAMA Period. However, Mr. Connor has not provided
sufficient information to quantify the extent to which
these repairs reduced main-stack emissions.

Regardless of what the exact figure is, any
emissions improvement from those Projects would have been
minor compared to the massive increase in emissions that
DRP had caused during the first nine years of its
operation.

In relation to Projects claimed to reduce
fugitive emissions of lead, the only Projects that could
have been effective were completed at the end of the
Year 2006, meaning that none of these would have reduced
fugitive emissions during the PAMA Period. The Sulfuric
Acid Plant for the zinc circuit was ready by 31
December 2006, 13 days before the end of the PAMA Period
ended.

[Page 1233]

Mr. Connor does not claim that any project could
have reduced SO2 emissions from the main stack during the
PAMA Period, and he couldn't, because SO2 emissions only
could have been reduced by the construction of Sulfuric
Acid Plants. Some of the Projects referred to by
Mr. Connor, such as the short rotary furnaces project, were
executed to address problems that DRP itself had caused by
increasing production of lead and by using dirtier
concentrates in the copper circuit.

DRP recorded a reduction in SO2 of 140,000 tons
in the Year 2000, a sudden drop. However, this reduction
is impossible. The planned Sulfuric Acid Plants for the
lead and zinc circuits were designed to abate, together, a
combined 104 -- 852,000 -- 850,000 tons of SO2. So DRP's
reported reduction in 2000 is equivalent to 133.5 percent
of the combined capacity of these two Sulfuric Acid Plants.
This reported reduction is clearly an error.

Other figures show that this drop is not
accurate. The temperature of the main stack reduced, and
the main stack data show a sudden drop in flow rate. There
are only three possibilities that could explain the
reduction in SO2 emissions in the Year 2000:

DRP's measured concentration of SO2 leaving the
stack were incorrect or measured flow rate is incorrect,
because the tons is the multiplication of the flow rate and

[Page 1234]

the SO2 concentration, two measurements together that lead
to the drop, so either one of the two can be flawed. Or,
the emissions were shifted from the main stack to more
fugitive emissions.

In the center of the slide is Annex 3 of the SVS
and Golder Associates Report, issued in June 2003. I have
screenshotted the relevant information for the Years 2000,
2001, and 2002. The Column that says "SO2 al ambiente
despuerdas de control" is the SO2 number measured at the
main stack, and the column that says "SO2 al ambiente
calculado" is the SO2 number calculated by a mass balancing
analysis.

The Report shows daily figures; therefore, we
multiply by 365 to obtain annual figures. The annual
figures of SO2 measured from main stack are the ones that I
have circled in purple, to the left. Annual figures of SO2
calculated by mass balancing are the ones that I have
circled in green, on the right.

The document on the left is Mr. Partelpoeg's
review of the La Oroya smelter from February 18, 2014. In
page -- PDF 39, there are the SO2 figures that DRP reported
annually to the MEM. I have screenshotted the reported
numbers for SO2 of the Years 2000, 2001, and 2002. These
are annual figures, so we did not need to multiply these by
365.

[Page 1235]

If we now compare the annual figures reported to
the MEM, left-hand side, with the annual SO2 numbers
measured from the main stack included in the SVS Report,
the document in the center, we see that the numbers are
very similar. They are nearly the same.

It seems that DRP reported to the MEM that "SO2
al ambiente," the control number, which is the SO2 measured
at the main stack, instead of its mass balancing
calculations of sulfur dioxide, which was a higher number.

I understand that the lawyers for Renco and DRRC have
represented that, from 1999, DRP started reporting to the
MEM the mass balancing number and not the number that was
coming out of the measurement of the main stack. However,
as I have just shown you, this is not true. DRP was
reporting the smaller number, the number that was measured
at the main stack.

The document on the right is DRP's 2002 Reports
to the communities, the Document C-47 from the Treaty case.
I have screenshotted page -- PDF 10, which shows
the amount of sulfur that was leaving the La Oroya
Facility, however, sulfur would not leave the Facility in
solid form, it would be in SO2, as sulfur dioxide, as a
gas.

Now, to obtain the amount of sulfur dioxide, you
have to multiply the sulfur number by two. Using DRP's own

[Page 1236]

mass balancing estimates of what is leaving the main stack,
the sulfur also needs to be multiplied by .95 because DRP
was assuming, at the same time -- because 95 percent of
all SO2 was leaving through the main stack. This allows us
to finally obtain the mass balancing number for SO2.

The obtained results for each year, as you can
see, are very close to the mass balanced calculation that
was in the SVS Report. I have circled these numbers in
green. There is a clear discrepancy between the numbers
that were being measured at the main stack and by the mass
balance calculation. The measured and calculated SO2 was
not the same, which suggests that DRP knew that it had a
huge amount of fugitive emissions that were being emitted
to the atmosphere and that were not reported to the MEM.

Now, to close, Mr. Connor testified yesterday
that DRP never exceeded its input limit. That is
incorrect. On the screen, I am showing you Mr. Connor's
slide on this subject. Mr. Connor's table only shows
concentrate inputs and does not include fluxes. As you can
see, fluxes can be a significant part of sulfur input, and,
once you add them, DRP exceeded the input limit for the
lead circuit. To be more clear, fluxes are not just sand
or lime; they also contain a lot of sulfur.

Thank you.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Thank you very much,

[Page 1237]

Mr. Dobbelaere.

We still have half an hour, so how should we best
use that half hour to start it?

MR. WEISS: I'm ready to go, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Sorry?

MR. WEISS: I'm ready to go.

PRESIDENT SIMMА: Fine. Yes.

So I give the floor to Mr. Weiss for the
cross-examination.

MR. WEISS: Thank you, Mr. President.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. Good morning, Mr. Dobbelaere.

A. Good morning, Mr. Schiffer.

Q. No. Do I look like Mr. Schiffer?

A. No, you have the name there.

Q. Sorry. I'll put that over there. It's
Mr. Weiss.

A. Mr. Weiss. Thank you.

Q. But you can call me whatever you like, just not
late for dinner.

Let's start with some background about the
smelter. You're aware that the Complex began operating in
the 1920s and it was operated by a company called Cerro de
Pasco; correct?

[Page 1238]

A. Yes. Correct.

Q. Okay. And you said you've been here and you've
heard the testimony that has occurred over the bulk of this
Hearing.

Do you recall hearing prior testimony that the
Government of Perú had not had any environmental
legislation until some point in the 1990s?

A. I have heard it, yes.

Q. Okay. Do you mind just being a little closer to
the mic?

A. Okay. I have heard it, yes.

Q. Thank you.

So just to level -- and you understand that the
Facility was nationalized by the Peruvian Government in
1974; correct?

A. I have read the PAMA.

Q. Yeah. And --

A. Multiple times.

Q. Yeah. Good. I'm glad you did.

And so, from 1974 to 1997, the Facility was being
operated by Centromín; correct?

A. Correct, yes.

Q. Okay. So just to level set and see where -- the
position we're starting from, so the Peruvian Government
allows Cerro de Pasco to pollute La Oroya for about

[Page 1239]

50 years, then Perú nationalizes the CMLO, gives it to
Centromín, which emits an extraordinary level of pollution
into La Oroya for the next 23 years, turning into what
journalists called a "vision from hell." And now, you're
here to tell us that DRP should be faulted because it
didn't clean up Centromín's mess fast enough.

Do I have that right?

A. No, you don't have that right.

Q. Okay. Well, then we'll get to your Opinion as we
go through it.

I want to show you -- did you see the slide that
Mr. Connor showed the other day which had all the
checkmarks, all the Projects listed and all the Projects
that Doe Run Perú had completed?

Did you see that slide?

A. Yes, I saw it. I saw it.

Q. Could we bring up our Slide 42, please.

Just so you know, what we've tried to do is we've
tried to put stuff we want to talk about into slides so we
don't have to waste time trying to find it in the document
and highlight it, but that may create some issues about
being able to read stuff, so if you can't, let me know, and
we'll try and make it better.

I don't think that's the right slide, so right
off the bat, this is not working out very well.

[Page 1240]

Do you have the slide with John's slide, with the
checkmarks and the PAMA Projects listed? I have it here.
It is 42, but, apparently -- it's 42 in my numbers, but
maybe my numbers are wrong.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Excuse me. Just -- I don't
think we've received the folder of the documents for the
Witness -- for the Expert.

MR. WEISS: I don't know what to tell you. The
team was supposed to do that and I hope they will as soon
as possible if they haven't.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Okay.

NEW SPEAKER: It is on the way.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. Okay. So Mr. Dobbelaere, you saw this slide
yesterday; correct?

A. Yes, I saw it.

Q. And this lists all the PAMA Projects, in fact,
including the ones that were expanded; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And it lists all the additional Projects that DRP
did for fugitive emissions and other things; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And it shows -- and do you dispute that all the
checkmarks here which show that all these Projects were
actually completed -- do you have any dispute with that?

[Page 1241]

A. I see that a lot of these Projects, and mainly
the ones to abate the fugitive emissions, were only
finished just before the end of the PAMA.

Q. I'm not asking you when they were finished. I
just asked you if they were finished.

A. Could be, but I think it's fundamental --

(Interruption.)

A. Fundamental.

Q. Okay. That's fine.

And could you bring up the next slide with the
quote from the Opening.

So this is a quote from Ms. Gehring Flores during
the Opening, and she says that "they" being us, Renco and
DRRC, "have desperately tried to focus the Tribunal's
attention on DRP completing the other eight PAMA Projects.
It sounds impressive; right? Eight out of nine. But do
not let it deceive you."

Is it your Opinion that, by DRP and DRRC
completing every single PAMA Project and then some, with
the exception of the copper circuit, that MEM and the
Peruvian Government ordered it to do, that Centromín
designed, it is deceiving the Tribunal?

A. I don't know what you mean by "deceiving."

Q. Well, I didn't say it. Your lawyer did.

A. What I was asked to do --

[Page 1242]

Q. I'm asking if you agree with that statement. You
don't know?

A. It is deceiving.

Q. It is?

A. Yeah, because the PAMA Project 1, was the only
one project that would have helped the children of La Oroya
to not get sick.

Q. Okay. So then every PAMA Project that Centromín
designed that the Peruvian Government mandated to be done
was useless? No reason to do it?

A. I didn't say that.

Q. That's exactly what you just said.

A. No.

Q. Okay. Let's move on. Okay.

Now, each of your Reports is titled "Expert
Report on poly-metallurgy"; is that right?

A. On pyrometallurgy.

Q. Pyrometallurgy. Excuse me. Sorry.

A. Making a fire and melting stuff.

Q. Yes. Yes. That is the science of using high
temperature to extract and purify metal; is that right?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. So you know how a smeller -- a poly-metallic
smelter like La Oroya works?

A. Yes.

[Page 1243]

Q. And what is an environmental engineer, to your
understanding?

A. An environmental engineer?

Q. Yeah.

A. An environmental engineer, to my understanding,
is somebody who evaluates the environmental -- or he is
able to evaluate the environmental impact of operations,
whatever they are.

Q. Do environmental engineers design emissions
control projects? Is that part of their expertise?

A. You know, I don't think I can answer that
question because I'm from Europe.

Q. They don't have environmental engineers in
Europe?

A. No, they work differently.

Q. Okay. Do you --

A. We know what to do. We are responsible for a
plant and we know what to do, and we have our environmental
advisors in the Plant.

Q. Right. Right.

A. But they don't design.

Q. Okay. So, when --

A. I designed environmental projects.

Q. Okay. When you were at the Umicore smelter in
Hoboken --

[Page 1244]

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a person who was in charge of
environmental health and safety or a similar position?

A. Yes.

Q. And that wasn't you; right?

A. That wasn't me, no.

Q. And was there a team of environmental engineers
which was responsible for things like emissions control?

A. There was a team to check and to have
communication with the local government and with the
Expert, which they did.

Q. Yeah.

A. There was a very close collaboration
with -- there were procedures for us because we were
responsible for our Plant, not the environmental engineer
was responsible.

Q. Okay.

A. We were responsible.

Q. Right. So you weren't on the environmental
engineering team; right?

A. Excuse me?

Q. You were not on a team of environmental engineers
at Umicore?

A. I was involved in every single -- every single
project that had environmental impact of the smelter and

[Page 1245]

the Sulfuric Acid Plant that I was responsible for.

Q. And --

A. It is very clear for me, and there was no excuse,
if anything, there would happen or would have happened.
Very clear.

Q. And I imagine that your Finance Department was
also involved when you were doing a project; correct?

A. Yes. And what I learned -- I can tell you what I
learned --

Q. No, I wasn't asking you what you learned. I
asked you a very simple question --

A. Okay. I can tell you --

(Interruption.)

Q. Yeah.

A. What I learned was to first find a solution and
then talk about it, not the other way around.

Q. Okay. So the finance people were involved in
completing environmental engineering projects, yeah?

A. Of course.

Q. Okay. Does that make them experts in
environmental engineering? Just because they were
involved, does that make them experts?

You have to answer, not shrug.

A. I think I'm sure. There is a huge difference
because this question doesn't fit. There's a huge

[Page 1246]

difference between the education of a financial expert and
the education of what we call a scientist who is
responsible for a plant.

And you can ask me any figure of every equipment,
from the start to the end of my plant and the other plant
and the plants I have studied later and the plants I have
consulted later.

Q. And just like there's a huge difference between
the training and education of the finance people and the
environmental people, there's a big difference in the
training between a pyrometallurgical engineer and an
environmental engineer; correct?

A. I can tell you, no.

Q. Okay.

A. Not in my case.

Q. Okay. Okay. Can we pull up Slide 1, which is
Paragraph 226 of your Second Report.

A. Yes.

Q. You say here -- I've highlighted a sentence which
says: "I am not an Environmental Expert and therefore will
not opine on the reliability of the air monitoring
equipment."

What is an Environmental Expert?

A. What I mean here to say is that I have in
my -- whole thing I have been looking at here, that I, from

[Page 1247]

my experience, have looked at emissions from the source,
and how they impact the community, is not a question you
have to ask me. The only thing is how they affect the
community. In this case, was made up by the Environmental
Expert of DRP, and that's the only number I use. That's
the only number I use.

Q. Which number is that?

A. 8.

Q. 8.

A. And Mr. Neil remembers it was 7.

Q. We'll get to that. We'll spend some time on
that. So you're not an --

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. It is not my number.

Q. Oh, I know, but you're relying on it, of course.

A. I'm what?

Q. You're relying on it. You're trying to tell this
Tribunal that it matters.

A. It matters a lot.

Q. Yeah.

A. Yeah.

Q. Right. But you don't have the expertise to know
how they arrived at that number, do you?

A. I have -- yes.

Q. Okay. We'll get there.

[Page 1248]

So we made it clear; you're not an Environmental
Expert. We know that. Yes?

A. Whatever you call it, yeah.

Q. No, you called it. You put it in your Report. I
didn't --

A. I called it, yes. Because I don't want to opine
upon all this stuff that was placed -- that was put into
place that did not function, that functioned, not
functioned, lead, SO2 emission, flawed emissions. I have a
lot of questions about this. But I cannot say this
equipment works better than this equipment and this one.
This is what I will not opine upon.

Q. That is exactly what you are doing, isn't it?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So when Ms. Gehring Flores was talking to
Mr. Connor yesterday, and she was asking him about the fact
that he's not a pyrometallurgist -- I keep getting that
wrong -- I think he asked Mr. Connor: "Wouldn't you need a
pyrometallurgist to understand how to work and design a
smelter?"

You agree with that; right?

A. That's a fair question.

Q. Yeah. But your Opinions go way beyond that,
don't they?

A. No.

[Page 1249]

Q. No?

A. No.

Q. Okay. For example, you offer many opinions on the efficacy of various of the Projects completed by Doe Run Perú, either under the PAMA or supplemental projects that they did outside the PAMA; correct?

A. What do you mean by "projects outside of the PAMA."

Q. There were a number of Projects that I showed you in that slide that Doe Run Perú completed to reduce air emissions but were not mandated by the PAMA.

A. You mean the extension of the PAMA?

Q. No. Either way, any of the Projects that are at issue in this case, many of them, your Opinion is that they were not worthwhile, they did not have an effect; correct?

A. I opined on the Projects that were put forward by Mr. Connor, not on all of them. I opined on them as far as they were important to reduce air emissions at the source.

Q. Even if they had nothing to do with pyrometallurgy?

A. I don't think so.

Q. You don't think so?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So you opined that DRP's installation of a closed-circuit television system to monitor fugitive

[Page 1250]

emissions was not effective, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes.

A. That's -- again --

Q. Do I need a pyrometallurgist to tell me whether a closed-circuit television system is an effective means to know about and reduce fugitive emissions?

Is that what they teach you when you're getting your degree in pyrometallurgy?

A. What Mr. Connor says --

Q. No, I'm asking you. You gave the Opinion. You're a pyrometallurgist. Apparently, you're here to tell us how a smelter works. How does this relate to how a smelter works?

A. I don't like --

(Overlapping speakers.)

MR. PEARSALL: Excuse me, Mr. President. I know Mr. Weiss is very excited. We all are, but if the witness could just be allowed to finish one answer, we would really appreciate it.

MR. WEISS: Well, as long as he's answering the question I asked, I'm happy to let him answer.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. So you say the cameras. I opined because of two things: First of all, Mr. Connor says that it helped him in the future projects, future

[Page 1251]

projects that were finished by the end of the PAMA. That is one thing.

The second thing is Mr. Partelpoeg, in his 2006 Report, had a lot of questions about the effectiveness of all these fugitive emissions programs.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. Yeah.

A. That was a Report he has written for the MEM, and I have the right to opine on or to take the conclusions that Mr. Partelpoeg has put there because I was asked to look at what Mr. Partelpoeg, as the only other pyrometallurgist, is saying. He's also a pyrometallurgist. He's also not an environmental engineer, is he?

Q. Okay. Well, if Mr. Partelpoeg had been called by Perú to testify here today, they could have asked him the same questions. I notice that you said during your presentation that you're the only pyrometallurgist who is here.

A. Yep.

Q. That's because Perú didn't call Mr. Partelpoeg to testify; correct?

A. Mr. Partelpoeg didn't even respond to my First Report.

Q. Okay. You heard --

A. I rebutted.

[Page 1252]

Q. You heard my question; correct?

My question was, the reason he is not here is because Perú didn't call him; correct?

A. That I don't know.

Q. You don't know. Okay.

You also opined on Doe Run's practice of washing streets and paving roads to reduce exposure to particulate emissions; correct?

A. Umm-hmm.

Q. Is that within your expertise as a pyrometallurgist?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. I told you that, maybe in Belgium, maybe in Europe it is different, but we were responsible, and we were talking about all these Measures that would help the community just across the border with -- to reduce the air emissions of lead expressed in nanogram, not in microgram, you know, factor, thousands. Okay.

Q. And you know that washing streets and paving roads is a practice that was employed at the Hoboken Smelter; correct?

A. Yes. It was. It one of the practices.

Q. Because it's a good, effective practice; correct?

A. It is -- I mean, you have to do everything.

[Page 1253]

Q. Yeah.

A. You have to do everything.

Q. But you're here to criticize DRP for doing that practice, the same thing as --

A. No, I --

(Overlapping speakers.)

(Interruption.)

Q. You can move on.

A. I am not here to criticize this measure. I am not here.

Q. Okay.

A. I was asked to see if this compensates for the many tons. You'll have to do a lot of cleaning works if you have to remove, on a daily basis, all the fugitive emissions. That's all I say.

Q. Unless you're wrong, of course, about the extent of the fugitive emissions; right?

A. I'm not wrong at the extent of fugitive emissions.

Q. We'll see. Okay. Are you opining that Doe Run Perú standards and practices were less protective of the environment and public health than Centromín's?

A. I am opining that Centromín had a track record of improvement. They were at the stage in 1995-1996 recognizing that they had to install Sulfuric Acid Plants.

[Page 1254]

No, new technologies and then Sulfuric Acid Plants to make the step from thousands of tons of lead emissions to hundreds of tons of lead emissions. That is a step you have to make.

This is the step where we were. We were reasoning in kilograms -- environmental specialists or not -- reasoning in kilograms, and nanograms per cubic meter, and not in micrograms per cubic meter and in tons of emissions.

That was recognized by -- and then they were at the situation where I was asked from 1995-1996 what happened when DRP took over the Facility?

And that is what I have my Opinion on.

Q. I see. So you started --

A. This was less protected -- I am 100 percent sure.

Q. You started from 1995-'96 -- right? -- and that was your point of comparison?

A. The PAMA, yeah.

Q. Okay. Let's take a look, if we could, at Section 5.2 of the PAMA, which I think is Slide 5.

Before we get to this slide, in your presentation you showed us a whole bunch of slides about the PAMA, and you told us that the PAMA required modernization first.

A. Yes.

Q. And you told us that the schedule in the PAMA was

[Page 1255]

what DRP was required to spend on modernization; correct?

A. I didn't say anything about the amount.

Q. You said that --

A. I think only -- I only hear amounts here and there by people -- I always say you find your technical solution first and then --

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Excuse me. Tribunal, I'm not sure Counsel has established whether or not the witness is even familiar with this document.

MR. WEISS: I haven't even asked him about the document yet. So hold your horses. I'll get there.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Mr. Weiss -- Tribunal, could you please instruct Counsel to be more respectful in this proceeding, and could you please instruct Counsel to establish whether or not this witness is even familiar this document that is on the screen?

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Actually, just on the document, I had the impression that Mr. Weiss was going to deal with PAMA, then we saw the document, and we misunderstood that this is the Contract.

MR. WEISS: This is the Stock Transfer Agreement. Before I get to that, I'm asking questions about --

PRESIDENT SIMMA: So you will be getting to that.

MR. WEISS: I will be getting to that.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: So with that, I have no

[Page 1256]

problem. I do have a certain problem with the tone and with the -- also with, personally, with the speed that you speak with because --

MR. WEISS: I'll slow down.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: -- and I see from the Transcript that the Transcript also shows that you also have a problem there. So could you just relax because it is --

MR. WEISS: No problem. No problem.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Okay.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. So my question about the PAMA is this: When you testified this morning, you told us about the requirements of the PAMA, with respect to modernization. Yes?

A. I am opining upon the necessity of going to modernized plant to even enable you to get the goals of the PAMA. And it is very simple, without the copper plant you would never have reached 83, that it be you reach 83. It wasn't even corrected until you reach 83 because --

(Interruption.)

A. 83 percent of the SO2 released to the -- set free by the processes. The PAMA required to capture 83 percent of them into sulfuric acid plants. That's what the PAMA required.

Q. So are you -- just to be clear, are you giving us

[Page 1257]

a legal opinion on what the PAMA required?

A. I am not giving you any legal opinion.

Q. Okay. Fair enough.

Now, what I'm showing you here is a paragraph from the Stock Transfer Agreement.

Are you familiar with the Stock Transfer Agreement?

A. No, I'm not.

Q. Okay. The Stock Transfer Agreement, for your education, is the Agreement between Doe Run Perú, Renco, and Perú, which sets out the terms of acquisition of the assets of CMLO.

Do you understand that?

A. You know, I've been here a few days, also last week and all discussions about the Stock Transfer Agreement and everything around it. I will absolutely not opine on this.

Q. Okay. But I'm asking you about it because I believe it is directly relevant to your opinion and the discussion that we just had. If you let me ask my question, I will make it clear to you. Okay?

A. Yeah.

Q. We talked about the comparison between Centromín's standards and practices and Doe Run Perú's standards and practices a few minutes ago; right?

[Page 1258]

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And the reason I'm showing you this is because that is the source of that comparison. So if you look at Section 5.3(a), it talks about the use of "standards and practices that were less protective of the environment or public health than those that were pursued by Centromín until the date of the execution of this Contract."

Do you see that?

A. I see it.

Q. Okay. And do you understand that what this is telling us, is that we have to compare Centromín's standards and practices for the entirety of its operation until the date of the execution of this Contract?

A. That's what I -- what I'm not involved in. I'm involved in looking at what was DRP doing and the effect of what it was doing. Was it less protective? Yes or no.

Q. I understand that, but what I'm trying to get at is, you could -- you could ask that question and measure it over different periods of time; correct?

It's a relative comparison?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes?

A. If we have data. We've been talking about a logbook, but the only logbook I have is the SX-EW document,

[Page 1259]

and there I am prepared to compare 1999 to 1997 with the rest.

Q. I understand, but --

A. And I also see even in comparing this period, there is no evidence or document from before.

Q. Okay. But you understand that Centromín was operating the Facility from 1974 to 1997; correct?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. So it is standards and practices as used in this Section 5 --

A. I cannot opine --

Q. Can I finish?

(Overlapping speakers.)

(Interruption.)

Q. It's standards and practices that are the subject of this comparison span 23 years.

Do you understand that?

A. I cannot opine on any legal aspect in this case.

Q. I'm not asking you to opine on a legal aspect. I'm asking you to opine on the comparison of standards and practices that you performed, and what was the period of time, the relative periods of time within which you compared those standards and practices?

A. As a technical person, as a pyrometallurgical person, I have to rely on the data that were provided with

[Page 1260]

me, and that's what I can do. I can do nothing else.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Excuse me. I have the impression that your discourse got stuck there at something which, of course, is pretty legal. Wouldn't that be a good moment to break? Because we have started half an hour earlier, and, personally, I'm really hungry.

MR. WEISS: That's fine. I'm happy to take a break. That's fine.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: So let's have our hour until 1:45 and then go back to maybe that point.

MR. WEISS: You said 1:45?

PRESIDENT SIMMA: The break. And it is 12:45 and at 1:45 we continue.

MR. WEISS: Yeah. That's fine. Thank you.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Super. All right. Let's have a good break.

Yes, of course. Mr. Dobbelaere, you are not doing this for the first time; right?

THE WITNESS: I'm doing this for the first time.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: You do?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: So you're not supposed to speak about anything having to do with this, with anybody --

THE WITNESS: That I know. That I understand from last week. Yes.

[Page 1261]

PRESIDENT SIMMA: So enjoy the lunch.

THE WITNESS: Okay. I can have lunch. Thank you.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: And I'll see you afterwards.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the Hearing was adjourned until 1:45 p.m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Thank you.

So, Mr. Weiss, you have the floor again.

MR. WEISS: Thank you. I'm happy to report that I've had some lunch and I'm much less "hangry."

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Great.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. Okay. Mr. Dobbelaere, good afternoon.

A. Good afternoon. Good afternoon.

Q. Where we last left off, I think we were talking generally about the comparison of Centromín standards and practices to Doe Run Perú's standards and practices, and I want to continue down that line of questioning.

Do you have any sense of what Centromín's fugitive emissions were in, let's say, 1975?

A. 1970 -- what I have a sense of is that Centromín was on a continuous road of improvement. If you read the PAMA well, you'll see the different consecutive Projects that have been put forward, and one of the last important

[Page 1262]

Projects was certainly to give -- to put a lot of money in the Oxygen Plant, and to use that Oxygen Plant to improve the performance of the -- a couple reverberatory furnaces, which has allowed them to do the same with less "fidantes" and produce less of gas.

Now, if in the same furnace, you tremendously increase oxygen to do the same, not to do more, then you reduce -- certainly you reduce fugitives. Unfortunately, there are no data. There are no data -- there are no measured data of fugitives at all, which means that only mass balancing, if you have the data available, can give you a better idea of it. That's what I did.

Q. Thank you.

So you cannot tell me or this Tribunal what were the magnitude of Centromín's fugitive emissions in 1980, for example?

A. No, but what I can tell is that in the same systems, DRP has dramatically increased the inputs without any measures. That's what I can confirm.

Q. Okay. I apologize. And I just want to ask you, as best you are able, I'm asking you a question, and I'd ask you to just respond to the question I'm asking.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And just to finish out this thread, you can't tell me or this Tribunal, what were the level of

[Page 1263]

Centromín's fugitive emissions in 1987, for example, can you?

A. 1987, no.

Q. Okay.

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. No, the first -- no, I cannot. No.

Q. Okay. And, in fact, Centromín did not even monitor air quality until 1995; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So we wouldn't even know the lead concentrations during the period 1974 to 1995 in the ambient air in La Oroya; correct?

A. I don't know. I will give -- I have another explanation on that, but I'm not a lawyer; so I have another explanation.

Q. Okay. Okay. Understood.

A. On what -- if you are a company, of corporate responsibility. I would do something.

Q. Okay. Did Centromín monitor blood leads of children in La Oroya?

A. I am not looking at blood levels. We have a specialist for that, and I think I did enough conversation and information.

Q. But when it comes to comparing standards and practices, we can't compare blood level data in the

[Page 1264]

community; right?

A. My understanding is that, compared to my experience, the blood-lead levels in 1998 and so on, which were measured, were very high.

Q. Right. But I --

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. That's my understanding, and they did not really improve. That's what I saw from the figures that --

(Overlapping speakers.)

Q. Yeah. But you're not here to tell us about blood-lead data; right?

A. No. No.

Q. But I was asking a slightly different question. I know there's blood-lead data during the period of DRP's operations.

A. Yes.

Q. I was asking you whether we have blood-lead data during Centromín's operations that we can compare to blood-lead levels during Doe Run Perú's operations to determine if it is relevant to the standards and practices of both?

A. My understanding is that there were a few at the end of the Centromín period.

Q. Okay. But we do have stacking emissions --

A. I don't compare lead-blood emissions. I'm not --

[Page 1265]

Q. Yeah, I understand.

We do have stack emissions data from the entire period of Centromín's operation.

A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Yeah.

(Overlapping speakers.)

(Interruption.)

Q. No, I'm going to restate it.

We do have stack emissions data for the entire period of Centromín's operations, and the entire period of Doe Run Perú's operations to compare; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And I'm going to ask them to put up Slide 6. And you've seen this Slide.

A. I have seen this Slide.

Q. Okay. And do you understand that this slide shows that there is a strong correlation between stack emissions and ambient air concentrations in La Oroya?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Is that because you disagree with it, or you read the chart differently?

A. No. That is because I have my doubts about stack emission data, first of all, and I have asked them already two years ago, and I never got any explanation. And secondly, I cannot look into the reliability or unreliability or any claim about this, about the air

[Page 1266]

quality measurements. The only thing I know is that -- and I've seen that, from 1994 until 1998, at least it were the same measurements, the same. That's what I read. But I cannot -- I cannot argue about how --

(Overlapping speakers.)

Q. Okay. I understand that you don't accept the validity of this chart. Okay?

A. No, I don't accept it.

Q. I'm going to ask you to assume, for the moment, that it's valid. We'll all accept that it's just an assumption.

Can we pull up Slide 7. Okay.

And this is a slide showing stack emissions data during the entire period of operations of Centromín and Doe Run Perú.

Do you see that?

A. I see that.

Q. Okay. And let's take just a sample here. We can see that during the period of approximately 1980 to 1986, Centromín's stack emissions are almost double Doe Run Perú's highest single year; correct?

A. What I see is that, if you are at a certain level, 1989, which is high, and you want to improve that, they did by several measures.

Q. Yep. Yep.

[Page 1267]

A. The only thing to bring that down to a level, one of the times lower is by building new installations and new acid stacks. That's the only way you can do. That's all I learned from it.

Q. I hear you.

And, once again, I just ask you to follow my question, and if there are things you want to talking about, I'm sure that Counsel will ask you on redirect.

A. Okay.

Q. So given the correlation that we've seen between stack emissions and air quality, and given the extremely high level of stack emissions during Centromín's operations, it's a fair assumption that the air quality in La Oroya during Centromín's operations was quite bad; correct?

A. I cannot confirm that.

Q. Okay. Okay. And given the extraordinary level of stack emissions during Centromín's operations, it's a pretty good bet that Centromín was also admitting substantial fugitive emissions; correct?

A. Can you repeat your question?

Q. Sure. I said, given the extraordinary level of stack emissions that we see during Centromín's operations, it's probably a pretty good bet that there was substantial fugitive emissions as well over the same period; correct?

[Page 1268]

A. No. That -- I cannot answer that.

Q. Okay.

A. What I know is, I can answer that in DRP's period.

Q. I understand. Okay.

And in your examination of the relative standards and practices of Centromín versus Doe Run Perú, did you find any way in which Doe Run Perú's standards and practices were better than Centromín's?

A. If I look at standard and practices, I look at prevention.

Q. So yes or no? Did you find any way in which Doe Run Perú's standards and practices were better than Centromín's? Simple question.

A. They were very good at trying to -- I mean, to blindfold, to put things into place with low costs and to say, look at what we have done.

Q. Okay.

A. That is something that completely against -- is against my nature and my experience from 30 years.

Q. I'm going to try this question again.

A. Okay.

Q. In your review of the relative standards and practices of Centromín versus Doe Run Perú, did you find any way in which Doe Run Perú's standards and practices

[Page 1269]

were better than Centromín's?

A. I have problems to understand your question.

Q. Okay. I'll try it one more time.

You're here to tell us, are you not, that Doe Run Perú's standards and practices were worse than Centromín's with respect to air emissions, at least; correct?

A. I'm here to analyze the available data, production data, and to see whether they reveal things that are not shown, because I am interested in the truth and only the truth.

Q. Okay.

A. That's what I want to say. And I look from my prior metallurgical experience to look into that.

Q. Okay. Were you aware that during Centromín's operations, they were dumping vast quantities of raw sewage and toxins into the Mantaro River?

A. I never looked at liquid effluence.

Q. Okay. So you don't know whether Doe Run Perú's standards and practices with respect to water treatment were better than Centromín's?

A. I know they have built a water cleaning station because it was one of the Projects of the PAMA, not the most expensive one but I know that, yes.

Q. And did that make an impact on the environment in la Oroya? Did that make it better?

[Page 1270]

A. It will have an impact on water quality.

Q. But you didn't look at that?

A. No. I was not asked to look at that.

Q. Okay. And what about treatment of solid waste?

Did you look at the relative standards and practices of Doe Run Perú and Centromín with respect to the treatment of solid waste?

A. I did not comment on it. I did not look at -- the only thing I know, that at a certain point, if you do anything about it, your license to operate goes away. If you have arsenic, you have to put it somewhere. And, I mean -- if there is a law that you have to put it with protection to -- for the bottom, you just have to do it, or you just cannot continue your operation.

Q. Okay.

A. That's my understanding, my experience.

Q. Thank you for that.

During the course of yesterday's examination, Mr. Connor at least, but perhaps during other examinations, we've heard Perú's Counsel ask a number of questions about Doe Run Perú's efforts to capture sulfur dioxide.

Do you recall all that discussion?

A. Oh. Yes. Oh, yes. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And I'm going to ask you to put up Slide 61, please.

[Page 1271]

Now, have you seen this Knight Piésold Report before?

A. Yes, I have. I have referred in it. I hope somebody read my First Report, but I have referred in it in my first Report.

Q. I certainly did.

This was a Report prepared in 1996; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was when Centromín was operating the CMLO; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And these were recommendations and discussions of Centromín's environmental standards and practices, yes?

A. My -- sorry, the screen is falling away.

Q. It is what?

A. It's falling away. I have no screen here. Okay. It's coming back.

Q. Are you able to see the large monitor? I apologize, we'll try to get that fixed.

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. Yes. I can see it. Yes. Thank you.

Yes. I mean, this is Knight and Piésold, as far as my understanding is, was involved in the preparation of the PAMA.

[Page 1272]

Q. Yeah. Their recommendations were incorporated into the PAMA; correct?

A. Yes. Yes. And what is written there, Centromín has installed controls applied, Cottrell precipitators, they were there, and they -- they were there until the end of -- to accomplish, yeah.

(Overlapping speakers.)

Q. Yeah. And -- okay. Could you read the last two lines beginning with "however."

A. "However, as the two emissions are reduced by only a small fraction through production of limited quantities of sulfuric acid, and" -- okay, I will complete that later, that Statement, but I know very well that the Cottrell will never abate as a --

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. -- that's --

Q. Thank you. Yeah. And so during Centromín's operations, there were significant sulfur dioxide emissions from the facility; correct?

A. That's why they called for an Acid Plant.

Q. Right. Understood.

A. Okay.

Q. And during Centromín's operations, there was only one Acid Plant on the zinc circuit; correct?

A. Until 31 December of 2006.

[Page 1273]

Q. I -- my question was during Centromín's operations --

A. Yes, it was only one --

(Interruption.)

Q. My question was, during Centromín's operations, there was only one lead circuit, and that, lead -- I'm sorry, only one Sulfuric Acid Plant, and that was on the zinc circuit; correct?

A. That is true.

Q. Okay. And that Sulfuric Acid Plant was substantially undersized; correct?

A. It was undersized, and it remained undersized. Okay.

Q. Right. Okay. And when Doe Run Perú came in, regardless of the time they took, they rebuilt the Sulfuric Acid Plant for the lead circuit; correct?

A. I don't know if I can answer this question with yes or no.

Q. And why is that?

A. First of all, the lead circuit, Sulfuric Acid Plant --

Q. I didn't ask about that. I asked about the zinc circuit. I apologize.

A. No, you asked --

(Overlapping speakers.)

[Page 1274]

Q. Apologize.

A. Okay.

Q. So let's start with -- my bad.

Let's start with the zinc circuit. So there was an existing Sulfuric Acid Plant on the zinc circuit?

A. Yes, there was. Yes.

Q. It was undersized. I think we've established that.

A. Yes.

Q. And Doe Run Perú undertook, executed a project to install a new or upgraded Sulfuric Acid Plant on the zinc circuit; correct?

A. They did not install a new Acid Plant on the zinc circuit.

Q. Okay.

A. They increased the capture of sulfuric acid as much as they could, but not to the full extent of SO2. It was not a full-fledged SO2 Acid Plant, even after probation. And to me, I can -- I have my comments on it, but I will not give them now.

Q. That's fine. But, certainly, it captured more Sulfuric Acid Plant than the Sulfuric Acid Plant that existed during Centromín's operations?

A. It reached an extra 3 percent of the PAMA requirement.

[Page 1275]

Q. Yeah. And --

A. 3 percent.

Q. I'm no math expert, but that's more, yes?

A. That's not more --

Q. It's not more?

A. Yeah. It's 3 percent more than -- if you're looking at this, yes.

Q. 3 percent more than what?

A. Than what was during Centromín's time.

Q. Okay. So it was more.

And then Doe Run Perú did complete a -- so there was no -- excuse me.

There was no Sulfuric Acid Plant on the lead circuit; correct?

A. No, there wasn't.

Q. During Centromín's operations?

A. No, there wasn't.

Q. Right. So they were not capturing any sulfuric acid from the lead circuit?

A. No, they didn't.

Q. Okay. And Doe Run Perú installed a Sulfuric Acid Plant on the lead circuit; correct?

A. Yes or no?

Q. Yes or no.

A. Yes, operating from 2008.

[Page 1276]

Q. Okay.

A. Okay.

Q. That's fine.

A. I cannot answer yes or no on a question that is not correct in my eyes.

Q. Okay. I wasn't asking you about dates. I asked you whether they completed the Project. Yes or no. You don't need to tell me the date they completed it.

A. Within the PAMA or outside the PAMA?

Q. Not the question. Did they complete the lead -- the Sulfuric Acid Plant on the lead circuit?

A. They completed the lead Sulfuric Acid Plant on the lead circuit, yes.

Q. And did that have the effect of capturing more sulfuric acid than was captured during Centromín's operations?

A. Sorry, I have to ask a question.

Q. Yes or no. Very simple question.

A. Of course it did.

Q. Of course it did?

A. Yes.

Q. Of course it did.

A. Yeah.

Q. And so, of course, Doe Run Perú did a better job of capturing sulfur dioxide than did Centromín; correct?

[Page 1277]

A. I don't know which kind of questions you're asking me, but this looks to me like not a question that I have to answer.

Q. Oh, well, if you don't want to answer it, I guess that's your prerogative.

A. I can answer -- I can tell a lot about the Acid Plants and what it had to do and what they didn't do.

Q. I understand that answering that question in the way that you would have to in order to be honest is inconvenient to your opinion, so we'll move on.

Are you an expert in the design and construction of Sulfuric Acid Plants?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So what was the earliest possible date, in your opinion, on which DRP, Doe Run Perú, could have completed construction and commissioned the three Sulfuric Acid Plants that were in the PAMA?

A. I have answered it -- this in my First Report.

Q. But you're here to talk about your Report.

A. Yep. I've answered this, and you're -- they were looking at acid plants -- or, if they were looking for acid plants -- how can I tell this? If they had to comply with the 83 percent, they had to go for acid plants, but, before they could do that, they had to go for modernization smelting technologies, which they proved they didn't. So

[Page 1278]

how many time would it need? Well, they redirected the whole thing as from the first day.

Q. Yeah.

A. So how much time would it need? I cannot --

(Overlapping speakers.)

Q. I can ask you a more specific question, and, perhaps, it will be easier for you to answer.

A. Yeah.

Q. If Wim Dobbelaere was in charge of building the three Sulfuric Acid Plants at Doe Run Perú, how soon would all three have been completed?

A. I am speaking from European experience, and I completed a Sulfuric Acid Plant, with the size of, certainly, the copper plant, in two years.

Q. One plant?

A. One, yeah. And then we do three, is six, yeah.

Q. So again --

A. If you have the money, you can do.

Q. Again, if Wim Dobbelaere were in charge at Doe Run Perú and were responsible for the construction of the Sulfuric Acid Plants, how soon could they have been completed?

A. They could have been completed within the PAMA.

And why I do say this? Because I understand that the speed in which you can do that is slower in Perú because you have

[Page 1279]

to bring all the equipment and things like this. So --

Q. Okay.

A. So in my First Report, because you want me to ask about -- to talk about the First Report, I used a longer period, a longer period but that was still within the PAMA. And I also noticed that Fluor Daniel said that they could finish the one Acid Plant within the PAMA Period.

Q. Okay. Well, I'm going to try one more time.

In the best-case scenario --

A. Could three Acid Plants within the PAMA Period.

Q. Okay. And at what point would the Sulfuric Acid Plant on a copper circuit have been completed if Wim Dobbelaere were in charge?

A. Within the PAMA Period. Absolutely.

Q. I'm sorry. You know that we have a dispute in this case about what is the PAMA Period, so I need you to be specific about the date.

A. No. Before the 13 January of 2007.

Q. Okay. That's when, if you were in charge, the Sulfuric Acid Plant would have been completed? Yes? Fair?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So --

A. But I would have modernized the Plant before.

Q. Yeah. I understand. I'm not asking about that. I'm asking when the entire Project would be completed.

[Page 1280]

So in the best-case scenario, the increased capture of sulfur dioxide from the copper circuit would not have begun until December of 2007?

A. If you ask me for the best-case scenario, there were better scenarios possibly. You said what would you -- could -- there were better scenarios possible.

If you ask for the best, then I did not understand your question.

Q. I'm asking you -- obviously, we have to take into account reality. Things that you mentioned, of course, like how difficult it is to get equipment and things in Perú. You acknowledge that that, perhaps, makes it logically more difficult.

(Interruption.)

Q. Could you just wait until I'm done.

So, again, that is what I am trying to get out. If you were in charge, given all the complexities, given the logical difficulties, what is the best date on which you could reasonably tell this Tribunal that you would have had three functioning sulfur dioxide Plants at La Oroya?

A. If you can do one plant in two years, in La Oroya you could do it in three years. You can also do three plants in three years. You have to just find the companies to do that for you. Not just find, but to have the companies. If you have enough money and enough -- but, I

[Page 1281]

mean, this is a totally different situation then what it was.

Q. Yeah. No, we certainly understand that.

You also -- do you think that the fact that Doe Run Perú had multiple other projects under the PAMA to undertake, if you were in charge and you had to deal with these other Projects, would increase the difficulty of completing three very complicated Sulfuric Acid Plants at the same time?

A. What I miss is, from the beginning, a responsible Project Manager to get the things done. So if you don't do that, what can I tell you? I mean -- of course, there were more projects and, of course -- I mean, somebody who builds a Sulfuric Acid Plant, he doesn't have to have an idea about how to pave a road.

Q. Umm-hmm. So your opinion is that, at this point, DRP's --

(Interruption.)

A. I'm sorry.

Q. I was in the middle of a question.

Your opinion, then, is that DRP's resources either were or should have been unlimited, both in terms of money and manpower, to accomplish all of the PAMA Projects within the timeframe that you suggest?

A. Not unlimited.

[Page 1282]

Q. Okay. All right.

A. Adequate.

Q. When you -- you mentioned that you completed a Sulfuric Acid Plant in, I think you said, two years?

A. Yes. It was completed by the end of '89, and we started beginning of '87.

Q. Yeah. And that was just one plant; correct?

A. One plant, yes.

Q. And how many other major environmental projects were you were undertaking at the same time?

A. Not in the period, later, a lot.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean -- so the period, the relevant period here is the complete turnover between 1992 and 1997, complete turnover of a similar facility than La Oroya. Five years.

Q. So now we're saying they could have done three Sulfuric Acid Plants in five years or by the end of the PAMA Period? Which one?

A. We didn't decide to build three acid plants.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean --

Q. Okay. I understand there's a lot of discussion here, and you have a lot in your Reports, about the engineering designs of the Sulfuric Acid Plants and the Modernization Plans. There's a lot of discussion about

[Page 1283]

that in your Report; correct?

A. In my First Report, I answered certain -- in my First Report, I agreed on a lot of things with Dr. Partelpoeg, but I answered the things that I did not agree because there were flaws, and I noticed that he didn't have -- he didn't notice anything about the Fluor Daniel -- the existence of the Fluor Daniel Project.

Q. Yep. When you are expressing your opinions about the speed -- Well, let me take that back.

When you're expressing your opinions about the designs of Sulfuric Acid Plant; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And I think there's a whole bunch of discussion about which design should have been implemented; correct?

A. Not about the Sulfuric Acid Plants.

Q. In the circuit itself; correct?

A. The new technology before the takeover.

Q. Yeah, I understand. And do you -- is it your opinion that, ultimately, Doe Run Perú made the wrong choice about what technology to use?

A. You mean for the copper circuit?

Q. Yeah?

A. Yeah, because they didn't do anything for the lead circuit -- like this? I have to make -- you have to be clear what you --

[Page 1284]

(Overlapping speakers.)

Q. No, I appreciate you making that clear.

A. For the copper circuit.

Q. Yeah.

A. Well, you know that, since 1997, I was responsible for the technology that was chosen by Doe Run Perú in 2007, 2006-2007, 10 years later. Okay. That's one thing. So how can I say that this is not the wrong technology? But I say that this technology existed in 1987.

Q. I understand that.

A. 1997. Sorry for the mistake.

Q. Again, I would really just appreciate if you'd listen to my question. It helps to listen.

A. Yes.

Q. And try to answer what I'm asking you.

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. Do you believe that the technology that Doe Run Perú ultimately chose and implemented for the copper circuit, the ISASMELT technology --

A. Yes.

Q. -- was the right choice?

A. There were at least three choices. So it was a good choice.

Q. Okay.

[Page 1285]

A. I think it was a good choice.

Q. Okay. Thank you.

A. But there were more choices.

Q. Understood.

And I understand that there is a lot of discussion about how long it took Doe Run Perú to settle on that choice.

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay. And if you were trying to investigate the right technology to use in the copper circuit; right?

A. Yes.

Q. You'd want to diligence that quite carefully, yes?

A. Of course. But what I didn't see, for instance, is -- to start, in 1998, when you take such a plant, you don't have a clue. You do testing. There was no single trace of any testing at all.

Q. Yeah.

A. This is something which is -- I don't understand, not on technology A, not on technology B.

Q. Yeah. You understood that, in 1998, they had already hired engineering firms to begin working on the design of the copper circuit in the Sulfuric Acid Plant?

A. Yes, I understand, and I am very surprised that Dr. Partelpoeg didn't tell any -- not one word, this Fluor

[Page 1286]

Daniel Company is not even mentioned in his First Report.

Q. Well, maybe, if he had been here, he would have.

A. No, no. In his First Report, I say.

Q. Yeah. I understand.

And so my question is, it starts -- and, yes, understood, it takes longer than expected.

Are you ascribing any motives to Doe Run Perú in the time -- in the amount of time that it took to implement the changes to the copper circuit?

A. What do you mean by --

Q. Well, are you suggesting that they were incompetent?

A. What I -- I am not suggesting anything. What I see is that they were a company that was experienced in lead smelting. Lead smelting. They were not experienced in copper smelting and certainly not experienced in complex copper smelting, meaning -- what you put it. So they were not.

Q. Okay. So it's not unreasonable that it took them more time than would be expected, if they weren't experts in copper smelting; correct?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. They had resources. They had resources in Perú because these Centromín guys who stayed there, they were

[Page 1287]

there for a long time.

Q. Yeah. So, I guess, what I'm asking you, are you suggesting that they purposefully or with ill motive dragged their feet in doing the work that needed to be done?

A. What I have read in the Fluor Daniel Report is that the goal of their -- what they were asked is what -- we have this new technology here, how can we save money? And what I say, you can never -- if you -- Mr. Connor was saying that they needed a surgeon. If you need a surgery, you first want to be alive, and then look at what it will cost you.

Q. Yeah. Okay.

A. And I didn't see that happening. I saw, "hey, we have to spend money here. Let's look at how we can save," and, from there, advisors from -- "oh, we will wait with this, and we wait with this."

Q. So does that come from your ability to read or your expertise as a pyrometallurgist?

(Interruption.)

Q. I'm asking if -- is that in your Expert Opinion or that just comes from reading snippets of documents?

A. No, that comes from reading the Fluor Daniel Document, 10 years Master Plan conclusion.

Q. Okay. Do I need an expert -- do I need an expert

[Page 1288]

to interpret it for me?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Okay. So if I understand where you're coming from, and you'll correct me if I'm wrong, is that, ultimately -- at least one pillar of your Opinion is that Doe Run Perú's standards and practices were worse than Centromín's, because, according to you, Doe Run Perú had greater fugitive emissions than Centromín; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And fugitive emissions are not monitored; right?

A. No.

Q. All right. So unlike stack emissions, where there's a monitor, there's no monitor that will tell you the extent of fugitive emissions; right?

A. I thought that a good operator was asked to install monitoring equipment.

Q. Yeah.

A. First of all. Secondary, what -- and that's my personal -- that's my opinion, that, as long as you keep this old equipment, it is not correct to increase the production dramatically.

Q. Did you spend --

A. How can you avoid fugitive emissions then?

Q. Okay. Okay. Did you spend time prepping for

[Page 1289]

your testimony with the lawyers for Doe Run Perú -- for

Centromín before you came to testify today?

A. How do you mean that?

Q. Did you spend time having them prepare you to

testify today?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. I have time. I'm here two weeks to follow this

process here.

Q. So you never sat with --

A. I have been writing this whole thing from my home

in Italy. Okay.

Q. Okay. Yep. So I want to come back --

A. This is a summary of what is there.

Q. Okay. I want to just come back to my question.

So fugitive emissions are, by definition, unmonitorable at

the source because we don't know where they happen; right?

A. They are monitorable at the source. Not in the

furnace.

Q. Yeah.

A. I mean, a little bit away from.

Q. Right. But you have -- in a main stack, you have

a monitor.

A. Yes.

Q. And it tells you what's going out; correct?

[Page 1290]

A. Yes.

Q. Fugitive emissions, you could have multiple

sources that you don't even know about; right?

Yes or no? Yes?

A. No. I mean, I would know my fugitive emissions

well. Look at my Second Report. I have said where they

were.

Q. Okay. You cannot monitor fugitive emissions in

the way that you can monitor stack emissions, can you?

A. If you are monitoring your stack emissions well,

they should be better than your fugitives.

Q. I understand that, but you don't have a monitor

at every place throughout the Plant where there could be

fugitive emissions; correct?

A. No, but the monitoring of fugitive emissions is

by choosing the right position of measurements and

modeling -- putting them into a modeling to see, and I know

where there was something happening in my plant is that, it

is your plant.

Q. Yeah. And that might be one reason why you had a

closed-circuit television system; correct?

A. Yes. No.

Q. Right?

A. We can have a small discussion on that system,

yes.

[Page 1291]

Q. Okay. So I want to make sure we're clear on

this. You can measure emissions coming out a stack because

you put a monitor in the stack. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. And we have that data?

A. Yes.

Q. Right. We don't have the same kind of data for

fugitive emissions, do we?

A. Unfortunately not.

Q. Not?

A. So there is only one way of doing it. That is

mass balancing.

Q. Right. So --

A. Unfortunately only that.

Q. So your conclusions about the amount of fugitives

then, they are not based on any measured data. They are

based on estimates and approximations?

A. On calculations from my side, based on hard data,

you have one equation, two unknowns, two unknowns, and if

the stack data are right, you know the other. If you

cannot measure the stack data, you can prove what you want.

Q. Yep?

A. Okay.

Q. So you think that mass balance data is reliable

data?

[Page 1292]

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So the fugitives we know can't really be

objectively measured in the same way as a stack emission

conclude; correct? We know that.

A. Yeah.

Q. We know that?

A. Yeah.

Q. And so, for you to conclude that DRP had greater

total emissions than Centromín, you had to base your

opinion on, one, a tiny fraction of Centromín's operations,

and on the one factor that cannot be objectively measured;

right?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. I have based my conclusions on 1999 to 1997,

which you call a small fraction, compared with 1998 until

2006, which is about the same fraction. And then separate,

the years 2007-2008.

Q. Right. But even that omits 16 years of

Centromín's operations; correct?

The Reporter can't see your hands or record it in

the Transcript.

A. No. Only what I see is assume that DRP increased

production by 30 percent on the data, the mass balance

data--they went up.

[Page 1293]

Q. Yeah.

A. And reliably went up.

Q. Yeah. Yeah. But not the air quality data;

right?

A. That, I don't know.

Q. You don't know?

A. No. No, because I have seen -- I don't know

because who in the room can tell anything about the

reliability of this air quality data. What I have read --

Q. I'm sorry. So you're here to tell us that your

calculations, based on mass balance data, are more reliable

than measured lead concentrations in the ambient air

attestations set up all over La Oroya? That's what you're

telling us?

A. What I see is if during -- the DRP period, the

lead losses are here, and during the period the lead losses

are there, I can also draw a correlation, but I don't

between the lower there and the higher there. I can also

draw this correlation. So it is easy as what -- what I

know if you draw a correlation with stack emission data and

you add a fugitive emission data one by one, there is

something that is not logic, in my eyes.

Q. Yeah.

A. I have "Bauernverstand" (in German.)--

PRESIDENT SIMMA: "A peasant's mind," just a

[Page 1294]

natural reason; right?

THE WITNESS: Yeah. There is some logic here.

MR. WEISS: I know we have Spanish-to-English,

and English-to-Spanish translation. I don't know if we

have any Dutch or German translation in English. Maybe we

need to get somebody else.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Because it's a German word.

MR. WEISS: It sounded German.

THE WITNESS: It's a German word, yeah. I've

been married 20 years.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. It sounds lovely.

If you were right -- if your mass balance theory

were right and there were substantially more fugitive

emissions, that would show up in the air monitoring data,

wouldn't it?

A. I have done mass balancing a few times on SO2.

Okay.

Q. Again--again, I asked you a question about the

air monitoring.

A. That should show up in a reliable air monitoring,

but now you will say that I suggest the air quality data

are not reliable, and how can I know that?

Q. And the answer is what?

[Page 1295]

A. I can only know what I read from, like, from the

SO2 measurements that you -- that DRP managed to have wrong

SO2 measurements five years long.

Q. Yeah. Okay.

A. That's what I can read.

Q. Okay. And that's SO2. That is not lead. And

those are different monitors; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. One is a stack monitor; correct?

A. You want to know what? The one is stack tack

monitor, yes.

Q. Yeah. And one is an ambient air monitor that is

at various stations throughout La Oroya; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. For example, Sindicato; right?

A. And you can choose which station you want to

choose to have your correlation.

Q. Yeah. Yeah. And those are two totally separate

systems; correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Two totally separate monitors?

A. Yes.

Q. Right. But you're trying to tell us because the

SO2 data might not be accurate, we should also assume that

the air quality data for lead is also not accurate; is that

[Page 1296]

right?

A. I have read that you doubt about air quality

measurements in a period that my mass balance shows that

there are less lead losses.

Q. Okay.

A. Unexplained lead losses, unexplained.

Q. So it's interesting that you're using unmeasured

data to challenge the veracity of measured data.

A. No. I use measured data.

Q. Okay. Yeah, with many calculations and

assumptions.

A. No.

Q. No. Okay. So you're not in a mass balance you

are making an assumption about what percentage of

indeterminate losses are actually fugitives, are you not?

A. I say if there are more than double unknown

losses, where are they? Yes? And I -- I will not tell how

much there are. This is what McVehil -- this is what SX-EW

have done.

Q. Yeah.

A. And I have commented that, and you have reviewed

that, and I have commented on the ability to say, okay,

leave it like this. Unexplained losses are enough for me.

Q. Okay.

A. Okay.

[Page 1297]

Q. But, again, there are indeterminate losses that

show up in a mass balance; correct? Indeterminate losses?

A. There are indeterminate losses that show up in a

masses balance, always.

Q. Yes. And you're saying that some percentage of

those indeterminate losses are fugitive lead emissions;

correct?

Yes or no.

A. Yes. Yes. And they are.

Q. And how do you know what percentage of the

indeterminate loss is a fugitive emissions?

A. I don't know, but I know if they double, they

double.

Q. Okay. So you don't know -- but you want us to

believe --

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. You don't have to explain to me, but I would like

to have somebody explain what are indeterminate losses. If

fugitives are not included.

Q. I think Mr. Connor had a slide, which had a

number of categories which showed you what those

indeterminate losses could be.

A. Yeah. Okay. Good.

Q. So I'm going to ask that we look at Slide -- I'm

going to ask that we look at Slide 10, please.

[Page 1298]

Mr. Dobbelaere, this is a report of the

energy -- of the Ministry of Energy and Mines. It is dated

November 25, 2022, and I'm particularly interested in

looking at the callouts that we have here, and in the

second one, which is called "Air monitoring done by monitor

Sereminer S.R.L., sampling date November 4-5, 2002."

Do you see that?

A. I have to look here.

Q. Sorry.

A. Yeah. Okay.

Q. Let me know when you're ready.

A. Yes.

Q. Are you waiting on me, or are you waiting on you?

I'm sorry.

A. No, I'm just thinking what you want to prove

here.

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. It seems like an order I didn't see.

Q. Yeah.

A. And I'm not involved in a monitoring stations

evaluation. The only thing I saw is that you also use the

same data --

Q. I have not asked -- I have not even asked you a

question yet.

A. Okay.

[Page 1299]

Q. My question is, are you aware that the air

monitoring data taken by Doe Run Perú was regularly audited

by the Ministry of Energy and Mines?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Okay. And I'm going to ask you to look at

Slide 11, please.

A. Okay.

Q. Actually, let's just go to Slide 12. I'm going

to ask you to take a look, Mr. Dobbelaere, at the -- these

two highlighted portions and you can either read -- I'm

going to read them out loud for you, if that would be okay.

It says: "In addition" -- I'm sorry. This is from Doe Run

Perú's "Report to our communities"?

A. I know that Report.

Q. Okay. This says: "In addition, our results are

verified by the laboratory of the Ministry of Health's

general business of environmental health, DIGESA, whose

officers have officially reported that Doe Run Perú has a

valid and reliable results since they are similar to

DIGESA'S findings."

Then it goes on to say, "Monitoring equipment

audit performed by a company registered with the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency. On March 19, 20, 21 of

2002, the CK Environmental company based in Canton,

Massachusetts, USA, performed an audit on the environmental

[Page 1300]

sulfur dioxide monitoring system. CK followed the

guidelines established by the US EPA's Quality Assurance

Handbook for Air Pollution Measurement Systems. CK's team

of evaluation specialists was comprised of Kathleen Holmes

and David Macintosh. The audit's final results were

positive and reflected well on Doe Run Perú since the audit

found that the equipment measures SO2 in the environment

with a margin for error of only plus or minus .23 percent,

which is far below the EPA's recommended margin of error.

In conclusion, environmental data collected by

Doe Run Perú is precise and reliable. This is demonstrated

by annual audits performed by outside specialists with

renowned technical expertise."

Have you read this before?

A. I have read this before.

Q. Okay. So you were aware that Doe Run Perú's

environmental monitoring data was audited, both by the

Government and outside Experts, and found to be reliable?

A. What I don't understand here is that when Deborah

was using SO2 measurements in their Report, that you said

they were flawed, and this is by SO2 measuring. So this

has been audited, yes.

Q. Well, actually --

A. But they were flawed five years, and this in the

period they were flawed.

[Page 1301]

Q. Actually --

A. How can you explain that?

Q. Actually, it is much broader than that.

A. Okay.

Q. It says: "Environmental data collected by Doe

Run Perú is precise and reliable."

A. Yeah, but you try to show me that the SO2 was

okay.

Q. I haven't tried to show you anything. I actually

showed you something.

A. That's my comment, and for the rest, I did not

involve. I read this document, and I see this looks

strange to me.

Q. Okay. Okay. But you're not an environmental

expert, and you can't opine on the validity of air

monitoring data or equipment; correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Can we go back to Slide 6, please.

Actually -- fine. I've already shown you this slide, which

shows decreases in stack emissions compared to the lead in

the ambient air in La Oroya, and I want to ask you, this

shows, does it not, that in every year, except for 1999,

lead concentrations were either equal to or lower than the

last recorded measurement during Centromín's operations;

correct?

[Page 1302]

A. This is what the graph shows, but it only shows

main-stack emissions.

Q. Okay.

A. Okay.

Q. And I think yesterday when Ms. Gehring Flores was

questioning Dr. Connor, she was asking him about the

increase in emissions at the time of the transition,

and -- do you see here where the approximately where the

red star is on this chart?

Do you see that?

A. Yes, I can see that.

Q. Okay. And so those -- right at this point where

that gray line intersects with the dotted line --

A. Yes.

Q. -- that's where Centromín's stack emissions were

at the time of handover; right?

A. I don't know.

Q. Okay.

A. Because you can -- I mean, you can interpolate as

you want. I have to check.

Q. Yeah.

A. This is an average over a year.

Q. Okay.

A. And I can tell something about the graph again

and again. Two years ago, I said, explain me the drop of

[Page 1303]

more than 200 -- it nearly -- from 500 -- it 1250 tons in

lead to main stack.

Q. Okay. Again, you can address --

(Overlapping speakers.)

(Interruption.)

Q. You can address all this on redirect, if you want

to.

A. Okay. Okay.

Q. We have been talking a lot about standards and

practices to protect human health in the environment.

What do you understand to be the ultimate goal of

those standards and practices?

A. The ultimate goal of lead emissions in main

stack, if you install new technologies is a scale on the

left in kilograms and not in tons. That's the ultimate

goal.

Q. So what I'm asking you is, we're talking about

the relative standards and practices of Doe Run Perú and

Centromín, and I'm asking you, what is ultimately the goal

of those standards and practices?

A. The ultimate goal is to protect the children of

La Oroya, I think.

Q. Right?

A. Yeah.

Q. I absolutely agree with you.

[Page 1304]

Can we put up our -- well, this is Proctor

Figure 2. I don't know if we have this on the Slide. No.

Okay.

You are aware, Mr. Dobbelaere, that from 1999

forward at least, as Dr. Proctor has acknowledged, the

blood-lead levels in the children of La Oroya consistently

decreased; correct?

A. You would have to be --

(Overlapping speakers.)

Q. You're either aware or you're not.

A. Aware or not?

Q. Yeah.

A. Aware that they decreased? No.

Q. You're not aware?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Well, let's assume for the moment that

they had, and that it is true what I'm telling you. Okay.

Then Doe Run Perú would have achieved exactly what the

standards and practices it followed were designed to

achieve, as you said before, reducing the blood-lead in

children at La Oroya?

A. I think reducing to an agreed level, but I'm not

the Expert to say what was the agreed level.

Q. Okay. And let me ask you this. You have a

theory about the increase in fugitive emissions, the

[Page 1305]

increase in total emissions of lead, but if that were true,

we would not see a decrease in children's blood-lead levels

in La Oroya, would we?

A. No, but I mean --

(Overlapping speakers.)

Q. No is fine.

A. I cannot answer.

Q. No is a good answer.

Okay. So just talking about the air monitoring

data that I just showed you, in terms of lead in the

ambient air -- and I showed you evidence explaining that

that data was reported regularly to the Peruvian

Government, audited by the Peruvian Government, and audited

by outside Experts.

So my question to you is, did you hear

Mrs. Gehring Flores during her Opening when she called the

lead data "fabricated"?

A. I have heard her asking that, yeah.

Q. Do you believe that the lead data is fabricated?

A. To be honest, I don't know.

Q. Okay. We have talked about the fact that you're

not an air modeling expert; right?

A. No.

Q. Okay. And you're not an air monitoring expert,

assuming there is even a difference between the two?

[Page 1306]

A. There is a difference between the two.

Q. Okay. But you're not that either?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. I know how it works, air modeling.

Q. Yeah. Yeah.

(Interruption.)

A. I know how it works, air modeling.

Q. I know how to drive a car, but I'm not a race car

driver.

So you have mentioned SX-EW a couple of times and

that is a report that you rely on; correct?

A. I rely on SX-EW because --

Q. I didn't ask you "because."

A. Okay. I rely upon SX-EW.

Q. Okay. Who is SX-EW? What is their specialty?

What is their raison d'etre? What do they do?

A. They are specialized in Metallurgy.

Q. Have you ever met anyone from SX-EW?

A. No. But if you know, SX-EW means Solid

Extraction Electrowinning.

Q. Okay.

A. Which is --

Q. Okay. Do you know who prepared the Report that

you relied upon?

[Page 1307]

A. It was prepared -- it was prepared and agreed

with DRP.

Q. That's not what I asked you.

A. Central office.

Q. No, I didn't ask you that.

I asked you who is the person?

A. No, I don't know him.

Q. You don't know him?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any idea what that person's

credentials are?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So had that person who prepared the SX-EW

ever done a mass balance analysis before?

A. I have done mass balancing.

Q. I'm not asking that.

Had the person who prepared the SX-EW Report ever

performed a mass balance before?

A. My understanding is that the mass balance was

prepared by DRP, and they used the same people from the

mass balance from Centromín because mass balance is a

central instrument in any pyrometallurgical operations.

And if you don't do it well, I don't think you have a

business.

Q. I understand that the people at Doe Run Perú were

[Page 1308]

the people at Centromín during the relevant periods of time

were the ones who actually did the sampling and reported

that data. I understand that.

I'm asking a different question, which is,

somebody at SX-EW took that data and performed an analysis

of that data; right?

A. I mean, I'm not sure. I mean, I did an analysis

of that data knowing what goes in must go out, and I know

what is -- I know what is recycled, I know what is --

(Interruption.)

A. "Transfrancias," concentrates, "findantes," all

these.

Q. Yeah, I don't doubt that you know it,

Mr. Dobbelaere. I'm asking about the people who prepared

the SX-EW Report that you are relying upon.

What is their expertise, what is their experience

performing mass balance analysis?

A. I am relying on the same data source, and I am

relying on a data source that comes from DRP.

Q. Okay.

A. That's the only thing I can say, and the rest of

the analysis I have checked.

Q. Okay.

A. But I am not -- I don't go into the translation

of indeterminate losses into air quality.

[Page 1309]

Q. Okay.

A. That's what they --

Q. Yeah. And let's -- there are two parts to SX-EW;

right? There is the mass balance and there's, for lack a

better term, what I'll call sort of the air quality

analysis?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. Who at SX-EW performed the air quality

analysis?

A. I don't know. I have read this, and I have seen

that this was based on data from other Doe Run Perú

operations and from a factor that was determined by McVehil

and Monette in the time of Mr. Neil.

Q. So what was the expertise credentials, education,

training of the person at SX-EW who performed -- who

conceived of and performed the air quality analysis that is

reflected in the Report?

A. I don't know. We cannot see that in the Report.

I provided the Report, finally data, finally data.

Q. So you're comfortable relying upon the Report and

opinions of people you've never met of whom you don't know

their experience, and you don't know -- could you wait

until I'm done?

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. I feel comfortable on the reliability of the data

[Page 1310]

on which I made my analysis.

Q. You understand that this is question and answer.

I ask you a question; you give me an answer. Right?

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Tribunal, Counsel is asking

this Expert questions on air quality data and air quality

monitoring. Ms. Proctor, Respondents' independent expert

on toxicology, was just here. These questions are for her.

If Counsel wants to ask this witness about mass

balancing in SX-EW Report, please, I would think that is

fine, but I don't think that this Expert should be subject

to questions that are beyond his expertise, which he said

many times.

MR. WEISS: Well, Mr. President, Mr. Dobbelaere

quotes from, cites to, relies upon all of the aspects of

the SX-EW Report, including the air quality analysis he

cites to the SX-EW Report 37 times in his Report. So it is

well within the bounds of my right of cross-examination to

ask him about the very things that he's discussed in his

Report.

And up to this point, the only thing that I've

been asking him is who prepared the Report and what was

their expertise. So I haven't even gotten to air quality

yet.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Please continue.

MR. WEISS: Thank you very much.

[Page 1311]

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. A few minutes ago, you told me that you reviewed

the data that SX-EW relied upon. Yeah?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Could we look at Slide 13, please. Now

these, I will represent to you, are annexes to the SX-EW

Report, and as annexes do, they typically list -- they list

a series of information that accompanies the Report.

Do you see that?

A. Yes, I see that.

Q. Okay. So did you have these documents that are

referenced in the annex when you did your analysis of

SX-EW?

A. I had -- this is a report that I exhibited

myself.

Q. Yeah. And the reason I ask you is because those

annexes were not attached to the version that you attached

to your Report or submitted with your Report?

A. I only analyzed the data that were available for

me in the Report, and I did not let away -- but first I

want to see what you want to show me.

Q. Well, this is the one of the annexes. You can

see the information as subscribed. I understand you read

Spanish. And I'm asking you whether you had these

documents and you reviewed them in connection with your

[Page 1312]

analysis?

A. I had all the data from 1999 to 2009.

Q. I'll just point to 1.1.

A. Yeah, in which Annex is this? Annex --

Q. It says right there 1.1. Balances from (in

Spanish). Did you have that annex?

A. That I have to check.

Q. Okay. Again, I'm representing that we never saw

it, it wasn't produced to us.

A. No.

Q. So I think your goal was to include with your

Report all the documents on which you relied; yes?

A. Yes. They are and they are referenced in my

Report.

Q. Yeah. And we don't see reference to this, and

these weren't produced to us.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And there -- there are multiple pages of

annexes?

A. Yeah, but I mostly used the WD-30 and the

WD- -- I remember Row 8.

Q. Okay.

A. Because in the one are inputs and outputs and in

the 30, are the losses.

Q. And you wanted to make sure when you read SX-EW

[Page 1313]

or you relied upon it and incorporated it into your Report,

that you analyzed all the data that SX-EW analyzed;

correct?

A. That I was provided with, yes.

Q. Are these things that you would want to see

before you opine that you agree with the conclusions in the

SX-EW Report?

A. I don't understand your question well.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean, if I make a mass balance, I make a mass

balance based on the raw data that I get.

Q. Well, that's exactly what these annexes

reflect --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- raw data?

A. I've seen a lot of them until I didn't get any

sleep anymore, so I know them, yes.

Q. Well, I didn't ask you to do it.

A. I know.

Q. But that's my point. If you rely -- you say you

relied on the raw data, but now you're telling me you

didn't actually have the raw data.

A. I don't say this. I want to see the detail of

what you want to show me, and then I can see if it was

useful for me or not.

[Page 1314]

Q. Okay. We'll pull it up.

But, I guess, so, now, you're telling me you are

relying on a report, you didn't even know who prepared it,

and you didn't have all the data that accompanied the

Report.

Is that where we are so far?

A. No. I think I had all the data that I needed.

Q. Okay. Again we're going to go through these

analyses --

MR. WEISS: Mr. President, where are we in terms

of time or break? Because I'm about to embark on a line

here, so I don't know what your...

If it's okay with you, this would be a convenient

time to break.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Yes. Certainly. So we break

until 3:10.

MR. WEISS: Okay.

(Brief recess.)

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Everybody is here; right? So

why don't we start again. Okay.

Mr. Weiss, please continue.

MR. WEISS: Thank you, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Except, if you needed more

time.

MR. WEISS: No, no, I'm fine. Thank you.

[Page 1315]

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Okay. Thanks.

MR. WEISS: Okay.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. Mr. Dobbelaere, when we left off, I think we were

about to begin talking about one aspect of the SX-EW

Report, and I'm going to ask my colleagues to put up

Slide 14.

Now, Mr. Dobbelaere, is -- this is the Table that

you describe at Paragraphs 217 and 218 of your Second

Report?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And that comes from R-150, which is the

SX-EW Report. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Now, there's a whole bunch of data in this

Table that we can see, and my question for you is, where

does that data come from? What is the source of that data?

A. The source of that data is this Report of SX-EW,

where they first determined -- at the end, unknown losses,

and then from there try to find out how much PM10 fugitives

that mean.

Q. Right. I'm -- let me try this again.

The data points, the numbers, where -- what is

the source of those numbers?

A. For me, the source is the analysis of SX-EW, for

[Page 1316]

these numbers.

Q. Yeah, so --

A. Not from the -- okay.

Q. No, finish. Finish. Go ahead.

A. No, I mean, not from the -- indeterminate lead

losses, this I have reconstructed myself completely on the

basis of the data that I got from DRP. But this further

transition, I wrote in my Second Report also that this is

an analysis of SX-EW. Because it translates into

environmental considerations of how the emissions at the

source distribute, and which ones are PM10. PM10 is the

debatable ones.

(Overlapping speakers.)

Q. Right. I don't -- no, I understand that.

You -- this study, according to your Report, concludes that

Doe Run Perú increased emissions 55 percent relative to

Centromín. Is that what -- is that your understanding?

A. No. I have to read Paragraph 227.

Q. Okay. Please go ahead.

A. When I say now I have addressed Mr. Connor's

concerns about the SX-EW analysis of equivalent lead

emissions, because he completely denies the existence of

equivalent lead losses, which was used by DRP. Okay.

This -- I feel compelled to state that the entire

discussion of the -- that analysis is a distraction.

[Page 1317]

I repeat, that the equivalent lead emissions

analysis is separate, separate, the one I did, and apart

from the simple arithmetic, which shows that DRP increased

production, using dirtier concentrates, which I can show,

also, in the copper circuit, and increased indeterminate

lead losses.

Those three data points tell the entire story.

There is no need to model equivalent lead losses, which I

refer to in my First Report, but I say, okay, there is no

need to go into that discussion about how it was in --

(Interruption.)

A. How that is -- how is the relationship between

total emitted dust and PM10 dust, based upon considerations

of other plants.

Q. Yeah. I think at some point you called, at least

Mr. Connor's criticism of your reliance on this study, a

"distraction." Was that the word that you used?

Just was that the word that you used? And I

apologize if it's not. But --

A. I feel compelled to state that the entire

discussion of that --

(Interruption.)

A. Yes, I feel that is a distraction.

Q. Okay. That's the word. Okay.

And it's -- it is a -- I understand you

[Page 1318]

characterize it as a distraction, but you're relying on the

Report of SX-EW. You incorporated this into your Opinion.

A. I first incorporated this in my Opinion, and then

I said, okay, we don't have to go into that direction.

Indeterminate lead losses are more than enough to show

that, based on seven years comparing with eight years,

within a confidence limit, that indeterminate losses went

up. That's what it is.

Q. Okay. And what if this analysis actually

contradicted your conclusions with respect to the mass

balance? Would it then be something we'd have to talk

about?

A. I don't know. What I see here is that, like,

McVehil and Monette has a higher estimate of PM10 fugitives

than DRP, than Mr. Fornbeck, for instance, that's why I

left this table in. There is no consistency about how much

PM10 dust was fugitives. But it is a lot, in all the

Reports.

Q. Okay. Okay. But what we're particularly

interested in here -- and what this analysis was attempting

to do, was compare fugitive emissions and total emissions

under --

A. Yes.

Q. I'm not finished yet -- under Doe Run Perú and

Centromín; right?

[Page 1319]

A. Yes.

Q. And you are putting this forward as evidence that

Doe Run Perú increased total emissions by 55 percent.

A. I am saying that this method, uses the same

method as Bruce McNeil used to get an Extension of the

PAMA.

Q. Umm-hmm. Yeah.

A. And this was based upon a study of McVehil and

Monette.

Q. Yep.

A. And end of 2003, as far as I remember. And this

study said, oh, you're lucky because you say what are the

fugitive emission data, and from the other data we have

between relationship between fugitive and -- we find the

relationship about five from SO2. So they do the

calculation. They say -- so it is eight.

Q. Okay.

A. And Mr. Neil confirmed that it was 7. Okay. He

could have forgotten the right number, but it was seven or

eight. What this guy did is say, okay, now we have an

estimate of the fugitive emissions. We may divide it

by 8 -- no, we may divide the stack emissions by 8, and add

them to the fugitive emissions to get equivalent emissions,

and that should correlate with -- that should correlate.

This a better indication of what happens close in La Oroya.

[Page 1320]

Q. Umm-hmm. Yeah. Okay.

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. This is what it is, and nothing more and nothing

less. This is what it is.

Q. Okay. Well, you mentioned the McVehil Monette

study. That is JAC-74. Why don't we take a look at that,

please.

So we're going to -- we'll bring it up in a

minute, Mr. Dobbelaere, but it's a study of -- authored by

McVehil Monette, dated July -- excuse me, January 29, 2004,

and it's called "relative contributions of La Oroya main

stack and processed fugitive emissions to ground level

concentrations."

Did you review that study in preparing your

Report?

A. I don't remember that I have access to that

study. I had access to what Mr. Bruce Neil was writing.

As a result of your study, I have these extra questions.

Can you also say what is the effect on lead.

Q. Okay.

A. Because I'm interested in that number to go to

the MEM, and to talk to them and said, I don't need to

install the Acid Plants. I need to install fugitive

emissions. That's what his --

Q. Okay. Yep. Yep. And you understand

[Page 1321]

that -- well, we're still trying to find it, that that

JAC-174 was attached to or submitted with Mr. Connor's

Report?

A. I don't know. I don't know.

Q. Okay. But you had access to that, Mr. Connor's

Report, and the appendices?

A. I have access to Mr. Connor's Report, and maybe

it was in there -- yeah, but...

Q. Now, I think -- yeah, well, here we are.

A. Okay. Right.

Q. So I don't know if this refreshes your

recollection.

(Overlapping speakers.)

(Interruption.)

Q. I'm sorry. Does this refresh your recollection

as to whether or not you have seen this --

(Interruption.)

Q. You've just got to wait until I'm done, for the

Court Reporter.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So you did review this study in connection

with the issuance of your Reports?

A. This, yes. Yeah.

Q. Yes?

A. But, I mean, this letter.

[Page 1322]

Q. Okay. Well, this is a multi-page letter?

A. Yeah. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And I think you understand, of course,

that McVehil, Monette, and George McVehil in particular,

they're air modeling Experts; right?

A. That's what I have to assume, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't know that.

Q. And that -- again, that's not your expertise;

right?

A. No.

Q. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. And we had an exchange earlier where I

showed you some documents reflecting that the air

monitoring data that Doe Run Perú collected was audited. I

want to show you some other Statements in the McVehil

Monette Report about the quality of the air monitoring data

and ask you if you have seen these before?

They're going to find them, and I will -- we'll

came back to them. Unfortunately, we didn't highlight

these in advance. Excuse me one second.

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. President, this is the

[Page 1323]

Interpreter.

(Interruption.)

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. President, I don't know if

you can hear me through your headset. This is the

Interpreter. We do need to have the Witness and the -- and

Counsel to please slow down.

(Interruption.)

MR. WEISS: Of course. I'll do my best.

THE WITNESS: Yep.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. Okay. Now, you understand, Mr. Dobbelaere, that

this is an air modeling exercise that is reflected in

JAC-174?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And do you also understand that the study

and the conclusions here -- oh, I'm sorry. Oh, that's

right.

(Comments off microphone.)

Q. Fine. Sorry.

That the data that McVehil is relying upon to

reach its conclusions comes, in large part, from Doe Run

Perú's air quality monitoring stations.

Do you understand that?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So, for example, you'll see in the

[Page 1324]

Report -- and I wonder if you remember this -- that there

are references to Huanchan, to Sindicato, and Inca. And

you understand those to be some of the air monitoring

stations; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Because they need this data to validate for their

model.

Q. Yeah. Okay. And that data and those stations

that they've relied upon here, that's the same air quality

data that I showed you in Mr. Connor's Slide, which shows a

decrease in lead concentrations in the ambient air in

La Oroya over the period of Doe Run Perú's operations;

correct?

A. This is from 2003, end of 2002.

Q. I think it's January of 2004, to be exact?

A. Exactly. Right.

Q. Right? So it's the same data, same monitoring

stations; correct?

A. Yes. Yes. SO2.

Q. Okay. And did you see in here where Mr. McVehil,

the air modeling and air monitoring Expert, opines on his

view of the reliability of Doe Run Perú's air monitoring

data?

A. I think he had nothing else to rely upon. Okay.

[Page 1325]

Like, I cannot judge if this was reliable or not, but he's

relying on this because there was no other data.

Q. Okay. But he not only relied on it, he opined in

his Expert Opinion that the air monitoring data was

reliable?

A. Could be.

Q. Could be. We'll find it.

A. I didn't read -- I was interested in --

(Overlapping speakers.)

Q. Okay. We'll find it and show it to you.

Okay. So I hate to beat this drum, but we've

already established that you're not an air modeling Expert.

So is it fair to say that the content of this

study is outside your area of expertise?

A. What Neil was asking to his consultant was clear

to me, and I think his air monitoring was not higher than

mine, so -- and I saw that he used that data to get an

Extension of the PAMA.

Q. Yeah. I'm asking --

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. That's my thinking. So...

Q. Yeah. I'm asking. This is -- I'm representing

to you, although I think you would agree with me, that this

is an air modeling study?

A. Yes.

[Page 1326]

Q. So I'm asking you if you would consider an air

modeling study, such as this, to be outside your area of

expertise?

A. Does -- doing the study, yes, but I could follow

the reasoning.

Q. Yeah. Okay. But you could not design and

execute this study within your realm of expertise?

A. No. If I would have the software, yes, but I

don't have the software, and I'm not interested at all.

Q. Okay. And there's obviously methodology that

Mr. McVehil applies in here, there are assumptions that he

applies in here?

A. Yeah.

Q. And so I want to show you some of those, and ask

you some questions about them. Let's first jump to

Section 5, which is the summary. Yep. If you just bring

that up.

A. That's the Factor 5.

Q. Yep. And I want to read something from the

summary here. It says that: "The calculations and

estimates presented above are obviously approximations,

based on rough estimates.

If you can provide us with monthly lead

measurements for one or more stations, it will be possible

to test our result by modeling the specific months for

[Page 1327]

which data are available."

Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. So Mr. McVehil considered the results of his

study to be approximations based on rough estimates.

Are you treating the McVehil results as

conclusive?

A. I have seen that Mr. Neil, Bruce Neil, estimated

them as conclusive because he used exactly the method to

calculate what would be the future air quality based on

this study.

Q. Yeah. But, to be clear, you're here as an Expert

offering your Opinions to this Tribunal?

A. Yes.

Q. And so I'm asking you if, in your Opinion and

your decision to rely on this study, did you consider

Mr. McVehil's conclusions to be definitive?

A. You mean definitive?

Q. Final.

A. Final. Yes.

Q. Yeah.

A. No. Because you would need other data from other

years, because it's -- that this is SO2, but then to go to

lead, he then relied upon data that he got because Mr. Neil

put him under pressure. I understand very well.

[Page 1328]

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, but I need lead data. Okay? That's what

happened.

Q. How do you know that Mr. Neil put him under

pressure?

A. Because it is further down. Yes, but I want to

know. Because I want to know for lead.

Q. Okay. Okay.

A. And then he answers, we are -- you are lucky.

Q. Yeah. But I guess what I'm asking you is, you

are conclusively relying upon the results of the SX-EW

model, which relies upon the McVehil study, but Mr. McVehil

is saying, these are only rough approximations and

estimates. So I'm wondering, how are you reaching a firm

conclusion based on two other people's rough estimates and

approximations?

A. But how --

Q. I have to finish my question.

A. Very good.

Q. Go ahead.

A. I mean, here is 8. And Neil said 7. It is

not 1. Nobody says it was 1. It's a fact of fugitive

emissions compared -- if you have 100 ton of fugitive

emissions, and 100 ton of stack emissions, that are spread

over -- the effect in La Oroya Antigua is not 1 to 1, and

[Page 1329]

that's what you tried to suggest the whole time. For me, it doesn't matter if it's five or seven. It doesn't matter.

Q. Okay. Well, you don't know that because you -- did you take the model and put different numbers into SX-EW's model?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. Oh, okay. We're going to do that --

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. For different years.

Q. Yeah. Okay.

A. Because it's a very simple calculation.

(Interruption.)

Q. So Mr. McVehil asked if they could be provided with monthly lead measurements for one or more stations, and that it would be possible to test the results by modeling specific months.

Did you test these results as Mr. McVehil suggested, by modeling specific months?

A. I used his reasoning, but, I mean -- I have done this for myself; so I don't see -- I don't think I even can talk about it.

But I did it so myself to see how much can it vary if, if in that year, the stack emissions are so high, and the fugitive emissions -- yeah, they are what they are,

[Page 1330]

and play with the numbers, and see that it's always higher than 1. Always.

Q. Did you search the documents available to you to see if, in fact, Mr. McVehil and his firm had done further work and refinement on this same subject?

A. No. No. No.

(Interruption.)

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. President, please.

(Interruption.)

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. My question is, did you search the documents available to you to determine whether, in fact, the record contained documents showing that Mr. McVehil had, in fact, done further work and analyses which would bear upon the approximations and rough estimates that he concluded in this January 29 Report?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Would you have wanted to know if he reached different conclusions in a Second Report before deciding to rely upon his conclusions, which were then relied upon by SX-EW?

A. I have answered in my Paragraph 227.

Q. So you never came across a subsequent Report dated in July of 2004?

A. No, because I didn't want to dig deeper into that

[Page 1331]

relationship because, I -- say, if your fugitive emissions at the source are controlled, and they can be much better controlled, than they were, you do better.

Q. I think you said at one point during this Hearing that you're only interested in getting to the truth.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you tell me that?

A. Yes.

Q. And you don't think subsequent data on the same topic, which you're relying, on would help you get to the truth?

A. Yes, but I was not asked this, and I had enough to do, to do all the rest.

Q. So you were too busy?

A. I was not too busy. I was busy with this because, if you have to dig in all these mass data balance, you're busy.

Q. So you didn't do the work you needed to do to reach a conclusive opinion because you were too busy?

A. No. I have said there is no need to model equivalent lead emission, and that is what you are asking me. And I said -- I concluded there is no need to model equivalent lead emissions.

Q. Okay. That was only after you actually did that in one of your Reports.

[Page 1332]

So you did it in one report --

A. I -- First Report, I said, look at this --

Q. Mr. Dobbelaere, I apologize. But you have to wait until I finish my question.

A. Okay. Right.

Q. After you incorporated the SX-EW model and data into your First Report --

A. Yes.

Q. -- did you change your mind about including it?

A. Not about including SX-EW.

Q. Okay.

A. Mass balancing.

Q. Okay.

A. And the data that I needed to do a proper mass balance.

Q. Okay.

A. And I decided to not go into discussions on air monitoring because, if you increase at the source, you can do whatever calculation you want. You will get worse. That's enough for me.

Q. Umm-hmm. But it also -- if you use more accurate numbers, it might actually get better; right?

A. Better than what? If you increase fugitives, if there is enough evidence that you increase fugitives, then there is no need to go over.

[Page 1333]

Q. Okay.

MR. PEARSALL: Look, can he just finish his answer? We get these "okays," and "I understands." We just want him to finish his answer, Mr. President. That's all.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. Thanks for the reminder, Counsel.

A. And this is written in 227, this conclusion. Second Report.

Q. Are you familiar with the modeling techniques that McVehil used?

A. I am familiar with modeling techniques that we used to calculate the impact of any possible source of fugitive emission or stack emission on the immediate neighborhood of the Plant.

Q. Okay.

A. Take into care wind directions all you want.

Q. I'm going to show you the second paragraph of Section 1 of this document. And it says, in the second paragraph: "If we assume that 100 ppb early morning concentrations are due to process/fugitive emissions, we can estimate the necessary SO2 rate."

Is that a reasonable assumption?

A. What they do, they rely on the fact that, in the morning, you have inversion, and that's their assumption.

[Page 1334]

Q. Do you have the expertise to determine whether that assumption is reasonable?

A. I have no expertise -- wait a minute -- in modeling a particular situation, at 4,000 meter high, in a valley, with -- we have -- we know, in our Plant, where the wind came from, what is the main wind directions, where the buildings that disturbed the distribution. I don't think we had an effluent model on that. We had a complete model, 3D model, that we got from the State completely, and we could put every source there. So this conclusion may be valid because he was the specialist for this Plant, for this particular situation. How can I question this?

Q. Well, he's not here; you are, and you're the Expert who is incorporating this information into your Report. And so, in your Expert capacity before this Tribunal, I'm asking you, is that a reasonable assumption?

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Mr. Weiss, and since this turns around numbers, for the sake of later readers, you read out "assume that the 100 ppb." It should be 1,000.

THE WITNESS: The 1,000 ppb.

MR. WEISS: You are correct, I apologize.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. Okay. Let's jump to the heart of this. So let's go back to the Table 15, which is the McVehil Chart. Yeah.

So, Mr. Dobbelaere, did you do any work to test

[Page 1335]

the accuracy of the numbers that are incorporated into this analysis?

A. Well, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. 447, chimney.

Q. Okay. Where did that come from?

A. From the chimney, from the stack emissions.

Q. Of course. I understand that.

A. That I discussed.

Q. No, but the number, 474, how is that number calculated? Where does it come from?

A. This is the main-stack emission of lead in a certain year, which is year, I assume, 2004, and this is measured in the stack, flow rate, dust, and analyzed how many lead is in the dust.

Q. Thank you. And I understand what it represents. I'm asking a different question.

What is the source of the data? Where is the 474 sourced from?

A. Normally, it should be from the MEM reporting or from the three-monthly reporting of Doe Run Perú to the MEM.

Q. Okay. Okay.

A. And it's not reported like this because you have to make the calculation yourself.

[Page 1336]

Q. Yeah. Okay. Now, and the next number, PM10 fugitives, 730.

You see that?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the source of that number?

A. That is an estimate of McVehil and Monette.

Q. Okay. And does it come from the McVehil Monette Report?

A. That I don't know.

Q. Okay. And --

A. But they say this is McVehil and Monette, it says here. This is the number.

Q. Yeah. I understand that. But you understand that's an estimate; correct?

A. Yes. It's always an estimate, fugitives.

Q. Right. Yes, it is. And --

A. I've seen other ones, half of it.

Q. Yeah. Yeah.

A. Okay.

Q. And did you do any work to test the validity of that estimate of 730?

A. I mean, how is it possible? The only check I can do is always the same comparison with what Mr. Fornbeck was estimating, which, from my memory, is about half of it.

Q. Okay. Can we bring up the slides showing the

[Page 1337]

model of the sources of data which, for some reason, I don't have listed here.

A. And to answer also your question, what I understand is that there is another document of Mr. Fornbeck where he takes the lead to dust ratio. That is very strange to me because he relies upon copper operations that are not comparable with this operation. So I have the tendency to believe in the McVehil and Monette number and not in the very low number of Mr. Fornbeck.

Q. Yeah. I understand. But you don't know who gave Mr. McVehil that estimate; right?

A. I think they estimated it themselves.

Q. But you don't know that, do you?

A. No.

Q. So you don't know how valid or how reliable that estimate is, do you?

A. That is so, and I don't have it here, but there is some document where they themselves say, "yeah, but we have a much higher number than you have."

Q. Or it could have been very conservative; right? Okay.

Now, what I've tried to do here is to source the data for you. So what I'm representing to you -- and you can tell me if I'm wrong -- is that the 474 number comes from the McVehil Report and it is basically a calculation.

[Page 1338]

The estimate of chimney -- of stack emissions was 1.3 tons per day, so it's just multiplied by 365.

A. 365.

Q. Is that your understanding of how that number is derived? Is that your understanding of how that number is derived?

A. No.

Q. Would you like me to show you where it appears in the McVehil Report?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. I would understand that a number that is used for the modeling is derived from the three-monthly reporting from MEM -- from DRP to MEM.

Q. Yeah. But, I guess -- you see that, above 474, it says "McVehil Monette Doe Run Perú"; right?

A. Yes.

Q. So is it your understanding that that data comes from McVehil Monette?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So do I need to show you the document, or you're comfortable accepting that that is the estimate offered by McVehil?

A. I would be interested to know how they got to the data.

[Page 1339]

Q. Okay. Sure. Let's look at the document please, which is JAC-74. And if -- and we can turn to Section 4, the first sentence. You see there, Mr. Dobbelaere, it says: "You have estimated that average lead emissions are approximately 1.3 tons per day from the Main Stack."

Are you with me?

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. "And 2.0 tons per day from process/fugitive sources"?

A. But who is writing that to whom?

Q. This is the same McVehil Report that I showed you before, from January of 2004.

A. Yes. I have read this.

Q. Okay. So could we go back to the chart, please. So you are now with me that the 474 number comes from McVehil? It's 1.3 tons per day times 365, 365 days in a year. Yes?

A. I'm with you, but I find it very strange.

Q. You find it what?

A. Very strange.

Q. Okay. Well, I'm not really --

A. I mean, a consultant who works for a client and has a number that is nearly half of what -- I don't understand that.

Q. Okay. But I'm really not asking for you to

[Page 1340]

editorialize. I'm just trying to make sure we're both on the same page as where the data comes from. Okay. All right.

So the next number I want to ask you about is 757. You see, under Centromín Perú, it says: "Chimney, PM10 fugitives," and the number is 757.

Do you see that?

A. Yes, from the chimney, yeah.

Q. What is the source of that number?

A. Yeah, I would -- okay. Right. Yeah, but these are both -- okay. There's a comparison. These are both stack emission data.

Q. Okay. Yes.

A. Because I remember I have checked them, but the one is from Centromín time and the other is from Doe Run Perú time. I think that the 474, if remember well, was the number from the Year 2002.

Q. Okay.

A. But -- yeah, because they made a study in 2003.

Q. Okay.

A. We can look at the study data.

Q. Once again, 757, under Centromín Perú, chimney PM10 fugitives, what is the source? I just showed you, for the 1.3 tons per day equaling 474. What is the source of the 757 number reflecting Centromín Perú's chimney PM10

[Page 1341]

fugitives?

A. That should be, again, the data reported to MEM.

Q. Okay. But you don't know where it came from?

A. Yeah, but -- I remember the chimney there. It should be the data from -- there are no other stack data than the ones reported from DRP to MEM.

Q. Okay.

A. So I was confused to say, hey -- that these two are different. But, now, I see this is Doe Run Perú and this is Centromín Perú. So -- and these are different years.

Q. Okay. And you didn't want to check the source of this data to make sure that it was accurate before you relied on it?

A. Yes -- I did --

(Interruption.)

Q. You didn't want to check this data to make sure that it was accurate before you relied upon it?

A. I checked the chimney data. That, I'm sure. I'm sure because they are there, and I -- as I already said, this first one should be the chimney data, and then you guided me in the direction to say, "no, this is from their modeling." This is not from their modeling. The 474 should be found back in the data from the Main Stack

[Page 1342]

because this is what it is. This are chimney data, and I would be very -- this is why I said I would be very surprised if McVehil and Monette comes up with another number than the number that was reported to MEM. Very interesting.

Q. Well, I just showed you, in the McVehil Monette Report, where that number comes from, and, in fact, in the chart it is specifically labeled as coming from McVehil and Monette, but you don't believe that's the source of the 474?

A. No, I think that is the source as I checked with the stack data.

Q. Okay.

A. And we can check and it could be that it is only 11 months because -- I know this was the end of the year, so they couldn't have taken 11 months because the year was not ready.

Q. Okay. But, at the end of the day, you don't know?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. Okay.

A. I know this is chimney data and there should not be anything else than the reported data to MEM.

Q. Yeah. You see, I know it's chimney data too, and you know how I know that? Because it says it on the chart.

[Page 1343]

A. No. No. No. I'm sure -- I checked it, and I know very well that it was the end of the year, and that it may not have been the complete year, but maybe one month less.

Q. Okay.

A. That's what I remember.

Q. So, again, I am looking at the 757 number, under the Column "Centromín Perú, chimney, PM10 fugitives." I have not been able to find out where that number came from.

A. Which number you mean?

Q. I just said 757.

A. I don't see a number.

Q. It's circled.

A. Okay.

Q. Okay. And as the person who's relying on this data and who offered this Report, who just told me that he checked all the numbers, I would like to know what is the source of the 757.

A. From the thousands of numbers, one of the thousands of numbers I have seen, I cannot say from my head, but it should be from the Reporting data from -- and I'm sure I've checked it -- from the reporting data from MEM. But they report it every three months.

Q. Okay. So you're sure you've checked it?

A. Yes.

[Page 1344]

Q. Okay. All right.

Now, let's go to the next slide, please. Okay. And this is the same chart, and now we're looking at different data points. So right now, I'm looking at PB equivalent, Doe Run Perú chimney PM10 fugitives, and the number is 59.25.

Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And you've mentioned, a number of times, the 8 times factor?

A. That's what they used.

Q. I've got to finish my question.

A. Okay.

Q. Is that what is reflected in that calculation?

A. Yes.

Q. So that would be the stack emissions divided by 8?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay. And is that the same thing for the second number, 95 divided by 8?

A. Yes.

Q. I'm sorry. I -- 757 divided by 8. Excuse me.

A. They rounded it up.

Q. Okay. And the 8 times factor, that also comes from the McVehil Monette Report?

[Page 1345]

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And did you do any work to confirm whether Mr. McVehil's conclusion in that regard is accurate?

A. No. I mean, this is the only numbers that are available, the only ones, and that Mr. Neil forced out of McVehil and Monette. So I want to know these numbers. And then he used them to ask an extension as the main argument to have this Extension.

Q. So when you tell me that it is the only number available, please correct me if I'm wrong --

A. Yeah.

Q. That tells me that you've scoured the record to look for documents to see if there were any further refinements of that number or contradictions; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you didn't find anything?

A. I didn't have to look at it because Mr. Neil used that.

Q. Okay. Understood.

Okay. So now, can we look at the next slide, please.

A. What I did --

Q. We're going to go to the next slide. Okay. All right. And this number here -- so I'm now looking at

[Page 1346]

McVehil Monette Doe Run Perú, and it says 730, under the Row "PM10 fugitives."

Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Now, I'm happy to show you the document, but I will represent to you that that number also comes out of the McVehil Monette Report, and it is calculated because the estimate given to McVehil was 2 tons per day times 365.

Is that your understanding?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Now, the 414 number that is circled there, under Centromín Perú, PM10 fugitives, what was the source of that number?

A. The source of that number is the SX-EW Report. If you want to hear that, this is the source of that.

Q. Well, I'm looking at the SX-EW Report right now. That's where the number exists, and I'm asking you to tell me what is the source of it? How was it calculated? Where does it come from?

A. The whole reasoning behind is in their Report.

Q. But you cited this table. You relied on this table. They're not here. I'm asking you.

A. Because there is nothing else. How can you -- if I see fugitives from -- I have done many calculations with other assumptions, and I always find a factor that is

[Page 1347]

bigger than 1. If you find a factor lower than 1 for the fugitives, I would be very surprised, and I would like to see it.

Q. Okay. I'm going to try my question one more time.

The number 414, under the heading "Centromín Perú and PM10 fugitives," can you tell me or the Tribunal how that number is derived, calculated, sourced?

Where does it come from?

A. I have cited this in my First Report and I have said in the Second Report. I will not go in that direction anymore, and this is what I already told you more than 10 times now.

Q. So, I guess, what you've told me more than 10 times now is that you can't explain something you relied upon in your Report to establish that Doe Run Perú emissions were 55 percent higher than Centromín's? You can't explain it?

A. I can explain that, from the different estimates that are circling around for fugitives, which are much higher than McVehil Monette than -- much higher than the ones that were estimated by Mr. Vanberg. This is the number that comes out.

Q. One more time. Is the 414 number, is it calculated by Doe Run Perú? Is it calculated by MEM? Is

[Page 1348]

it calculated by McVehil Monette?

A. It is calculated by SX-EW, who was appointed by the insolvency bankruptcy -- not insolvency, but bankruptcy.

Q. Okay. That's helpful.

A. That's what they calculated.

Q. Okay. Thank you. And how did they calculate it?

A. They calculated it referring to other operations, lead operations, to Herculeanum operations because they were interested in PM10 fugitives and not in the total amount of -- if you have a number of lead losses that you cannot explain, and they had -- a part of it is fugitive dust, and a part of that fugitive dust is PM10 dust. And they used the factor there that they apparently derives from a document that is also described there to get to that number. I cannot check if -- no, I cannot check. If the information that DRP has in the Glover Smelter and Herculeanum Smelter that is used to have a good idea about it -- how can I check this number? Because the number is from DRP.

Q. Okay. I'm not asking you to check the number. I'm asking you to check the methodology. I'm asking you to explain the methodology.

These are numbers that you are relying on, and I think you owe the Tribunal an explanation of how they were

[Page 1349]

calculated. You can't rely on something if you can't tell someone how you calculated it.

A. I have explained, in my Paragraph 227, there is no need to model equivalent lead emissions, which was an extra step that SX-EW took for its own purposes unrelated to the Arbitration.

This is what is there. So why should I keep on telling you again -- because I have been seeing this two years ago now, and I said I will not -- I will go for what is emitted at the source, and I know what is emitted at the source. If this is more --

Q. Okay. The reason --

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. -- you're doing worse. And that's enough.

Q. Okay and the reason I think you should be telling me about it is because I think it contradicts your Opinion.

A. Why? Why?

Q. I'll show you.

A. You'll show me?

Q. Yeah. So I asked you, I think, a couple times whether you had reviewed other document in the record to give yourself certainty that these numbers were accurate; right?

And I think you said you didn't; is that right?

A. No, I didn't.

[Page 1350]

Q. Okay.

A. I didn't need to because I didn't want to.

Q. Right. And I think you said that if you initially thought or you initially said that the fugitives number should have come from a number that Doe Run Perú reported to MEM; right?

A. Not the fugitives. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. The fugitives -- also not that fugitives.

Q. Well, a number that Doe Run Perú reported to MEM. That's where you said it should be sourced?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So I'm going to ask --

A. As long as that number is right. Okay.

Q. Yeah, well -- I'd like to bring up Slide 22, please.

So this is the 2005 Doe Run Perú request for an extension.

Have you reviewed this document?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay. And you see here that what I'm showing you is Table 5.1-1. It is entitled "Reduction of lead in fugitive emissions."

Do you see that?

A. I see that.

[Page 1351]

Q. And you see that in 2002, Doe Run Perú has reported to MEM fugitive emissions of less than 1 ton/day.

Do you see that?

A. I've seen it. This is at, but...

Q. Okay. And throughout the entire period -- and some of these are projected numbers -- they are less than 1 ton/day.

Do you see that?

(Interruption.)

A. I see that. And I'm happy that you show me this table because I have done some, but I will not give them now.

Q. Okay. And then if we could bring up Slide 23.

So this is also a submission to MEM from DRP from February 17 of 2004.

Have you seen this document?

A. More than 100 times.

Q. Okay. 101.

This is a cutout. It is a table of emissions, and at the bottom column you can see it's highlighted. It says "Total Fugitive Emissions, 374"; correct?

A. Yes. Correct.

Q. And that's tons per year; correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

[Page 1352]

A. Estimate.

Q. All right. So that is half. Both of these documents show that Doe Run Perú's reported fugitive emissions were half of what SX-EW incorporated in its model?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay. You didn't consider this data when you assessed the validity of the SX-EW conclusion, did you?

A. I don't understand. I know this table very well, and this number at 374, and I cannot assess this data as only to find out that the lead to this ratio, especially the copper plant is much underestimated because they had used figures from U.S. -- what I have documents, and these are not plans with high lead content.

Q. Okay. Now, can we go back to the slide Table 15, please. Do we have --

(Comments off microphone.)

Q. So --

A. I noticed that they use higher numbers.

Q. Correct.

A. Yes.

Q. So --

A. And they are the advisors of the DRP.

Q. And so this number that we're looking at here, the first one is 3.7, air quality, and that's McVehil

[Page 1353]

Monette, Doe Run Perú, and the second number that is circled is 2., 1 and that's air quality for Centromín.

Do you see these numbers?

A. Yes, I see the numbers.

Q. Okay. Can you tell me what is the source of the 3.7 number for Doe Run Perú?

A. This should be the -- this is the air quality measurement from the end of 2002.

Q. Is it a monitored air quality measurement?

A. It's a monitored air quality measurement.

Q. What is the 2.1 number?

A. I have to look. I don't know exactly. There are only two measurements there.

Q. Yeah.

A. Okay.

Q. I mean, it says it on the slide. So that is the average annual air quality during Centromín's operations?

A. Yes.

Q. From 1995 to '97; right?

A. Yes. There were only two measurements there.

Q. Okay. So next slide, please. Now, before you told me that the 414 was a reported number.

It's not a reported number, is it?

A. No, 414 is not a reported number.

Q. It's not a reported number?

[Page 1354]

A. No. Never. And also the 730 is not a reported number.

Q. All right. And you didn't know how SX-EW calculated 414; right?

A. I have been reading this two years ago, and I -- I think I know this is one of the Reports of SX-EW where they talk about the effect of -- basically the effect of putting more lead in the circuit.

Q. Yeah. What they actually did was they made an assumption about chimney emissions, stack emissions. They added total emissions, and then they ascribed an air quality number to both Doe Run Perú and Centromín; right?

A. They did not invent a chimney number.

Q. I didn't say "invent." So I apologize if that's what you heard.

Then what they did is they created what they called a "reduction factor" -- right? -- by dividing the air quality numbers to capture the difference between the two?

A. Yes.

Q. Right. And then they applied that reduction factor to Centromín's stack emissions; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And that is how they derived the estimate of PM10 fugitive emissions, which is 414?

[Page 1355]

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. But that can be right. It is right.

Q. Yeah.

A. But you cannot relate fugitives with stack emissions if things change.

Q. Yeah. Okay.

A. Okay.

Q. Okay. So next slide, please.

I'm sorry, if I misspoke. It was -- you apply the reduction factor to Doe Run Perú's estimated fugitives to reach the 414.

Next slide, please.

Okay. So we have seen -- I think I just showed you two documents -- post-McVehil Monette where Doe Run Perú reported fugitive emissions of less than 1 ton/day to the MEM.

Do you recall those documents that I showed you?

A. Yeah. I know those documents.

Q. Yeah. Okay. And so this is the calculation of how McVehil Monette calculated the 3.7 air quality number for Doe Run Perú.

Do you see that?

[Page 1356]

A. Reported?

Q. Calculated?

A. Calculated.

Q. Right. So McVehil Monette didn't use air monitoring data, as you suggested, to ascribe an air quality value for the purposes of this document. They calculated it based on some calculations they came up with.

Did you understand that?

A. I understand everything.

Q. Really?

A. Yes.

Q. Good for you.

A. But what I also understand is that, whatever you do about fugitives, it is always based -- also your reasoning is based on estimated fugitive emissions from Doe Run Perú without any measurement, 10 years' long.

Q. Yep.

A. I will discuss the table later hopefully.

Q. Yeah. So what we see here is what McVehil did was, they derived a concentration from lead -- from main stack emissions and a different concentration for fugitive emissions.

You with me?

A. Yeah.

Q. So for the main stack they assumed it was 3.2,

[Page 1357]

and they multiplied by that -- excuse me. They multiplied that by the number of lead emissions per day, and that's how they got .4.

Do you see that?

A. Yes, I see that. What I see is that below -- and I didn't have this document -- it was 3.3 divide by .4, and if my calculation is right, this is the factor 8. And now they corrected it, some document to come to a factor 4. It is still highly above 1.

Q. I would really, really, appreciate if you would follow my questions instead of going off on tangents.

A. I will follow your questions.

Q. So you'll see there that there is under the main stack calculation, there's a concentration calculation for fugitives; right? And apologies if the crossing out creates a problem, but it shows that they are ascribing of 1.65, and they originally multiplied that by the estimate of 2 tons/day of fugitive emissions; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And they got 3.3; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And they added 3.3 to .4, to get 3.7?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So we now understand it wasn't based on monitoring data; right?

[Page 1358]

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And I showed you documents which indicated that that fugitive emissions estimate was quite high and possibly wrong, and, in fact, it is half of that. Those were the data reported to the MEM by DRP.

You saw that; yes?

A. I saw that.

Q. Okay. And now if I change this model to the reported number, the concentration decreases because now it is only 1.65 times 1.0.

Do you see that?

A. Yes, I see that.

Q. And the total when I add 1.65 to .4, I get 2.05; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And let's go to the next slide. Okay.

Do we have the model? Could we put up the model? Yeah. So what I've done here, I've recreated the SX-EW model exactly as we just described using the same numbers, using the same reduction factor, and, as you can see, he arrives at exactly the same conclusion as in SX-EW, a 55 percent increase in total emissions.

Do you see that?

A. I see that. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So I'll just run you through the numbers;

[Page 1359]

right? The 474 is the same number we saw in Table 15; right?

A. Umm-hmm.

Q. And the 59.31 is that number divided by 8?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Same thing with Centromín; the 757 was the number we saw in Table 15; right?

A. Yes.

Q. 94.63, just divided 757 divided by 8; right?

A. Yes.

Q. The PM10 fugitives for Doe Run Perú, 730. That was in the original Table 15; correct?

730 was the estimate of fugitive emissions based on 2 tons/day?

A. From McVehil and Monette?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. And totals emission number is just math adding those two columns?

A. Yes.

Q. And then we have done the same thing. We have applied -- if you look at 414 number under Centromín for fugitives, that is 730 times the reduction factor that we discussed earlier, which is represented there below, .567.

A. Yes.

[Page 1360]

Q. Okay. So let's use the numbers that were actually reported.

If you could put in a correct PM10 fugitives number, and if you change the air quality number accordingly to 2.05 as we discussed. So you see here, when we use reported numbers, we actually reached the conclusion that Doe Run Perú's emissions decreased almost 10 percent relative to Centromín.

Do you see that?

A. Yes, I see that, but it is all based on estimates that nobody can check. And you say they are reported, but how are they measured?

Q. Yeah.

A. If you see how arithmetically they increased -- okay. I will stop.

Q. Well, you are the --

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Could you -- Tribunal, could the Witness -- could the Expert please finish his answer? We have been very generous with Claimants' Experts. Our Expert was trying to finish.

MR. WEISS: I will, Mrs. Flores, but I would note that I've been very generous when he's stepping on my questions too. This is a two-sided problem that I will try to fix.

MS. GEHRING FLORES: Mr. President, can the

[Page 1361]

Expert finish his explanation?

PRESIDENT SIMMA: Yes. Mr. Dobbelaere, can you finish your explanation of this point?

THE WITNESS: Yes. I have -- before issuing my Second Report, I have also been playing with all these numbers, but, I mean, you can prove whatever you want because it is all based on estimates on fugitives, and I stopped it, and then I said: "Okay. I don't want to go into this discussion," and now you're discussing this in one hour.

BY MR. WEISS:

Q. Okay. I guess, Mr. Dobbelaere, that is exactly my point. You offered this to convince this Tribunal that Doe Run Perú's fugitive emissions went up 55 percent, and now you're telling everyone it is all just fudging numbers that you cannot rely on.

Is that what you're telling us?

A. I'm telling you that you prove whatever you want if your estimates are -- what I know is these 365 tons of estimates are just an estimate from a time that, for some reason, Doe Run Perú has turned into 50 percent of what McVehil Monette, a professional company, was estimating.

So I'm asking the question, where and what? And I find fugitive emissions from the copper plant largely underestimated because if you look at how much SO2 was

[Page 1362]

emitted by the copper plant -- and there is no doubt about it. You saw it every day -- and you look at the gases of these copper -- of these copper plants, and there are other data that tell you about the lead-to-SO2 relationship between this data. You come to different numbers, much higher numbers, and you do your exercise again, and you, again, find an increase.

Q. Yeah. That is exactly my point.

A. But I would say -- I don't go into this thing anymore because I say, if you emit more at the source, you have -- and you don't do anything at your installation, which you didn't, which DRP didn't -- sorry, you didn't -- DRP didn't, how can it be that your fugitives went down? And the effect of the fugitive is much larger and, Factor 8, what is the effect of the fugitives related to the Main Stack here? You cannot say they are less. You cannot say that are less.

Q. Yeah. Right. I hear you, and I understand your Opinion. And I understand that ultimately your Opinion -- ultimately, to believe the whole tangent you just went on, we have to accept that Doe Run Perú did 42 Projects, spent $313 million on emissions control projects that were mandated by the Peruvian Government, but they achieved nothing. So we'll have to -- the Tribunal will have to decide that one.

[Page 1363]

A. I don't -- well --

Q. Okay. So let's move on.

The other part of SX-EW is the mass balance; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And can you tell us, how is the sampling for a mass balance performed? How are the data that go into the mass balance calculations collected?

A. Yeah. You tell it by sampling. And then -- first they are sampled, and then you have like from -- first they are sampled.

If you have a heap, 1,000 ton of concentrates, somebody goes around it and picks, according to a procedure, a number of scoops. It is mixed. It is then mixed, reduced, until there are -- normally there are three samples, and each sample is then analyzed in the lab.

It depends on -- because -- three samples because you want to have a sample for yourself, you want to have a sample for the supplier, and you have a sample for the -- like the arbitrator for, you know. If you have a discussion upon the number you have -- and this is very important -- and the more precious metals you are treating, more importantly this -- but also here, also here the impurities because there is a penalty on the impurities.

Q. Yep.

[Page 1364]

A. So the samples and the sampling method and the whole system, according to Mr. Buckley, were not changed. It existed in Centromín and they continued in Centromín. And he was only interested in, at the end of the day: "What is my recovery?" Because that is money. Okay.

He was General Manager. It would have been maybe the only thing he was interested in, but what is recovery. But has much more information in that, much more information.

Q. Okay. So, again, I'm just trying to understand the actual --

(Overlapping speakers.)

A. -- if you're a decent company. Sorry.

Q. I'm just trying to understand practically how it done by the people on the ground; right?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. So if I understand it correctly, there is the input. So there's a concentrate that comes in, and that is weighed, and it is tested -- let me finish. I'm going to finish. It is weighed. It is tested for percentages of various metals --

A. Yes.

Q. -- and then you have a calculation of how much metal and how much of various things are in that concentrate; right? Step 1.

[Page 1365]

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Step 2 is, it goes through the smelter, it comes out the other side, and then you have a pile of slag; right?

A. You have a pile of slag. You have a metal. You have dust in the Cottrell, and you have dust going from the Main Stack, and you have fugitives and water.

Q. Got it. Got it. So you know how much metal you have; right? That's easily quantifiable. We know how much comes out of the smelter?

A. I think, yes.

Q. Okay. And then one of the things somebody has to do is go out to the slag pile and take a sample?

A. Also.

Q. Right. And not only do they have to take a sample, they have to estimate the size of that slag pile; right?

A. They can weigh it.

Q. Well, if it's on the ground, can they weigh it?

A. They can weigh it with -- depending on how you produce it.

Q. Okay.

A. You can weigh it. You can measure it. From your sample you have the water content, you have the wet content, the dry content. You can do everything, and a

[Page 1366]

good plant -- I hope DRP was a good plant -- would be interested to know the losses in the slag because this is one of the outputs that is lost.

So you should have -- and because slag was granulated, it was much more easy to sample than granulated issue. The slag is caused in water and it gives like fine sand. You can sample it much better than if you have blocks and you have to go around and try to find out what is in the block. It was granulated slag.

Q. Do you know what the process was at DRP or at Centromín? You said that sometimes the slag piles are weighed.

Do you know if that was the case?

A. No. What I know is that there was a whole team, and I -- such a plant. It is in the heart of such a plant. You need a whole team to manage all this, partially on a daily basis and then reporting on a monthly basis, and then inventory. We did it four times a year. Maybe we did it only one time a year, depending, to make corrections. You must make corrections.

Q. Okay. But -- so let's assume it isn't weighed. Somebody has to go out to the slag pile and estimate how many tons are in the slag pile; right?

A. Yes. There are good ways to do it.

Q. I understand. But there is inherent uncertainty

[Page 1367]

in that process?

A. I don't know. They have to be transported, so you have a second weighing. You load your truck and you go over weigh-in bridge, if you have one, and you go to the dump. There are many ways to do that very well.

Q. Right. But there can be substantial inherent uncertainty?

A. There are -- this is statistic, and this is variance, and variances add up, and you can do an analysis, and you know at the end of the day what is your confidence limit.

Q. Yeah. And typically what is the margin for error on a mass balance, given all the calculations and estimates that you have to do?

A. I checked it. I don't have the document here, but because what I used is -- at the end of the day comes out indeterminate losses before correction and after correction, and I've checked the numbers. And because there were seven or eight data years, you reduce the -- you reduce the mistake, the sum of the mistakes -- the variance. You reduce the variance.

And I did at least do the analysis on it, and I have put a confidence level on it because I knew this question would come up. I have to do that.

And I have found from the seven years before and

[Page 1368]

the other -- seven years because if you do this-- and there's an important change in your process, you will see it in the data. Yes.

Q. Okay. Can we take a look at Slide 30, please. This is from the IGAC, and this is translated -- there is Spanish and English, and I'm going to read it out loud, and this is talking about mass balances.

These balance -- "these balances consider an indeterminate category whose quantity reflects sampling inaccuracies, errors in lab analyses, unquantified spills, unquantified waste, among others."

Is that your understanding of some of the uncertainties inherent in a mass balance?

A. Yes. That is.

Q. Okay. And can we go to the next slide, please, 31.

And you relied on SX-EW, of course, who did a mass balance, and this is what they say about it.

"The undetermined losses of lead considered as fugitives include losses that are not transported by air currents outside the Metallurgical Complex, others that do not reach the population, or simply these losses partially have sampling errors, analysis, and errors in the weight estimates in the metallurgical balances."

[Page 1369]

1 Is that something you read when you considered

2 the validity of the SX-EW Report?

3 A. Yes. I mean, I have done four inventories per

4 year, 20 years long, and I have done monthly mass balances.

5 I know all these things.

6 Q. Okay. Now we talked about indeterminate losses;

7 right? And that is the stuff that isn't accounted for

8 between the inputs and the outputs; right?

9 A. That is why you have a second check and you have

10 a correction at the end of year and you make your

11 inventory.

12 Q. I'm just trying to get an understanding of the

13 term "indeterminate loss."

14 A. Absolutely.

15 Q. Okay. So what I said is correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. And I think I understand that your Opinion

18 is that some percentage of the indeterminate losses are

19 fugitive emissions?

20 A. Absolutely.

21 Q. Okay. And how does one determine what percentage

22 of indeterminate loss are fugitives?

23 A. That you cannot because you cannot measure. You

24 don't measure.

25 Q. But you have -- you have ascribed some percentage

[Page 1370]

1 to the indeterminate losses to characterize them as

2 fugitives; right?

3 A. Indeterminate losses are all the losses you don't

4 know because you didn't measure them, and one of them is

5 fugitives.

6 Q. Right.

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. Understood. So that's what I'm getting at, which

9 is, you have 100 indeterminate -- I'm picking a random

10 calculation. You have a 100 indeterminate losses.

11 How many of the indeterminate losses are

12 fugitives, and how do you know that?

13 A. I only know if they increase or decrease from

14 others, from other methods to derive, to say I have an

15 increase here. Okay. I can see that. The indeterminate

16 loss is a check.

17 I increased my lead in the circuit, and

18 systematically I have more losses exactly with the year

19 that I did increase. What is happening there? Now you

20 explain me which other losses can be -- have changed

21 because you changed your operations by 30 percent, and your

22 lead in the copper circuit -- I can explain you later -- by

23 whatever year you compare it can go from, you know,

24 60 percent or more because you have to recycle and

25 everything.

[Page 1371]

1 Q. Yep.

2 A. And it is very clear that the SO2 emissions have

3 increased. And it's very clear -- it's very clear that the

4 copper converter was a big source of SO2 emissions that was

5 not unabated over the whole period.

6 And it is also very clear that it was a high

7 source of lead fugitives. So these lead fugitives alone

8 there have increased. There is evidence.

9 Now, and these are -- and the proof is -- yeah, I

10 find the evidence in the mass balance because the

11 difference has significantly -- significantly increased.

12 And why would a team from the DRP make a

13 systematic error that was not made by the team before,

14 before -- if Buckley, who was the first present, said, oh,

15 this guy is doing a good job and they continued.

16 Q. Could we look at Slide 32, please.

17 So this is another slide from the SX-EW Report,

18 and you'll notice here that there is both Spanish and

19 English, and SX-EW is suggesting that they would apply a

20 32 percent number to determine what percentage of

21 indeterminate losses were fugitive emissions.

22 Is that your understanding?

23 A. They have done -- I have done the indeterminate

24 balance and checked it off, and they have continued with

25 what is here in 227.

[Page 1372]

1 Q. Is that what they did? They applied 32 percent?

2 A. Could be. Yep.

3 Q. Did you check that?

4 A. I said that I stopped with this exercise to try

5 to translate a whole bunch of things of -- based on

6 estimates from others, as you do here, and how they travel

7 from a converter to a measurement. How do they travel from

8 a converter to a measurement?

9 Q. Do you agree with SX-EW's conclusion that

10 32 percent of indeterminate losses are fugitive emissions?

11 A. Can be, yes. This is like a number of 800 in

12 Centromín's time.

13 Q. Is that a number-- is that a number that you used

14 in your analysis?

15 A. I did not -- I did do a mass balances and

16 indeterminate losses, and I did not go further to say this

17 is the percentages of fugitive emissions because it's an

18 estimate like another estimate.

19 But if you use consequently 16 percent, which is

20 a reasonable number, you end up for this plant with

21 800 tons/year, and Doe Run says it's 320 tons/year. And

22 there we are.

23 Q. Okay. But, again, in your analysis, did you

24 follow SX-EW's conclusion to determine that 32 percent of

25 the indeterminate losses were fugitive emissions?

[Page 1373]

1 A. I did not follow that because I did not use that.

2 I did not use that.

3 Q. In your Figure WD-28 -- do you remember that?

4 Can we bring that up?

5 A. Yeah, I can check. Which Report? First one or

6 Second?

7 Q. That's a good question. I think it's the

8 original. We'll put it up. We might not. It is in the

9 slide.

10 Okay. We're going to look for that, but we'll

11 move on to save time.

12 So I asked you about -- maybe we have found it.

13 MS. GEHRING FLORES: I'm sorry, Tribunal, many

14 apologies. Could we just ask for a humanitarian break? I

15 believe -- we already had our coffee break; right? I

16 honestly don't even remember at this point. Okay.

17 PRESIDENT SIMMA: So we have a break of

18 five minutes until 4:35.

19 MS. GEHRING FLORES: All right. Thank you.

20 (Brief recess.)

21 PRESIDENT SIMMA: I suggest we get back to work.

22 Yes, Mr. Weiss, please continue.

23 MR. WEISS: Ready when you are. Thank you very

24 much, Mr. President.

25 BY MR. WEISS:

[Page 1374]

1 Q. Mr. Dobbelaere, I want to show you some

2 information from the mass balance tables, that I think were

3 used by SX-EW. Okay. And I think you told us,

4 Mr. Dobbelaere, during your presentation that mass can't be

5 created; right? What goes in must come out?

6 A. Yep.

7 Q. Yep. And a mass balance yields a range of data;

8 correct? Sometimes it shows an indeterminate loss, but

9 other times it shows an indeterminate gain; correct?

10 (Interruption.)

11 A. Yes. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. And if I look at this Table here, in the

13 highlighted columns, what we see in all of those columns

14 are indeterminate gains; right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So that would be the opposite of fugitive

17 emissions; right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. That means somehow, some way, more metal is being

20 created than was put in; right?

21 A. That I don't know.

22 Q. You don't know?

23 A. No, because -- no.

24 Q. Okay. And this data, which you don't know about,

25 would you rely on this data to reach a conclusion about

[Page 1375]

1 emissions?

2 A. I would say if I have a plant, copper, that I

3 would be -- I would pay a lot attention on copper and lead

4 and iron. Okay? You can analyze iron, but iron can

5 have -- can be a VO and a VO2 or 3, and that's a different

6 way, and it's depending on your lab. So maybe I would have

7 questions with how your lab is analyzing iron, and I would

8 be very pleased if I have a negative number on silver.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Because you're negotiating well.

11 Q. But you understand that these mass balance

12 calculations and the samples, they come from the same

13 concentrates. They come from the same slag piles, because

14 of those concentrates and those slag piles include all

15 these metals; right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Right. So when we're seeing negative numbers

18 here that show a magical gain of iron, that is the same

19 process that you are relying upon to tell us that there was

20 a massive increase in fugitive emissions?

21 A. But can you please look at the total balance?

22 Q. Yeah.

23 A. You just pick out the copper circuit.

24 Q. I am picking out the results --

25 A. The lead circuit, you only pick out one circuit.

[Page 1376]

1 Q. Yeah. Well, I am showing you, as an example,

2 that mass balances can result in indeterminate losses, and

3 they can result in indeterminate gains, and that says to me

4 that this data is very unreliable. Would you agree?

5 A. I -- no. No. I don't know. No, I don't agree

6 because you have to look at the total mass balance. You

7 have a complex circuit. You take the total mass balance of

8 the Plant, and then you look at it, because you can't

9 have -- you have intermediate products that go from the one

10 to the other, and you don't sample -- if you have a

11 transfer from the lead circuit to the copper circuit,

12 because there's copper inside, there's also lead inside.

13 There will also be iron inside. You will not

14 sample that on a daily basis. And you're interested in

15 copper and lead, because Mr. Buckley is interested in how

16 much lead do I recover. You have to do that very accurate.

17 And I'm looking at lead in this study, and I

18 prefer to look at the whole first, the whole -- and, I

19 mean, I didn't even use the Table 22B because I'm not

20 interested in these numbers here. I'm interested in the

21 "pérdidas indeterminate" -- and I don't even -- I calculate

22 them myself because they are the result of all the rest.

23 This is calculate -- I never used Annex 22B. I don't use

24 that.

25 Q. Yeah. I understand that. But as I said, before

[Page 1377]

1 these numbers are derived using the exact same mass balance

2 process that is used to determine lead losses or gains;

3 right?

4 A. Yes. Please, then look at the data with what I

5 base my analysis upon, and then look at this data, and look

6 if there are inconsistent numbers.

7 Q. Yeah. And what I am asking you is, would you

8 ever rely on a negative number showing that the smelter

9 magically gained iron from a mass balance?

10 A. I will check, and if I would use this Table, I

11 would check. But I didn't use it, this Table here. This

12 is result of a calculation.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. And iron is one of the elements that it depends

15 very much on how you analyze it in the lab, and you have to

16 check the sum of the elements. But you cannot check the

17 sum of the elements because some are oxides, most of them,

18 like iron is an oxide; so...

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I didn't use this Table. And please look at the

21 basic data that we used, and from which we determined the

22 indeterminate losses.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 A. And if you see that DRP makes 2,000 ton of copper

25 slag consistently over seven years, I mean, where would you

[Page 1378]

1 doubt them?

2 Q. Okay. Let's look at --

3 A. It's the number of measures -- measurements you

4 take that determine the accuracy.

5 Q. I understand. But that -- what I'm saying -- and

6 you can disagree with me -- is that the entire process that

7 you're describing on as the basis for your Opinion yields

8 absurd, illogical results that don't exist in the real

9 world, yet you want us all to believe that your Opinion is

10 well-founded?

11 A. Every mass balance has bowing and can have gains

12 and losses. Here, the negative numbers are gains. Most of

13 the time, it's because you are not really interested in

14 these numbers, and your lab doesn't pay the attention it

15 should have, like or -- like bismuth, if I have a gain of

16 bismuth, that's a pity, because then I have to -- this

17 means that in the Plant, I took more bismuth. Or I had

18 more bismuth, and I assayed at the beginning.

19 So it's just the lab. You have to know the lab

20 is interested in copper and in lead, and in gold and

21 silver, gold and silver gives gains, but that is because

22 they negotiated well, or because they say you have -- you

23 know, gold is kilograms. The rest is tonnage. Of course,

24 it is less accurate to -- so it's not serious to put

25 numbers that are here in kilograms to say, oh, I have

[Page 1379]

1 16 ton -- no, 16 kilogram of silver out of 800 -- what is

2 the base? 800,000 ton. Now, here is 235,000 ton.

3 Q. Is it serious to rely on a number that tells me

4 that I've created more metal than I put into the circuit?

5 A. I never relied on a number that was negative,

6 because I analyzed lead.

7 Q. But you relied on a process that yielded that

8 exact result?

9 A. But that process is not the same for every

10 element.

11 Q. Really?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Sure about that?

14 A. No, it's depending on the accuracy of your lab.

15 I am not interested in a loss of -- if I have -- or here a

16 gain of thousand ton of iron, because the way I analyze it,

17 as I say, iron can have its every 2 or every 3, and that

18 determines how accurate, because you cannot -- you can do

19 that, but how expensive your lab should be. This just

20 tells me that they didn't put attention into -- to know how

21 much iron did I exactly have. Why would they be

22 interested.

23 Q. Okay. But you want us all to assume that they

24 did pay the attention they needed to pay for lead?

25 A. Absolutely, because it's their recovery, it's

[Page 1380]

1 their business.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Lead and copper.

4 Q. Not a precious metal?

5 A. Also the precious metal, but the precious metal

6 here, lead is in tons. Precious metals are in kilograms,

7 from the same heap. Yep.

8 Q. Same samples?

9 A. Same samples.

10 Q. Same estimations?

11 A. Yes. What would they put in, you have free

12 copper -- you have free gold, like, if you have a

13 concentrate, you can have 10 ppm free gold, just free gold

14 for you. This tells me that they had some free gold. This

15 is gold that was not measured at the input because it's so

16 low, but it's still there. And the balance takes, oh, I

17 have some gold here. I weigh my gold, I have 50 kilogram

18 of gold per year in the copper circuit, 50 kilogram.

19 And, I take it out of 235,000-kilogram. That's

20 just free gold; so the precious metals, of course, I'm very

21 happy. I would be very happy, as Buckley, to say, I

22 recover more gold than I have paid my client. That's what

23 the number says.

24 Q. Right. And if that happened, it would be because

25 your measurement of the gold in the concentrate when you

[Page 1381]

1 brought it in was unreliable; right?

2 A. No. It was not unreliable. If you have lower

3 than 10 ppm, you will not even -- it will be so difficult

4 to measure, and it's free gold.

5 Q. And these are iron, not gold; right?

6 A. Iron. You're not interested in iron. I say here

7 it's copper. You don't see? Which numbers are here?

8 Positive. Copper, lead, sulfur.

9 Q. Okay. Can we pull up WD-130, PDF Page 74.

10 WD-30. Sorry. Is that what I said?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And before, Mr. Dobbelaere, I was showing you the

13 SX-EW Report, and I was showing you some screen shots on

14 the Slides of Annexes, and I was asking you if you had

15 reviewed those Annexes. And I promised I would put up some

16 of the information.

17 A. These are all the losses of lead in the lead

18 slag.

19 Q. This data that is highlighted here --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- where is the support for this data, the raw

22 data behind it?

23 A. I do not use the -- I do not use any summary

24 here. I use the data, the raw data, on top of it. So I do

25 per year as (in Spanish), I lose here 4,656.4, and that's

[Page 1382]

1 okay for me.

2 Q. Yeah. No, I understand that you use that data.

3 I asked you about those Annexes, and I asked you because

4 they contain data that, as far as I know, you didn't have.

5 A. No. I had the result, and they said, you do a

6 monthly analysis, you add it up, and then you do inventory,

7 and then you have like this "diferencia al cierra de

8 stock," which is logical.

9 Q. Yeah. But the information that I've

10 highlighted --

11 A. Yeah, "diferencia al cierra de stock."

12 Q. No, "producción planta de" -- I can't even read

13 what that says.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. First highlighted one.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did you have the raw data that is reflected in

18 those following lines?

19 A. No, and how important is "es punto de cadmio," .1

20 in my mass balance of lead, going about 8,000 tons per

21 year. I don't know, this is the lead circuit, which is

22 about 100,000 tons per year.

23 Q. Okay. So --

24 A. Why should -- and I have to accept "diferencia al

25 cierra de stock." This is a number. This is a number

[Page 1383]

1 of -- if you make a balance, the whole -- I mean, all your

2 managers are involved, and they have on that -- you have to

3 make it clear-cut, and they have to reweigh things, write

4 everything down, they come to the office, and they say this

5 is what we find. And then they make a correction.

6 Q. Right.

7 A. At the end of the year -- and this, I mean --

8 Q. I'm asking you a different question. I think you

9 told us that you relied on the raw data, and I believe that

10 the raw data is in the Annexes. If I'm wrong you can tell

11 me, and I also believe that you didn't have certain of the

12 annexes.

13 A. I had all the annexes I need and the raw data to

14 make the balance.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. And this is, for the most important thing, for

17 the copper circuit, I think this is the annex. It's

18 one -- it's always 1A or 2A from my Exhibit 008, and for

19 the losses I took the 30. It's in the -- it's different

20 documents.

21 Q. Okay. But this is just one example of data that

22 you do not have, so I just don't -- do you even know the

23 extent of the data that you did not have?

24 A. I mean, I have -- you do an analysis with and

25 without these corrections, and you see that, in both cases,

[Page 1384]

1 I've done both, and I explain it in my Second Report. The

2 monthly correction -- the monthly analysis and then the

3 corrections at the end of the year, which were made by

4 their professionals, and this were these data which

5 explained the corrections. And that's enough because both

6 of them show an increase of more than 2 -- more than

7 doubling of the lead. That's what they show.

8 Q. So you wouldn't want to check their reporting of

9 the data before giving your Opinion?

10 A. If they were important, yes.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. But they are not available.

13 Q. But I showed you --

14 A. I would not know where they are available. You

15 had more SX-EW reports than I have.

16 Q. Did you ask Perú for the annexes?

17 A. Which annexes?

18 Q. The ones that I represented that you don't have.

19 A. I have, I think -- I have all the raw data here,

20 and this was okay to do the monthly mass balances, and then

21 I had the data for the corrections in the table which I

22 exhibit, which I showed.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And I showed that this data are not showing

25 different conclusions, a little bit different numbers.

[Page 1385]

1 Q. Right.

2 A. That's what I did.

3 Q. I understand. I understand.

4 A. So why would I have to check that?

5 Q. I'm just saying, you understand that this data,

6 represented in the SX-EW Report, is based on raw data that

7 was reviewed by SX-EW that is in the annexes.

8 Is that your understanding?

9 A. I don't -- my understanding is not that they were

10 reviewed. My understanding is this was -- that it was

11 written, that they went to the offices of Doe Run Perú, in

12 Perú, in Lima, and that they have done a cross-check with

13 the responsible persons there to see that the data are

14 okay, consistent, and, eventual, take out flaws.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. That's what's written there.

17 Q. Yeah.

18 A. Now, I could fly to Perú to find these people,

19 but I probably would not have found them. I have to rely

20 on data which are coming from the metallurgical office from

21 Doe Run Perú. It's the best available.

22 Q. Sorry. You knew that there was additional data

23 because you had the annexes; right?

24 A. Which annexes? I have more documents with

25 annexes. So I want to know. Show me the annex you mean.

[Page 1386]

1 Q. I'll show you the annexes. SX-EW, at the end of

2 the copy that is attached to your Report.

3 A. Yeah. You have the annexes with the small

4 columns.

5 Q. Correct.

6 A. Yes. And these columns I checked to see the

7 difference between the Data A and the Data B.

8 Q. Right.

9 A. Which are in two tables -- two numbers beside

10 each other.

11 Q. We'll show you the slide. We'll show you what I

12 mean so we're on the same page.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. So this is from the SX-EW Report, and these are

15 the annexes that I am referring to. There's a whole list.

16 I think there's five pages of reports that are referenced

17 in the Annex.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Okay. And have you seen these annexes before?

20 A. They are in my Report. Yes, WD.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. And they are different small tables.

23 Q. Did you review the annexes in connection with

24 your review of the SX-EW Report?

25 A. I think I checked between A and B to see if that

[Page 1387]

1 fit.

2 Q. I'm sorry. What is it? A and B?

3 A. There is -- I have to see. In my second -- I

4 think, my Second Report, there is a table. It's

5 figure -- Table 2. It's Figure H on Page 52.

6 Q. Okay. So --

7 A. And this gave two data (in Spanish), and there

8 are difference between these two data, but the average of

9 the whole is 11,195, and 11,574.

10 Q. Okay. But, again, I'm sorry, these annexes were

11 attached to the version of the SX-EW Report that you

12 reviewed; correct?

13 A. I think so, yes.

14 Q. Okay. And did you have the data that is

15 reflected in these annexes?

16 A. I only had the data that are in this Report.

17 Q. So if it's referenced in an annex, you did not

18 have it?

19 A. If it's -- if it was not in the Report, I did not

20 have it.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. And I don't know why it would be important for my

23 analysis.

24 Q. Well, I think you told us that you reviewed the

25 raw data, and it's my understanding that this is the raw

[Page 1388]

1 data.

2 Is that your understanding?

3 A. The raw data are the annexes.

4 Q. Okay. Thank you.

5 A. So I can say, if it's WD-030, then there is like

6 a Table 10 for the slag of the copper Plant, and these are

7 the raw data.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. These are balances.

10 Q. Mr. Dobbelaere, I want to look at the PAMA, C-90.

11 I think, probably, about Page 84.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. So these are pages of the PAMA, and we can scroll

14 through them. And so, I want you to tell me if I'm correct

15 about what I'm reading here. So first of all, is it your

16 understanding that it was Centromín who prepared the PAMA?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So Doe Run didn't write the PAPA; right?

19 (Interruption.)

20 Q. Doe Run Perú did not write the original PAMA?

21 A. As far as I understand, no, they didn't.

22 Q. Okay. And the PAMA, to the extent it describes

23 the operations of the CMLO, is describing the operations

24 during Centromín's tenure; correct?

25 A. My understanding is that most of the data here

[Page 1389]

1 are from 1995.

2 Q. So during Centromín's tenure?

3 A. Yes, but not the average over 10 years.

4 Q. I understand. That's not what I'm asking.

5 And, again, to the extent that there are

6 descriptions of the operations and the processes, the PAMA

7 is talking about those processes during Centromín's

8 operation of the CMLO?

9 A. Yes. It could not be helped.

10 Q. So we're looking at Table 4.1.1/1, and it's

11 called "gases, sources, and dust."

12 Do you see that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. And if we look at the bottom, you'll see

15 there's a Number 3, and it says "fugitive emissions." And

16 that is under the heading "emissions source," and, under

17 the "Treatment Equipment" Column, it says "none."

18 Do you see that?

19 A. That's good news. I see that.

20 Q. Well, it's good news that they had no treatment

21 equipment for fugitive emissions?

22 A. Okay. I thought there were no -- that it was

23 written in the other one. Okay. That's the equipment you

24 installed -- that's good that they understood that there

25 was a high need to start that.

[Page 1390]

1 Q. So they did.

2 Okay. Well, let's scroll down a little further

3 to Pages, maybe, 86 or 87.

4 A. That's a very interesting table.

5 Q. It's all very interesting. We could spend days

6 reading this. Okay. Fugitive emissions. Yeah. There.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. So this is a document that we've looked at

9 a handful of times, and, in fact, the President, I think,

10 asked some questions about this, perhaps, of Mr. Neil. So

11 I'm going to tell you what my understanding is of this, and

12 please correct me if I'm wrong. What I understand this to

13 be is Centromín's description of the fugitive emissions

14 sources that it had during the operation of the CMLO.

15 Is that accurate?

16 A. Well, I would say they describe emission of SO2

17 gasses from the roaster plant, this is okay, and this can

18 be seen in audit. And also from the copper roasters and

19 the transfers with the hot cars. And they say -- and this

20 is generalized -- that "there is inadequate ventilation

21 system at the converters which results in fugitive dust and

22 SO2 emissions in the environment during the loading of

23 recirculated cooling materials," but that's -- I think this

24 could have been -- I mean, you know that it's during every

25 loading and every casting. And this is saying that the

[Page 1391]

1 converters were under-ventilated, the aspirator was much

2 too slow -- much too small, and my understanding is that

3 this has not changed.

4 Q. Okay. I'm going to ask my question again.

5 My understanding of what this reflects is

6 Centromín's description of the fugitive emissions sources

7 that it knew existed during its operations.

8 So, for example, the first one says -- Well, it's

9 supposed to say "fugitive," but it says

10 "figurative" -- "fugitive emission from the copper smelter

11 are produced in the preparation plant as materials are

12 taken outside the area of the collection hood."

13 Do you see that?

14 A. Yes, I see that.

15 Q. Okay. And that means that those emissions were

16 being created during Centromín's time; right?

17 A. All the time. Yes, during Centromín's time also,

18 yeah.

19 Q. And all of these sources -- I don't want to take

20 the time to go through all of them -- that's what all of

21 these are. These are fugitive emission sources during

22 Centromín's operations; correct?

23 A. Yes. Yes.

24 Q. Right. And as we saw above in the table that we

25 looked at first, they had no treatment for any of these

[Page 1392]

1 fugitive emission sources?

2 A. No.

3 Q. That's not what the table said?

4 A. Yeah. Yeah.

5 Q. I'm sorry?

6 A. They had not.

7 Q. They had none?

8 A. If they say no, they had none. And I didn't see

9 one.

10 Q. Okay. So there were multiple sources of fugitive

11 emissions during Centromín's time?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Centromín was doing absolutely nothing to control

14 those fugitive emissions; correct?

15 A. Maybe not, yeah. I don't think so.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. No, I think they did. Because they have -- if

18 you have seen the Projects, there have been several

19 Projects to address emissions and -- question, if you call

20 it "fugitive" or "stack emissions."

21 Q. So can we go back to the table.

22 A. But this is a very important observation for

23 somebody who buys a plant.

24 Q. We'll get there. We'll get there.

25 So are they wrong when Number 3 says that, for

[Page 1393]

1 the fugitive emissions, there was no treatment equipment?

2 A. Generally, they are right.

3 Q. They are right.

4 (Interruption.)

5 A. They are right, generally.

6 Q. Okay. Now, if we could go back to the list of

7 fugitive emissions resources. Now, I think we agreed,

8 Mr. Dobbelaere, that these descriptions here were sources

9 of fugitive emissions during Centromín's operations; right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And these are not PAMA Projects to control

12 fugitive emissions; right?

13 A. No.

14 Q. In fact, Centromín --

15 A. I said that these are PAMA Projects to abate.

16 Q. I'm sorry.

17 A. If you go there, with a prior metallurgical

18 background, and you know that you have to abate, you have

19 to reach targets, and you have to reach targets for SO2,

20 you automatically should know that this is your most

21 important thing to do, is build new technology and new acid

22 plants as the PAMA addressed, and this was apparently not

23 enough.

24 Q. Okay. Could you tell me what project number in

25 the PAMA included a project in the copper smelter to cure

[Page 1394]

1 the emission sources in the preparation plant as materials

2 are taken outside the area of the collection hood? What

3 number project is that in the PAMA?

4 A. In my understanding, and also in the

5 understanding of Dr. Schoof, as I have understood, and if

6 you allow, you're looking at PM10, and this originates from

7 your smelting operations. And I would put high priority at

8 fumes. It's like smoking, and, when it comes down, it gets

9 a fine dust. And this was addressed by the PAMA Project 1,

10 modernization of these Plants. And well recognized.

11 Q. Okay. Let's try the last one.

12 In blister copper molding retention furnace,

13 combustion and SO2 gases are freely dispersed due to the

14 lack of a collection system.

15 Where -- what number PAMA Project requires Doe

16 Run Perú to do a -- to implement a project to address the

17 blister copper molding retention furnaces? Where is that?

18 What number PAMA Project?

19 A. It's the Modernization Plan 1. There is a

20 new -- there's a new molding machine, and there is an old

21 furnace before you go in, refinery, you have to refine your

22 copper pyrometallurgically to reduce the number of

23 impurities.

24 Q. So you think that this was a required project

25 under PAMA Project 1?

[Page 1395]

1 A. You see here SO2 gases, and the PAMA asked you to

2 abate 83 percent. From my analysis, even with the copper

3 plants, you never go to 83 percent with the plants

4 that -- which would have finally been installed.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. So, I mean, there was a lack of attention to

7 capture enough SO2, even with the three acid plant

8 projects. I can prove that.

9 Q. And we're here, of course, because we're

10 comparing Centromín's operations to DRP's operations;

11 right?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. So all of those things that we initially

14 characterized as fugitive emissions sources and now you're

15 characterizing a PAMA projects were all things that

16 Centromín had not done during 23 years of its operations;

17 correct?

18 A. Correct. Like all the plants in South America.

19 Q. Okay. Okay. So controlling fugitive lead

20 missions, not a priority for Centromín; right?

21 A. No, not right.

22 Q. Not right. So it's not right even though they

23 identified every fugitive emissions source but did nothing

24 to control it. That meant it was still a priority for

25 them?

[Page 1396]

1 A. The people who helped them to make the PAMA knew

2 that fugitive emissions were addressed by newer

3 technologies, and you can also see that in the Fluor

4 Daniels study that, although they tried to get below the

5 bar, they still addressed -- talk about fugitive emissions

6 in their study of 1998. So DRP knew well that they had to

7 do that.

8 Q. I am talking about Centromín.

9 A. Yeah. But Centromín --

10 (Overlapping speakers.)

11 Q. I ask you what it was that Centromín did to cure

12 any of these fugitive emissions sources during its

13 operations? What Projects did it implement to control

14 these sources of fugitive emissions?

15 A. It was --

16 Q. Which project? Which one of these things did it

17 do? Point it out to me.

18 A. If you want to abate SO2, you need an acid plant.

19 Q. And Centromín never built one; right?

20 A. No. No. Everybody knows. That's why they wrote

21 the PAMA and looked for help.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I guess.

24 Q. Let's move on.

25 I want to talk about the SO2 and the SO2 plants,

[Page 1397]

1 and we've heard a lot from Perú about this narrative that

2 Doe Run Perú sat on its hands and did nothing to control

3 sulfur dioxide. So I want to dive into that.

4 Can we pull up the 2005 Extension Request, and

5 this is Slide -- we have this on Slide 55.

6 Okay. So as I said, this is from the 2005 PAMA

7 Extension Request, and what you'll see here is the plan of

8 Doe Run Perú to attack the problem of building the Sulfuric

9 Acid Plants, and I will read you from the bottom here: "In

10 1997, DRP deemed it convenient to develop a short-,

11 medium-, and long-term action plan for which it hired the

12 services of the company BHA who assessed the gas and

13 particulate management systems of the smelters' different

14 parts. As a result of the study, various tasks to be

15 performed in the smelter were defined, the most immediate

16 of which was the instrumentation, control, and

17 modernization of the Central Cottrell, a plant for the

18 cleaning of gases and recapturing of dust."

19 And Doe Run Perú did that; right? And that was

20 part of the modernization. Did they do?

21 A. I have an audit to Partelpoeg 2006 saying that

22 Doe Run Perú did not follow the advises made by BHA from an

23 audit in 2001, and he said it in 2006. That's what I know.

24 Second thing is, zinc circuit possesses a plant

25 with 55,000. My understanding is that it is 48,000. It's

[Page 1398]

1 a small difference because it's not much.

2 Q. Okay. So, once again, did Doe Run Perú address

3 the instrumentation control and modernization of the

4 Central Cottrell?

5 A. They have done this, as they say, and this was

6 ended at least one year after the spectacular drop in lead

7 on Central Cottrell, spectacular drop in lead.

8 Q. So they weren't sitting on their hands because

9 they were engaged in modernization?

10 A. No. Maybe we can look at the graph where you say

11 you have improved Central Cottrell. Lead has dropped

12 tremendously, but PM10 has raised. Maybe that's a good

13 thing to see if this was true.

14 Q. Okay. Now, let's go to the next slide, please.

15 So this slide is also from the Extension Request, and it

16 reflects that Doe Run Perú's plan was to break this up into

17 three stages: Environmental mitigation, conditioning of

18 gases, and then the new Sulfuric Acid Plant.

19 Do you see that?

20 A. Yes. Of course. I see that.

21 Q. So this was a plan they developed earlier on;

22 right? They weren't sitting on their hands.

23 A. This was 2005 and this was after Buckley, and

24 conditioning for gases was -- in one of my slides I've

25 shown that you need 6 percent of SO2, what they say to go

[Page 1399]

1 to Sulfuric Acid Plant. And in the first five years,

2 seven years, they tried to go below that bar, to not

3 modernize the lead plant, and they had difficulties to find

4 6 percent on the Sinter Plant. And the Sinter Plant

5 anyway, it left a big amount of sulfur in the sinter, and

6 that goes to the blast-furnace where it is not abated.

7 It only goes to the main stack. So they say they

8 had like 65 percent of the SO2 generated -- SO2 generated

9 by concentrates, not by the concentrates, and then the

10 fluxes together. I think it was 58 percent all together,

11 where the PAMA asked for 83 percent, which means that there

12 was a huge gap to bridge with an acid plant that was never

13 started up.

14 Q. Did you do -- do you even remember my question?

15 A. You asked me if I have read this.

16 Q. No. Not what I asked you.

17 A. No. Then you can -- can you please repeat the

18 question?

19 Q. Well, I would just really ask you to listen to my

20 questions. It is important.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I'm asking you about the improvement of the gas

23 cleaning and dust-capturing system known as the Central

24 Cottrell.

25 A. Yes.

[Page 1400]

1 Q. And the installation of short rotary furnaces,

2 number one, number two, for treating captured dust in the

3 Central Cottrell.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. DRP completed those Projects; correct?

6 A. They completed those Projects.

7 Q. Okay. Let's talk about the conditioning of gas.

8 Modification of the gas handling system of the sinter

9 machine in the lead circuit, did they complete that

10 project?

11 A. In late 2006.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Nearly 2007.

14 Q. Now, let's go to the next slide, please.

15 Now, I think Ms. Gehring Flores asked Mr. Connor

16 a number of questions yesterday whether there was any

17 explanation for a drop in SO2 emissions and whether Doe Run

18 Perú had done anything to reduce SO2 emissions. So I would

19 ask you to take a look at -- could you highlight the -- so

20 I'll ask you to look at the last paragraph, which begins

21 "finally" appropriately. "Finally beginning January 1,

22 2005, the operation of the three Jersey roasters of the

23 zinc circuit was stopped with the subsequent reduction of

24 130 metric tons in SO2 emissions and 1.1 metric ton in

25 particulate matter emitted through the chimney."

[Page 1401]

1 Do you see that?

2 A. I see that.

3 Q. So they were reducing sulfur dioxide emissions;

4 right?

5 A. Six years later than requested by the PAMA.

6 Q. How do you know when they commenced this Project?

7 A. How do I know when?

8 Q. How do you know when this began? You said they

9 sat on their hands and did nothing. These Projects don't

10 happen overnight, do they?

11 A. The mention of a New Jersey roaster would take

12 one year maximum, and it was reported to be in 2004. And I

13 can -- and how I know that is, if I look at the acid

14 production, you can see when it happens. I don't have it

15 here by hand, but I can show you from the acid production

16 because--

17 Q. Nonetheless, at least as of 2005, they had

18 reduced sulfuric acid emissions by at least 47 tons per

19 year; right? 4,700 tons per year. Right? Centromín

20 didn't do that, did they?

21 A. I didn't understand the number because 470,000 is

22 impossible.

23 Q. 130 metric tons per day times 365.

24 A. That is 30,000.

25 Q. Okay. They did that; right?

[Page 1402]

1 (Overlapping speakers.)

2 A. -- that I calculate.

3 (Interruption.)

4 Q. Doe Run Perú achieved that reduction in sulfuric

5 acid emissions; correct?

6 A. No. SO2 emissions.

7 Q. Sorry. Excuse me, SO2 emission.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. They did achieve it, yes?

10 A. Yes. Yes.

11 Q. And that was better than what Centromín was

12 doing; correct?

13 A. That was not, according to the PAMA.

14 Q. That's not what I asked you.

15 Once again, that was better than what Centromín

16 was doing. Centromín wasn't capturing that SO2, were they?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. But Centromín put lower sulfur in the circuit

20 then.

21 Q. Okay. Also, do you understand what a thermal

22 inversion is?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. What is it?

25 A. It's when the temperature from the air makes that

[Page 1403]

1 you have a downstream air, downward airstream keeping the

2 SO2 in the valley.

3 Q. Right. So what is the effect on SO2 emissions on

4 a thermal inversion?

5 A. Nothing on emissions. On SO2 in air.

6 Q. On SO2 in air?

7 A. Yes. Not on emissions.

8 Q. Forgive me. Right. It doesn't disperse it if

9 there's a thermal inversion; correct?

10 A. Right. It stays longer in the valley.

11 Q. Understood. So you also understand that Doe Run

12 Perú implemented an environmental mitigation plan where

13 they would stop operations during a thermal inversion;

14 correct?

15 A. Yes. I understand that, yes.

16 Q. Yeah. And that would help with exposure to SO2

17 emissions as well; correct?

18 A. That would help with SO2 exposure in that time.

19 Q. Right. And that was a practice actually -- there

20 are weather-related practices that the Umicore smelter in

21 Hoboken implemented as well?

22 A. No.

23 Q. No. Okay.

24 A. We didn't need it.

25 Q. I'm not talking about thermal inversions.

[Page 1404]

1 A. Okay. Well, I have my Opinion on that.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. It just means that you produce the same amount as

4 you do in a shorter time, so you put it on another day.

5 Yeah, the total SO2 generated by the plant was higher, and

6 you reduced the number of smelting hours. It is very

7 strange measure, I think.

8 Q. Except that ultimately the question is, not the

9 emissions, but how they affect the people of La Oroya;

10 correct?

11 A. Yes. Yes.

12 Q. If we knew that all the SO2 emissions dispersed,

13 then we wouldn't be concerned about the level of emissions?

14 A. I wouldn't be concerned about the level of

15 emissions.

16 Q. We wouldn't have the same health concerns for the

17 people of La Oroya because it wouldn't be affecting them.

18 A. Mr. Weiss, if you allow me, when we were

19 discussing emission reduction --

20 Q. I understand.

21 A. -- at the level of 800 tons/year, and you were

22 talking about 300 tons -- 300,000 tons/year. Sorry. I

23 come from a different world.

24 Q. Okay. But Perú is the one who has said that Doe

25 Run Perú did nothing to address the sulfuric acid

[Page 1405]

1 emissions. Perú has said that, but that's not true, and

2 that was point of my question.

3 Now, can we go to the next slide. Go to the next

4 slide. Next.

5 Right.

6 So this is a summary of the preceding Pages;

7 right?

8 So this shows what you Doe Run Perú accomplished

9 in terms of modernization and work towards development of

10 the Sulfuric Acid Plants.

11 So as we talked about before, they completed the

12 installation of a new system of plants and electrodes,

13 automatic voltage controllers with supervision software,

14 PLC analog communication modules, and structural repair

15 works of the pipes at a cost of almost $2.2 million; is

16 that right?

17 A. The description is right. I did not look at the

18 number. I do not look at numbers here.

19 Q. Okay. But this was part of the modernization

20 that was necessary to complete the Sulfuric Acid Plants as

21 Perú has suggested?

22 A. No.

23 Q. No?

24 A. No.

25 Q. So this had nothing to do with the Sulfuric Acid

[Page 1406]

1 Plants?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did have something to do with the circuit and

4 preparing the circuit so that it would be compatible with

5 the Sulfuric Acid Plant?

6 A. No.

7 Q. No. Okay.

8 What about the next project? Short rotary

9 furnaces being added at a cost of almost $8.6 million? Did

10 they complete that project?

11 A. Yes. This is not an environmental project, and I

12 have explained that in my Second Report.

13 Q. Okay. And we already talked about the New Jersey

14 roaster, so we don't have to go that again.

15 A. Yes, please.

16 Q. But now the conditioning of gases; right? They

17 did a technical feasibility study to optimize and modify

18 the sintering machine, to capture the largest amount of SO2

19 concentration for production of sulfuric acid.

20 That's true; right?

21 A. Yes, that's true.

22 Q. And that was necessary; right?

23 A. But not enough.

24 Q. Okay. And they completed conceptual

25 engineering --

[Page 1407]

1 MS. GEHRING FLORES: Sorry. Excuse me. I'm just

2 trying to figure out what this document is. We don't

3 recognize it.

4 MR. WEISS: It's just a summary of the documents

5 that I had just put in front of you. It just -- it

6 excerpts exactly what was reported in the 2005 Extension

7 Request. It is my demonstrative.

8 MS. GEHRING FLORES: Okay. It's a demonstrative.

9 Okay.

10 MR. WEISS: And I'm representing that I pulled

11 the information from the 2005 Extension Request.

12 MS. GEHRING FLORES: Okay. Just for the record,

13 we did not receive any of these documents until we were

14 about an hour into Mr. Dobbelaere's cross-examination.

15 That's why I'm asking these questions --

16 MR. WEISS: Apologies. Understood.

17 MS. GEHRING FLORES: -- because we did not have

18 advance notice of these documents at all.

19 MR. WEISS: Okay.

20 BY MR. WEISS:

21 Q. Next is conditioning of gases. I'm sorry.

22 A. No. No. Go ahead.

23 Q. We talked about the conceptual engineering for

24 the modernization study that was completed for the copper

25 circuit with the purpose of capturing over 80 percent of

[Page 1408]

1 the sulfur in the copper concentrate. That conceptual

2 engineering was a step towards completion of the Sulfuric

3 Acid Plant. Yes?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. And then we talked about the new Sulfuric

6 Acid Plant. They had completed a technical feasibility

7 study for the zinc circuit; right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. And what was in progress, at that time,

10 was detail engineering to replace main equipment with new

11 equipment such as a drying tower, pumping tanks, acid pipes

12 and gas pipelines, as well as the purchase of acid coolers

13 to ensure operational continuity.

14 Do you see that?

15 A. What we call a "revamp".

16 Q. Yeah. And it was in progress; right?

17 A. Yes. I'm not sure that the -- in 2005, that the

18 conceptual engineering for the modernization study was

19 completed for the copper smelter. I'm not sure about that.

20 Q. Okay. Okay. All right. Can we go to -- what

21 Demonstrative we created.

22 (Comments off microphone.)

23 Q. I promise I'm getting close.

24 So this a demonstrative, and what it reflects is

25 some data you've seen in other slides. It reflects, in the

[Page 1409]

1 gray line, SO2 main-stack emissions during the entire
2 period of operation from 1975 to 2008. It reflects, in the
3 orange line, the total production numbers that Dr. Alegre
4 put together. The dashed line running from top to bottom
5 tells you the transition from Centromín to DRP, and the
6 circles we'll talk about.

7 So do you understand what this slide is showing?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. So we've had a lot of discussion about
10 sulfur dioxide and sulfur dioxide emissions, and it is your
11 opinion, as I understand it, that the decrease, which is
12 calculated as 31 percent, which we see from 1999 to 2000 is
13 not valid and the data is not reliable, yes?

14 A. It is not feasible.

15 Q. I understand. So we should not rely on that
16 decrease?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Okay. So the first thing I want to ask you is,
19 we see here on the entire history of Doe Run Perú's
20 operations that SO2 emissions are quite lumpy. There is a
21 lot of ups and a lot of downs; right?

22 A. Yes. Could be. Yeah.

23 Q. And, in particular, of course, we see a decrease
24 from 1989 to 1994, during Centromín's tenure, of
25 25 percent.

[Page 1410]

1 Do you see that?

2 A. Yes, I see that.

3 Q. Okay. And you also see that, at the same time
4 that the emissions are dropping precipitously during that
5 period, production is increasing during Centromín's tenure;
6 right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. And that doesn't make sense, does it?

9 A. It can make sense.

10 Q. It can. But you told us that as production
11 increases, emissions increase?

12 A. With the same feed in the smelter.

13 Q. Yeah, with the same feed. So I'd like to ask --

14 A. We have to check the feed there, but I know there
15 was a program in that period. I don't know if it started
16 in '99 to reduce the "findantes," and it certainly explains
17 what happened with the -- as soon as you have the
18 reverberatory furnace with oxygen, you can reduce your
19 sulfur because you bring more energy -- you lose more
20 energy because you bring more energy by adding -- by
21 replacing nitrogen, which uses -- consumes energy by
22 oxygen.

23 Q. Do you --

24 A. And I think this is part of this drop there, but
25 I did not look at -- but I know there was a program, what

[Page 1411]

1 they called -- it was in Spanish, but -- the metallurgical
2 reducing the metallurgical indexes, and this was a program
3 that to do with the use of less findantes, findantes, which
4 is flexus.

5 Q. Okay. But have you measured whether that is the
6 entire reason for 25 percent decrease in sulfur emissions?

7 A. No. No.

8 Q. We don't really know?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Okay. And then, of course, we see -- well, and,
11 of course, before when I asked you about the relationship
12 between production and sulfur emissions, we see -- for
13 example, if you look at 1989, we see a very strong
14 correlation when SO2 emission dropped precipitously.
15 Again, we see that production declined; right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. But then when it continues from there, we
18 see the absolute opposite, we see increase in production
19 but decrease in sulfuric acid? Sorry, sulfur dioxide
20 emissions.

21 A. We should look at the feed, and then take our
22 conclusion.

23 Q. Okay. Now, you have a number of hypotheses as to
24 what might explain the decrease in SO2 emissions between
25 1999 and 2000?

[Page 1412]

1 A. Yes. Absolutely.

2 Q. Now, have you looked at the increase of
3 57 percent between 1994 and 1998 in sulfuric acid
4 emissions, primarily during Centromín's operation?

5 A. Which data?

6 Q. Look at the line beginning in 1994 and going all
7 way up to 1998. It is in the orange box, and it is
8 reflected as a 57 percent increase.

9 A. I know.

10 Q. Yeah. Did you look at what Centromín was doing
11 over that period to cause such a dramatic increase in SO2
12 emissions?

13 A. What I think and what we -- we have asked for
14 this. I have seen this, of course. I have seen this
15 two years ago, and I think it is up to the lawyers to say
16 what we did.

17 Q. I'm asking you --

18 A. And what we didn't get. We asked to have an
19 explanation for this and for the lead drop and never got
20 it. That is very clear.

21 Q. The increase of 57 percent occurred almost
22 entirely during Centromín's operation. Hold on. I'm not
23 done with my question yet.

24 It occurred almost entirely during Centromín's
25 operation, so if you wanted to know about that, you could

[Page 1413]

1 have asked your client. Did you?

2 A. I -- no. How could my client answer about
3 measurements on the main stack? Would that be possible?

4 Q. Okay. So you can't explain why sulfur dioxide
5 emissions increased so dramatically during that period of
6 time, '94 to '98?

7 A. I cannot explain it in this, and in this, and in
8 this, these three points are not explainable because they
9 are just not feasible.

10 Q. Okay. So --

11 A. And I can tell you that for the SO2 increase,
12 only the measured data can be flawed from your stack, but
13 if that is the flow rate, then your lead data are
14 absolutely flawed.

15 ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Mr. Weiss, I have to
16 intervene here.

17 You pointed to three points that --

18 (Overlapping Speakers.)

19 (Interruption.)

20 ARBITRATOR THOMAS: You pointed to your screen.

21 (Overlapping Speakers.)

22 (Interruption.)

23 ARBITRATOR THOMAS: And you said, that the data
24 points, the three points are not explainable because they
25 are not just not feasible. We need to know what points on

[Page 1414]

1 the chart you're actually indicating. Can you please do
2 that.

3 THE WITNESS: Excuse me for interrupting. So
4 1997, which is the last point of Centromín's time and
5 partially from Doe Run's time, because the last reporting
6 was their reporting. 1998 and 1999.

7 And it is just not feasible because you cannot
8 produce 450,000 or 400,000 tons of SO2 if you have
9 put -- if you have put less than 200,000 tons of sulfur in
10 the circuit. It's totally impossible.

11 ARBITRATOR THOMAS: Okay. Thank you.

12 BY MR. WEISS:

13 Q. Okay. So, Mr. Dobbelaere, I'm going to try to
14 make sure I understand what you're saying. I think you
15 were just saying that it's impossible for the sulfur
16 dioxide emissions to have increased that dramatically
17 between 1994 and 1998.

18 A. But it is perfectly impossible that they
19 increased because you put more sulfur in the system.

20 Q. Okay. I'm not sure -- I'm sorry. Maybe we're
21 talking past each other.

22 A. Maybe. Yes.

23 Q. We see a very substantial increase from '94 to
24 '98?

25 A. Yes.

[Page 1415]

1 Q. So just bear with me.

2 A. Yes. Yes.

3 Q. Bear with me. Do you have an explanation for
4 that increase, or do you think that that increase is wrong,
5 is invalid data?

6 A. I am sure that the SO2 data of these three years
7 are flawed.

8 Q. Okay. Understood perfectly.

9 So if there were no increase, and as you say,
10 there is no decrease; right?

11 A. Not to that extent.

12 Q. Understood. But if there were no increase, there
13 certainly would be no decrease; right? Both --

14 A. Yeah. Yeah.

15 Q. Right. So both the increase and the decrease are
16 not valid, in your Opinion?

17 A. Not valid.

18 Q. Okay. It doesn't reflect what actually happened?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Okay. And so, actually, we don't really know,
21 according to what you have just said, what were the SO2
22 emissions at the end of Centromín's tenure and at the
23 beginning of Doe Run Perú's tenure because we don't trust
24 the data on the left side of the line, and we don't trust
25 the data on the right side of the line.

[Page 1416]

1 A. What we do know is how many sulfur was put in the
2 systems and how many sulfur was fixed into a little bit of
3 acid, a little bit of acid and in the slag of sulfurs.

4 And by subtracting these two, you have perfectly
5 an idea of how many SO2 went into air and the degree of
6 freedom is what went into stack and what went into
7 fugitives. Okay.

8 Q. Okay. So --

9 A. If you then say my stack data are reliable, you
10 can perfectly calculate a fugitive perfectly.

11 Q. But -- I'm sorry. I'm just trying to make sure
12 we're on the same page.

13 A. I want to be --

14 Q. If we agree that the decrease that we see on the
15 right side of the line is invalid, we also agree that the
16 increase that we see on the left side of the line is
17 invalid.

18 Are you with me?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I'm not with you. We didn't agree on the fact
22 that there could not have been an increase and a decrease,
23 only not to that extent. That's what we agreed on.

24 Q. Fair enough. Fair enough.

25 But -- so your position, with respect to the left

[Page 1417]

1 side of the line, is that Centromín was not experiencing
2 that level of SO2 emissions that is reflected here?

3 A. Not in 1997. That is impossible.

4 Q. Okay. And so, I guess, part of the reason that
5 you reject that data as invalid is because you don't have
6 an explanation for it. There is nothing that supports
7 doubt that that would happen; right?

8 A. For the explanation -- for the SO2 there is a
9 clear proof that it is not feasible.

10 Q. I get it. And there is no -- you're saying to us
11 there is no reason why that would happen.

12 A. No. There is no reason why that would happen.

13 Q. I understand.

14 A. It's a flawed measurement or something else.

15 Q. Right. Okay. So if we can't understand it, and
16 we don't have an explanation, we reject it. I'm with you.

17 Okay. So can we pull up Slide 6, please. Okay.

18 I've showed you this slide a couple of times, but I want to
19 focus on something slightly different here. I'm going to
20 look at the air monitoring data on the left side of the
21 line that begins in 1994, '95, and '96.

22 Do you see that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. And so we know that, at this point in
25 time, Centromín's stack emissions were quite high. We can

[Page 1418]

1 see levels above 800 tons during those years; right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. And we also know that, at this point in
4 time, Centromín was ramping up production every year;
5 right?

6 A. They had installed --

7 Q. I'm just asking about the increase in production.

8 A. Yes. Yes. They had installed oxygen on the --

9 Q. But they were increasing production at the same
10 time; right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And Centromín was also using dirty concentrates;
13 right?

14 A. Not to that extent.

15 Q. But they were using dirty concentrates?

16 A. Such a plant uses -- doesn't live from clean
17 concentrates. That is clear.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Understood.

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. And we also know that from --

23 A. Nothing more to say about.

24 Q. Yeah. We also know from when we looked at the
25 PAMA and we looked at the fugitive emissions sources that

[Page 1419]

1 Centromín had identified --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- and we looked at the table, looking at the
4 control systems that were in place to capture those
5 fugitives, that Centromín reported that they had none?

6 A. They had none.

7 Q. They had none. Right.

8 So at this point, we're looking at air quality
9 data from '94, '95, and '96, which has no explanation.

10 What is the explanation as to how the air quality
11 data could be that low when stack emissions were incredibly
12 high, fugitive emissions were uncontrolled, there
13 was -- production was increasing, and Centromín was using
14 dirty concentration? How could the air quality be that
15 low? What's the explanation?

16 A. My explanation is mainly the difference in the
17 copper flow sheet because there was -- in these years, '94,
18 '95, '96, there was considerably less lead that would go to
19 the slag, not -- about the same but considerably less
20 input, and I don't know how to explain that here.

21 Q. Well, we see that in 1997 and 1998, that
22 data -- that air quality data increased pretty
23 substantially?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Same process was being employed; right?

[Page 1420]

1 A. We have to look at how much dirty concentrates
2 have been put in the system.

3 Q. No. Right there. The data point, 1997, during
4 Centromín's tenure.

5 A. Yep.

6 Q. Do you see how much higher it is than the
7 reported data in 1996?

8 A. Yes. And what do you mean by this?

9 Q. My question is, if the process that you just
10 hypothesized was responsible for causing those low
11 concentration numbers in '95, '96 -- '94, '95, and '96,
12 what happened in 1997?

13 Wasn't that process still being used?

14 A. Yes. And was it the same feed?

15 Q. I don't know. I'm asking you.

16 We had a big discussion for a long time on the
17 last slide that, if we can't explain data and the data is
18 inconsistent with what we know was going on at the time, we
19 should reject it.

20 Do you remember that discussion?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. So should -- I should reject this data?

23 A. I will -- which data?

24 Q. The air quality data for '94, '95, and '96.

25 A. I don't know. What I see that in '97, '98,

[Page 1421]

1 apparently, the same measurements, they were higher.

2 Q. Sorry?

3 A. Well, for '97 and '98, apparently were the same
4 lead measurements they were higher, but you claim that this
5 was not the same lead air measurements, and I didn't
6 look -- I can look into the system that you used and you
7 reported.

8 Q. I'm not asking you to look into a system I used.
9 I'm asking you to look into a system that Centromín used,
10 and I'm asking you why your Opinion that we should reject
11 data when it is not explicable does not also apply to that
12 data which, by everything we know, is also inexplicable?

13 A. I don't know. I will look into -- I will look
14 into the data, the total inputs that you have done in the
15 system, and also Centromín in 1997, including the European
16 1997.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. You're running the plant in the last months; it
19 was not that much.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. But it's a mixed data.

22 Q. Okay. All right.

23 Now we heard Mr. Connor say that his Opinion was,
24 that "as long as your measuring standards and practices, we
25 should look at trends and we should ask the question: Did

[Page 1422]

1 the Operator leave the Facility better than it found it?"

2 Do you remember that testimony?

3 A. From Mr. --

4 Q. Mr. Connor?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay. And do you agree or disagree that Doe Run
7 Perú ultimately left the Facility better than when it found
8 it?

9 A. What do you mean by "ultimately"?

10 Q. I mean when they stopped operating. Were
11 conditions better than when they arrived?

12 A. I have looked at when they -- when the PAMA was
13 ready, when the PAMA Period was ready.

14 Q. What do you mean by "ready"? I'm sorry.

15 A. When the PAMA Period was finished. And what I
16 see is that you just kept on going by putting higher amount
17 of lead in the system. DRP kept on going putting a higher
18 amount of lead in the system, higher amounts, considerably
19 higher amounts of lead in the copper circuit.

20 A lot of doubts about the SO2, not only doubts,
21 also data and promises that the data fugitives would drop
22 in 2011, when the acid plant was ready with the clear proof
23 that the fugitives would only go down after the
24 installation of the acid plant.

25 Q. Okay.

[Page 1423]

1 A. So how can I say that DRP did better?

2 Q. Okay. Well, that there is substantial drop in
3 the lead concentrations certainly when you get to 2007 and
4 2008; correct?

5 So does that mean that they left it better than
6 they found it?

7 A. That's what the data say.

8 Q. And the blood levels dropped considerably, yes?

9 A. Well, I will not opine on it.

10 Q. If that's true, did they leave it better than
11 then found it?

12 A. I will not opine on air quality and not upon
13 lead-blood data. It is not my assignment so I will not
14 opine on it.

15 Q. Okay. They built two out of three Sulfuric Acid
16 Plants that did not exist during Centromín's time.

17 Did they leave it better than they found it?

18 A. What do you do with an acid plant that is ready
19 at the end of 2008 to say that you did better? It is just
20 standing there. It is just picking up 65 percent,
21 58 percent even, from the requirement, years behind.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Let us say.

24 Q. Okay. So can we bring up the Newsweek articles
25 the Newsweek article.

[Page 1424]

1 Okay. Mr. Dobbelaere?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. This is an article we've shown a number of times.
4 I wonder if you have ever read it. It's a Newsweek article
5 from 1994 about La Oroya.

6 A. I've been busy more than two years with this,
7 sometimes more, sometimes less. I got every article that
8 appeared and I've seen a lot of articles.

9 Q. Okay. So did you read this one?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay. I want to read a couple of quotes to you.

12 A. Maybe, yes, but I read so many.

13 Q. "Dusted with a whitish powder, the barren hills
14 looked like bleached skulls, blacken slag lay in heaps on
15 the roadsides. At La Oroya, Kamp found a dingy cluster of
16 buildings under wheezing smelter smoke stacks. Pipes
17 poking out of the Mantaro River's banks sent raw sewage
18 cascading into the river below. This is a vision from
19 hell."

20 Do you see that?

21 A. I remember having read this from the World Bank
22 and there were similar articles in much later.

23 Q. Okay. And the next paragraph says: "Standing on
24 the banks of the Mantaro River, a six-year-old girl named
25 Ana María doesn't need anybody to tell her that her

[Page 1425]

1 environment is perilously polluted. Deep coughs shake her
2 body, and she points a stubby finger toward the river's
3 murky depths. 'It's very dirty,' she warns a visitor.
4 'You can't drink it.' The Government says Centromín's
5 environmental legacy will be cleaned up regardless of the
6 cost, but it can't say how or when."

7 Now, this is from 1994; correct? And this,
8 everything that is described in this horrific article,
9 results from what Centromín did over 23 years; correct?

10 A. I've read so many articles, and a lot of them
11 from DRP's period that were not better.

12 Q. So when DRP arrived in La Oroya, it was a vision
13 from hell; correct?

14 Do you agree with that characterization?

15 A. It's not a beautiful picture, but, if I see the
16 smoke from the converters and if I see the nice Netflix
17 presentation from Mr. Connor, I don't see anything
18 happening on the copper converters. Nothing. It's still
19 the same thing that is smoking.

20 Q. Do you think that this article accurately
21 reflects the conditions that one would have found in 1994
22 in La Oroya?

23 A. Could be.

24 Q. Could be. And those conditions were created by
25 Centromín's 23 years of pollution; right? Right?

[Page 1426]

1 A. I don't know. 23 years.

2 Q. Well, how else did it happen? How else did it
3 happen?

4 A. I mean -- I don't think this is prone to -- for
5 the subject of an Expert Opinion on technology and mass
6 balancing and everything.

7 Q. Except you're here to compare Centromín's
8 standards and practices to Doe Run Perú's, and isn't it
9 relevant to you that, for 23 years, Centromín was polluting
10 rampantly in La Oroya? Don't you think that's relevant to
11 your Opinion?

12 A. I have a problem to -- I have a problem to
13 understand the definition of "less protective," and, if I
14 have a house and I burn wood with a stove, like in Germany,
15 and I have been putting there 20 years dirty wood,
16 anything, and I sell the house, I sell the house with the
17 agreement, then you -- because there's a new law, it says
18 you cannot put this dirty smoke in the air anymore.

19 And the new owner he agrees with the community
20 that he has to put a new kind of stove -- a new kind of
21 heating system in his house. He agrees upon that, and he
22 has five years, 10 years to do that. And he has a
23 neighbor. And he promises that, signs that, and then,
24 after a few years, he said, "wait a minute, I don't
25 have" -- so when he bought a house, the legislation was

[Page 1427]

1 already there. The old owner, he took fresh wood -- not
2 fresh wood but dry wood from the woods, not making a big
3 smoke stack, and the new owner said, "yes, this is all
4 good, but I don't have money to buy that dry wood. I will
5 put some dirty wet wood that I have from demolishing things
6 here," with tars in it and so on, more dirty wood. And I
7 start to do this.

8 After a few days, the neighbor comes, they say,
9 "hey, what is this now? You bought this house. And here
10 is coming black smoke from the stack." And then the new
11 owner says, "yeah, but I don't have money, but don't worry,
12 I will learn you how to clean up your garden, I will give
13 you masks and I will put a comma now because if it is too
14 much, you know, I will come and tell you that you have to
15 stay into your house."

16 Q. Mr. Dobbelaere.

17 A. This is my analogy.

18 Q. Yeah. It's --

19 MS. GEHRING FLORES: He's answering your
20 question.

21 MR. WEISS: No, not even close. Not even close.
22 That was a four-minute tangent.

23 MS. GEHRING FLORES: Mr. President, can the
24 Expert please finish answering the question?

25 PRESIDENT SIMMA: As I listen to the story, I am

[Page 1428]

1 not clear how, at this moment, Mr. Dobbelaere got to tell
2 this story. I missed the context.

3 MR. WEISS: Yeah, I'd like to ask some more
4 questions. I have a few more, and then I'm done. So if
5 you'll permit me, I'll ask him some questions.

6 MS. GEHRING FLORES: I think that the Expert was
7 just about to get to the end of his analogy. He was
8 explaining an analogy. He was just about there.

9 PRESIDENT SIMMA: So, Mr. Dobbelaere, I follow
10 the story with great empathy, so will you bring it to an
11 end.

12 THE WITNESS: Yeah. Okay. Thank you. For me to
13 bring it to an end?

14 BY MR. WEISS:

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. For me, you have to understand that I'm coming
17 from an operation that is from the feed that is similar.
18 Okay. We may have made more money with precious metals,
19 that's right. We may have had a better sampling. I've
20 learned a lot about mass balancing, but the numbers we were
21 looking at, at the stack and in the fugitives, we measured
22 fugitives, we monitored them, and we reported them we were
23 obliged to report them.

24 If we were talking -- if, here, they were talking
25 about -- I was shocked. They were talking about

[Page 1429]

1 1,000 tons, and we were talking about 1,000 kilograms,
2 which is a factor, nearly 1,000. And I know the main
3 difference was acid plants. You could not go without. It
4 is impossible, such an operation, to go without acid
5 plants, because --

6 MR. WEISS: Mr. President, we're now at the point
7 where he's basically engaging in his direct examination
8 again.

9 PRESIDENT SIMMA: Right. I think --
10 (Overlapping speakers.)

11 PRESIDENT SIMMA: Sorry. The most efficient way
12 would be that we got the story, I think, the analogy you
13 brought, to an end. And let's have the two last questions.

14 MR. WEISS: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you.

15 PRESIDENT SIMMA: And your answers are there.

16 THE WITNESS: Yes.

17 BY MR. WEISS:

18 Q. So we've heard a number of questions throughout
19 this Hearing where Ms. Gehring Flores has asked about
20 children in Perú being poisoned. I've never once heard an
21 acknowledgement that Centromín was poisoning children for
22 23 years. Did you?

23 A. What do you mean by an "acknowledgment"?

24 Q. An acknowledgement --

25 A. I don't understand the word.

[Page 1430]

1 Q. Well, you understand, again, we are talking about
2 the relative standards and practices of Centromín and Doe
3 Run Perú. We cannot assess Doe Run Perú's standards and
4 practices in a vacuum. We have to compare them to
5 Centromín's.

6 You understand that; right?

7 A. I understand that.

8 Q. Okay. So Centromín created one of the worst
9 environmental disasters in the history of the world, right
10 at La Oroya. And now, you're here to tell this Tribunal
11 that Centromín did a better job than Doe Run Perú, who
12 spent over $300 million and did 42 Projects that never
13 existed at Centromín and dramatically reduced emissions and
14 improved public health; right?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Okay. So let's just end this.

17 A. Just because my reference is different.

18 Q. Okay. Your reference is one year of Centromín's
19 operations?

20 A. My reference is, I've seen a company that was
21 improving, improving, improving, they only had main-stack
22 emissions. That's agreed. We didn't have fugitive
23 emissions. Not in Centromín's time and not in Doe Run
24 Perú's time.

25 Q. So my last question --

[Page 1431]

1 A. The only thing I could do was mass balancing and
2 see that there is something behind here.

3 Q. Yep.

4 A. And that's what I did.

5 Q. Yep. So I'm curious. I see a trend here, and I
6 wonder if you agree with me. Perú's contract Expert says
7 that we should believe that one Contract is two contracts.
8 Their Legal Expert says we should believe that an extension
9 of deadlines doesn't actually extend deadlines; and that
10 repeated reports of compliance aren't actually proof of
11 compliance with the PAMA. And now, you're here to tell us
12 that 42 Emissions Control Projects didn't control
13 emissions; right?

14 Is that what you're here to tell us?

15 A. What kind of question is that?

16 Q. Okay. I have no further questions.

17 Thank you very much, Mr. Dobbelaere.

18 A. I commented on 26 Projects. Each of them, and I
19 commented. This has an effect on this, and this has an
20 effect on this, as to my Opinion. You cannot ask me if
21 48 -- that I am saying that 48 Projects did not have any
22 effect. That you cannot tell me.

23 Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Dobbelaere.

24 PRESIDENT SIMMA: Okay, Mr. Dobbelaere. Thank
25 you very much.

[Page 1432]

1 We are more or less at the end of our time.

2 Redirect will be held tomorrow. Tomorrow, like today, we
3 are going to start at 9:00.

4 (Comments off microphone.)

5 I'm on the cautious side in this regard after
6 this experience, and better end up in the afternoon an hour
7 later. So time is 9:00 -- acceptable?

8 MR. WEISS: That's fine. Sure.

9 PRESIDENT SIMMA: And then we have one, the last
10 Expert witness, Ms. Kunsman Santos will have to be examined
11 at the end.

12 By the way, you're going to -- maybe you could
13 say that you're going to send an email. Could you, maybe,
14 just in a few words, announce what's going to be in there.

15 MS. GEHRING FLORES: Sure. Just an email with
16 the Tribunal's directions with regard to the question on
17 the status of the Missouri Litigation.

18 MR. WEISS: I'm sorry. The what?

19 PRESIDENT SIMMA: Can you speak louder.

20 MS. GEHRING FLORES: My apologies. The Tribunal
21 had put the question of the current status of the Missouri
22 Litigation to the Parties. There was an exchange on
23 exactly how and when that should be addressed, and there
24 will be an answer to exactly that question for the Parties,
25 hopefully, shortly following our conclusion right now.

[Page 1433]

1 MR. WEISS: And I apologize because I was
2 preparing and I missed that discussion, and I fortunately
3 or unfortunately am the primary source of that information
4 because I live with that Litigation almost every day. So
5 it would be really helpful to me, you know, the more
6 specific you could be about exactly what it is that you
7 want to know.

8 PRESIDENT SIMMA: Fine. I think we live up to
9 your expectations.

10 MR. WEISS: I hope so.

11 MR. FOGLER: Could we get a rundown on the time
12 that has been used, Mr. Doe?

13 SECRETARY DOE: Yes. The total is 17 hours and
14 20 minutes thus far for the Claimant, and 18 hours and
15 36 minutes for the Respondent.

16 MR. FOGLER: Thank you.

17 MR. WEISS: Thank you very much.

18 PRESIDENT SIMMA: Thank you. See you tomorrow.

19 (Whereupon, at 6:01 p.m., the Hearing was
20 adjourned until 9:00 a.m. the following day.)

[Page 1434]

POST-HEARING REVISIONS

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Dawn K. Larson, RDR-CRR, Court Reporter, do
hereby attest that the foregoing English-speaking
proceedings, after agreed-upon revisions submitted
by the Parties, were revised and re-submitted to the
Parties per their instructions.

I further certify that I am neither counsel for,
related to, nor employed by any of the Parties to
this action in this proceeding, nor financially or
otherwise interested in the outcome of this
litigation.

Signature
Dawn K. Larson