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INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES


In the arbitration proceedings between

NIKO RESOURCES (BANGLADESH) LTD.
(Claimant)

and

BANGLADESH PETROLEUM EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION COMPANY LIMITED
(“ВАРЕХ”)
(Respondent)

ICSID Case No. ARB/10/11


AWARD



Members of the Tribunal
Mr Michael E. Schneider, President
Professor Campbell A. McLachlan KC
Professor Jan Paulsson


Secretary of the Tribunal
Ms Frauke Nitschke





Date of Dispatch: 18 December 2025

[Page ii]

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................. IX

1 INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF THE CASE CONCERNING
THE CHATTAK BLOWOUTS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES .....30

2 THE PROTAGONISTS..................................................................................58

2.1 The Claimant ........................................................................................ 58

2.2 The Respondent....................................................................................59

2.3 The Arbitral Tribunal ............................................................................ 61

2.4 The Secretariat ..................................................................................... 62

3 SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT FACTS................................................... 63

4 THE PROCEDURE ...................................................................................... 72

4.1 The initial phase of the Arbitration leading to the Decision
on Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 72

4.2 The proceedings leading to the Decision on Liability....75

4.2.1 The initial proceedings in the absence of a
substantive defence by BАРЕХ....................................................75

4.2.2 Addressing BAPEX failure to deal with the merits and
the appointment of the Tribunal Experts..............77

4.2.3 BAPEX's change of position: adaptation of the scope
of the Arbitration and of the procedure .................................... 79

4.2.4 The November 2015 Hearing .................................................... 84

4.2.5 Post-Hearing Events on Liability .............................................. 88

4.2.6 The Decision on Liability............................................................ 94

4.3 The Corruption Claim ........................................................................ 106

4.3.1 The Proceedings on the Corruption Claim ............................ 106

4.3.2 The Decision on the Corruption Claim .................................. 134

4.4 The Arbitrations and Court Proceedings in Bangladesh144

4.4.1 Court proceedings in Bangladesh related to Niko and
the blowouts ................................................................................ 144

[Page iii]

4.4.2 Dealing with the Court Proceedings in the Arbitration
and the Decision on Exclusivity ................................................ 154

4.4.3 The Alam Judgment.................................................................. 169

4.5 The Proceedings following the Decision on Liability until
the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss..................................... 172

4.6 The Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss.................................... 182

4.7 Proceedings following the Decision on the Heads of
Recoverable Loss until the completion of the case ..... 196

4.7.1 The CMC of 8 June 2021: organising the procedure
concerning the Lost Gas and its Valuation and the
Environmental Claims ................................................................ 196

4.7.2 The Respondents' Document Production request 200

4.7.3 PO No 27 and further steps concerning the quantity
of lost gas, its valuation and the Environmental
Claims .......................................................................................... 201

4.7.4 PO No 30 and the October 2021 Pre-Hearing
Conference.................................................................................... 204

4.7.5 The November 2021 Hearing .................................................. 212

4.7.6 Post-hearing matters and completion of the
proceedings .................................................................................. 220

5 PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL ................................................ 226

5.1 The Decision on Jurisdiction.............................................................. 226

5.2 The Decision pertaining to the Exclusivity of the
Tribunals' Jurisdiction........................................................................ 227

5.3 The Decision on the Corruption Claim ............................................ 228

5.4 The Decision on Liability .................................................................... 228

5.5 The Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss.................................. 229

6 RELIEF REQUESTED ...............................................................................232

6.1 The Claimant ...................................................................................... 232

[Page iv]

6.1.1 The final version ........................................................................ 232

6.1.2 Earlier versions.......................................................................... 235

6.2 The Respondents/BAPEX.................................................................. 239

6.2.1 The final version ........................................................................ 239

6.2.2 Earlier versions.......................................................................... 240

7 QUANTITY OF THE GAS LOST................................................................ 244

7.1 Overview of the issues........................................................................ 244

7.2 The assessment in the Government's Gas Loss Reports
and the claim in the Money Suit ...................................................... 244

7.3 Methodologies .................................................................................... 265

7.4 The evidence ...................................................................................... 273

7.5 Parameters and remaining issues of liability .................................. 276

7.5.1 Graphical Representation........................................................ 276

7.5.2 Reservoir Pressure .................................................................... 280

7.5.3 Geology, stratigraphy and lithology ...................................... 300

7.5.4 Shale stringers............................................................................ 305

7.5.5 The causes of the Chattak 2A blowout and liability
for the subsequent loss of gas .................................................. 310

7.5.6 Niko's liability for gas lost after the completion of the
Chattak 2B relief operation ...................................................... 317

7.6 Flow Rate assessment........................................................................ 368

7.6.1 Overview of the Parties' positions .......................................... 368

7.6.2 Period 1 – Q1: Chattak 2 initial flare ...................................... 375

7.6.3 Period 1 – Q2 and Q3: Chattak 2 after bridging until
the Chattak 2A blowout ............................................................377

7.6.4 Period 2 – Q1: Chattak 2A initial flare .................................. 428

[Page v]

7.6.5 Period 2 – Q2 and Q3: Flow from the Reservoir after
the Chattak 2A bridging............................................................431

7.6.6 Period 3: the post 9 October 2005 gas loss for which
Niko is liable................................................................................ 436

7.6.7 Overall gas loss based on Flow Rate assessment 481

7.7 Material Balance Assessment............................................................ 482

7.7.1 The range of OGIP estimates .................................................. 482

7.7.2 Limits to the Tribunal's examination: agreed EUR
quantity, estoppel and shifted burden of proof ...486

7.7.3 The factors critical for the OGIP and EUR estimates500

7.7.4 Reservoir mapping – the productive area........................... 504

7.7.5 Compartmentalisation: three gas bearing sands or
one? .............................................................................................. 508

7.7.6 Net Pay and GWC .................................................................... 516

7.7.7 Water or gas saturation (Sw and Sg), resistivity and
the GWC........................................................................................ 521

7.7.8 The Tribunal's conclusion on the OGIP of the
Reservoir ...................................................................................... 531

7.7.9 Calculating the loss based on the OGIP................................ 532

7.8 Conclusion on the quantity of lost gas............................................ 535

8 VALUATION OF THE GAS LOST ............................................................ 537

8.1 The presentation of the valuations .................................................... 537

8.2 The loss of BAPEX ............................................................................ 539

8.2.1 BAPEX's revenue .................................................................... 539

8.2.2 The timing of the loss................................................................ 545

8.2.3 The currency ............................................................................ 548

8.3 The loss of the Government................................................................ 549

8.3.1 The positions of the Parties and their evolution .. 549

[Page vi]

8.3.2 Substitution for fuel at the highest alternative price
or additional gas? ......................................................................556

8.3.3 The comparison between the GPSA price and the PSC
prices ............................................................................................ 558

8.3.4 Making the GPSA price and the PSC prices
comparable.................................................................................. 560

8.3.5 Mitigation and production uncertainties................................ 563

8.4 Interest.................................................................................................. 565

9 ENVIRONMENTAL LOSSES .................................................................... 570

9.1 The context of the Environmental Losses ...................................... 570

9.1.1 The Tengratila village and its inhabitants.......................... 570

9.1.2 The Blowouts: overview of the events .................................. 575

9.2 Prior Assessments and related evidence ........................................ 603

9.2.1 The Government reports on environmental losses603

9.2.2 The EIA and the Monitoring Reports of the
Government and Crown Agents/Tera .................................... 620

9.2.3 Expert and technical reports and studies ............................ 647

9.3 The identified environmental losses and the claims
remaining to be decided .................................................................. 652

9.3.1 Losses compensated by Niko and other Niko
measures of compensation and restoration ........................652

9.3.2 Claims no longer pursued by BAPEX (Losses of
Agriculture and Fisheries) ........................................................ 663

9.3.3 The Tribunal's Decisions on Claims for
Environmental Losses ................................................................ 665

9.3.4 The claims remaining to be decided........................................ 666

9.4 Atmospheric Pollution ...................................................................... 667

9.4.1 The Parties' positions .............................................................. 667

[Page vii]

9.4.2 The scope of the claim for atmospheric pollution 674

9.4.3 The UNFCCC, the IPCC and the international
framework concerning GHG emissions and climate
change.......................................................................................... 676

9.4.4 Greenhouse Gases, their warming effect and the
complexity of the climate system ............................................ 678

9.4.5 The role of human activities in the increase of the
Earth's temperature.................................................................... 689

9.4.6 Impact of the increasing temperatures and climate
change.......................................................................................... 696

9.4.7 International action to deal with anthropogenic GHG
emissions .................................................................................... 704

9.4.8 Climate change litigation.......................................................... 713

9.4.9 The quantity of GHG emissions for which Niko is
liable ............................................................................................ 730

9.4.10 The impact of the atmospheric pollution from the
Chattak 2 blowout on Bangladesh.......................................... 732

9.4.11 Niko's obligation to repair the damage to the
atmosphere.................................................................................. 740

9.4.12 Atmospheric Pollution owing to the burning trees750

9.5 Other Claims for Environmental Losses ........................................ 752

9.5.1 Damage to vegetation (trees and forest resources)752

9.5.2 Loss of water resources............................................................ 770

9.5.3 Loss of soil resources .............................................................. 787

9.5.4 Loss of the environmental system .......................................... 804

9.5.5 Losses related to human health .............................................. 813

9.5.6 The claim for the costs of Mr Wilson's proposal ..866

9.5.7 Losses to Education and Social Lifestyle ..........................876

[Page viii]

9.5.8 The residual damage from the stress, suffering and
disruption caused by the first blowout ...............................892

9.6 Currency and Interest ........................................................................ 894

10 COSTS.......................................................................................................... 898

10.1 Cost allocation between the two cases ............................................ 898

10.2 The Parties'cost claims concerning the Compensation
Declaration proceedings .................................................................. 899

10.3 The principles guiding the cost decisions ...................................... 902

10.4 The phases of the Compensation Declaration procedure905

10.5 The Arbitration Costs........................................................................ 909

10.6 The Jurisdiction phase........................................................................ 913

10.7 The BAPEX Default phase .............................................................. 914

10.8 The Corruption Claim phase .......................................................... 917

10.9 The Liability phase............................................................................ 921

10.10 The Quantum phase .......................................................................... 926

10.11 Post-Award Interest .......................................................................... 929

10.12 Summary of the Decision on Costs................................................ 930

11 THE TRIBUNAL'S AWARD .................................................................... 933

[Page ix]

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abel ReportExpert Report by L. William Abel, PE, 8 June 2015
Adams ReportExpert Report by Dr Neal Adams, 31 August 2015
aerosolSuspension of airborne solid or liquid particles, with typical
particle size in the range of a few nanometres to several tens
of micrometres and atmospheric lifetimes of up to several
days in the troposphere and up to years in the stratosphere.
(IPCC Glossary)
AmendmentBAPEX's Amendment to Memorial on Damages, 7 September
2020
AOFAbsolute Open Flow, exposed only to atmospheric pressure
APIAmerican Petroleum Institute
API-RPAPI Recommended Practice
AR1IPCC First Assessment Report, 1990 with 1992 Assessments
(FAR)
AR2IPCC Second Assessment Report, 1995 (SAR)
AR3IPCC Third Assessment Report, 2001 (TAR)
AR4IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 2007
AR5IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, 2014
AR6IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, 2023
AreaA measure of the areal extent of a reservoir, or more typically
of the hydrocarbon-bearing part of the reservoir, as recorded
on a structure map
AsArsenic
Back pressureResistance of the formation against the pressure exercised by
the gas

[Page x]

Background gasBackground gas is the average or baseline of formation gas
liberated from the formation while drilling through a
formation interval. It represents the relative baseline to
compare formation gas readings
BAPEXBangladesh Petroleum Exploration & Production Cотрапу
Limited, the Second Respondent
bblBarrel (42 US gallons)
BBL I or BBL
Experts I
Expert report Expert report by Clifford Ian Betton, Professor
Paul Leinster and Dr Ian Borthwick, dated 23 March 2016
and presented by the Respondents with the Memorial on
Damages
BBL II or BBL
Experts II
Expert report by Betton, Bothwick and Leinster, dated 20
August 2021 and presented with BMEС
B-CD.1BAPEX's Counter-Memorial Concerning the Compensation
Declaration, 30 January 2014
B-CD.2BAPEX's Rejoinder Concerning the Compensation
Declaration, 25 September 2014
B-CD.3BAPEX's Comments on the Reports of the Tribunal Experts
B-CD.4BAPEX's Request for Leave to Submit One Additional
Pleading and Counterclaims, 25 September 2015
B-CD.5BAPEX responsive Comments on the Tribunal-Appointed
Expert Reports, 30 September 2015
B-CD.6BAPEX Submission concerning the Full Scope of Liability
approach and related issues, 6 October 2015 (first letter)
B-CD.7BAPEX Submission concerning the November 2015 Hearing,
6 October 2015 (second letter)
B-CD.8BAPEX Submission identifying additional obligations and
breaches by the Claimant, 12 October 2015
B-CD.9BAPEX's Submission on Various Procedural and Legal
Issues, 19 October 2015

[Page xi]

B-CD/PMBAPEX's Request for Provisional Measures, 13 August 2015
Bcf or BscfBillion cubic feet of gas at standard conditions
BDTBangladeshi taka
BGSLBakhrabad Gas System Ltd.
BHABottom Hole Assembly
BHPBottom hole pressure
BHTBottom hole temperature
Biogenic gasGas generated by the anaerobic decomposition of organic
material (Wilson I, paragraph 1.6.1
BlowoutUncontrolled flow of well fluids (including gas) or formation
fluids from the wellbore; the blowouts in the present case
occurred in the Chattak field on 7 January and 24 June 2015
(see definition in R-439)
Blowout gasGas that escaped from the Chattak 2 well as part of the first
blowout (see Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraph
237)
BMDBAPEX Memorial on Damages, 25 March 2016.
ВМЕСBAPEX Memorial (Submission) on the Environmental Claims,
20 August 2021
BOPBlowout preventer
B-PHB 1BAPEX's Post-Hearing Brief on Damages, dated 2 March
2022
B-PHB 2BAPEX's Reply Post-Hearing Brief on Damages, dated 9 May
2022
bpmBarrels/minute
Brattle IExpert Report of Brattle Group, dated 24 March 2016
Brattle IIUpdated Expert Report of the Brattle Group, dated 7
September 2020

[Page xii]

Brattle IIISecond Supplemented Expert Report of the Brattle Group,
dated 20 August 2021
CARBCalifornia Air Resources Board
C-CD.1Niko's Memorial concerning the Compensation Declaration,
27 September 2013
C-CD.2Niko's Reply concerning the Compensation Declaration, 29
May 2014, also referred to as Niko's Reply
C-CD.3Niko's Comments on the Tribunals Experts' Reports
Concerning the Compensation Declaration, 31 August 2015
C-CD.4Niko's Comments on BAPEX's Comments on the Reports of
the Tribunal Experts Concerning the Compensation
Declaration, 30 September 2015
C-CD.5Niko's Submission concerning the Full Scope of Liability
approach and related procedural issues, 5 October 2015
C-CD.6Niko's Defence in Principle to New Allegations Raised by
BAPEX's Expert, 9 October 2015
C-CD.7Niko's Submission on Newly Alleged Breaches, 23 October
2015
C-CD/PMNiko's Opposition to BAPEX's Request for Provisional
Measures in the Counterclaim Declaration, 21 August 2015
C-CMCClaimant's Counter-Memorial on the Corruption
C-Costs INiko's Submission on Costs, dated 31 May 2022
C-Costs IINiko's Comments on the Respondent's Submission on Costs,
dated 21 June 2022
C-Costs IIINiko's Updated Submission on Costs, dated 5 September
2025
Centre or ICSIDInternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
C-Gas LossNiko's Reply, on Quantum for Updated Lost Gas Calculation,
1 October 2021

[Page xiii]

Chattak field
(also: Chhatak)
One of the gas fields to which the JVA relates
Clay stringer,
also Shale
Stringer
Thin layers of shales of Girujan clay in the Overburden; see
Section 7.5.4
CMDNiko's Counter-Memorial on Damages, 7 September 2020
C-MJ. 1Claimant's Memorial on Jurisdiction, 1 April 2011
C-MJ.2Claimant's Second Memorial on Jurisdiction, described as
Claimant's Response to the Respondents’First Counter-
Memorial on Jurisdiction for the Payment Claim, and the
Claimant's Memorial on Jurisdiction for the Compensation
Claim, 30 June 2011
C-MJ.3Reply to the Respondents’Response with respect to the
Compensation Declaration, 10 October 2011
Commerciality
Report
Niko's assessment of the commercial viability of further
development of the Chattak field, submitted to BAPEX on 1
July 2007 (Exhibit C-072)
Compensation
Claims
Claims for compensation brought in the Money Suit
Compensation
Declaration
The declaration requested by the Claimant concerning the
Compensation Claims
Contract ActBangladesh Contract Act 1872 (Exhibit CLA-004)
ConventionIn section 9 of this Award, refers to the UNFCCC
Convention or
ICSID Convention
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States
COPConference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (Article 7 of the
UNFCCC)

[Page xiv]

Corruption ClaimClaim filed by BAPEX and Petrobangla on 25 March 2016
and decided by a decision of this Tribunal on 25 February
2019
C-PHBClaimant's Post-Hearing Brief, 22 January 2016
C-PHB 1Niko's Post-Hearing Brief on Damages for Lost Gas, dated 2
March 2022
C-PHB 2Niko's Reply Post-Hearing Brief on Damages for Lost Gas,
dated 9 May 2022
CPTDCChina Petroleum Technology and Development Corporation,
the Drilling Contractor engaged by Niko
CRECNiko's Reply on the Environmental Claims, 1 October 2021
Crore10 million in the South Asian numbering system
Decision on
Exclusivity
Decision Pertaining to the Exclusivity of the Tribunals'
Jurisdiction of 19 July 2016
DERDaily Environmental Reports
DoEDepartment of Environment in the Ministry of Environment
and Forest, Bangladesh
Down-dipA location or area of structure (or field) that is deeper than a
designated (target) location or area.
DupitilaLayer of sandstone in the Overburden
ECDEquivalent Circulating Density: The measure of the actual
density applied against the borehole walls by the
circulating drilling fluid.
ECSEquilibrium Climate Sensitivity (see AR 6 WG I chapter 7
FAQ 7.3, page 1023 at
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/I
PCC_AR6_WGI_FullReport.pdf
ΕΙΑEnvironmental Impact Assessment, here specifically Niko's
EIA, dated June 2004 (Exhibit R-72 and C-13)

[Page xv]

Electric LogLogging tool that measures electric conductivity (resistivity).
This is the primary logging tool to calculate Sw
EMRDEnergy and Mineral Resources Division of the Ministry of
Power, Energy and Mineral Resources
EMWEquivalent Mud Weight: The mud weight (in ppg or psi/ft) needed
to balance a formation fluid pressure
Environmental
Losses Reports
Reports commissioned by the Government of Bangladesh,
consisting of
Report of the Committee for Estimation of Environmental and
Forestry Losses caused by the fire created in Tengratila Gas
Field in Sunamgonj, dated 17 January 2005 (Exhibit R-1),
First Report
Report of the Committee formed to estimate the amount of
environmental losses due to the blowout explosion in
Tengratila, 13 April 2005 (Exhibit R Annex 2(bis), Second
Report
Report of the Committee formed to estimate the amount of
environmental losses due to the second blowout in Chhatak
Gas Field (Tengratila) of Doarabazar Sub-District of
Sunamganj District, dated 1 September 2015 (Exhibit R
Annex 5(bis), Third Report
EQSEnvironmental Quality Standards
ESGEnvironmental Scientifics Group Limited, author of a report,
dated March 2016 and produced as R-129
EUREstimated Ultimate Recovery, a term used to define those
quantities of petroleum estimated, as of given date, to be
potentially recoverable plus those quantities already
produced.
Exclusivity
Decision
Tribunal's Decision pertaining to the exclusivity of the
Tribunal's jurisdiction, 19 July 2016
FAOUN Food and Agriculture Organization
FARFirst Assessment Report

[Page xvi]

Fault/faultingA break in the subsurface that displaces the formation(s) on
one side of the fault from the same formation(s) on the other
side of the fault. Faults may be sealing (do not allow the
transmission of fluids) or not.
February 2016
Hearing
Hearing on Liability (held on 21-22 February 2016 in Paris)
Fekete ReportAssessment of Lost Gas Boka Bil Sand 1&2 reservoir due to
Loss of Control Incidents Well Chattak 2 & Chattak 2A,
Chattak West Field, Bangladesh, prepared by Fekete
Associates Inc, Calgary, 8 December 2006 (Exhibit C-070)
Feni fieldOne of the gas fields to which the JVA relates
FGDFocus Group Discussion
First Enquiry
Report
Report of an Enquiry Committee on Blowout of Well Chattak
No 2 on 7 January 2005, dated 7 February 2005 (Exhibit R-3)
First
Environmental
Loss Report
Report of the Committee for Estimation of Environmental and
Forestry Losses caused by the fire created in Tengratila Gas
Field in Sunamganj, 17 January 2005 (Exhibit R-1, and
attachment to Exhibit R-Annex 2(bis), see Section 10.2.1)
Fluid contactThe physical contact (usually horizontal surfaces except in
extremely rare cases) between one fluid (e.g., gas) and
another fluid (e.g., water)
Fracture
Pressure
The pressure at which a rock formation will fracture
Framework of
Understanding
(FoU)
Framework of Understanding for the Study for Development
and Production of Hydrocarbon from the Non-producing
Marginal Gas Fields of Chattak, Feni and Kamta executed on
23 August 1999 between BAPEX and Niko (attached to the
JVA)
FtFoot or feet
ft ssFeet subsea – a vertical depth measurement from a datum at
sea level

[Page xvii]

Gaffney Cline IFirst Expert Report by Gaffney Cline & Associates, dated
29 May 2014
Gaffney Cline IISecond Expert Report by Gaffney Cline & Associates, dated
20 August 2020
Gaffney Cline IIIThird Expert Report by Gaffney Cline & Associates, dated
30 September 2021
Gaffney Cline IVFourth Expert Report by Gaffney Cline & Associates, dated
5 November 2021
GCAGaffney Cline Associates, Claimant's experts
GDTGas Down To: The gas down to depth is the deepest evidence
of gas in the wellbore. [See also LKG]
GHGGreenhouse Gases
GIIPGas initially in place, see also OGIP and IGIP
Girujan ClaySee Upper Marine Shale
GLGround Level
GLOFGlacial lake outburst flood
GOB or
Government
The Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the
First Respondent until the Decision on Jurisdiction
GPSAGas Purchase and Sale Agreement of 27 December 2006
between Petrobangla and the Joint Venture Partners BAPEX
and Niko
GSMGSM Consulting Petroleum Engineers, a company of Robert
Grace, PE
Grace ReportEvents at Niko Resources – Chattak 2A Relief Well, Thursday,
June 23 and Friday June 24, 2005, prepared by Robert D.
Grace, PE, 4 July 2005, Exhibit C-45
Also: GSM End of Well Report on Chattak 2B, 29 November
2005, Exhibit C-266
GTPGlobal Temperature-change Potential

[Page xviii]

GWCGas Water Contact
GWPGlobal Warming Potential
HCPVHydrocarbon Pore Value
Heads of
Recoverable Loss
Decision
Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, dated 18 May 2021
Hearing or
November 2021
Hearing
Hearing on the quantity of lost gas, from 8 to 13 November
2021; in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, the term
refers to the November 2020 Hearing
HorizonAn alternative name for a rock formation. May refer to a
feature that is observable on seismic surveys and can
therefore be mapped
HSEHealth, Safety, Environment
HSFOHigh Sulphur Furnace Oil
HT 2016Hearing Transcript of the February 2016 Hearing on
Standards and Liability
HT 2017Hearing Transcript of the April 2017 Hearing on the
Corruption Claim
HT 2020Hearing Transcript of the November 2020 Hearing on Heads
of Loss, day; page references are to the corrected version of
the transcript
HT 2021Hearing Transcript of the November 2021 Evidentiary
Hearing on Damages
Hughes IExpert report by Jeffrey Hughes dated 23 March 2016,
presented by the Respondents
Hughes IISupplemental Expert report by Jeffrey Hughes dated 19
August 2020
Hughes IIISecond Supplemental Expert report by Jeffrey Hughes dated
20 August 2021

[Page xix]

ICSID Arbitration
Rules
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings under the
ICSID Convention
IGIPInitial gas in place, see also OGIP and GIIP
INDCIntended Nationally Determined Contributions under the
UNFCCC, prior to Paris Agreement, see NDC
IOCInternational Oil Companies
IPCCIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPCC GlossaryGlossary attached to IPCC reports; definitions varied over
time; quotations from the latest of these glossaries in Annex
I to AR6, Synthesis Report, 2022 at
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IP
CC_AR6_SYR_AnnexesIndex.pdf
IPRInflow Performance Relationship
ITMOInternationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes
IUCNInternational Union for the Conservation of Nature
IWCFInternational Well Control Forum
JMCJoint Management Committee (JVA Article 6)
Joint Venture
Partners
BAPEX and Niko
JVAJoint Venture Agreement between BAPEX and Niko, dated 16
October 2003 (Exhibit C-1)
Kantonsgericht
Zug
Cantonal Court of Zug
KempExpert Report by Robert Kemp, dated 29 May 2014
KickAn influx of formation fluid (here: gas) into the wellbore
because underground pressure exceeds drilling mud
pressure; if not controlled, it may lead to a blowout
KTKick Tolerance

[Page xx]

Kua wellIn the 20th Monitorind Report, kua wells are described as
“shallow hand dug wells” (see Exhibit C-69, page 12)
L&DLoss and Damage
LELLower Explosive Limit
LithologyThe description of the general physical characteristics of a
rock formation
LKGLowest known gas. The lowest known gas depth is the
deepest evidence of gas in the wellbore, see also GDT
Local Losses
Report
Report by the Committee formed to estimate the amount of
local losses due to the fire in Tengratila Gas Field, dated 8
June 2005, Convener Deputy Commissioner Sunamganj,
Exhibit R Annex 3(bis)
LogA record of certain physical properties with depth from
logging tools that are lowered into a well on wireline.
Measurements of a variety of rock and fluid properties are
made to estimate key parameters of interest to the evaluation
of hydrocarbons in place
LOTLeak Off Test
LULCLand Use Land Cover (see EVI Report, Exhibit C-285)
mMeters (m sS meters subsea)
Marine ShaleSee Upper Marine Shale
Material balance
(MBAL) analysis
Mathematical analysis of reservoirs based on the changes in
reservoir pressure in response to production of oil, gas and
water, and any change in rock properties or water influx
McfThousand cubic feet
MDMeasured depth (measured along the path of the well). For a
vertical well the measured depth will be equivalent to the true
vertical depth (TVD)
MFEMarginal Field Evaluation (Annex B to JVA)

[Page xxi]

MGSMud Gas Separator
MicrologMicrolog is a vintage electrical logging method which
measures the resistivity of small formation volumes near and
behind the wall of the well bore. The microlog provides a
qualitative indication of permeability.
MinistryMinistry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources, unless
otherwise specified
MMcf or MMscfMillion cubic feet, the “s” for “standard”
MOEFMinistry of Environment and Forests
MOEFMinistry of Environment and Forest
Money SuitProceedings brought by GOB and Petrobangla in the Court of
the District Judge in Dhaka against Niko and others (see
below Section 5, in fine, with further reference and Exhibit C-
006)
Moulavi Bazar(also Maguchora) an exploration well drilled by Occidental
Petroleum in the Sylhet area, which also suffered a blowout
mssMeters subsea, total vertical depth below mean sea level
MudlogA record of properties extracted from mud and drilling
operations and typically includes but not limited to rate of
penetration of the bit, depth, description of drill cuttings, gas
measurement (total and composition), mud rheology, drilling
parameters
nSaturation exponent (input to Archie's clean sand equation
for water saturation calculation)
NAPANational Adaptation Programme of Action
NDCNationally Determined Contributions, as provided by the
2015 Paris Agreement
NDVINormalised Difference Vegetation Index (see EVI Report,
Exhibit C-285)

[Page xxii]

Net PayThe net thickness (or height) value to be used in the
volumetric calculation of OGIP. Average net pay thickness
will consider net pay determined at the well(s), the structural
configuration of the top of reservoir surface, influence of fluid
contacts and other reservoir limits, and interpreted net/gross
variations away from well control (usually from the
interpretation of seismic data)
Net pay
thickness or Net
pay height
The aggregate thickness (or height) of vertical intervals of the
reservoir rock that are expected to contribute to the flow of
hydrocarbons
Net reservoir
thickness or
height
The aggregate thickness (or height) of vertical intervals of the
reservoir rock that are expected to contribute to the flow of
hydrocarbons or/and water
Net/Gross (N/G)The ratio of net pay thickness (height) or net reservoir
thickness (height) to the gross vertical thickness of the target
interval, sand or formation
Niko CanadaNiko Resources Ltd., the Canadian parent company of the
Claimant
Niko, Niko
Bangladesh or
NRBL
Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd., the Claimant
November 2015
Hearing
Hearing on Liability, held 2-7 November 2015 in London
November 2020
Hearing
Hearing on Heads of Loss, held by video-conference on
19 and 20 November 2020
November 2021
Hearing
Evidentiary Hearing on Damages, held 8–13 November 2021
by video-conference
OGIPOriginal Gas in Place, also GIIP and IGIP
OLG HammHigher Regional Court, the Court of Appeal of Hamm in
Germany

[Page xxiii]

ONGC ManualManual of the Well Control School at the Institute of Drilling
and Technology, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited,
Dehradun, India
OperatorNiko's function under the JVA
OverburdenStratum between the surface and the Upper Marine Shale in
the Chattak field, i.e. “all of the formation above the marine
shale” (B-PHB1, FN 94); it also referred to by other terms such
a “shallow formation”
OverburdenFormation below the surface down to the Regional Seal
pPressure
Payment ClaimsClaims to payment under the GPSA for gas delivered (subject
matter of ARB/10/18)
Period 1Flow Rate assessment from 7 January to 24 June 2005
Period 2Flow Rate assessment from 25 June to 9 October 2005
Period 3Flow Rate assessment after 9 October 2005
PermeabilityA measure of the ability of a rock to permit the flow of fluids
(usually reported in mD – milliDarcy)
PetrobanglaBangladesh Oil Gas and Mineral Corporation, the Third
Respondent
PetroleumAny naturally occurring hydrocarbon, whether in gaseous,
liquid or solid state, or mixtures thereof (JVA Article 1.46)
Petroleum
Operations
Operations of Development and Production and all other
operations pertaining to Petroleum as provided in the JVA
(JVA Article 1.47)
Porosity (Por)The fraction of the rock that is pore space that contains fluid
(water, oil, and/or gas)
ppbPounds Per Barrel
ppgPounds per Gallon

[Page xxiv]

Pressure
Differential
Difference between the pressure of the gas flowing out of the
Reservoir and the pressure in the Overburden against which
that gas must flow
PSCProduction Sharing Contract
psiPounds per Square Inch
psi/ftPressure gradient in pounds per square inch per foot
psiaPounds per square inch absolute
psigPounds per square inch gauge
Q1, Q2, Q3Categories for the assessment of the quantities of gas lost
due to the two blowouts, used by the Gas Loss Committees
and in the arbitration (see below Section 7 and specifically
Section 7.6)
R-CMJ. 1Respondents’Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, 16 May
2011
R-CMJ.2Supplemental Counter-Memorial, described as Respondents'
Response to the Claimant's Presentation of its Position with
respect to the Request for the Compensation Declaration, 28
September 2011
R-Costs IBAPEX's Submission on Costs, dated 31 May 2022
R-Costs IIBAPEX's Comments on the Claimant's Submission on Costs,
dated 21 June 2022
R-Costs IIIBAPEX's Updated Submission on Costs, dated 5 September
2025
Recovery factor
'RF' or (Recovery
efficiency)
The fraction of hydrocarbons originally in place in a
reservoir that may be recovered through the wells and
facilities installed (or to be installed)
OGIP (GIIP or IGIP) x RF = EUR
Regional ShaleSee Upper Marine Shale

[Page xxv]

ReservesReserves are those quantities of petroleum that are
anticipated to be commercially recoverable by application of
development projects to known accumulations from a given
date forward under defined conditions
ReservoirGenerally: Underground rock formation capable of containing
hydrocarbons; in the Award: Sands 1 and 2 in the Chattak
field, from where gas escaped by the blowouts
ResistivityA measure of the resistance of a rock formation and its
entrained fluids to conduct electricity. This is used to interpret
the quantity of pore space occupied by water and
hydrocarbons
RespondentsBAPEX and Petrobangla until the closing of the procedure
and the Procedural Order No 29, both of 24 September 2021,
by which ICSID case ARB/10/18 was completed; after 24
September 2021 BAPEX is the sole Respondent
RfA IRequest for Arbitration, dated 1 April 2010 and received by
the Centre on 12 April 2010 (ARB/10/11)
RfA I ClarificationClaimant's response of 18 May 2010 to the Centre's request
for clarification of 7 May 2010
RfA IIRequest for Arbitration, dated 16 June 2010 and received by
the Centre on 23 June 2010 (ARB/10/18)
RFCReasons for Concern (in the context of IPCC reports)
RGIPRecoverable Gas in Place (= EUR)
RmResistivity of mud
RoResistivity of the water-bearing formation
ROSResidual oil saturation
R-PHBBAPEX's Post-Hearing Brief, 22 January 2016
R-Preliminary
Objections
Preliminary objections raised by the Respondents in the letter
of 21 June 2010 (ARB/10/11)

[Page xxvi]

R-RJRespondents’Rejoinder on Jurisdiction for the Payment
Claim, 30 August 2011
RSCRyder Scott Company, BAPEX expert
RwResistivity of formation water
Ryder Scott IExpert Report of Ryder Scott, dated 21 March 2016
Ryder Scott IISupplemental Expert Report of Ryder Scott, dated
7 September 2020
Ryder Scott IIISecond Supplemental Expert Report of Ryder Scott, dated
20 August 2021
Ryder Scott IVThird Supplemental Expert Report of Ryder Scott, dated
29 October 2021
SandSand or rock layers charged with natural gas (C-CD2, para
73), defined as “Porous and permeable stratum capable of
producing Petroleum, considered a unit with respect to
exploitation (JVA definition of Reservoir in Article 1.53)
SARSee AR2
SaturationThe percentage of the rock pore space occupied by a liquid or
gas
Seismic dataInformation obtained from artificially induced shock waves
sent into the earth. The reflections of these waves enable
interpreters to map the shape of the subsurface formations
SFTSequential (Selective?)¹ Formation Tester
SFTThe Selective Formation Tester (SFT) is a tool run on electric
wireline into a well to take multiple reservoir pressure
measurements. It was marketed by Precision Energy
Services, now owned by Weatherford
SgGas saturation; percentage of gas in a pore space

¹ Ryder Scott III, paragraph 7.

[Page xxvii]

SGFLSylhet Gas Field Ltd.
SgiInitial gas saturation
SgrResidual gas saturation
Shalealso referred to as Regional Shale (or Seal) and Girujan Clay
Shale stringerSee clay stinger
SLCPShort-lived climate pollutants
Soil FalloutSoil, sand and other material ejected by the blowouts, see
Section 9.5.3
SPESociety of Petroleum Engineers
SPE-PRMSPetroleum Resources Management System
Spill pointThe structurally lowest point in a hydrocarbon trap that can
retain hydrocarbons. This identifies the maximum area of a
potentially hydrocarbon-bearing reservoir rock.
Spud dateDate of start of drilling
ssSubsea – Depth reference to mean sea level
SSSVSub-surface safety valve
Standard
conditions
Standard conditions are defined as 14.7 psia and 60 degrees
Fahrenheit.
StriplogA log that combines mudlog and wireline log information
Structure mарA structural contour map of a subsurface feature such as the
top of a reservoir
SVE systemSystem for Soil Vacuum Extraction (see Section 9.5.6)
SwWater saturation - percentage of water in the pore space
TARIPCC Third Assessment Report, see AR3
tCTons of Carbon

[Page xxviii]

TDTotal Depth
TengratilaVillage in the Sylhet area, neighbouring the Chattak 1 and 2
wells
The ProcedureProcedure for Development of Marginal/Abandoned Gas
Fields, prepared in 2001 and attached as to the JVA as
Annex C
Thermogenetic
gas
Gas that is generated by thermal decomposition of buried
organic material at high temperature and pressure and at
great depth (Wilson I, paragraph 1.6.1)
Tipam or Tipam
Sand
Layer of sandstone in the lower part pf of the Overburden
and possibly also at the Reservoir
TkBangladeshi taka (also BDT)
ToRTerms of Reference
TrapA mechanism for retaining hydrocarbons in an underground
reservoir, preventing them from leaking out to the surface
TribunalCollectively, the two Arbitral Tribunals constituted in ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/11 and ICSID Case No. ARB/10/18 on
20 December 2010
TVDTrue vertical depth - generally referenced to the derrick floor
‘DF' or Kelly Bushing ‘KB’
TVD GLTrue vertical depth referenced to the ground level ‘GL’
TVD SSTrue vertical depth referenced to the mean sea level (MSL) or
‘sub-sea' (ss)
UMSUpper Marine Shale
UNFCCCUN Framework Convention on Climate Change
Up dipA location or area of structure (or field) that is higher than a
designated (target) location or area

[Page xxix]

Upper MarineImpermeable sedimentary rock, retaining the gas from Sands
1 & 2 in the Chattak field
VOCVolatile Organic Compound
Vw/VgRatio of volume of water to volume of gas at reservoir
conditions
Wallis IExpert Report of Ian Wallis, dated 8 June 2015
WGWorking Groups under the UNFCCC
Wilson IExpert report by Mr Stephen A. Wilson, dated 23 March 2016,
presented by the Respondents
Wilson IISupplemental Expert report by Mr Stephen A. Wilson, dated
3 September 2020
Wilson IIISecond Supplemental Expert report by Mr Stephen A. Wilson,
dated 20 August 2021
WIMWarsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage
WIPWarsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage
Wright IExpert Report by John Wright, PE, 29 May 2014
Wright IISupplemental Report by John Wright, PE, 23 October 2015.
Wright IIIExpert Report by Colin Stuart & John Wright, PE, 27 August
2020
Wright IVSupplemental Report by John Wright, PE, 30 September 2021
Wright VSupplemental Report by John Wright, PE, 5 November 2021
WUTWater Up To: The water up to depth is the shallowest
evidence of water in the wellbore for the formation unit

[Page 30]

1 INTRODUCTION: Overview of the case concerning the
Chattak blowouts and its consequences

1 This is a case of extraordinary complexity and duration. Details of the case
and these proceedings have been set out in the Tribunal's earlier decisions.
In this introduction, the Tribunal provides an overview, highlighting the
principal issues that arose and the circumstances in which they had to be
decided. Further details will be presented below in this Award.

2 The case concerns a project for the development of marginal and abandoned
gas fields in Bangladesh. The Government of Bangladesh designated BAPEX,
a subsidiary of Petrobangla, the national oil gas and mineral corporation, to
conclude a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with the Canadian company Niko
Resources (Niko) to develop two such fields, Feni and Chattak. Niko acted as
the Operator at its “sole risk and expense” (the JVA of 16 October 2003).

3 The development of the Feni field was successful. The gas produced was sold
by the Joint Venture to Petrobangla under a Gas Purchase and Sales
Agreement (GPSA) of 27 December 2006. With the exception of two initial
payments, Petrobangla did not pay for the gas it received from the Joint
Venture.

4 In the Chattak field, the first well drilled by Niko (Chattak 2) reached the
targeted sands containing gas (the Reservoir consisting of Sands 1 and 2) and,
after it had continued drilling, suffered an uncontrolled release of gas
(blowout) on 7 January 2005. The blowout ejected gas and debris including
sand, rocks, bricks and parts of the drilling equipment. The debris was
dispersed in the neighbourhood and caused dust deposits in a wider range;
the escaping gas ignited into a high flare and the drilling rig collapsed into the
crater formed by the blowout. After some 40 hours, the wellbore collapsed
(bridged over), the flare extinguished but gas continued to escape from the
Reservoir and at the surface. The first relief well drilled to stop the flow of gas
from the Reservoir (Chattak 2A) also suffered a blowout with similar effects.
The second relief operation (Chattak 2B) was completed on 9 October 2005,
but seepages continued to occur at the surface. Niko proposed that further
wells be drilled, to produce the gas remaining in the Reservoir and to stop any
further seepages; BAPEX did not agree.

5 The loss of gas was assessed by two Gas Loss Committees formed by the
Government after each of the two blowouts and in which both BAPEX and
Niko participated. The two Committees produced their reports in 2005. Niko
agreed with the findings set out in the second report and part of the findings
of the first.

[Page 31]

6 The blowouts caused no casualties but damage to the environment and the
population in the neighbouring village of Tengratila: families suffered losses;
the schools near the blowouts closed temporarily and schooling removed to
temporary accommodation provided by Niko. Niko engaged a group of local
and international consultants who monitored the consequences of the
blowouts. The immediate damage to the population was assessed by the local
authorities and amounts so assessed were paid by Niko. Other damage to the
population and the environment was assessed by three Environmental Losses
Committees formed by the Government, which produced their reports in
2005. Niko disagreed with the conclusions of these Committees and made no
payment with respect to any of the losses assessed by them.

7 The Government and Petrobangla commenced legal proceedings in
Bangladesh against Niko in 2008, seeking compensation as assessed by the
Lost Gas and the Environmental Loss Committees (the Money Suit). As far
as the Tribunal is informed, these proceedings are still pending.

8 Niko initiated two ICSID arbitrations in 2010 against the Government,
Petrobangla and BAPEX, one for a declaration of non-liability for damage
caused by two blowouts (ICSID Case No ARB/10/11, the Compensation
Declaration) and the other for the outstanding payment for the natural gas
delivered (ICSID Case No ARB/10/18, the Payment Claim). Because of some
common features and with the agreement of the parties, identical tribunals
were formed in the two Arbitrations, and the proceedings were conducted
concurrently. While related, the disputes arising out of each of these contracts
nevertheless raised different issues. The two Tribunals 2 rendered eight
Decisions and an Award that completed the proceedings on the Payment
Claim. Some of the Decisions addressed issues that were common to both
cases and others issues specific to only one of the two.

9 In the proceedings on Jurisdiction, the Tribunals noted that the Government
had designated BAPEX to implement the project with Niko and had approved
the JVA; but it did not become party to that contract. The Tribunals concluded
that they did not have personal jurisdiction over the Government, which had
designated Petrobangla and BAPEX, implicitly but necessarily, as agencies in
the sense of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.

10 In the proceedings on Jurisdiction, the Respondents raised a corruption
allegation in a first version (see below) which the Tribunals rejected. Moreover,
the Respondents objected to Niko's acting alone in the claim for payment
under the GPSA for gas deliveries by the Joint Venture. The Claimant sought


² Until the completion of the proceedings for the Payment Claim in 2021, the Tribunals always acted
collectively; nevertheless, the singular was used occasionally.

[Page 32]

a declaration that, under the JVA, BAPEX had to cooperate with Niko (the
Cooperation Claim). In the Decision on Jurisdiction, the Tribunals reserved
the question of the necessary role (or otherwise) of BAPEX. In the subsequent
proceedings on the Payment Claim, Petrobangla identified the amount owed
to Niko and the Claimant accepted this quantification. The amount was no
longer treated as owed to the Joint Venture and BAPEX did not claim any
rights as Joint Venture Partner over the amount claimed by Niko._The
Tribunal confirmed in the Decision on the Payment Claim that the
"entitlement of BAPEX to payments under the GPSA” was not affected by its
decision concerning the amount due to Niko.

11 Niko's share in the invoices for gas delivered by the Joint Venture having been
agreed, the main issues in the proceedings on the Payment Claim
concerned the effect of legal action before the courts of Bangladesh.

12 In 2005 an entity named Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers' Association
(BELA) was granted by the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh an injunction restraining payments to Niko. In 2009, the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court linked the injunction to the Money
Suit, extending the injunction “till disposal of the money suit or till amicable
settlement amongst the parties, whichever earlier”.

13 In the Arbitration, Petrobangla relied on the injunction as an impediment
constituting force majeure; it concluded that the GPSA was frustrated and
terminated. The Tribunals found that the impediment existed already when
the GPSA containing the payment obligation was concluded and that, having
made the payment committee in the GPSA, Petrobangla did not take any steps
to remove the impediment. The Tribunals concluded that Petrobangla was not
excused from its payment obligations and confirmed the amounts owed by
Petrobangla to Niko in the Decision on the Payment Claim of 11 September
2014.

14 During the proceedings on the Payment Claim Petrobangla applied for an
attachment in the Money Suit, followed in the Arbitration by a request for
provisional measures in December 2013 and a conditional request for
provisional measures in February 2014. During the hearing on the Payment
Claim in April 2014, the Parties reached an understanding concerning these
applications, which the Tribunals recorded in Procedural Order No 6 of 1 May
2014. The understanding included the withdrawal of the applications for
provisional measures and the commitment of Niko not to dispose directly or
indirectly of its assets in Bangladesh.

15 In view of these commitments and various interim arrangements discussed at
the 2014 Hearing, the Tribunals also invited the Parties to seek an amicable
settlement, which would satisfy the order of the BELA Court and permit

[Page 33]

Petrobangla to meet its payment obligations under the GPSA. They identified
“possible elements of interim arrangements which the Parties may agree on,
or, in the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal may order”.

16 The Parties did not succeed in agreeing on such an interim arrangement. The
Claimant requested a decision from the Tribunals regarding the
implementation of the First Decision on the Payment Claim, proposing several
alternatives, including the use of the funds owed by Petrobangla for
operations in Bangladesh and payment into an escrow account. Petrobangla
argued that Niko may be found responsible for the blowouts and may owe
damages; it would therefore be “unnecessarily prejudice Respondents, and
the sovereign State of Bangladesh, to have to pay or set aside a substantial
sum for Claimant that may not be owed at all”.

17 The Tribunals did not accept this argument, pointing out that the amount for
gas delivered by Niko to Petrobangla was long overdue. Moreover, the debt of
Petrobangla was established, while Niko's liability for the blowouts remained
to be determined. Petrobangla had decided not to bring any claims in the
Arbitration but that any liability of Niko for the blowouts might be due not to
Petrobangla but to others. The Tribunals concluded that there was no
justification for Petrobangla to further withhold the funds owed to Niko.

18 The Tribunals also noted that the Claimant had proposed different
possibilities for using the funds paid by Petrobangla, including use of the
funds in Bangladesh and possible compensation obligations found as result
of the blowout. They adopted therefore with some adjustments the alternative
in the Claimant's proposals that provided for an escrow account. The
Tribunals issued the Decision on the Implementation of the Decision on the
Payment Claim (the Second Decision on the Payment Claim), dated 14
September 2015, ordering payment into an escrow account for which they
defined the modalities. In that decision, the Tribunals also decided the claim
for compound interest.

19 The Parties then agreed on the documentation for the escrow account and the
Tribunals approved it at the November 2015 Hearing. The Respondents did
not execute the escrow documentation. The Claimant requested on 15
December 2015 that the Tribunals issue an award on the Payment Claim,
ordering Petrobangla unconditionally to make payment to Niko of the amount
that the Tribunals had found to be owed. The Respondents stated that the
execution of the escrow documentation required a modification of the 2005
injunction and that they had applied for such a modification. In response to
the Claimant's request for an award, the Respondents requested on 6 January
2016 that the Tribunals maintain in place the Second Decision on the
Payment Claim while the petition for review of the injunction was under

[Page 34]

consideration. On 25 March 2016, together with BAPEX's Memorial on
Damages, Petrobangla and BAPEX separately raised an expanded version of
the corruption allegations (see below); on that basis Petrobangla requested
that the decisions on the Payment Claim be vacated and the Tribunal find
that Niko is not entitled to any payment.

20 Instead of a modification of the 2005 injunction, a new injunction was issued
by the High Court Division on 12 May 2016, further to a writ petition by a
Professor Shamsul Alam, acting as “public interest litigant” (the 2016
injunction). The injunction directed the Respondents and the Government
not to give any kind of benefit and not to make any payment to the Claimant.

21 Considering these developments, the Tribunals noted that the creation of an
escrow account was frustrated through no fault of the Claimant. As the
objectives of the payment into an escrow account could not be achieved in the
manner contemplated and no other interim arrangement had been proposed,
the Tribunals saw no other manner of implementing the prior decisions on
the Payment Claim save by requiring Petrobangla to make direct payment to
Niko. They did so by the Third Decision on the Payment Claim of 26 May
2016.

22 On 30 June 2016 the Respondents applied for a reconsideration of this
Decision. The Tribunals decided in Procedural Order No 16 of 14 November
2016, without determining the admissibility of the application, that, if it were
admissible, the application would have to be denied.

23 The relation of the Tribunals' jurisdiction with that of the courts of
Bangladesh was again raised by the Claimant's application of 19 May and 1
June 2016, seeking a declaration that the Tribunals have exclusive
jurisdiction over (i) the validity of the JVA and the GPSA, (ii) Niko's liability
and (iii) interim or provisional matters, including any injunction, stay of
payment, attachment or other relief. Responding to this application, the
Tribunals referred to their Decision on Jurisdiction, including jurisdiction
ratione materiae concerning the JVA and the GPSA. In the First Decision on
the Payment Claim, the Tribunals explained that their jurisdiction “is
exclusive with respect to the merits on the dispute validly brought before
[them]". They confirmed the exclusive nature of their jurisdiction in the Third
Decision on the Payment Claim. In response to the Claimant's last
application, the Tribunals issued their Decision Pertaining to the
Exclusivity of the Tribunals' Jurisdiction of 19 July 2016 (Exclusivity
Decision), confirming that they “have sole and exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction with respect to all matters which have validly been brought before
[them]". They explained that this exclusive substance matter jurisdiction did
not prevent a court in Bangladesh to be seized by a person not party to the

[Page 35]

ICSID proceedings; it however bound the courts in Bangladesh, when deciding
the claim of such a person, to conform its decision to that of the ICSID
Tribunals in all those matters for which the ICSID Tribunals have exclusive
jurisdiction.

24 The proceedings on the Payment Claim were suspended when the
Respondents raised the expanded version of the Corruption Claim. After the
Corruption Claim had been decided, the Claimant requested on 7 October
2020 that the Tribunals decide the reserved question of costs and issue an
award on the Payment Claim. The Respondents objected to the separation of
the two proceedings and the issue was heard during the November 2020
Hearing. The Tribunals determined that the proceedings be separated and
that those on the Payment Claim be completed by an award. They examined
the cost claims and determined the part of the costs to be allocated to the
proceedings on the Payment Claim. In its Award of 24 September 2021, the
Tribunal in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 confirmed the earlier decisions of the
two Tribunals and ordered payment of the amounts due to Niko plus interest
and a share of Niko's costs.

25 As a matter of public record, on 21 January 2022 Petrobangla and BAPEX
filed an application for annulment of the Award on the Payment Claim,
invoking grounds relating to (i) corruption in the procurement of the GPSA,
(ii) the Tribunal's treatment of the Alam Decision, (iii) the Exclusivity Decision
and (iv) the nature of the relief granted by that decision and (v) the decision
concerning designation of Petrobangla and BAPEX as agencies of the State of
Bangladesh, according to Article 25(1) of the Convention. By a publicly
available Decision on Annulment of 12 October 2023,³ the Committee
dismissed the application on all grounds unanimously, except with respect to
the decision concerning designation where the dismissal was by majority.

26 In the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration Niko presented its case
on liability for the two blowouts, accompanied by documentary evidence,
witness testimony and expert reports. During a first phase of the Arbitration
on the Compensation Declaration, BAPEX took the position that it had never
invoked Niko's liability for the two blowouts and that there was no dispute
between BAPEX and Niko. As a result of this position taken by BAPEX, the
Claimant's argument and evidence in support of its request for a
Compensation Declaration had not been contested by the Respondents in any
substantive manner. At the same time BAPEX continued to request the


³ Decision on Annulment, 12 October 2023, available at
https://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/11003.

[Page 36]

Tribunals, based on other grounds, to dismiss the Claimant's request for a
declaration of non-liability.

27 Given the technical nature and the complexity of many of the issues arising
in the context of the Compensation Declaration, the Tribunals did not wish to
proceed in the absence of a critical review of the technical issues arising from
the Claimant's case. In the circumstances, the Tribunals decided by
Procedural Order No 7 of 17 October 2014, to appoint experts for (i) the well
design and drilling of the Chattak 2 well and the design and execution of the
relief well operation for Chattak 2A; (ii) the quantum of gas lost as a result of
the Chattak2 and Chattak 2A blowout control incidents; and (iii) the air
quality and greenhouse gas emissions due to these incidents and resulting
monetary loss or damage.

28 The Tribunals consulted the Parties on the choice of the experts, their
mandate and the procedure to be followed; they appointed experts in each of
the three fields and finalised with them their terms of reference. Their reports
were provided to the Parties on 10 June 2015.

29 After several changes of their counsel representing them in these proceedings,
the Respondents changed counsel again and appointed on 9 July 2015 the
counsel who continued to represent them during the remainder of the
proceedings. The new counsel stated that prior counsel had made grave errors
in judgment and had failed to understand the nature of these proceedings.
Adding that circumstances had changed and the hitherto uncooperative party
was about to cooperate, they requested the Tribunals to “restore” party
“equality of arms” and BAPEX's right to be heard.

30 The Parties commented on the reports of the Tribunals' experts and submitted
reply comments. With its comments, BAPEX also submitted for the first time
in the Arbitration observations from three experts in relation to matters
related to the Compensation Declaration. It withdrew the observations of one
of these experts and submitted redacted versions of the other observations.
The Tribunals held that the previously submitted observations remained on
the record. BAPEX also informed the Tribunals that it had filed a Notice of
Dispute with Niko.

31 The procedure was adjusted to provide additional time for the new counsel to
comment on the reports of the Tribunal-appointed experts. The Respondents
requested provisional measures concerning the expert opinions and withdrew
the requests after an exchange of correspondence. Two Ministers of the
Government intervened and requested a procedural consultation in their
presence in London. The Claimant accepted that the Ministers be present at
the meeting as observers; but as they had not been designated as agents,
counsel or advocates, it objected that the Ministers should not address the

[Page 37]

Tribunals given that the Government was no longer a party in the Arbitration.
As no convenient date could be found, the meeting did not take place.

32 After several consultations and meetings, the procedure was adjusted to meet
the requests of the Respondents' new counsel and the scope of a hearing on
the merits was defined. The Tribunals noted that BAPEX's recent submissions
had referred to a broad scope of obligations and laws that had to be considered
when determining whether Niko “breached no obligation or law as concerns
the two blowouts”. The Tribunals accepted at the request of the Claimant to
extend the proceedings to the full scope of possible breaches causing liability.
The Respondents stated that they were ready to argue the liability issue but
required additional time for quantum. The procedure therefore was divided in
a phase on liability and another phase on damages.

33 Considering the Parties' argument concerning the scope of the hearing on
liability that had been fixed for November 2015, the Tribunals defined the
issues for that hearing. That hearing was held in London in November 2015
at which primarily witnesses and experts were heard. It was agreed that the
legal issues that had been envisaged for that hearing and, in particular, the
issue of breaches of obligations, applicable laws and standards possibly
relevant as bases for liability would be addressed by the parties in written
submissions and that their oral closing argument on the liability phase would
be heard subsequently in the course of a 2-day hearing.

34 Following the November 2015 Hearing, the Respondents filed a request for the
production of documents relating to the drilling of the wells and the
environmental monitoring. The Tribunals heard the Parties about the scope
and basis of this request. They then were informed about a site visit hosted
by Niko on 5 and 6 February 2016 in the absence of the Tribunals. The
Claimant provided access to the documents at the site. The Tribunals
discussed with the Parties the request and recorded the agreement reached,
identifying the documents which the Claimant accepted to produce.

35 Following the filing of the post-hearing briefs, the hearing for oral closing
argument on liability was held on 22 – 23 In February 20016 in Paris for full
legal argument on liability. At that hearing the remaining issues concerning
the document production request were addressed and the steps for their
resolution adopted. The February 2016 Hearing completed the proceedings
on liability; no further submissions were foreseen.

36 Further to the agreed timetable, BAPEX produced its Memorial on Damages
on 25 March 2016 and included in it a new version of the corruption claim,
asserting that the JVA was procured by corruption. In a separate submission
of the same date, Petrobangla filed a similar claim with respect to the GPSA.

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37 The Corruption Claim centred initially on a Toyota Land Cruiser⁴ that Niko had
purchased for the Joint Venture, recorded in the name of BAPEX and delivered
to the Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources on 23 May 2005; the delivery
became public, the Minister resigned on 18 June 2005, and the car was returned
to BAPEX on 20 June 2005. In the Arbitration, the Claimant produced an Agreed
Statement of Facts, recording Niko's punishment by a fine of CAD 9.499 million
for having sought the Minister's influence in the procurement of the GPSA. The
statement concluded that Niko had never been convicted of a similar offence and
that it was not proven that “any influence was obtained as a result of providing
the benefits". In fact, the GPSA was concluded only in December 2006, one and
a half years after the Minister had resigned. The High Court Division in the BELA
proceedings concluded “that the JVA was not obtained by flawed process by
resorting to fraudulent means” and that there was no evidence that the GPSA
had been procured by corruption.

38 As noted above, the issue of corruption was first raised in the proceedings on
Jurisdiction. The Respondents relied on several incidents of alleged corruption.
The Claimant disclosed the Canadian investigation concerning the incident with
the Land Cruiser and investigations by the United States Department of Justice
which were discontinued “in light of Niko's guilty plea in Canada”. The
Respondents also relied on investigations by the Bangladesh Anticorruption
Commission (ACC). The Tribunals noted that the Government, which at the time
was still party to the Arbitration proceedings, was best placed to provide evidence
of the ACC investigations. They noted that, judging from the evidence before
them, the investigations had not led to any trial, let alone conviction for acts of
corruption that may be attributed to the Claimant and its group; and they
referred to the conclusions of the High Court in the BELA proceedings. The
Tribunals concluded that, apart from the acts subject of the Canadian conviction,
no other acts of corruption were committed by the Claimant or its group. The
Tribunals had no reason to believe that corruption had any influence in the
conclusion or the content of the JVA or the GPSA.

39 Corruption was again raised as a defence in the proceedings on the Payment
Claim: Petrobangla asserted that the GPSA was procured by corruption and was
therefore void. The Claimant objected to the assertion, relying on the Tribunals'
finding in the Decision on Jurisdiction. No new argument or evidence had been
produced since then. Petrobangla did not pursue the matter further and omitted
the corruption claim in the final version of the relief sought on the Payment
Claim.


⁴ Claimant's Exhibit C-15. A second charge concerned the “non-business related portion of the travel
and expense" in Canada, quantified at CDN 5'000.

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40 As noted above, in March 2016, a new version of the Corruption Claim was
introduced by the Respondents; this new version had a much broader scope. The
requests for relief were modified to some extent over time, with the Respondents
requesting first a declaration that the JVA and GPSA were voidable and had been
voided; later the requested relief included a declaration that the two Agreements
were void ab initio; subsequent requests included findings that “Niko used
corruption in the establishment and maintenance of the investment”; they also
included requested findings that Niko was not entitled to any payment or credit
for past performance.

41 The Tribunals heard the Parties about the admissibility of the new version of the
Corruption Claim and the procedure to be followed. In Procedural Order No 13, they
suspended all proceedings on all other claims.

42 The Corruption Claim, as it was presented at this stage of the proceedings,
was characterised by several features which distinguished it from other cases,
which also involved allegations of corruption. In particular, the corruption on
which the Respondents based their case in the new version did not consist of
a single act or group of acts by which an investor bribes a civil servant in
order to gain some advantage. In the new version of the claim, the
Respondents argued that, during the period when the two Agreements were
negotiated and concluded, the country was under the rule of a government
which had established an endemic system of corruption which required bribes
from anyone wishing to do business in the country. These payments,
according to the Respondents, were not made directly by Niko to the targeted
civil servants, but through a multitude of payments made to different players
in different countries and passing through different accounts of different
individuals and destined for a number of final beneficiaries. This explains why
the inquiry, which the Tribunals had to conduct in addressing the
Respondents' case, was exceptionally complex and time-consuming.

43 As the Respondents explained during the proceedings on their Corruption
Claim, a vast investigation had been carried out in cooperation between the
Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission (the “ACC"), the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (the “RCMP”) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations
(the "FBI"). The investigation by these organisations also concerned other
companies and generated a vast amount of material, on which the
Respondents relied and which they disclosed gradually. Many of the payments
identified in the course of the investigation were represented graphically on a
synthetic table which found itself at the centre of argument and
demonstrations at the Hearing and often referred to as “Spider Web”

44 The Tribunals organised their examination in a broad manner, responding to
the broad scope of the alleged corruption. They fixed the period from 2001 to

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the first quarter of 2004 as the “Targeted Period”; ordered or authorised the
production of documents, including complete records of all payments by the
Niko group to Bangladesh and a statement of the Niko auditor; heard
witnesses from Niko, including Mr Amit Goyal, the Financial Controller of the
Niko parent company, witnesses from Bangladesh, including Mr Ferdous
Ahmed Khan, Special Assistant to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on
corruption matters, providing strategic services to the ACC, and Ms Debra
LaPrevotte Griffith, Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist, assigned as
F.B.I. Agent to the majority of the international money laundering and asset
recovery cases of the F.B.I.; when, after a change of government, the caretaker
government of Bangladesh requested assistance from the United States to
investigate corruption in Bangladesh, the investigative aspects of the request
were assigned to her at the F.B.I.

45 In the course of the procedure, the Tribunals addressed issues concerning
requests to the courts in Canada, including the question whether an ICSID
Tribunal had powers to make such requests to a national court; evidence by
persons with no personal knowledge of the facts they addressed, the relevance
of criminal investigations relating to the alleged corrupt regime in Bangladesh,
issues concerning confidential information and derivative materials
incorporating confidential information and a confidentiality regime in the
Arbitration and at the hearing, legal privilege under Canadian law and issues
of the Exclusivity of the Tribunals' decisions, as had arisen in the context of
the Payment Claim.

46 The Tribunals considered the legal grounds for the avoidance of the two
Agreements, including grounds under Article 102 of the Bangladesh
Constitution, the relevance of a judgment by the High Court Division in the
Alam case, and the grounds under the Bangladesh Contract Act.

47 The Tribunals also considered the various sources of evidence, noting that the
Respondents had insisted through repeated procedural initiatives that would
have involved the Tribunals in a prosecutorial search for evidence which must
have been available in Bangladesh. The Tribunals were however disinclined
to draw inferences from these inconclusive and disruptive initiatives and
decided the Corruption on the basis of the evidence that was brought before
them. On this basis, the Tribunals examined the different Governmental acts
allegedly procured by corruption, examining the facets of the alleged
corruption and specific suspect payments. The Tribunals reached the
conclusion that the allegations and the related evidence to a large extent were
extrapolations from other cases of corruption in Bangladesh and from the
investigations related to these other investigations.

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48 In conclusion of their examination, the Tribunals noted that, apart from the Canadian conviction that had been considered already in the Decision on Jurisdiction, no other acts of corruption had been found in Canada, in the United States or in Bangladesh; the Respondents themselves did not claim invalidity of the Agreements when corruption first was considered in the Arbitration and relied on it as grounds for avoidance only after the Tribunals had decided that Petrobangla had to pay for the gas delivered by Niko. The Tribunals also noted that Niko's project, recovering gas from marginal/abandoned fields, had been assessed by the Respondents and the Government as advantageous to Bangladesh and was implemented at Niko's sole expense and risk; no administrative irregularity had been identified, and the evidence did not establish that the Agreements or Government acts in their preparation were procured by corruption. In their 572-page Decision on the Corruption Claim of 25 February 2019, the Tribunals therefore denied the declarations requested by the Respondents, rejected the objections to the Tribunals' jurisdiction, found that the JVA and the GPSA were not procured by corruption and remained valid and binding; and they found that there was no basis for revising the Tribunals' decisions on the Payment Claim. The decisions on the liability for the blowouts and the resulting damages were reserved.

49 When the Corruption Claim had been decided the Tribunals resumed the proceedings on Niko's liability for the blowouts. Further to the Tribunals' invitation, the Parties identified the standards relevant for this liability. The Tribunals considered specifically the standard of conduct set out in the JVA, in Petroleum Industry Standards and in the Laws of Bangladesh as well as the role of the experts in the identification and understanding of the Petroleum Industry Standards.

50 The Tribunals concluded that no directly applicable contractual or other legal obligation had been identified which required, at the time of the blowouts, a specific act or omission, the breach of which by Niko was causal for the blowouts. The experts insisted on the need to consider the specific nature of drilling operations and the control of the well, emphasising the diversity of situations, the choice by the operator of the most suitable way of proceeding, while ensuring both safety and efficiency. This standard was defined in the JVA and referred to as the “prudent operator standard”. No standard under the law of Bangladesh relevant to Niko's liability for the two blowouts had been identified that was more stringent for the conduct of Niko as the Operator than those of the JVA.

51 These conclusions required a detailed examination of the specific circumstances in which the wells were drilled and the manner in which the design of the well and the drilling operation took these circumstances into

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account. The Parties and their experts provided extensive evidence about the geology of the Chattak field and appropriate well design, in particular the hazards of "shallow gas”, casing depth, the diverter system and blowout preventers; reference to the Chattak 1 well drilled in 1959 and the blowout that had occurred not far from the Chattak field in 1997 in the Moulavi Bazar field operated by Occidental Petroleum Corporation; the drilling operation and limited evidence about the events of the blowouts. Much time was also consecrated to examining the possible causes of the first blowout and the conduct of the drilling crew, in particular the performance of the wiper trip and the reaction when a kick occurred, which developed into the blowout.

52 Considering the evidence and the contradictory explanations of the experts, the Tribunals identified a list of possible failures that may have caused the blowout. They submitted this list as part of the note accompanying PO No 12, prior to the November 2015 hearing. These possible failures were discussed at length at the hearing and in the post-hearing submissions.

53 The Tribunals eventually identified two principal categories of issues: (i) the design of the drilling operations, specifically with respect to casing depth and kick tolerance and (ii) the qualifications and performance of the drilling crew. In the Decision on Liability of 20 February 2020, the Tribunals concluded that the Claimant had not established that the Chattak 2 design had a "reasonable kick tolerance”; this meant that the design relied on a high standard of the capability of the drilling crew; any error of that crew causing the kick tolerance to be exceeded would be fatal. Irrespective of the qualifications of the crew, a design that relied on the crew's capability to master the necessary well control operations, in the circumstances of the Chattak 2 well and despite the availability of safe alternatives, was excessively risky, failed to take adequate account of safety concerns, and thus was not in compliance with the prudent operator standard. The Tribunals also concluded that the drilling crew was not properly prepared for dealing with the risks that Niko had created by its well design. The resulting failure of the drilling crew to control the well caused the first blowout. Niko's failure to ensure the safety of the drilling operation could not be reconciled with the prudent operator standard. The Tribunals concluded that, with respect to the Chattak 2 blowout, Niko breached its obligations under the JVA.

54 With respect to the second blowout, that of Chattak 2A, similar issues were raised and considered. The design and drilling operations of this well were conducted by a specialist engaged by Niko. The Tribunals concluded that the experts' observations about the relief well strategy and its implementation did not justify a conclusion that the relief operation was conducted in breach of the prudent operator standard and the Petroleum Industry Standard. In any event, drilling relief wells was not an operation in Niko's scope of work and

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responsibilities under the JVA. The obligation was to select and engage the relief well specialist and Niko performed this obligation in line with the standard of a prudent operator.

55 The Claimant also argued that its liability was shared with BAPEX under the JVA and in any event was limited. The Tribunals found that in the circumstances there was no basis for making BAPEX share the liability for the breach of Niko's obligations as Operator in relation to the first blowout.

56 Extensive argument was presented by the Parties with respect to the limitation of liability under Section 73 of the Bangladesh Contract Act and Article 27.2 of the JVA. The Tribunals considered these provisions in light of their interpretation by authorities from Bangladesh and other common law jurisdictions. They concluded that the breach of Niko's obligations as Operator under the JVA was the immediate cause of the first blowout. This blowout was driven by gas escaping from the Reservoir. The gas that escaped during the first blowout was lost. They found that the loss of this gas and the corresponding loss of production were direct losses caused by Nokia's breaches for which the Tribunals found the Claimant liable. The exclusions of Article 27.2 of the JVA and those of Section 73 of the Contract Act do not apply to these losses. The Tribunals reserved other losses to be determined, expecting the Parties to address the issue of exclusion in their submissions in the damages phase.

57 When the Tribunals considered with the Parties the continuation of the proceedings on damages, it appeared given the Covid 19 pandemic that a full evidentiary hearing on damages could not be held before mid-2021. It was therefore decided to hear and decide, in advance of the evidentiary hearing and to the extent this would be possible prior to that hearing, legal issues concerning the heads of loss for which Niko is liable under the law of Bangladesh and the JVA. The Parties filed further written submissions and were heard at a hearing on 19 and 20 November 2020. The Tribunals rendered their Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss (the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision) on 18 May 2021. The Tribunals clarified that it was the objective of the decision, by identifying claimed losses that were recoverable in principle, to avoid costly and time-consuming expert and factual investigations and submissions on quantum with respect to claims which would fail on legal grounds.

58 The Parties discussed further the legal principles applicable to the scope of liability and its limitation, in particular the relationship between the objective of putting the injured party as much as possible in the situation in which it would have been but for the breach, to which the Parties referred as restitutio in integrum, and the provisions on the limitation of liability. The Tribunals

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concluded from the authorities presented by the Parties that the loss that must be compensated should not be remote or indirect, by reference to Section 73 of the Contract Act and Article 27.2 of the JVA; restitutio in integrum applied to the compensable loss so defined and did not impact on the definition of the recoverable loss. The Tribunals also concluded that, in order to be compensable, the loss must have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of the JVA. They saw no clear distinction between “remote and indirect” in Section 73 and “consequential” in Article 27.2. They concluded that the compensable damage is that “which naturally arose in the usual course of things” from the breach and in the absence of intervening events.

59 The Tribunals applied these principles to the three principal heads of loss: the first head of loss concerned the gas that escaped due to the blowout of the Chattak 2 well (the Blowout Gas). Different periods had to be considered: there was no dispute between the Parties that, for the gas that escaped during the first period (from 7 January to 24 June 2005), Niko was liable; with respect to liability for gas lost during the second period (from the second blowout on 24 June to the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well on 9 October 2005) the Parties disagreed on the precise causes of this second blowout, a matter that required that any relevant evidence and the experts be heard in the next phase of the Arbitration; concerning the loss during the third phase (following the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation) the Tribunals determined that two distinct issues had to be considered: the question whether the relief operation was indeed successful and sealed the Chattak 2 wellbore and, if the sealing was not complete, the responsibility for the continuing seepages, which both had to be determined in the next phase of the Arbitration.

60 The second head of loss concerned loss of production due to damage to the Overburden and drilling hazards caused by the Chattak 2 blowout. The loss claimed under this head was not the gas that had escaped but instead the gas that had remained in the Reservoir but could no longer be produced. BAPEX explained that the gas that had escaped and was trapped in the Overburden created serious hazards for drilling and production activities; drilling a production well therefore was no longer possible. The Tribunals noted that the Parties disagreed about the factual allegation that the gas in the Reservoir could no longer be produced. Assuming that the BAPEX's allegations in the Arbitration were factually correct, the Tribunals noted, however, that, after the blowouts had occurred, Niko proposed the drilling of production wells, BAPEX and the Government did not object that the drilling of such wells had become too hazardous or that the gas in the Reservoir had been lost; the development of the Reservoir, in the view of the Parties, remained technically feasible and was not precluded. In the opinion of the Tribunals this excluded that the Parties, when they concluded the JVA, knew

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or even contemplated these hazards and a resulting loss of the gas from the Reservoir as a likely result of a breach of Niko's obligations as the Operator. Even if that alleged loss were proven, it would be remote and therefore excluded.

61 The third head of loss concerned environmental losses. The Tribunals examined the reports about the blowouts and the losses to the population of Tengratila, the village in the immediate neighbourhood of the blowouts, and the claimed losses. The Tribunals noted the incomplete presentation of the environmental claims in the Arbitration and adopted a cautious approach in their determination of the recoverability of these claims in principle. They pointed out some of issues that the Respondents had to address when presenting the supporting evidence and argument. In the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, the Tribunals considered specifically two causes of loss to which the Respondents had attributed particular attention:

(i) BAPEX's experts had observed arsenic in the groundwater and drinking water which was “a known hazard in the region”; they asserted that the blowout caused an increase in the arsenic content. The Tribunals noted that arsenic was not a component of the gas emissions from the blowout; if it occurred in connection with the blowout, it would have had its origin in the minerals of the soil ejected during the first hours of the blowouts. Arsenic in the soil does not occur naturally in soluble form; arsenic containing minerals must react under specific conditions to form water soluble compounds.

(ii) The Parties' experts described different processes by which such reactions might occur. These processes were complex and rested on different assumption. Neither the Respondents nor the experts were certain about the mechanism by which the material ejected during the blowout could have caused the contamination of the water. The Tribunals were unable to consider any of the different processes described by the experts as a natural result of the Niko's fault as Operator that caused the blowout. If it would be established that, as a consequence of the first blowout, the arsenic content in the drinking water increased, this would be a remote loss unforeseen at the time of the JVA and excluded by Section 73 of the Contract Act and by Article 27.2 of the JVA. The Tribunals excluded Niko's liability for any arsenic contamination.

(iii) Mr Wilson, one of BAPEX's experts, had proposed projects of abatement and mitigation of risks resulting from continuing seepages of gas. One risk factor resulted from the use of gas as

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an “informal cooking gas supply system” causing “a significant risk of explosions to the residents in the building”. Irrespective of the disputed liability for continuing gas seepages, the Tribunal found that the risk from this use of the gas seepages was attributable to the decision of the villagers to use the gas in their homes and was therefore indirect. Niko was not liable for it. Other aspects of the proposed project were reserved in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision and are decided in the present Award.

62 Concerning Niko's liability in relation to losses of the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla, the Tribunals held in the Decision on Jurisdiction that they had jurisdiction to determine whether Niko has any liability for the two blowouts under the JVA and to make the requested declaration if they deemed it to be well founded. Based on the assignment recorded in the JVA, the Tribunals concluded that their jurisdiction concerning Niko's liability extended to the liability towards the Government and Petrobangla. They decided in the Decision on Liability that Niko's liability as Operator for the 2005 blowouts in the Chattak field must be determined exclusively under the JVA between Niko and BAPEX by the Tribunal constituted in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11; that Tribunal's decision on Niko's liability for the two 2005 blowouts in the Chattak field is binding on the Government and Petrobangla as assignors to BAPEX. On the same grounds, the limitation of liability agreed in the JVA also applies to claims by the Government and Petrobangla as assignors.

63 Concerning the loss of the Government due to the lost gas, the Tribunals clarified in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision that the issue was not a question of assignment of claims to BAPEX. Rather the issue had to be considered as a function of the JVA, which regulated the development and production of gas from the Chattak field. This included the manner in which loss and damage caused by this activity was dealt with. Consequently, BAPEX's claim for the Government's losses is a claim under the JVA. It is a claim to damages in contract; it is not necessary to examine whether the claim also meets the requirement of a separate tort claim. The Tribunals also clarified that the quantum of the Government's claim may not exceed the difference between the price that Petrobangla would have paid to the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture and the market price, determined by reference to the price the Government or Petrobangla paid to comparable gas producers in Bangladesh.

64 Concerning the loss and damage of the population and to the environment, the Respondents first had insisted that they were claimed in the Money Suit and were outside the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals. Further to the Tribunals' decision on liability, BAPEX claimed for these losses under the

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JVA. The Claimant objected that the claims made were not for losses actually incurred and in any event were for losses of third parties, without showing subrogation or representation. The Tribunals distinguished this matter as follows:

(i) with respect to loss concerning the State as such, specifically the claim for atmospheric pollution: the Tribunals decided that the Government may claim for this loss, just as it may claim for the lost gas;

(ii) with respect to the claims for remedial action to be conducted in the future, the Tribunals pointed out that they were aware of the Government's limited resources. They noted that they would have to consider in each case what conclusions must be drawn from the fact that the remedial or mitigation action for which the Government claims have not (yet) been taken;

(iii) With respect to claims for individuals having suffered losses, the Tribunals concluded that the Government was entitled to act for them, provided it acted along the lines that were adopted in determining compensation to the local population, further to the assessment of the Local Losses Committee.

65 Concerning BAPEX's warranties in the JVA relating to the assignment by the Government and Petrobangla, the Tribunals found in the Decision on Liability that no decision in the Money Suit had been made; a decision about the breach of these warranties would therefore have been premature. The Tribunals reserved the decision about a possible breach of warranties until further notice. No such notice was provided and in the final version of the relief sought, the Claimant did not repeat the request for a decision on the warranties.

66 With its Counter-Memorial on Damages the Claimant had introduced a request referred to as its Set-off Claim. The Claimant argued that BAPEX's failure in 2005 and thereafter to approve further drilling in the Chattak field was a breach of its obligations under the JVA and had caused loss of at least USD 114 million. It requested set-off against the claims by BAPEX. The Respondents argued that the claim was inadmissible in the procedure and in any event time barred. In the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss the Tribunals found that the claim was admissible in the procedure but time barred. They denied the Set-off Claim.

67 After the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, the Tribunals split the proceedings in the two cases. They completed the proceedings on the Payment Claim and issued the award in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18. The proceedings continued before the Tribunal in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11. This Tribunal

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now completes the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration claim by deciding the remaining issues, in particular the quantum of the losses to be awarded for the lost gas and for the environmental losses. At this point it summarises its decisions and the reasons that are developed in the body of this Award.

68 The quantification of the lost gas was a complex task, as the gas escaping from the Reservoir had not been measured. The experts presented by the Parties employed two methods to quantify this loss, one by estimating the flow from the Reservoir (Flow Rate method), the other by comparing the quantities of gas in the Reservoir before and after the blowout (Material Balance method). The Gas Loss Committees in Bangladesh in 2005 employed the Flow Rate method and pointed out the possibility of applying the Material Balance, if a future well would provide the necessary data. In the Arbitration, the experts of both Parties provided estimates using the Material Balance method; the Claimant's experts relied primarily on the Flow Rate method and presented Material Balance as a “cross check”; BAPEX's experts insisted that, in the circumstances of the present case, Material Balance was the only reliable method. BAPEX nevertheless presented a Flow Rate estimate but did so only after the last evidentiary hearing in its first Post-Hearing Brief.

69 Concerning the Flow Rate estimates, the Gas Loss Committees had distinguished three stages: Q1 the initial flare of unrestricted flow of gas that ignited into a high flame, Q2 gas seepages and flames at the surface after the blowout well bridged and Q3 gas that escaped from the Reservoir into the subsurface above the Regional Shale (the Overburden). The First Gas Loss Committee calculated the Q1 loss by a formula using factors such as the pressure in the Reservoir and the dimensions of the wellbore to calculate the flow rate. Both Parties accepted the estimate of the volume of gas during the initial 40 hours so calculated; the Tribunal saw no reason to differ.

70 The Q2 rate was estimated on the basis of observations of gas escaping at the surface. The Tribunal considered the evidence for this flow and concluded that it was too unreliable to provide the basis for an estimate which it could adopt with any confidence.

71 With respect to the Q3 rate, the First Committee used a formula similar to that for the Q1 rate and calculated a flow rate in two scenarios. For the first scenario its calculation reached a rate which was higher that the Q1 flow through the open borehole. The Committee recognised that this was an impossible result and replaced the calculated rate by the rate it had adopted for the Q1 rate. The Second Committee considered that, in view of the evidence from the Chattak 2A well, drilled subsequently to Chattak 2, this rate seemed "unlikely". The second scenario of the First Committee reached a rate far lower

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than the first scenario. This rate was in the range of that adopted in other estimates. In the absence of substantial criticism of the rate of the Committee's second scenario, the Tribunal accepted it for to estimate the flow of gas after the bridging of the first blowout well.

72 The quantification of the gas loss due to the Chattak 2A blowout required the decision on one of the remaining issues of liability and causation: whether this loss was part of the Chattak 2 blowout or the result of a separate chain of causation for which Niko is not liable. BAPEX's experts assumed that gas had accumulated in the Overburden, caused the second blowout and burnt until the Chattak 2A well bridged; the gas during the Q1 flare of the second blowout, in the opinion of BAPEX and its experts, thus was gas that had escaped from the Reservoir already and was therefore attributable to the first blowout for which Niko is responsible. The Claimant's experts stated that a quantity of gas that burnt in a high flame for some 12 days could not have accumulated near the well; they assumed that the blowout created a connection with the Chattak 2 wellbore, opening a new flow from the Reservoir. Considering the evidence and the experts' explanations, the Tribunal concludes that the gas of the Q1 flare flowed from the Reservoir through a new connection to the Chattak 2 wellbore and this is due to the Chattak 2A blowout; to the extent to which it exceeds the rate of flow from the Chattak 2 blowout, Niko is not liable for it.

73 The completion of the Chattak 2B relief well on 9 October 2005 led to a substantial reduction in the emissions on the surface. Bob Grace, who had conducted the relief well operation, believed that the operation was successful but accepted that “only time will tell for sure”. Seepages of gas at the surface continued for many years with varying strength and frequency. Some of the villagers collected the seeping gas for cooking purposes and one enterprising villager set up a network distributing gas to several households until the local police intervened for safety reasons. The Tribunal concludes that the relief operation did not succeed in sealing completely the opening in the Upper Maring Shale and concludes that Niko is liable for the continuing flow at a reduced rate.

74 Niko had repeatedly requested agreement for it to drill further production wells and had asserted that such wells would reduce and eventually extinguish the seepages after 9 October 2005. BAPEX delayed its authorisation of such wells and eventually made it subject to conditions which Niko considered unacceptable. The Claimant argued that, by its failure to approve further drilling of production wells, BAPEX itself was responsible for the gas losses that could have been avoided by such wells. The Tribunal examined the circumstances of BAPEX's delay and the reasons given by BAPEX for the conditional approval; it concludes that both the delay and the

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conditions were not justified and limits Niko's liability to the quantity of gas that would have escaped until the additional wells would have caused the seepages to cease.

75 The difficulties in the application of the Material Balance method concerned almost exclusively the estimation of the Original Gas in Place (OGIP or GIIP) and the Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR). As there was no direct evidence available, the Parties' estimation depended on indications by inference or relied on evidence from other sources. Widely differing estimates were presented. BAPEX argued that the Parties had agreed in the JVA on an OGIP value which was binding for the loss calculation. The Claimant contested that there was such an agreement. It argued that subsequent information, in particular a 3D seismic study, had provided information that required a different assessment. BAPEX also relied on other estimates, which Niko had produced after the 3D seismic information had become available. The Claimant also contested the relevance of these estimates. The Tribunal examined these estimates and concludes from the context in which they were presented that they were not reliable. It considered for its estimates those quantifications that showed that they were based on verifiable data and used these data in a verifiable manner. When using available data the Parties and their experts differed widely in their interpretation.

76 Prior to the Arbitration, it was assumed that the Reservoir consisted of two separate gas deposits, Sand 1 and Sand 2. In the Arbitration, BAPEX's experts contested this assumption of compartmentalisation and opined that the two Sands were pressure connected and had a single Gas-Water Contact (GWC); the Claimant's experts contested this opinion.

77 The differences between the experts concerned the relevant factors for determining the OGIP, the sources for the relevant data and the interpretation of the data, in particular Reservoir pressure, GWC, reservoir mapping (productive area) and pay height (reservoir thickness) water saturation, resistivity factor and conductivity, and porosity.

78 Concerning the Reservoir pressure, the First Committee and the Claimant's experts relied on the mud weight for the drilling of the Chattak 2 well, assuming that the pressure in the Reservoir could not have been higher than the resistance from the drilling mud. BAPEX's experts agreed that this was an accepted method for determining the pressure of a reservoir. They argued, however, that the mud weight used during the drilling of the Chattak 2 well should not be used because that well blew out. Instead, these experts used the reservoir pressure of Sands 3 – 6 recorded in a Reservoir study of 1978 concerning the Chattak 1 well drilled in 1959. As the Claimant's experts pointed out, the Chattak 2 blowout occurred only after the Chattak 2 well had

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been drilled successfully through both Sands 1 and 2, had reached a level below the Reservoir at a depth of 807m and the drill assembly was pulled out again in a wiper trip. The kick occurred during this wiper trip when the drill assembly had reached 466m. In other words, the drilling mud of Chattak 2 was heavy enough to prevent the gas of the Reservoir from entering the borehole. BAPEX's experts did not respond to this objection. They introduced the argument that the static weight of the mud, as it is measured at the top of the well, was not decisive. They stated that other factors increased the effective mud weight but did not present a calculation based on the Chattak 2 mud weight, adjusted for these other factors. The Tribunal was not persuaded by the reliance on pressure measurement of Sands different from those of the Reservoir and accepted the pressure determined on the basis of the Chattak 2 mud weight. It considered the adjusting factors to which BAPEX's expert referred and determined the mud weight relevant for determining the upper limit of the reservoir pressure.

79 Concerning the water saturation and conductivity, BAPEX's experts had taken the values for the water resistivity in their estimation not from the Reservoir but from a gas deposit below it. The Claimant's experts had taken the data from the Reservoir itself, and the Tribunal sees no justification for choosing the data from a different deposit.

80 Considering the petrophysical analysis of Chattak 1 and the information about the water saturation between the sands of the Reservoir and its conclusions about BAPEX's experts position with respect to reservoir pressure and water saturation, the Tribunal concludes that BAPEX's assumption of a single GWC and pressure connection between the sands of the Reservoir is not supported by a correct choice of relevant data and their interpretation: the Tribunal assumes that Sand 1 and Sand 2 are separated.

81 The Tribunal considered the relevant estimates and noted that the estimates of the Claimant's experts, one of the estimates of BAPEX's experts and an estimate by Fekete Associates, consultants engaged by Niko in 2006, all were based on the assumption of compartmentalisation and a separation of Sands 1 and 2. The Tribunal noted that these estimates were within the same range and adopts one of them for the OGIP value in its Material Balance estimate.

82 While the estimate of OGIP was subject to uncertain factors and subject to controversy and widely differing estimates, the data available from the Chattak 2C well are materially uncontroversial and gave rise to only minor differences.5 This well provided information of the Reservoir pressure at a date


5 BAPEX's experts had misunderstood some information provided by the Claimant and in their first report based their estimate on erroneous assumptions. These were corrected in the second report; Ryder Scott III, paragraph 14. ↩

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after the blowout. BAPEX's experts had calculated their gas loss estimate by establishing the difference in Reservoir pressure before the first blowout and the pressure from the Chattak 2C well on 4 September 2005; they applied the percentage of that difference to their OGIP value to determine the quantity of the lost gas. The Claimant's experts, while pointing out that the loss calculation was more complex, accepted that the loss of reservoir pressure indicated the order of magnitude of the loss of gas. The Tribunal decided to apply this simplified approach for the gas loss estimate according to the Material Balance method.

83 The result reached by the Tribunal's application of the Material Balance method was substantially lower than that produced by the Flow Rate method. The Tribunal decides to use the average of the two methods to determine the gas loss for which Niko is liable.

84 The environmental damage, which includes loss and damage to the population of Tengratila and damage to the atmosphere by Greenhouse Gases (GHG), had been assessed in 2005 by the Local Losses Committee and the three Environmental Losses Committees. Shortly after the first blowout, Niko engaged a team of environmental consultants from Canada and Bangladesh to “implement and oversee a comprehensive environmental monitoring programme”. The team produced a first Environmental Site Inspection Report and, during the following three years, a total of 46 monitoring reports; these reports were followed by monthly and thereafter quarterly reports by Niko itself. The Government also inspected and monitored the environmental effects of the blowout: the DoE created a Sub-Committee for Observation and Monitoring of the Environmental Status after the blowout; that committee prepared an Observation and Monitoring Report and gave directions for the monitoring by the team engaged by Niko.

85 After the critical observations and initial directions by the DoE, which were implemented by the environmental consultants, no complaints or criticism of the team of environmental consultants and their report have been reported in the Arbitration until August 2015. At that time BAPEX filed its Request for Provisional Measures, withdrawn shortly thereafter, and presented the first report of Dr Borthwick, dated 31 August 2015, which severely criticised the monitoring reports, asserting that the monitoring failed to meet applicable standards. This was followed in BAPEX's Memorial on Damages of 25 March 2016 by a request that the Tribunal order Niko to pay some USD 8.5 million for future “expenses of monitoring, surveying and abatement and to hold [the Arbitration] proceeding open until such time as a complete survey and monitoring of the Tengratila area can be conducted and BAPEX can provide the fullest possible accounting of environmental and health related losses”.

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The principal request in this memorial was the Corruption Claim which the Tribunal addressed by priority.

86 When the Corruption Claim had been decided and proceedings on the Compensation Declaration claim resumed, no progress was reported by BAPEX on the monitoring and survey for which it had requested the suspension of the proceedings. In written submissions and at the November 2020 Hearing, BAPEX continued to request advance payment by Niko, as compensation for direct loss caused by the blowout, and renewed its requests for the suspension of the proceedings concerning the environmental claims. The duration of the requested suspension remained uncertain due to the Covid 19 pandemic. The Tribunal addressed the requests for advance payment and suspension in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision of 18 May 2021.

87 Concerning BAPEX's claim seeking that Niko pay for further monitoring and assessment costs before its liability for these costs had been determined, the Tribunals considered that, under certain circumstances, the party liable for another party's losses may have to participate in establishing and assessing the losses which it must repair, including by advancing some or all costs for establishing the losses. The explanations provided by the Respondents, in the opinion of the Tribunals, did however not justify an order for such advance payments.

88 Concerning the suspension request, the Tribunals pointed out that the mandate of the Third Environmental Losses Committee included to “estimate the long term potential losses”, that the assessment of this committee formed the basis of the Money Suit and had not been put into question by the Respondents who had announced in 2016 that the assessment of the Committees had to be “supplemented due to continuing harm occurring over the past decade”. The Tribunals accepted that the Respondents supplement, develop or modify these assessments; they did not accept further delay by an open-ended programme for the completion of the assessment.

89 Following the Case Management Conference of 8 June 2021, the Respondents confirmed that the environmental claims to be decided by the Tribunal in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11 were those in the table showing 11 items forming the "Total amount of environmental losses” in the Third Environmental Losses Report, with any necessary updates. These 11 items were recorded in paragraph 460 of the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision; it was agreed that, in a further round of submissions, the Parties would specify for each of these claims their position concerning the justification, the amount claimed and the relevant evidence on record. This table and the submissions further to

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Procedural Order No 27 form the basis of the Tribunal's decision in this Award.

90 After some claims had been decided on a legal basis in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, the remaining claims were further argued by BAPEX in its Submission on Environmental Claims, dated 20 August 2021, and Niko's Reply on Environmental Claims of 1 October 2021. The Parties agreed that no oral argument was necessary in relation to the environmental claims, and that these could be decided on the basis of the written submissions. They are now decided in this Award.

91 The Tribunal examined the evidence about the work of the local authorities and the report of the Local Losses Committee, registering and assessing the damage suffered by the local population, businesses and institutions, notably schools and the mosque, and the environment. It concludes that these records reflect a conscientious effort through direct contact with the affected households, one by one, to understand and evaluate the losses. The Tribunal noted that this otherwise complete assessment expressly excluded long-term effects.

92 It is uncontested that Niko supported the effort of the Local Losses Committee and fully paid the losses recorded by it. Niko also made an initial payment for distribution by local authorities to 616 families in January 2005, unrelated to specifically identified damage and direct payments to up to 100 families residing near the blowout sites and temporarily evacuated from their homes. Niko also made other payments to the population and performed work relevant to the blowout and the reparation of the damage.

93 Considering the 11 items forming the “Total amount of environmental losses” in the Third Environmental Losses Report that formed the basis for the environmental claims remaining to be decided, the Tribunal notes that they included and indeed focused on long-term effects. Two of these items of loss, those concerning the agricultural sector and fisheries, referred to losses that had been assessed by the Local Losses Committee and thus were part of the losses paid by Niko. BAPEX so recognised and did not pursue these claims in the Arbitration. The Tribunal concludes that the losses in the agricultural sector and fisheries have been fully compensated, and no further claims are before it concerning these losses.

94 The claims that remained to be decided and that are addressed in this Award concern (i) the Losses due to Atmospheric Pollution, (ii) the remaining items in the Commission's list and (iii) the reserved part of Mr Wilson's proposal for removal of gas from the soil.

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95 The first claim, which is the claim for the highest amount, is described as concerning “Air Pollution” or “Atmospheric Pollution”. It concerned in substance the emission of GHG as part of the blowouts. The Committee reports referred to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Bangladesh's obligations under that Convention. BAPEX and its experts also relied on reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Concerning the quantity of GHG for which it claims, BAPEX points out that the blowout released methane of which some ignited and produced CO2. The quantity of methane emissions was converted into to CO2 equivalent. BAPEX applied to the total quantity of CO2 and CO2 equivalent emissions a “shadow price”, understood to be related to a value for carbon credits.

96 The Claimant objected that the alleged environmental damages were consequential and indirect. Moreover, Bangladesh had no obligation to reduce carbon emissions; the emissions from the blowout therefore did not constitute a loss for Bangladesh. BAPEX also pointed out that Bangladesh had no regulatory regime requiring the purchase of GHG offset credits; by the claim, BAPEX in reality sought a windfall, not compensation for an actual loss.

97 The Tribunal considered the evidence about GHG effects, in particular by reference to the IPCC reports, and concluded that CO2 and methane (CH4) by themselves are not harmful to the atmosphere; it is the increase in their emissions beyond a certain level that disturbed the natural carbon cycle and causes global warming. The Tribunal concludes from this evidence that, by 2005, GHG emissions had reached a level that the emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout, together with other emissions worldwide, contributed to further warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere, affecting weather and climate extremes. Additional GHG emissions therefore increase these effects and thus are damaging. Insofar, the GHG emissions by the Chattak 2 blowout are a damage caused by the event for which Niko is liable.

98 While it appears likely that Bangladesh suffers from the effects of global warming, the process of climate change is of such complexity that the Tribunal sees no possibility of tracing the Chattak 2 emissions to any adverse climate effects in Bangladesh.

99 The Tribunal notes that, in the context of climate change litigation, attempts to establish the causal link between GHG emissions and specific damage have been attempted rarely and only in special circumstances, which in the Tribunal's view do not operate in the present case. In any event, BAPEX has not attempted to demonstrate or argue such a causal link between the Chattak 2 blowout and any loss caused by adverse weather effects. Moreover, the link, if it could be established, would be indirect to a high degree. The

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Respondents have failed to show any concrete damage suffered by BAPEX, the Government or Bangladesh in general, caused by the GHG emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout.

100 Nevertheless, the Tribunal had to consider that a damage had occurred caused by Niko and BAPEX claimed reparation for it on behalf of the Government. The Tribunal considers that the Respondents have relied on the commitments of Bangladesh under the UNFCCC system. While it has not assumed specific GHG reduction commitments, Bangladesh is committed, since its adhesion in 1994 to the UNFCCC, to supporting actions for mitigating GHG emissions. Restoring the damage caused by the GHG emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout is therefore an action in line with Bangladesh's international commitments. In the opinion of the Tribunal, this entitles BAPEX, on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh, to include the related costs in the claim against Niko. The Tribunal accepts that restoration of the environmental baseline is an obligation of Niko which BAPEX may claim under the JVA. As the Claimant had requested that the Tribunal “order such other and further relief as the Tribunal may deem appropriate in the circumstances” and the Respondents had made similar requests, the Tribunal decided on restoration as the remedy for the damage caused by the GHG emissions of the Chattak 2 blowout. The Tribunal nevertheless invited the Parties to comment on the specific restoration project it had identified.

101 The Third Environmental Losses Committee also referred to carbon sequestration and, referring to the claimed amount, stated that “plantation work can be taken to offset emitted CO2, using this money to be collected as compensation”. The Tribunal therefore has sought to identify the costs of plantation work sequestrating the quantity of CO2 and equivalent for which Niko is responsible. A 2022 World Bank report identified the costs for such sequestration by Afforestation/Reforestation. The Tribunal referred the Parties to this report and invited comments. Having considered these comments the Tribunal calculated the costs of sequestering the Chattak 2 emissions for which Niko is liable and awards these costs in this Award.

102 Concerning the other remaining claims for environmental losses, the Tribunal concludes that the claimed losses, to the extent that they were proven, were to a large extent compensated, as assessed by the Local Losses Committee or by other action of Niko, in particular by the substantial improvements to the access of the local population to clean drinking water and improvements to the environment. As an exception to this conclusion the Tribunal finds that, in the context of the claim for loss to education and social life, additional compensation must be paid to the students affected by the makeshift schooling in a substitute location and related inconvenience and prejudice.

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103 The Tribunal also considers that the repair and restoration of some of the environmental damage, as observed in the context of some of the environmental loss claims, did not compensate for the disruption and suffering of the affected population for such effects. The Tribunal considers in particular the stress and disruption from the blowouts and the related noise and disruption and serious inconvenience to the local population from the spread of debris ejected by the first blowout until this debris was removed or washed out. For this disruption and suffering, the Tribunal awards compensation in relation to several claims taken collectively. The Tribunal noted the recommendation of the Third Environmental Losses Committee that the amounts awarded “can be distributed among the villagers through District Administration” and supports this recommendation.

104 Given the controversial nature of many of the issues it had to decide, the Tribunal made an effort to set out in detail the circumstances and the reasoning related to the legal and the many factual and technical issues that arose in this dispute. It did so in its prior Decisions and does so in this Award with respect to the remaining issues concerning primarily the quantum of the losses for which Niko is liable. As pointed out above, these issues were complex and subject to a large degree of uncertainty; the views expressed by the Parties and their experts varied widely and took much time to resolve in a manner that adequately and fairly addresses the loss and damage caused by Niko's negligence in the design and drilling of the Chattak 2 well.

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2 THE PROTAGONISTS

2.1 The Claimant

105 The Claimant in this case is Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd. It is a company incorporated under the laws of Barbados. The Claimant and its nationality were discussed in Section 5 of the Decision on Jurisdiction of 19 August 2011.

106 Since August 2013, the Claimant is represented in this Arbitration by:

Mr Gordon Tarnowsky KC, Ms Rachel Howie, and
Mr Anthony Cole
Dentons Canada LLP
850 – 2nd Street SW
15th Floor, Bankers Court
Calgary, Alberta T2P 0R8
Canada

and

Mr Barton Legum
Ms Clara Motin
Honlet Legum Arbitration
28 rue Cambacérès
75008 Paris
France
(Mr Legum was part of the Dentons team until January
2022, and continues to represent the Claimant)

and

Mr Rokanuddin Mahmud and Mr Mustafizur Rahman Khan
Delta Dahlia (level 8)
36, Kamal Ataturk Avenue
Banani, Dhaka 1213
People's Republic of Bangladesh

107 During the initial phase of the proceedings up to the Decision on Jurisdiction, the Claimant was represented by:

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Mr Kenneth J. Warren KC Mr James T. Eamon KC, Mr John R. Cusano
and Ms Erin Runnalls
Gowlings
1400,700 - 2nd Street S.W.
Calgary, Alberta
Canada T2P 4V5

and

Mr Ajmalul Hossain KC
A. Hossain & Associates
3B Outer Circular Road
Maghbazar, Dhaka 1217
People's Republic of Bangladesh

2.2 The Respondent

108 The Respondent in this Arbitration is Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration & Production Company Limited or BAPEX.

109 BAPEX is a wholly owned subsidiary of Petrobangla incorporated under the Bangladesh Companies Act 1994.6 By Notification issued on 8 June 2003 the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources granted to BAPEX “complete administrative and financial freedom by the Government”.7

110 The legal status of this corporation and its relationship with the Government of Bangladesh was discussed in Sections 6 and 7 of the Decision on Jurisdiction.

111 The Respondent is represented in the Arbitration by:

Engr. Md. Fazlul Haque
Managing Director, BAPEX
Level-6, BAPEX Bhabon
4 Kawran Bazar C/A
Dhaka 1215
People's Republic of Bangladesh

and


6 Hearing on Jurisdiction, HT 2011.10.13 (Day 1), page 42. ↩
7 Exhibit 2, Appendix B to R-CMJ.1. ↩

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Mr Derek C. Smith and Mr Sudhanshu Roy
Foley Hoag LLP
1717 K Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States of America

and

Ms Christina Hioureas
Foley Hoag LLP
1301 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
United States of America

and

Mr Moin Ghani
Barrister-at-law
Alliance Laws
Suite 6A (Level 5), Paradise Lake View Nibash
Ba-73/1 Gulshan-Hatirjheel Lake Drive Road
Dhaka 1212, People's Republic of Bangladesh

112 Between June 2015 and September 2024 the Respondent's external counsel was:

Mr Imtiaz U Ahmad Asif
Aequitas Chambers
Suite 5B House 1 Road 27
Banani Block K
Dhaka 1212, People's Republic of Bangladesh

113 Between June and July 2015, the Respondent's external counsel were:

Mr Kay Kian Tan
Watson Farley & Williams (Thailand) Limited
Unit 902, 9th Floor
GPF Witthayu Tower B
93/1 Wireless Road
Patumwan,
10330 Bangkok
Thailand

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114 Between 2011 and June 2015, the Respondent was represented in these proceedings by

Mr Luis Gonzalez Garcia and
Ms Alison Macdonald
Matrix Chambers, Griffin Building, Gray's Inn
London WC1R 5LN
United Kingdom

115 Between 2011 and December 2014, the Respondent was also represented in these proceedings by

Mr Tawfique Nawaz, Senior Advocate and Mr Mohammad Imtiaz Farooq
Juris Counsel
59/C, Road #4
Banani, Dhaka 12 13
People's Republic of Bangladesh

2.3 The Arbitral Tribunal

116 The Arbitral Tribunal, constituted on 20 December 2010, is composed of Professor Jan Paulsson, appointed by the Claimant, Professor Campbell McLachlan KC, appointed by the Respondent, and Mr Michael E. Schneider, President of the Tribunal, appointed per the agreement of the Parties.

Professor Jan Paulsson
Gudabiya Palace
Bani Otbah Avenue
Building 101, Road 351, Block 325
Manama
Kingdom of Bahrain
National of Sweden, France and Bahrain,
appointed by the Claimant

Professor Campbell McLachlan KC
University of Cambridge
Faculty of Law
Trinity Hall
Cambridge, CB2 1TJ
United Kingdom
National of New Zealand,
appointed by the Respondent

Mr Michael E. Schneider
LALIVE

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35 rue de la Mairie P.O. Box 6569
1211 Geneva Switzerland
National of Germany,
appointed as President of the Arbitral Tribunal upon agreement by the
Parties

2.4 The Secretariat

117 The Tribunal was assisted by Ms Frauke Nitschke, ICSID Senior Counsel/Team Leader.

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3 SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT FACTS

118 The history of Niko's relations with the Government of Bangladesh, Petrobangla and BAPEX, of the projects concerning the Niko and the Feni and Chattak gas fields, the blowouts in the Chattak field and the related dispute have been described in several of the Tribunal's decisions. The Tribunal refers to these descriptions. In the present section, the Tribunal limits itself to a summary of the facts. Further details relating to the gas loss and the environmental damage following the blowouts in 2005 are presented below in Sections 7 and 9.

119 The dispute concerning the Compensation Declaration proceedings relates to Niko's work in the Chattak field. The field is sometimes also referred to by the name of the neighbouring village of Tengratila, in the Sylhet area in the far north-east of Bangladesh. Gas was discovered in 1959 by Pakistan Petroleum Ltd., the predecessor of Petrobangla. The first well, the Chattak 1 Well, was drilled in 1960, operated for some 25 years, producing some 26 Bcf of gas. Increased water production forced Petrobangla to shut down the well in 1985. This Chattak 1 well is situated in the Western part of the field. For the location of the Chattak field in Bangladesh, see the map produced from BAPEX Memorial on Damages:8


8 BMD, Figure 11 at page 168. ↩

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[Map of Bangladesh]

Labels on Map:

Map Title: TENGRATILA WITHIN BANGLADESH

120 In 1997, a blowout occurred in the Moulavi Bazar well, sometimes also referred to as Maguchora, an exploration well drilled by Occidental Petroleum also in the Sylhet area. The Parties disagree as to whether information concerning this well and this blowout was available to Niko before it drilled in the Chattak field, as has been discussed in Section 8.2.1 of the Decision on Liability.

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121 Niko and its parent company Niko Resources Ltd (Niko Canada) were in contact with the Government of Bangladesh and the Respondents since 1997. In August 1999 Niko and BAPEX concluded a Framework of Understanding pursuant to which they produced in February 2000 a joint study on three marginal/abandoned fields, including the Chattak field. This study, entitled "Marginal Field Evaluation Chattak, Feni and Kamta”, presented the information that had been gathered on the three fields.9 It was decided that the Chattak and the Feni fields were promising enough to justify further work, in the Chattak field with priority to Chattak West. In June 2001, the Government adopted the Marginal Field Procedure, regulating contracts of the type to be concluded with Niko.10

122 After protracted negotiations in which the Government and Petrobangla were actively involved, BAPEX and Niko concluded the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) on 16 October 2003 relating to the Feni and the Chattak fields.11 Niko was assigned the role of the Operator. The details of these negotiations are described in particular in Section 4.1 of the Decision on the Corruption Claim.

123 Following the conclusion of the JVA, the Joint Venture started its work in the Feni field where it drilled several wells. Production by the Feni 3 Well started on 2 November 2004.12 The BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture produced gas from the Feni field and delivered it to Petrobangla, starting before a contract for these deliveries had been concluded. After protracted negotiations Petrobangla and the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture concluded the Gas Purchase and Sale Contract (GPSA), dated 27 December 2006.

124 Apart from two initial payments, Petrobangla did not pay for the gas delivered. Niko initiated ICSID Arbitration proceedings, registered as ICSID Case No ARB/10/18. The proceedings in this case, conducted in parallel with the present Arbitration by a tribunal of identical composition, were completed by an Award of 24 September 2021.

125 With respect to the Chattak field, Niko conducted a 3D Seismic Study, starting in May 2004. After production in the Feni field had started, Niko moved the drilling rig to the Chattak field. On 31 December 2004, Niko started drilling the Chattak 2 well.


9 Both the Framework of Understanding and the Marginal Field Evaluation are attached to the JVA as Annex A and B and produced in this arbitration as Exhibit C-1. For further details see Decision on the Corruption Claim, Sections 9.1 and 9.2. ↩
10 Attached as Annex C to the JVA; see also Decision on the Corruption Claim, Section 9.4. ↩
11 Exhibit C-2. ↩
12 For details about the production from the Feni field see in particular Decision on the Corruption Claim, pages 146 et seq. ↩

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126 In Chattak West eight gas bearing sands had been identified. The Chattak 1 well produced gas from Sands 3 and 4 and from Sands 5 and 6; Sands 7 and 8 were tested from 1632m – 1657m. The Chattak 2 Well Proposal targeted primarily Sands 1 and 2 that were logged but untested in Chattak 1; but it was designed for a depth of 1750m, exploring also Sands 7 and 8.13

127 Sands 1 and 2 are situated below an impermeable Upper Marine Shale, also referred to as the Regional Shale, at a depth between 570m and 650m. In the present Award these two sands are referred to as the Reservoir.14

128 Drilling of the Chattak 2 well had reached the depth of 807m when the drilling crew performed a wiper trip. During that wiper trip on 7 January 2005, the first blowout occurred at 19:50h. Gas mixed with debris erupted from the Chattak 2 well and blew up to 100m or more in the air. The rig collapsed and fell into the crater that had formed. The gas ignited and burned for several days.

129 Niko's personnel escaped safely, and no casualties occurred. The few cases of physical injury are discussed below in Section 9.5.5.4. Damage was caused to the surrounding habitats and environment. The events are described in further detail below in Section 9.

130 The Parties in the Arbitration agree that on 9 January 2005, the Chattak 2 well "bridged over” or “bridged off”.15 They disagree, however, at which level the well bridged over, an issue that was discussed in particular in the context of the flow rate after the bridging16 and in the context of the Chattak 2A blowout.17 In the Hughes Supplemental Report “bridging over” is described as follows:

formation sand and shale packed off around the drill string and casing and prevented any further flow of gas to the surface.18

131 That report also states that, when the “well bridged over downhole, flow diminished, and the fire was extinguished”.19 The report indicates that the bridging occurred at the level of 466m.20 This is also where the Respondents


13 Chattak 2 Well Proposal, attached to Niko's letter to BAPEX of 14 December 2004, Exhibit C-15. ↩
14 For the geology of Chattak West see in particular below Sections 7.5.3 and 7.5.4. ↩
15 The Respondent at Amendment, paragraph 30; the Claimant, at HT 2020 Day 1, page 129 contests the explanations of Mr Hughes, but does not seem to contest that on 9 January 2005 the Chattak 2 well bridged off. ↩
16 Below, Section 7.6.3.4. ↩
17 Below, Section 7.5.5. ↩
18 Supplemental Expert Report of Jeffrey Hughes, 19 August 2020 (Hughes II), paragraph 15. ↩
19 Hughes II, paragraph 6. ↩
20 Hughes II, Figure 1 at page 10. ↩

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assume the bridging to have occurred; they rely for this assumption on Robert Grace's report of 4 July 2005 which contains the following observation: “it was generally considered that, assuming the bit to be at 466m (1529 ft), the bridge in the blowout well would be at or near the bit".21

132 The Claimant objected, arguing Mr Grace did not know where the bit was and referring to Gaffney Cline's reports which considered different locations of the bridge.22

133 Despite the bridging of the well, gas continued to escape from the Reservoir and to the surface.23 The importance of this seepage and the charging of gas into the Upper Sands is a controversial issue in the Arbitration.

134 Niko engaged Safety Boss Inc., a Canadian well control and safety consultant, whose representatives arrived on site on 9 January 2005. They concluded that surface intervention was not possible and that sub-surface intervention, i.e. a relief well, remained the only option.24

135 Niko then engaged GSM Consulting Petroleum Engineers (GSM) the company of Robert Grace for the relief well design and drilling.25 GSM prepared a Relief Well Program which Niko submitted to BAPEX on 13 February 2005.26 After consultation with Mr Grace, the programme for Relief Well Chattak 2A was approved by the JV Joint Management Committee (JMC) on 27 March 2005.27

136 Drilling the relief well, referred to as Chattak 2A well,28 started on 30 May 2005 some 100m away from the blowout at the Chattak 2 well. The Chattak 2A Well also suffered a blowout on 24 June 2005, ejection material from the well and igniting into a high flame, similar to the events at the first blowout. This high flame continued until 7 July 2005 before this well, too, bridged and gas continued seeping as at the Chattak 2 blowout.

137 Niko and BAPEX then decided that a Data Acquisition Well (referred to as the Chattak 2C well) should be drilled, providing information for a further relief well, referred to as the Chattak 2B well. The drilling programmes for


21 Niko: Robert Grace Report, Events at Niko Resources - Chattak 2a Relief Well, 4 July 2005, Exhibit C-45, page 4; the Respondents rely on this passage at HT (Day 2), page 352. ↩
22 C-PHB 1, paragraph 34 and FN 54. ↩
23 See below Section 7.6.3.4. ↩
24 Safety Boss, Summary Report Covering the Period from 9 to 12 January 2005, 24 January 2005 (Safety Boss Summary Report), Exhibit C-23. ↩
25 Consulting Agreement between Niko and GSM Consulting Petroleum Engineers, 7 January 2005, Exhibit C-18. ↩
26 Niko's Letter to BAPEX, attaching Relief Well Programme, 13 February 2005 (Relief Well Program), Exhibit C-28. ↩
27 Revised Minutes of JMC Meeting held on 22 February 2005, Exhibit C-31. ↩
28 Chattak 2A Relief Well Plan and Drilling Procedure, Exhibit C-86. ↩

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both wells were submitted on 23 July 200529 and were approved by the Joint Venture JMC at its 5th meeting.30

138 The Chattak 2B relief well was eventually completed on 9 October 2005. The Claimant asserts that the relief operations were successful and sealed the opening in the Regional Shale through which the gas escaped from the Reservoir as a result of the first blowout. BAPEX contested this assertion and relied on the continued seepages at the surface in a wide range around the wells. The Claimant attributes the seepages to gas in the Overburden that was migrating slowly to the surface. The issue is discussed below in Section 7.6.6.1.

139 Shortly after the first blowout, Niko engaged a team of environmental specialists, formed of TERA Environmental Consultants, Canada, and Crown Agents Services, an international development company with offices in Dhaka, to inspect and monitor environmental damage. The Department of Environment reviewed the first report of this team and gave directions for further work. During its work it produced 46 monitoring reports, the last of which on 31 December 2008. The Department of Environment also produced an Observation and Monitoring Report on 19 February 2005. The reports are discussed below in Section 9.2.2.2.

140 Starting on 3 May 2005, Niko proposed to resume drilling development wells in the Chattak field to produce gas from the Reservoir and lower Sands, specifically Chattak 3 and Chattak 4, in addition to re-entering Chattak 2C. When the dispute arose about the success of the Chattak 2B relief operation, Niko also explained that producing gas from the Reservoir would save gas and would also reduce seepages if it were correct that the relief operation had not been successful. BAPEX had approved the drilling of the Chattak 3 well, subject to the successful completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation and the prior adoption of the budget. After the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation, BAPEX did not approve the drilling of Chattak 3.

141 Eventually BAPEX announced at the 6th JMC on 7 March 2006 that the Government had approved the work programme, but made it subject to a number of conditions which Niko did not accept.31 Despite continuing seepages and repeated observations that producing from the Reservoir would resolve the problem, no further wells were drilled. The issue of additional wells is discussed below in Sections 7.5.6.


29 Niko's Letter to BAPEX, attaching Drilling Programmes, 23 July 2005, Exhibit R-59. ↩
30 BAPEX's letter of 22 November 2005, Exhibit C-4, paragraph IV. ↩
31 Exhibit C-66 and below Section 7.5.6.4. ↩

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142 The Government set up several committees to examine the issues relating to the blowouts. In some of them Niko was represented, in others it was not.

143 Concerning the causes of the blowout and the responsibility for it, the Government established two Enquiry Reports which presented their reports on 7 February and 13 August 2005. Both reports concluded that Niko was responsible for the blowouts.

144 Two Committees examined the gas losses caused by the blowouts. The First Gas Loss Committee produced its report on 4 June 2005. It estimated the gas loss caused by the first blowout, dividing the loss in three components. The first component (Q1) concerned the initial flare of gas and fire, which was estimated at a flow of 271.70 MMcfd and a total of 0.453 Bcf. The second component (Q2) estimated the seepage of gas at the surface at 2 MMcf per day. For the third component (Q3) concerning gas charging into the Overburden (subsurface loss), the Committee calculated, in a first scenario, a loss of 558 MMcfd. It found that this rate was not possible and adopted the rate of 271.70 MMcfd, producing a total of 50.808 Bcf for the period until 15 July 2005; the Committee adopted a second Scenario calculating a rate of 31.47 MMcfd and a total of 5.885 Bcf. Niko's representative on the Committee disagreed with the first Scenario, did not sign the report and wrote to express his objection.

145 The Second Gas Loss Committee presented its report on 27 August 2005. It noted that the Chattak 2A well did not reach the Regional Shale and had not drilled a new hole in it so that the estimation “will remain unchanged”. It considered, however, that the first scenario seemed unlikely. It estimated that the flow at the initial flare was on average at 148.2 MMcfd and the surface loss after the bridging was at 4 MMcfd. Niko signed the report of the Second Gas Loss Committee.

146 The losses to the local population and the environment were examined and quantified by a committee formed by the local authorities. The committee produced a detailed report, dated 8 June 2005 (the Local Losses Report), recording damage and loss of each affected family and each business and quantifying its monetary value of these losses.32

147 The Local Losses Report expressly noted that long term losses were not considered in the investigation on which the loss assessment was based. These long-term effects were estimated by three Environmental Losses Committees and their reports. After a First Environmental Losses Report,


32 See below Section 9.2.1.4. ↩

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dated 17 January 2005,33 the Second and Third Environmental Losses Reports, dated 13 April and 15 September 2005,34 provided more detailed assessments and estimated the losses they had considered. The Second Committee estimated the loss at BDT 354'450'078.60 and the Third Committee at BDT 845'583'973.35

148 Niko paid all the losses assessed by the Local Losses Committee and provided other restoration work and some direct payments to the local population. It contests the estimates by the Environmental Loss Committees and has made no payment with respect to the losses assessed by them.

149 Following the 6th JMC, Niko made several attempts to obtain approval for developing the Chattak field. It produced an assessment of the gas losses caused by the blowouts, prepared by the Canadian consultant Fekete Associates Inc. (the Fekete Report),36 dated 8 December 2006. It relied on this report in an assessment of the commercial viability of the remaining reserves in Chattak West (the Commerciality Report)37 which it submitted to BAPEX on 1 July 2007.

150 The Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla, following a legal notice of 27 May 2008, initiated on 15 June 2008 legal action in the Court of District Judge, Dhaka against Niko and others. The proceedings, referred to as the Money Suit, and other court proceedings in Bangladesh related to Niko, have been discussed in previous Decisions of the Tribunal, in particular in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 of the Decision on the Corruption Claim, in the Decision pertaining to the Exclusivity of the Tribunal's Jurisdiction and in the Decision on Liability. In the Money Suit, the Government and Petrobangla claim compensation for “losses sustained due to burning of gas and destruction of mineral resources and natural resources which are mainly losses of movable property".38 These losses relate to the two blowouts in the Chattak field and


33 Report of the Committee for Estimation of Environmental and Forestry Losses Caused by the Fire Created in Tengratila Gas Field, 17 January 2005 (First Environmental Losses Report), Exhibit Annex R-1; also produced as annex to the Second Environmental Losses Report (Exhibit Annex R-2(bis)) in a different translation. ↩
34 Report of the Committee Formed to Estimate the Amount of Environmental Losses due to Blow-out Explosion in Tengratila Gas Field, 13 April 2005 (Second Environmental Losses Report), Exhibit Annex R-2 and Report of the Committee Formed to Estimate the Amount of Environmental Losses due to 2nd Blowout in Chattak Gas Field, 15 September 2005 (Third Environmental Losses Report), Exhibit Annex R-5. ↩
35 See below Sections 9.2.1.1. to 9.2.1.3. ↩
36 Fekete Report, Exhibit C-70. ↩
37 Letter from Niko to BAPEX, attaching Chattak West Commerciality Report, 1 July 2007, Exhibit C-72. ↩
38 Complaint, People's Republic of Bangladesh v. NIKO Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd., Money Suit No. 224/2008 (2d Court of Joint District Judge) (Bangl.) (Money Suit Complaint), Exhibit C-6, paragraph 65. ↩

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are for a total of Taka 746.50 crore, corresponding according to Niko to approximately USD 106 million.39 The claimed amounts are presented in the following schedules:

Schedule A, Gas burnt at Chattak field: Taka 36.85 crore (USD 5'250'040)

Schedule B, Subsurface loss at Chattak field: Taka 72.35 crore (USD 10'307'740)

Schedule C, Additional subsurface loss at Chattak field: Taka 552.75 crore (USD 78'750'530)

Schedule D, Environmental Losses at Chattak Gas Field: Taka 8455,83,973 (USD 12’047٬070).40

151 The Claimant's request for the Compensation Declaration relates to these claims. In paragraph 217 of the Decision on Liability the Tribunal noted that the latest information it had received about the proceedings in the Money Suit was that it is “now pending”. No further information about the Money Suit has been received by the Tribunal since then.


39 Based on OANDA for 27 May 2008, see C-CD.2, paragraph 192. ↩
40 Money Suit Complaint, Exhibit C-6, pages 76 and 77; the US Dollars equivalents were calculated by the Claimant using the exchange rate in the Money Suit of Tk 70.19 per USD (C-CD.2, paragraph 195 and FN 255). ↩

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4 THE PROCEDURE

152 In the course of the proceedings in this Arbitration, the Tribunals in the two connected cases have rendered decisions on issues concerning both cases together and others specific to one or the other case. Five of these decisions concern the claim for the Compensation Declaration; the operative part of these decisions is reproduced below in Section 5. Each of these decisions contains a detailed description of the phase of the procedure that led to it. The present Section summarises these earlier phases and then describes in more detail the phase following the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss leading to the present Award.

4.1 The initial phase of the Arbitration leading to the Decision on Jurisdiction

153 The present proceedings were started by two successive Requests for Arbitration against the two Respondents and the Government, filed with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID or the Centre), one on 1 April 2010 (the First Request or RfA I) and registered as ARB/10/11; the other on 16 June 2010 (the Second Request or RfA II) and registered as ARB/10/18. In these requests Niko sought an award for payment of outstanding invoices for gas delivered (the Payment Claim) and a declaration that it was not liable for damages and owed no compensation in relation to the blowouts and alternatively fixing the amount of any compensation (the Compensation Declaration).

154 Because of some common features of the cases in these two requests, the Parties agreed to appoint identically composed tribunals in the two Arbitrations. The Tribunals in both Arbitrations were constituted on 20 December 2010 in accordance with Article 37(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.

155 The proceedings were conducted together, as agreed during the Joint First Session on 14 February 2011 in Geneva. At this session the Parties also agreed that the applicable arbitration rules would be the ICSID Arbitration Rules in force as of 10 April 2006, that the place of proceedings would be London, United Kingdom, and that the language of the Arbitration would be English. The Parties confirmed that the Tribunal was properly constituted in the two cases and that they had no objection to the appointment of any Member of the Tribunals.

156 Concerning the conduct of the procedure, the Parties agreed:

... that the two cases proceed in a concurrent manner as reflected in these minutes and in the procedural order concerning the procedural calendar. The Tribunals may therefore issue a single instrument (procedural order,

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decision or award) in relation to both cases, and may discuss the two cases jointly except where circumstances distinct to one case necessitate separate treatment.41

157 During the course of the joint conduct of the proceedings in these two Arbitrations, the Parties and the Tribunals often used the term “arbitration" and “tribunal” in the singular, as this is done also in the present decision in the context of Niko's liability to BAPEX. This may not be taken as an indication that during the joint conduct of the two proceedings the Tribunals disregarded the distinction between the two cases. In principle, given that the two cases were conducted concurrently, the Tribunal will apply the term “Tribunals” and “Respondents” (in the plural) up to the time when the award in the Payment Claim proceedings was dispatched. This clear distinction has not always been strictly observed.42

158 At the Joint First Session, the Tribunals and the Parties also considered the procedural timetable. It was decided inter alia that the Respondents' objections to jurisdiction against the Payment Claim would be dealt with as a preliminary matter, reserving for the Respondents the possibility of relying on claims for losses caused by the blowouts. As the Respondents did not avail themselves of this possibility, the Parties' subsequent written submissions addressed the Respondents' objections to jurisdiction on both claims. A hearing on jurisdiction was held on 13 and 14 October 2011 in London.

159 The proceedings started by addressing jurisdictional objections raised by the Respondents and the Government. They argued that the People's Republic of Bangladesh had not agreed to arbitration and that Petrobangla and BAPEX had not been “designated to the Centre” by Bangladesh, to qualify as a designated agency for the purposes of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. The objections also concerned the Claimant's identity and nationality. In its submissions, the Claimant also sought a declaration that BAPEX was obligated under the JVA to cooperate with Niko for commencing arbitration against Petrobangla (Cooperation Claim).

160 During the jurisdictional phase, the Respondents (i.e. BAPEX and Petrobangla) and the Government also asserted that the Claimant had committed illegal acts, had violated good faith, and had unclean hands. In particular, they argued that the Claimant had “violated principles of good faith and international public policy” by acts of corruption and that, therefore, the Tribunal should dismiss the claim in order “to protect the integrity of the


41 Summary Minutes of the Joint First Session of the Two Arbitral Tribunals, 4 April 2011, Section 20. ↩
42 As a general matter, the Tribunal also notes that quotations set out in the Award omit footnote references that appear within the quoted text. ↩

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ICSID dispute settlement mechanism”. The Respondents clarified, however, that they did “not intend to argue that the contract is void or voidable by reason of corruption or otherwise” but reserved their position in case of further disclosures. At that stage the Respondents invoked the corruption as grounds for denying jurisdiction.

161 On 19 August 2013, the Tribunals issued their Decision on Jurisdiction,43 accepting jurisdiction over Petrobangla with respect to the GPSA and BAPEX in relation to the JVA. On the side of the State of Bangladesh, the Government had chosen to implement the project by the means of agreements which it did not conclude directly. Instead, it delegated the necessary powers to Petrobangla and BAPEX. The Tribunals concluded that they did not have jurisdiction over the State of Bangladesh and released the State from the Arbitrations.

162 In the Decision on Jurisdiction, the Tribunals addressed the arguments concerning designation to the Centre, the Claimant's identity and nationality and the Cooperation Claim. With respect to the substance of the dispute, the Tribunals held that they had jurisdiction with respect to both the Payment Claim and the Compensation Declaration and that their jurisdiction ratione materiae included not only issues of compliance with specific contractual obligations but should be understood in a wider sense including

...sources of liability other than the agreement itself. The question what these sources are and which obligations, contractual or other, fall to be considered concerns the substance of the dispute and is not determined at this stage of the arbitration.44

163 With respect to the corruption allegation, as raised during the jurisdictional phase, the Tribunal noted that that allegation was based on a Canadian conviction of Niko Canada on account of bribes to the Bangladeshi Minister of Energy in 2005. The Agreed Statement of Facts,45 which completed the Canadian proceedings, made mention of the conviction while also observing that “the Crown was unable to prove that any influence was obtained as a result of providing the benefit to the Minister”. Indeed, the Minister resigned shortly after the benefits had been provided, some eighteen months before the GPSA was signed. Investigations in the United States were discontinued on the grounds that “prosecution is not necessary at this time in light of Niko's guilty plea in Canada”. The Tribunals had no reason to believe that the acts of corruption to which the Canadian conviction related had any influence in


43 For the operative part of that decision and some further comments, see below Section 5.1. ↩
44 Decision on Jurisdiction, 19 August 2013, paragraph 505. ↩
45 Agreed Statement of Facts, 23 June 2019, Exhibit R-215. ↩

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the conclusion or the content of the JVA or the GPSA. Having examined also other allegations made by the Respondents, the Tribunal concluded that it had no reason to believe that there were any other acts of corruption by the Claimant or the Niko Group.

4.2 The proceedings leading to the Decision on Liability

4.2.1 The initial proceedings in the absence of a substantive defence by BAPEX

164 Following its Decision on Jurisdiction, the Tribunals organised the proceedings on the merits of the two Arbitrations. With respect to the Compensation Declaration, it was agreed that the Claimant first specify the scope of the liability concerning the two blowouts which it wished the Tribunal's Compensation Declaration to cover, and to state whether and by whom any such liability had been invoked. BAPEX was to respond by stating the scope of liability invoked against Niko and the quantum of the loss for which compensation was sought.

165 The Claimant presented its position in its Memorial Concerning the Compensation Declaration of 27 September 2013 (C-CD.1). The Claimant stated that it was seeking, in particular, an award that it was “not liable to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns”, and, in the alternative, that the Tribunal fix the amount of such liability. The Claimant also specified that it was seeking a declaration that Niko is entitled to compensation for the damages caused by the Money Suit.

166 The procedural order organising this initial phase of the proceedings on the merits required from BAPEX a full memorial on liability and quantum, including the evidence on which it relied. The Tribunal had given the following directions:

BAPEX shall file a First Memorial addressing the scope of liability to which the Declaration may extend and the particulars of the claims concerning Niko's alleged liability for the two blow-outs and damage allegedly caused by Niko, including its quantum. If BAPEX intends to rely on expert reports these reports must be included in the First Memorial. If BAPEX relies on the testimony of witnesses, it must include short written statements setting out the essential points of this testimony. Any

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documentary evidence on which BAPEX intends to rely and which has not yet been produced, must accompany this memorial.46

167 In the Counter-Memorial that it filed on 30 January 2014 (B-CD.1), BAPEX discussed the Tribunal's Decision on Jurisdiction, the factual background of the two blowouts, and its understanding of its obligations under the JVA. BAPEX produced documents, legal authorities and an annex entitled “Investigations into the blowouts and their consequences” together with appendices 1-5. It did however not discuss the Claimant's liability, nor did it file any fact witness statements or expert opinions. It requested that the Tribunals issue a declaration “that there is no legal dispute between BAPEX and Niko under the JVA” and, in the alternative, that “BAPEX is not obligated to indemnify Niko for any damage resulting from the pursuit of the Money Suit by the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla in the Bangladesh courts".47

168 The Claimant filed its Reply on 29 May 2014 (C-CD.2), in which it discussed at length the factual, technical and legal issues relating to the two blowouts and responded to BAPEX's Counter-Memorial. The Reply was supported by documents and legal authorities (CLA-3 to CLA-8), as well as the witness statements of Brian Adolph, Randal Glaholt and William Hornaday, and expert reports of William Cline, Robert Kemp and John Wright. The Claimant repeated its request for relief as stated in its Memorial.

169 On 25 September 2014 BAPEX filed its Rejoinder (B-CD.2). The Rejoinder was accompanied by further documents and legal authorities. BAPEX stated inter alia that it “ha[d] never invoked Niko's liability for the two blowouts” and that "this case involves no dispute between Niko and BAPEX concerning the blowouts". BAPEX further declared that it had no involvement in the findings of the Committee Reports which dealt with the blowouts and added that “it has little or nothing to add in response to Niko's description of the facts”. As in the Counter-Memorial, BAPEX did not discuss the factual and legal issues related to the question whether Niko breached any obligation or law and whether Niko has any liability with respect to the blowouts. No witness testimony or expert opinions were attached to BAPEX's submission.


46 Procedural Order No 3 of 15 November 2013, issued following the Tribunals' proposal of 19 September 2013, the Parties' comments and further correspondence about the organisation of the procedure. ↩
47 For the complete text of this request see below Section 6.2.2. ↩

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4.2.2 Addressing BAPEX failure to deal with the merits and the appointment of the Tribunal Experts

170 Given BAPEX's approach as stated in these submissions, the Tribunals noted that the Claimant's argument and evidence had not been contested by BAPEX in any substantive manner, while at the same time BAPEX continued to request the Tribunals to dismiss the Claimant's request for a declaration of non-liability. Neither Party had identified in its written pleadings with specificity the applicable law and standards based on which the Claimant's non-liability under the JVA or otherwise was to be determined by the Tribunal.

171 The Tribunal addressed this situation in Procedural Order No 7 of 17 October 2014, reminding the Parties of the issues that had to be addressed:

The question whether Niko complied with these obligations under the JVA clearly must be determined according to the procedure prescribed by the JVA itself, i.e. ICSID arbitration. The Tribunals considered this matter in their Decision on Jurisdiction under the heading “Jurisdiction ratione materiae” (section 10.2) which may also be referred to as subject matter jurisdiction. The Tribunals found that they have jurisdiction to decide whether Niko is liable under the JVA for the two blowouts (paragraph 497). In addition the Tribunals also found that “it may well be possible that [they] can make findings concerning liability on grounds other than the JVA” (paragraph 506), but left the question open for further consideration.

172 The Tribunals concluded that they must continue with the examination of Niko's request for the Compensation Declaration and the issues which were raised by that request. In particular, the Tribunals had to examine and decide whether Niko was liable for the two blow-outs and the damage caused by them. The Tribunals concluded:

Given the technical nature and the complexity of many of the issues arising in this context, the Tribunals do not wish to proceed in the absence of a critical review of the technical issues arising from the Claimant's case. In the circumstances the Tribunals require the opinion of an independent expert or, given the diversity of the relevant substance matters, several experts.

173 In consultation with the Parties the Tribunals organised the appointment of Tribunal experts and their preparation of technical reports. In Procedural Order No 7 the Tribunals identified three subject matter areas in which they intended to seek assistance given the absence of a critical review of the Claimant's evidence and technical opinions by BAPEX:

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(a) the well design and drilling of the Chattak-2 well and the design and execution of the relief well operation for Chattak- 2A;

(b) the quantum of gas lost as a result of the Chattak-2 and Chattak-2A and

(c) the air quality and greenhouse gas emissions due to these incidents and resulting monetary loss or damage

174 The Tribunal invited the Parties jointly to propose the names of experts in these three subject matter areas.

175 While they had to take steps to appoint their own experts, the Tribunals nevertheless granted the Respondents a final opportunity for substantive submissions. The Tribunals specified that in the event the Respondents availed themselves of this opportunity, the Tribunals would reconsider the rulings in Procedural Order No. 7. The Respondents however did not seize this opportunity.

176 The Parties were unable to jointly propose names of independent experts for the subject matter areas identified by the Tribunals. The Tribunals held a Procedural Consultation on 12 November 2014 to discuss with the Parties inter alia: (i) the expert appointment procedure, (ii) the expert(s)' mandate(s), (iii) the documents to be reviewed by the expert(s), (iv) communications between the expert(s), the Parties and the Claimant's experts, (v) the expert(s)'s reporting obligations, and (vi) the conduct of the expert(s)'s examination during the oral procedure.

177 As discussed with the Parties at this occasion, the Tribunals addressed itself to the International Centre for Expertise of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) which proposed the names of nine experts. At the invitation of the Tribunal ranked their preferences and the Tribunal appointed the following experts:

(a) Gas Well and Relief Well Design and Execution: Mr Leo William Abel;

(b) Quantification of Gas Lost: Mr Keith Brian Masters; and

(c) Air Emissions: Mr Ian Wallis.

178 In consultation with the Parties, the Tribunals prepared the terms of reference for each expert, identifying the substance matter of the requested expert opinion. It was agreed that each expert prepare a written report on which the Parties would be given an opportunity to comment and, subsequently to comment on the other party's observations. The experts would then be available for examination during the evidentiary hearing. The

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Tribunals also provided the Parties with an estimate of each expert's budget for the anticipated work.

179 Once the terms of reference had been executed, the experts were provided with the Parties' pleadings, the Committee Reports and the expert reports and witness statements that had been filed by the Claimant. The Tribunal experts presented their reports, which were provided to the Parties on 10 June 2015 with the invitation to present their observations by 15 July 2015.

180 During the time following Procedural Order No 7, the Respondents informed the Tribunal of several changes of their representatives.48 On 9 July 2015, they announced the appointment of new counsel, Messrs Paul S. Reichler and Derek C. Smith of Foley Hoag LLP.

4.2.3 BAPEX's change of position: adaptation of the scope of the Arbitration and of the procedure

181 The Respondents’ new counsel requested modifications of the previously agreed procedure, announced their intention to produce new expert reports and requested an extension of the time for the observations on the reports of the Tribunal experts. After exchange of correspondence on the requested modifications to the procedure and the scope of the newly announced expert evidence, the Tribunals issued on 19 August 2015, Procedural Order No. 11. The Tribunals recalled the procedural history which preceded the Respondents’ 9 July 2015 request, specifically referencing the multiple counsel changes, the many opportunities afforded to the Respondents to file expert evidence and the purpose of the appointment of Tribunal experts. The Tribunals concluded:

... by 25 September 2014, the time of the BAPEX Rejoinder, the written phase of the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration had been completed. By that time, all documentary evidence had to have been presented, all witnesses had to be announced by short written statements and all expert reports had to have been presented. The additional phase which the Tribunals opened at that stage had a very limited purpose: in the absence of substantive comments from the Respondents, it was to provide the Tribunals with a “critical review of the technical issues arising from the Claimant's case”. This was the purpose for which the Tribunal Experts were appointed and this must be the limit to the comments which the Parties may make to the Reports.49


48 For details see below Section 2.2. ↩
49 PO No 11, paragraph B14. ↩

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182 The Tribunals saw no justification for revising the previously agreed procedure and its scope as requested by the Respondents; but it extended the time for the Parties' observations on the reports of the Tribunal experts and accepted that these observations may be accompanied by observations of the Parties' own experts within the limits of the issues defined in the terms of reference.

183 On 31 August 2015, both Parties filed their Comments on the Reports of the Tribunal Experts (C-CD.3 and B-CD.3). The Respondents' submission was accompanied by observations from Dr Neal Adams, Mr Ian Borthwick and Mr Parthasarathi Bandyopadhyay. Each party filed Responsive Comments on 30 September 2015 (C-CD.4 and B-CD.5).

184 On 13 August 2015, BAPEX had filed a request for provisional measures (BCD/PM), concerning alleged gas seepages in the area of the Chattak 2 Well, attributed to an incomplete sealing of opening caused by the first blowout. BAPEX requested that the Tribunals order:

(i) that Niko provide for the immediate relocation as needed of the people affected by a continued flow of gas from the Chattak reservoir, and

(ii) that Niko take all necessary steps, in a safe and prudent manner under the supervision of an internationally recognized shallow gas well control specialist approved by BAPEX, to stop the flow of leaking gas caused by the 2005 blow-outs.

185 Following observations and objections by the Claimant, BAPEX withdrew the request on 4 September 2015. BAPEX informed the Tribunals that it had filed a Notice of Dispute with Niko and its parent company as required by the JVA “in order to pursue its claims arising from gas seepage caused by Niko's blowouts at the Chattak field after 9 October 2005”; a copy of the that Notice was attached to BAPEX's letter.

186 BAPEX then sought to withdraw the evidence that it had produced with the request for provisional measures, in particular Exhibits R-14, R-14A and R-14B, and sent versions of the expert reports in which passages related to the damage caused by the seepages were redacted. The Tribunal decided that all submissions of the Respondents, including expert reports and documentary evidence would remain on the record in unredacted form.

187 In the original procedural timetable, the evidentiary hearing had been scheduled for 10 – 14 November 2014. When the appointment of Tribunal experts was decided, these dates were cancelled; subsequently new hearing dates were fixed for the period from 2 to 7 November 2015. In Procedural Order No 11, Tribunals confirmed the hearing dates and proposed pre-hearing

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conference during the week of 19 October 2015 to prepare the hearing. Eventually these consultations were held by telephone conference on 1 October 2015.

188 In its comments on the reports of the Tribunal Experts of 31 August 2015, BAPEX stated that Niko had failed to indicate important sources for its liability and had failed to address the full scope of the damage caused by Niko's breaches; and the Tribunal Experts also did not address these sources of liability and scope of damage.

189 BAPEX expanded these comments in a submission of 25 September 2015 (B- CD.4), asserting that the scope of Niko's breaches was more far reaching and the damage caused by the blowouts more substantial than presented by Niko. It argued that “the case record is substantially incomplete in terms of facts, legal argument, expert testimony and other evidence, which, taken together, seriously compromise the integrity of these proceedings and the Tribunal's ability to deliver a just and fair award”. For these reasons, BAPEX requested on 25 September “the opportunity for BAPEX to file an additional pleading and to present counterclaims in these proceedings”.

190 In support of this request BAPEX's newly appointed counsel asserted that BAPEX's “prior counsel made grave errors in judgment and material omissions that resulted in the deprivation of BAPEX's right to be heard and an inequality of arms”. According to BAPEX, previous counsel “failed to understand the nature of these proceedings and the consequences of his actions on the rights of his clients”. Relying on Article 45 of the ICSID Convention, BAPEX argued that it thus found itself in the position of a party that has failed “to appear or to present his case at any stage of the proceedings". BAPEX stated that the “circumstances have now changed" and, quoting Schreuer, the “hitherto uncooperative party is about to cooperate”. BAPEX requested the Tribunal to “restore party equality of arms and BAPEX's right to be heard,” and to provide BAPEX with an opportunity to file an additional pleading and present counter-claims.

191 The Tribunals were informed that, on 17 September 20215, BAPEX also had served on the Claimant a Notice of Dispute, seeking inter alia compensation for environmental damage and for gas lost as a result of the two blow outs and had announced that, if attempts to settle the dispute concerning these claims fail, it intended to request arbitration under Articles 18.2 and 18.5 of the JVA.

192 In view of these developments, the question of the scope of the Arbitration about the Compensation Declaration arose: the Claimant had sought a declaration that it had not breached any obligation or law and was not liable for the blowouts. BAPEX had been invited in Procedural Order No 3 to address

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in its first memorial “the scope of liability to which the Declaration may extend and the particulars of the claims concerning Niko's alleged liability for the two blow-outs and damage allegedly caused by Niko, including its quantum”. BAPEX denied that it had any dispute with Niko and had not taken position on Niko's liability. The Tribunals had concluded that the scope of the Arbitration was confined to the non-liability declaration sought by the Claimant. BAPEX's latest submissions and the expert reports attached to them introduced aspects of possible liability of the Claimant which seemed to exceed substantially the scope of the Arbitration resulting from the request initially defined.

193 The Tribunals found it critical for the further conduct of the Arbitration proceedings that the scope of the Arbitration be clearly defined and, if required, be distinguished from actual or possible other proceedings concerning the same or related substance matters. The Tribunals invited Niko on 28 September 2015

... to clarify with precision the declaration it seeks in these proceedings and to specify whether any of the issues arising from the submissions and requests by BAPEX and its experts do not in its view fall within the scope of the present arbitrations.

194 In its reply of 30 September 2015, the Claimant repeated the relief it had previously requested describing it as

... the core declarations on liability and damages that Niko requests in the Compensation Declaration:

Claimant Niko respectfully submits that the Tribunals should issue an award in its favour and against BAPEX:

a. Declaring that Niko breached no obligation or law as concerns the two blowouts in 2005 at Chattak field and is not liable to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns;

b. In the alternative, and in the event that the Tribunals find liability on the part of Niko, fixing the amount of any compensation due for any damages to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns ...

195 The Claimant added that

these declarations are framed in broad terms. They encompass any liability on Niko's part as concerns the two blowouts, and any aspect of the amount of compensation due for any damages to BAPEX and its predecessors, assignors, successors and assigns.

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196 In another letter of the same date, Niko commented on BAPEX submission of 31 August 2015, arguing:

Instead of serving the purpose of offering comments on the analysis and conclusion of the Tribunal Experts, BAPEX's Comments and the associated expert reports have been tendered as an entirely new case, advanced at the eleventh hour, and far outside of the long-established procedural timetable.50

197 The Tribunal concluded that the scope of the Arbitration remained a live issue and addressed it at the Pre-Hearing Conference on 1 October 2015 (PHC). It discussed with the Parties the choice between, on the one hand, what was called the “Base approach”, considering the case as it had been made by the Claimant and, on the other hand, an “Full Scope of Liability approach” which would expand the Arbitration to include the case as requested by BAPEX on 25 September 2015 the obligations and laws which the Respondents and their experts had raised recently. In this approach the Compensation Declaration Arbitration would cover all possible obligations which Niko had under the JV Agreement or under the law and which, according to BAPEX, were breached by Niko, causing or contributing to one or both of the two blow-outs in 2005 (“the alleged Niko Breaches”).

198 During the PHC, the Tribunals also discussed with the Parties the organisation of the Hearing, its scope and preparation. BAPEX explained that it required five months for submitting the additional pleading, as requested in its letter of 25 September 2015; this would require to postpone the hearing scheduled for November 2015. BAPEX explained the additional time was required essentially for the evaluation and documentation of the damage for which BAPEX held the Claimant liable. Niko's Breaches, however, had been set out essentially in the submissions and expert reports produced in response to the reports to the Tribunals' experts. If the proceedings in a first phase would be limited to the question of possible breaches of the obligations and the law in relation to the blow-outs, the November 2015 hearing could be preserved, the Claimant could be given an opportunity to respond to the newly alleged breaches, including new evidence and expert explanations, with possible responses by BAPEX at the opening of the hearing. Steps were considered for completing, prior to the hearing the list of obligations and laws would be completed and preliminary comments were prepared. The damage possibly flowing from any breaches determined by the Tribunals and the counter-claim would then be considered in a further phase


50 Niko's letter of 30 September 2015.

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of the Arbitration. At the pre-hearing conference (PHC), BAPEX declared that it was not in a position to substantiate its counter-claim.

199 The Summary Minutes of the PHC, prepared by the Tribunal and Secretariat and dated 5 October 2015, record the following position of the Respondents:

Recognising that the need for these modifications to the procedure was the result of their failure to make their submissions in due time, the Respondents undertook to make every reasonable effort in this alternative approach, to limit the disruptive effects of these modifications. They stated that this alternative approach as discussed at the Pre- Hearing Conference satisfied the request, as it had been made in BAPEX's letter of 25 September 2015. The Claimant accepted that such a modification was feasible in theory but reserved its position as to whether such a change should be admitted at this late stage of the proceedings.

200 On 5 October 2015, the Claimant informed the Tribunal that it chose the Full Scope of Liability Approach. In a letter of 7 September 2015, the Tribunals noted the acceptance of the adjustment of the procedure and added:

... the Tribunals have decided to modify the procedure so as to afford the Respondents yet another opportunity to present the argument and evidence which they had previously failed to present in accordance with the procedural schedule.

201 The Tribunals confirmed the revision of the procedure:

The approach that emerged from the Pre-Hearing Conference of 1 October 2015 would allow the Respondents a full opportunity to present their defence as requested, without causing excessive disruption to the proceedings, by dividing the Respondents' presentation of two issues: (i) the Claimant's liability and in particular the alleged breaches by Niko, and (ii) the damage said to have been caused by these alleged breaches and its quantification. The Respondents said they were ready to argue the first of these issues at the November hearing but requested additional time to analyse questions concerning the second issue. The Tribunals were prepared to accommodate this concern by reserving the second issue for a later phase in the arbitrations.

4.2.4 The November 2015 Hearing

202 At the PHC of 1 October 2015 and in PO No 12 of 21 October 2015, the Tribunals organised, in consultation with the Parties, the preparation of the

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Hearing that had been fixed for 2 to 6 November with a possible extension on 7 November 2015.

203 During this preparatory period, BAPEX filed on 19 October 2015, a submission on legal issues (B-CD.9), in particular in response to the Claimant's letter of 5 October 2015, details on the Money Suit, the cost allocation, and certain issues concerning the hearing organisation. The Claimant objected to this submission, which it described as an “unauthorised submission” and a “second rejoinder”.

204 The Claimant filed a pre-hearing submission on 23 October 2015, entitled “Niko's Submission on Newly Alleged Breaches” (C-CD.7), accompanied by a second witness statement of Mr William Hornaday and a supplemental expert report by Mr John Wright (Wright II); and BAPEX announced on 23 October 2015, its intention to have Mr Md. Abdul Baqi testify at the November 2015 Hearing. The Claimant objected but the Tribunals accepted the testimony and invited the BAPEX to provide information about the substance of the testimony in the form of a witness statement or otherwise which was done on 27 October 2015.

205 In the course of the preparatory exchanges, BAPEX conveyed a request from the Minister of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources and the Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs that the Tribunals hold the procedural consultation in London, in the presence of representatives of the Government. Despite several exchanges between the Parties and the Tribunals, a convenient date for that meeting could not be found. BAPEX subsequently withdrew the request.

206 Following a request from the Parties at the PHC, the Tribunals provided a “Note on the Scope of Examination and Questions for Consideration” as Annex to PO No 12. The Tribunals identified, in a provisional manner and subject to correction by the Parties and their experts, what the Tribunals had understood as the overall principles governing Niko's obligations concerning the conduct of the operations under the JVA and other obligations relating to such operations and the actions possibly relevant for the blowouts. The Tribunals further provided the Parties with a “Preliminary Note on the Organisation of the November 2015 Hearing” on 27 October 2015. The Note confirmed that the principal objectives of the November 2015 Hearing were to determine

(i) the nature and content of the laws and standards which apply to Niko's conduct of the drilling and the relief operations (the “Applicable Laws and Standards”);

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(ii) whether any breaches of these Applicable Laws and Standards occurred which caused or contributed to the blow-outs and the damage caused by them (the “Breaches”).

207 The hearing took place from 2 to 7 November 2015 in London. In addition to the three Members of the Tribunal and the Tribunal Secretary, the Hearing was attended by the Parties and their counsel, witnesses and experts. Minister Nasrul Hamid, Government of Bangladesh, presented as shareholder of BAPEX, also attended. No objections were raised against the presence of a representative of the Government of Bangladesh which, as a result of the Tribunals' decision on jurisdiction, was no longer a party to the Arbitration proceedings.51

208 The Parties' counsel delivered opening statements, addressing inter alia the issues which the Tribunals had outlined prior to the hearing. In the course of the Opening Statements and subsequently during the hearing, it was clarified that the Claimant was seeking a declaration of non-liability only in respect of those breaches of Applicable Laws and Standards which were causal for the two blowout incidents, and not an assessment of the Claimant's operation in general terms.

209 The Tribunals explained that, before examining the specific factual aspects of the two blowouts, the arbitrators wished to obtain from the experts a better understanding of the technical issues as they arise in the context of drilling and relief operations and the relevant laws, standards and practices. After the Parties' opening statements, the Tribunals therefore invited Mr Abel, the expert appointed by the Tribunals, to deliver a presentation on these matters and to answer specific questions from the arbitrators. Mr John Wright, the expert appointed by the Claimant and Dr Neil Adams, the expert appointed by the Respondents, commented on Mr Abel's explanations and provided their own views in an open discussion among the three experts.

210 Subsequently, Mr Wright delivered a presentation on drilling operations and answered questions from the Tribunals, with Mr Abel and Dr Adams also being requested by the Tribunals to provide their views on various issues in the form of an interactive discussion. This was followed by a presentation by Dr Adams, with questions from the Tribunals and a discussion in the same format. Subsequently, Mr Wright was cross-examined by counsel for the Respondents, followed by cross-examination of Dr Adams by counsel for the Claimant, who then also posed questions to Messrs Abel and Wright. This was


51 A detailed lists of attendees is presented in the Decision on Liability, paragraph 111.

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followed by further examination by counsel for the Respondents, the Claimant and the Tribunals.

211 After this initial clarification of the technical issues concerning drilling and relief operations and the relevant laws, standards and practices, the Tribunals turned to the factual questions of what actually happened when the blowouts occurred. The Tribunals started by examining Mr Adolph, who was also examined by counsel for the Claimant and cross-examined by counsel for the Respondents. Thereafter Mr Hornaday and Mr Baqi were examined by the Tribunals and counsel of the Parties.

212 Having completed the fact witness testimony, the Tribunals turned to issues specific to relief operations and sought clarification from the three experts. The three experts addressed specific issues related to the relief well operations identified by the Tribunals and were examined by the arbitrators and the Parties' counsel, following the same procedure of an interactive discussion under the direction of the Tribunals.

213 The three experts had disclosed in their written reports that they knew each other well. This was apparent at the November 2015 Hearing. They also stated that they knew Mr Grace well, who had been engaged by Niko for the relief operations. It was understood that all four were included in the small number of industry specialists who had experience in drilling relief wells. They had worked with each other in one form or another on other projects; some of them also were engaged in the context of the Moulavi Bazar blowout in Bangladesh. No objection was raised against any of the experts and their qualifications to provide expert opinions in these Arbitrations.

214 It was agreed during that hearing that legal argument regarding breaches and bases for liability would be addressed in written submissions, followed by a two-day hearing. At the conclusion of that hearing the Parties agreed on the procedural calendar for the remainder of the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration, providing for simultaneous Post-Hearing Briefs on Liability, addressing in particular the Applicable Laws and Standards, identifying breaches and bases for liability, followed by a hearing in Paris on liability. Thereafter, the Respondents were scheduled to present their Memorial on Damages, followed by the Claimant's Counter-Memorial and a subsequent hearing on damages to take place in Paris.

215 At the end of the November 2015 Hearing, the Tribunals enquired whether the Parties were satisfied with the conduct of the oral procedure and if there were any complaints they wished to raise. No such complaints were raised by the Claimant and the Respondents.

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216 Transcripts of that hearing were prepared by Ms Georgina Ford and Mr Ian Roberts of Briault Reporting Services. A copy of the transcripts was sent to the Parties and the Members of the Tribunal on each hearing day. They were subsequently corrected by the Parties. Sound recordings were made of the hearing and uploaded to the electronic file sharing account created for this proceeding for access by the Parties and the Tribunals.

217 The Tribunals prepared Summary Minutes of that hearing which were sent to the Parties on 12 January 2016, together with Hearing Exhibits (Exhibits RH- 6 and TEH-3 and TEH-4).

4.2.5 Post-Hearing Events on Liability

218 Following the November 2015 Hearing, the Tribunal prepared a note on Possible Issues for the Parties to address in their Post-Hearing Briefs. The Parties filed post-hearing briefs on 22 January 2016, in accordance with the procedural calendar agreed at the November 2015 Hearing.

219 A pre-hearing conference was held on 28 January 2016 addressing procedural issues that had arisen since the November 2015 Hearing, the preparation of the forthcoming Hearing and certain issues concerning documents that had arisen at and after the November 2015 Hearing and the related correspondence; specifically (i) Niko's Well Control Manual,52 the “2005 SWP Manual”.53 Summary Minutes of that PHC were sent to the Parties on 3 February 2016.

220 At this pre-hearing conference the Tribunal also discussed with the Parties a document production request that the Respondents had filed on 8 January 2016. The latter request had been the subject of correspondence and at the procedural conference; as agreed at that occasion, the Respondents provided some further information concerning their request.

221 On 10 February 2016, the Claimant informed the Tribunal that on 5 and 6 February 2016, a site visit had taken place at the Chattak field. The Claimant stated that “beginning on 5 February 2016 Niko hosted a site visit by the Respondents at Chattak” at which “Niko permitted inspection of all documents concerning Petroleum Operations that Respondents wished to review". The Claimant wrote:

Over 70 persons visited the Chattak site, including the Minister of Energy, a score of personnel from BAPEX and its sister company Sylhet Gas Fields Limited, four representatives of Foley Hoag, numerous technical


52 See Decision on Liability, paragraphs 128 et seq. 53 See Decision on Liability, paragraphs 129 et seq.

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and/or environmental experts retained by BAPEX, an intelligence officer, two ambulance attendants, five fire service employees and 33 police officers. Niko made available to BAPEX's team all documents on site arising from Petroleum Operations as defined under the JVA. BAPEX’s legal team scanned hundreds of pages of these documents.

222 The Claimant asserted the Respondents' letter of 4 February 2016 contained “a range of erroneous or misleading statements” and that “BAPEX assertions concerning the necessity of a Tribunal order have been overtaken by events”. It also stated that, following the search of its records requested by the President during the 28 January 2016 pre-hearing conference, it had identified letters transmitting to both BAPEX and the Department of Energy all but one of the Environmental Reports requested by BAPEX.

223 By letter of 14 February 2016, the Tribunals requested the Respondents to respond to the information provided by the Claimant regarding the 5 February 2016 site visit, specifying whether or not the Respondents maintained their 8 January 2016 document production request.

224 Responding to directions from the Tribunals, the, the Respondents provided on 14 February 2016 a status update regarding the site visit and the documents. They confirmed that a site visit had taken place on 5 and 6 February 2016 and explained that “BAPEX exercised its rights under the Joint Venture Agreement to inspect documents on the site through its legal representative, Foley Hoag LLP”. The latter, they explained, had been granted access to inspect and copy some documents but not others. The Respondents pointed out that the “documents were by no means presented in an organised fashion”; many of the documents were irrelevant and their condition “was less than ideal having been exposed to the elements, dust, and pests for the past ten years”. The Respondents concluded that

... the documents obtained at the site visit do not obviate the Respondents' request for documents. Accordingly, BAPEX maintain its request for the documents listed in its letter of 23 December 2015.

225 In subsequent correspondence the Tribunals attempted to clarify the status of the requested documents and the identification of the documents that remained outstanding with no success. On 20 February 2016, the Respondents added further items to the list of requested documents.

226 At the February 2016 Hearing, the Tribunal discussed with the Parties these requests and settled the requests as follows:

The Claimant confirmed its willingness to cooperate with BAPEX in the context of the JVA and invited representatives of BAPEX to its Dhaka

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office in order to examine whether any of the requested documents existed and would be required by BAPEX. This procedure applied to all document requests of the Respondents, except for the following:

227 The Tribunals requested the Parties to address certain technical aspects related to casing and drilling operations at the forthcoming February 2016 Hearing. It also requested information about other cases concerning well blowouts and to provide copies of such decisions. The Claimant “identified in excess of 20 authorities meeting the stated criteria”. It excluded “authorities addressing blowouts allegedly resulting from defective equipment and authorities lacking substantial discussion of the drilling operations conducted before the blowout" and transmitted five authorities from US courts. The Respondents also “found a number of cases of varying relevance to the present case that met the stated criteria”. In addition to the cases presented by the Claimant, the Respondents presented on 20 February 2016 a court decision in the Deepwater Horizon case and filed it as Exhibit RLA-115.

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228 The two-day hearing on liability that was held, as scheduled, on 21 and 22 February 2016 in Paris, at the offices of the World Bank. The Hearing was again attended by the full Tribunal, the Tribunal Secretary, the Parties and their counsel and by Minister Nasrul Hamid, State Minister of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources, Ms Khadiza Nazneen, Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources.54 The Claimant did not object to the presence of the representatives of non-parties to the Arbitration, specifically the government, who was no longer a party to the Arbitration since the Tribunals' Decision on Jurisdiction.

229 The Parties presented full legal argument on liability and answered questions from the Tribunals on 21 February 2016. Rebuttal presentations were delivered on the following day, followed by a further rebuttal. followed on 22 February 2016, with each side providing final observations, i.e. a further rebuttal after that. Copies of the slides of these presentations were distributed and entered on the record.

230 In response to an observation from the Respondents, the Tribunals reminded the Parties that the scope of the hearing and of the Tribunals' forthcoming decision had been described in Procedural Order No 12 and its accompanying annex. Accordingly, the scope included the question of the effect of Niko's operations on the long-term viability of the Chattak field, as it had been identified in item 4(vi) of the annex to that Procedural Order.

231 The Claimant objected to the reliance by the Respondents on independent opinions expressed by Mr Abel, the expert appointed by the Tribunals, in his report and during the November 2015 Hearing. The Claimant further recalled its written submissions made in this regard in its 31 August 2015 comments on the reports issued by the three Tribunal appointed experts. The Tribunal pointed out that it had heard three qualified experts, i.e. Mr Wright, Dr Adams and Mr Abel, and that it did not consider it justified to generally give less weight to the views of Mr Abel than to those of the other two experts. The Claimant's counsel agreed with this position, confirming that the best evidence for the Tribunals to turn to when determining the liability questions is the evidence of these three experts. The Claimant's counsel emphasised the differences in the standards and certain calculations applied by Mr Abel in his report. The Tribunals reiterated that it did not consider itself bound by any particular opinion or calculation of any of the experts and that the Tribunal members would apply their own minds to the issues they have to decide.


54 The list of attendees can be found at paragraph 149 of the Decision on Liability.

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232 The February 2016 Hearing was recorded and the audio recording was uploaded subsequently to the file sharing account established for these proceedings. A verbatim transcript was also prepared by Ms Georgina Ford and Mr Ian Roberts of Briault Reporting Services Limited, which was distributed to the Parties and the Tribunals on each hearing day. As the hearing completed the proceedings on liability and no further submissions were foreseen, a simplified process for correcting the transcript, limited to checking references, was agreed at the end of the hearing. Summary Minutes, prepared by the Tribunal, were distributed to the Parties on 31 March 2016.

233 Following the February 2016 Hearing, the Respondents filed on 5 March 2016 a new submission on shallow gas. The Respondents stated that, on the last day of the February 2016 Hearing, the Claimant had presented new arguments relating to “the definition of shallow gas and the extent to which Niko knew or should have known that it faced shallow gas risks prior to drilling the Chattak 2 Well”. The Respondents alleged that the Claimant had distorted the facts and requested leave to respond to the new arguments.

234 The Respondents' submission was accompanied by a document from Niko entitled “Chattak Field Development Plan, December 2004”55 which, as the Respondents asserted, “BAPEX encountered [...] two days ago when it was given access to documents in Niko's office in Dhaka”. They requested that the document be admitted into the record, stating that “this document is also relevant for the Damages phase of the proceedings”, adding that they would enter it on the record with the forthcoming submission on Damages.

235 The Respondents concluded by requesting “that the Tribunal recognize [BAPEX's] right to respond by accepting the present submission in response to new arguments related to shallow gas raised by Niko at the second Hearing on Liability".

236 The Tribunals invited the Claimant to comment, limited to admissibility of the submission, reserving comments on the substance of the document in case it were admitted.

237 The Claimant objected to the Respondents' submission and described it as an "unsolicited post-hearing brief [and] an abuse of procedure that should be rejected”. It asserted that the “new” points to which the Respondents referred had been argued previously and discussed in detail at earlier occasions where the issue of shallow gas had been addressed. The Claimant stated that the arguments in the 5 March 2016 submission could have been made at the


55 Produced as Exhibit R-47.

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February 2016 Hearing. “There is no justification for BAPEX's decision to wait until after the hearing to respond to points raised in Niko's Post Hearing Brief and further articulated at the February Hearing.”

238 The Claimant also objected to the production of the new document which, in its opinion did not add anything to the record and for which there had not been any opportunity to analyses and addressed by witnesses or experts. The Claimant concluded by requesting that the Tribunal “deny BAPEX's request and rule it inadmissible".

239 By letter of 21 March 2016, BAPEX provided the Tribunals with a status update on the documents the production of which the Parties had agreed during the hearing at the February 2016 Hearing, specifying those documents that remained outstanding, and requesting the Tribunals to order the Claimant to produce the documents identified in that letter.

240 The request was overtaken by another request made by the Respondents, in another letter of 21 March 2016, by which they announced “new, recently obtained evidence of Niko's use of bribes and corrupt means to procure the JVA and GPSA”. They concluded that “the Tribunal should not issue any further decision or award in the two proceedings without considering that evidence and our statements on it” and requested the “Tribunal defer its decision until after the 25th [March] and after its review of our pleading on this issue".

241 On 25 March 2016, BAPEX presented its Memorial on Damages, which argued that the Tribunals' jurisdiction was “confined to determining the damages owed to BAPEX”. Concerning the loss of gas, BAPEX claimed that Niko was responsible for the lack of development of the Chattak field in the aftermath of the blowouts and quantified this loss as USD 118 million for BAPEX and USD 896 million for the Government;56 with respect to environmental losses, BAPEX claimed “between US$ 8'461'463 and $8’642'493 to cover the expenses of monitoring, surveying and abatement and hold the proceedings open until such time as a complete survey and monitoring of the Tengratila area can be conducted and BAPEX can provide the fullest possible accounting of environmental and health losses”.

242 Considering the corruption claim that had been filed on 25 March 2016 and after consultation of the Parties, the Tribunals decided in Procedural Order No 13 to examine the Corruption Claim with priority. The Tribunals suspended the proceedings on all other issues, except for the Third


56 BMD, paragraphs 240 and 400(h). This figure was subsequently updated to USD 857 million: see Amendment, paragraph 99; Brattle II, Table 2 at page 5.

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Decision on the Payment Claim which was issued on 26 May 2016. The proceedings in relation to the Corruption Claim are addressed below in Section 4.3.

4.2.6 The Decision on Liability

243 The Decision on the Corruption Claim was issued on 25 February 2019. When communicating that decision to the Parties the Tribunals informed them that:

The Tribunals will now resume their work on the decision concerning liability for the blowouts which had been put on hold by the Respondents' Corruption Claim. The Tribunals will then consult the Parties concerning further directions for the completion of the Arbitrations.

244 Neither Party renewed the procedural requests that had been reserved in Procedural Order No 13. The Tribunals nevertheless considered the requests concerning the Respondents' submission of 5 March 2016 with Exhibit R-47 and the Claimant's objections of 16 March 2016. Concerning the documents which the Respondents had identified as still outstanding in their letter of 21 March 2016 and the explanations that had been provided by the Respondents on their relevance and materiality, the Tribunals concluded that they were not of critical importance for its Decision on Liability. It was comforted in this conclusion by the absence of a renewed request from the Respondents.

245 The Tribunals concluded that there are no procedural requests outstanding and that the Parties had full opportunities to provide argument and evidence in support of their positions concerning the liability for the blowouts. It resumed their deliberations and issued their Decision on Liability on 20 February 2020.

246 The Tribunals confirmed their jurisdiction with respect to Niko's liability to BAPEX under the JVA, noting that the initial position of BAPEX had changed and BAPEX sought a declaration that Niko must compensate BAPEX for the harms from Niko's breaches of the JVA ..."

247 With respect to Niko's liability to the Government and Petrobangla, the Tribunals found that Niko's liability for the two blowouts in the Chattak field must be determined under the JVA and its dispute resolution provision. As a result of their assignment to BAPEX and their approval of the JVA, the Government and Petrobangla may not seek different remedies in different fora concerning Niko's obligations with respect to its conduct in Petroleum Operations and the liability for the breach of these obligations.

248 The Tribunals noted that, at the February 2016 Hearing, the Respondents continued to assert that “it continues to be BAPEX's position that the record

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is not what it would be had BAPEX had competent counsel that would have filed evidence”. The Tribunals addressed this position as follows:

... whatever may have been their first counsel's failure to address the issues raised by the case brought by the Claimant, the Respondents were given repeated opportunities to present their case on Niko's liability; and after the latest change of counsel, the Respondents availed themselves of this opportunity.

The Tribunal concludes that the Parties had a full opportunity to argue all possible grounds of Niko's liability for all kinds of possible damage resulting from the two blowouts; and they had an equally full opportunity to address Niko's alleged breaches of its obligations under the JVA and the applicable law.57

249 The Tribunals were therefore satisfied that, in addition to the issues on jurisdiction just referred to, the following issues were ready for determination in the Decision on Liability, reserving the quantification of any loss and damage for which Niko was found to be liable:

250 Concerning the first of these issues, the Tribunals considered the requirements of the JVA, specifically Article 26.2.4, which required Niko as the Operator to

conduct all Petroleum Operations in a diligent, conscientious and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the applicable law, the JVA and generally accepted standards of the international Petroleum industry designed to achieve efficient and safe development and production of Petroleum and to maximize the ultimate economic recovery of Petroleum from the JVA Area.

251 The Tribunals used the term “prudent operator standard” to express the standard required by this provision. They noted that there was no contention that Niko violated its obligations of efficiency or, if it were treated as a separate objective, of maximising economic recovery. The question was whether Niko's


57 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 319 and 320.

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actions and omissions in relation to the blowouts violated relevant safety standards. The Tribunals focused their examination on the question whether a failure of Niko to observe safety measures, specifically prescribed by any of the relevant standards or as they had to be observed by a reasonable and prudent operator in the given circumstances, caused or contributed to the blowouts.

252 The Tribunals examined specifically American Petroleum Industry (API) publications. While they recognised that the API recommended practices have no legislative force, not in the United States and not in Bangladesh, the Tribunals noted that the Parties had accepted these recommended practices as a valuable source for determining “generally accepted standards of the international Petroleum industry”, as they are applicable according to Article 26.2.4 of the JVA. The Tribunals considered specifically the API Recommended Practices (RP) for Well Control Operations (API RP 29) and Diverter Systems Equipment and Operations (API RP 64).58 The Tribunals concluded that these publications

.... are relevant texts that can provide useful information when determining Petroleum Industry Standards applicable according to Article 26.2.4 of the JVA. These publications are recommendations based on broad industry experience; but they do not prescribe specific actions concerning well design or blowout control. In their application the specific circumstances of each well must be considered, using sound engineering judgment.59

253 The Tribunals also considered other sources for Petroleum Industry standards to which the Parties had referred, such as the Well Control Training Manual of the Well Control School at the Institute of Drilling and Technology, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, Dehradun, India,60 sometimes referred to as the ONGC Manual. Reference was made to Niko's “Drilling and Control Manual”; the Claimant produced “a February 2005 edition of Niko's drilling work over SWP [Safe Work Procedures] manual” but the Claimant considered this and some other documents as “completely irrelevant to the issues before the Tribunals”, given their date of issuance.

254 The Tribunals also considered the laws of Bangladesh. The Respondents in general terms referred to environmental law and general tort liability. The Tribunals concluded that it "had not been demonstrated that the relevant standard under Bangladesh tort law is more exacting than that prescribed by


58 Exhibits R-43 and R-42. 59 Decision on Liability, paragraph 396. 60 Exhibit R-33.

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the JVA”. With respect to specific petroleum legislation, the Claimant pointed out that there was no regulatory regime in Bangladesh prescribing mandatory standards, an assertion that was supported by the recommendation of the First Enquiry Report by the Committee set up by the Government to determine the causes of the blowout:

Guidelines associated with such drilling should be adopted and enforced in Bangladesh for in future the country will produce many of its shallow gas. The necessity for an upstream regulator, therefore, may receive urgent attention.61

255 In their Post-Hearing Brief of 22 January 2016, the Respondents referred to the Bangladesh Petroleum Act of 1974. The Tribunals noted that the Respondents had not invoked any breaches of the Petroleum Act at any time before the Post-Hearing Brief and no action had been taken in Bangladesh under that Act in relation to the blowouts. In any event, the Tribunals noted that the terms of Section 6.1 of the Act on which the Respondents relied “resemble in some respects the wording of Article 26.2.4 of the JVA”. The Respondents did identify any aspect of these terms which differ from the obligations under that Article or impose more stringent requirements and the Tribunals have not been able to identify such amplifying requirements. The Tribunals concluded that

... Article 26.2.4 of the JVA encapsulates Niko's obligations as the Operator that must be considered in the present case. As the Respondents stated at the November 2015 Hearing in terms quoted above: “No specific question of the violation of applicable law” needs be considered by the Tribunal when determining Niko's liability for the blowouts".62

256 The Tribunals also considered the opinions expressed by the three experts presented by the Parties and the expert appointed by the Tribunals.


61 Enquiry Report, Exhibit R-3, paragraph 6.22. 62 Decision on Liability, paragraph 427.

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257 In the Decision on Liability the Tribunals emphasized the important contribution of these experts:

... the advice of the three experts was particularly important and useful for the Tribunal, both with respect to the identification of the standards relevant for specific aspects of the case and in applying such standards to the specific conduct at issue. All three experts were highly qualified and had extensive experience in relevant petroleum operations. When examining the events [concerning the two blowouts], the Tribunal found their explanations very useful and at many occasions found their advice persuasive. Where it had to choose between conflicting views, the Tribunal considered the arguments in support of these views to determine the most persuasive one in the circumstances and giving regard to the contractual terms.

258 Considering the evidence and argument on Niko's obligations, the Tribunals concluded that

... no directly applicable contractual or other legal obligation has been identified which required, at the time of the blowouts, a specific act or omission the breach of which by Niko was causal for the blowouts.

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259 When considering the sources relevant for this standard, the Tribunals noted that they generally recognise the diversity of situations that arise in the performance of operations such as the Chattak wells. Mr Wright, for instance, insisted on the specific nature of drilling and well control, and highlighted the extent to which these operations depend on the circumstances of each well:

The drilling of oil and gas wells, unless there are specific laws in the country of operations that must be followed, is left to the operator to determine the best course of action for their situation. That is, there are 50 shades of grey in attempting to determine a reasonable course of action.

260 The Tribunals note the expression of Mr Abel:

... the people who taught me to drill said the hole speaks to you, listen to what it is saying ...

261 With respect to the application of the Prudent Operator Standard, the Tribunals concluded from these explanations:

While in many respects the operator has the choice of the most suitable way of proceeding, it must exercise this choice in a responsible manner, ensuring both safety and efficiency. The standard to be followed thus is one of professional competence and responsibility.63

262 When applying these considerations to the specific events of the two blowouts, the Tribunals examined the specific circumstances at the location of the wells, in particular the characterisation of “shallow gas”; with respect to the design a particularly relevant consideration related to the depth of the casing of the wellbore. The Tribunals analysed the evidence about the events of the blowout. The noted that the drilling had started on 31 December 2004, traversed the Upper Marine Shale and Sands 1 and 2 until it reached on 7 January 2005 (day 8 since the spud the depth of 807m. The drilling crew then performed a wiper trip. When the drilling bid had been raised to 466m, gas entered the well and quickly developed into the blowout. The details of this event described in Section 8.2 of the Decision on Liability; further information is contained below in Section 9.1.2.

263 The Tribunals considered the causes for the blowout and concluded that it was most likely due to “swabbing” during the wiper trip. They concluded that the shallow casing created a risk that the drilling crew failed to master.


63 Decision on Liability, paragraph 479.

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264 With respect to the design the Tribunals considered the “risk trade-off made in the casing design setting depth”. They considered:

Two assumptions are essential in this “trade-off”: the kick tolerance must be reasonable, and the drilling crew must be able to “execute the necessary well control operations”. As just explained, the Claimant has not established that the Chattak 2 design had a “reasonable kick tolerance”. The reliance on the capability of the drilling crew meant that any error of that crew causing the kick tolerance to be exceeded would be fatal.

265 On this basis the Tribunals concluded that Niko's design of the Chattak 2 well did not meet the reasonable operator standard:

The Tribunal concludes that, irrespective of the qualification of the crew, a design that relied on the crew's capability to master the necessary well control operations, in the circumstances of the Chattak 2 Well and despite the availability of safe alternatives, was excessively risky, failed to adequately take into account safety concerns, and thus was not in compliance with the reasonable operator standard. Niko's design breached its obligations under Article 26.2.4 of the JVA.64

266 With respect to the qualification of the drilling crew, the Tribunals concluded that it "met the requirements of the certification and experience ordinarily expected of a drilling crew”; but Niko did not take adequate precautions to prepare the drilling crew to face the risks caused by the chosen design and to ensure that it was able to control the well especially when tripping through the targeted shallow reservoir.65

267 The Tribunals held that Niko also breached its prudent operator obligation by failing to ensure the safety of the drilling operation. They concluded that

... the drilling crew was not properly prepared for dealing with the risk that Niko had created by its well design. The resulting failure of the drilling crew to control the well caused the blowout. Niko's failure to ensure the safety of the drilling operation cannot be reconciled with the prudent operator standard. Niko breached its obligation under the JVA.66

268 The Tribunals then considered the second blowout when Mr Robert Grace and his company GSM Consulting Petroleum Engineers drilled the Chattak 2A relief well. The Tribunals considered the events of this blowout which was


64 Decision on Liability, paragraph 851. 65 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 863 and 875. 66 Decision on Liability, paragraph 914.

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attributed to a premature and inadvertent communication of the relief well with the blowout well.67

269 Concerning Niko's scope of responsibility with respect to the Chattak 2A blowout, the Tribunals noted agreement between the Parties that, in case of a blowout, Niko as the Operator had to engage a competent specialist to deal with the blowout. Based on its examination of Niko's obligations under the JVA, the Tribunals concluded that

drilling relief wells is not an operation in Niko's scope of work and responsibilities under the JVA. A contract concluded by Niko for provision of this service, therefore, is not a subcontract for the performance of which Niko is responsible as if it was its own performance under the JVA.

270 The obligations of Niko with respect to the control and extinction of the Chattak 2 well blowout consisted in selecting and engaging the relief well specialist:

If this obligation was performed in line with the standard of a prudent operator, Niko has met its obligation. It is not responsible for the performance of the work of this specialist and not liable for any defects in its performance of the relief well operations.68

271 The Tribunals examined the manner in which Niko selected and engaged Mr Grace as relief well contractor. They found that Mr Grace was “one of the few internationally recognised experts for relief operations”. They had no reason to doubt the solidity of his reputation. The Tribunals also examined the process by which Mr Grace was selected and the Respondents' criticism in this respect. They concluded:

... Mr Grace was suitably qualified for performing the Chattak 2A relief operation and that Niko could rely on his determination that he was so qualified. When engaging Mr Grace, Niko met the standard of conduct of a prudent operator under Article 26.2.4 of the JVA.69

272 The experts discussed the relief well strategy adopted by Mr Grace and his implementation of the relief operation. The Tribunals concluded that

... the experts' observations about the relief well strategy of Mr Grace and its implementation do not justify the conclusion that the relief operation itself was performed in breach of the prudent operator and the Petroleum


67 Decision on Liability, paragraph 934. 68 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 949 and 950. 69 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 954 and 977.

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Industry Standard. The performance of the relief operation leading to the blowout of Chattak 2A did not constitute a breach of the requirements of Article 26.2.4 JVA, assuming it was applicable to this performance.70

273 The Claimant had sought to rely on limitation of its liability. It argued that, in the hypothesis of a breach by Niko, BAPEX, as the joint venture partner, must be held to have shared this liability and that, in any event, Niko's liability was limited under the JVA: The Respondents denied any shared liability and did not agree that Niko's liability was limited under the JVA.

274 In support of its argument about a shared liability, the Claimant had asserted that BAPEX approved the well design and that it withheld information relevant information.

275 The Tribunals observed that Niko had prepared the well design and chose the relief well contractor. The Tribunals did “not accept that BAPEX's failure to object to the design or its approval of the design reduces Niko's liability". With respect to the allegedly withheld information, the Tribunals concluded:

The Claimant has not shown that the information allegedly withheld by BAPEX was of a nature that it could have required a different risk assessment, leading to a different design solution. Even if the Claimant's allegation were correct, this would not affect Niko's liability, as found by the Tribunal.71

276 The Claimant relied on the limitation of liability under Section 73 of the Bangladesh Contract Act which is worded as follows:

Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract

73. When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.

Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.


70 Decision on Liability, paragraph 982. 71 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 996 and 1001.

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277 The Claimant also relied on Article 27 of the JVA which, in the relevant parts, reads as follows:

27.1 While conducting Petroleum Operations, OPERATOR shall take necessary measures in accordance with generally accepted standards of the international petroleum industry, for conservation, safety of life, property, crops, fishing and fisheries, navigation, protection of environment, prevention of pollution and safety and health of personnel, including but not limited to

[...]

27.2 Bear responsibility in accordance with laws applicable in Bangladesh for any loss or damage to third Parties caused by the wrongful or negligent acts or omissions of the OPERATOR or the OPERATOR employees or sub-Contractor's or sub Contractor's employees and indemnify BAPEX and the Government against all claims and liabilities in respect thereof. Under no circumstances shall a Party be liable to the other Party for any consequential loss or damage including but not limited to lost profits or lost production or other consequential loss or damage resulting from pollution.

278 The Parties argued extensively about the exact meaning of these provisions under the Law of Bangladesh as applied by the courts of the country and in other common law jurisdictions.

279 With respect to Section 73 of the Contract Act, the Tribunal reached the following conclusion:

Section 73 of the Contract Act is clear on its face insofar as, in the first paragraph, it specifies the two types of losses or damage that must be compensated in case of a breach, those which naturally arise and those known by the parties to be likely. The former are recoverable whether or not the particular defendant was conscious of the consequences (because contract breakers are held to what the reasonably expected consequences of their acts), whereas the latter, often referred to as “special”, require proof of specific contextual understanding of the parties.

[...]

The second paragraph of Section 73 excludes “such compensation”, i.e. compensation provided by the preceding paragraph. It follows that even where the specific contextual understanding was that a particular type of damage might flow from non-performance, it will nevertheless not be

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recoverable if it is “remote and indirect”. The Tribunal considers that this does not “go beyond” the Hadley v. Baxendale rule; it might rather be suggested that the available compensation is more clearly restricted.

In any case, the Tribunal will apply Section 73 as it is written; even loss or damage which the parties knew would likely arise in a case of breach is excluded if remote and indirect.72

280 Having examined the wording of Article 27 of the JVA, the argument of the Parties, decided cases and the use of terms “consequential loss and damage”, the Tribunal saw no basis for distinguishing the loss or damage that remains compensable under Article 27.2 from that which is compensable under Section 73, first paragraph. With respect to the exclusion of loss of profit, the Tribunals concluded:

Article 27.2 of the JVA, second sentence, does not exclude liability for any lost profit and lost production; it excludes liability for such losses only insofar as they are consequential and not direct.

[...]

... loss of profit may be direct and thus not excluded by Article 27.2 of the JVA.

[...]

... direct loss or damage from pollution is not excluded.73

281 Noting the difference in the claims, the Tribunals concluded that the “question whether the losses claimed are direct or consequential, remote or indirect thus will have to be considered distinctly with respect to each of the claims.” They announced that this would have to be done in the next phase of the Arbitration. Considering an argument of the Claimant relying on the rare occurrence of blowouts and concluding that damage by such occurrences was remote, the Tribunals stated that

...the relevant question is not whether blowouts, as they occurred in the present case, are ordinary in the course of things in the oil and gas industry. Section 73 of the Contract Act does not refer to ordinary events in the context of the contract performance in general but to loss or damage caused in the usual course of things “from such breach”.74


72 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 1016, 1018 and 1019. 73 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 1138, 1142 and 1144. 74 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 1148 and 1149.

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282 While the claims for different items of loss were reserved for the next phase of the proceedings, one item of claim was ready for an immediate decision: the gas lost as part of the first blowout. The Tribunals made the following determination:

The breach of Niko's obligations as Operator under the JVA, as determined in the present decision, was the immediate cause of the first blowout. This blowout was driven by gas escaping from the reservoir with the effect described. The gas that escaped during this blowout was lost. It is therefore clear without the need for further argument and evidence that the gas that escaped from the Chattak 2 Well as part of the first blowout and the corresponding loss of production are direct losses caused by Niko's breaches for which the Claimant is liable. The exclusion of Article 27.2 of the JVA does not apply to them.

283 Finally, the Tribunals considered an argument of the Respondents based on the wording of Article 27.2 of the JVA which applied liability of “a Party” to "the other Party”. The Respondents argued that the limitation of liability provision did not apply to the claims by the Government and Petrobangla which were not included in the contractual definition of “Party”. The Tribunals concluded that

... the words in the exclusion clause in the JVA which refer to liability “to the other Party” do not restrict the scope of that clause. Niko's liability must be determined under the JVA including the exclusion clause of that agreement. The Government and Petrobangla as assignors are bound by this determination within the limits resulting from the exclusion clause.75

284 On the basis of these considerations and conclusions, the Tribunals decided Niko's liability on 28 February 2020 in terms recorded below in Section 5.4.

285 The Respondents subsequently requested a correction of the Decision on Liability as the Tribunals had inadvertently omitted to include Messrs Asif and Ghani in the list of the Respondents' counsel. On 6 March 2020, the Tribunals issued a correction, adding their names and addresses to paragraph 15 of the Decision on Liability.


75 Decision on Liability, paragraph 1158.

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4.3 The Corruption Claim

4.3.1 The Proceedings on the Corruption Claim

286 BAPEX's Memorial on Damages of 25 March 2016 (BMD) started with a section entitled “Niko procured the JVA and GPSA through corruption”. BAPEX requested that the Tribunals

  1. Declare that Niko procured the Joint Venture Agreement between BAPEX and Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd of 16 October 2003 through corruption;
  2. Declare that Claimant is not entitled to use the international arbitration system to pursue claims related to the JVA;
  3. Declare that the JVA is voidable, recognize BAPEX's invocation of its right to void the JVA, and treat the JVA as void.76

287 BAPEX sought dismissal of the Claimant's claims and a declaration that it was "entitled to compensation for all of its losses arising from Niko's corrupt procurement of the JVA, including all losses resulting from the two blowouts that occurred at the Chattak Field”. In the alternative, should the Tribunals determine that the JVA was not voidable or voided, BAPEX sought compensation as specified above.

288 In a letter of the same date, Petrobangla relied on BAPEX's presentation of the facts and requested the Tribunals to find that “the GPSA was procured by corruption and is voidable”. Petrobangla requested that Niko's claims based on the GPSA be rejected and the Tribunal's decision on the Payment Claim be vacated.77

289 Subsequently, the Respondents pursued their respective corruption claims jointly.

290 In the BMD, BAPEX stated that “BAPEX and Petrobangla now have evidence that both the JVA and GPSA were procured by corruption” and it asserted that “new evidence of corruption recently obtained by BAPEX fundamentally change the nature of these proceedings”. BAPEX explained:

According to the corruption case currently proceeding against former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and 10 other defendants in the criminal courts of Bangladesh, Niko used bribe money and corrupt influence to


76 BMD, paragraph 400 and Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 379. 77 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 380.

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obtain the Joint Venture Agreement with BAPEX. The accused include the former President of Niko Bangladesh and the former Law Minister on whose legal opinion the Prime Minister relied.

291 The Respondents explained during the proceedings on the Corruption Claim that a vast investigation had been carried out in cooperation among the Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The investigation also concerned other companies and generated vast amounts of material on which the Respondents and which was disclosed gradually during the proceedings on the Corruption Claim.

292 The Tribunals started these proceedings by inviting on 18 April 2016, the Claimant to comment on the applications by the Respondents; and the Respondents to comment on the consequences of the avoidance of the GPSA and the JVA.

293 In its response of 29 April 2016, the Claimant argued that the Corruption Issue now raised by the Respondents had been known for a long time and had been considered by the Tribunals in their Decision on Jurisdiction. This decision was final and binding and could not be reopened. If, however, the Decision were reopened, BAPEX had not offered any justification for doing so. In any event, Petrobangla's request to rescind the GPSA, “an agreement that had expired by its own terms years ago”, was frivolous and should “summarily be rejected".

294 The Respondents confirmed their position that “Niko cannot seek any relief from this Tribunal” and modified the relief requested, no longer arguing that the agreements were voidable but seeking a declaration that the “JVA is void, or in the alternative, declare that the JVA is voidable”. They stated:

Respondents first ask that the Tribunal recognize that the JVA and GPSA are void under Bangladeshi law and without legal effect. In the alternative, Respondents maintain their request to void the agreements.

295 Concerning the consequences of the avoidance of the agreements, the Respondents stated that “no credit would be due to Niko for performance under the JVA”. They concluded:

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents submit that Niko is not entitled to any payment or credit for past performance. As a result of Niko's corruption, the Tribunal should reject all of Niko's claims and any attempt by Niko to have the Tribunal give it a benefit for its corrupt acts. In addition, in accordance with the above, Respondents would like to modify their requests to the Tribunal.

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296 On 10 May 2016 the Respondents filed several requests concerning the evidence for their Corruption Claim, concerning evidence from the investigation in Canada, information from the Claimant's previous counsel and documentation concerning “transfers and/or payments of funds between 2001 and 2006” which they had requested previously from the Claimant. The Respondents expressed confidence that no further evidence was required to justify the relief requested, adding that “we do not at this time seek an order compelling the production of documents by Niko”.

297 The Tribunals considered the Parties' initial explanations and in Procedural Order No 13 of 26 May 2016, gave first directions about the manner in which it intended to deal with the Corruption Claim. They noted that their jurisdiction to decide the Corruption Issue had not been contested and decided to consider the Respondents' claims in this respect.

298 The Tribunals recognised the seriousness of corruption and the responsibility they had for the protection of international public policy. In PO No 13, the Tribunals described their approach to dealing with the Corruption Claim in the following terms:

The Tribunals are conscious of the seriousness of corruption offenses. In their Decision on Jurisdiction, they have recognised that, as a principle of international public policy, the prohibition of bribery overrides the general principle of party autonomy otherwise widely upheld in international and comparative law. The Tribunals have noted that other ICSID tribunals have taken the initiative of examining alleged acts of corruption without being restricted by the specific allegations of the Respondents and their burden of proof with respect to them. Mindful of their responsibility for upholding international public policy, the Tribunals will therefore examine the corruption charges that have been raised by the Respondents.

299 The Tribunals decided that they would, “as a matter of priority examine whether the JVA and/or the GPSA were procured by corruption” and ordered:

The proceedings on all issues other than the Corruption Issue and the Claimant's Request for Interim Measures of 19 May 2016 are suspended.

300 In PO No 13, the Tribunals addressed the Respondents' evidentiary requests and gave directions for the proceedings on the Corruption Claim and invited both the Claimant and the Respondents to provide an account of the negotiations for the two Agreements, identifying inter alia the persons involved in the negotiations, both on the side of Niko and on the side of Petrobangla, BAPEX and the Government of Bangladesh. The Tribunals also gave other

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instructions concerning evidence and announced its intention to hold a procedural consultation, once the requested initial information had been received.

301 Following submissions from the Parties and further instructions by Procedural Order No 14 of 29 July 2016, a Procedural Consultation was held on 10 August 2016 by telephone to discuss the further organization of the Corruption Claim procedure, addressing a “List of Issues” which the Tribunals had sent in advance of the consultation. The Parties agreed on simultaneous document production, followed by a written memorial in which the Respondents were to set out their allegations concerning the procurement by corruption of the JVA and the GPSA, accompanied by the relevant evidence. The Claimant was then to respond in the form of a written memorial containing its case in defence, also accompanied by evidence. The Respondents further requested a second round of written submissions.

302 The Tribunals prepared Summary Minutes of this procedural consultation and sent them on 25 August 2016 to the Parties in draft form together with the draft of Procedural Order No 15. These drafts were discussed at another Procedural Conference by telephone on 1 September 2016.

303 Procedural Order No 15 of 7 October 2016 confirmed the steps in the procedure and the procedural timetable as previously discussed with the Parties and settled a number of issues concerning in particular the scope of the Tribunals’examination, including the Target Period, the collection of evidence, the requested interventions of the Tribunals with respect to the Canadian Investigation.

304 With respect to the scope of their examination of the alleged corruption, the Tribunals noted that the Respondents insisted that the Tribunals' Decision on Exclusivity entailed an augmented responsibility with respect to the Corruption Claim and the need for a broad enquiry. Although they asserted that Niko's alleged corruption was proven by the information and evidence that they had received, the Respondents requested from the start of the proceedings on the Corruption Claim repeatedly interventions by the Tribunals to gather evidence. The Claimant insisted on the adversarial nature of ICSID arbitration proceedings, which require that a party state clearly the case which the other party must meet and the decisions which requires the arbitral tribunal to make.

305 In response to the Parties' arguments and requests, as expressed in the various written submissions and during the Procedural Consultations, the Tribunals reminded the Parties that their function was the decision of claims

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before them, not punishing acts of corruption, as a criminal court would do. They added:

For the reasons previously explained, the Tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction to make these determinations. They are conscious of the responsibility that flows for them from their exclusive jurisdiction and from their general obligations as ICSID tribunals. This may lead them to take their own initiatives in the evidentiary process in accordance with the ICSID Arbitration Rules; but they must preserve and protect the adversarial nature of ICSID proceedings, which requires that each Party clearly state its case and identify the evidence on which it relies so that the other Party has the opportunity to address this case.

306 The Tribunals also clarified that, in the interest of a rational and efficient conduct of the proceedings and in view of their adversarial nature, requests by the Parties that the Tribunals take such initiatives must be justified specifically and “the scope of the evidentiary enquiry must be limited to the issue that has to be decided, namely whether the two agreements were procured by corruption”.

307 The Claimant raised issues of confidentiality and “collateral use” of documents from the Arbitrations in other proceedings, especially in the Alam proceedings. It requested that “protective measures relating to the use or disclosure of documents or information exchanged in connection with the Tribunals' examination” be imposed. The matter was discussed at the Tribunals' consultations with the Parties and directly between the Parties. During the procedural consultation on 1 September 2016, the Parties informed the Tribunals that they had reached an agreement in principle. As no information on that agreement was received, the Tribunals requested to be informed and, until further notice instructed the Respondents' counsel

... not to make any document produced by the Claimant available to any person other than the legal team of their law firm.78

308 Discussions on confidentiality continued.79 In November 2016 the Parties reached agreement specifically with respect to the financial documentation released by the Claimant to the Respondents' financial expert. In PO No 17, the Tribunals defined the terms “Confidential Information” and “Derivative Materials." It had turned out, however, that the information to which confidentiality obligations had to be applied were limited and the Tribunals


78 PO No 15, paragraph 69. 79 See in particular Decision on the Corruption Claim, Section 2.4.7.

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concluded that a general confidentiality regime did not appear necessary at that stage.

309 Following PO No 17, the Respondents objected to the restrictions imposed by the Tribunal, explaining that “forbidding us from sharing information filed in the arbitration with our client, prejudices our ability to present our clients and violates principles of procedural fairness”. The Respondents argued that there was a “growing consensus that transparency and public access to pleadings should be the rule” and concluded:

Counsel for Respondents strongly believe that an order allowing all relevant parties (the Parties to the arbitration, all counsel, and witnesses) to view and use documents submitted to the Tribunals for the purposes of this arbitration with the understanding that such documents should be kept confidential and must not be shared with others would be sufficient. There is no justification to leap to the extraordinary measure of ordering that one Party to the arbitration is prohibited from reviewing the pleadings, exhibits, and witness statements while the other Party has full access to all the materials.

310 In preparation of the April 2017 Hearing, an agreement was reached and confirmed in PO No 19, concerning the use of confidential documents at the hearing and the confidentiality of the transcripts. The Respondents maintained, however, their position “that Respondents, their officers, and Boards of Directors should be provided unfettered access to all materials presented in the course of these proceedings”.80

311 The timetable ordered by the Tribunals provided for a Memorial on the Corruption Claim by the Respondents, preceded by simultaneous document production and indications on persons available for testimony at the Hearing and followed by the Claimant's Counter-Memorial. Prior to the second round of written submissions (Respondents' Reply and Claimant's Rejoinder), a Status Conference was scheduled. After the second exchange a Prehearing Conference was scheduled, followed by a Hearing on the Corruption Claim in Paris, from 24 to 28 April, with 29 April 2017 in reserve. Post-Hearing Submissions were reserved.

312 The Respondents produced their Memorial on Corruption on 23 November 2016. The Memorial was accompanied by Annex A (a chart depicting payments and influence), exhibits, legal authorities and witness statements


80 PO No 9, paragraph 15 and Decision on the Corruption Claim paragraphs 244 – 247; for the arrangements at the hearing itself, see paragraph 253.

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by Mr Ferdous Ahmed Kahn, Mr Muhammad Imaduddin, Mr Md. Nural Islam, Ms Debra LaPrevotte Griffith and Mr Md. Maqbul-E-Elahi.

313 The Claimant filed its Counter-Memorial on the Corruption Claim on 11 January 2017, accompanied exhibits, legal authorities and by witness statements by Mr Brian Adolph, Mr Amit Goyal and Mr William Hornaday and an expert report by Mr Christopher P. Moyes. An updated version of this Counter-Memorial was produced on 31 January 2017.

314 The Respondent's Reply on the Corruption Claim was filed on 22 February 2017, accompanied by exhibits and legal authorities and by a witness statement by Mr Khairuzzaman Chowdhury and second witness statements by Ms LaPrevotte Griffith and Mr Khan.

315 The Claimant filed its Rejoinder on the Corruption Claim on 5 April 2017, accompanied by exhibits and legal authorities and a further witness statement by Mr Adolph.

316 Further to the procedural timetable a Status Conference was held between the first and second exchange on 30 January 2017, at which the Tribunals considered pending issues. The Tribunals provided to the Parties summary minutes of the conference.

317 After the completion of the written exchanges a Pre-Hearing Conference was held on 10 April 2017 by telephone, where the Tribunals were represented by their President. The Tribunals provided summary minutes to the Parties.

318 The Hearing on the merits of the Corruption Claim was held at the ICC Hearing Centre in Paris from 24 to 29 April 2017. It was attended by the full Tribunals, the Tribunal Secretary, the Parties counsel and representatives and, as witnesses Mr Adolph, Mr Hornaday and Mr Goyal, named by the Claimant, and Ms LaPrevotte Griffith, Mr Khan, Mr Islam, Mr Elahi and Mr Chowdhury, named by the Respondents, and by Mr Moyes as expert named by the Claimant. Mr Imaduddin and Mr Islam, who had provided witness statements were not called to testify.

319 The Parties were given an opportunity to examine the experts and fact witnesses, developed their arguments orally, and responded to questions from the Tribunals. In the course of the April 2017 Hearing, the Parties introduced additional documents. Among these documents was a marked-up version of Exhibit R-320, produced as Hearing Exhibit CH-19, representing all payments by Niko or its agents/consultants which, in the Respondents' view, the Tribunals had to consider when examining the corruption allegations. The exhibit frequently was referred to as the “Spider Web”.

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320 Sound recordings and verbatim transcripts, labelled as confidential, were made of the April 2017 Hearing and deposited in the Centre's archives. Copies of the confidential transcripts were distributed to the counsel and the Tribunals in accordance with the agreed confidentiality provisions. Summary Minutes prepared by the Tribunals were provided to the Parties.

321 Following the April 2017 Hearing, the Tribunal sent to the Parties as Annex A to the Procedural Order No 20 of 17 May 2017 a list of questions.

322 The Parties submitted their First Post-Hearing Submissions on 12 July 2017; the Respondents' submission was replaced on 13 July 2017 by a corrected version. The Respondents were ordered to submit a corrected version, respecting the agreed limit; they did so on 20 July 2017. Further to the agreed confidentiality arrangements the Parties subsequently filed a redacted version of their First Post-Hearing Brief.

323 The Parties filed confidential, unredacted versions of their Second Post- Hearing Submissions on 2 August 2017 and redacted versions on 4 August and 8 August 2017.

324 During the period following PO Nos 13, 14 and 15 discussed above, the Tribunals issued in the proceedings on the Corruption Claim the following Procedural Orders:

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325 The Decision on the Corruption Claim was issued on 25 February 2019. It gave rise to an issue addressed in PO No 23 of 24 May 2019, concerning Redactions in the Decision on the Corruption Claim and publication of the redacted Decision on the ICSID Website.

326 Shortly after the Respondents had presented their expanded Corruption Claim in their BMD of 29 April 2016, Professor Samsul Alam filed on 9 May 2016, a Writ Petition before the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court seeking a decision that the two Niko Agreements were void ab initio. Like the Respondents in the BMD, Professor Alam relied on Article 102 of the Bangladesh Constitution. On 24 August 2017, the Respondents informed the Tribunal that the High Court Division had rendered its decision and had, on 24 August 2017, announced it orally (the Alam Judgment): the Court declared the JVA and the GPSA “to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and thus void ab initio”. The assets of Niko and Niko Canada, including their shareholding in interest in Tullow Bangladesh Limited concerning Block-9 were attached.

327 This judgment gave rise to renewed correspondence by the Parties and submissions on 21 December 2017. It was considered in Section 6.4 of the Decision on the Corruption Claim

328 During the procedure leading to the Decision on the Corruption Claim numerous incidents and applications occurred and had to be dealt with by the Tribunals. They are described in detail in the Decision on the Corruption Claim. In particular, the Tribunals described the evidence that was available to the authorities in Bangladesh, and the evidence the Respondents made available in the Arbitration and the steps they requested the Tribunals to undertake. The Tribunals limit themselves here to highlight some of the issues that arose during the procedure.

329 The Scope of the Tribunals'enquiry and the Target Period: the Respondents alleged that Niko systematically engaged in corruption over a long period; it was only thus that, according to the Respondents, Niko obtained not just the conclusion of the JVA and the GPSA but also the various steps that preceded these agreements, especially the JVA. The Respondents stated that BAPEX and Petrobangla were not corrupted but they were instructed by corrupted members of the Government to conclude the JVA and the GPSA.

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330 The Respondents insisted that the Tribunals' Decision on Exclusivity entailed an augmented responsibility with respect to the Corruption Claim and the need for a broad enquiry. Although they asserted that Niko's alleged corruption was proven by the information and evidence they had obtained, the Respondents, from the start of the proceedings on the Corruption Claim, repeatedly requested interventions by the Tribunals to gather evidence. The Claimant insisted on the adversarial nature of ICSID arbitration proceedings, requiring that a party state clearly the case which the other party must meet and the decisions which it requests the arbitral tribunal to make.

331 The Tribunals had sought to define the scope of their enquiry and its limits from the outstart, especially by PO No 15. The Tribunals clarified that they were not a criminal court but were tasked with resolving an inter partes dispute. Concerning the period that had to be considered in the enquiry (the Targeted Period):

The Tribunals note that the principal focus of the corruption enquiry pertains to the circumstances of the conclusion of the JVA and the allegation that it was procured by acts of corruption attributable to Niko. The Parties agree that the relevant period begins sometime in 2001 and continues until the conclusion of the JVA on 16 October 2003. The Tribunals moreover accept the Respondents' observation to the effect that this period should be extended to the time immediately following signature of the JVA, in the event that evidence emerges of payments triggered by it.

Thus the relevant period of time comprises the years 2001 to 2003 as well as the period immediately following the conclusion of the JVA until the end of the first quarter of 2004 (“Targeted Period").

332 During the proceedings that followed, the Tribunals had to respond to repeated requests from the Respondents to extend the enquiry. The Respondents had declared and continued to state that they had presented “more than ample evidence of Niko's corruption”; but they requested the Tribunals to take action to obtain further information. Some of these requests were raised in the context of the Status Conference on 30 January 2017, after the first round of submissions. On 26 January 2017, the Respondents wrote in preparation of the Status Conference:

Respondents maintain their position that the Corruption Issue merits the fullest possible inquiry by the Tribunals even though Respondents put on more than ample evidence of Niko's corruption in the Memorial, and these Tribunals have the information necessary to find that the JVA and GPSA were procured by corruption. Despite our best efforts and the significant

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amount of evidence gathered, there is additional specific evidence known to exist that has thus far not been available to Respondents or the Tribunals.81

333 In this letter and at the Status Conference, the Respondents also requested that the Target Period be extended. In PO No 18 the Tribunals addressed this request and made the following comments about the scope of their enquiry:

In their letter of 26 January 2017 the Respondents requested that the Target Period be extended beyond the time fixed in Procedural Order No 15. In support of this request the Respondents argued that, prior to the BNP government, Niko laid the grounds for corruption and for making payments with the objective of corruption. While confirming that the corrupt system within the Government was limited to the period under the BNP Government between 2001 and 2006, the Respondents stated that the Sheikh Hasina Government was not corrupted but individual actors may have been. The Respondents continue to hold that the FoU was tainted by corruption and request that the Target Period be extended to the time prior to the BNP Government. The Respondents state that after the end of the BNP Government in early 2007, no corrupt payments were received by the Government from Niko.66

The Tribunals repeat here what they have pointed out at previous occasions: they are not a criminal investigator or court charged with punishing acts of corruption. Their mandate at this stage of these arbitrations is to determine whether the JVA and the GPSA were obtained by corruption. Acts of corruption which were not causal for the conclusion of the two agreements do not appear to be decisive for this determination.

It is the Respondents' case that BAPEX and Petrobangla themselves were not corrupted but were instructed by corrupted members of the Government to execute the JVA and the GPSA. No such corrupted Government instructions are alleged for the period prior to the BNP government. The Tribunals, therefore, see no justification for extending their examination beyond the Target Period, as defined in Procedural Order No 15. They do not exclude, however, evidence outside the Target Period and will consider it.82

334 The corruption on which the Respondents relied in their Corruption Claim of 2016, had been the subject of intensive prior investigations in Bangladesh,


81 Respondents' letter of 26 January 2017 in preparation of the Status Conference on 30 January 2017. 82 PO No 18, paragraphs 102 – 104.

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Canada and the USA and a Joint Investigation between the authorities of these countries: The Respondents explained that, as soon as the BNP Government left office, the corruption during that period became the object of criminal investigations. BAPEX stated in its Memorial on Damages that the caretaker government, installed in Bangladesh on 12 January 2007, “spearheaded a massive anti-graft campaign, resulting in the arrest of the former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and others involved in the Niko corruption". The investigation in Bangladesh was conducted by the Anti- Corruption Commission of Bangladesh (ACC).

335 Mr Ferdous Ahmed Khan described the investigations in Bangladesh in his witness statements and explained that the “Bangladeshi investigative teams were multidisciplinary groups made up of higher-level officials from different departments [...] working in concert with the Governments of Canada and the United States”. He played a key role in this investigation. Since 2007 he and his company Octokhan had been

... formally engaged to provide key strategic services to the Anti- Corruption Commission of Bangladesh, initially through the National Coordination Committee against Grievous Offences (‘NCCAGO') and then directly to the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Office of the Attorney General for Bangladesh and other agencies. [He] was appointed Special Assistant to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on corruption matters in 2009 and [his] appointment was renewed in 2014.

336 With respect to Niko, the ACC contacted the Canadian authorities, specifically the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which had started an investigation of Niko following the payment of travel expenses in the USA and the incident of the Toyota Landcruiser that had been delivered in June 2005 to a State Minister who resigned shortly thereafter, when the delivery of the car became public.83 In the Niko matter, the ACC was also in contact with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which took interest in the case because Mr Sharif, Niko's consultant and for some time Head of Niko's Bangladesh subsidiary, was a U.S. citizen.

337 The three organisations cooperated closely and shared the resulting evidence in the “Joint Investigation”. Mr Khan explained in his witness statement:

The vast majority of that evidence was gathered in Bangladesh in joint efforts between Canadian and Bangladeshi officials. This evidence was then given to the RCMP through the mutual legal assistance process to be


83 The incident is described in detail at Section 10.1 of the Decision on the Corruption Claim, mentioned also below in Section 7.5.6.4.

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processed, indexed and scanned to create a common source for the use of both countries and U.S. law enforcement agencies. It was returned to Bangladesh through the mutual legal assistance process and the RCMP stamp simply indicates that it has been shared with the RCMP, not that it was originally provided by Canada.

338 The Canadian investigations were conducted by Corporal Kevin Paul Duggan, a member of the RCMP. The Respondents highlighted the importance of this investigation:

According to Corporal Duggan, the Niko investigation involved assistance of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, City of London Police, the World Bank, and the United States Department of Justice, eight completed Mutual Legal Requests, 16 Production Orders, and 20 people interviewed in six different countries.84

339 The investigations in the USA were conducted by Ms Debra LaPrevotte Griffith, Supervisory Special Agent at the FBI, where she had “instituted the agency's Kleptocracy Program” and had “seized more than $1 billion in corrupt proceeds”. In her first witness statement she explained that the FBI “was informed of numerous corruption investigations opened in Bangladesh", adding that she addressed first the “cases with a strong to the U.S.”. She travelled four or five times to Bangladesh and worked closely with the Bangladesh investigators, in particular the ACC. She explained:

Niko was one such case, because Niko used a U.S. citizen as one of its so-called consultants in Bangladesh and eventually made him President of its subsidiary in Bangladesh.

340 At the April 2017 hearing, Mr Khan testified that in March 2012 he handed over to Mr Nawaz, the Respondents' then counsel in the Arbitration, the evidence collected from Canada. After Mr Khan had been contacted by Foley Hoag around June 2016, instructed by the Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office and “after due process” he handed over this evidence to the Respondents'new counsel in September 2016.85 In his second witness statement he described the evidence that had been given to Foley Hoag for submission to the Tribunals, consisting of, as quoted above, in its “vast majority" of the evidence gathered in Bangladesh “in joint efforts between


84 Quoted in the Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 814. 85 HT 2017 Day 2 (Confidential), pages 118 – 120, quoted in the Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 841.

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Canadian and Bangladeshi officials” that was “processed, indexed and scanned” in Canada and then returned to Bangladesh.86

341 The Joint Investigation was completed in Canada by the Agreed Statement of Facts, dated 23 June 2011,87 that was considered already in the context of the corruption allegation in the Jurisdiction phase and discussed above in Section 4.1, containing the conviction of Niko for having delivered a Toyota Landcruiser to the State Minister and the covered the non-business-related expenses of his trip to Canada in 2005. Details were described in the Decision on Jurisdiction88 and were summarised in Section 10.1 of the Decision on the Corruption Claim. The Agreed Statement of Facts recorded that “the Crown is unable to prove that any influence was obtained as a result of providing the benefits to the Minister". The Tribunals note that no other alleged acts of corruption were held against Niko in Canada.

342 In the United States the proceedings were discontinued. Ms LaPrevotte Griffith expressed her conviction that “the F.B.I. had a strong case to seize and forfeit the corruptly obtained assets of the U.S. citizen employed by Niko”, i.e. Mr Sharif, the principal representative of Niko during the negotiations for the JVA. She also asserted that “there was never any question of a lack of evidence that Niko engaged in bribery”.

343 Nevertheless, the United States Department of Justice determined in August 2011, “that it will discontinue its inquiry into potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by Niko Resources Ltd. (Niko)”. The Department explained:

While we have determined that prosecution is not necessary at this time in light of Niko's guilty plea in Canada, this letter should not be taken as an indication that we do not have concerns about Niko's compliance with FCPA.89

344 The Department strongly encouraged Niko to adopt and implement policies and attached a “Corporate Compliance Program” to its letter. It also pointed out that “the Department may decide to restart this inquiry at any time”. The Tribunals have not been informed of any other action taken in the United States against Mr Sharif or Niko in relation to the project in Bangladesh.


86 WS II of Mr Khan, paragraph 10. 87 Exhibit R-215. 88 Decision on Jurisdiction, Section 9.2. 89 Letter of the U.S. Department of Justice to Baker Botts of 11 August 2011, produced as Exhibit D to the Statement of Kristine Robidoux, Q.C. of 6 September 2011, Exhibit C-222; see also Decision on Jurisdiction, paragraph 390.

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345 The evidence from the Joint Investigation was introduced in the Arbitrations with delay and piecemeal:

346 When the Respondents first raised allegations about corruption in 2011, they referred to the Canadian conviction based on the gifts to the Minister. In the context of a document production request, the Respondents made reference to the ACC investigations.90 At the hearing in October 2011, the Respondents' counsel stated that an “investigation was going by the ACC and they have seized some files from Petrobangla” and the Claimant produced a charge sheet of which the Respondents' counsel was unaware. The Tribunals noted that “no further evidence was provided about the investigation by the ADD”.91 The Respondents made no reference to the evidence from the Joint Investigation, neither at the Hearing in October 2011 nor after March 2016 when, according to Mr Khan, this evidence had been made available to them; and the did not indicate that they had made any requests to access that evidence.

347 When they renewed the corruption allegation in the BMD of 25 March 2016, the Respondents identified the ACC as one of the principal sources of evidence for corruption and explained:

The evidence of payments made to obtain the JVA was discovered in the ACC investigation, and no court or tribunal has yet determined the validity of the JVA based on the evidence that it was obtained by bribery.

348 The Respondents added that until recently they did not have access to the evidence collected by the ACC and that BAPEX had not until the week of the filing in March 2016 received information from the ACC “to be able to share some evidence with the Tribunal. No mention was made of the evidence gathered by the ACC in the context of the Joint Investigation that Mr Khan had delivered to BAPEX's counsel in 2012:

Under the Bangladesh Anti Corruption Commission Act, 2004, the ACC is an independent statutory body entrusted with the powers to enquire, investigate, and file corruption cases. The Government has no control over the activities of the ACC and, for obvious reasons, the ACC has no obligation to share information with the Government, much less a company like BAPEX or Petrobangla. Other than the court orders available, BAPEX/Petrobangla have had no information on the content of the ACC investigation or what evidence was being gathered. BAPEX and Petrobangla have requested documentation from the ACC on the Niko


90 Decision on Jurisdiction, paragraph 419. 91 Decision on Jurisdiction, paragraphs 400 and 401; see also Decision on the Corruption Claim, Section 8.2.

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corruption case, and now that the trial has restarted, the ACC provided them with some of the evidence that it recently submitted to the Bangladesh court. Only this week has BAPEX received the information from the ACC to be able to share it with the Tribunal. The full record, however, is still not public and is not yet available to BAPEX.92

349 In the subsequent proceedings on the Corruption Claim, the Respondents pursued a different approach: they did not rely on incomplete information received from the ACC. Instead, they requested “that the Tribunals issue a declaration that could be presented to the court” in Bangladesh. The requested declaration was to support an application of the Writ Petitioner in the Alam proceedings concerning evidence from Mr Khan. The Respondents explained that

... an individual consultant to the ACC, Mr. Ferdous Khan, has “substantial evidence of corruption in procurement of the Impugned Agreements” in his possession. The evidence in Mr. Khan's possession includes shared evidence from the Bangladesh, United States, and Canadian law enforcement investigations. Because this evidence is part of the ACC investigation, without authorization from the ACC or a Bangladeshi court order, such evidence is not available to Respondents or these Tribunals. If the court orders it, then the information should be released and be available for these Tribunals.

350 The Respondents complained that Niko opposed the request by the Writ Petitioner and added that the Petitioner had withdrawn the application requesting to compel Mr Khan to produce evidence.

351 The Respondents' request was considered at the Procedural Consultation on 10 August 2016. The Claimant objected to the Respondents' application. When, according to Mr Khan in September 2016, the Respondents received the evidence from the Joint Investigation, they did not withdraw the application. The Tribunals decided it in Procedural Order No 15 on 7 October 2016:

The Tribunals understand the explanations provided by the Parties about Mr Khan's evidence in the sense that he does not have any direct knowledge of the JVA and the GPSA nor of the alleged corruption; but that he is said to have in his possession evidence on such alleged corruption. There is no information about the evidence which he is said to have, except that Professor Shamsul Alam, in his application to the


92 BMD, paragraphs 39 and 41. ↩

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Supreme Court of Bangladesh, asserted that Mr Khan had in his possession “substantial evidence of corruption in procurement of the Impugned Agreements”.

In these circumstances, the Tribunals see no reason to pursue this allegation any further but leave it to the Parties to produce any relevant evidence which Mr Khan may have.93

352 The Respondents then obtained directly from Mr Khan the evidence for which they previously they had requested the Tribunals' intervention with the court in Bangladesh.

353 The full extent of the Joint Investigation and of the Respondents' access to the evidence gathered by it became clear in Mr Khan's second witness statement of 17 February 2017 and at the hearing in April 2017.

354 The Tribunals saw no indication that the Canadian investigators withheld any evidence and noted Mr Khan's understanding of the joint effort of gathering the evidence which was “processed, indexed and scanned to create a common source for the use of both countries and the U.S. law enforcement agencies”. The Tribunals noted that they had no reason to believe that the RCMP or the FBI withheld any evidence relevant for Niko's alleged corruption. The Tribunals concluded:

... it is now clear to the Tribunals that any intervention of the Tribunals in Canada and the United States are not likely to produce evidence beyond that which is available in Bangladesh and accessible to the Respondents.94

355 In the examination which the Tribunals organised when they addressed the revised Corruption Claim, the examination of financial flows was a central element: the Respondents relied on the World Bank Module on Planning an Investigation of Corruption and described the acquisition and analysis of financial information to “follow the money” as a “key aspect of a corruption inquiry". They requested

... financial documents showing transfers or payments of funds to Bangladesh, including from or on behalf of Niko to Mr Qasim Sharif, Mr AKM Mosharraf Hossain, Mr Giasudding Al Mamun, and Mr Selim Bhuiyan, among others. The study of financial information to track payments that might have been used for corruption must be done by


93 PO No 15, paragraph 56. ↩

94 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 829, highlighted in the original. ↩

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specialized financial experts “including financial investigators and experts in financial analysis, [and] forensic accountants [...]. Thus, Respondents reserve their right to have a financial expert review all financial information presented by Niko.

356 The Respondents also requested that

... Niko be ordered to make its financial records available to an independent financial expert for review. Respondents are prepared to appoint an expert for this purpose and would, of course, agree to have Niko appoint an expert as well. Respondents also believe it would be useful for the Tribunals to appoint its [sic] own expert or experts.

357 The Tribunals considered the Claimant's explanations about the financial records. In PO No 15 they recorded that the Claimant was prepared to produce these records and gave the following directions:

During the September 2016 Procedural Consultation the Claimant stated that it was prepared to produce complete records of all payments to Bangladesh made by any of the companies of the Niko Group. The Tribunals accept this production as a possibly sufficient measure in the production of financial records; but they reserve the right to consider the adequacy of this approach, once the production has been made and the Respondents have had an opportunity of commenting thereon. In particular, the Tribunals reserve the right to order a statement of the auditor of the Niko Group, as it had been announced in the draft of the present Procedural Order prior to the September 2016 Procedural Consultation.

358 Considering that the Niko Group produced consolidated accounts for the fiscal years ending on 31 March, the Tribunals concluded that any payment from a company of the Niko Group to third parties in Bangladesh must be reflected in these consolidated accounts. The Tribunals advised the Claimant to make the necessary preparatory arrangements so that the auditor may produce on short notice

... a statement identifying any payments during the fiscal years ending 31 March 2001 to 31 March 2004 which the Niko Group made to beneficiaries in Bangladesh, including Stratum, identifying each beneficiary and the amounts received. In view of these directions, the Tribunals see no need, at this stage, to make further directions concerning the financial records of the Niko Group.

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359 The Claimant did produce financial records. The Respondents were of the view that the production was insufficient. They produced with their letter of 23 November 2016 an opinion of Duff & Phelps, “a global financial firm with expertise in complex valuation, disputes, compliance, and regulatory consulting, among other topics”. In this opinion, the firm stated:

The documents provided by Niko were unorganised, incomplete, and do not meet the level of documentation needed to conduct a proper corruption examination...

360 In the correspondence leading up to the Status Conference on 30 January 2017, the Respondents made an application concerning the appointment of a financial expert by the Tribunals. In their letter of 26 January 2017, they wrote:

Specifically, Respondents maintain that the Tribunals should reconsider, as envisaged in Procedural Order No. 15, [...] ordering Claimant to open its financial records for the entire relevant period (2001-2006) to review by an independent financial expert.

361 The Claimant responded that the Respondents had produced extensive financial records of third Parties but did not tender any report from a forensic expert. The Claimant added that it did not see any justification why it should commission such a forensic expert concerning its own records. Concerning the Respondents' complaint about the insufficiency of the records on Niko's payments which it had produced, the Claimant asserted that the Respondents did not argue that channels of payment other than those indicated by the Claimant were used; rather they questioned the Claimant's explanations concerning the use of the funds transferred to Bangladesh. The Respondents confirmed that, other than the note by Duff & Phelps, their experts had not produced any opinion on the documents disclosed by the Claimant.

362 The Respondents stated that the Claimant had not provided the necessary information that experts would need to conduct an analysis of possible corruption emanating from Niko's accounts. The Respondents then extended the requested information beyond what had been ordered in PO No 15, requesting on 14 March 2017, correspondence and records of reports, insisting that, according to Duff & Phelps, “complete records” included:

copies of checks, deposit slips, records of electronic transfers, invoices to support payments, receipts, and general legers to understand the payments between Niko, Stratum, Mr Sharif, Mr Bhuiyan, Mr Mamoon and others, including payments through intermediaries and foreign accounts.

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363 The Respondents also requested “all reports by Mr Sharif or Stratum ‘on the use of funds' received from Niko”; and “correspondence and other documents, pertaining to payment negotiations or received by Five Feathers for any services provided”.

364 By the time of that request, the Tribunals had learned from the witness statements of Mr Khan and Ms LaPrevotte Griffith that the Joint Investigation had conducted an extensive collection of evidence for the financial transactions of the Niko Group. In PO No 18, of 23 March 2017 the Tribunals concluded that the Respondents had access to the results of this investigation or, at least, failed to demonstrate that they made diligent efforts to gain such access. The Respondents indeed had shown by some of the evidence produced with their submissions on the Corruption Issue that at least some of the evidence now requested from the Claimant was in their possession. The Tribunals concluded:

In these circumstances, the Tribunals see no justification to order the Claimant to produce documents of a type that had been made available already by the Niko Group and others during the course of the joint investigation and of which at least the “vast majority” is in the possession of the Bangladesh authorities and available to the Respondents. The request is denied.

365 With respect to an allegedly incomplete production of documents in the Respondents' list the production of which had been ordered previously, the Tribunals organised in PO No 18 an exchange to determine with specificity the allegedly incomplete productions. The Tribunals announced that they may draw adverse inferences if it appears to them that the document production remained incomplete and without convincing explanations for missing documents.

366 The Respondents then listed on 31 March 2017 the documents they had received and commented in particular on the financial documents. They explained why they considered these documents as incomplete; quoting the Duff & Phelps opinion reproduced above.

367 In its letter of 7 April 2017, the Claimant referred to the document production orders of the Tribunal in PO Nos 13 and 15 and Niko's commitments to the Tribunals, asserting that there were no outstanding documents or documents responsive to the Tribunals' orders. It also referred to Niko's agreement to produced certain records and asserted that it had fully complied with this agreement and explained that it:

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... disclosed all documents it was able to identify as falling within the above description that are in its possession or control. This included, but was not limited to: complete bank records for the Targeted Period; the pertinent data from IDEAs accounting software respecting the Targeted Period, as well as underlying transactional support (such as invoices, vouchers and cheques where available) for any payments over US$5,000 dollars. With respect to the US$5,000 threshold, as Niko pointed out in its letter of 9 December 2016.95

368 The Respondents declared at the Pre-Hearing Conference that they were not satisfied but declared that they saw “no need for further submissions on the topic". In PO No 19 the Tribunals noted that the new list of correspondence and other documents requested by the Respondents on 14 March 2017 had a “very broad scope”, some failed to identify documents with specificity but instead described subjects of enquiry, yet others were of doubtful relevance – or seemed to be available in Bangladesh. The Tribunals considered that the documents and information sought by the Respondents on 14 March 2017 must have been considered by the Joint Investigation and stated that they saw:

... no justification to initiate now, one year after the Corruption Issue had been raised by the Respondents, such measures which, at best, would be duplicative of the joint investigation performed by organisations of incomparably greater means of investigation.96

369 Other requests by the Respondents focused on evidence allegedly available in Canada: In its Memorial on Damages of 25 March 2016, BAPEX relied on a document referred to as the Duggan Affidavit.97 This is a heavily redacted document, recording the declaration of Corporal Duggan before the Provincial Court of Alberta. The investigation to which this affidavit relates does not concern Niko directly but an officer of the Canadian Government: this officer was accused of having used his office “to lobby on behalf of a private company”. The Respondents explain that that private company was Niko and quote from this document by completing redacted passages a statement that the Canadian investigations “uncovered information that [Niko] used bribes to influence [Bangladesh] public officials in order to secure the Joint Venture Agreement with state-owned [BAPEX]"98


95 Claimant's letter of 7 April 2017, quoted in the Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 929. ↩

96 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 931. ↩

97 BMD, in particular paragraphs 28 and 55; Exhibit R-213. ↩

98 BMD, paragraph 52, quoting from Exhibit R-213, paragraph 6. ↩

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370 This document was at the start of a series of applications by which the Respondents sought evidence from the Canadian investigation. In a first phase, the Respondents requested on 10 May 2016 “an order from the Tribunals to compel Niko's cooperation to seek [a less redacted] version from the Canadian authorities”. The Tribunals denied the request in PO No 14 for reasons of doubtful evidential value and lack of possibilities of questioning Corporal Duggan.

371 The Respondents applied on 9 August 2016 for reconsideration, inviting the Tribunals to make an application to a court under the Canada and Alberta Evidence Act “to order the examination of” Corporal Duggan and “command [his] attendance [...] for the purpose of being examined”. Corporal Duggan thus would be available for cross examination and Niko's due process concerns could be resolved. The Tribunals continued to have doubts about the evidentiary value of Corporal Duggan's testimony and noted that there was no assurance that he would appear at a hearing before the Tribunals.

372 In a letter of 26 January 2017, the Respondents again asked for reconsideration, “seeking evidence from the Canadian investigation". The request was discussed at the Status Conference on 30 January 2017 following which the Respondents provided further details in their letter of 3 February 2017: the Tribunals were invited to make and application to the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench requesting the assistance of the Court in obtaining evidence. The Respondents then proposed on 10 February 2017 a draft of that application on ICSID letterhead but signed by the President of the Tribunals, addressed to the Alberta Court and requesting from that court an order “to compel the testimony and production of documents from the RCMP and testimony from Corporal Kevin Duggan of the RCMP ...”. The draft specified the requested documents and video recordings and the manner in which Corporal Duggan would be interrogated by the Tribunals.

373 One of the requested documents concerned the redacted version of an affidavit of Corporal Kevin Duggan of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) with respect to which they sought assistance in obtaining an un-redacted or less redacted version. Another request concerned information “relating to the ACC and the Canadian investigation and possibly the US investigation” which the law firm of Gowlings Lafleur Henderson LLP, the Claimant's previous counsel, had mentioned during the jurisdictions phase

374 This was followed by a further exchange in which the Claimant on 15 February 2017 and the Respondents on 28 February 2017 discussed further aspects of the application, in particular the question whether in ICSID

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arbitration a tribunal has the power to enlist the assistance of a national court.

375 The Tribunals examined the Parties' arguments and decided the application in PO No 18 of 23 March 2017.

376 Concerning the powers of the Tribunals to make the request to the court in Alberta, the Respondents had quoted Gary Born on International Commercial Arbitration who referred to had referred to some national laws providing that the parties may seek the assistance of a national court in obtaining disclosure of materials for use in the arbitration and who stated:

If carefully applied, in order to assist and not undermine the arbitral process, judicial assistance in evidence-taking should be no different from court-ordered provisional relief in aid of arbitrations – including foreign arbitrations.99

377 While such powers of arbitral tribunals in commercial arbitration were not contested, the Claimant argued that “the ICSID Convention is a self-contained system that does not contemplate parallel resort to national courts”. It referred to Article 26 of the ICSID Convention providing that, unless otherwise stated, consent to ICSID arbitration is “to the exclusion of any other remedy"; the Claimant concluded:

A consequence of the Convention's stand-alone dispute settlement regime is that, contrary to accepted practice in commercial arbitration, resort to national courts for provisional measure in aid of arbitration is not permissible unless the parties explicitly agree to it.

378 The Claimant also quoted from the commentary on the ICSID Convention of Professor Schreuer:

The Convention does not provide for the right of an ICSID tribunal to enlist the assistance of national authorities, notably domestic courts, to obtain evidence. Under Arbitration Rule 39(6), the parties may agree that provisional measures may be requested from domestic courts. But such requests may be made by the parties only. There is no explicit legal basis for a tribunal's request for judicial assistance.100


99 G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed., 2014, pages 2320 and 2420. ↩

100 C. Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention – A Commentary, 2nd ed., 2009, Article 43, at pages 653 – 654, paragraph 52, referenced in the Claimant's letter of 15 February 2017, page 3. ↩

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379 The Tribunals noted that the Convention lays the primary responsibility on the parties to assist tribunals by bringing forward the evidence necessary to the fair disposition of the dispute; nevertheless, it held:

For the purpose of this decision, the Tribunals are content to assume, without finally deciding, that, despite the absence of such an express power, an ICSID tribunal may, in an appropriate case where it is satisfied that a request under Article 43(a) of the Convention would be unavailing, be entitled to issue a request for assistance in the collection of evidence to a national court or (in what would likely be the more suitable step) to permit a party to pursue such a request directly. Although no such power is expressly included in the Convention and Rules, neither is it expressly excluded. It might be said that such a request for assistance, when issued under the control of the tribunal, supports its exclusive jurisdiction and does not undermine it, since it submits no part of that jurisdiction to the national court.101

380 The Tribunals also pointed out that the request which the Respondents invited it to address to the Alberta court would be a very unusual step; indeed the Respondents had not found any precedent. Such a request would be an exception to the general principle, mentioned above, according to which the production of evidence is the responsibility of the parties to an arbitration. The Respondents accepted that such an intervention would be conditional on a number of requirements being met. They identified the requirements under the Canadian Evidence Acts. And they have referred to Article 3.9 of the IBA Evidence Rules, the latter corresponding to a large extent to those of the requirements in Canada.

381 The relevant provisions under the IBA Evidence Rules require that the requested documents are “relevant to the case and material to its outcome” and the requesting party must state that the requested documents are “not in the possession, custody or control” of the requesting party. The Tribunals therefore examined whether the evidence which the request to the Alberta court was available to the Respondents. They observed:

For almost a year the Respondents have sought through various initiatives to involve the Claimant and the Tribunals in gathering evidence of which “the vast majority” is in the possession of the authorities in Bangladesh.


101 PO No 18, paragraph 70. ↩

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382 The Tribunals summarised the varying statements that the Respondents had made about limitations in the availability of the ACC evidence and the Joint Investigation; they asserted that they made efforts to obtain this evidence but gave no explanations about the steps they had taken as part of these alleged efforts. And the Tribunals noted that in his second witness statement, Mr Khan explained that he understood “that providing this evidence to the Arbitral Tribunal is appropriate and the information was given to the Tribunals with the consent of the Government”. The Tribunals concluded:

In these circumstances, the Tribunals do not accept that the Respondents do not have access to the evidence from the joint Bangladeshi/Canadian investigation. The Respondents have not alleged that any of the items of evidence they seek to obtain through the Alberta Court were not included in the “vast majority” of the evidence gathered and exchanged in this investigation. The Tribunals see no justification to intervene with a court in Canada in order to obtain evidence which is available in Bangladesh and of which the Respondents have not shown that it is not accessible to them there.

383 The Tribunals also considered the “relevance and materiality" of the videos and transcripts that the Respondents had identified in the proposed application to the Alberta court. The Claimant had asserted that the material requested was “not properly evidence". While they did not believe that the material as such was excluded as evidence, the Tribunals were of the view that it had to be considered with great caution and considered it of limited probative value. For this reason, too, the Tribunals dismissed the Respondents' request for an application to the Alberta court.

384 After the April 2017 Hearing and after the evidentiary record for the Corruption Claim had been closed by PO No 20 of 17 May 2017, the Respondents wrote to the Tribunals on 23 August 2017, communicating a letter which the Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing of the RCMP had addressed on 21 April 2017 to the Attorney General of Bangladesh (the RCMP letter), in response to a request from the latter dated 26 March 2017.

385 The RCMP Letter described the 26 March 2017 request:

In your letter, you ask that the RCMP meet with your designee, Mr. Ferdous Khan, to discuss your request that the RCMP grant permission for Corporal Kevin Paul Duggan to provide a written statement and be available to be cross-examined in Paris, France during the scheduled hearing (April 24-29, 2017), and to grant permission for Corporal Duggan to use relevant evidence in possession of the RCMP for his witness statement.

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386 The letter continued by describing the RCMP's understanding of PO Nos 14 and 15 as an indication that the Tribunals did “not wish to hear from the RCMP, either through documentary evidence or through witnesses”. The RCMP concluded that it was “unable to voluntarily participate in the matters before the Tribunal”. The letter continued, however, by referring to the possibility of a request from the Tribunal. It did not say that Corporal Duggan would then appear before the Tribunal but that the RCMP “would then consider [the request] before determining how to proceed”. The relevant passage of the RCMP Letter reads as follows:

The RCMP is impartial with regards to the matters before the ICSID. If further involvement is required by either the Claimant (Niko) or Respondents (Bapex and Petrobangla), the RCMP would need a request from the Tribunal, which it would then consider before determining how to proceed.

387 In their letter of 23 August 2017, the Respondents described the RCMP letter as an "invitation” and stated:

The RCMP's invitation opens the possibility for the Tribunals to obtain the RCMP's evidence directly, without having to go through the Canadian Court procedures previously described by the Respondents.

388 The Claimant responded on 25 August 2017 stating that the Respondents' request for “reconsideration, for the essentially the fourth time” of the Tribunals decision concerning requests to the Canadian authorities. They declared that the “Respondents' submission is inadmissible on its face and therefore requires no response".

389 The Tribunals noted that the RCMP letter did not contain an “invitation" to the Tribunals; in case “further involvement” of the RCMP was required by Niko or the Respondents, the RCMP would “consider” and would determine how to proceed. Nor did the Respondents' letter of 23 August 2017 request specific action from the Tribunals. Therefore, the Tribunals informed the Parties on 11 September 2017, that they would address the matter in due course when this may become necessary.

390 In the Decision on the Corruption Claim, the Tribunals pointed out that they had accepted to hear the testimony of Ms LaPrevotte and Mr Khan, two of the investigators. They did not refuse to hear Corporal Duggan, contrary to what the RCMP seemed to have been made to believe. The Respondents failed to bring the correspondence about Corporal Duggan's testimony to the attention of the Tribunals at the Hearing or at any time before the closing of the

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evidentiary record on the Corruption Claim; the Tribunals did not see a justification for re-opening of the evidence. The Tribunals added:

As to the documentary evidence held by the RCMP to which the Respondents made reference in their 23 August 2017 letter, the Tribunals have pointed above to the very close cooperation between three agencies investigating corruption the Niko case. The Respondents have not shown any evidence nor even argued that the RCMP refused a request from the Bangladeshi authorities to share evidence gathered in the Niko investigation. The RCMP letter of 14 April 2017 does not indicate the contrary.102

391 At the April 2017 hearing, Mr Hornaday referred to an investigation (also referred to as “audit”) by Deloitte & Touche Forensic & Investigative Services Inc. Calgary (Deloitte). He mentioned specifically a PowerPoint presentation concerning the result of the investigation. The Respondents requested the production of this presentation and related documents. The Claimant explained that Deloitte was engaged by Gowlings Lafleur Henderson LLP Calgary (Gowling), in support of the legal advice they were providing to Niko Canada. The Claimant produced the Deloitte Engagement Letter 103 and invoked privilege.

392 By PO No 20 of 17 May 2017, the Tribunals ordered the Claimant to produce a list of all relevant documents, identifying those for which privilege was claimed and to produce those for which no privilege had been claimed. The Claimant produced the lists and documents of which some were redacted. The Respondents objected and requested information and documents. The Tribunals gave further directions in PO No 21 of 4 June 2017.

393 In the Claimant's submission on privilege of 22 May 2017 and the Respondents' Response on Privilege of 9 June 2017, the Parties discussed the factual background and argued in particular the rules concerning -Solicitor-Client Privilege and Litigation Privilege in Canadian law. In PO No 22 of 27 July 2017, the Tribunals summarised the factual background:

On the basis of the evidence produced by the Claimant, the Tribunals conclude that around early 2009 Niko Canada became aware of an “investigation of allegations of improper payments made by Niko Resources Ltd. and/or its subsidiary in Bangladesh and other locations”,


102 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraphs 868 and 869. ↩

103 Exhibit C-238. ↩

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that it retained Gowlings who in turn engaged Deloitte to conduct the enquiry.

394 The Tribunals determined that the issues had to be decided on the basis of Canadian law. The explained the difference between Solicitor-Client Privilege and Litigation Privilege in Canadian law. The Tribunals examined the argument and evidence produced and concluded with respect to Solicitor-Client Privilege:

The Tribunals conclude that some and possibly many of the documents for which the Claimant asserts privilege do indeed attract solicitor-client privilege or at least may require redactions. The decision about their production requires further information from the Claimant and an examination of the documents themselves possibly by an independent expert. Before initiating a procedure to this effect and engaging time and resources in it, however, the Tribunals have examined the other basis on which the Claimant asserts privilege.

395 With respect to Litigation Privilege, the Tribunals concluded:

... the internal investigation, as it was initiated by Niko's engagement of Gowlings and then continued by the engagement of Deloitte, had as the dominant if not sole purpose to prepare Niko's defence against court or other proceedings relating to the allegations of corruption in Bangladesh. To that extent, the investigations by Deloitte and the documents and information produced by them are covered by the litigation privilege as protected by Canadian law.

[...]

The Tribunals conclude that the Claimant's defence against the Respondents' Corruption Claim is so closely related to the Gowlings-Deloitte investigation that the “protected area” of the litigation privilege of the latter extends to the former. The Tribunals accept that the Claimant may assert litigation privilege against the Respondents' request for production of the Deloitte documents.

396 In view of this conclusion, the Tribunals saw no need to resolve the remaining uncertainty with respect to solicitor-client privilege. The Respondents also had alleged that, in his testimony at the hearing, Mr Hornaday had waived Niko's privilege. The Tribunals concluded that

... the answers provided by Mr Hornaday to the questions of the Respondents' counsel and the Tribunal did not present direct evidence about the content of the Deloitte documents nor about the conclusions

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reached by Deloitte. They are not to be treated as a partial revelation of information protected by privilege and do not justify treating the privilege over the Deloitte documents as waived.104

397 The Tribunals held that the Claimant was entitled to invoke privilege against the production of the Deloitte documents; the Respondents' request for the production of these documents was denied.

398 In the Decision on the Corruption Claim, the Tribunals explained the different sources through which evidence was available specifically to the Respondents and the efforts the Tribunals had made to contribute to the gathering of the evidence. The Tribunals also asked whether gaps remained in the evidence and concluded:

... the Tribunals point out again that any gaps in the evidence that remained at the end of the proceedings are attributable primarily to the Respondents who insisted through repeated procedural initiatives on involving the Tribunals in the search for evidence which must be available in Bangladesh. The Tribunals have not drawn from these disruptive initiatives inferences adverse to the Respondents. They will decide the Corruption Claim on the basis of the evidence that was brought before them.105

4.3.2 The Decision on the Corruption Claim

399 The Decision on the Corruption Claim was issued on 25 February 2019. The Respondents' case was very broad and was summarised in the assertion that "Niko's corruption tainted the entire decision process”.106 The Tribunals therefore had to examine all governmental acts allegedly procured by corruption, starting with Niko's first proposals in 1997 and Niko's qualification for having its proposal considered in 1998, through the FOU, the MFA and the various steps in the negotiations for the JVA to the Government approval for that agreement in 2003; and the negotiations of the GPSA from 2004 until its conclusion in December 2006. The Tribunals also examined the various forms that Niko's corruption was said to have taken, in particular the use of consultants and “layering” and it examined specific payments that the Respondents had identified as “suspect". Examining the large amount of evidence presented to support allegations of a system of corruption with many acts of corruption over an agreed Targeted Period of four years from 2001 to


104 PO No 22, paragraphs 63, 88, 98 and 139. ↩

105 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 963. ↩

106 Respondents' Reply on Corruption, paragraph 104 et passim. ↩

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2004 but with alleged acts of corruption starting in 1997, in a context described as a “state of Kleptocracy”107, required much time and effort resulting in a decision of 571 pages.

400 In their examination of the large and complex corruption allegations the Tribunals noted that the explanations of the Respondents and some of their experts on numerous occasions were at odds with the evidence in the record and ultimately failed to support their allegations. In many respects these explanations required substantial corrections in the pattern of facts; when these corrections are made, the picture of Niko and its activities in Bangladesh was found to be significantly different from that painted by the Respondents.

401 The Respondents and their experts assimilated Niko and its project for the development of marginal and abandoned gas fields to other targets of the Joint Investigation, which paid bribes to obtain lucrative contracts under which Bangladesh paid important sums to foreign companies. Ms LaPrevotte Griffith asserted that in “many ways the Niko tender or bid was very similar” to that of a large international corporation that was awarded a contract under which Bangladesh paid USD 40 million; and that thanks to her action USD two million were forfeited and refunded to Bangladesh.

402 In the case of Niko, Ms LaPrevotte Griffith “was confident that we could show that the assets in question were subject to forfeiture as proceeds of corruption by Niko in Bangladesh”. She did not explain what assets in the case of Niko would be forfeited “as proceeds of corruption”. Indeed, Niko did not receive payments from Bangladesh but had to make investments that produced returns both for Niko and BAPEX. Niko's project was welcomed by BAPEX and Petrobangla as it provided for production of gas from gas fields abandoned by other companies or too marginal to interest others.

403 The Respondents' case about Niko's corruption amounts to stating that from the time when it first proposed the project of marginal and abandoned gas fields in 1998 until October 2003, when the JVA was concluded Niko progressed by corruption. It identified the steps of this progress in three groups and for each of these groups they identify the evidence for the alleged corruption. In the Decision on the Corruption Claim, the Tribunals have examined each of the listed steps in each of the three groups and the alleged acts of corruption. The first of these three groups included the following steps:


107 See in particular Decision on the Corruption Claim, Section 10.2. ↩

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Approval of Niko's proposal to be considered to develop marginal fields, FoU, and draft Procedure for Development of Marginal/ Abandoned Gas Fields.108

404 The Tribunals considered these steps in sections 4.1 and 9.1 to 9.4 of the Decision on the Corruption Claim. They noted that the Respondents asserted that, when seeking to procure the JVA and the GPSA, Niko “did not have the technical and financial capacity to obtain these rights through legitimate procedures”. The Respondents argue that Niko used corrupt means to achieve its acceptance by the Government, Petrobangla and BAPEX as a competent partner for the development of marginal/abandoned fields: “the only way Niko could enter into the oil and gas market in Bangladesh” was “the promise and payment of bribes”.109

405 The assertion about the lacking technical and financial capacity is based on the evaluation of Niko's bid in the 2nd bid round for PSC for Blocks 9 and 10 in 1997.110 Mr Elahi, who had not participated in the bid evaluation, testified that he "learned” that Niko “was disqualified from the bid process because it was found to be unqualified for such a project”; Ms LaPrevotte Griffith testified that, when she started her investigation,

...the first thing I learned is that Arthur Andersen had deemed Niko unqualified to explore gas in Bangladesh.111

406 The Claimant contested the relevance of the PSC bid evaluation process and its results which it described as a “fundamentally different process” and it contested the scoring process applied in the evaluation of the PSC bid it concluded:

... it is entirely misleading for the Respondents to use the PSC bid evaluation results to cast aspersions on Niko's qualifications, particularly to undertake a marginal field development project.112

407 The Tribunals examined the evidence and noted that the evaluation did indeed rank Niko the lowest among the bidders; but there was no evidence for a disqualification or a finding that Niko was “unqualified to explore gas in Bangladesh”. The criteria used for the ranking in the bid evaluation included


108 Respondents' Post-Hearing Brief of 12 July 2017, paragraph 4. ↩

109 BMD, paragraph 1. ↩

110 About this bidding round and a letter by Arthur Andersen about this process, see Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraphs 393 and 294. ↩

111 Transcript of the April 2017 Hearing, Day 3, page 169, quoted at Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 971. ↩

112 C-CMC, paragraph 77. ↩

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the number of proposed wells and their depth and the seismic tests (weighted at 45%) and technical capability by the number of countries of activity. The Tribunals concluded that the ranking in the PSC bid process had little if any relevance with respect to Niko's qualification for its proposal concerning marginal and abandoned gas fields.113

408 There was no evidence in the record showing that, when BAPEX and Petrobangla received in 1998 Niko's proposal about the marginal and abandoned fields, Niko was considered unqualified for developing such fields. Quite to the contrary, when BAPEX commented on this proposal and Petrobangla prepared a note about the proposal on the basis of these comments,114 Petrobangla pointed out the interest of the proposed development of “these marginal fields [which] still have some salvageable infrastructure and produc[ible] quantum of gas”. Petrobangla's comments considered Niko's proposal “attractive” and noted: “We have not much to lose, if anything. We have rather much to gain if a proper MOU/contract is entered into safeguarding our basic interests”. The Respondents produced these comments and relied on them in another context. Later they expressed “doubts about the provenance of this document”. Having considered the Respondents' reasons for these doubts, the Tribunals saw no reason to doubt that the document reflected the considered joint opinion of BAPEX and Petrobangla.115 Indeed, the minutes of a high-level meeting at the Ministry of Electricity, Fuel and Minerals on 26 January 1999, record similar statements by the representative of Petrobangla.

409 In any event, the Tribunals noted that BAPEX negotiated the terms of the JVA and did not question the qualification of Niko for performing the work required under the JVA. The Tribunals concluded that “Niko's June 1998 Proposal was welcomed by the Respondents as an economically interesting contribution to the supply of gas in Bangladesh". The Tribunals also concluded that the evidence did not support the Respondents' assertion that “the only way Niko could enter into the oil and gas market in Bangladesh” was “the promise and payment of bribes”.116

410 The Framework of Understanding (FOU) was the next step listed by the Respondents in the first of the Respondents' groups of steps procured by corruption. It brought a change from what, according to the record, was discussed at the high-level meeting at the Ministry of Electricity, Fuel and


113 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraphs 980 – 983. ↩

114 Exhibit R-267. ↩

115 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraphs 995 – 997. ↩

116 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraphs 999 and 1004. ↩

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Minerals on 26 January 1999 just mentioned, that was chaired by the Secretary of the Department and attended inter alia by four Deputy Secretaries, the Chairman and two Directors of Petrobangla, and the Managing Director and General Manager of BAPEX. The minutes of the meeting record that after “details discussion” the gas fields of Chattak, Feni and Kamta “might be developed” as per Niko's proposal; the JVA “shall be finalised" and a MOU be signed.

411 That approach was confirmed in a letter of 25 May 1999 in which the Ministry informed Petrobangla of the Government's decision on the “Implementation of proposal of Niko Resources of Marginal Gas Fields Development and Production", providing that the “gas fields at Chattak, Kamta and Feni may be developed and produced under the concept of “Marginal Gas Field Development” under joint collaboration of Niko and BAPEX”. BAPEX had informed Niko already on 6 May 1999 of this development and invited Niko “to send your authorised representative to draft the Joint Venture Agreement as early as possible”.

412 At the initiative of the Respondents, the approach was changed. Instead of concluding the JVA, Niko had to accept an additional step, a study “to provide for the estimation of recoverable reserves [...] to predict the production characteristics of proven and potential reservoirs in the Study Area”. The FOU provided that this study was to be performed as a joint venture between Niko and BAPEX; it was signed on 23 August 1999. Niko claimed that it spent USD 1.5 million on its work for the Study. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had granted an amount of not exceeding Canadian Dollars 101’650 for a “Viability Study”. The work under the FOU produced the Marginal Field Evaluation of February 2000.

413 Finally, the Respondents presented as a step procured by corruption the “draft Procedure for Development of Marginal/ Abandoned Gas Fields”. This procedure was prepared during the first half of 2001 by the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources. This procedure defines marginal gas fields and regulates the procedures for awarding contracts for the development of marginal/abandoned fields. It was approved by the Prime Minister on 14 June 2001.117

414 The charge sheet in the proceedings against former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia contained a passage concerning the Marginal Field Procedure: “the then Prime Minister (Sheikh Hasina) approved an illegal system called ‘Procedure for Developing Terminal [sic] and Abandoned Gas Fields on 14-6-2001”. The


117 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraphs 446 - 462, specifically paragraph 456. ↩

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High Court Division, in an order of 5 November 2015 concerning Sheik Hasina, concluded that “no such allegation that the process of approving the 'procedure' by her involved any unlawful financial or other transaction”. The criminal proceedings against her were quashed.118

415 Concerning the steps on the way to the JVA just discussed, the Respondents presented the following related acts of corruption:

416 The Tribunals examined each of these alleged acts of corruption. Before reporting on the conclusions reached by the Tribunals with respect to each of these allegations, the Tribunal notes a general contradiction in the Respondents case. That case, as mentioned already, relies on corrupt practices of Niko, from the time it entered Bangladesh. This includes the period just described from 1997 to the Procedure for Development of Marginal/Abandoned Gas Fields, adopted in June 2021:

... it is clear that Niko, from the moment it entered Bangladesh [...], used bribery and corruption to obtain favourable decisions from the Government and procure the JVA and GPSA.119

417 Elsewhere in their submissions, the Respondents had presented a different position. They argued that this alleged corrupt system, Niko's corrupt modus operandi, as described by themselves and the various Investigators, was set up only once the BNP Government with Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia at its head came to power; she was sworn in on 10 October 2001. Niko's systematic corruption, as described by the Respondents, thus can have started only in late 2001 or 2002. This is indeed what the Respondents have asserted in one of their submissions:


118 Exhibits R-211, R-230 and R-230; discussed in the Decision on the Corruption Claim at paragraphs 366-368. ↩

119 Respondents' First Post-Hearing Brief on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 4, quoting from the Respondents' Opening Statement at the April 2017 Hearing; HT 2017 Day 1, pages 72, lines 21 - 24, 122, line 12-123, line 22 (Mr Argueta). ↩

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The behind the scenes corrupt activities to influence the negotiations and approval of the JVA began in 2002.120

418 It is true that the Respondents do not exclude that incidents of corruption occurred during the government of Sheikh Hasina who left office in July 2001. Such instances, however, did not in the Respondents' submission implicate that Government; they contend that during the years 1997 to 2001 the subsequent network of corruption did not exist – or at least was not connected to the power of the government then in place. Indeed, the criminal proceedings against Sheik Hasina that had been initiated with respect to the Niko case during her period in power were quashed while those against Khalida Zia continued.121

419 The conclusion to be drawn from this part of the Respondents' argument is that the Government, Petrobangla and BAPEX were not confronted with acts of corruption during this initial period (during which the first group of alleged acts of corruption occurred) and that their acts were not caused by corruption.

420 Turning now to the specific acts of corruption listed by the Respondents, the Tribunals have examined the role of Mr Sharfuddin Ahmed and his company Five Feathers and discussed their findings in section 10.3.2 of the Decision on the Corruption Claim. They noted that advice and assistance from a local consultant was a useful service and not in itself a ground for reproach, provided legalities are scrupulously observed; a Senior Commercial Officer of the Canadian of Foreign Affairs and International Trade noted that “Niko needs to be much more active on the ground [in Bangladesh], both in terms of senior executives from Calgary and through an effective local partner/agent which can deal with the government and other IOCs”.122

421 Niko's use of Mr Ahmed was open and transparent; Mr Ahmed was involved in the presentation of Niko's June 1998 proposal and Five Feathers was mentioned in this context. Niko recognised that Five Feathers had been “actively supporting” its efforts. The Tribunals concluded from the evidence that the total amount paid to Mr Ahmed and Five Feathers was USD 60'000. Mr Khan testified that he had no indication that Mr Ahmed bribed anybody.

422 The Tribunals concluded:


120 Respondents' Responses to PO No 13, paragraph 14. ↩

121 For a more detailed discussion see Decision on the Corruption Claim ↩

122 Exhibit C-195 and explanation in the Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 1488. ↩

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From the evidence before the Tribunals, the Tribunals conclude that there is no evidence that Mr Ahmed or his company bribed anybody on Niko's behalf, nor did he make a commitment to pay bribes. There is no evidence in the record that the consultancy agreement required them to make such commitments nor is there any evidence that Niko itself had made such a commitment or planned to do so, intending to use Five Feathers as a "conduit".123

423 The second alleged act of Niko's corruption was “Mr Sharif's payments to lower level officials at Ministry of Energy” related to the consideration of Niko's proposal, the FOU and the Marginal Fields Procedure. The Tribunals examined the allegation in section 11.3 of the Decision on the Corruption Claim. The Tribunals noted the Claimant's response to the allegation:

The allegation is hopelessly vague, and does not identify the amount of the payments alleged to have been made, the date of such payments, the recipients of such payment, or the alleged act induced or procured from such recipients.124

424 The Respondents present a long extract from a “deposition” of Mr Shafikul Islam, the former accountant of Mr Sharif.125 Mr Islam is recorded to have said that he “used to visit BAPEX, Petrobangla and the Ministry to deliver Niko's letters”; on these occasions he made payments to arrange “the pass for me to enter the Secretariat”. He mentioned more specifically that “At the end of 2003, during the Eid period, Mr Sayed Kabir in consultation with Qasim Sharif paid Taka three and half lac to different staff and officers of the Ministry, BAPEX and Petrobangla. Mr Islam also mentioned payments to “different staff officers of the Ministry, BAPEX and Petrobangla and he stated that Mr Sayed Kabir introduced Mr Sharif to various people at various places regarding the Niko agreement and advised him to give cash and valuable gifts to various individuals. Accordingly, Mr Qasim Sharif [...] gave cash and gifts to those individuals".

425 The Claimant explained payments on which Mr Islam had been more specific were the per diem for the persons attending the Second Joint Management Committee meeting in Calgary and produced vouchers and allowances for the period 20 November to 7 December 2003.126


123 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 1543. ↩

124 Claimant's Second Post-Hearing Brief, page 17. ↩

125 Shafikul Islam, a witness deposition as per Section 164 of the Bangladesh Criminal Procedure Code, dated 12 March 2008, Exhibit R-392, quoted at Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 1835. ↩

126 Claimant's Rejoinder on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 148 and Exhibit C-208. ↩

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426 The Tribunals examined the evidence and concluded:

In any event, the Niko project and the terms of the JVA were subject to a broad process of analysis and were examined over many years and considered in various committees by many high-ranking officials in the Ministry, in Petrobangla and in BAPEX. The Tribunals do not consider that the mostly unidentified “low level officials” in the Ministry made any effective contribution to the conclusion of the JVA. Payment to any of them, if it were proven, has not been shown to have procured that Agreement.127

427 The third alleged act of Niko's corruption was “Mr. Sharif's payments of US$ 54,000 to the brother of the then Secretary of Energy”. The Tribunals examined this allegation in section 11.2 of the Decision on the Corruption Claim. The allegation is that during the period from December 1999 to November 2000, Mr Sharif made nine payments of USD 6'000 to Mr Jahangir E. Chowdhury. Mr Jahangir Chowdhury is Mr Sharif's uncle and the brother of the then Secretary of Energy, Tawfiq Elahi Chowdhury. The Respondents asserted that the payments were intended for the Secretary of Energy and describe the assistance which Niko drew from it as “Support for Niko's unilateral proposal to develop marginal fields and the FoU” and “to push Niko's “proposal through”.

428 The Claimant pointed out that there was “no direct evidence for the payments themselves” and that it had not been shown that the payments had a purpose of corruption. And they stated that there was not “any credible evidence to establish that such alleged payments had anything to do with Niko or its procurement of the JVA.

429 The Tribunals noted that the evidence for the payment was testimony by Ms LaPrevotte Griffith of what she heard from to unidentified persons who conducted interviews of Mr Sharif in Texas and Mr Jahangir Chowdhury in Australia. The explanations about the purpose of the payment had nothing to do with Mr Tawfique Elahi Chowdhury, the then Secretary of Energy, but they differed from each other. Ms LaPrevotte Griffith concluded that they were not a payment by Mr Sharif to his uncle but a payment by Niko intended as a bribe by Niko for the Secretary of Energy.

430 The Respondents established the link with Niko by relying on Ms LaPrevotte Griffith who had explained that the payments coincided with actions taken on behalf of Niko to approve, among other things, the FOU. She concluded:


127 Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 1842. ↩

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There was probable cause to believe that these payments were bribe/kickback payments in exchange for favourable rulings for Niko.128

431 She explained the “exchange” at the April 2017 Hearing:

... Mr Chowdhury exerted influence at the January '99, May '99 meetings where the framework of understanding was being discussed and developed and was we think directly responsible or one of the participants in that the FoU was approved the August '99. Then in December his brother starts receiving nine payments.129

432 The Tribunals noted that, as explained above, the FOU was not a “favourable ruling" requested by Niko but was required by the Ministry, Petrobangla or BAPEX. There is no evidence that it was discussed at the January and May 1999 meetings which concluded that the JVA “shall be finalised” and a MOU be signed. The record shows that the FOU appeared as a surprise to Niko when its representatives, following an invitation from BAPEX, had arrived in Bangladesh to finalise the JVA and, instead were required to conclude the FOU. The Tribunals found it difficult to believe that Niko would spend bribe money with the objective of being required to spend additional funds in the order of USD 1.5 million on a study instead of concluding the JVA.

433 The Tribunals also noted the Claimant's repeated assertion, without being contradicted, that Mr Tawfiq Elahi Chowdhury continued to be employed in a high Government position. There was no indication that any clarification was sought in the course of the Joint Investigation about the assertions concerning his involvement in the conclusion of the FOU, any influence of Niko in this respect and any payments to his brother by Niko or Mr Sharif. Nor did the Respondents,-indicate that they sought any clarification from Mr Tawfique Elahi Chowdhury when they made the bribery allegation.

434 The Tribunals also noted that, at the April 2017 hearing the Respondents accepted: “We cannot prove that the FoU was obtained by bribery. It seems to be tainted by bribery.”130

435 The Tribunals concluded that

... the evidence produced does not justify assuming that Niko paid US$54,000 to Mr Tawfiq Elahi Chowdhury indirectly through his brother;


128 WS LaPrevotte Griffith, paragraph 26. ↩

129 Transcript of the April 2017 Hearing, Day 3, page 171, quoted in the Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 1825. ↩

130 HT 2017 Day 1, page 76, quoted in the Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 1817. ↩

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in any event, even if such a payment had been made, it did not procure the conclusion of the FOU by Niko.

436 The Tribunals examined with the same depth and attention to the evidence the other allegations about corruption and the conclusion of the JVA and the GPSA. This examination considered in particular the evidence gathered by the Joint Investigation, to the extent the Respondents had made it available in the Arbitration. The conclusions which the competent authorities in Canada and the USA reached on the basis of this evidence have been recorded above. The Crown in Canada had considered Niko's guilty plea in the Agreed Statement of Facts and concluded that it was “unable to prove that any influence was obtained as a result of providing the Benefits to the Minister” and no other acts of corruption were held against Niko in Canada. And the Department of Justice in the United States considered Niko's guilty plea in Canada and found prosecution not necessary. On the basis of the evidence from the Joint Investigation and additional evidence from the Respondents the Tribunals reached conclusions that did not differ substantially from those reached by the Canadian and US authorities. The Tribunals recorded these conclusions the operative part of the Decision on the Corruption Claim, as reproduced below in Section 5.3.

437 The Tribunal has reviewed this decision and confirms the conclusion reached in it.

4.4 The Arbitrations and Court Proceedings in Bangladesh

4.4.1 Court proceedings in Bangladesh related to Niko and the blowouts

438 Several court proceedings in Bangladesh related to Niko and the blowouts were brought to the attention of the Tribunals and–at different occasions required their intervention.

439 The first of these proceedings was occasionally referred to as the BELA proceedings. A description of the proceedings was provided in the First Decision on the Payment Claim with further explanations in the Decision on the Corruption Claim.131 These proceedings were brought by the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) which filed on 12 September 2005 a Writ Petition No. 6911 against 10 respondents, including


131 ICSID Case No. ARB 10/18, First Decision on the Payment Claim, 11 September 2014, Section 7.2, Attachment 2 of the Award in that case, dated 24 September 2021; and Decision on the Corruption Claim, Sections 2.6.1 and 6.3. ↩

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440 The petition sought a declaration that the Niko/BAPEX Joint Venture Agreement was concluded without lawful authority and had no legal effect, that it should be “treated as a nullity having been procured through flawed process and resorting to fraudulent means and forged documents” and “should be treated as illegal; [having come] to an end as a result of material breach of the statutory and legal obligations”. In the petition BELA also requested that Bangladesh and BAPEX be

... directed to take immediate effective measures to realize full compensation for destruction of the valuable natural gas resources and the damage to live [sic] and property and environment by the blow outs resulting from the respondent No. 10's failure to discharge its legal obligations ...

441 Pending the hearing of the case, the petitioners applied for a number of injunctions and orders.

442 On the same day, 12 September 2005, the High Court Division (Special Original Jurisdiction) of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, proceeding ex parte, gave directions for further proceedings on the petition and made inter alia the following order:

Pending disposal of the Rule, Respondents no. 1 to 9 are restrained from making any payment of [to?] no. 10 in respect of Feni Gas Field or any other account up to 22.10.05.

443 In addition, the order contained directions to Bangladesh, Petrobangla and BAPEX (Respondents 1, 4 and 5), inter alia

... to submit a report within 45 days of receipt of this order specifying the measures that have been taken against respondent no. 10 to recover

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compensation for the successive blow outs, [...] and freeze all bank accounts of respondent No. 10 maintained in Bangladesh.

444 The following day, on 13 September 2005, Niko filed “Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 712 of 2005” in the Appellate Division (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction) of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. It stated that it had learnt about the interim orders of the High Court Division from the daily newspapers and requested a stay of these interim orders. It explained in particular that the freezing of its bank accounts would lead to a stoppage of the day-to-day operations both for the gas supply from the Feni field and the relief operations from the Chattak field. Restraining payments to Niko would “add to the adverse effect on the finance and cash flow required for the continuous operations" of Niko “jeopardising and stopping gas production and supply”.

445 On 14 September 2005, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court removed the freezing order concerning the bank accounts, but left the injunction against payments to Niko intact. It made the following order:

Let the application for stay be placed before the Court on 23rd October 2005. The interim order so far it relates to freezing of all the Bank accounts of the Respondent No. 10 maintained in Bangladesh is stayed till that date. The Respondent No. 10 is restrained from making any foreign remittance from the Bank Account.

446 The High Court Division considered the matter again on 19 October 2005. It noted that the order freezing Niko's bank accounts had been stayed by the Appellate Division and concluded that “there is no scope to extend the previous stay order”. Concerning payments to Niko, the court found that no decision had been made by the Appellate Division and concluded:

Since the order retraining the respondents 1-9 from making any payment to respondent No. 10 in respect of any gas field or any other account passed by the High Court Division has not been modified by the Appellate Division that order shall continue.”

447 Niko filed on 23 October 2005 Civil Petition No. 1395 of 2005 (arising out of C.M.P. No. 712) for leave to appeal against the interim orders of 12 September 2005, essentially on the grounds exposed in the petition of 13 September 2005.

448 The Appellate Division addressed the petition on the same day, 23 October 2005, and left the situation unchanged. It made the following order:

The order of stay granted earlier is extended till 11th December, 2005 on which date the leave petition will come up for hearing before the Court.

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449 On 12 December 2005, the Appellate Division extended its order for further six weeks; on 24 January 2006, it was extended for further two months, on 28 March 2006, for further three months and on 26 June 2006, for further six months. On 12 December 2006, the Appellate Division decided that “the earlier order of stay is still in force and hence tantamount to continue”.

450 The Appellate Division considered Petition No. 1395 of 2005 for a last time at a hearing on 3 October 2007. In its order of that day, the Appellate Division referred to the High Court's order of 12 September 2005 and the order which the Appellate Division had made in response to Niko's “leave petition”, i.e. the stay of the freezing of Niko's bank accounts in Bangladesh and the restraining order against making any foreign remittances from the Bank Account. It concluded

The aforesaid order passed earlier by this Division is extended till hearing of the aforesaid Writ Petition.

451 Thereafter the High Court Division held several hearings in the BELA proceedings which spanned a period of several months, starting in February 2009.

452 The Court rendered its judgment orally on 16 and 17 November 2009 and on 2 and 3 May 2010 in writing (the BELA Judgment).132 The Court found:

... JVA was not obtained by flawed process by resorting to fraudulent means.

453 To that extent the Petition was denied. With respect to the remainder of the Petition, relating to the compensation for the blowouts, the Court decided that the amount of the damage had to be determined by “the Court below after taking proper evidence or by mutual agreement amongst the parties involved”. The injunction was upheld insofar as it concerned the prohibition of payments to Niko. The Court made the following order:

... Niko is directed to pay the compensation money as per the decision to be taken in the money suit now pending in the Court of the Joint District or as per the mutual agreement among the parties. The respondents are restrained by an order of injunction from making any payment to [Niko]... This order of injunction shall remain in force till disposal of the mоnеу suit or till amicable settlement amongst the parties, whichever is earlier.

454 The BELA injunction was directed only against the JVA; at the time when it was first issued, the GPSA had not yet been concluded. By the time the


132 Exhibit CLA-143. ↩

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Judgment was issued, the GPSA had been concluded, and the Judgment makes some references to it. In particular it states that under the GPSA Petrobangla pays USD1.75 per Mcf while under identified other contracts Petrobangla pays USD2.75 or even USD2.90.

455 Petrobangla presented this injunction as a case of force majeure to justify its failure to pay the invoices for the gas delivered by the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture from the Feni field. The Tribunals considered this defence and noted that the GPSA was conclude in d on 27 December 2016, over a year after the injunction was first made. The GPSA continued a clear commitment to make payment and Petrobangla continued to accept the gas deliveries and the invoices for them without informing Niko and the Joint Venture that it was prevented from meeting its payment obligation. The Tribunals concluded:

... Petrobangla made its payment commitments under the GPSA in full knowledge of the injunction prohibiting such payments. It took the risk that this injunction would continue even after the conclusion of the GPSA. It may not now rely on the injunction as excuse for not making the payments that it promised to make.

Therefore Petrobangla's failure to make the contractual payments is not excused by the defence of force majeure. Petrobangla is in default of its payment obligations under the GPSA

456 The injunction against payments to Niko remained in place despite the Tribunals' decisions concerning the Payment Claim. In a letter of 19 October 2015, providing an update on the proceedings in the Money Suit, BAPEX informed the Tribunals that Niko had filed a Civil Revision application (with entry No. 4580 dated 17 September 2015) with the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh seeking a stay of the Money Suit. Further to an order of the Court, Niko submitted an application requesting that the Court record the 21 September 2015 order of the High Court.

457 When the Tribunals issued their Decision on Exclusivity, the Respondents wrote on 8 August 2016 to inform the Tribunals that they “had already requested to have the stay on payments to Niko lifted before the Tribunals' 19 July decision”. They explained that the request for review had remained without success, because the file of the case could not be found:

The review petition is pending and under consideration of the Personal Secretary to the Honorable Chief Justice (High Court Division of the Supreme Court). However, there has been a difficulty in retrieving the case file in order to reopen the matter. The Supreme Court requires the original file to reopen the case to consider the review petition, but it

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appears that the office of the court clerk is unable to locate the file of the original case, which, at the end of proceedings, was transferred to the records section on 25 April 2010. Counsel for BAPEX and Petrobangla made a submission to the court on 16 June 2016 seeking to have the court recover the file so that it can address Respondents' original petition, and, when this is resolved, Respondents will make a submission informing the court of the Tribunals' decision on exclusive jurisdiction and reiterating the request to terminate the stay.

458 The Claimant objected on 12 August 2016, addressing different proceedings pending in Bangladesh, including the BELA Proceedings, the Claimant wrote:

... the BELA Injunction arguably still exists, and Petrobangla continues to assert that it operates to prevent payment for gas delivered from Feni field (and thus payment pursuant to the Third Decision in the Payment Claim). All of these issues are within the exclusive competence of the Tribunals. Neither Petrobangla nor BAPEX have taken any steps in this proceeding to give effect to the Tribunals' Decision on Exclusivity. The only action referenced by the Respondents in their 8 August letter is a 16 June 2016 inquiry by Petrobangla's counsel as to the whereabouts of the court file. This predates the Decision on Exclusivity. Respondents have done nothing to bring the Decision on Exclusivity to the attention of the court.

459 The Respondents protested on 19 August 2016 against this description of their action. They argued that they had “done everything possible under the procedures of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh to have that injunction reviewed and reversed" but failed to succeed because the file could not be found. They added that they would make a further submission with the Court.

460 On 29 November 2016 the Tribunals invited the Respondents to report on their action in this respect. The Respondents replied on 7 December 2016, confirming that

... the court's file in the BELA suit was transferred to a filing facility and could not be located, which has prevented the court from addressing the matter

461 The Respondents added that despite a complaint with the Registrar of the court “the file has not been traced, and the court has not taken up the review petition". They added that Bangladeshi counsel for the Respondents will continue to follow up on this matter. They announced that they would be able to make further submissions with the court “when the Supreme Court is

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addresses the petition for review and is in a position to consider such further submission”.

462 Since then no further information has been provided about search for the file and any action on the BELA injunction.

463 The Tribunals considered the BELA Judgement in the context of their examination of the Corruption Claim.133 They noted the comments about this judgment by the Alam court which had pointed out that the BELA court had not considered corruption. The Tribunals note that, indeed, the allegations of “flawed processes” and “fraudulent means” in the BELA case did not include the corruption charges which the petitioner in the Alam case made. In the BELA Judgment no findings were made with respect to corruption, although, by the time of that judgment, the ACC investigation was well advanced; the ACC Charge Sheet, which contained the essence of the corruption allegations including the Niko case, had been issued on 2 May 2008, two years before the BELA Judgment.134

464 The Tribunals also pointed out that the BELA Judgment was issued on 2 and 3 May 2010, at a time when only RfA I had been received with the Centre on 12 April 2010; RfA II was received by the Centre only on 3 May 2010. In other words, no ICSID Tribunal had been established; the BELA Judgment did not intrude on the exclusive jurisdiction of these Tribunals.

465 Claims concerning Niko's liability for the two blowouts were first brought in Bangladesh by what was referred to as the Money Suit, to which the Claimant reacted by commencing the Arbitration in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11.135

466 On 27 May 2008, Petrobangla served legal notice on Niko, claiming Tk746.50 crore as damages for the blowouts. Niko responded on 9 June 2008, denying that it had liability for any damages arising from the blowouts at Chattak and that Petrobangla suffered the alleged damage. It added that the claims brought by Petrobangla had to be resolved by arbitration and that it was willing to resolve the issues between the Parties through arbitration conducted through ICSID, as agreed between the Parties.136

467 In the proceedings on Jurisdiction, the Claimant stated that the Government and Petrobangla“appeared to be in agreement that the claims could be arbitrated under ICSID provided the arbitration was held in Dhaka”. It


133 Decision on the Corruption Claim, Section 6.3. ↩

134 See Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 689. ↩

135 See Decision on Jurisdiction, paragraph 108. ↩

136 See First Decision on the Payment Claim, paragraphs 79 and 80. ↩

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presented a letter by its Counsel to a lawyer in Dhaka. No other written evidence for these negotiations has been produced. In any event the Claimant does not contend that agreement was reached in this respect.137

468 The case then was initiated on 15 June 2015. Plaintiffs were the Government of Bangladesh (represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources) and Petrobangla, as Plaintiffs, filed before the District Judge in Dhaka, Money Suit No 224 of 2008 before the 2nd court of the Joint District Judge, Dhaka against (i) Niko Resources (Bangladesh), (ii) Brian J. Adolph, (iii) Peter Mercier, (iv) GSM Inc. (v) George M. Lattimore, as Defendants.

469 The Plaintiffs sought Tk. 746,50,83,973/- plus 12% interest, as compensation for "losses sustained due to burning of gas and destruction of mineral resources and natural resources which are mainly losses of movable property”. The losses relate to the loss and damage caused by the two blowouts in the Chattak field and are specified in four Schedules with the following titles:

Schedule A: Gas burnt at Chattak field;

Schedule B: Sub-surface loss at Chattak field;

Schedule C: Additional sub-surface loss at Chattak field;

Schedule D: Environmental Losses at Chattak Gas Field.138

470 In the Arbitrations, the Tribunals were informed that, on 17 October 2013, Petrobangla filed an attachment application in the Money Suit, seeking to attach approximately USD 27 million, as invoiced by Petrobangla under the GPSA. The Claimant filed a request for provisional measures in the Arbitrations, followed by a conditional request for provisional measures filed by Petrobangla on 28 February 2014. After written exchanges, the Tribunals addressed these applications during the hearing on the Payment Claim and Provisional Measures which was held from 28 to 30 April 2014. At the end of this hearing the Parties reached an understanding with regard to their respective requests for provisional measures, which the Parties also provided


137 Reported in the Decision on Jurisdiction, paragraph 104, with references. ↩

138 People's Republic of Bangladesh v. NIKO Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd., Money Suit No. 224/2008 (2d Court of Joint District Judge), Complaint, 15 June 2008, Exhibit C-6. See also Decision on Jurisdiction, paragraph 102. ↩

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to the Tribunals in written form. The Parties' understanding was embodied in the Tribunals' Procedural Order No 6, issued on 1 May 2014.139

471 In the agreement recorded in PO No 6, Petrobangla agreed to withdraw its attachment application in the Money Suit and Niko agreed that it

... will not directly or indirectly dispose of its assets in Bangladesh until disposal of the Money Suit without the prior consent of Petrobangla and the Government of Bangladesh.

472 With respect to the Money Suit, Niko agreed to withdraw its application for a stay and gave the same undertaking of non-withdrawal of assets to the court. Some procedural steps were also agreed. The Agreement concluded by the statement:

The above will otherwise be without prejudice to the parties' positions in the ICSID arbitration.

473 Further to the Tribunals' request of 7 October 2015, BAPEX informed the Tribunals on 19 October 2015 that the Money Suit was “currently pending hearing before the Joint District Judge, Second Court, Dhaka (“the Court”). It referred to the agreement that the Tribunals had recorded in PO No 6 but did not explain the action that was taken before the Court of the Money Suit in implementation of the that agreement.

474 BAPEX reported that in July 2014 the Court continued to organise the proceedings, fixing time for the filing of Niko's Written Statement (statement of defence). Niko sought on 22 July 2014 further and better particulars regarding allegations of negligence by Niko. The Court denied this request and fixed a new date for Niko's written statement on 30 March 2015; at a further request by Niko the filing date was again extended to 30 June 2015. On that date Niko submitted the Written Statement in its own name and in the name of three other defendants. The Court framed the issues and on 4 August 2015, struck out the names of two defendants. On 4 August 2015, the Court also rejected the petitions for striking out the names of the defendants. The Court fixed the time for cross-examination of witnesses and decided procedural issues in this respect. Niko then filed a request for the Civil Revision, seeking a stay of the Money Suit. The Court fixed the next date of hearing for 15 October 2015.

475 In its 19 October 2015 letter, BAPEX stated that, if Niko continued to apply for a stay of the Money Suit, it would be that case would be completed within


139 See First Decision on the Payment Claim, 11 September 2014, Attachment 2 to the Award in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18, Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. ↩

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the next two years. Appeal to the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh was likely to take at least two to three years. A judgment from the High Court Division can be appealed before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, the apex court. The appeal before the Appellate Division would likely take another two to four years.

476 Subsequently, the Claimant informed the Tribunals that Petrobangla was “actively and vigorously pursuing” the Money Suit and that the court was “currently hearing witness testimony from various officers and representatives from Petrobangla, the Government of Bangladesh, and BAPEX on the blowouts and the consequences of the blowouts at Chattak”. It added that on 25 July 2016, “Niko filed an application for adjournment based on the Tribunals' Decision on Exclusivity” and that this application was rejected on 8 August 2016. The Claimant also mentioned that on 24 May 2016 the High Court Division directed the Money Suit court “to proceed to complete the trial of the suit as expeditiously as possible preferably within 4 (four) months from the date of receipt of this order."

477 The latest information made available to the Tribunal about these proceedings are references to the Money Suit contained in the written version of the Alam Judgment of November 2017. The judgment mentions information provided by counsel, stating that the case is “now pending”.140

478 A further set of court proceedings in Bangladesh was initiated on 9 May 2006, leading to an injunction against Niko and others (referred to as the 2016 Injunction and the Alam Injunction).141

479 As noted above, on 9 May 2016, Professor M. Shamsul Alam filed Writ Petition No. 5673 in High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh under Article 102 of the Bangladesh Constitution (the Writ Petion). Professor Alam argues, inter alia, that the JVA and GPSA were procured by fraud and are void ab inito and sought a declaration to this effect. He also requested the Court to attach Niko's assets, including the interest of an indirect Niko affiliate in Block 9 “to provide adequate compensation for the 2005 blowouts”. In the interim, the Writ Petition asked for the Court to stay operation of the JVA and GPSA “to ensure that [Niko] and [Niko Canada] are not able to obtain any benefits under them,” and to “stay any payments made to [Niko] and [Niko Canada] or any of their affiliates or subsidiaries, including payments made in pursuance of the gas supplied from Block 9 which is 60% owned by [Niko Canada] ... .”


140 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 216 and 217, quoting the Claimant's letter of 12 August 2016, quoted in the Decision on the Corruption Claim, paragraph 355. ↩

141 Third Decision on the Payment Claim, Section 7 and Claimant's Request for Provisional Measures of 19 May 2016. ↩

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480 The Respondents stated that Professor Alam did not seek a decision on liability but a determination of the legality of the Government's authorization to enter into the JVA and GPSA.142

481 On the same day, 9 May 2016, the Court ordered a temporary stay of the JVA and GPSA for a period of one month (the “Stay Order”). The Court also ordered the Government of Bangladesh, Petrobangla and BAPEX “not to give any kind of benefit to [Niko or Niko Canada] and not to make any kind of payments to [Niko or Niko Canada] or any of their affiliates or subsidiaries, including payments made in pursuance of the gas supplied from Block-9 ... during the period of stay.”

482 The High Court Division of the Supreme Court issued its judgement on 24 August 2017, declaring, inter alia, that the JVA and the GPSA were “without lawful authority and of no legal effect and thus void ab initio”. The Judgement will be discussed below in Section 4.4.3.

4.4.2 Dealing with the Court Proceedings in the Arbitration and the Decision on Exclusivity

483 One of the jurisdictional issues that the Tribunals faced during the first phase of the Arbitrations concerned the scope of the arbitration clauses in the two Agreements and specifically that in the JVA. The issue concerned essentially the relation to the Money Suit and the Tribunals' jurisdiction ratione materiae which the Tribunals addressed in the Decision on Jurisdiction. The Claimant had requested a declaration that it had “no liability for any damage" and argued that the Tribunals' jurisdiction extended to the claims made in the Money Suit; the Respondents argued that jurisdiction under the JVA arbitration clause concerned contractual claims and did not extend the claims of the Government and Petrobangla in the Money Suit. BAPEX insisted that the claims in the Money Suit were not contractual but were based on "tort and statute law” and “criminal and statutory liability".

484 The Tribunals found that there can be no doubt that the Tribunals have jurisdiction to determine whether Niko has any liability for the two blowouts under the JVA and to make the requested declaration if it deemed it to be well founded. The issues were whether the requested declaration concerning “any liability" extended beyond the liability under the JVA to other grounds for liability, such as those mentioned by the Respondents.

485 While the basis for arbitral jurisdiction is contractual, the subject matter jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals need not be limited to contractual claims.


142 Respondents' Response to Niko's Request for Provisional Measures, 1 June 2016, paragraph 10. ↩

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Other grounds of liability may be included, depending on the scope of the arbitration agreement and limits on arbitrability.

486 The Tribunals accepted that the disputes were “arising directly out of an investment” and thus were arbitrable under the ICSID Convention. They noted that the arbitration clause applied to the disputes “arising in connection with the performance or interpretation ...” of the JVA and did not contain any limit as to the legal basis on which claims are made. What is required is that the dispute be in connection with the performance of the JVA. The performance of the JVA touches on a variety of substantive matters which are regulated not in the agreement itself but by laws, regulations and practices concerning Petroleum Operations, as this appears from a number of provisions in the JVA and is set out in a general provision in Article 26.2.4 which prescribes that Niko as the Operator shall:

... conduct all Petroleum Operations in a diligent, conscientious and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the applicable law, this JVA and generally accepted standards of international Petroleum industry designed to achieve efficient and safe development and production of Petroleum and to maximize the ultimate economic recovery of Petroleum from the JVA Area.

487 The Respondents had not given any reason why claims “in connection with the performance” of the JVA must by necessity be contractual claims in the narrow sense in which the Respondents used the term and the Tribunals did not see any such reason. The Tribunal understood disputes “in connection with the performance” of the JVA in a wider sense, including sources of liability other than the agreement itself. The question what these sources are and which obligations, contractual or other, fall to be considered concerns the substance of the dispute was a question of the merits of the dispute and did not have to be determined at the jurisdiction stage of the Arbitration.

488 The Tribunals therefore concluded that they had jurisdiction ratione materiae concerning “any liability”, irrespective of its source.

489 Concerning jurisdiction ratione personae, the Tribunal noted that Petrobangla was not party to the JVA; it had no personal jurisdiction over Petrobangla with respect to claims based on the that agreement.

490 The Tribunals also noted that they were not called upon to adjudicate upon the responsibility of Petrobangla and Bangladesh. Their task was rather to determine the rights and duties of Niko and BAPEX in connection with the performance of the JVA. However, the Government and Petrobangla assigned to BAPEX rights and obligations which otherwise are theirs. That was seen in the terms of some provisions of the JVA and was recorded in very clear terms

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in paragraph 14 of the JVA Preamble. There BAPEX warrants that it has the necessary approvals and then continues:

The responsibilities and obligations of Petrobangla and the Government in all relevant Articles, Annexes and Amendments under this JVA has been assign [sic] to BAPEX.

491 The Tribunals clarified that, when dealing with responsibilities and obligations that were assigned to BAPEX, they were not assuming jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the responsibility of third parties. Rather, they would determine responsibilities and obligations assigned to BAPEX, a party to the JVA and as such subject to the Tribunals' jurisdiction.143

492 In the Decision on Jurisdiction the Tribunals therefore decided that they had “jurisdiction under the JVA and between the Claimant and BAPEX to decide (a) the Claimant's request for a Compensation Declaration”;144 the reasons for this decision made it clear that this jurisdiction applied to “any Claim”, including the claims raised by the Government and Petrobangla in the Money Suit.

493 With respect to the Payment Claim between the Claimant and Petrobangla, the relation with the Courts of Bangladesh arose first in the context of the BELA injunction, discussed above, on which Petrobangla relied in an attempted force majeure justification for not paying for the gas delivered by the Joint Venture. The issue was resolved by the Tribunals in the First Decision on the Payment Claim of 11 September 2014 on grounds which did not have to consider the Tribunals' jurisdiction in relation to that of the Courts of Bangladesh: the injunction prohibiting payment to Niko was a risk assumed by Petrobangla against which it failed to take adequate action and which does not excuse its failure to make payment under the GPSA.

494 The Tribunals nevertheless considered that, when they decided that Petrobangla owed to Niko the outstanding invoice amounts, the injunction was still in place and, under the law of Bangladesh, was binding on Petrobangla. The injunction provided that it

... shall remain in force till disposal of the money suit or ill amicable settlement among the parties, whichever is earlier.

495 The Claimant had argued that the problem of the injunction could be resolved by an agreement by Petrobangla and Niko on the basis of the Decision on the


143 Decision on Jurisdiction, Section 10. ↩

144 Decision on Jurisdiction, paragraph 575(1). ↩

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Payment Claim. The Tribunals invited the Parties’ engagement in such negotiations.

496 The Tribunals also addressed the powers of the Tribunals in relation to the injunction of the Bangladesh court. The Tribunals recalled that Petrobangla and BAPEX, exercising rights and powers of the Government as described in the Preambles of the JVA and referred to in the GPSA, have agreed in the GPSA to submit all disputes with Niko to ICSID arbitration. In its Decision on Jurisdiction, the Tribunals found that they had jurisdiction to decide Niko's claim against Petrobangla under the GPSA. This includes jurisdiction with respect to Provisional Measures according to Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, including such measures which the Tribunal may recommend on its own initiative.

497 The Tribunals also explained:

The jurisdiction of the present Tribunal is exclusive with respect to the merits of the dispute validly brought before it. Since the Parties have not availed themselves of the possibility afforded under Rule 39 (6) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules to request provisional measures from judicial or other authorities, the Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction also extends to provisional measures.145

498 The Tribunals explained that, by virtue of its ratification of the ICSID Convention, the People's Republic of Bangladesh and all of its organs, including the courts, are bound by this Convention and must give effect to awards rendered in ICSID arbitration.

499 The Tribunals also pointed out that, when the High Court Division and the Appellate Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court were seized of issues affecting the contractual relationship between Niko and Petrobangla, and when they issued and partially confirmed the injunction against payment to Niko, the present Arbitration had not yet commenced. As far as the Tribunals were able to determine from the procedural records of these court proceedings, as they were filed in the present proceedings, no reference had been made in the Bangladesh court proceedings to the existence of the contractual provision which required that disputes under the GPSA be submitted to ICSID arbitration.

500 The seizure of the ICSID Tribunals had created a new situation. The payments which Niko must make under the GPSA must be decided by the ICSID


145 First Decision on the Payment Claim, paragraph 286, emphasis added. ↩

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Tribunals, including any injunctions against such payments. The Tribunals concluded that they had

... no reason to believe that, when this exclusive jurisdiction, founded on the ICSID Convention, is brought to the attention of the courts in Bangladesh, in particular the High Court Division having issued the injunction, these courts would disregard the international obligations assumed by Bangladesh when adhering to that Convention.

501 The Tribunals were confident that the First Decision on the Payment Claim settled the dispute with respect to that claim and that the remaining issues were susceptible to a mutually acceptable resolution crafted by the Parties themselves. The Tribunals nevertheless remained seized of the dispute in the event such a resolution would not be achieved.

502 It turned out that the Parties were unable to agree on an amicable implementation of the Decision on the Payment Claim. The Claimant had made several alternative proposals which could have responded to the “amicable settlement” provision of the BELA injunction.146 The Respondents insisted on deferring any payment to Niko until the Compensation Declaration in the proceedings under the JVA had been completed. As no progress towards an agreed solution was made, the Tribunals decided the issues in the Second Decision on the Payment Claim on 14 September 2015, ordering payment into an escrow account.

503 By that time, the Respondents had appointed new counsel and the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration were changed, as described above. In this revised approach the relation with the Money Suit arose again.

504 As explained above, in the proceedings about the Tribunals' jurisdiction the Respondents had sought to distinguish between the liability under the JVA and liability under “tort and statute law” and other bases. In the Decision on Jurisdiction, the Tribunals determined that, ratione materiae, their jurisdiction extended “beyond the liability under the JVA to other grounds" and they mentioned expressly the grounds which the Respondents had mentioned.147


146 Second Decision on the Payment Claim, paragraph 40. ↩

147 Decision on Jurisdiction, Section 10.2 on Jurisdiction ratione materiae and specifically paragraphs 494, 497 and 498. ↩

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505 When the extension of the procedure to the Full Scope of Liability had been defined at the PHC of 1 October 2015 and the Claimant accepted it by its letter of 5 October 2015, the Claimant wrote:

For the first time, Niko faces in two different forums affirmative claims for precisely the same liability as concerns the two blowouts: the claims of BAPEX for lost gas production and environmental damages before these Tribunals; and the claims asserted by Petrobangla and the Government for precisely the same liability and damages in the Money Suit. The present situation is irreconcilable with Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, pursuant to which “[c]onsent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall ... be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy.

506 In its response on 6 October 2015, BAPEX raised again the distinction between the legal bases invoked in the Money Suit and in the Arbitration; it sought to limit the scope of the November 2015 hearing:

BAPEX understood that the scope of the hearing would be to address whether or not Niko's actions breached the JVA and caused or contributed to one or both of the blow-outs. BAPEX did not understand that, and does not consent to proceed on the basis that, the alternative approach discussed at the pre-hearing conference includes assessment of breaches of laws or legal instruments other than the JVA.

507 BAPEX also relied on the approach adopted by its prior counsel to argue that the examination of bases other than the JVA had not been adequately briefed; it referred to

... issues on which Niko and BAPEX's prior counsel did not provide adequate briefing. The only issue that is ripe for decision is the question whether Niko breached the standard of care under the JVA.

508 In the Respondents' letter of 19 October 2015, BAPEX insisted that it was not a party to the Money Suit and that Niko had mischaracterized the Money Suit:

Niko asserts that the Government and Petrobangla are pursuing claims under the JVA. However, the Money Suit does not make claims or seek compensation based on violations of the JVA. As explained in the Money Suit complaint the damages sought [...] are damages arising out of tortious liabilities [...]. [T]he plaintiffs are seeking damages caused by negligence, lack of skill and proper supervision, which come within the ambit of tortious liabilities and not breach of contract and therefore, the arbitration clause inserted in the JVA has no manner of application in

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this case. ‘Damages for tortious liabilities' are distinct and separate from the liabilities arising out of ‘Breach of Contract' [...]

509 The Respondents argued that the Money Suit is compatible with the ICSID Arbitrations because in “the Money Suit, the People's Republic of Bangladesh is seeking compensation for injury, inter alia, due to the loss of gas deposits underlying the land of Bangladesh owned by the Republic, on behalf of the people of Bangladesh”. In seeking compensation for the loss of the gas in the subsoil of the territory of Bangladesh, the Government and the Ministry are pursuing claims of the Republic and the people of Bangladesh. These claims for compensation for loss of these ownership rights to the gas in the subsoil, as contrasted to the loss of the right to develop and produce that gas, are not claims arising from rights assigned to BAPEX. They are independent rights of the people of Bangladesh vested in the Republic and being protected by the actions of the Government and the Ministry in the Money Suit. The Respondents asserted that the rights were distinct and they were held by different parties with different legal claims:

Different adjudicatory bodies have jurisdiction to resolve disputes regarding them. This Tribunal has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims related to BAPEX's rights and the courts of Bangladesh have jurisdiction to hear claims related to the ownership rights of the people and the Republic of Bangladesh represented by the Government and the Ministry. The competence to enforce environmental laws and prosecute environmental claims on behalf of the people of Bangladesh and the Government has likewise not been delegated to either Petrobangla or BAPEX and is properly being pursued in the Money Suit.

510 The Tribunals noted that the distinction between the legal bases for liability, which BAPEX sought to reintroduce, had been considered in the Decision on Jurisdiction; the Tribunals had rejected the argument based on it. The Tribunals did not agree that this distinction should limit the scope of their decision on liability and sought to ensure that all grounds on which BAPEX intended to rely had been clearly identified. Further to a reference at the PHC,148 the Tribunals gave the following directions in their letter to the Parties of 7 October 2015:

Having accepted the change in the scope of the procedure requested by the Respondents and the resulting expansion of the arbitrations, the Tribunals will decide the Claimant's request for a declaration on the basis of the obligations identified by the parties and will consider the


148 As the matter was merely mentioned but not discussed, it was not recorded in the Summary Minutes, but it was mentioned by the Respondents at page 27 of B-CD.9. ↩

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obligations so identified as complete for the purpose of the requested declaration. They will not accept that for the purposes of their decision on the Claimant's request for a non-liability declaration any issues concerning breach and liability be reserved.

511 The Respondents were offered the possibility to complete the list of obligations and breaches for the Tribunals' examination and decision on the Compensation Declaration, “specifying the source of each obligation and its precise content”. After further correspondence concerning the laws and standards to be considered, the Tribunal concluded in PO No 12 of 21 October 2015:

The list of Breaches of Applicable Laws and Standards that must be considered by the Tribunals when making their determination concerning the requested declaration is now complete. The Tribunals will examine by reference to the Breaches alleged until now the Claimant's request for a declaration according to which “Niko breached no obligation or law as concerns the two blowouts in 2005 at Chattak field”.

512 In the Tribunals' understanding, all laws and standards relevant for Niko's liability for the two blowouts, without distinction between those raised under the JVA and on other legal bases and without the forum in which they were raised, were considered in the proceedings that followed and in the Decisions dealing with this liability.

513 In the proceedings on the implementation of the Decision on the Payment Claim new issues in the relation to proceedings in the courts of Bangladesh arose in 2016. During the proceedings leading to the Third Decision on the Payment Claim of 26 May 2016, the Parties were in consultation about an escrow agreement. The draft of such agreement was proposed by the Claimant and was modified to reflect the observations by the Respondents. At the November 2015 Hearing the arrangements for the escrow agreement were accepted for implementation. Petrobangla informed the Tribunals that, on 10 December 2015 it had filed a petition with the BELA court seeking review of the judgment imposing the BELA 2005 Injunction. On 6 January 2016, the Respondents confirmed that Petrobangla” “has committed to making payment into the escrow account as soon as the injunction is modified or lifted”. The Respondents informed the Tribunals on 6 January 2016 that their counsel in the court proceedings had informed them that he anticipated that the petition would be dealt with within the next three months.

514 The Tribunal concludes that this did not happen. Instead, the Respondents filed on 25 March 2016, in the Arbitrations their Corruption Claims. In their Third Decision on the Payment Claim of 26 May 2016, the Tribunals

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considered the question whether the possibility of a finding by the Tribunals that corruption did occur and that the Respondents corruption claim were justified would require the Tribunals to suspend the Respondents' payment obligation until the Corruption Claim had been decided. The Tribunals considered that the acts of corruption alleged in the context of the conclusion of the GPSA had been examined already in the Decision on Jurisdiction; and they considered that in their submission of 29 April 2016, the Respondents had argued that, in case of avoidance, the Claimant could make a claim for enrichment by the gas delivered. The Tribunals concluded that under a possible claim for enrichment, Niko could claim for enrichment, valued on the basis of the contract price.

515 The Tribunals concluded that that there was no justification for deferring their Third Decision on the Payment Claim or to suspend its effect until the Corruption Claim had been decided. They ordered that Petrobangla must pay the outstanding amounts forthwith.

516 Shortly before the Tribunals issued this Third Decision on the Payment Claim, the Respondents informed the Tribunals on 12 May 2016 of the Alam Injunction that had been ordered on 9 May 2016. The Claimant filed on 19 May 2016, a request for interim measures. In their Third Decision on the Payment Claim, the Tribunals confirmed that their jurisdiction was exclusive.149 They announced procedural directions and invited the Claimant to consider whether, in light of the Decision and the forthcoming procedural order, it wished to amend its request for interim measures.

517 On 1 June 2016, the Claimant revised its request for interim measures. It withdrew “its request for a declaration as concerns Petrobangla's obligation”. It referred to the Tribunals' earlier decisions on their jurisdiction and added that

Niko nonetheless considers that it would be useful for the Tribunals to state in unequivocal terms that their jurisdiction over these questions is exclusive of all other remedies. Niko therefore maintains its other requests for declarations.

518 With respect to the injunction in the Alam proceedings, the Claimant maintained “its request for an order requiring specific action by the Respondents as concerns the Stay Order and the Writ Petition”. The Claimant requested


149 Third Decision on the Payment Claim, paragraphs 107 and 108. ↩

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... the Tribunals to declare that no court is competent to order provisional measures of any kind concerning matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of these Tribunals. As ICSID Arbitration Rule 39(6) recognizes, a national court may address provisional measures only in the event that the parties have in the agreement recording their consent provided for such a thing. Neither the JVA nor the GPSA here provides for such intervention by a court.

519 In the revised version, the Claimant sought the following relief: “to make payments to Niko” and amended its request of 19 May 2016:

(a) Declaring that these Tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction over the questions of: (i) the validity of the JVA and GPSA as concerns Niko, BAPEX and Petrobangla, and their successors, predecessors, assignors and assignees; (ii) whether Niko is liable to BAPEX or any of its successors, predecessors, assignors and assignees and if so, what compensation is due; and (iii) any requests for interim or provisional measures concerning any matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of these Tribunals, including any injunction, stay of payment, attachment or other relief.

(b) Ordering BAPEX and Petrobangla to consent to the removal of the interim injunction in Writ Petition No. 5673 before the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, High Court Division, and to take all measures to request and support the removal or discontinuance of such interim injunction and dismissal of the Writ Petition.

520 The Respondents had been invited to comment on the Claimant's request and submitted their comments on 1 June 2016. They argued that the Claimant had misrepresented the proceedings concerning the Alam injunction. The writ petition had been made by a distinguished scholar, highly qualified to deal with the relevant matters. They stated:

The petitioner in the Writ Petition proceeding is a legitimate public interest litigant seeking redress under Article 102 of the Constitution of Bangladesh.

521 The Respondents asserted that they had no contact, direct or indirect, with Professor Alam and they did not “spoon feed” documents.

522 Concerning the jurisdiction of the Tribunals concerning matters in the Alam proceedings, the Respondents argued

... Niko wrongly states the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals in these arbitrations. Niko seeks to end the proceedings before the Supreme

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Court of Bangladesh, but the existence of this arbitration does not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear a petition from a citizen of Bangladesh who is not a party to these proceedings. The State of Bangladesh is not a party to these ICSID proceedings and has not consented to this arbitration. The Tribunals do not have jurisdiction over the State, including its courts. The overlap of subject matter and the fact that the parties in these proceedings are among the defendants in the Writ Petition proceeding do not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction.

523 The Respondents also contested that the Claimant had made out the urgency of the request. Moreover, the request was seeking the protection of companies of the Niko Group, other than the Claimant; but the Claimant could seek protection only of its own rights. The Respondents also contested the Claimant's reliance of Article 26 of the ICSID Convention that does not have support the exclusive meaning attributed by the Claimant.

524 On 15 June 2016, the Respondents commented on the Claimant's revised request of 1 June 2016. The Respondents confirmed the position which they had expressed in their written submission of 1 June 2016, contesting that the proceedings before the High Court Division were in violation of Article 26 of the ICSID Convention. The Respondents stated:

The State of Bangladesh is not a party to these proceedings. The jurisdiction of the Tribunals does not preempt the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh to order the measures it deems appropriate in proceedings under the Constitution instituted by a citizen of Bangladesh who is not a party to the ICSID proceedings for the purpose of protecting the rights of the people of Bangladesh. Nothing in the ICSID Convention creates an obligation on the courts of a State to abstain from exercising their constitutional jurisdiction when seized by a non-party to the arbitration, especially where the State is not a party to the ICSID arbitration in question.

525 The Parties developed their positions in further submissions, the Respondents on 7 and 12 July 2016 and the Claimant confirmed its request for provisional measures on 23 June 2016 and made further submissions on 11 and 13 July 2016.

526 The Tribunals decided the Claimant's application concerning the Alam Injunction in their Decision Pertaining to the Exclusivity of the Tribunals' Jurisdiction on 19 July 2016 (the Decision on Exclusivity).

527 The Tribunals considered the Parties' submissions and prior decisions concerning their jurisdiction and powers related to the issues raised by the Claimant's request. They referred in particular to their Decision on

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Jurisdiction, that had confirmed the Tribunals' jurisdiction ratione materiae over the subject matter of the two Agreements; and to the First and Third Decisions on the Payment Claim which had clarified that the Tribunals' jurisdiction was conclusive and extended to provisional measures.

528 The Tribunals confirmed their “exclusive jurisdiction to determine the issues that are validly brought before [it]”. They clarified the distinction between the personal and substantive jurisdiction and the impact on the jurisdiction of the courts in Bangladesh:

This finding does not affect the personal jurisdiction of the courts in Bangladesh in other respects. These courts may well receive and determine claims by persons over which the Tribunals do not have jurisdiction and adjudicate such claims. In making their decision involving other parties, the courts of Bangladesh, however, are bound to conform to and implement the decisions rendered by these Tribunals that are within the competence of these Tribunals. This means, for instance, that it is for these Tribunals, and the Tribunals alone, to decide whether the JVA and the GPSA were procured by corruption, whether the blow- outs were caused by Niko's breach of the standards it had to observe under the JVA and the amount of the damage caused by such a breach. When seized by a claim of a party not subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunals, a court in Bangladesh may entertain that claim but it must conform in its decision to those of the Tribunals.

529 The Tribunals explained that, if it were otherwise, the international commitments of the State of Bangladesh “could be rendered ineffective by the simple expedient of any third parties claiming to be affected in their rights by the actions and occurrences over which the Tribunals have jurisdiction", creating the risk of decision conflicting with Bangladesh's obligations as a party to the ICSID Convention. They added:

This is particularly striking in a case in which the plaintiff does not seek to vindicate his own rights, but acts by way of a derivative action invoking rights of public bodies which the plaintiff, in his vision of the public interest, prefers to be pursued in national courts rather than before the international tribunal whose jurisdiction have been accepted by those public bodies, including delegation of the State as a signatory to the ICSID Convention.

530 The Tribunals noted that such a conflicting position had been taken by the Respondents when they argued that “a court in Bangladesh may order measures in conflict with the decisions of the Tribunals, simply because the application is made by a person not party to the Convention and the

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Arbitrations [...] Accepting this position would subvert the international obligations assumed by Bangladesh by virtue of its decision to become a party to the ICSID Convention. The Tribunals are not prepared to give effect to such a position."

531 The Tribunals considered the form in which their decision on the Claimant's request should be issued. They concluded that the relief granted is not provisional but requires a final determination of the issues raised. Therefore, the Tribunals were of the view that the requested relief, while justified in substance, cannot take the form of provisional measures. Indeed, in the letter accompanying its submission on 1 June 2016, the Claimant had pointed out that a statement in “unequivocal terms that [the Tribunals'] jurisdiction over these questions is exclusive of all other remedies” was useful.

532 Considering the Respondents' submissions in response to the Claimant's request, the Tribunals concluded that “a further clarification of the jurisdictional issues was required” and that such clarification had to be provided in the form of a declaratory decision. The Tribunals therefore granted in substance the relief requested but did so in the form not of a provisional measure but in a decision in the following terms:

The Tribunals:

1. Declare that the Tribunals have sole and exclusive subject matter jurisdiction with respect to all matters which have validly been brought before [them], notably

(a) The validity of the JVA and the GSPA, including all questions relating to the avoidance of these agreements on grounds of corruption;

(b) The liability of Niko under the JVA for the blow-outs that occurred in the course of its activity in the Chattak field and the quantum of the damage for which it may be responsible in case such liability were found to exist;

(c) The payment obligations of Petrobangla towards Niko under the GSPA for gas delivered, the jurisdiction for injunctions seeking to prevent such payments and to retract such injunctions;

533 The Claimant also had requested that the Tribunals order a specific action by BAPEX and Petrobangla in the following terms:

(b) Ordering BAPEX and Petrobangla to consent to the removal of the interim injunction in Writ Petition No. 5673 before the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, High Court Division, and to take all measures to request and

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support the removal or discontinuance of such interim injunction and dismissal of the Writ Petition.

534 The second part of this request was more general than the first specific order, requesting “all measures" and applying to “such interim injunction”. Given the general nature of the jurisdictional clarification, the Tribunals expressed the direction for further action also in a broad nature and ordered BAPEX and Petrobangla

(a) to intervene with all courts and other authorities in Bangladesh that are or may be concerned with issues identified above under (1) to bring to their attention the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunals in respect of these issues and the international obligations of the State of Bangladesh resulting therefrom under the ICSID Convention; and

(b) to take all steps necessary to terminate any proceedings and orders by the courts in Bangladesh which are in conflict with this order.

535 The Respondents wrote on 25 July 2016, objecting to the Decision on Exclusivity in the following terms:

Specifically, without limiting the scope of our objections, Respondents disagree with the Tribunals’making a declaration and order that effectively extend the reach of the arbitration agreements of the JVA and the GPSA beyond the signatories’sphere and scope of consent. Respondents also object to the Tribunals' decision to exceed the relief requested by Claimant without previously affording the Parties an opportunity to comment on their power to do so.

Respondents note for the record that their compliance with the Tribunals’ order and obligations deriving thereunder is without prejudice to such disagreement and Respondents’substantive and procedural rights. Respondents reserve all of their rights with respect to post-award remedies regarding the Tribunals' Decision.

536 The Tribunals noted the Respondents' objection and the announcement of their compliance. In PO No 14, they invited the Respondents to inform the Tribunals about the manner in which they complied with the Decision on Exclusivity.

537 On 8 August 2016, the Respondents responded in writing. With regard to the Writ Petition, the Respondents stated that they were “preparing to file an affidavit as soon as possible requesting the termination of proceedings inconsistent with the order of the Tribunals, and in particular the prohibition on payments to Niko”.

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538 On 12 and 16 August 2016, the Claimant responded to the Respondents' letter, arguing that neither Respondent had taken any steps in the Alam Proceeding to give effect to the Tribunals' Decision on Exclusivity.

539 On 16 August 2016, the Respondents notified the Tribunals that they had filed on 14 August 2016, an Application in connection with the Writ Petition informing the court of the Tribunals' Decision on Exclusivity and requesting it to issue an order vacating the order prohibiting payments to Niko. A copy of this application was attached to the Respondents' letter. In a letter of 19 August 2016, the Respondents disputed the Claimant's characterization of the Respondents' actions in connection with the Alam Proceedings and their compliance with the Decision on Exclusivity.

540 The matter was again addressed at the Status Conference on 30 January 2017. The summary minutes record the following:

The Respondents referred to their submission of 14 August 2016 filed with the court hearing the writ petition of Professor Alam, stating that since then, they have been awaiting the court's decision. The Claimant asserted that no efforts have been made by the Respondents to lift the injunctions. The Respondents objected to this statement.

541 Despite the Respondents' submission to the High Court Division concerning the Tribunals’Decision on Exclusivity, that court continued with its proceedings on the Alam Writ Petition. It held hearings on 11 April 2017, and on several days during the months of July and August 2017.

542 On 10 August 2017, the Claimant complained to the Tribunals that the Government presented arguments supporting a finding of corruption and judgment in favour of the petitioner and that the Government contested the application of the exclusive jurisdiction of these Tribunals, as recognized in the Decision on Exclusivity, to the Writ Petition proceedings. The Claimant noted that the only step taken by Petrobangla and BAPEX in the Alam proceedings had been the application that the Respondents had transmitted under cover of their letter of 16 August 2016 to these Tribunals. The Court had taken no action on that application, and the Respondents had done nothing to pursue the application. The Claimant asserted that the conduct of Petrobangla and BAPEX, and of the Government of Bangladesh, could be reconciled neither with their obligations under Article 26 of the ICSID Convention nor with the Tribunals' order that Petrobangla and BAPEX “take all steps necessary to terminate any proceedings and orders by the courts in Bangladesh which are in conflict with” the Decision on Exclusivity. No specific action was, however, requested from the Tribunals.

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543 The Respondents responded on 16 August 2017, stating that the Respondents “have no authority over the Government of Bangladesh and cannot respond to accusations against the Government in these arbitration proceedings”. The Respondents requested the Tribunals to ignore the Claimant's letter of 10 August 2017.

544 The Tribunals have considered the Respondents'objections. They have considered their jurisdiction and its scope at repeated occasions, as explained above. They confirm the conclusions reached at these occasions: their jurisdiction on matters validly brought before them is exclusive and the courts of Bangladesh must give effect to and therefore comply with the Tribunals' substantive findings as a matter of respect for the ICSID Convention to which Bangladesh is a signatory.

545 Concerning the Decision on Exclusivity, the Tribunals confirm its paragraph 1 and hold that BAPEX and Petrobangla must comply with this decision in their action.

4.4.3 The Alam Judgment

546 On 24 August 2017, the Respondents informed the Tribunals that the High Court Division had rendered its decision and had, on 24 August 2017, announced it orally (the Alam Judgment): the Court declared the JVA and the GPSA “to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and thus void ab initio”. The assets of Niko and Niko Canada, including their shareholding in interest in Tullow Bangladesh Limited concerning Block 9 were attached. The written version of the High Court's Judgement, containing detailed reasons, was issued on 19 November 2017.

547 The Respondents wrote to the Tribunals on 21 November 2017:

The judgment of the Supreme Court is relevant to the Tribunals' decision on the Corruption Claim because“[t]he validity, interpretation and implementation of [the JVA and GPSA] shall be governed by the laws of Bangladesh.”

[...]

In determining the Corruption Claim, these Tribunals must apply the laws of Bangladesh as articulated in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and should give particular consideration to the Supreme Court's judgment in determining how the laws of Bangladesh would be applied. Respondents are prepared to provide a more detailed assessment of the significance of this judgment should the Tribunals invite further input from the Parties on this matter.

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548 In its submission of 11 December 2017, the Claimant described the Judgement as “fundamentally illegitimate”. It asserted that the Judgment:

... was issued by a court with no authority to resolve disputes of fact or to hear more than summary evidence. The judgment's disingenuous assertions that disputed facts were undisputed and its leaps of logic confirm its results-driven, partial approach. The Respondents assert that the Writ Petition Judgment is persuasive authority. Review of the document leads to the conclusion that it is neither persuasive nor an authority legitimately considered in this forum.

549 In a further submission of 11 December 2017, the Respondents insisted on the relevance of the Alam Judgment:

The judgment confirms prior Supreme Court jurisprudence relied on by Respondents to show that the JVA and GPSA are void ab initio under Bangladeshi law [and it] confirms that the acts admitted by Niko were corruption under the laws of Bangladesh and Niko violated these laws in the establishment of its investment.

550 The Tribunals considered the Alam Judgment in the Decision on the Corruption Claim.150

551 Article 102 of the Bangladesh Constitution, in the relevant passages reads as follows:

The High Court Division may, if satisfied that no other equally efficacious remedy is provided by law

a) on application of any person aggrieved, make an order

(i) ...

(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Republic or of a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect [...]

552 The High Court Division of the Supreme Court recorded the opinions presented by the parties to the proceedings and concluded that:

... from 2003 till 2006 the Respondents No 4 and No 5 [Niko and Niko Canada] had set up a corrupt scheme to illegally obtain gas exploration


150 Decision on the Corruption Claim, Sections 2.5 and 6.4. ↩

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rights in Bangladesh. Based on the undisputed facts, we find that the JVA and GPSA have been procured by corruption and thus render them void ab initio. The rights and assets of [Niko and Niko Canada] in Block 9 PSC for which [Niko Canada] was found to be the least qualified of seven bidders in 1997, have also been obtained through the corrupt scheme and are thus being seized and confiscated as proceeds of crime as well as to provide compensation for the 2005 blowouts. All the rights, assets, and property of [Niko and Niko Canada], obtained from the State through the corrupt scheme, shall revert back to the State.

In view of the above observations, we are inclined to hold that the Rule deserves merit and is bound to succeed.

Accordingly the Rule is made absolute. The Joint Venture Agreement for the Development and Production of Petroleum from the Marginal/Abandoned Chattak and Feni Fields (“JVA”) dated 16.10.2003 between [Niko and Niko Canada] is declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and thus void ab initio and the Gas Purchase and Sale Agreement for the sale of gas from Feni Gas Field (“GPSA”) dated 27.12.2006 between [Petrobangla] as Buyer, and a joint venture between [BAPEX and Niko], as Seller, are also declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and thus void ab initio. The assets of [Niko and Niko Canada], including their shareholding interest in Tullow Bangladesh Limited concerning Block-9 are hereby attached.

553 The Tribunals accepted that the Agreements are subject to the law of Bangladesh and have referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court and its Divisions for content of this law. They stated clearly:

The Tribunals recognise the authority of the Supreme Court in the interpretation of the laws of Bangladesh and accept, as asserted by the Respondents, that the judgments of this Court are “directly relevant to the decision of the Tribunals on the Corruption Claim”. As shown above in Section 6.2, the Tribunals have carefully analysed the relevant jurisprudence of this court.151

554 They also noted the Claimant's observation that the Court proceedings under Article 102 of the Constitution have “no authority to resolve disputes of fact or to hear more than summary evidence”. Indeed, in the Alam Judgment, the Court noted Niko's argument that the corruption allegations were disputed; it


151 Decision of the Corruption Claim, paragraph 718. ↩

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had argued that “only admitted facts can be relied upon”. The Court addressed this argument by stating:

We are of the view that we do not need to rely on any disputed question of fact in this situation since, in addition to admitting to making payments of bribes to the then State Minister for Energy AKM Mosharaf Hossain for obtaining and retaining business interests in Bangladesh for its subsidiaries, [Niko] brazenly admits to making payments of over US$ 4 million to Mr. Qasim Sharif and US$ 500,000 to Mr. Salim Bhuiyan for their services in making “payments to Government officials” and for “arranging meetings with Government officials”.

555 Apart from the fact that Niko did not admit any corruption except for the guilty plea in Canada, the alleged admissions to which the Court refers are far from supporting the conclusion of the “corrupt scheme to illegally obtain gas exploration rights in Bangladesh” which the Court found. The “corrupt scheme” which the Court found to have been created by Niko, in the argument of the Respondents started when Niko first came to Bangladesh in 1997; for the Court, however, the scheme starts only in 2003, when the Government changed.

556 The Tribunals have examined the factual statements made by the Court and noted that it is replete with statements of fact that differ from “admissions” by Niko. The Tribunals gave some examples in the Decision on the Corruption Claim.

557 The Tribunals noted that, when determining whether the Agreements are void or voidable, they take account of the principles of Bangladeshi law, in particular with respect to the application of Article 102 of the Constitution. In the application of this law to the fact of this case, however, they are bound neither by the Alam nor the BELA Judgments.

4.5 The Proceedings following the Decision on Liability until the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss

558 The procedure that followed the Decision on Liability of 28 February 2020 was described in detail in the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss.152 The Tribunal summarises here the principal steps of this phase in the procedure.

559 The procedure on the Compensation Declaration had been adjusted in October 2015 to take account of the Respondents' requests. It expanded the scope of the Arbitration in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11 and provided additional


152 Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, Section 3.2. ↩

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time for the Respondents to present the quantification of the losses resulting from the blowouts. The details of that procedure were then agreed by the Parties and approved by the Tribunals at the November 2015 Hearing. The November 2015 timetable, recorded in the Summary Minutes of that hearing, provided the following steps and dates following the Decision on Liability

560 When it resumed the proceedings on damages, the Tribunals consulted the Parties regarding the next steps in the proceedings. On 3 March 2020 the Tribunal referred to November 2015 Timetable and invited:

561 In the correspondence that followed the Respondents requested that the agreed procedure be modified to accommodate a “full assessment of environmental damage” by their experts; they stated that this assessment required nine months and could start only once the “present travel restrictions” are lifted and its experts can travel to Bangladesh.

562 The Claimant objected to the extension of the proceedings to new quantifications and to the requested adjustment of the procedure. It insisted that the approach adopted in November 2015 be maintained.

563 The Claimant also announced its intention to assert a set-off. The Respondents objected to the introduction of such a set-off and the Claimant developed its argument concerning its right to introduce a set-off claim. The

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Respondents reserved their right to challenge the admissibility of any such claims and contested the Tribunals' jurisdiction over them.

564 The Tribunals summarised their understanding of the Parties' positions and sought further clarifications as follows.

565 The Tribunals accepted that the Respondents be given the opportunity to make an amendment to its Memorial on Damages, expecting that by that amendment the Respondents will: (a) identify with specificity which loss and damage presented in the Memorial on Damages satisfies the requirements of the Tribunals' findings on Niko's liability for the Chattak 2 blowout and the limitation of such liability; and (b) where necessary, adjust accordingly the Respondents' claims as set out in their Memorial. The Tribunals invited the Respondents: “to state whether the Decision on Liability requires any other amendments of their Memorial on Damages and, if so, identify the relevant passages in the Decision on Liability”.

566 Concerning the Claimant's Counter-Memorial on Damages, the Tribunals expected that the Claimant will address the Respondents' quantification of Niko's liability as amended, considering in particular the Tribunal's findings on the scope of that liability and its limitation. The Tribunals invited the Claimant to specify:

(i) whether, in addition to such explanations concerning the scope of liability and previous submissions concerning quantum including expert reports, it intends to produce (a) any new technical argument concerning the loss and damage caused by the Chattak 2 blowout and (b) new evidence and expert opinions in this respect; and

(ii) whether the claim on which the Claimant intends to rely for the intended set-off is established already or requires evidence and argument and a decision by the Tribunal.

567 Both Parties were further invited to indicate:

(iii) whether and to what extent the present COVID-19 situation and the existing and anticipated restrictions in this regard affect their capacity to prepare the submissions for the quantum phase, distinguishing between (a) legal argument, in particular concerning the question whether and to what extent Niko's liability extends to loss and damage of the type claimed; and (b) obtaining expert advice on the quantification of this loss and damage; and

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(iv) availability for a hearing on quantum for seven days (as the Claimant suggests) or shorter, (a) in the first half of 2021 (b) after October 2021 or (c) after July 2022.

568 The Tribunals also invited the Parties to address the expected effect of the COVID-19 situation on the Parties' work programme and proposed possible hearing dates.

569 The Respondents explained existing restrictions and necessary precautions in communications between counsel and their client in Bangladesh. With respect to the work of their experts they described difficulties with respect to field work:

The environmental experts have indicated that significant additional fieldwork will be required to determine the extent of the environmental damage caused by Niko's breach of the JVA.”

570 The Respondents also pointed out the uncertainty about further developments in general and specifically the effect of the COVID-19 situation on their experts “ability to operate safely and without putting the health of the people of Tengratila at risk”.

571 The Claimant explained with respect to “the potential set-off [that had] not yet been articulated, Niko will need to present its contractual and legal basis” and made proposals concerning the timing. With respect to the impact of the COVID-19 situation, the Claimant believed that it would impact its capacity to prepare legal argument or witness statement”. It expected that counsel and experts would be working remotely for the foreseeable future. It “anticipated that usual time frames for work-flows will be increased somewhat, but not by any material amount”.

572 The Tribunals considered the scope of the issues to be addressed. Considering the number of witnesses and experts, the Claimant suggested that more than five days may be required for the evidentiary hearing; it planned for seven days. The Tribunals were of the view that, for the full scope of the heads of loss as now quantified or announced, the time for the evidentiary hearing could hardly be less than seven days. Consultation concerning the availability of the Parties and the members of the Tribunals showed that a seven-day evidentiary hearing could not be held before late June 2021.

573 In this situation the Tribunals noted that legal argument identifying the heads of recoverable loss could be heard earlier during a hearing of one or two days which could take place in the fall of 2020. They issued Procedural Order No 24 on 3 April 2020, providing for subsequent procedural steps as follows:

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(i) By 17 August 2020 (later extended to 7 September 2020): Claimant's Counter-Memorial on Damages, as provided by the November 2015 programme, presenting also the Claimant's argument concerning the effect of the Decision on Liability on the heads of recoverable loss as well as argument on the justification of the intended set-off claim.

(ii) By 17 August 2020 (extended also to 7 September 2020): the Respondents' Amendment to the 2016 Memorial on Damages as they had proposed as an alternative approach in a communication of 11 March 2020.

574 The Tribunal specified that, in these submissions, the Parties were required to identify with specificity which heads of recoverable loss presented in the Memorial on Damages of 25 March 2016 (including the environmental damage reserved for subsequent quantification) satisfy the requirements of the Tribunal's findings on Niko's liability for the Chattak 2 blowout and the limitations of such liability. The Respondents were also asked to address the admissibility and justification of the requested changes from the November 2015 agreed procedure.

(iii) A hearing for oral argument on the issues addressed in these submissions was envisaged for September/October 2020 at a date to be agreed forthwith. The Tribunals clarified that the Parties would be given an opportunity to respond to their opponent's argument identifying the heads of recoverable loss in light of the Tribunal's findings. The Tribunals pointed out that the issues to be argued at that Hearing concerned essentially legal analysis which each Party would have performed in preparation of its 17 August 2020 written submission. Other issues, requiring factual evidence and expert opinion were to be addressed in a subsequent phase.

575 The Tribunals further informed the Parties that they would issue a Decision on the heads of recoverable loss following the fall 2020 hearing for oral argument, with the intent to conduct an evidentiary hearing in July 2021.

576 The Claimant filed its Counter-Memorial on Damages on 7 September 2002, accompanied by factual exhibits and legal authorities, and

  1. Second Expert Report of Gaffney Cline (Gaffney Cline II);
  2. Expert Report of Stuart Wright (Wright I);
  3. Second Witness Statement of Randal Glaholt (WS Glaholt II);

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  1. First Witness Statement and Expert Opinion of Grant Kelly (WS Kelly I);
  2. Fourth Witness Statement of Brian Adolph (WS Adloph IV); and
  3. Fourth Witness Statement of William Hornaday (WS Hornaday IV).

577 The Respondents filed also on 7 September 2020 BAPEX's Amendment to the Memorial on Damages accompanied by factual exhibits and legal authorities and

  1. Supplemental Expert Report of Jeffrey Hughes on Field Development Costs for the Chattak West Gas Field (Hughes II);
  2. Supplemental Expert Report of Steven A. Wilson (Wilson II);
  3. Supplemental Report on Geomechanical Damage and Gas Loss at the Chattak West Gas Field, Bangladesh (GeoMechanics II);
  4. Supplemental Expert Report of James F. Latham PE and Michael J. Novicki PE, Ryder Scott Company PE (Ryder Scott II); and
  5. Updated Quantum of Damages Report, Paul A. Carpenter PhD, the Brattle Group (Brattle II).

578 After the Hearing for oral argument had been agreed for 19 and 20 November 2020, the Respondents requested (i) clarification of the agenda for the November 2020 Hearing, (ii) leave to file a submission responding to the Claimant's set-off claim and its admissibility, and (iii) the organization of a pre-hearing conference.153 On 2 October 2020, the Tribunals confirmed that the set-off claim and its admissibility was among the topics to be addressed at the November 2020 Hearing and informed the Parties that further written submissions prior to 22 October 2020 were permitted. The Tribunals further confirmed its intention to hold a pre-hearing conference.

579 Subsequently, BAPEX filed a Written Presentation in Advance of the 19-20 November 2020 Hearing, addressing legal issues related to heads of loss. The submission was accompanied by new evidence and legal authorities. The submission also set out the Respondents' legal argument on the Claimant's set-off claim. The Claimant informed the Tribunals that it did not consider it


153 Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, para. 87. ↩

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necessary to make a written submission or introduce new legal authorities prior to the November 2020 Hearing.

580 A pre-hearing conference was held on 4 November 2020. The Tribunals were represented at the Pre-Hearing Conference by their President, in view of the wide range of time zones involved. The List of Issues to be addressed at the November 2020 Hearing was discussed, including the following:

3.1. Criteria for distinguishing recoverable heads of loss from those which are excluded by Clause 27.2 of the JVA and Section 73 of the Contract Act; for the Tribunals it is important to understand, in light of the Tribunals' findings in the Decision on Liability, the reasons why the Parties consider each of the losses claimed as recoverable heads of loss or deny recoverability;

3.2. Legal issues concerning the Government's tort claim;

3.3. Admissibility and justification of the Claimant's set-off claim, including the question whether heads of loss relied upon are recoverable in light of the Tribunals' decision on liability;

3.4. The procedure for the quantification of recoverable claims, following the Tribunals' forthcoming Decision on Heads of Claim.

581 At the Pre-Hearing Conference, the Parties confirmed in principle their agreement with the identification of the issues listed, subject to some adjustments and clarifications. Disagreement arose, however, with respect to item 3.1 of the List of Issues insofar as Claimant understood that this issue should not be limited to distinguishing recoverable loss from losses that were excluded by Article 27.3 of the JVA and Section 73 of the Contract Act but that all issues of liability that arose from the submissions should be addressed. The Respondents objected and argued that adopting the broad definition of the issue would go beyond the scope that had been announced for the November 2020 Hearing.

582 With respect to item 3.3 of the List of Issues, it was agreed that this issue be limited to the admissibility of the set-off defence and the Tribunal's jurisdiction over it. If the Tribunals determined in the Decision on Recoverable Loss that the set-off defence would be admissible, it was agreed that liability and quantum of that defence would be subject of the final phase of the arbitration.

583 The Parties were invited at the Pre-Hearing Conference to explain their respective positions regarding the scope of agenda item 3.1 in writing after the Pre-Hearing Conference, which they did on 6 November 2020.

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584 The Tribunals prepared Summary Minutes of the Pre-Hearing Conference, which were provided to the Parties for comments and thereafter finalized taking into account the Parties' observations. The Summary Minutes were thus sent to the Parties on 10 November 2020.

585 The Tribunal considered the Parties' positions on the scope of agenda item 3.1 as expressed orally and in their 6 November 2020 submissions and issued Procedural Order No 25 on 15 November 2020. The Tribunals clarified that agenda item 3.1 concerned

all claims by BAPEX and the question whether the claims are recoverable in principle. If the Claimant “den[ies] recoverability”, its argument at the Hearing is not limited to specific grounds of its denial. The Tribunal sees no need to modify the definition of the issue in item 3.1 of the List of Issues.

586 The Tribunals further noted in PO No 25 the scope of agenda item 3.3, limited to the admissibility of the set-off claim, as agreed during the Pre-Hearing Conference; and they recorded that otherwise the List of Issues was confirmed without prejudice to subsequent clarifications in consultation with the Parties. Attached to PO No 25 were (i) the List of Issues, (ii) a Protocol Regarding Remote Hearing Matters and the Hearing Agenda, including time allocation and connection details. No comments were subsequently received from the Parties on the remote hearing protocol.

587 In order to assist the Parties in their hearing preparation and as the Tribunals had done on prior occasions, the Tribunals sent to the Parties a list of questions related to the agreed List of Issues. The introduction to the list stated

The Tribunals presume that most if not all of these questions have been identified already by the Parties in their preparation of the forthcoming November 2020 Hearing. The below list summarising some of the Tribunals' questions may nevertheless assist the Parties in focusing their presentations. The list is by no means complete and may not be taken in any way as a prejudgement of the Tribunals on any of the issues it must decide; and it should not be taken as limiting in any way the Parties' argument at the Hearing.

588 The November 2020 Hearing took place as scheduled on 19 and 20 November 2020 by video-conference. In light of the place of residence of the hearing participants (Wellington, Dhaka, Manama, Geneva, Paris, Washington, D.C. and Calgary), it was agreed that each hearing day would consist of two 2-hour sessions, i.e. a total of 8 hearing hours, organized as follows:

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Hearing Day 1
Hearing Day 1 - Session 1
UTC-time Wellington Dhaka Manama Geneva/Paris Washington, DC Calgary
Thu 5pm-7pm Fri 6am-8am Thu 11pm-Fri 1am Thu 8pm-10pm Thu 6pm-8pm Thu 12pm-2pm Thu 10am-12pm
Hearing Day 1 - Session 2
UTC-time Wellington Dhaka Manama Geneva/Paris Washington, DC Calgary
Fri 3am-5am Fri 4pm-6pm Fri 9am-11am Fri 6am-8am Fri 4am-6am Thu 10pm-Fri 12am Thu 8pm-10pm
Hearing Day 2
Hearing Day 2 - Session 1
UTC-time Wellington Dhaka Manama Geneva/Paris Washington, DC Calgary
Fri 5pm-7pm Sat 6am-8am Fri 11pm-Sat 1am Fri 8pm-10pm Fri 6pm-8pm Fri 12pm-2pm Fri 10am-12pm
Hearing Day 2 - Session 2
UTC-time Wellington Dhaka Manama Geneva/Paris Washington, DC Calgary
Sat 3am-5am Sat 4pm-6pm Sat 9am-11am Sat 6am-8am Sat 4am-6am Fri 10pm-Sat 12am Fri 8pm-10pm

589 The Hearing was attended by the three members of the Tribunals, the Tribunal Secretary and staff of the ICSID Secretariat, the Parties' Counsel and staff of their law firms, as well as representatives of the Claimant and of the Respondents and the Honourable State Minister, Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources and other members of the Ministry. A complete list of participants was distributed to the Parties as Annex B to the Summary Minutes of the November 2020 Hearing prepared by the Tribunals.

590 The Parties presented their argument on the issues that had been identified and responded to the questions of the Tribunals. Prior to the start of their respective presentations the Parties distributed to the Tribunals and their opponent electronic copies of the slides shown during their presentation. These were uploaded to the Box account established for these cases and recorded as RH-1 to RH-3 and CH-1 and CH-2.

591 Concerning item 3.4 of the agreed agenda for the Hearing, the Respondents presented BAPEX's Proposed Procedural Schedule for Quantification of Recoverable Claims. This schedule provided for a reply by the Respondents on Heads of Damage 1 and 2, followed by the Claimant's rejoinder, a hearing and the Tribunal's “Decision on the Quantification of Damages under Heads of Damage 1 and 2 and Order Requiring Payment of Monitoring Costs Arising Out of Head of Damage 3". This decision was then to be followed by proceedings on BAPEX's Head of Damage 3, starting with a submission of the Respondents to be filed “9 months from when the World Health Organisation declares the COVID-19 pandemic over”. According to the Respondents, the proceedings in this phase were to consist of an exchange of written submissions, a hearing and the Final Award.

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592 The Claimant objected to this proposal and the change of the procedural approach adopted at the end of the November 2015 Hearing. It took the position that further monitoring was neither required nor justified, and requested that the claims be decided on the basis of the evidence on the record.

593 The Respondents announced BAPEX's intention to file requests for production of documents. The Claimant objected that a phase for document production had not been provided in the agreed programme and was inadmissible. The Tribunals examined with the Parties whether document production could be organised without causing delay to the procedure, affording both Parties the opportunity for such production. Further to the discussion and agreement at the Hearing, the Tribunal issued on 1 December 2020, Procedural Order No 26, setting directions for the document production procedure.

594 Sound recordings and transcripts were made of the November 2020 Hearing and deposited in the Centre's archives and provided to the Parties and the Tribunals. Transcript corrections were provided by the Parties after the Hearing and corrected transcripts were subsequently circulated. The Tribunals prepared Summary Minutes of the Hearing and provided them to the Parties in draft form; they were finalized following two rounds of comments.

595 As noted above, further to the agreement on document production reached at the November 2020 Hearing, the Tribunal issued on 1 December 2020, Procedural Order No 26, setting directions for the document production procedure.

596 Following the November 2020 Hearing and a discussion with the Tribunal about the Tribunals' Question No 12, the Respondents wrote to the Tribunals on 5 December 2020 with respect to the Government's claim for lost gas:

In light of Respondents' more complete understanding of the Tribunals’ question, Respondents consider that the loss to the Government could be determined in relation to alternative gas supplies. The valuation of the loss on this basis would require further analysis, with input from valuation experts. Respondents respectfully inform the Tribunals that they are prepared to provide such analysis now or in the subsequent quantification phase

597 On 15 April 2021, the Respondents wrote to the Tribunals, “to provide an update to the Tribunal regarding the work of BAPEX’s environmental damages experts". With the letter the Respondents communicated a note from Delphic HSE concerning “the planned health, environmental and monitoring and

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environmental conditions study (the Study) to be carried out in Trengratila, Bangladesh”. The note stated that “Delphic HSE is planning to start the Study in November 2021” but identified “[s]everal significant risks to the Study [...] primarily related to COVID-19”.

4.6 The Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss

598 The Tribunals examined the Parties' written and oral submissions, the evidence produced and the expert reports. After deliberation, they rendered their Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss on 18 May 2021, within the scope agreed before and at the November 2020 Hearing and defined in further detail in Section 6 of that Decision.

599 In Section 6 of that Decision, the Tribunals summarised the discussion leading to the definition of the scope of this decision as it was confirmed at the November 2020 Hearing and they concluded:

... the present Decision will determine Niko's liability in principle for the claims presented by the Respondents. Where this requires the consideration of facts, the Tribunal will rely only on facts that are not contested and when contested facts must be considered, the Tribunal will assume that the Respondents' allegations are correct.

600 The Tribunals clarified:

These assumptions are of course not factual findings. To the extent they remain relevant for the decision on claims that are admitted in principle, they will have to be proven in the next phase of the proceedings like any other contested fact that is relevant for the Tribunal's decision. The Claimant emphasised, specifically in the context of the Lost Gas Claim, that “the Factual and Expert Opinions that have been presented by BAPEX in support of its Claim [...] are [...] highly disputed as set out in Niko's Counter-Memorial on Damages”, adding:

... we are proceeding with this Hearing today on the basis of an assumption that BAPEX can establish those facts as pled.

601 The Tribunals also pointed out that two other requests were added to the scope of the Decision on Recoverable Loss:

(i) a request by the Respondents that the agreed procedure be modified to accommodate a “full assessment of environmental damage” by their experts; and

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(ii) a set-off claim by the Claimant, considered at this stage within the limits of the Parties' argument, without considering the merits of the claim.

602 With respect to the criteria for distinguishing recoverable from excluded losses, the Tribunals examined the argument of the Parties and the authorities on which they relied, in particular with respect to Section 73 of the Contract Act and Article 27 of the JVA, as it had been discussed already in the Decision on Liability.

603 The Tribunals noted that they continued to be faced with the difficulty of having to determine whether the losses claimed by the Respondents “naturally arose in the usual course of things”. [They had] not received much guidance in this task, except for “the test of likelihood and foreseeability”, as recommended by the Respondents”. The Tribunals added:

When determining the usual course of things according to the first paragraph of Section 73 of the Contract Act, the Tribunal must, however, remain mindful of the distinction resulting from the second paragraph which excludes “remote and indirect loss and damage”. As indirect loss and damage is excluded by the second paragraph, natural flow and the usual course of things in the first paragraph must be direct loss and damage. In the opinion of the Tribunal this leaves no room for intervening events.

604 The Tribunals found support for this understanding in the English decision in Saint Line v. Richardson, a case already discussed in the Decision on Liability and referred to by the Respondents at the Hearing. In the words of Atkinson J:

Direct damage is that which flows naturally from the breach without other intervening cause and independently of special circumstances, while indirect damage does not so flow.154

605 With respect to the second type of loss or damage that must be compensated under the first paragraph of Section 73 of the Contract Act, sometimes referred to as "special", the Tribunals concluded that it required proof of specific contractual understanding of the parties. The Tribunals concluded that it was not correct to consider whether the loss was “reasonably foreseeable at the time of the JVA”. The Tribunals explained:


154 Saint Line Ltd v. Richardsons, Westgarth & Co Ltd, [1940] 2 KB 99, RLA-70, page 103, quoted at HT 2020 Day 1, pages 111, 113, and Claimant's Presentation, 19 November 2020, Slide 8, quoted in the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, paragraph 228. ↩

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Such reasonable foreseeability is a relevant criterion when determining the usual course of things; in the context of Section 73, first paragraph, second type of loss, what is required is that the parties “knew when they made the contract” that the claimed loss would likely result from the breach of the contract.

606 While the examination of the legal provisions and their interpretation produced some guidance, the task of identifying recoverable loss required a case by case analysis. The Tribunals concluded:

Having carefully considered the Parties’argument and the legal authorities on which they relied, the Tribunal concludes that the question whether the losses claimed by the Respondents in this arbitration are recoverable or excluded by Section 73 of the Contract Act or Article 27.2 of the JVA must be determined specifically for each claim. While some general considerations and guiding principles have emerged and were set out above, there did not appear a readily applicable definition distinguishing between recoverable and excluded losses. The determination must be made in a case-by-case analysis, in which the Tribunal exercises its judgement.155

607 Against this background, the Tribunals examined the three heads of loss.

608 The First Head of Loss concerned gas that escaped the Reservoir due to the blowout of the Chattak 2 well, also referred to as the Blowout Gas. Depending on the method for estimating the gas loss, different methods applied. When applying the flow rate method, as this had been done by the Gas Loss Committees, the loss was considered in three periods. The Tribunals identified the factual issues that remained to resolved for the quantification. With respect to the third period also questions of liability remained outstanding, in case it would be determined that gas continued to escape from the Reservoir, after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation.

609 Concerning the loss of the Government due to the Blowout Gas, the Tribunals found that

... loss of the blowout gas is a loss not only for BAPEX but also for the Government, even though the two are affected differently. This loss was caused by Niko's breach of its obligations as Operator that produced he Chattak 2 blowout.

[...]


155 Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, paragraph 236. ↩

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BAPEX's claim for the Government's losses is a claim under the JVA. It is not a claim for indemnification of a third party under Article 27.2, first sentence. As the Respondents declared at the Hearing it is a “claim to damages in contract under the JVA”. Nor is the claim an assigned freestanding claim in tort. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary [to] examine whether the claim also meets the requirement of a separate tort claim.156

610 This left the question whether the Government's loss was recoverable and how it had to be quantified. The Tribunals identified as one of the issues:

The question there concerns what is compensable, is it the loss of the cheaper gas or is it the loss of the costs of electricity production by use of substitute fuels.

611 The Tribunals identified points that remained to be clarified and concluded:

In any event the compensation which BAPEX may claim on behalf of the Government may not exceed the difference between the price that Petrobangla would have paid to the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture and the market price, determined by reference to the price the Government or Petrobangla paid to comparable gas producers in Bangladesh.

612 The Second Head of Loss concerned the loss of production due to damage to the Overburden and drilling hazards caused by the Chattak 2 well blowout.

613 The Respondents asserted that, due to the blowouts and the continued seepage of gas, an additional loss occurred. This loss does not consist in the gas that escaped from the Reservoir but in the gas that remained in it. According to the Respondents that gas can no longer be extracted from the Reservoir and therefore must be treated as lost. The Respondents clarified that the gas in the sands below the Reservoir (Sands 2 to 8) are not to be treated as lost.

614 The Tribunals considered the argument of the Respondents and their experts to support this loss. They argued that the first blowout and the gas that escaped from the Reservoir was trapped in the Overburden had created geotechnical damage there and rendered drilling any further wells too risky and no longer feasible. This explanation was strongly contested by the Claimant and its experts. For the purpose of the decision they had to make, the Tribunals assumed that the assertions by the Respondents and their


156 Decision on Recoverable Loss, paragraphs 309 and 312. ↩

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experts were correct and the Reservoir of Sands 1 and 2 had become incapable of being developed.

615 The Tribunals examined whether the claimed loss arose naturally in the usual course of things from the breach. It observed that the demonstration leading to this conclusion relied on several factual assumptions, such as the shale layers of a specific form and distribution that in the view of the Respondents' experts were of the size, shape and number that they prevented the gas from migrating to the surface and caused gas traps of such importance that the risk of further blowouts made the risk of drilling through the Overburden excessively high; the flow of gas was not stopped by the Chattak 2B relief operation and continued for over ten years; drilling wells in a direction that avoided the areas with trapped gas would have been technically difficult and not feasible.

616 The Tribunals concluded:

The damage for which the Respondents seek compensation under their second head of loss, thus would depend on several supervening events and would have developed only over time as the result of a failure to take any action to stop the allegedly continuing seepages. Such damage cannot be accepted as a damage that “naturally arose in the usual course of things” from Niko's breach of its duties as prudent operator.

In any event, the intervening events would make such a damage “indirect” and “consequential” by any definition of these terms and thus would exclude the loss according to Section 73, second paragraph of the Contract Act and Article 27.2 of the JVA, as explained above in Section 7.3.

617 The Tribunals also examined whether the Parties knew, when concluding the JVA, that Niko's breach of its duties as Operator would likely cause the loss of the gas remaining in Sands 1 and 2. The Tribunals noted that there was no evidence or even allegation that the Parties knew or should have contemplated that the breach of Niko's duties as Operator would likely result in the loss claimed under this head. The Tribunals noted:

397.... even after the breach of Niko's duty had been committed and the Chattak 2 blowout had occurred, the Parties did not contemplate a loss as claimed by the Respondents. They assumed that drilling the sands above the Reservoir remained possible. As discussed above in Section 8.3.2, Niko submitted work programmes for drilling one or more production wells. BAPEX and the Government did not object that the drilling of such wells had become too hazardous or that the gas in the Reservoir had been lost; they rather posed conditions of performance

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which Niko did not accept. The development of the Reservoir, in the eyes of the Parties, remained technically feasible and not precluded, despite the blowouts and the hazards attributed to them.

398. This excludes, in the eyes of the Tribunal, that the Parties, when they concluded the JVA, knew or even contemplated these hazards and a resulting loss of the gas from the Reservoir as a likely result of a breach of Niko's obligations as the Operator.

618 The Tribunals concluded that the Second Head of Loss for which the Respondents claim, if it were found to have occurred, would not be a damage that had to be compensated under Section 73, first paragraph of the Contract Act. In any event it would be excluded by the second paragraph of that section and by Clause 27.2 of the JVA. The Tribunals decided that Second Head of Loss is not recoverable.

619 The Third Head of Loss concerned environmental loss caused by the Chattak 2 well blowout.

620 This head of loss comprises a large group of losses including “immediate impacts on the local population, agriculture, pisciculture and environment of Tengratila" as well as “long-term effects on the environment and people in Tengratila". These losses frequently were referred to as “environmental losses”. The Tribunals used this term to refer to all losses that may enter into the Respondents’third head of loss, including losses to the health and property affected by the blowouts.

621 The Tribunals considered the reports about the blowouts, the losses caused and their assessment, including the variations in the Respondents' approach to these claims.

622 Given the incomplete presentation of the environmental claims in this Arbitration, the Tribunals adopted a cautious approach in their determinations about the recoverability of these claims in principle. They considered specifically those items of damage and loss to which the Respondents have attributed particular attention in their more recent submissions, viz. seeping gas and arsenic contamination. The Tribunals also considered specifically the proposals for abatement action by Mr Wilson, the only two items of environmental loss for which the Respondents had made a complete claim in the arbitration, including quantification.

623 Concerning seepages, the Respondents asserted that relief well Chattak 2B did not completely seal the Chattak 2 well and that, despite the declared success of the relief operation, gas from the Reservoir continued to escape. This gas found its way through the Overburden above the Regional Shale and

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continued to cause seepages in a wide range around the Chattak 2 well. For the Respondents these seepages are a major source of continuing environmental losses. In their letter of 17 September 2015, the Respondents had explained that BAPEX was pursuing claims concerning the gas seepages by separate action; however, in its Memorial on Damages and thereafter BAPEX included the alleged gas seepages in its claims for lost gas and for environmental losses caused by the seepages.

624 The Claimant firmly denied the assertion that the Chattak 2B relief well did not properly seal the blowout well and that gas continues to escape from the Reservoir as a result of the blowouts. It also challenged the proposition that certain asserted losses, such as those resulting from arsenic, were direct.

625 The Tribunal deferred its decision on this claim until the Parties had been given the opportunity to present further argument and evidence in the proceedings on quantification. The issue is now addressed below in Section 7.5.6.

626 With respect to arsenic contamination, the Respondents asserted that the blowouts caused an increase of the arsenic content in the water with effects on the health of the population and pisciculture. They stated that “the blowouts are likely to be a major, if not the sole primary, cause of the high level of arsenic poisoning present in people living in Tengratila”. The Respondents recognised that prior to and independent of the Chattak blowouts, there were, as explained by the Respondents, “known issues with arsenic in the groundwater in Bangladesh"; their environmental experts stated that “arsenic in drinking water is a known hazard in the region in general”. They asserted, however, that arsenic contamination increased in the region as a consequence of the blowouts and relied on reports about such increase.

627 The Claimant contested the conclusions of the Respondents' environmental experts and asserts that they are “wholly unsupported by evidence” and relied on contrary evidence, in particular testimony about recent test results showing arsenic levels below health threshold.

628 The Tribunals assumed, as part of the legal analysis, that the Respondents were correct and arsenic levels did increase and examined the explanations about the causes of such increase:

629 It was uncontested that the gas did not contain arsenic. If the blowouts did cause an increase of arsenic in the water, this must have had its origin in the soil. In the explanations given by the Respondents and their experts the arsenic had its origin in the minerals in the soil ejected by the blowout or disturbed by it. If the soil so ejected contained these minerals, the experts

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explained that the arsenic was not naturally water soluble. “The arsenic containing compounds in minerals can react under different conditions to form water soluble compounds which have greater mobility and are more bioavailable”.157 Other explanations about the process by which arsenic can become soluble and contaminate water were of similar complexity. The experts could not determine which of these processes would have been prevailing in the alleged increased arsenic contamination. The Tribunals were

... unable to consider any of the different processes described by the experts as a natural result of Niko's fault as Operator when it decided on the casing depth and performed the wiper trip in the course of which the first blowout occurred; nor is there any indication that the Parties knew, when they concluded the JVA, that any of these processes would result from this fault as Operator. Indeed, there is no indication that the occurrence of such a process was reasonably foreseeable by a diligent operator.

630 The Tribunals concluded that Niko was not liable under Section 73, first paragraph of the Contract Act for any increase in the arsenic content of the Tengratila drinking water that may have occurred following the first blowout. The loss and damage caused by such increase is remote and indirect and it is consequential and thus excluded by Section 73, second paragraph of the Contract Act and by Article 27.2 of the JVA, respectively.

631 Mr Wilson's projects: The Respondents submitted a report by Mr Wilson in which he presented projects of abatement and mitigation in the Reservoir area. The projects were based on the assumption that gas continued to seep from the Reservoir to the surface and caused a risk to the population. Mr Wilson had two projects to deal with this risk.

632 For the first project, Mr Wilson had noted that some of the villagers in Tengratila used the seeping gas as an “informal cooking gas supply system” causing “a significant risk of explosion to the residents in buildings". The Tribunals noted that the first project concerned a risk that does not arise directly from the seepages but from the decision of the villagers to use the seepages for cooking purposes. The Tribunals observed:

That may be an economically reasonable decision, drawing an advantage from the problem of the seepages. It is nevertheless an intervening event of the type that breaks the chain of causation for Niko's liability.


157 Explanation in BBL I, quoted at paragraph 560 of the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss. ↩

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633 The second project proposed consisted in a soil vacuum extraction procedure intended to remove “the gas from the shallow ground below the buildings and open spaces”. The Tribunals found that several factual and legal questions remained to be addressed and reserved its decision.

634 For these reasons the first of Mr Wilson's projects was found not recoverable and the claim for the second was reserved. It is now decided in below Section 9.5.6.

635 The Tribunals noted that BAPEX was not claiming for its own environmental losses but for environmental losses of the Government. The Tribunals concluded that

... the Government may claim for damage to the environment, just as it may claim, on different grounds explained above in Section 8.4.4, for the gas lost as a result of the Chattak 2 blowout. Such claims must be presented within the framework of the JVA and by BAPEX as the Government's assignee.

636 The Tribunals accepted that if the Government had taken action to mitigate damage caused by Niko it can claim for reimbursement of the related expenses. The Tribunals considered the case where the need for protective and remedial action arose and no action was taken by the Government. The Government referred to the “limited resources" of the Government and Niko's obligation. The Tribunals expressed the view that

...this question cannot be answered in the abstract. The Tribunal is aware of the limited resources of the Government and understands that the available resources may not be sufficient to pay for all actions of some importance; a choice must be made. The allocation of funds to Governmental action obviously is a matter of setting priorities.

The Tribunal will have to consider in each case what conclusions must be drawn from the Government's decision to take or not to take any remedial or mitigating action, taking into consideration the specific situation of the Government that, in this respect, differ from those of a private claimant.

637 With respect to claims for individuals having suffered losses, the Tribunals observed that in Article 27.1 of the JVA Niko assumed express responsibility for “conservation, safety of life, property, crops, fishing and fisheries, navigation, protection of environment”, listing many details of this responsibility. When implementing the JVA, Niko submitted to the Department of Environment an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) that

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contained express commitments, in case of a blowout, to pay compensation to the affected population.

638 When the blowouts occurred, the Government took an active role, through the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and through various authorities at the local and regional level, in the assessment of the damage caused by the two blowouts and the distribution of compensation paid by Niko to the affected population. The Deputy Commissioner Sunamganj chaired the Local Losses Committee. With the assistance of several concerned officers of the Doarabazar Sub- district, the UP Chairman concerned and its Executive Officer, that Committee gathered information about the families, businesses and others affected by the blowouts, prepared detailed lists indicating the loss of each of them and organised the distribution.

639 The compensation to the persons so identified was agreed with Niko and paid by it. It was then distributed, as described above, by the local authorities. The Tribunal sees in this report and Niko's involvement in its preparation and implementation, as well as, more generally, in the work of the Environmental Losses Committees, clear evidence of the active role played by the Government, at the Ministerial level and through local authorities, in the assessment of the losses suffered by the individuals affected, in the collection of the compensation from Niko and the distribution to the individuals concerned. These activities are legitimate governmental action; the legitimacy of this action is uncontested by Niko.

640 The Tribunals concluded that the Government is entitled to act for the individuals who have suffered loss from the blowouts, provided it proceeds along the lines that were adopted in the compensation to the local population, as described in the reports presented in these proceedings. BAPEX, as the Government's assignee, may claim on the Government's behalf.

641 The Tribunals also considered the Respondents' requests (i) to make advance payments on account of monitoring and surveying costs and (ii) to “hold this proceeding open until such time as a complete survey and monitoring of the Tengratila area can be conducted and BAPEX can provide the fullest possible accounting of environmental and health related losses”. The Tribunals considered both requests unjustified and dismissed them.

642 Finally, the Tribunals considered the Claimant's Set-off claim.

643 With its Counter-Memorial on Damages, dated 7 September 2020, the Claimant introduced a request which came to be referred to as its “set-off claim". Niko sought the following relief:

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Declare that BAPEX is liable to Niko for damages suffered as a result of BAPEX's breaches of the JVA and wrongful deprivation of Niko's right to produce gas from Chattak West;

Fix the amount of Niko's losses in an amount to be proven at the hearing, but which Niko contends to be at least USD 114.1 million, and set this amount off against any amount for which Niko is determined to be liable to BAPEX;

In the alternative, declare that the Tribunal and the Centre have jurisdiction over Niko's claim in set-off, that BAPEX is liable to Niko for damages suffered as a result of BAPEX's breaches of the JVA and wrongful deprivation of Niko's right to produce gas from Chattak West, fix the amount of Niko's losses in an amount to be proven at the hearing, but which Niko contends to be at least USD 114.1 million, and set this amount off against any amount for which Niko is determined to be liable to BAPEX;

Declare that Niko owes no compensation to BAPEX.158

644 The Claimant argued that BAPEX's failure to approve Niko's proposals for further drilling since 2005 was a breach of the JVA. The Claimant asserted that this breach entitled it to at least USD 114.1 million as damages and requested this loss be set off against the claims of BAPEX.

645 The Claimant relied on the request for damages only for the purpose of set- off. It did not seek an award for any amount that may have remained after the set-off and denied that its request for damages may be described as a “claim”.

646 The Respondents object to the set-off claim as late and hence inadmissible under the ICSID Rules and under the law of Bangladesh.

647 The Tribunals considered first whether the set-off claim was admissible in the pending Arbitration proceedings.

648 The Respondents had argued that the claim was an “ancillary claim” governed by Rule 40 of the 2006 Arbitration Rules applicable to these proceedings. That rule requires that ancillary (“incidental or additional”) claims “shall be presented not later than in the reply and a counter-claim no later than in the counter memorial, unless the Tribunal, upon justification by the party presenting the ancillary claim and upon considering any objection of the other


158 CMD, paragraphs 458 – 461. ↩

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party, authorizes the presentation of the claim at a later stage in the proceeding".

649 The Claimant argued that its set-off claim was admissible according to Arbitration Rule 40 and fell within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

650 The Tribunals explained that the relevant issue was not the Claimant's declaration of set-off but the introduction in this Arbitration of the Claimant's request for damages. This is an ancillary claim. The Arbitration was introduced as a request for a declaration of non-liability. BAPEX had not raised a claim for liability. It did so only in its Memorial on Damages of 25 March 2016, when it claimed compensation in the amount of USD 118 million. The Claimant replied to this claim by the Counter-Memorial on Damages. In that submission it raised its set-off claim and thus complied with ICSID Arbitration Rule 40(2).

651 The Tribunals added that the set-off claim was closely related to BAPEX's claims. They concluded:

... the set-off claim meets the time requirement of ICSID Arbitration Rule 40(2)

[...]

... even if the Set-off Claim were not otherwise admissible under Arbitration Rule 40, the Tribunal would have authorised it under its subparagraph (2).159

652 The Respondents' alternative argument was in substance that, if the claim were procedurally admissible it would be time barred under the applicable law. The Parties differed about (i) the issue to which the time-bar applied, (ii) the law applicable to the time-bar issue and (iii) the application of that law to the facts of the case.

653 The Claimant argued that “the limitation period for a claim in set-off or a defence in set-off runs from the filing of the Claim for the recovery of money that is sought to be set off. And it is not in dispute that that period began in March 2016”. The Respondents considered the issue by reference to the “underlying claim”, viz. the damages claim on which the Claimant relied for the set-off.

654 The Parties argued by reference to the law of Bangladesh and the UNIDROIT Principles about the conditions for set-off. The Tribunals concluded that, before examining whether the Claimant may rely on set-off as a defence, the


159 Decision on Recoverable Loss, paragraphs 703 and 710. ↩

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damages claim must be considered in order to determine whether it is “legally recoverable”. If this were not the case, the question of set-off would not arise. The time-bar question therefore had to first be asked with respect to the damage claim.

655 Concerning the law applicable to the time-bar for the damages claim, the Respondents argued that “under Bangladeshi law, time-bar is an issue of substance" and relied on the choice Bangladesh law in the JVA applied also to statutory time-bar; the Bangladesh Limitation Act [2008] was applicable; the Act provides for a limitation period of three years. The Respondents also referred to Article 10.2(1) of the UNIDROIT Principles which also provide for three years.

656 The Claimant pointed out that, in the discussion of the limitation issue with respect to the Corruption Claim, the Respondents had taken the opposite position, asserting that the limitation was a procedural issue; and that Bangladesh's limitation period had no application in the ICSID arbitration.

657 The Tribunals considered the choice of law clause in Article 13 of the JVA:

The Validity, interpretation and implementation of this JVA shall be governed by the laws of Bangladesh.

658 The Tribunals observed that there was no indication in the record of the Arbitration that the Parties, when agreeing that the “implementation” of the JVA was to be governed by the law of Bangladesh, intended that the law applicable to the creation of the claim for damages or for breach of the contract would be different from the law that rendered such a claim ineffective by the operation of a time-bar.

659 The Tribunal concluded that the Parties' choice of the applicable law extended to the question whether Niko's claim for damages against BAPEX for breach of the JVA is time-barred.

660 Aware of the controversy about the nature of the time-bar rules, procedural or substantive, the Tribunals also considered the Claimant's position arguing that the time-bar issue was procedural and that it had to be determined by reference to Article 44 of the ICSID Convention which reads:

Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.

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661 The Tribunals observed that neither the ICSID Convention nor the ICSID Arbitration Rules contain provisions on limitation of action. If the choice of law would not be treated as including the Bangladesh Limitation Act and the matter would be treated as procedural, it would be for the Tribunals to decide. In such a decision on the temporal limitation of Niko's claim for damages, the Tribunals would have to take account of the nature of that claim. The relevant rules and principles would be those concerning the breach of contract under domestic law, as they apply under the Bangladesh Contract Act, not principles applicable in international law based on State responsibility.

662 The Tribunals therefore perforce sought guidance from practice relating to international commercial contracts and comparative law. The Parties had referred the Tribunal to the UNIDROIT Principles. The Claimant argued, as quoted above, that the Tribunals should be guided by these principles “not as governing law, but, rather, as international best practices that the Tribunals may properly consider in exercising their authority under Rule 44 [recte: Article 44 of the Convention]".

663 No other reference had been provided by the Parties to guide the Tribunals if they were to determine the applicable time-bar as a procedural issue under Article 44 of the ICSID Convention. The three-year period under the UNIDROIT Principles therefore would apply also if the limitation issue were considered procedural.

664 The Tribunals therefore applied a three-year period of limitation.

665 The Tribunals noted that the first case of a breach on which the Claimant relied occurred in November 2005. Other breaches occurred at various occasions thereafter. The last of these occasions was in May 2012. The Tribunals held that these occasions were repeated breaches, not a continuing breach. The Tribunals concluded:

... limitation period for Niko's breach of contract claim commenced in November 2005; subsequent breaches occurred until May 2012, initiating further limitation periods.

666 In order to preserve Niko's rights to a damages claim, the claim had to be made by November 2008 and with respect to subsequent breaches prior to May 2012 by May 2015. It was made only in the Claimant's Counter-Memorial on Damages of 7 September 2020.

667 The Tribunals also considered the Claimant's argument that the claim should be treated as having been made with the Request for Arbitration; they noted that that request did not contain a damages claim and did not reserve such a claim. Moreover, the Claimant's attempt to rely on Section 15 of the

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Bangladesh Limitation Act, providing for discounting periods during which proceedings are suspended, would be of no assistance. The Procedural Order No 13 on which the Claimant relied was issued in May 2016, after the period of limitation had expired in May 2015.

668 The Tribunals concluded:

Niko's claims for breaches by BAPEX of the JVA allegedly committed at various dates between November 2005 and May 2012 are time-barred. The Claimant's set-off relying on these claims is therefore denied.

669 On the basis of these considerations the Tribunals rendered the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss in terms set out below in Section 5.5.

4.7 Proceedings following the Decision on the Heads of Recoverable Loss until the completion of the case

For the evidentiary hearing on damages it was originally envisaged that 8 sitting days were required and that the hearing could be held from 10-19 August 2021, excluding as sitting days the weekend of 14 and 15 August 2021. The November 2015 Timetable then envisaged a hearing on in Paris from 29 August to 2 September 2021. The Parties recognised, however, that the scope for the proceedings following the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss would be determined to a large extent by that decision. Details for this stage of the proceedings were reserved.

4.7.1 The CMC of 8 June 2021: organising the procedure concerning the Lost Gas and its Valuation and the Environmental Claims

670 When the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss was notified to the Parties on 18 May 2021, the Tribunals invited the Parties on the same day to consultation about the planning of the remainder of the procedure. The Tribunals suggested to hold a case management conference (CMC). They identified the following subjects for that CMC, considering in particular the restrictions in place due to the Covid 19 pandemic:

(i) The evidentiary hearing currently scheduled for 10 to 19 August 2021, the venue and other logistic matters, including restrictions relating to the conduct of a physical meeting and considerations relating to remote participation, possible alternatives, the scope of the hearing, including witnesses and experts and the issues to be addressed;

(ii) Further submissions of evidence and argument in preparation of that hearing; and

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(iii) The Respondents' document production request [of January 2016], as revised to take account of the [18 May 2021] Decision.

671 Following an invitation from the Tribunals, the Parties proposed on 4 June 2021 to add further points to these agenda items. The Claimant requested an update on the status of the Tribunals' work on the Claimant's request for the issuance of an award in the Payment Claim and confirmation that the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss did not address or decide the evidentiary burden that any party must carry out to prove an assertion made by that party. The Respondents indicated that they wished to discuss the next steps in the remainder of the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration and whether a second round of written pleadings on quantum should be included in the next steps on the procedure.

672 The Tribunals then requested the Parties to provide precise details of the evidence on record of the Arbitrations that the Parties considered necessary for the quantum phase on the Compensation Declaration, indicating the issues to which the evidence related and current place of residence of the relevant witness/expert. The Claimant responded on 8 June and the Respondents on 9 June 2021, providing the requested information.

673 The CMC was held on 8 June 2021 by video conference, starting at 9pm in Manama, 8pm in Paris/Geneva, 2pm in Washington, D.C and 12pm in Calgary, corresponding to 6am in Wellington, 12am in Dhaka on 9 June 2021. The CMC was attended by the Members of the Tribunal, the Parties and their counsel, and members of the ICSID Secretariat. The Tribunal prepared Summary Minutes that were sent in draft form to the Parties on 21 June 2021 for comments. They were revised and finalised to reflect the edits and additions suggested by the Parties in their communications of 24 June 2021 and delivered to the Parties on 3 July 2021.

674 At the CMC the Tribunals explained that the intention of the identification of evidence was not to determine in a binding manner, at this stage already, the evidence for the next phase of the arbitration but to obtain information that would help to understand the scope of the hearing and the required organisational arrangements. In response to the Claimant's inquiry whether the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss addressed or decided the evidentiary burden that any party must carry to prove an assertion made by that party, the Tribunals confirmed that it did not intend to decide this question.

675 The discussion at the CMC regarding the evidence related to the quantum phase of the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration was focused on the lost gas and its valuation and on the Environmental Claims.

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676 With respect to the Lost Gas and its Valuation, the Respondents stated that new evidence including new expert reports was required, both with respect to the lost gas and the valuation of that gas. They explained that the Claimant's experts had filed extensive new reports and evidence to which the Respondents and their experts had not had an opportunity to respond. The Respondents also noted that their experts had not made the specific calculations to provide gas loss values in accordance with the subdivision into time periods, as identified by the Tribunal in its Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss. The Respondents also argued that certain factual questions relating to the second blowout had to be examined, in particular where the bridging of the Chattak 2 well occurred and what happened with the bridging during the second blowout. Another issue concerned the success of the Chattak 2B relief well and the question whether it succeeded to stop the flow from the Reservoir or not; in case seepages continued, Niko's request for a production well would have to be considered. These questions required determination by the experts. In the Respondents' view, these and some other issues had not been specifically addressed by the Parties in the submissions on record, and the Respondents would need to be given an opportunity to provide further evidence and expert opinions.

677 The Claimant objected to the introduction at this stage of new evidence and expert opinions. The Claimant reminded the Respondents of the agreed procedure and recalled that a number of these aspects had been addressed in submissions, some of which dating back to 2014. According to the Claimant the Tribunals should decide the outstanding issues on the basis of the materials on record.

678 The Tribunals reminded the Parties of the wealth of information already on record. They pointed out in particular that the November 2015 timetable provided for a Memorial on Damages by BAPEX and a Counter-Memorial by the Claimant followed by a hearing on damages. The Respondents were given an opportunity for an additional submission; they filed an Amendment to BAPEX's Memorial on Damages. All three of these submissions were accompanied by evidence and expert reports.

679 The Respondents noted that if additional written submissions are not permitted, their experts would need sufficient time on direct examination to address the technical issues raised by the Claimant's experts in their reports annexed to the Counter-Memorial on Damages and the specific technical issues noted in the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss.

680 In the discussion on the scope of witness evidence and expert opinions required for the Tribunals to decide the quantum of the recoverable loss,

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reference was made to the list presented by the Claimant before the CMC. The Respondents provided information on the corresponding experts named by them. With respect to the specific points which the Respondents had identified as needing further evidence and reports, the Claimant pointed out that the Respondents had presented a method for quantifying the lost gas that did not distinguish between the three periods identified in the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss; by contrast, the Claimant had produced expert reports that allowed such distinction. The experts having provided these opinions had to be available at the hearing and their opinions be tested by the Parties and the Tribunals. Similar conclusions were reached with respect to other controversial issues concerning the quantification of the gas lost.

681 With respect to the valuation of the lost gas, the Claimant explained that, in addition to the pricing of that gas, other calculations are required to determine the value of the share BAPEX would have had in the lost gas. The relevant calculations are on the record. The Parties agreed that this aspect of the case – the valuation of the lost gas – could be addressed in written submissions and that there was no need for a hearing on these matters. It was agreed that in order to fix the time for the written submissions the Parties would consult their respective experts and revert to the Tribunals within 3 weeks of the case management conference with a proposal for this procedure.

682 With regard to the Environmental Claims, the Respondents expressed their intention to develop the claims by providing further expert reports once their experts could travel again to Bangladesh. The Tribunals confirmed their ruling set out in their 18 May 2021 decision, denying the Respondents' request. The Respondents then confirmed that the claims to be decided by the Tribunals in the Arbitrations are those that had been made in the Money Suit, based on the report of the Third Environmental Losses Committee, dated 15 September 2005 and any necessary update.

683 The Tribunals and the Parties then discussed the procedure how to address the Environmental Claims on the basis of the existing record. The Parties and the Tribunals identified the table in that report, reproduced at paragraph 460 of the Decision on the Heads of Recoverable Loss, as a starting point for presenting the Parties' positions on the Environmental Claims. In this procedure, the Parties specify, by reference to each of the eleven types of losses in the table, their position on (i) the justification of the claim for this loss; (ii) the specific amount claimed/admitted (including credit for any payment made already by Niko); and (iii) the evidence on record in this Arbitration, relied upon for that claim. The Tribunals may then decide the Environmental Claims on the basis of the table so completed and the

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evidence relied upon without any further submissions and without a hearing on these issues.

684 It was agreed that the submission based on the table would first be presented by the Respondents. The time limit for this completion remained to be fixed within a timeframe in the order of one month to six weeks. The Claimant would respond within a period of the same length. No other procedure was proposed for addressing the Environmental Claims within the framework of the agreed timetable.

685 The Claimant accepted this procedure including the timeframe. The Respondents' counsel requested time to consult their client.

686 At the CMC, the Tribunals further discussed with the Parties matters of hearing organisation in particular in light of the global heath situation and travel restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Following a discussion with the Parties at the CMC, it was agreed that subject to the availability of the respective experts, the evidentiary hearing would be held from 8-12 November 2021, with 13 November 2021 in reserve. It was agreed that each hearing day would comprise of 5 sitting hours with a 30-minute break and short mid-session breaks as needed in between, each day starting at 10pm in Dhaka, 7pm in Manama, 5pm in Geneva and Paris, 11am in Washington and 9am in Calgary.160

4.7.2 The Respondents' Document Production request

687 The Respondents had filed a document production request on 8 January 2016. The Claimant had replied to this request on 18 January 2016. The request had been discussed at the February 2016 Hearing.161

688 At the June 2021 CMC, the Respondents were requested to review their document production request and indicate for each requested document the relevant issue and a justification for the document's relevance. The Respondents filed their updated requests on 22 June 2021, and the Claimant responded on 6 July 2021. In Procedural Order No 28, issued on 30 July 2021, the Tribunals summarized the request and observations as follows:

689 The Redfern Schedule submitted to the Tribunals set out the Respondents' requests as they had been defined in the original version, drafted prior to the Tribunals' Decision. Some of these requests are marked as withdrawn, others continue to be pursued. With respect to the requests which continue to be


160 Summary Minutes of the 8 June 2021 CMC; See also Summary Minutes of the Hearing. ↩
161 See above Section 4.2.5. ↩

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pursued, the Respondents did not present a modified request, adjusted to the issues remaining after the Decision. Instead, they preserved the original request and added a column in the Redfern Schedule with comments by which the requests were reduced or modified and occasionally expanded. In order to understand the Respondents' various requests, one therefore would have had to amalgamate the two columns and extract from the original request the remainder that the Respondents continue to pursue. This was not of assistance to the Tribunals' examination of the requests.

690 Moreover, in response to a number of the requests, the Claimant accepted the production of requested documents but did so subject to its General Objection, as discussed below; it also made its acceptance of a number of requests subject to the condition of reciprocity. As a result, the Respondents still have not received the documents which the Claimant is prepared to produce. The Respondents therefore were not in a position to determine finally whether and to what extent the production which will be made is compliant and, if it is not, specify what remains to be produced. The Tribunals, in turn, cannot make a clear decision on which documents remain to be produced.

691 Against this background, the Tribunals in PO No 28

found it necessary to summarise their understanding of the request as it remained after the Decision and respond to it accordingly. The Tribunals concluded that it was not practical for the Tribunals' ruling on the requests so adapted to add an additional column to the already voluminous Redfern Schedule submitted by the Parties. The Tribunals therefore present their decision in the present form of a Procedural Order.

692 The Tribunals set out its rulings in relation to each specific request whether the Parties had reached an agreement, whether the request had been withdrawn and for those requests to be ruled upon, set out its analysis and reasoning.

693 Following a request for clarification by the Claimant of 4 August 2021, the Tribunals provided a clarification on PO No 28 and confirmed that they did not wish to receive documents exchanged between the Parties.

4.7.3 PO No 27 and further steps concerning the quantity of lost gas, its valuation and the Environmental Claims

694 Further to the June CMC and subsequent correspondence, based on the procedure agreed with the Parties, the Tribunals confirmed the next steps in Procedural Order No 27, which provided the following steps:

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  1. The Hearing for argument and evidence on the quantity of lost gas was fixed for 8 to 12 November 2021, with 13 November 2021 in reserve.
  2. With respect to the quantity of the gas lost, the Parties, their witnesses and experts were scheduled to be heard at the November 2021 Hearing. PO No 27 specified:

    The Parties and their experts will present their views on the basis of the evidence on record. No new evidence will be admitted at the hearing. Following the hearing, the Tribunals will issue their award.162

  3. It was further specified that (i) on 20 August 2021 the Respondents were to file updated argument and evidence regarding the valuation of the lost gas, concerning the claim by BAPEX and that by the Government; and that (ii) on 1 October 2021 the Claimant was to file its Response to the Respondents' submission. PO No 27 specified:

    There will be no further submission on this issue and the Tribunals will make their ruling on the basis of argument and evidence on record by that time.163

  4. It was also determined that on 20 August 2021, the Respondents were to file a submission on the Environmental Claims as specified in paragraph 16 of the Summary Minutes of the 8 June 2021 CMC; and that on 1 October 2021, the Claimant's response to the Respondents' submission was due:

    The Tribunals will make their decision on the Environmental Claims on the basis of these submissions and any evidence on the record without any further submissions or hearing.164

695 As in the case of other procedural orders and summary minutes issued following discussions between the Tribunals and the Parties, PO No 27 was sent to the Parties in draft form for comment. No changes to the draft were requested and the PO was issued in finalized form on 30 July 2021.

696 In accordance with the procedural calendar fixed by PO No 27, on 20 August 2021, BAPEX filed two submissions: one concerning Quantum for Updated


162 PO No 27, paragraph 6. ↩
163 PO No 27, paragraph 3. ↩
164 PO No 27, paragraph 4. ↩

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Gas Loss Calculations and the other on the Environmental Claims. Together with these submissions, BAPEX filed the Second Supplemental Expert Report of Ryder Scott (Ryder Scott III), the Second Supplemental Expert Report of Jeffrey Hughes (Hughes III), the Second Supplemental Expert Report of the Brattle Group (Brattle III), the Second Expert Report of Bretton, et al. (BBL II), the Second Supplemental Report of Steven Wilson (Wilson III), and Exhibits R-452 through R-471.

697 The Parties exchanged documents further to PO No 28 and introduced some of them in the Arbitrations. On 15 September 2021, the Parties communicated to the Tribunals their agreement recording productions that were made and their introduction as exhibits. The agreement contained the following passages:

The Parties have agreed that Respondents may submit any new documents from the Claimant's production pursuant to PO 28 into the record by 1 October 2021, coinciding with Claimant's Submissions on Quantum for Updated Gas Loss Calculations and Submission on Environmental Claims. Claimant reserves the right to address any such records at the Evidentiary Hearing on Damages;

The Parties have agreed that Claimant will introduce any new exhibits from the above referenced production from both Claimant and Respondent along with its 1 October 2021 Submissions on Quantum for Updated Gas Loss Calculations and Submission on Environmental Claims;

Neither Party will introduce new documents into the record after 1 October 2021, unless so ordered by the Tribunal upon prior application and a showing of good cause.

698 The Tribunals agreed with and approved the timetable proposed by this agreement and, in their reply of 16 September 2021 added:

The Tribunals wish to clarify that only those documents should be introduced into the record and submitted to the Tribunals that the Parties consider relevant for the quantification of the gas losses. The Tribunals expect that the Parties' submissions of 20 August and 1 October 2021 provide the information about the relevance of the documents so produced for the Tribunals' decision.

699 On 1 October 2021, the Claimant filed its Reply on Quantum for Lost Gas Calculations and on the Environmental Claims, together with the Fifth Witness Statement of William Hornaday (WS Hornaday V), an Expert Report

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of John Wright (Wright IV), the Third Expert Report of Gaffney Cline (Gaffney Cline III), and exhibits and legal authorities.

700 With reference to the Parties' agreement of 15 September 2021, the Respondents confirmed on 1 October 2021, that they did not wish to introduce additional evidence.

4.7.4 PO No 30 and the October 2021 Pre-Hearing Conference

701 On 19 October 2021, the Tribunals issued Procedural Order No 30 dealing with matters of hearing organisation. In advance of the pre-hearing conference (PHC) scheduled for 21 October 2021, the Tribunals set out a number of discrete issues to be addressed at the November 2021 Hearing for the Parties' consideration and indicated that these would be considered with the Parties at the PHC:

(i) The methodology for quantifying the lost gas;

(ii) The volume of the gas lost during the first period up to the Chattak 2A blowout on 24 June 2005;

(iii) The Chattak 2A blowout and its effect on the gas flow;

(iv) The volume of gas lost during the second period from the Chattak 2A blowout until the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation;

(v) The question whether the Chattak 2B relief operation effectively sealed the Chattak 2 wellbore;

(vi) The volume of gas lost, if any, following the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation.

702 In PO No 30, the Tribunal further sets out its understanding for the methodology for estimating the quantity of lost gas and the need for possible further submissions:

The Claimant quantifies the loss specifically by reference to each of the three periods. It objects against the method on which BAPEX relies, arguing that this method fails to address specifically the periods before and after the blowout at Chattak 2A, and after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation. The Tribunal will have to determine whether that method, described by the Claimant as “simplistic mathematical average daily gas flow rate (up to 4 September 2005) and the extrapolation of that flow rate to future periods”, may be applied or whether the loss in each of the three periods must be assessed

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separately. If the Parties and their experts wish to respond to the method of their opponent by presenting the results which, in their opinion, that method produces, they should do so in writing before the November 2021 Hearing. The Parties are invited to consult about any further submissions on this issue before the November 2021 Hearing.

703 The Tribunal further invited the Parties to submit prior to the Hearing (i) a list of the relevant submissions and supporting evidence for each issue and (ii) an updated hyperlinked index.

704 The Pre-Hearing Conference was held on 21 October 2021. As previously agreed, the PHC was attended by the President of the Tribunal, the Secretary of the Tribunal and representatives of the Parties and their counsel:

705 During the PHC, the November 2021 Hearing dates and sitting hours were confirmed as set out in the Summary Minutes of the 8 June 2021 CMC. With regard to the scope of the hearing and further written submissions, the PHC discussions were summarized in the Summary Minutes as follows:

5. It was confirmed that the November 2021 Hearing was limited to argument and evidence concerning the quantification of the gas lost as a result of the first blowout. No further written submissions are foreseen except on the issue of methodology, as described in item 4 of Procedural Order No 30. The Parties wish to avail themselves of the opportunity for further written submissions on this issue and will revert to the Tribunal with respect to the dates for the submissions. The Respondents expressed a reservation of rights concerning further submissions. The Parties differ in their understanding about the exact terms of this reservation and about the discussion relating to it. Their statements about the terms in which the discussion at the PHC should be recorded in these Summary Minutes are attached herewith.

706 At the PHC, the Tribunal indicated that the Tribunal may have questions not only in relation to quantum but also on other issues that are before the Tribunal, including the pricing of the gas lost and the environmental damages claims. The Tribunal wished to reserve some time for these questions and it was agreed that to the extent possible, the Tribunal would provide indications of such questions in advance of the November 2021 hearing.

707 The Parties agreed with the list of issues set out in PO No 30. In addition,

... [t]he Respondents wished to include questions concerning the conditions for approval of drilling further production wells as “mitigation” measure, and the conditions imposed by BAPEX on further drilling by

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Niko, and the impact, if any, that such “mitigation” measure would have on gas escaping from the Reservoir, if it were assumed that the Chattak 2B relief operation did not completely seal the Chattak 2 wellbore. The President explained that the Tribunal had considered these questions as part of issue (vi); the questions could be considered as a separate issue (vii) or as part of issues (v) or (vi). In any event, they would be included in the scope of the hearing. The Respondents reserved the right under item 4 of Procedural Order No 30 to respond in writing, if needed, to Claimant's method for estimating the quantities of lost gas before the November 2021 Hearing.

708 Concerning the sequence of these issues, the following order was agreed at the PHC:

a. Issue (i) Methodology

b. Issue (iii) Chattak 2A blowout

c. Issue (v) Chattak 2B

d. Volume of gas lost in each of the three phases as describe in issues (ii), (iv) and (vi), including the issue concerning production wells as possible mitigation measure.

709 Concerning the Hearing agenda, it was agreed to proceed as follows:

a. General opening statements on Day 1: one hour each for BAPEX and Niko, in this order.

b. Three hours for each issue identified in PO No 30.

c. No oral closing is envisaged; the directions for post-hearing submissions and submissions on costs will be given at the end of the November 2021 Hearing.

710 For each of the six issues listed in PO No 30, it was agreed to include an opening presentation by counsel, an opening presentation by any expert(s) followed by cross-examination of experts and witnesses.

711 It was further agreed that all experts and witnesses may attend the entire hearing. The Summary Minutes of the PHC stated in this regard:

It was agreed that, as a matter of principle, all experts and witnesses may attend the entire hearing by being connected. Those witnesses and experts concerning a specific issue may be grouped and questioned collectively. If a Party is of the opinion that a witness should be

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sequestered while a specific issue will be examined, it must make a specific request in advance, identifying the witness and the issue and the reasons for sequestration.165

712 In this regard, on 6 November 2021, the Respondents informed the Tribunal that the Parties had differing positions on the question of sequestration and made the following request:

...Respondents' respectfully request that all fact witnesses shall be sequestered from the proceedings until they have testified. This includes sequestration from general Opening Statements. Allowing fact witnesses to be able to sit in on the Opening Statements would provide with strategic advance and foreshadow their cross-examinations.

713 The Tribunal pointed out that a different agreement had been reached at the PHC on this subject, as recorded at paragraph 14 of the Summary Minutes. It denied the Respondent's request on 7 November 2021.166

714 At the PHC other issues concerning the hearing organisation, completing the directions that had been given in PO No 30, and recorded in the Summary Minutes. The Tribunal had expressed the wish to have graphic representations of the wellbore in the different stages relevant for the experts' explanations:

By 1 November 2021, the Parties will produce, for the use at the Hearing, a bundle of graphic representations of the well bores in their successive stages (showing in particular the wellbore before the blowout, the location of the bridging and the final state), possibly using Mr Wright's depiction of the Chattak 2, 2A and 2B wellbores in his 2021 report. The Parties shall try to agree on a joint representation; if they fail to agree, each Party may submit its own set of representations. The Parties may agree on other graphic representations they jointly wish to provide in advance of the Hearing.

715 The Summary Minutes of the PHC were sent to the Parties in draft form on 26 October 2021 and revised and finalized to reflect the edits and additions suggested by the Parties (the Parties' mark ups were annexed to the Summary Minutes as Annex B).


165 Summary Minutes of the PHC, paragraph 14. ↩
166 Summary Minutes of the Hearing, paragraph 21. ↩

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716 On 25 October 2021, the Parties exchanged lists of fact and expert witnesses they intended to call and issues on which each fact or expert witness would be expected to testify.

Each side named its own experts available at the November 2021 Hearing and those of the opponent experts whom it wished to cross examine, identifying for each expert the relevant topics on the agenda. The Respondent also announced that it wished to cross-examine Mr Adolph. The resulting programme was presented in the form of the following table:167

Specific Issue Respondents' expert Claimant's expert/witness Relevance (with Respondent's Relevant Experts in Parenthesis)
TOPIC 1: Method for Quantifying Lost Gas
(i) Methodology for quantifying the lost gas
  • Mr. James F. Latham & Mr. Michael J. Nowicki (Ryder Scott Company)
  • William B. Cline & Rawdon J.H. Seager (Gaffney Cline & Associates)
  • Assessment of the reliability and feasibility of the material balance method and the rate-flow method (Ryder Scott)
TOPIC 2: Sequence of Events
(ii) Chattak 2A blowout and its effect on the gas flow
  • Mr. Jeffrey Hughes (Hughes Petroleum Consulting, LLC)
  • Mr. Michael S. Bruno (Geomechanics Technologies)
  • William B. Cline & Rawdon J.H. Seager (Gaffney Cline & Associates)
  • Mr. John Wright (Wild Well Control)
  • Cause of the Chattak 2A blowout and its impact (Hughes)
  • Characteristics and significance of below-ground conditions (Geomechanics, Hughes)
  • Effect, if any of the bridging of the Chattak 2 and 2A wells (Hughes)
(iii) Whether the Chattak 2B relief operation effectively sealed the Chattak 2 wellbore
  • Mr. Jeffrey Hughes (Hughes Petroleum Consulting, LLC)
  • Mr. Michael S. Bruno (Geomechanics Technologies)
  • Mr. Steve Wilson (The
  • William B. Cline & Rawdon J.H. Seager (Gaffney Cline & Associates)
  • Mr. John Wright (Wild Well Control)
  • Nature and results of the Chattak 2B kill operation (Hughes, Geomechanics, Wilson)
  • Characteristics and significance of below-ground conditions (Hughes; Geomechanics)

167 See also Summary Minutes of the Hearing, paragraph 18. ↩

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Environmental Protection Limited Group)
  • Mr. Brian Adolph
  • Surface gas emissions, its measurement, and its significance (Wilson)
TOPIC 3: Volumes of Gas Lost on the Three Periods Identified by the Tribunal (Decision on Heads of Recoverable Losses, paragraph 773)
(iv) Volume of gas lost during the first period from the Chattak 2 blowout to the Chattak 2A blowout
  • James F. Latham & Michael J. Nowicki (Ryder Scott Company)
  • William B. Cline & Rawdon J.H. Seager (Gaffney Cline & Associates)
  • Volume of Original Gas in Place (Ryder Scott)
  • Gas-water contact and pressure analysis (Ryder Scott)
  • Application of the material balance method and daily average flow v. time/rate flow (Ryder Scott)
  • Volume of gas lost (Ryder Scott)
(v) Volume of gas lost during the second period from the Chattak 2A blowout until the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation
  • James F. Latham & Michael J. Nowicki (Ryder Scott Company)
  • William B. Cline & Rawdon J. H. Seager (Gaffney Cline & Associates)
  • Same as (iv)
  • Reliability of differentiation between gas lost as a result of the first blowout from gas lost as a result of the second blowout (Ryder Scott)
(vi) Volume of gas lost, if any, following the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation.
  • James F. Latham & Michael J. Nowicki (Ryder Scott Company)
  • Mr. Jeffrey Hughes (Hughes Petroleum Consulting, LLC)
  • Mr. Steve Wilson (The Environmental Protection Limited Group)
  • William b. Cline & Rawdon J. H. Seager (Gaffney Cline & Associates)
  • Same as (iv) (Ryder Scott)
  • Depletion of Sands 1 and 2 through escape of gas after completion of Chattak 2B well operations (Hughes, Wilson, Ryder Scott)
(vii) BAPEX's conditions for production wells and the impact the wells would have had, if any, on production after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation.
  • Mr. Jeffrey Hughes (Hughes Petroleum Consulting, LLC)
  • James F. Latham & Michael J. Nowicki (Ryder Scott Company)
  • Mr. Brian Adolph
  • William b. Cline & Rawdon J. H. Seager (Gaffney Cline & Associates)
  • Niko's proposals regarding the development wells and its impact, if any, on gas loss. (Hughes, Ryder Scott)

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717 In further exchanges between the Tribunal and the Parties the further details were agreed, allocating time allocating time to the topics, the Parties and their experts and to the Tribunal, reflecting also the different time zones in which the participants were located.

718 On 29 October 2021, the Respondent submitted Ryder Scott's Third Supplemental Expert Report (Ryder Scott IV) regarding methodology of quantifying gas loss per paragraph 4 of PO No 30. The Claimant submitted a response to this report on 5 November 2021.

719 On 1 November 2021, the Claimant submitted a set of wellbore drawings as it had been agreed at the PHC. Later that day, the Tribunal confirmed receipt and gave the following directions:

The Tribunal understands that the Parties were unable to agree on a joint submission of drawings representing the wellbores in their successive stages. The drawings now submitted by the Claimant are, according to the Claimant's statement, those of Mr Wright, as they were produced previously by the Claimant in the arbitration.

In order to facilitate and focus the discussion at the forthcoming hearing, the Respondents are invited, by Thursday 4 November 2021, to identify on or by reference to each drawing those aspects on which it disagrees.

720 BAPEX submitted a new set of drawings later that day. The Tribunal noted that the drawings differed from those that its expert, Mr Hughes, had previously presented and from those of Mr Wright. In the accompanying message, the Respondent objected to the Tribunal's reliance on "demonstrative exhibits produced by one Party as the primary images [...] in adjudging the Parties' competing claims”; the Respondent stated in particular that Mr Wright had “included opinion commentary on those slides and depictions with which Respondents have fundamental disagreements”. Even if the Respondent were given the opportunity to comment, the demonstrative drawings produced by the Claimant “would still depict the facts from Claimant's perspective, and their use as the primary source of images by the Tribunal would be highly prejudicial to Respondent”. The Respondent requested that the Tribunals “use ... at the hearing and in their deliberation process” the “complete set of images showing the sequence of well events ...”.

721 On 3 November 2021, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No 31 addressing (i) the Respondent's requests for a further response included in their comments on the draft Summary Minutes of the 21 October 2021 PHC, (ii) the issue regarding the well bore drawings, and (iii) the timeline for submission of demonstratives.

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722 Regarding the Respondent's request for a further written response, the Tribunal stated in PO No 31:

1. The Tribunal considered the Respondents' requests, as recorded in their comments on the draft Summary Minutes of the 21 October 2021 Pre-Hearing Conference (PHC),

(a) “to respond fully in writing to the Claimant's Counter-Memorial, including the six witness and expert statements attached”; and

(b) “to allocate additional time at the Hearing for an oral presentation” and “that they be given the fullest possible opportunity at the Hearing to respond with counsel argument and expert testimony to unaddressed matters in the Counter Memorial."

2. The Tribunal noted that the Respondents have presented their positions on the blowout damages in three written submissions accompanied by expert reports, submissions that were progressively narrowed as the Tribunal decided certain aspects concerning the Compensation Claim with the intention to assist the Parties in focusing their submissions. The previously agreed procedure for the remainder of the proceedings on the Compensation Claim did not provide for any further written submissions (see paragraphs 3 and 4 of Procedural Order No 27); only remaining issues on the quantities of lost gas were to be addressed orally at the November 2021 Hearing. In an additional submission invited by the Tribunal subsequently, the Respondents were given the opportunity to make a fourth submission on an important issue on quantification and did so by the Ryder Scott expert report of 29 October 2021.

3. The Tribunal also took note of the agreement which the Parties reached following the 21 October 2021 PHC concerning the agenda for the November 2021 Hearing, including the allocation of time. It accepted this allocation and concluded from the fact that it was agreed by both Parties that the agreed allocation satisfies the Respondents' concern also in respect to the time required for any “unaddressed matters”.

4. If the Respondents see any “unaddressed matters” in the Claimant's Counter-Memorial which can only be addressed by a further written submission, they are invited to specify these by Friday 5 November 2021.

723 On 6 November 2021, the Respondent responded to the Tribunal's invitation regarding the ‘unaddressed matters' on 6 November 2021. The Respondent

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maintained the request for responsive pleadings including additional reports by several of their experts and reserving all rights.

724 Regarding the wellbore drawings, the Tribunal recalled the instruction given by the Tribunal at the PHC, as recorded in the Summary Minutes and quoted above. The Tribunal gave an account of the production of the wellbore drawings produced by Mr Hughes and by Mr Wright and the Tribunal's request for a set of drawings to assist them in understanding the explanations of the Parties and their experts. The Tribunal recalled its request for explanations about the relevance of the differences between the drawing sets. The Tribunal confirmed its interest in the drawings but wished to avoid spending time at the hearing on this issue. On 3 November 2021, the Tribunal noted in PO No 31 with regard to the well bore drawings the history regarding the well bore drawing issue. The Tribunal concluded in PO No 31:

Given that the Parties' experts, in their account of the “sequence of events” have illustrated these events by drawings, the Tribunal prefers to refer to these drawings as they had been produced. In order not to privilege the representation by the expert of one of the Parties over those of another, the Tribunal confirms its request to receive from the Respondents explanations how their understanding of the events differs from that represented by Mr Wright. If the Respondents wish to illustrate these explanations by reference not only to the Hughes drawings on the record but also by referencing aspects of the 1 November 2021 Drawings, the Respondents may do so, provided that they explain also how the information differs from that represented in Mr Hughes' drawings and identify the sources from which the Respondents have taken the differing information.

725 The Respondent explained areas of disagreement with the Claimant and with Mr Wright's drawings and commentary on the wellbore on 4 November 2021.

726 On Day 4 of the Hearing, the issue of the well bore drawings arose again, the Claimant arguing that the new drawings contained new evidence and the Respondent contesting it. The substance of the exchange is recorded in the Summary Minutes of the November 2021 Hearing. The Tribunal considered both sets of drawings without being affected by any missing information.

4.7.5 The November 2021 Hearing

727 The November 2021 Hearing was held from 8-13 November 2021 by video conference.

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728 As indicated in Annex A – Record of Attendance to the Summary Minutes of the Hearing, the following persons attended the Hearing:

Members of the Tribunal
Mr Michael E. Schneider President
Prof Jan Paulsson Arbitrator
Prof Campbell McLachlan Arbitrator

ICSID Secretariat
Ms Frauke Nitschke Secretary of the Tribunal
Ms Ekaterina Minina (days 1-5) ICSID Paralegal

For the Claimant
Counsel
Mr Barton Legum Dentons
Mr Gordon Tarnowsky KC Dentons
Mr Anthony Cole (days 1 & 5) Dentons
Ms Rachel Howie Dentons
Ms Laura McPhee Dentons

Party Representative
Mr Glen Valk Niko

Witnesses
Mr Grant Kelly (day 6) Kaizen Safety Group
Mr Bill Hornaday Niko
Mr Brian Adolph Niko

Experts
Mr John Wright John Wright Co
Mr Bill Cline GaffneyCline & Associates
Mr Rawdon Seager GaffneyCline & Associates
Mr Joshua Oletu GaffneyCline & Associates

For the Respondent
Counsel
Mr Derek C. Smith Foley Hoag
Ms Christina Hioureas Foley Hoag
Ms Alejandra Torres Camprubí Foley Hoag
Ms Diana Tsutieva (day 1) Foley Hoag
Mr Richard Maidman Foley Hoag
Mr Sudhanshu Roy Foley Hoag
Ms Natalia Tchoukleva Foley Hoag

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Ms Sun Young Hwang Foley Hoag
Mr Moin Ghani Alliance Laws
Mr Imtiaz U Ahmad Asif Aequitas Chambers

Party Representatives
Mr Shaheena Khatun (days 1-4, 6) Joint Secretary (Development), Energy & Mineral Resources Division
Mr Abdullah Arif Muhammad Joint Secretary (Development), Energy & Mineral Resources Division
Mr Md. Shaheenur Islam (days 1-3, 4-5) Director (Production Sharing Contract), Petrobangla
Mr Syed Ashfaquzzaman Secretary, Petrobangla
Mr Mohammad Ali Managing Director, BAPEX
Mr Howlader Ohidul Islam General Manager, BAPEX
Mr Merajul Alam Deputy General Manager, BAPEX

Experts
Mr Michael Nowicki Ryder Scott
Mr James Latham Ryder Scott
Mr Michael Bruno Geomechanics
Mr Jeffrey Hughes HTK
Mr Steve Wilson EPG

Court Reporter
Mr Trevor McGowan

IT Support
Mr Adam Kirn Hennessey WBG IT
Mr Brian Bucher DOAR
Mr Kevin High Foley Hoag
Mr James Herrity DOAR
Ms Silvia Gomez Foley Hoag
Ms Sarah LeBarron Foley Hoag
Ms Samanta Kolenovic Foley Hoag
Ms Yara Zhu Foley Hoag
Ms Melika Mostowfi (day 6) WBG IT
Ms Kiana Mozaffari (day 6) WBG IT

729 The previously agreed hearing agenda was confirmed and applied as follows, with a modification on Day 6, agreed by the Parties on the morning of 13 November 2021:

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730 The Respondent's Counsel started on Day 1, by an opening statement addressing general issues and, in addition, gave an introductory presentation on each of the agreed topics. The Claimant's counsel made initial submissions responding briefly to those made by the Respondent's counsel regarding general issues and the agreed topics. The following topics were addressed, and experts and witnesses examined.

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731 On each of these topics, the expert reports and the witness statements were taken as direct evidence; the experts were given the opportunity for a presentation on the topic for which they were named. The Parties then were given the opportunity for cross-examination and redirect examination of the experts and the witnesses. In the case of Mr Hornaday, a witness called by the Tribunal, both Parties were given the opportunity to ask further questions and they did so.

732 The agreed hearing agenda set out the time that each Party and the Tribunal would have at the opening of the Hearing and for each Topic. The Tribunal clarified that this time schedule had to be handled in a flexible manner. The overall time allocation had to be equal for the Parties, but time not used in one of the agreed time slots could be used in other slots.

733 As the November 2021 Hearing progressed, the examinations of the experts by the Parties and the Tribunal exceeded the time allocated to the time slots per the agreed hearing agenda.

734 On Day 3 of the Hearing, during the examination of the Respondent's experts, an issue arose in relation to part of the “working papers” of Ryder Scott in preparation of their first report. The incident, the Parties' positions and the Tribunal's decision were recorded in detail in the Summary Minutes (paragraphs 25 – 31). The Tribunal summarises the issue here:

735 That report contained a table showing “Estimated Remaining Recoverable Contingent Gas Resources”, showing a low estimate, a best estimate and a high estimate. The calculations were based inter alia on a petrophysical analysis for each of the three estimates. That analysis was part of the working papers attached to the report with respect to the best and the high estimate but not for the low estimate. It turned out that the petrophysical analysis for the low estimate had been made available to the Claimant during the document production, but the Claimant did not produce it in the Arbitration as an exhibit.

736 In the morning of Day 3, the Claimant's counsel communicated with the Respondent's counsel team, asking them to make sure that the Ryder Scott experts had their “working papers” available at the cross-examination. These papers had previously been produced to Niko but not introduced by Niko into the record.168 When later in the day the examination of the experts commenced, the Respondent's counsel advised at the Hearing that they were


168 Summary Minutes, November 2021 Hearing, paragraph 26. ↩

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in the process of printing the documents to be available during cross-examination. In order to avoid loss of time, the Claimant's counsel proposed to put to the experts the factors he had taken from the working papers, questioning the expert on the assumption that this information about the factors was correct and, if the expert were not able to confirm immediately, giving him the opportunity to verify the assumption as soon as the working papers were made available to him. The expert replied that this was agreeable to him.

737 The Claimant proposed that one of the Claimant's experts (Mr Oletu) would project them on the screen accessible to all participants and that the examination of the Ryder Scott experts proceeded on this basis. The Tribunal accepted this procedure and instructed that the documents shown on the screen be given exhibit numbers.

738 The Respondent's counsel objected to both the procedure for questioning the expert witnesses on these documents and to their introduction into the record of the Arbitration. The Respondent's counsel recalled the exchanges and agreements concerning the production of documents, in particular PO No 27 and stated:

There was an agreement between the Parties that the record was closed after the submission of your Counter-Memorial. These documents are not in the record. They may be Ryder Scott's documents, but they're not in the record, and I am certainly not in agreement that documents not in the record can be introduced at the moment of cross-examination and be used.

739 The Claimant's counsel stated that these documents had not been included in the record because they were part of the experts' Working Papers; these papers showed the analyses and the data underlying the explanations in the experts' report, showing how the experts had reached the opinions in their report.

740 The Tribunal deliberated and decided as follows:

Our understanding is that the question goes to the assumptions made by the experts. The assumptions are either in their head or in their working papers. So, providing the working papers to assist the experts in the answer to the question of their assumptions is, in our view, something perfectly legitimate. On top of it, these working papers have been shared between the parties. The fact that they have not been introduced into the hearing, from our perspective, is no detriment because it's the experts' own papers; it is something very different from new exhibits, on which

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we have regulated the rule that there should be no new exhibits in the hearing.

On that basis, the Tribunal accepts the method adopted now. We have now presented by Mr Oletu the relevant document, the experts have confirmed that this is part of their working papers, and we allow counsel for Claimant to proceed on that basis with the cross-examination.

741 Following this decision by the Tribunal, the Respondent's counsel made the following declaration:

I won't interrupt any further to get on the record our disagreement, but I want to reserve our rights, and we will explain our position to the Tribunal in writing subsequently.

742 The Claimant referred again to pages from the Ryder Scott Working Papers on Day 6; the Respondent objected again and the Tribunal confirmed its earlier decision.

743 On Hearing Day 5, following discussions with the Tribunal, the Parties prepared a revised Agenda for Hearing Day 6. They proposed, “in order to allow better calibration of time, for cross-examination of experts to take place before any specific time allocated to Tribunal's questions (expecting they will, as they consider fit, ask questions during the experts' testimony otherwise)”. The proposal provided for the following sequence:

Topic 3 (cont’d):
Hughes redirect
Bruno cross-examination and any redirect
Wilson cross-examination and any redirect
Wright cross-examination and any redirect
Tribunal questions

Topics 4 and 5:
Respondent's counsel/Ryder Scott presentations
Claimant's counsel/GCA presentations
Tribunal questions (if any) for any of Messrs. Hornaday, Adolph, Glaholt, and Kelly
Adolph cross-examination and any redirect (pursuant to Respondent request to question Mr Adolph)
Kelly cross-examination and any redirect (pursuant to Respondent request to question Mr Kelly)
Ryder Scott cross-examination and any redirect
GCA cross-examination and any redirect
Tribunal questions

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744 The Tribunal accepted this proposal which was implemented with slight changes in the sequence and, at the Respondent's request on Day 6, an additional presentation by Mr Hughes was made at the beginning of Topics 4 and 5. Upon the further request of the Respondent, Mr. Hughes was permitted to continue his presentation at the end of Day 6 after all other presentations and questioning had been completed.

745 Given the travel and meeting restrictions during the Covid 19 pandemic, the hearing had to be organised remotely, spanning distant time zones, hence, the time management of the Hearing was a particular challenge. The Tribunal made special efforts to ensure that the Parties and their experts had available to them the time that had been agreed. In order to ensure that the Parties could complete the programme in the modified form as jointly requested by them, the Tribunal accepted, despite the inconvenient hour, to extend the hearing on Day 6 by an additional sitting hour.

746 As indicated in the time log sent by the Secretary of the Tribunal to the Parties on the last Hearing Day, the time used by each Party and the Tribunal was as follows:

Claimant: 8h25min
Respondent: 8h28min
Tribunal questioning: 4h49min
Procedural matters: 3h30min
Total hearing time: 25h12min

747 Hearing Exhibits: In the course of the Hearing, the Parties provided electronic copies of presentations and demonstratives in accordance with the Hearing Protocol. These documents were uploaded to the Box account established for this Arbitration. A full list of these documents was annexed to the Summary Minutes of the Hearing as Annex D.

748 Referring to a question of the Tribunal on Day 1, the Respondent submitted in writing at the end of the Hearing a “Response to the Tribunal's Request on Technical Requirements with Respect to Niko's Proposed Additional Production Wells".

749 Real-time transcription was provided by Mr Trevor McGowan, and transcripts were sent to the Parties and the Tribunal at the end of each Hearing Day. Sound recordings were made of the Hearing and uploaded to the Box account established for this proceeding and deposited in the archives of the Centre.

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750 The Summary Minutes of the Hearing were sent to the Parties on 14 December 2021, inviting the Parties to provide comments. The Parties commented on 21 December 2021. The Tribunal proposed revisions to the Summary Minutes on which the Parties were invited to comment; the Claimant had no further comment; the Respondent's comments were received on 3 February 2022. Following an invitation by the Tribunal, the Claimant provided observations on the Respondent's comments on 8 February 2022. The Tribunal invited the Respondent to respond to the Claimant's comments with a view to further reduce the remaining differences between the Parties, and the Respondent's comments were received on 18 February 2022.

751 The Summary Minutes of the Hearing were revised and finalized on 17 March 2022 to take into account the Parties comments.

4.7.6 Post-hearing matters and completion of the proceedings

752 On Day 6 of the Hearing, the Parties and the Tribunal discussed post-hearing matters. After further consultation with the Parties, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No 32 on 16 December 2021 setting out the post-hearing procedural calendar. PO No 32 recorded that the Parties agreed that the evidentiary record was and would remain closed unless the Tribunal ordered otherwise on a showing of good cause.

753 On 10 December 2021, the Parties provided their mutually agreed corrections to the transcript of the November 2021 Hearing.

754 Further to an inquiry from the Tribunal on Day 5 of the November 2021 Hearing, the Claimant identified on 10 December 2021 references in the Claimant's submissions and the record of contemporaneous evidence concerning the reduction in gas flows at surface immediately following the completion of Chattak 2B relief operation.169 With leave from the Tribunal, the Respondent responded to the Claimant's 10 December 2021 communication on 21 December 2021.

755 On 14 December 2021, the Parties reverted to the Tribunal on a question discussed on Day 4 of the Hearing concerning the duration of the initial flare of the Chattak 2A blowout prior to bridging. They communicated the following agreement:

The parties have discussed and note that the evidence in the record indicates two possible periods.


169 Provisional HT 2021 Day 5, page 93:17-22. ↩

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1. The Report of the Second Gas Loss Committee at Annex R-4, pages 6-7 states a period of 12.17 days (or 292 hours) starting on June 24 and ending when “the Relief well choked off on July 7”.

2. Exhibit C-45 (the Grace Report on the Chattak 2A Blowout) indicates at page 7 that the blowout initiated at 0300 on 24 June. Exhibit C-47 (which contains the 6th Bi-Weekly Environmental Report from Niko) states at PDF 6: “On July 5, 2005 at 21:30 the Chhatak 2A blowout bridged". This evidence suggests the period was 282.5 hours, or 11.77 days.

The parties agree that period between the Chattak 2A blowout and its bridging, for purposes of gas loss calculations, is approximately 12 days in duration.

The parties reserve their right to explain in the Post-Hearing Briefs the impact of the parties' agreement as to the period between the Chattak 2A blowout and its bridging on any particular gas loss calculation.

756 On 23 December 2021, and in response to an inquiry from the Tribunal on Day 1 of the November 2021 Hearing, the Parties submitted an agreed consolidated glossary containing the reservoir experts' terminology and definitions.

757 As requested by the Parties on Day 6 of the November 2021 Hearing, according to the post-hearing programme, the Tribunal submitted on 26 January 2022 the Tribunal's Questions to the Parties for the Post-Hearing Briefs. The Tribunal pointed out that these questions were not meant to restrict in any way the Parties' submissions. In presenting its questions, the Tribunal also set out its preliminary understanding of the Parties' positions on some of the contested issues, expecting the Parties to correct any errors in this understanding.

758 In its message of 31 January 2022, the Tribunal, with regard to the designation of the Parties on the Respondent side following the completion of ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 the following clarification:

... concerning the Claimant's observation regarding the designation of the Parties on the Respondent side, the Tribunal recalls that following the Joint First Session in the two cases initiated by the Claimant, the formation of an identically composed arbitral tribunal in each of the two cases and the agreement to proceed with the two cases in a concurrent manner, correspondence and submissions followed this concurrent approach and hearings were held jointly in the presence of all Parties in

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the two cases. By Procedural Order No 29 of 24 September 2021, the Tribunal in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 closed the proceedings in that case and rendered on the same date its Award. Since then there is no longer any justification for listing Petrobangla in the remaining proceedings concerning ICSID Case No ARB/10/11. The Tribunal therefore has removed Petrobangla from the case reference and refers to the Respondent side in the singular.

759 On 2 March 2022, the Parties submitted their post-hearing briefs. Together with its submissions, the Claimant submitted a Summary List of Niko's Submissions Regarding Damages for Lost Gas. The Respondent submitted Legal Authorities RLA-481 and RLA-482 with its submission.

760 On 9 March 2022, the Claimant addressed the Tribunal stating that the Respondent's post-hearing brief “purport[ed] to express new opinions without support in the existing evidentiary record or (b) advance[d] claims or legal theories not discussed at the hearing in November” 2021. The Claimant requested that “the Tribunal accord no weight to those portions of the Respondent's submission”.

761 The Respondent objected to the Claimant's description of its submission on 10 March 2022, stating that the Respondent had relied on the Tribunal's 25 January 2022 questions and those raised by the Tribunal on Day 2 of the Hearing. The Respondent stated:

Whilst Respondent maintains the position on volumes of gas lost and relevant methodologies it expressed at the Hearing, in the alternative, and when the Tribunal's List of Questions required so, Respondent provided further calculations adapted to the periods and concepts requested by the Tribunal. These encapsulate Respondent's “latest position” on the contested issues addressed by the Tribunal's List of Questions. To request that Respondent refrains from submitting such calculations would tantamount to depriving it of its due process rights and its obligation to respond fully to the Tribunal's List of Questions.

762 Referencing paragraph 12 of PO No 32, the Respondent stated that it recognized that the record was closed to new factual evidence but considered the submission of new legal authorities as always open to the Parties.

763 Following an invitation by the Tribunal of 15 March 2022, the Claimant responded on 22 March 2022, identifying a list of the paragraph and footnote references which according to the Claimant “purport[ed] to express new opinions without support in the existing evidentiary record or (b) advance[d] claims or legal theories not discussed at the hearing in November”. The

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Respondent objected to the Claimant's 22 March 2022 communication on 23 March 2022, reiterating that the quoted passages were responsive to questions posed by the Tribunal.170

764 In its Procedural Order No 33, issued on 8 April 2022, the Tribunal noted that the Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief and in particular the passages identified by the Claimant contained assertions of fact and argument that had not been presented by the Respondent. The Tribunal also notes some similar assertions in the Claimant's Post-Hearing Brief. PO No 33 continued as follows:

The Tribunal is conscious of the fact that the November 2021 Hearing dealt with a broad range of evidence and expert opinion. It is in the nature of such a hearing that it may open new perspectives on the Parties' respective cases and may give rise to adjusted argument. When the Tribunal communicated after the Hearing its questions to the Parties, it pointed out therefore the importance it attributed to “understand the Parties' latest position” on the issues that had arisen, “in particular in response to the criticism raised by their opponent” at the November 2021 Hearing. It also pointed out that, by inviting the Parties to address in their Post-Hearing Briefs the matters arising from the Tribunal's January 2022 Question, the Tribunal did not wish to limit in any way the scope of the Parties' post-hearing submissions.

Understanding that the argument and evidence presented at the November 2021 Hearing and responding to the January 2022 Questions, could lead a Party to adjust its argument, the Tribunal sees no objection to such adjustments, provided that such adjustments are presented on the basis of the evidence in the record. Where such adjustment consists in argument and opinion that have not been previously presented, the opposing party must however be given an opportunity to comment.

In the explanations to the January 2022 Questions, the Tribunal also set out its preliminary understanding of the Parties' positions on some of the contested issues and expected the Parties to correct any errors in this understanding. The Tribunal notes that in their Post-Hearing Briefs, the Parties have indeed identified such errors and clarified their positions.

In this respect, too, the opposing party must be given an opportunity to consider the correction and clarification and to address the position as corrected and clarified.


170 PO No 33, paragraph 6. ↩

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For these reasons, the Tribunal does not exclude or disregard any of the passages in the Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief but gives both Parties an opportunity to respond to their opponent's Brief. These briefs must be limited to rebuttals of statements in the opponent's Brief and may not produce new evidence.

765 The time for these Reply Post-Hearing Briefs was fixed for 9 May 2022; on this date these replies were submitted by the Parties. The Respondent attached a Summary List of its Submissions Regarding Damages for Lost Gas to its submission.

766 Further to the programme as recorded in PO No 32, the Parties submitted at the time limits extended by PO No 33 on 31 May 2022 their cost submissions and on 21 June 2022 replies to their opponent's submission. The Respondent submitted Legal Authorities RLA-483 to RLA-485 with its first cost statement.

767 The Tribunal was working on the Award and deliberating as the work progressed. It updated the Parties about the progress of this work

768 On 24 July 2024, the Respondent provided an update on pre-award interest and related matters up to 30 June 2024, accompanied by Exhibit R-455 “Brattle Workpaper D – Revised and Updated Gas Loss Damages” and Exhibit R-456 “Brattle Workpaper E, Updated Environmental Damages Calculations.xlsx.". The Tribunal confirmed receipt of this submission and responded as follows:

The Tribunal has taken note of the new calculations provided by BAPEX. Considering the decision on closing the record of this case, as recorded in paragraph 6 of the October 2021 PHC, the Tribunal will proceed as follows: If it reaches the conclusion that the new calculations and other changes presented in the letter are relevant and admissible, the Tribunal will consider revisiting the closure of the record and will afford the Claimant an opportunity to comment on the Respondent's calculations.

769 BAPEX provided a further update on 10 January 2025.

770 On 17 April 2025, the Tribunal addressed to the Parties the following message:

The Tribunal refers the Parties to the World Bank Report 2006 exhibited in these proceedings (Ex R-207, page 65, para. 194), which discusses emission reductions and carbon sequestration. It attaches hereto a link to a subsequent World Bank Country Climate and Development Report on Bangladesh dated October 2022, and directs the Parties' attention to Table 6 (pages 49-50). The Parties are hereby given an opportunity to

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comment by simultaneous submission on April 28, 2025 on its relevance, if any, to the quantum of the claim for atmospheric pollution in the present proceedings.

771 The Parties submitted their comments on 28 April 2025. The comments of BAPEX were accompanied by 14 Annexes.

772 On 22 August 2025, the Tribunal offered the Parties the opportunity for an update to their latest statement of costs. These updates were provided on 5 September 2025.

773 On 27 September 2025, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No 34. It noted that following the updated cost submissions, dated 5 September 2025, no application was made thereafter. The Tribunal concluded that the Parties had full opportunity to argue all relevant issues in the Case for the Compensation Declaration and closed the proceedings in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11 in accordance with ICSID Arbitration Rule 38(1).

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5 PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL

774 As explained in the previous section, ICSID Case Nos ARB/10/11 and ARB/10/18 were conducted concurrently. The two Tribunals constituted in ICSID Case Nos ARB/10/11 and ARB/10/18 rendered during the course of the proceedings altogether eight decisions and the Award on the Payment Claim in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11; five of these decisions relate directly to the Compensation Declaration or are relevant to it.

5.1 The Decision on Jurisdiction

775 The proceedings in the two Arbitrations were commenced against the Government of Bangladesh, Petrobangla and BAPEX. The Respondents raised objections against the Tribunals in both cases. These objections were decided in the Decision on Jurisdiction of 19 August 2013:

(1) [The Tribunals have] jurisdiction under the JVA and between the Claimant and BAPEX to decide: (a) the Claimant's request for a Compensation Declaration and (b) the Claimant's Cooperation Claim;

(2) [The Tribunals have] jurisdiction to decide the Claimant's claim against Petrobangla for payment under the GPSA and reserves the questions related to the necessary role (or otherwise) of BAPEX in relation thereto;

(3) [The Tribunals have] no jurisdiction over Bangladesh, which therefore will no longer be a Respondent in this arbitration [recte: these arbitrations]

776 In the reasons to this decision, the Tribunals explained that the State of Bangladesh, acting through the Government, had chosen to implement the project by the means of agreements which it did not conclude directly. Instead, it delegated the necessary powers to Petrobangla and BAPEX. The Tribunals concluded that they did not have jurisdiction over the State of Bangladesh and released the State from the two Arbitrations.

777 Concerning the Respondents' objection with respect to the requirement of designation set out in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, the Tribunals examined the provision and the conduct of the Government and were satisfied that, by authorising BAPEX and Petrobangla to conclude the Agreements containing the ICSID arbitration clauses, in terms previously proposed by the Bangladesh agencies, the State of Bangladesh not only approved consent to ICSID arbitration by these two agencies in terms of Article 25(3) of the Convention but also designated, implicitly but necessarily, BAPEX and Petrobangla as agencies in the sense of Article 25(1), if such designation had

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not occurred earlier. The designation was communicated to the Centre by the Claimant's Request for Arbitration. On these grounds the Tribunals dismissed the Respondents' objection relying on an alleged failure of Bangladesh to designate BAPEX and Petrobangla.171

778 With respect to Petrobangla in connection with claims brought by Niko under the JVA, i.e. in the Compensation Declaration proceedings, the Tribunals held

515. The Tribunal concludes that it has not seen any argument to justify treating Petrobangla with respect to the JVA any different than it treated Bangladesh with respect to both agreements. Petrobangla is not party to the JVA and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over Petrobangla with respect to claims based on the JVA.

5.2 The Decision pertaining to the Exclusivity of the Tribunals’ Jurisdiction

779 Addressing difficulties that had arisen in the context of the implementation of their Decision on the Payment Claim, the Tribunals issued on 19 July 2016 in relation to both Arbitrations the following Decision pertaining to the Exclusivity the Tribunals' Jurisdiction in which the Tribunals:

1. Declare that the Tribunals have sole and exclusive subject matter jurisdiction with respect to all matters which have validly been brought before it, notably

(a) The validity of the JVA and the GSPA, including all questions relating to the avoidance of these agreements on grounds of corruption;

(b) The liability of Niko under the JVA for the blow-outs that occurred in the course of its activity in the Chattak field and the quantum of the damage for which it may be responsible in case such liability were found to exist;

(c) The payment obligations of Petrobangla towards Niko under the GSPA for gas delivered, the jurisdiction for injunctions seeking to prevent such payments and to retract such injunctions;

2. Order BAPEX and Petrobangla

(a) to intervene with all courts and other authorities in Bangladesh that are or may be concerned with issues identified above under (1) to bring to their attention the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunals in respect of


171 Decision on Jurisdiction, Section 7.2 and paragraph 345. ↩

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these issues and the international obligations of the State of Bangladesh resulting therefrom under the ICSID Convention; and

(b) to take all steps necessary to terminate any proceedings and orders by the courts in Bangladesh which are in conflict with this order.

780 The Decision and its context are discussed above in Section 4.4.2.

5.3 The Decision on the Corruption Claim

781 On 25 February 2019, the Tribunals issued their Decision on the Corruption Claim, deciding as follows:

(i) The declarations sought by the Respondents concerning the establishment of Niko's investment in Bangladesh and the Government's approval of the Agreements are denied;

(ii) The Respondents' objections to the Tribunals' jurisdiction are rejected;

(iii) The JVA between BAPEX and Niko Resources Bangladesh was not procured by corruption and remains valid and binding;

(iv) The GPSA between Petrobangla and Niko Resources Bangladesh was not procured by corruption; there is no basis for revising the Tribunals’ decisions on the Payment Claim;

782 The Decision and the procedure leading to it are discussed above in Section 4.3.

5.4 The Decision on Liability

783 On 20 February 2020, the Tribunals issued their Decision on Liability. They concluded and decided as follows:

(i) Niko's liability as Operator for the 2005 blowouts in the Chattak field must be determined exclusively under the JVA between Niko and BAPEX by the present Tribunal;

(ii) The Tribunal's decision on Niko's liability for the two 2005 blowouts in the Chattak field is binding on the Government and Petrobangla as the assignors to BAPEX;

(iii) No standards under the law of Bangladesh relevant to Niko's liability for the two blowouts have been identified that are more stringent for the conduct of the Operator than those in the JVA;

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(iv) The first blowout at Chattak 2 was caused by Niko's breaches of its obligations as Operator under the JVA;

(υ) The second blowout at Chattak 2A was not caused by any breach of obligation on the part of Niko;

(vi) Niko must compensate BAPEX for direct loss and damage caused by the first blowout;

(vii) The compensation owed by Niko to BAPEX includes the gas that escaped from the Chattak 2 Well as part of the first blowout; the identification of other loss and damage that Niko must compensate and the quantum of such compensation are reserved for the next phase of these proceedings; so are the decisions on the claims for interest and for the costs of the proceedings.

784 The Decision and the procedure leading to it are discussed above in Section 4.2.

5.5 The Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss

785 The Decision on the Heads of Recoverable Loss was issued by the Tribunals on 18 May 2021 with the following substantive provisions:

13.1 Concerning the First Head of Loss

773. BAPEX is entitled to compensation for its share under the JVA of the value of the gas that escaped from Sands 1 and 2 in the Chattak field (the Reservoir) at a price to be determined (the JV price). This compensation must be paid

(i) for the gas that escaped from the first blowout on 7 January 2005 to the second blowout on 24 June 2005; and

(ii) for the gas that escaped after the second blowout on 24 June 2005 unless it is established (i) that the bridging of the Chattak 2 wellbore, assumed to have taken place on 9 January 2005, obstructed the wellbore at the Regional Shale and reduced the flow of gas from the Reservoir and (ii) that the second blowout removed the obstruction and reactivated the flow of gas; and

if the Tribunal determines that gas losses after 24 June 2005 are recoverable,

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(iii) for gas that escaped after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well on 9 October 2005, unless it is established that the relief operation completely sealed the Chattak 2 opening in the Regional Shale; and

if the Tribunal determines that gas losses after 9 October 2005 are recoverable,

(iv) only for gas that would have escaped the Reservoir despite a production well, provided it is established that BAPEX failed without justification to approve that Niko drill such a production well.

774. BAPEX is entitled to recover on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh any difference between the JVA price, as determined according to paragraph 773 above, and the price the Government or Petrobangla paid to comparable gas producers in Bangladesh for the quantities of gas lost for which the Claimant must compensate BAPEX according to paragraph 773 above.

13.2 Concerning the Second Head of Loss

775. The alleged loss of production due to the impossibility of producing gas from the Reservoir as a result of the first blowout, is not recoverable.

13.3 Concerning the Third Head of Loss

776. BAPEX is entitled to claim on behalf of the Government for the loss and damage caused by the first blowout to the environment and the local population (Environmental Losses) to the extent Niko has not already compensated such loss and damage, subject to the following determinations:

(i) any loss that the first blowout may have caused by increasing the level of arsenic in the Tengratila drinking water is not recoverable;

(ii) compensation for any Environmental Losses attributed to continuing seepages of gas from the Reservoir must take into account the decision concerning Niko's liability for loss of gas according to paragraphs 773 (b) to (d) above;

(iii) any costs of Mr Wilson's project to avoid or reduce the explosion risk caused by the use of the gas collected from seepages for cooking purposes are not recoverable;

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(iv) the decision on the claim for the costs of Mr Wilson's project for the soil vacuum extraction is reserved; and

(υ) the decision on other issues concerning the recoverability of Environmental Losses claimed by BAPEX on behalf of the Government is reserved.

777. The Respondents' request to suspend the procedure on the claims for Environmental Losses is denied.

778. The claim for advance payment on account of BAPEX's monitoring, surveying and abatement programme is denied.

13.4 Pre-Award Interest

779. The decision on the Respondents' claim for pre-award interest is reserved.

13.5 The Claimant's Set-Off Claim

780. The Claimant's request for set-off based on its claims for breaches by BAPEX of the JVA allegedly committed at various dates between November 2005 and May 2015 is admitted in the arbitration.

789. These claims are time-barred.

790. The Claimant's set-off relying on these claims is denied.

786 The Decision and the procedure leading to it are discussed above in Sections 4.5 and 4.6.

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6 RELIEF REQUESTED

787 The relief requested by the Parties varied over time. During the course of the proceedings, the Tribunal had to address different versions of the requested relief. The Tribunal reproduces therefore the various versions of these requests as they were presented during the course of the proceedings. This presentation starts with the final version of the requested relief which the Tribunal addresses in this Award.

6.1 The Claimant

6.1.1 The final version

788 In its last submission on the merits the Claimant made the following submission:

The record and the law do not support the updated lost gas calculations and claims for damages of BAPEX. Niko incorporates by reference its submissions at paragraphs 112 and 113 of Niko's Reply on Quantum for Lost Gas.172

789 At the indicated location in the Claimant's Reply on Quantum for Updated Lost Gas Calculations of 1 October 2021 the Claimant states:

112. Niko incorporates by reference its submissions at paragraphs 451 to 470 of its Counter-Memorial on Damages. Niko nonetheless recognizes that the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss has disposed of the requests for relief stated at the following paragraphs, which therefore do not fall to be decided in this phase of the proceedings:

a. paragraph 452 (request for declaration that the JVA does not permit BAPEX to recover losses alleged to be suffered by the Government);

b. paragraphs 454 and 461 (request for declaration that BAPEX has failed to prove any loss directly resulting from the first blowout and is entitled to no compensation);

c. and paragraphs 458-460 (requests concerning set-off claim).

113. In addition, Niko revises its request for relief stated at paragraph 457 to refer to BDT 80 million rather than USD 2.2 million.


172 C-PHB 2, paragraph 58. ↩

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790 The indicated paragraphs of the Claimant's Counter-Memorial on Damages of 7 September 2020 are reproduced below; the passages that remain unchanged and thus represent the Claimant's latest request are set in bold characters:

451. For all of the foregoing reasons, Niko respectfully requests that the Tribunal:

452. Declare that BAPEX may not recover the losses alleged to have been suffered by the Government of Bangladesh as these losses are excluded from recovery by the Joint Venture Agreement;

453. Dismiss the claims asserted by BAPEX for the recovery of such losses;

454. Declare that BAPEX has failed to prove any loss directly resulting from the first blowout at Chattak West field;

455. Declare that BAPEX is not entitled to pre-award interest;

456. Dismiss BAPEX's claims for failure to establish them;

457. In the alternative, should the Tribunal find that BAPEX has proven a loss directly resulting from the first blowout at Chattak West field, fix the amount of that loss in an amount to be proven at the hearing but which Niko contends to be USD 2.2 million [replaced by BDT 80 million] or less;

458. Declare that BAPEX is liable to Niko for damages suffered as a result of BAPEX's breaches of the JVA and wrongful deprivation of Niko's right to produce gas from Chattak West;

459. Fix the amount of Niko's losses in an amount to be proven at the hearing, but which Niko contends to be at least USD 114.1 million, and set this amount off against any amount for which Niko is determined to be liable to BAPEX;

460. In the alternative, declare that the Tribunal and the Centre have jurisdiction over Niko's claim in set-off, that BAPEX is liable to Niko for damages suffered as a result of BAPEX's breaches of the JVA and wrongful deprivation of Niko's right to produce gas from Chattak West, fix the amount of Niko's losses in an amount to be proven at the hearing, but which Niko contends to be at least USD 114.1 million, and set this amount off against any amount for which Niko is determined to be liable to BAPEX;

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461. Declare that Niko owes no compensation to BAPEX;

462. Declare that the Tribunal's determination of Niko's liability and determination concerning compensation due are final and binding on BAPEX and all of its predecessors, assignors, successors and assigns, including the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla;

463. Declare that BAPEX breached its warranties and misrepresented in the JVA that it had been vested with and assigned all relevant rights, obligations and responsibilities of the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla;

464. Declare that Niko is entitled to be made whole for any and all damages resulting from the pursuit of the Money Suit by the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla in Dhaka court as a consequence of the above-mentioned breach of warranty and misrepresentation;

465. Order BAPEX to pay to Niko as compensation for said breach and misrepresentation the amount corresponding to all attorneys' fees, expert fees and other costs incurred by Niko in defending itself and its officers in the Money Suit;

466. Order BAPEX to pay on Niko's behalf the full amount of any damages assessed against Niko by a final judgment or decree in the Money Suit;

467. Order BAPEX to pay to Niko the costs of this arbitration, including professional disbursements;

468. Order BAPEX to pay to Niko interest on all sums awarded to Niko;

469. Order that all sums awarded to Niko be in freely transferable and exchangeable funds, in accordance with the requirements of Article 26.1.6 of the JVA; and

470. Order such other and further relief as the Tribunal may deem appropriate in the circumstances.

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6.1.2 Earlier versions

791 In its Notice to Arbitrate of 8 January 2010,173 Niko announced its intention to commence arbitration proceedings against BAPEX, Petrobangla and Bangladesh in respect to a dispute defined as follows:

(a) All claims held jointly or severally by any of Bapex, Petrobangla and Bangladesh to damages or losses alleged to arise from the blow outs of two wells which were then being drilled by Niko under the JVA in the gas field in Bangladesh known as the Chattak gas field (the “Compensation Claims”), including those arising from the matters alleged in either the Legal Notice dated May 27, 2005 issued on behalf of Petrobangla to Niko (a copy of which is attached) and/or in the pleadings filed on behalf of Petrobangla in the suit filed June, 2008 by Petrobangla and the Government of Bangladesh against Niko and others in the Court of District Judge, Dhaka, Bangladesh, no. 224 of 2008;

(b) Whether Niko is liable for any of the Compensation Claims in whole or in part, and if it is liable, determination of the amount of liability;

(c) [description relating to the Payment Claim].

792 In the RfA I, dated 1 April 2010, Niko referred to the Notice to Arbitrate and quoted the quoted definition of the Compensation Declaration claim contained in the Notice, stating its intent to have that Claim resolved by ICSID arbitration.

793 At the Preliminary Procedural Consultation and First Session on 14 February 2011, the Claimant's request for relief was defined as

... a declaration that it has no liability for any damage that may have arisen from the two well blow-outs which occurred on the Chattak wells and that it owes no compensation for such damage.174

794 The Claimant specified its requested relief in its Memorial concerning the Compensation Declaration of 27 September 2013,175 seeking an award by the Tribunal

a. Declaring that Niko breached no obligation or law as concerns the two blowouts in 2005 at Chattak field and is not liable to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns;


173 RFA I, Attachment D I. ↩
174 Procedural Order No 1, second paragraph. ↩
175 C-CD.1, paragraph 23. ↩

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b. In the alternative, and in the event that the Tribunals find liability on the part of Niko, fixing the amount of any compensation due for any damages to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns;

c. Declaring, for the purposes of the preceding declarations, that BAPEX is in all relevant respects the successor and assignee of the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla;

d. In the event that BAPEX is not in all relevant respects the successor and assignee of the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla, declaring that BAPEX breached its warranty in the JVA that it had been assigned all relevant obligations and responsibilities of the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla;

e. Declaring that Niko is entitled to any and all damages resulting from the continued pursuit of the Money Suit by the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla in Dhaka court as a consequence of the breach of the arbitration clause of the JVA and/or the warranty that BAPEX had been assigned all relevant obligations and responsibilities of the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla in the JVA;

f. Ordering BAPEX to pay to Niko as compensation for said breach the amount corresponding to (i) all attorneys' fees, expert fees and other costs incurred by Niko in defending itself and its officers in the Money Suit; and (ii) any pecuniary difference between the findings of these Tribunal as to the extent of Niko's liability for the 2005 blowouts and the findings of any final judgment in the Money Suit;

g. Ordering that all sums awarded be in freely transferable and exchangeable funds, in accordance with the requirements of Article 26.1.6 of the JVA;

h. Ordering BAPEX to pay to Niko the costs of this arbitration, including professional disbursements;

i. Ordering BAPEX to pay to Niko interest on all sums awarded; and

j. Ordering such other and further relief as the Tribunals deem appropriate in the circumstances.

795 In its Reply concerning the Compensation Declaration of 29 May 2014,176 Niko presented a slightly modified request for relief as follows:


176 C-CD.2, paragraph 315. ↩

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Niko respectfully submits that the Tribunals should issue an award in its favor and against BAPEX:

(a) Declaring that Niko breached no obligation or law as concerns the two blowouts in 2005 at Chattak field and is not liable to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns;

(b) In the alternative, and in the event that the Tribunals find liability on the part of Niko, fixing the amount of any compensation due for any damages to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns;

(c) Declaring that BAPEX breached its warranties and misrepresented in the JVA that it had been vested with and assigned all relevant rights, obligations and responsibilities of the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla;

(d) Declaring that Niko is entitled to any and all damages resulting from the pursuit of the Money Suit by the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla in Dhaka court as a consequence of the abovementioned breach of warranty and misrepresentation;

(e) Ordering BAPEX to pay to Niko as compensation for said breach and misrepresentation the amount corresponding to (i) all attorneys' fees, expert fees and other costs incurred by Niko in defending itself and its officers in the Money Suit; and (ii) any pecuniary difference between the findings of these Tribunals as to the extent of Niko's liability for the 2005 blowouts and the findings of any final judgment in the Money Suit;

(f) Ordering that all sums awarded be in freely transferable and exchangeable funds, in accordance with the requirements of Article 26.1.6 of the JVA;

(g) Ordering BAPEX to pay to Niko the costs of this arbitration, including professional disbursements;

(h) Ordering BAPEX to pay to Niko interest on all sums awarded; and

(i) Ordering such other and further relief as the Tribunals deem appropriate in the circumstances.

796 In the Post-Hearing Brief of 22 January 2016,177 Niko spelled out the decision in requested in an award against BAPEX in the following terms:


177 C-PHB, paragraph 431. ↩

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(a) Declaring that Niko breached no obligation or law as concerns the two blowouts in 2005 at the Chattak field and is not liable concerning the blowouts to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns;

(b) In the alternative, and in the event that the Tribunals find liability on the part of Niko, fixing in the hearing on quantum scheduled for August 2016 the amount of any compensation due for any damages to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns;

(c) Declaring that the Tribunals' determination of Niko's liability concerning the blowouts and any damages resulting therefrom is final and binding upon BAPEX and all of its predecessors, assignors, successors and assigns;

(d) Declaring that BAPEX breached its warranties and misrepresented in the JVA that it had been vested with and assigned all relevant rights, obligations and responsibilities of the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla;

(e) Declaring that Niko is entitled to be made whole for any and all damages resulting from the pursuit of the Money Suit by the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla in Dhaka court as a consequence of the above-mentioned breach of warranty and misrepresentation;

(f) Ordering BAPEX to pay to Niko as compensation for said breach and misrepresentation the amount corresponding to all attorneys' fees, expert fees and other costs incurred by Niko in defending itself and its officers in the Money Suit;

(g) Ordering BAPEX to pay on Niko's behalf the full amount of any damages assessed against Niko by a final judgment or decree in the Money Suit;

(h) Ordering BAPEX to pay to Niko the costs of this arbitration, including professional disbursements;

(i) Ordering BAPEX to pay to Niko interest on all sums awarded to Niko;

(j) Ordering that all sums awarded to Niko be in freely transferable and exchangeable funds, in accordance with the requirements of Article 26.1.6 of the JVA; and

(k) Ordering such other and further relief as the Tribunals deem appropriate in the circumstances.

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The relief requested in the Post-Hearing Brief was confirmed and clarified at the February 2016 Hearing.178 In particular the Claimant confirmed that the “predecessors, assignors, successors and assignees” include Petrobangla and the Government.179

6.2 The Respondents/BAPEX

6.2.1 The final version

797 In its final submission on the merits, the Reply to Niko's Post-Hearing Brief of 9 May 2022,180 BAPEX requested the following relief:

It is BAPEX's position that none of the claims and arguments presented by Niko in its Post-Hearing Brief alter any of BAPEX's contentions. Therefore, BAPEX hereafter reaffirms the submissions it filed in its Post-Hearing Brief, and respectfully requests that the Tribunal:

a. Declare that BAPEX is entitled to compensation for all losses resulting from the Chattak 2 blowout that occurred at the Chattak Field (periods (i) to (iii), inclusive);

b. Order Claimant to pay damages, including pre-award interest, of US$120 million for BAPEX's losses;

c. Order Claimant to pay damages, including pre-award interest, of US$162 million to BAPEX for the Government's gas loss of gas production;

d. Order Claimant, with respect to losses due to atmospheric pollution, to pay damages to BAPEX for the Government (1) in the amount of US$123,379,376 in the event that the Tribunal finds that Brattle Scenario Case 1 is applicable, (2) in the amount of US$ 201,216,815 in the event that the Tribunal finds that Brattle Scenario Case 2 is applicable, (3) in the amount of US$438,819,099 in the event that the Tribunal finds that Brattle Scenario Case 3 is applicable, or (4) in the amount of US$386,381,204 in the event that the Tribunal finds that Brattle Scenario Case 4 is applicable;


178 HT 2016 Day 1, pages 142 et seq. ↩
179 HT 2016 Day 1, page 145. ↩
180 B-PHB 2, paragraph 146. ↩

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e. Order Claimant to pay additional damages to BAPEX for the Government in the amount of US$12,458,984, representing all other environmental losses;

f. Order pre-award and post-award interest on all sums awarded;

g. Award all costs and fees incurred by BAPEX in this proceeding, including attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees and expenses, ICSID and the members of the Tribunal fees and costs, and the charges for the use of hearing facilities;

h. Grant BAPEX any other remedy that the Tribunal considers appropriate.

6.2.2 Earlier versions

798 In response to the Requests for Arbitration and during the initial phase of the Arbitrations, the Respondents denied the Tribunal's jurisdiction with respect to all claims and requested their dismissal.

799 Following the Tribunal's Decision on Jurisdiction, BAPEX requested in its Counter-Memorial concerning the Compensation Declaration of 30 January 2014, at paragraph 89 that the Tribunal:

a. Declare that there is no legal dispute between BAPEX and Niko under the JVA;

b. In the alternative, declare that BAPEX is not obligated to indemnify Niko for any damage resulting from the pursuit of the Money Suit by the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla in the Bangladesh courts;

c. Dismiss all of Niko's claims against BAPEX;

d. Award all costs, including legal representation, incurred by BAPEX in this proceeding.

800 In its Rejoinder concerning the Compensation Declaration of 25 September 2014, BAPEX continued to argue that Niko's real claim was against acts of third parties and that there was no claim for BAPEX to answer. It concluded:

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... the Tribunals should dismiss the claim in its entirety and award costs in [BAPEX's] favour.181

801 In its Post-Hearing Brief of 22 January 2016, BAPEX concluded:

The evidence on the record and testimony at the hearing demonstrate that Niko has not met its burden to prove that it is entitled to the relief it seeks. This Tribunal should reject Niko's request for a declaration on non- liability and its request for a finding of breach of warranty.182

802 In its Memorial on Damages of 25 March 2016,183 the relevant parts of BAPEX's request stated the following relief:

BAPEX requests that the Tribunal: [...]

a. Declare that Niko procured the Joint Venture Agreement between BAPEX and Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd of 16 October 2003 through corruption;

b. Declare that Claimant is not entitled to use the international arbitration system to pursue claims related to the JVA;

c. Declare that the JVA is voidable, recognize BAPEX's invocation of its right to void the JVA, and treat the JVA as void;

d. Dismiss all of Claimant's claims asserted in this arbitration;

e. Declare that BAPEX is entitled to compensation for all of its losses arising from Niko's corrupt procurement of the JVA, including all losses resulting from the two blowouts that occurred at the Chattak Field;

f. In the alternative, should the Tribunal determine that the JVA is not voidable or voided, declare that Niko must compensate BAPEX for the harms arising from Niko's breaches of the JVA, including all losses resulting from the two blowouts that occurred at the Chattak Field;

g. Order Claimant to pay damages of $118 million for BAPEX's losses;

h. Should the Tribunal make a determination of the Government's losses, order Claimant to pay damages of $896 million for the Government's gas losses and between US$ 8,461,463 and $8,642,493 to cover the expenses of monitoring, surveying and abatement and to hold this


181 B-CD.2, paragraph 103. ↩
182 R-PHB, paragraph 308. ↩
183 BMD, paragraph 400. ↩

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proceeding open until such time as a complete survey and monitoring of the Tengratila area can be conducted and BAPEX can provide the fullest possible accounting of environmental and health related losses;

i. Order prejudgment and post-award interest on all sums awarded;

j. Order Claimant to pay all the expenses and costs associated with defending against these proceedings, including BAPEX's attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees and expenses, the fees and expenses of ICSID and the members of the Tribunal, and the charges for the use of hearing facilities;

k. Grant BAPEX any other remedy that the Tribunal considers appropriate.

803 By correspondence of 29 April 2016 BAPEX modified its requests, making items (c) and (f) the changes marked in red and leaving all other items unaltered:

c. Declare that the JVA is void or, in the alternative, declare that the JVA is voidable, recognise BAPEX's invocation of its right to void the JVA, and treat the JVA as void;

[...]

f. In the alternative, should the Tribunal determine that the JVA is not voidable or voided and proceed to adjudicate Niko's claims, declare that Niko must compensate BAPEX for the harms arising from amount it determines is owed by Niko for Niko's breaches of the JVA, including all losses resulting from the two blowouts that occurred at the Chattak Field.

804 In its Amendment to Memorial on Damages of 7 September 2020,184 BAPEX presented the request for relief in the following terms:

a. Declare that BAPEX is entitled to full compensation for all direct losses resulting from the Chattak 2 blowout that occurred at the Chattak Field and that all the losses claimed by BAPEX in its Memorial on Damages and this Amendment are direct losses;

b. Order Claimant to pay damages of $118 million for BAPEX's losses;

c. Order Claimant to pay damages of $857 million for the Government's loss of gas production and between US$ 8,461,463 and $8,642,493 to


184 Amendment, paragraph 99. ↩

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cover the expenses of monitoring, surveying and abatement and to hold this proceeding open until such time as a complete survey and monitoring of the Tengratila area can be conducted and BAPEX can provide the fullest possible accounting of environmental and health related losses;

d. Order prejudgment and post-award interest on all sums awarded;

e. Order Claimant to pay all the expenses and costs associated with defending against these proceedings, including BAPEX's attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees and expenses, the fees and expenses of ICSID and the members of the Tribunal, and the charges for the use of hearing facilities;

f. Grant BAPEX any other remedy that the Tribunal considers appropriate.

805 Following the November 2020 Hearing, the Respondents clarified on 5 December 2020, with respect to the Government's claim for lost gas:

In light of Respondents' more complete understanding of the Tribunals’ question, Respondents consider that the loss to the Government could be determined in relation to alternative gas supplies. The valuation of the loss on this basis would require further analysis, with input from valuation experts. Respondents respectfully inform the Tribunals that they are prepared to provide such analysis now or in the subsequent quantification phase.185


185 BAPEX's Letter on Issues Arising from November 2020 Hearing, page 2. ↩

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7 QUANTITY OF THE GAS LOST

7.1 Overview of the issues

806 In the Decision on Liability the Tribunal decided that Niko owes compensation for direct loss and damage caused by the first blowout but not for the loss caused by the second blowout.186 In the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, the Tribunal decided that BAPEX is entitled to compensation for the loss caused to itself and to the Government by the loss of the gas that escaped from Reservoir (Sands 1 and 2) during the time from the first blowout on 7 January 2005 to the second blowout on 24 June 2005; the Tribunal defined the circumstances under which Niko's liability extended to gas that escaped after the second blowout and after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation on 9 October 2005.187

807 In this Section of the Award the Tribunal determines first in Section 7.5.6 Niko's liability for the gas that escaped after the Chattak 2A blowout and in Section 7.6.6 the liability for the gas that escaped after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation. It then determines the quantity of lost gas to which this liability applies. The monetary value of these quantities is determined in Section 8.

7.2 The assessment in the Government's Gas Loss Reports and the claim in the Money Suit

808 The Government's investigations after each of the two blowouts, included setting up a committee to estimate the quantity of gas lost after the first and the second blowout, respectively. These Committees included high-ranking members of Petrobangla and, in the Second Committee, members of the Energy and Mineral Resources Division of the Government and a representative of BAPEX. Niko was represented on both Committees.

809 Each of the Committees prepared a report, assessing the losses caused by the relevant blowout. The report of the Second Committee built on the analysis and results of the First Committee and took a position on one of the assessments where the First Committee had made an alternative assessment.

810 With one exception, Niko agreed with the result of the first report; it did not object to the result of the second report. No objection by BAPEX to either report was recorded at the time.


186 Decision on Liability, paragraph 1159(vi). ↩
187 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraph 773. ↩

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7.2.1 The First Gas Loss Report

811 The "First Committee for Estimating Gas Losses caused by Blowout in Chattak-2" (First Gas Loss Committee), produced its report on 4 June 2005 (First Gas Loss Report).188 The report states that the Committee “has learned that [Energy and Mineral Resources Division] previously formed another committee on 09.01.2005 to investigate the Chattak-2 blowout” with “exactly the same" terms of reference as those for its own work.189 The Parties in the Arbitrations have not discussed the work of this other committee and no report by it has been produced; it is therefore not considered any further.

812 The First Gas Loss Committee was formed on 2 March 2005 by the Energy and Mineral Resources Division (EMRD); it was composed of:

813 The Committee visited the site on 23 March 2005 “to observe the status of blow-out effect”; in addition to its visual observations at that occasion, the Committee relied on pictures and a number of documents concerning the geology, drilling of the well, reserve estimates and other documents annexed to the Report or listed in it.

814 The First Gas Loss Report is signed by all members of the Committee, except Mr Adolph who explained in a letter of 1 June 2005191 that he found the estimates of Q1 and Q2 “reasonable and in the realm of possibility" but disagreed with the range adopted for Q3.192

815 The gas loss estimate of the Committee covered the period from the start of the Chattak 2 blowout until early June 2005. It reported that the Chattak 2A relief well had been spud-in on 1 June and that capping of the blowout well had been targeted for 15 July 2005, counting for the loss estimate flow from the Reservoir during 187 days from the blow-out of Chattak 2 until its capping.


188 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2. ↩
189 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, paragraph 1.4. ↩
190 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 and Annexes 1 and 2. ↩
191 Attached to the Report as Annex 20. ↩
192 For the definition and use of the categories Q1, Q2 and Q3, see below. ↩

[Page 246]

816 For estimating the gas loss during this period, the First Gas Loss Report distinguishes three components as follows:

Q1 Loss during to the main flare due to blow-out;

Q2 Subsequent surface losses until the Relief Well contains them;

Q3 Subsurface losses due to charging of sands above the Upper Marine Shale until the Relief Well successfully plugs the blow-out zone.193

7.2.1.1 Q1: The first Component: the “main flare”

817 The First Gas Loss Committee defined this component as “the initial blow-out period of about 40hrs”. It represented the flow during this initial period in the following drawing:194


193 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 4. ↩
194 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, Annex 16. ↩

[Page 247]

Well:Chattak-2

[Transcription of diagram content]

Schematic of Blow-out effect during the massive flaring of gas (Jan 7-9,2005)
Ref: Niko, Wellbore Diagram, Chattak-2 Relief Well for Lithology & Depths

818 The Committee started its explanations by determining the reservoir pressure by reference to the “mud condition” recorded in the Chattak 2 drilling report. It stated:

... at mid-point of reservoir Sands 1 & 2 @ 1879 ft (573m) assuming a balanced mud condition with 9.1 ppg mud just prior to the blowout as per Drilling Report, 903.62 psia.195

819 Considering a number of other factors, including in particular the diameter of the wellbore below the casing shoe, which represents also the diameter of the hole in the Regional Seal through which the gas escaped from the Reservoir, the Committee estimated a “maximum flow rate of 271.7 MMcfd” per day. As the main flare lasted for 40 hours, the First Gas Loss Committee estimated the loss attributed to this component at 453 MMcf or 0.453 Bcf.


195 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 5. ↩

[Page 248]

820 For this calculation, the Committee considered several formulae. It dismissed the first of these formulae since it was “significantly dependant on the unknown quantity k”, representing the “formation permeability". It then considered a formula that relied inter alia on the wellbore diameter:

Gas had to flow out of the 8 ½” x 13 3/8” wellbore to atmosphere, the capacity of the minimum wellbore section of 8 ½” dia. from reservoir Sands 1&2 to 13 3/8” casing shoe was expected to have controlled the outflow potential of the well. To determine the flow potential on a conservative basis the following equation of turbulent flow of gas through vertical pipes was employed (Ref. Katz et al, 1959, p 306) assuming 8 ½” all the way to the surface.196

821 The First Gas Loss Report indicated the values assumed for each of the nine factors in the formula, including the reservoir pressure of 903.62 psia, taken from the drilling report. The result is verified against data from a recent geological report.197 The Committee also considered a Rate Sensitivity Analysis, presented by Niko and using “Fekete's software FAST VirtuWell”. The analysis showed “very high” gas release rates; the Committee concluded from this analysis that the estimated flow rate of 271.70 MMcfd “may be considered at best conservative".198

822 The First Gas Loss Committee nevertheless confirmed its estimate based on this rate and the estimate of 0.453 Bcf for the first Component, i.e. Q1, loss due to the main flare of the blow-out.

7.2.1.2 Q2: Second Component: the “gas losses to the surface after extinction of main flare”

823 The First Gas Loss Committee noted that on 9 January 2005 at 4 am, “there was a big jerk like an earthquake in and around several kilometres of the blow-out well, following which the main flare size got reduced. After the sinking of the rig and nearby equipment the size of the flare reduced to some 3-10m, for several days”.199 After the end of the initial 40 hours of the main flare, the Committee described the situation from 10 January 2005 to the time of its report as follows:

Big bubbles can be seen in the main crater (similar to will Haripur-1 which blew-out in 1955), gas escaping along a 1 km surface fault line as


196 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 5. ↩
197 The Surma Basin Generalised Stratigraphic Column, from the Jalalabad Field Reserves Report, of 1 January 2000, Occidental of Bangladesh, UNOCAL (First Gas Loss Report, page 8 and Annex 18). ↩
198 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 6 and Annex 19. ↩
199 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 3. ↩

[Page 249]

well as to all adjacent area,200 a small fire continues to burn in a fracture near pit (Ref. Picture at Annex 14).

824 The First Gas Loss Committee also noted that

... there has been gas escapes in progressively smaller flames and gas still continues to bubble out from around crater created by the blow-out. This will continue until the gas passage from the reservoir Sands 1&2 is totally blocked by drilling successful Relief Well.

It is impossible to accurately calculate the amount of gas loss daily in these processes, but going by the surface indications the average escaping rate is estimated at about 2.0 mmcfd.

825 As it had assumed that the relief well 2A, spud on 1 June 2005, would succeed in capping the well on 1 July 2005,201 the Committee calculated that gas would flow to the surface at this rate for 187 days and concluded that the Q2 loss was 374MMcf or 0.374Bcf.202

826 The report of the Second Gas Loss Committee also commented on that flow after the first blowout:

Since [9 January 2005] the high-pressure gas had been leaking through the ground via different fissures, fractures and holes in and around the blowout crater. The extent of this seepage has been observed at hundreds of meters away from the blowout crater.203

7.2.1.3 Q3. the sub-surface losses

827 The First Gas Loss Committee made the following assumption, using a wellbore model shown in a drawing produced as annex to its report and reproduced below. It explained:

... the main surface escaping of gas due to blow-out most probably stopped with the collapsing of overburden earth into the case that was created around the 13 3/8” casing shoe [the bridging of the well]. The bulk of the gas then started flowing into the alternate routes available, into the massive Tipam, Dupitila and other sands.204


200 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 3. ↩
201 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 3, Section 3.3. ↩
202 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 3, Section 5.2. ↩
203 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, paragraph 4.2. ↩
204 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 7. ↩

[Page 250]

828 For its analysis the First Gas Loss Committee created two scenarios, differing with respect to a number of assumptions, including the location of the bridging of the well, the “pressure in Tipam” and the permeability of the Tipam sand.

829 The First Scenario assumed bridging at the casing shoe at 303m, which it considered as the weakest area in a well. It represented this scenario in the following drawing:205


205 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, Annex 17. ↩

[Page 251]

Well: Chattak-2

[Transcription of diagram content]

Schematic of Blow-out Effect: Surface & Subsurface loss of gas (since Jan 10,2005 to date)
Ref: Niko, Wellbore Diagram, Chattak-2 Relief Well for Lithology & Depths

830 The Committee explained the reasons for situating the bridging at the casing shoe at 303m as follows:

It is known that the weakest area in a well is around the casing shoe, since the formation above the shoe is comparatively strong being cased and cemented and the strength of the formation below it also increases with depth. In well Chattak-2, during the blowout, huge volume of sand, debris, clays, chips were blown out. These sands and debris most probably came out from the weak areas of the well, around the 13 3/8” shoe, thereby creating a cave. After the uncontrolled flow for about 40 hrs a sudden jerk was observed in the nearby area of well Chattak-2, following which the main flow of gas was stopped. This could have happened due to collapsing of surrounding earth into the cave below the

[Page 252]

shoe at 303 m. Simultaneously, with the sinking of rig, rig materials, etc. and collapsing of upper parts of the drillhole & casing helped to create further restriction for gas to escape to the surface in bulk volumes. Gas then found the next courses of least restriction to flow out from the 8 ½” drillhole was the adjacent massive sand layers of Tipam, Dupitila, etc.206

831 The First Gas Loss Committee considered it “quite possible” that the drill bit had remained at the location it had reached during the wiper trip at 466m and continued:

As the drill string and drill bit got stuck onto one side of the wellbore gas flowing at the initial high rates (and velocity) must have cut the wall opposite the drill bit enough to maintain the flowrate at around AOF of the well. Thus it is quite possible that following stoppage of gas exit to the surface by restrictions created around the 13 3/8” shoe and above the 8 ½” drillhole gas can now flow past the drill bit unabated to other sands at rates similar to the initial conditions of minimal restrictions in the wellbore (i.e. @ AOF).207

832 Among other assumptions made by the Committee in this scenario was a formation pressure of 903.62psia and a pressure at wellbore of 862.68psia. Concerning the “adjacent porous and permeable sandstone layers" and specifically the Tipam layer, the Committee assumed a gross thickness of 115m (the height of the open Tipam layer), a depth to mid-point of 417m, a “pressure in Tipam (assuming hydrostatic) [at] 607psia”, and permeability “assumed similar to the gas sand” of 313mD.208

833 With these and other assumptions, the Committee considered it “most likely” that the gas from the Reservoir was “charging into the adjacent porous and permeable sandstone layers” at very high volumes in view of “their vast lateral extent in the Suma basin until equilibrium is reached with the gas reservoir”. Using “parameters for Tipam in Chattak-2” and “the reservoir flow equation (2)", the Committee concluded that “the maximum possible charging rate into the Tipam Sand alone is estimated at around 558mmcfd. The gas injection would be even higher if the other sandstones layer as Dupitila, etc. are taken into account".

834 The flow rate of 558MMcfd produced by this calculation was substantially above the rate of 271.7MMcfd of the unobstructed outflow of the main flare in Q1. The First Gas Loss Committee considered this result as inacceptable since


206 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 7. ↩
207 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 8. ↩
208 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 8. ↩

[Page 253]

the "total gas charging rate into the upper formations however cannot be greater than the AOF of the gas reservoir Sands 1&2”. Despite having noted this impossibility of the result reached by the formula adopted, the Second Gas Loss Committee did not modify the formula or the assumptions; instead, it replaced the calculated value of 558MMscfd by the rate it had adopted for the Q1 flow, i.e. 271.7MMcfd.209

835 Assuming a flow at this rate of 271.7MMcfd for 187 days until successful capping of the well, the Committee reached for the first scenario a total quantity of lost gas of 50.808Bcf.210

836 In the Second Scenario, the First Gas Loss Committee assumed that the bridging of the well occurred at a lower level, at 466m, i.e. 19m above the top of the Upper Marine Shale. In this scenario, the Report assumed:

... sealing in and around the 8 ½” drill bit after it got stuck in its original location at 466m. The annulus between drill string and 8 ½” drill hole above the bit is assumed to have been filled up with rocks, debris, thus gradually stopping the bulk flow of gas up the hole. Gas would then flow only into the lower part of Tipam sands from the gas sands through the 8½” hole created in the Upper Marine Shale [...]. Gas entering the Tipam sands through the 19m window, however, can flow both laterally and vertically in unlimited quantity until equilibrium is reached with the gas reservoirs.

837 The Report specifies among the assumptions: “pressure in the Tipam sand @ 495m = 717.72psia”, pressure of gas above the Regional Seal at an estimated 883.15psia, the thickness of the “window across Tipam sands” at 19m and the permeability of the Tipam sands estimated at 152mD; other gas related properties are assumed unchanged compared to the First Scenario.

838 On this basis, the First Gas Loss Committee reached a flow rate of 31.47MMscfd, leading for the 187 days to a total loss in the second scenario of 5885 MMcf or 5.885 Bcf.211

839 The First Gas Loss Committee concluded its Report by summarising that the loss of recoverable gas was estimated as between 51.63 Bcf and 6.71 Bcf, of which 0.453 Bcf were loss during the main flare, 0.374 loss to the surface


209 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 8. ↩
210 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 9. ↩
211 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 9. ↩

[Page 254]

after the extinction of the main flare and “a range of 50.81Bcf to 5.88 Bcf" subsurface loss.212

7.2.2 Comments about the Q3 estimate by Niko's Representative on the Committee and the Second Committee

840 Mr Adolf, Niko's representative on the First Gas Loss Committee, did not sign the First Gas Loss Report. In a letter of 4 June 2005, attached the Committee's Report, Niko accepted that the “values for Q1 and Q2 and that have been estimated by the Committee are reasonable and within the realm of possibility". With respect to the value for Q3, Niko expressed the view that it was “not reasonable and more data and observations are required to be able to determine a reasonable value (if any) on the gas that may have been lost in this manner”. The letter added:

... if the theory is correct that the upper sands have been charged with significant quantities of gas, then when these upper sands are being drilled as part of the relief well activities, we should see indications of significant gas ‘pockets’ present as drilling proceeds through these sands.213

841 In his first Witness Statement Mr Adolf stated that he “did not regard the discussion and conclusions around Q1 and Q2 losses as unreasonable”. He continued by stating:

However, the third category of subsurface loss, the Q3 losses, was introduced by the chair (or “Convener”) of the Committee, Mr Shahidur Rahman, at the very last meeting of the First Lost Gas Committee. The notion of Q3 losses had not been part of the deliberations of the Committee to that point and Niko had been given no prior opportunity to provide input.

842 The Second Gas Loss Committee, while being set up to estimate the gas loss due to the blowout of the Chattak 2A relief well,214 also considered the work of the First Gas Loss Committee and made some observations in this respect. With one exception, the Second Gas Loss Committee confirmed the quantification of the First Committee, concluding that the losses of its own


212 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 10. ↩
213 Produced as Annex 2 to First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 32 of the Report, Section 9; also Exhibit C-37. ↩
214 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, paragraph 1.1. ↩

[Page 255]

quantification of the second blowout “are in addition to the losses calculated in the 1st blowout gas loss estimation report for similar components”.215

843 The exception concerned the Q3 component estimates of the First Gas Loss Committee. In this respect, the Second Gas Loss Committee relied on the drilling records of the Chattak 2A relief well and made the following comments:

The First report assumed two scenarios for the calculation of the third component of the gas loss. Scenario-1 assumed the bridging of the well beneath the casing shoe (303m) and Scenario-2 assumed the bridging at the drill bit position (466m). From the log data of Chattak 2A well, it can be observed that no gas accumulation was encountered in the upper Tipam/Dupitila sand layers. As a result, the possibility of Scenario-1 for the higher estimate of the third loss component (Q3) as described in the first reports seems unlikely.216

844 In its conclusions, the Second Gas Loss Committee confirmed that it considered the quantification in the first scenario as “unlikely”, limiting the Q3 quantity to the that of the second scenario:

The gas loss process due to charging, which was the third component in the previous blowout report, has not changed except for the duration involved due to the relief well blowout although the higher loss estimate figure mentioned in the Chattak 2 report seems unlikely. The Government may decide in the light of the 1st blowout (Chattak 2) gas loss estimate report.217

7.2.3 The Second Gas Loss Report

845 The “Committee for Estimating Gas Losses Caused by Chattak 2A Relief Well Blowout" produced its report on 27 August 2005 (Second Gas Loss Report).218

846 This Second Gas Loss Committee was formed by an order of 29 June 2005 also of the EMRD. Apart from the representative of Petrobangla, its members differed from those of the first Committee:


215 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, paragraph 6a. ↩
216 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, paragraph 4.3, item 4. ↩
217 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 9, Section 6b. ↩
218 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4. ↩

[Page 256]

847 All of the members, including Mr Stocker for Niko, signed the Report.

848 The Committee members, except for Dr Stocker who had not been advised of the visit,220 visited the site between 30 June and 2 July 2005 “to have a clear understanding of the nature of the blowout”. The documentary and other information on which the Committee relied is identified in the report and in annexes to it.

849 The Second Gas Loss Report provides some background information, including the Committee's position concerning the GIIP or OGIP: the Report referred to the Marginal Field Evaluation, attached to the JVA,221 which had mentioned the “proved and probable (2P) reserve” of Sands 1 & 2 as 115Bcf as “risked mean” and 191Bcf as “unrisked mean”. It explained:

After the drilling of Chattak 2, it can be safely upgraded to its unrisked mean reserve of 191 Bcf. This report will consider the GIIP in Chattak Sands 1 & 2 as 191 Bcf, as was done in the similar report on the blowout of Chattak 2 Well.222

850 The Report also summarises the events around the first and the second blowout, including the assessment of the First Gas Loss Committee and discusses in particular the loss due to “charging into the upper sands over the cap-rock from the blowout well”. It concludes

As no new hole has been drilled into the cap rock, gas loss estimation due to charging will remain unchanged. However, any such loss will continue until a successful kill of the 1st blowout well.223


219 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, paragraphs 1.1 – 1.3. ↩
220 WS Adolph, paragraph 140: "Dr Stocker was not advised of the visit and so was not present”. ↩
221 Exhibit C-1. ↩
222 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 2. ↩
223 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 3. ↩

[Page 257]

851 When estimating the gas loss due to the Chattak 2A blowout, the Second Gas Loss Committee adopted the same division as the First Committee had done.

7.2.3.1 Q1: First Component: the main flare

852 With respect to the “Gas loss (flared) through the blowout relief well until well bridging”, identified as Q2A1, corresponding to the Q1 component in the First Gas Loss Report, the Committee first considered the cause of the blowout, discussing two alternative models:

The first [model] assumes that the Relief well hit an accumulated gas close to the 1st blowout well and only accumulated gas has been burning without communication with the main reservoir. The second assumes that after initial burning of some accumulated gas the Relief well had direct communication with the first blowout well and since the gas had been flowing from the main reservoir (Sands 1 & 2 of Chattak West). From the intensity of the flame, water and sand that came out of the well it was concluded that the second scenario is the most likely model.224

853 Adopting the second scenario, assuming that the second blowout established a connection with the Chattak 2 well and the Reservoir, the Committee considered that, during this phase of the blowout, the flow of gas was subject to atmospheric pressure and escaped at Absolute Open Flow (AOF). The Committee calculated this flow by the following formula:225


224 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 4, paragraph 4.1. ↩
225 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 4, paragraph 4.1. ↩

[Page 258]

qAOF = kg h p / (141.2μg Bg [ln(re/rw) - 3/4 + S'])

where,

p = Average reservoir pressure at datum ≈ 875 psia

(Due to the blowout, initial reservoir pressure of Sands 1&2 could not be determined. So the pressure was determined at mid point of reservoir Sands 1& 2 @ 1990 ft (606.75m). The normal pressures for sand 1 and 2 are 835 psia and 915 psia respectively. An average of these two pressures was used for the calculation)

μg = Average gas viscosity, 0.015 cp.

Bg= Gas formation volume factor, 0.8693 vol/vol

k = permeability, 313 md (as estimated in the first blowout gas loss report).

h = pay thickness, 34 m (mean value as reported in Niko-Bapex joint study).

Drainage area = Infinite acting (750 hector ≈ 1850 acres)

rw = Wellbore radius

re = Drainage radius

854 The Committee found that the AOF was in the range of 500MMscfd. It “reduces with time and stabilizes after a certain period”. Considering the information about the drilling, it modelled the flow path through an 8 ½” casing. It added a list of additional data, including those of porosity of 35% “(highly unconsolidated sand stone)” and initial water saturation of 30%.226

855 On the basis of these and other identified data, the Committee calculated the flow rate from the time of the Chattak 2A blowout “until the main flame in the Relief well choked off on July 7, 2005”. The table representing this flow showed over this period a decreasing AOF from 505psia to 349psia and a wellhead flow rate decreasing form 159 MMscfd to 146 MMscfd and an average rate of 148.2 MMscfd.227


226 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 5, Section 4.1. ↩
227 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, pages 5 – 6. ↩

[Page 259]

856 On this basis, the Committee estimated the cumulative gas loss from 24 June to 7 July 2005 through the burning of the main flame (Q2A1) at 1.8 Bcf.

7.2.3.2 Q2: Second Component – gas loss to the surface

857 With respect to component Q2, described as “Gas losses (Q2A2) to the surface through observed and undetected seepages in the ground after the extinction of main flare in the Relief well (Chattak 2A)”, the Second Gas Loss Committee considered first the seepages after the first blowout. The data it recorded for its analysis included porosity of 35% “(highly unconsolidated sand stone)” and initial water saturation of 30%.228

858 Relying on information from Niko about the flame height, as it had been collected by the monitoring team,229 the Committee concluded:

It can be reasonably assumed that 2 MMscfd gas is still leaking through these old locations due to the 1st blowout.230

859 Considering the effect of the second blowout, the Report states:

Before and after the extinction of the main flame in Relief well (2A) on July 7, 2005 gas started leaking through the ground on several new locations. Assuming pressure release due to the burning of the main flame, ground leakage due to the 2nd blowout is ignored prior to July 2005. According to the documents supplied by Niko, it is seen that no new location was added for monitoring gas emission after the 2nd blowout. It measured gas emission near crater of Chattak-2 blowout site in terms of percentage of lower explosive limit (%LEL). A number of locations around the old blowout were added progressively showing increasing gas emission. After the 2nd blowout on June 24, 2005 all those old locations around the first blowout site shows further increase in gas emission. Out of 55 measuring points, 21 of the show 100% LEL on June 23, 2005 and 36 locations show 100% LEL on July 14, 2005.231

860 The Report continued by stating:

The second blowout created numerous new locations of gas leakage. Members of this committee observed gas coming out at different locations 4/5 hundred meters away from the blowout site in the water-submerged


228 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 5, Section 4.1. ↩
229 See below Section 7.6.2. ↩
230 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 7, Section 4.2. ↩
231 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, p. 7. ↩

[Page 260]

low land as well. This was observed while the main flame was still burning. Ground cracking, gas leakage, and water coming out of tubewells have been reported from locations as far as a kilometre from the blowout site. Apart from the observable places, it can be concluded that gas is leaking from a number of undetected places.232

861 On the basis of these considerations, the Second Gas Loss Committee observed, as the First Committee had done, that it is “impossible to accurately quantify the leakage gas”; it concluded nevertheless that the additional leakage, after 7 July 2007, “can be securely estimated at 2 MMscfd”. In other words, the Committee concluded that the Chattak 2A blowout doubled the leakage to the surface.

862 Relying on a letter by Niko attached to the Report, the Committee assumed that the original blowout well would most likely be killed by 15 October 2005 and counted 99 days for the gas escaping through the ground from 7 July 2005.

863 The additional gas lost to the surface thus was 198 MMcf. Consequently, the Committee quantified the “total surface loss”, composed of the gas losses for Q1 and Q2, at 1803 + 198 = 2001MMcf, corresponding to 2 Bcf.233

7.2.3.3 Q3: Third Component – Subsurface losses by charging into the Overburden

864 With respect to the third category, the “Sub-Surface gas loss”, the Second Committee explained:

When a blowout well gets bridged, pressure starts building up under the bridging point. The pressured gas that is connected to the reservoir can migrate to structurally damaged fractured zone or it can also charge the sands it is exposed to.

865 The Report continued by observing that “the Relief well did not create a new hole in the cap rock for further gas loss through charging” which led to the conclusion that “the 2nd blowout of the Relief well (Chattak 2A) did not change the process suggested in the first blowout gas loss report”.

866 The Report also considered the causes for the Chattak 2A blowout, noting two scenarios, similar to those which were discussed during the course of the Arbitration:


232 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 7, Section 4.2. ↩
233 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 7, Section 4.2. ↩

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(i) “the relief well first penetrated into an area of accumulated gas around the 1st blowout well”, or

(ii) “a direct interception of the 1st blowout well occurred”.

867 As to the quantification of the subsurface gas, the Second Committee examined the two scenarios which the First Gas Loss Committee had described and concluded that the first of these scenarios “seems unlikely”. It compared the drilling records of Chattak 2 and Chattak 2A and observed that the Chattak 2A relief well had not shown any gas return up to a depth of 380m, while the Chattak 2A relief well showed gas returns of 1% to 3% gas despite the heavier mud used in the drilling (10ppg compared to 8.6ppg); in other words, the Chattak 2A drilling records showed only insignificant gas accumulations in the Overburden after the blowouts. The Second Gas Loss Committee explained its position on the two scenarios of the First Committee:

The first report assumed two scenarios for the calculation of the third component of the gas loss. Scenario-1 assumed the bridging of the well beneath the casing shoe (303m) and Scenario-2 assumed the bridging at the drill bit position (466m). From the log data of Chattak 2A well, it can be observed that no gas accumulation was encountered in the upper Tipam/Dupitila sand layers. As a result, the possibility of Scenario-1 for the higher estimate of the third loss component (Q3) as described in the first report seems unlikely.234

868 With respect to the methodology for assessing the quantum of the gas lost to the sub-surface, the Committee pointed to the usefulness of the material balance method but noted the difficulty resulting from the absence of data for the original reservoir pressure:

The gas loss amount due to charging can be validated by properly determining the initial reservoir pressure and maintaining appropriate pressure production data history in future. This will enable to perform an accurate material balance calculation and may allow estimating the loss. Unfortunately, no initial pressure measurement of Sand 1&2 of Chattak West was possible due to the 1st blowout that may make the estimation difficult.235


234 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 8. ↩
235 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 8. ↩

[Page 262]

7.2.4 The position of Niko's Representative on the Second Gas Loss Committee

869 Dr Stocker, Niko's representative on the Second Gas Loss Committee, received a draft of the Second Gas Loss Report and commented on it in a note, dated 14 August 2005, which was sent to the Convener of the Committee under cover of Niko's letter of the same date.236 In that report, Dr Stocker commented on the draft and objected to a number of observations in the draft report.

870 The note commenced by comments on the reservoir pressure which shall be discussed in further detail below in Section 7.5.2.

871 Other comments concerned the “reserve risk” in the prior appraisal of the Reservoir, the loss “through crossflow to and charging up of shallower formations", the distance from the blowout wells at which significant seepages have been observed and some of the conclusions reached. He commented on possible effects of the kill operation and emphasised the desirability of further production and the usefulness of a material balance study once the Reservoir “has been placed on production”. He stated that some of the findings in the Report went beyond the mandate of the Committee and complained that some points of agreement at the deliberations on 12 July 2005 had not been included, in particular the recommendations concerning a material balance study and the strategy of planning for “production at the highest possible rate".

872 Dr Stocker also disagreed with the assessment of the flow of gas, as presented in the draft and stated that some of the conclusions in the draft, did not correspond to the conclusions reached in the debates of the Committee.

873 With respect to the assessment of the flare during the initial phase of the blowout (component Q2A1), Dr Stocker had concluded in his explanations on the reservoir pressure that the average pressure was most likely in the order of 820psia, and not 875psia as assumed in the draft report. On this basis, Dr Stocker reached a lower value for the quantity of this loss and quantified at a total of 1156.1 MMscf and an average of 87.8 MMscfd. He presented his calculation in the following table, which adopted the same format as that in the daft and in the final version, shown above:237


236 Exhibit C-49. ↩
237 Exhibit C-49, pages 1 – 3. ↩

[Page 263]

Time
(h)
(d) WH AOF
(MMscfd)
Gp
(MMscf)
1 0.04 101.9 [illegible]
2 0.08 99.6 [illegible]
4 0.17 97.4 [illegible]
8 0.33 95.3 16.1
16 0.67 93.2 31.4
32 1.33 91.2 60.5
64 2.67 89.3 120.3
128 5.33 87.4 235.6
256 10.67 85.6 461.3
316 13.17 85.0 213.3
Total 1156.1 (MMscf)
(Bcf)
Avg Rate 87.8 MMscfd.

874 Concerning the second component of the loss during this period (component Q2A2), described in the Report as losses “to the surface observed and undetected seepages in the ground after the extinction of the main flare in the Relief well (Chattak 2A)”, Dr Stocker agreed with the statement: “It is impossible to accurately quantify the leakage of gas”, but pointed out that the following assertion in the draft was in contradiction with this statement. It appears that in the draft available to Dr Stocker it was asserted that the rate in this phase “can be securely estimated at 5 MMscfd”. Dr Stocker objected:

... this conclusion is at variance with my own notes from and recollections of our deliberations on July 12, 2005, during which it was generally agreed among the members of the committee that the seepage rate from the Chattak 2A well was certainly less than that from the original Chattak 2 accident. As the Gas Losses Assessment Committee for Chattak 2 fixed the seepage rate from that well at 2 MMscfd, the seepage losses from the Chattak 2A well ought accordingly be something less than this amount

Given the foregoing discussion, the total amount of gas lost due to the seepage from around the Chattak 2A site – and assuming that kill

[Page 264]

operations will be concluded by September 30, 2005 at the latest – should be a maximum of 168MMscf.238

875 Dr Stocker's observation concerning what was “generally agreed among the members" of the Committee seems to have been correct, as can be seen from the final version of the Second Gas Loss Report. In the final Report, the additional loss for Q2A2 for the period until 15 October 2005 is assessed at 198MMscf, which is exactly the amount stated by Dr Stocker, extended for the additional 15 days assumed by the Committee.

876 The adjustment following Dr Stocker's note appear to be even more important with respect to the third component of gas lost during this period (component Q2A3), described in the Report as “Sub-surface loss”. Concluding from the reference to the text in the note, the draft seems to have included an estimate of this component based on the mud log. Dr Stocker objected:

I reiterate that there is no substantive evidence to date for any subsurface “charging”, mud log record notwithstanding. In particular, the statement which begins “2, Using 10 ppg mud ...” concludes that charging must be occurring due to gas returns which were logged to a maximum of 9.6% at a depth of 300 - 340 m TVD. To me, this indicates exactly the opposite. Gas originating in the reservoir sands below and in pressure communication with those sands, assuming a reservoir pressure of 820 psia, would be at a pressure of 805 psia. The pressure exerted by a column of 10 ppg mud of 340 m vertical height is only 575 psia. Gas returns from a porous sand with an underbalance of 230 psi are likely to be substantially higher than 9.6%. There are alternate explanations which fit the known facts equally well.

Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd restates its disagreement with any suggestion that such subsurface losses have taken place or are taking place. In the absence of any substantive evidence to the contrary, such a suggestion can only be speculative.239

877 The Claimant asserted that very few of Dr Stocker's comments had been addressed in the final report”.240 As the Claimant did not introduce into the record the draft on which Dr Stocker commented, this assertion cannot be verified. A comparison of Dr Stocker's comments with the final version of the Report seems to indicate, however, that the Committee took account of Dr Stocker's observations on some important points. In any event, contrary to


238 Exhibit C-49. ↩
239 Exhibit C-49, pages 4 and 5, Section 4.3(i) and (ii). ↩
240 C-CD.2, paragraph 174. ↩

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the First Gas Loss Report, the Second Gas Loss Report was signed by Dr Stocker, the representative of Niko, without any reservations.

878 Mr Adolf, then Niko's Country Manager Bangladesh, recalled “that Dr Stocker advised that he was reasonably satisfied with how deliberations of the Second Gas Loss Committee were proceeding”. Considering the Report that was issued by the Committee, Mr Adolf observed:

The Conclusions of the Second Lost Gas Committee regarding the volume of gas lost during and after the blowout were higher than Dr Stocker believed appropriate. However, the difference was not large and could be accounted for by a divergence of opinion regarding particular factual assumptions which underpinned the conclusions.241

879 The Claimant does not allege that, upon receipt of the Second Gas Loss Report, Niko objected and wrote in protest as it had done when it received the First Report.

7.2.5 The Claim in the Money Suit

880 In the Money Suit, the Government and Petrobangla based their claim for lost gas

(i) with respect to the “Gas burnt at Chattak field” on 3 Bcf;

(ii) with respect to “Sub-surface loss at Chattak field on the second scenario (5.89Bcf) of the First Gas Loss Report; they added, however,

(iii) 45 Bcf, as "additional sub-surface loss at Chattak field”.

881 This brought the total “sub-surface loss” to 50.89 Bcf, practically identical with the value which the First Gas Loss Committee had estimated under the first scenario.

882 No allowance was made in the Money Suit for the gas losses to the surface.242

7.3 Methodologies

883 The Parties and their experts rely on two different methods for the assessment of the loss of gas and disagree on the preference that should be given to one or the other.


241 WS Adoloph, paragraphs 141 and 142. ↩
242 Money Suit Complaint, Exhibit C-6, page 76, Schedules A, B and C. ↩

[Page 266]

(i) The Flow Rate Methodology seeks to determine the gas that escaped from the Reservoir as a result of each of the two blowouts. As the flow of the gas was not measured when it escaped the Reservoir, the quantity of gas that escaped must be estimated. In the present case this was done by determining a flow rate, the quantity of gas that escaped the Reservoir during a given time period (primarily hour or day). The rate was established by various methods, including visual observations and observation on the surface, considerations related to the geological formations through which the gas moved to the surface or was retained in the Overburden, the size of the wellbore and available data about the Reservoir. The Claimant assumes that "all of the gas that escaped as a result of the blowouts would otherwise have been recoverable"243 and thus must be considered as “lost” for the purpose of the loss assessment in the present case, it being understood that Niko is not liable for gas “lost” due to the Chattak 2A blowout. This seems uncontroversial and is not contested by BAPEX.

(ii) The Material Balance Analysis compares the volume of gas in the Reservoir before a specific date with that thereafter. In the present case, the comparison is between the volume before the volume and that at the later date when information about the depleted Reservoir became available on 4 September 2005 through the Chattak 2C well. For the assessment of lost gas, the Original Gas in Place (OGIP) or Gas Initially In Place (GIIP) and the Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR) must be determined. If no precise information is available for OGIP and EUR, their values must be established by various methods, depending on the information available. Only the recoverable gas has a value that must be considered in the present damage calculation.244 The Parties agree in their replies to the Tribunal's Question No 22245 that the determination of the EUR is an issue that arises only in case of a valuation on the basis of the Material Balance Method.

884 In the present case, the two Gas Loss Committees applied the Flow Rate method. They presented findings about the “Initial Recoverable Gas


243 C-PHB1, paragraph 100. ↩
244 The Claimant points out at C-PHB1, paragraph 5 that "the methodology is agnostic as to what caused the estimated reduction of pressure/gas volume and when it escaped”, an issue that is relevant for distinguishing for the loss for which Niko is liable from that attributable to the Chattak 2A blowout. ↩
245 C-PHB1, paragraph 99 and B-PHB1, paragraph 94. ↩

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Reserves"246 and the GIIP in Sands 1 and 2;247 but a Material Balance analysis was not possible, or at least not sensible, as the flow from the Reservoir continued at the time when their reports were prepared. The Second Gas Loss Committee recommended that “a meaningful material balance analysis after the commencement of production” be conducted.248 No such analysis was conducted before the Government and Petrobangla initiated court proceedings in the Money Suit in June 2008; the claims in this suit are based on the assessment of the Second Gas Loss Committee, with some variations, as noted above in Section 7.2.5.249

885 In the Arbitration, a material balance analysis was first discussed in the first GCA Report of 21 May 2014, presented with the Claimant's Reply.250 Thereafter the experts of both sides presented and refined their respective Material Balance analyses; their approach to the Flow Rate method differed, as shall be described.

886 The Claimant takes the assessment in the Committee's Gas Loss Reports as starting point and accepts them in part. It develops and modifies this assessment by further analysis, in particular in the Gaffney Cline reports.

887 The Claimant does not contest that the Material Balance Method is well established in the industry. It presented a First Report of Gaffney Cline which applied both the Flow Rate and the Material Balance Method. The Claimant and Gaffney Cline discuss the latter method and its application to the present case;251 but the Claimant insists that “the material balance methodology alone cannot provide an estimate of the gas lost due to the Chattak 2 blowout to the date of the Chattak 2B sealing operation (or thereafter)”, adding that, in the present case, “a material balance analysis cannot provide an estimate of the volume” of the gas lost during and following the Chattak 2A blowout for which the Claimant is not responsible. The Claimant also points out that the Material Balance Method “involves the estimation of OGIP, EUR and the gas remaining in place” after the pressure measurement taken in the Chattak 2C well on 4 September 2005. Therefore it “does not provide an indication of what volume of gas was lost due to the Chattak blowout, or “after 4 September (if any), or at what rate(s)”.252


246 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, Section 4. ↩
247 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, paragraph 2.4. ↩
248 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, paragraph 6(c). ↩
249 Complaint in the Money Suit, Exhibit C-6. ↩
250 C-CD.2. ↩
251 BAPEX lists reference to this discussion in B-PHB 1, FN 12. ↩
252 C-PHB 1, paragraphs 4 and 5. ↩

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888 While accepting that, as pointed out by the Tribunal in Question 8, volume estimates in the estimated flow of escaping gas “cannot be determined with precision", the Claimant “submits that the totality of the analyses and opinions of [Gaffney Cline] are the best supported and most reasonable estimates available upon which the Tribunal can make its determination of damages".253

889 The Claimant also points out that Gaffney Cline employed additional analyses “to model and estimate flow rate, the volume of gas that could be trapped in the pore spaces in the sands above the Marine Shale, or trapped below a shale stringer"; these are “additional methodologies available in the overall estimation of lost gas that supplement the flow rate and material balance analyses”.254 The Claimant concludes:

... given there can be no scientific certainty with respect to any of the estimates of the volume of gas lost due to the Chattak 2 blowout, Niko submits the Tribunal must consider all of the available methodologies, evidence, and opinions in order to reach conclusions as to the most probable scenarios and most reasonable estimates of lost gas. While each methodology has its frailties and shortcomings, GCA is the only expert that employed all of the methodologies.255

890 BAPEX also accepts that “the exact quantification of the volume of gas lost due to Chattak 2 is not possible” and that all that could be done was to “provide an estimate of the volume of gas lost”. Supported by its experts Ryder Scott, BAPEX contests the validity of the Flow Rate Method in its submissions and at the Hearing. It criticised elements of the Flow Rate calculations presented by the Claimant but, until after the November 2021 Hearing, did not produce its own calculations. At that Hearing, BAPEX asserted:

In sum, the only reliable gas loss calculation that you have are those by Ryder Scott using the material balance method.256

891 In its first Post-Hearing Brief, BAPEX confirms this position, stating:

Material balance is the only scientifically justified method to estimate gas losses when flow rates cannot be measured because it is based on


253 C-PHB 1, paragraph 7. ↩
254 C-PHB 1, paragraph 6. ↩
255 C-PHB 1, paragraph 28. ↩
256 HT 2021 Day 4, page 140. ↩

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significant known data rather than anecdotal observation and unsupported assumptions.257

892 BAPEX asserts that, despite deficiencies in the data set available to estimate the inputs to the calculation”, “key inputs, such as the reservoir pressure on 4 September 2005, are known and there is information to estimate the other material balance inputs, if the proper analysis is performed using the appropriate data, which Ryder Scott did”.258

893 Responding to the Tribunal's question about flow rates, BAPEX stated that the daily flow of gas after the blowouts is not identical each day. Quoting its experts Ryder Scott, it added that the rate of gas escaping from the Reservoir due to the first blowout “probably varied over time”; and that it “is impossible to estimate the rate gas was escaping at any point in time with any degree of accuracy”.259 For determining a daily rate it adopts the calculation of Mr Hughes, in which the total loss, calculated by the Material Balance Method, is spread over the period from 7 January to 31 December 2005, starting with 141 MMcfd on 7 January 2005 and declining at 0.10% per day to 99 MMcfd on 31 December 2005.260

894 In addition, BAPEX presents in its First Post-Hearing Brief on Quantum, in response to the Tribunal's Question No 2, an estimate of the flow rates and the resulting gas loss.261 In response to the Tribunal's Question No 6, BAPEX considers that, immediately after the bridging of the Chattak 2 well, the flow rate was 123MMcfd, declining steadily at a rate of 1.5% per month.262

895 The Tribunal has considered both methods used by the Parties, including the “additional methodologies” highlighted by the Claimant. It has carefully examined the argument and evidence presented for and against each of the methods and the resulting gas losses at which the Parties arrived on the basis of one and the other method.

896 Considering the argument of BAPEX and Ryder Scott that the Material Balance method is “the only reliable gas loss calculation” and “the only scientifically justified method” in the circumstances of the present case, the Tribunal notes that, for critically important factors in the application of that method, direct measurements are not available and the indirect


257 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 14 and 15. ↩
258 B-PHB 1, paragraph 15. ↩
259 B-PHB 1, paragraph 16. ↩
260 B-PHB 1, paragraph 16, referring to Hughes III, figures 9 – 16. ↩
261 B-PHB 1, pages 8-23; for details see below Section 7.6.1. ↩
262 B-PHB1, paragraph 33. ↩

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determinations are subject to controversies between the experts.263 It also noted that Ryder Scott's estimation of the OGIP, which is the starting point for applying the Material Balance Method, has a range from 45.811 Bcf as the low estimate to 240.112 Bcf as the high estimate,264 a range that indicates the scope of disagreement and potential error in the loss estimation.

897 The Tribunal concludes that the Material Balance method cannot be the only method applied by the Tribunal in a situation where another method has been presented and applied by the Gas Loss Committees.

898 Since the available data are incomplete for the application of both methods, and their interpretation is controversial, the reliability of the results produced by each of them is limited. The Tribunal therefore will consider both methods, their application and results.

899 The Tribunal will start with the Flow Rate Method, on the basis of which the Gas Loss Committees based their assessments and on which the Government and Petrobangla made their claim against Niko. The Tribunal attributes particular weight to this method and its result, considering:

(i) the qualification of the members forming these the Committees;

(ii) the fact that the first of these reports was accepted in part also by Niko's representative;

(iii) that the Second Gas Loss Report was signed by the representatives of Petrobangla, BAPEX and Niko;

(iv) the fact that the Government and Petrobangla based the gas loss claim in the Money Suit on the second of these reports;

(v) that, in this arbitration, the Claimant took the assessment in these reports as the basis for its claim; and

(vi) that until its Memorial on Damages, presented on 25 March 2016 BAPEX did not present an approach to the quantification of the claim for gas losses that differed from that in the Gas Loss Reports, as it was pursued by the Government and Petrobangla in the Money Suit.

900 Following the examination of the Flow Rate Method and the conclusions about the gas losses, the Tribunal will examine the results that is produced, in the


263 See below Section 7.7. ↩
264 Ryder Scott I, Table at page 6. ↩

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circumstances of the present case, by the Material Balance Method. This latter method thus will serve as a “cross check"265 of the results reached according to the former method. The Tribunal noted the recommendation expressed in the Second Gas Loss Report calling for the “conduct of a meaningful material balance analysis”. The Report recommended that such an analysis be performed “after the commencement of production” from the Chattak field.266 As will be discussed below, to the knowledge of the Tribunal such production has not commenced; the gas loss assessment is thus deprived of the information that according to the Second Gas Loss Committee had to be made available. Nevertheless, given the uncertainties resulting from the limits in the data available in the Arbitration, the Tribunal considers the Material Balance analysis as an essential complement to the Gas Flow Method.

901 Both Parties also have addressed the consequences of difficulties of proving in the present case the quantum of the lost gas, as they arise in both methods. They addressed the burden of proof and the standard of proof for quantification. BAPEX explained:

As both parties' experts have explained, the key events affecting the volume and rate of gas flow in this case occurred underground, where observation and measurement is difficult, and sometimes impossible. This is true of the most important event affecting the rate of gas loss at any given moment: the uncontrolled flow of gas from the Chattak Sand 1/2 reservoir through the Chattak 2 wellbore in the marine shale. The fact that these events took place underground hinders the marshalling of certain kinds of direct proof.267

902 Concerning the burden of proof, BAPEX referred to the standard of preponderance of the evidence and argued that the responsibility for the damage had to be considered. It identified critical issues for the Tribunal's decision, and expressed confidence that the evidence in the record supported its position. Relying on Niko's liability for the Chattak 2 blowout, BAPEX added:

However, to the extent the Tribunal finds that the available evidence does not allow for proof by preponderance of the evidence on any of these


265 See Gaffney Cline III, paragraph 30. ↩
266 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, paragraph 6(c). ↩
267 HT 2021 Day 1, page 14. ↩

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issues, Niko would fail to meet its burden and the issue should be decided in BAPEX's favour.268

903 The Claimant addressed the issue from the perspective of uncertainty and the party having caused the uncertainty. It contested the assertion that any uncertainty as to the fact of the loss and the uncertainty over quantum was attributable to Niko's breach of the JVA. It did not dispute that “the actions of a wrongdoer in contributing to uncertainty may be relevant to the question of quite how exacting the standard of proof may be”. It submitted that

... the question does not turn on who committed an act or breach that set in chain the motion of the chain of events that led to the loss. Otherwise, in any case where there's uncertainty, that burden would always be on the defendant, which is of course contrary to the normal rule that the claimant has the burden of proving loss and proving amount of loss.

The Tribunal certainly has the flexibility to assess if there is uncertainty [...] it must still have the reasonable confidence in terms of the quantum of loss. So it must be certain as to the fact of the loss and it must have reasonable confidence in the amount of loss.

In terms of any uncertainty creating difficulties for the Tribunal, the Tribunal certainly has flexibility in considering who is responsible for that loss.

904 In this context the Claimant referred to Niko's proposals after the blowouts for drilling production wells and the “considerable technical data that would have been available had drilling been allowed to proceed post-blowout”.269

905 The Parties agreed that when quantifying the quantum of loss, the standard of proof may be less stringent than that applicable for establishing liability. BAPEX stated:

... once the fact of damage has been established, a claimant should not be required to prove its exact quantification with the same degree of certainty. This is because any future damage is inherently difficult to prove.270

906 BAPEX quoted from CMD:


268 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 17 – 18. ↩
269 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 65 - 66. ↩
270 HT 2021 Day 1, page 10 and RH-1, page 10. ↩

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Niko recognises that the law does not always require absolute certainty or precision in quantification of damages, especially where the circumstances make exact quantification impossible.271

907 The Claimant confirmed:

There appears to be no dispute there is sometimes a lesser burden or standard expected with regard to proof of quantum of the loss. But the fact of the loss, the Tribunal must be certain that the loss has in fact occurred, and in turn may have some more flexibility in addressing due to uncertainties the quantum of loss claimed.272

908 The Tribunal will consider these positions where they become relevant due to uncertainties in the evidence.

7.4 The evidence

909 In support of their positions concerning the Gas Loss, the Parties produced a large number of expert report.273

910 The Claimant produced:

(i) Four expert reports by Gaffney Cline & Associates (GCA):

At the Hearing, Mr William Cline, Mr Joshua Oletu and Mr Rawdon Seager testified and were examined; they also produced PowerPoint presentations, recorded as Hearing Exhibits (CH).


271 HT 2021 Day 1, page 11, RH-1, slide 4, quoting from C-CMD, paragraph 129. ↩
272 HT 2021 Day 1, page 65. ↩
273 The Parties also produced expert reports for the Environmental Losses; for these see below Section 9.2.3. ↩

[Page 274]

(ii) Five expert reports by Mr John Wright, PE:

Mr Wright testified and was questioned at the Hearing and presented demonstrative exhibits (CH).

911 The Respondents produced:

(i) One Expert Report of Mr Neil Adams, dated 31 August 2015;

(ii) One report presenting Observations on the Expert Report of Keith Masters by Mr Parthasarathi Bandyopadhyay, dated 30 August 2015;

(iii) Four Expert Reports of Ryder Scott Company:

At the Hearing, Mr James F. Latham, PE and Mr Michael J. Nowicki testified and were examined; they also produced PowerPoint presentations, recorded as Hearing Exhibits (RH).

(iv) Two reports by GeoMechanics Technologies:

[Page 275]

At the Hearing, Dr Michael S. Bruno testified and was examined; he also produced PowerPoint presentations, recorded as Hearing Exhibits (RH).

(v) Three reports by Mr Jeffrey Hughes, PE:

At the Hearing, Mr Hughes testified and was examined; he also produced PowerPoint presentations, recorded as Hearing Exhibits (RH).

(vi) Three reports by Mr Steven A. Wilson:

At the Hearing, Mr Wilson testified and was examined; he also produced PowerPoint presentations, recorded as Hearing Exhibits (RH).

(vii) Three reports by The Brattle Group:

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912 The Tribunal's experts produced the following reports:

(i) Mr L. William (Bill) Abel, PE, Expert Report, dated 8 June 2015, (Well Control);

(ii) Mr Keith B. Masters, PE, Expert Report, dated 8 June 2015, (Gas Loss);

(iii) Mr Ian Wallis, M.Eng, Expert Report, dated 8 June 2015 (Safety Engineering).

913 The experts relied on drilling and monitoring reports and many other documents that are referenced below where they are relied upon.

7.5 Parameters and remaining issues of liability

914 In its Decision on Liability and in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, the Tribunal determined Niko's liability for the blowouts and the types of losses to which this liability applied. Two liability issues required further evidence and arguments and the decision on those issues was deferred. They will now be addressed in Sections 7.5.5 and 7.5.6 below, together with some other matters which are of general importance and relevant to both methods of quantification.

7.5.1 Graphical Representation

915 At the October 2021 Pre-Hearing Conference, the Tribunal had pointed out to the Parties that it would be assisted in understanding the technical issues by graphical representations of the Chattak 2 well showing the different stages as the events evolved, reflecting each Party's position. The Tribunal recalled that Mr Wright had presented drawings with such representations and the Tribunal suggested to use these graphics as a baseline to which add the positions of both Parties could be added. The Parties were however unable to present such joint drawing, and each Party subsequently presented its own set of drawings reflecting the events as they evolved.274


274 See above Sections 4.7.4 and 4.7.5. ↩

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916 The Tribunal produces here two examples each of the set of drawings submitted by the Claimant and of those submitted by the Respondents, followed by other illustrations relevant for the assessment.

917 The Claimant produced a set of 19 drawings, which included the following two, representing Mr Wright's view of the initial blowout and the last drawing showing a final stage of the Chattak 2B relief well operation.

[Image of two diagrams side-by-side]

Figure 1: Initial Blowout Conditions on Chattak 2

Figure 19: Pumping 1500 bbls of 9.2 ppg Mud, 1000 bbls 19.2 ppg Mud, 750 bbls 15.8 ppg Cement in Borehole with Volume Greater than 3250 bbl

[Page 278]

918 BAPEX provided a set of 21 slides275 which also presented successive stages of events, including the status after the Chattak 2 well bridged over on 9 January 2005:

[Image of a diagram]

Chattak 2 Well Bridges
January 9, 2005

And the final stage, representing the current status of the wells:

[Image of a diagram]

Current Status of Chattak Wells 2, 2A & 2B


275 Exhibit RH-8. ↩

[Page 279]

919 The following cross section of the trajectory of the wells drilled in the Chattak West field has been presented by Gaffney Cline:276

Figure 4: Cross-Section Showing Well Trajectories

[Image of a chart]

Chattak Wells' Trajectory relative to Chattak-2

[Transcription of chart legend]


276 Gaffney Cline III, Figure 4 at page 16. ↩

[Page 280]

920 The picture below, provided by Niko, shows the BAPEX/Niko compound and the location of the wells on the surface, and the craters produced by the two blowouts:277

[Image of an aerial photograph with labels 2, 2A, 2B, 2C, 1]

921 Other representations of the Chattak site and the wells are shown elsewhere in the Award in the context where they are discussed.

7.5.2 Reservoir Pressure

922 The Reservoir Pressure is of critical importance in this case, both for the quantification of the uncontrolled flow out of the Reservoir and for determining the Original Gas in Place (OGIP) as the basis for the Material Balance method.

923 As Ryder Scott explained, “There is no actual measurement of the initial pressure in the Sand1/2 reservoir”.278 The only direct pressure data was provided after the two blowouts by the Data Acquisition Well Chattak 2C on 4 September 2005. The determination of the initial reservoir pressure therefore had to be derived otherwise.

7.5.2.1 The Parties' positions

924 The Claimant and Gaffney Cline, like the First Gas Loss Committee, determined the pressure of the Reservoir on the basis of the weight or density of the drilling mud used during the drilling of Chattak 2. Relying on Gaffney


277 Extract from Exhibit C-90 (undated). ↩
278 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 20(b). ↩

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Cline, the Claimant states that pressure at the top of Sand 1 is 883 psia, based on a mud weight of 9.1 ppg.279

925 On BAPEX's side, Ryder Scott accept as reasonable the determination of the Reservoir pressure by reference to the mud weight; in the present case, however, because of the blowout of the Chattak 2 well, the reservoir pressure may not be determined on this basis.280 Ryder Scott base their calculations “on actual pressure measurement for other reservoirs within the Chattak West Field", specifically on measurement of the pressure in Sands 3 to 6, as recorded in a 1978 report about Chattak 1. They estimate the pressure at mid-point at 957psia281 and at the top of the Reservoir at 954 psia.282

926 The Tribunal notes that these conflicting values for the Reservoir Pressure mark one of the three “principal drivers” of the difference between the two teams of experts on the quantification of the lost gas. The Tribunal examines first whether the Reservoir pressure may be determined by reference to the Chattak 2 Drilling Records and specifically the mud weight of Chattak 2.

7.5.2.2 The Chattak 2 mud weight or density as reference for
determining the Reservoir Pressure

927 There is general agreement between the Parties that relying on the mud weight is a suitable method for determining the pressure in a reservoir. Mr Wright explained at the Hearing the rationale for determining reservoir or formation pressure by reference to the mud weight:

The mud weight will tell you that the pressure in the borehole -- if you have not taken a kick, if you do not have a gas influx -- is greater than the pressure in the reservoir. It's not going to tell you exactly what it is, but it's going to tell you that it's less than that.283

928 Ryder Scott expressed their understanding that

Fekete and GCA assume because the Chattak 2 did not blow out as soon as it contacted the top of the Sand 1/2 reservoir, the reservoir pressure must be at or less than the pressure that would be exerted by a column of mud at the reported static mud weight. This would be a reasonable assumption for a well that drilled safely through a reservoir to


279 C-PHB1, paragraph 32. ↩
280 Already in Ryder Scott I, paragraph 62. ↩
281 Ryder Scott IV, paragraphs 20 and 21 and Exhibit RH-4, slide 33, relying on Reserves Study Chattak Gas Pool, October 1978, Exhibit R-66. ↩
282 Exhibit RH-4, slide 33. ↩
283 HT 2021 Day 3, page 120. ↩

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its intended objective. It is a very poor assumption for a well that blew out prior to reaching its intended objective.284

929 Ryder Scott contested the reliance on the weight of the Chattak 2 drilling mud in their first report, asserting that the Chattak 2 blowout provided “strong evidence that Chattak-2 was underbalanced (the weight of the mud column was less than the formation pressure) when drilling through Sands 1/2".285

930 In its Decision on Liability of 28 February 2020, the Tribunal had examined the Drilling Records and all other available evidence about the drilling of the Chattak 2 well and the blowout. It concluded that “while drilling through Sands 1 and 2, Niko seems to have kept overbalance in the well and thus to have avoided a kick”. The Tribunal also noted that the blowout occurred during the wiper trip, after the drilling had reached the depth of 807m, below Sand 2; “swabbing” was indicated as one of the likely causes”.286

931 Gaffney Cline responded to Ryder Scott on 20 August 2020 that the blowout did not occur “when drilling through Sand 1/2":

Chattak 2 did not blow out while drilling through Sands 1 and 2. On the contrary, there was no recorded flow from the well while it was drilled to a depth of 807m, below the base of Sand 2. At that depth, drilling was paused and the drill pipe was pulled out of the hole for a wiper trip. It was not until the bit had been pulled up to a depth of about 466m (i.e. above Sand 1) that gas flow started, most likely due to the “swabbing” or “suction” effect of pulling up the drill pipes. It is therefore clear that the pressure exerted on the formation by the drilling fluid in the well (mud weight) was adequate to control the reservoir pressure while the well was drilling and while several flow checks were made.287

932 Ryder Scott nevertheless relied in its report of 29 October 2021, on the blowout to question the reliance on the mud weight, as quoted above. And, after having noted that Niko “drilled through the Upper Marine Shale with a static mud weight of 9.1 ppg”, they asserted that:

... Niko was not anticipating a pressure increase after drilling through the Upper Marine Shale. The Chattak-2 suffered a blowout of gas from the Sand 1/2 reservoir and a primary cause of this blowout appears to be


284 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 20b(ii), at page 8; emphasis in the original. ↩
285 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 62. ↩
286 Decision on Liability, Sections 8.2 and 8.3, and specifically paragraph 561. ↩
287 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 56 (footnote omitted). ↩

[Page 283]

Niko's failure to recognize the pressure increase they would encounter after drilling through the Upper Marine Shale.288

933 Mr Wright responded on 5 November 2021 to these statements, with references to the Drilling Records: he pointed out that, after having reached the depth of 485m “approximate top of the regional seal” (i.e. the Upper Marine Shale), Niko increased the mud weight from 8.9 ppg to 9.1 ppg. He reproduced an extract from the Drilling Records, showing the increase of recorded “gas shows” when the drilling passed through Sands 1 and 2; he referred to several flow checks recorded and the “well was not observed to flow". 289

934 At the Hearing, Ryder Scott repeated the earlier assertions: “Niko drilled through the Upper Marine Shale with a static mud weight of 9.1 ppg” and concluded that “Niko was not anticipating a pressure increase after drilling through the Upper Marine Shale”. And they added:

And we all know that the Chattak 2 suffered a blowout of gas from the Sand 1/2 reservoir, and a primary cause of this blowout appears to be Niko's failure to recognise the pressure increase they would encounter after drilling through the upper marine shale.290

935 The Tribunal notes that, as Gaffney Cline and Mr Wright had pointed out, these statements are incorrect; they are contrary to the evidence in the record and the Tribunals' findings in the Decision on Liability. The record shows that the Chattak 2 blowout did not occur when the drilling through the Upper Marine Shale encountered the pressure from the Reservoir but only many hours later, after the drilling had traversed the Reservoir and had reached a depth of 807m and the drill assembly was being pulled out during a Wiper Trip. The Drilling Report of that day shows that in the early hours of that day the drilling passed through Sands 1 and Sands 2 and by 8:00h in the morning had reached 625m without any gas inflow or kick being recorded. During the following 10 hours, drilling continued to a level of 807m, again without any inflow of gas being recorded. In the evening of that day, at 19:00h the crew started the Wiper Trip which led to the blowout at 19:50h.291

936 The Tribunal concludes that the evidence contradicts Ryder Scott's assertion that the Chattak 2 well was underbalanced when drilling through Sands 1 and 2. The mud weight in the wellbore when the Chattak 2 drilling passed through the Reservoir may serve as basis for determining the formation


288 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 20(b)(iv)(6). ↩
289 Wright V, page 6. ↩
290 HT 2021 Day 1, page 147 and Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 31. ↩
291 Exhibit C-20. ↩

[Page 284]

pressure of the Reservoir. Since the pressure of the Reservoir can be determined by a reasonable method, the Tribunal sees no justification to rely on a higher pressure measured in other reservoirs of the Chattak West Field, as Ryder Scott did.

7.5.2.3 Determining the relevant mud weight and the effective
mud weight

937 The Chattak 2 mud weight when drilling through the Reservoir is recorded in the Drilling Reports. These reports show the mud weight for each day of drilling, except for Day 8, the last day, when the drilling passed through the Reservoir in the morning and the blow out occurred in the evening. The reports show that the mud weight was increased as the drilling advanced into deeper formations: Drilling Report No 6, at a depth of 306m, recorded 8.7ppg mud weight. Drilling Report No 7, shows drilling from 430m to 485m, reaching on top of the Upper Marine Shale, and an increase of the mud weight to 8.9 ppg.

938 The report for the drilling on the following day (Day 8), is incomplete; it does not have the second page which, in previous reports, recorded details such as the drilling fluids, including the mud weight. The weight of the drilling mud on that day is indicated in the Sequence of Events document. That document states that “Sands 1&2 were expected at 550m” and “While drilling between 560 – 590 m we observed gas peak three times and gas increased to maximum 17.73% from background gas of 0.8-1%” and “Flow check was OK (static)”. This was followed by a new paragraph with the following text:

Drilled ahead to 807 m, gas dropped to 1% while drilling below 750 m (approx). The average ROP was 22 m/hr. MW was 9.1 ppg ...292

939 The passage shows that, by the time the depth of 807m was reached, the mud weight had been increased from 8.9 ppg to 9.1 ppg. The record does not show when exactly this increase of the mud weight occurred.

940 Ryder Scott show drilling with 9.1 ppg mud weight at a level below 300m and assert that the choice of the mud weight indicated “that Niko was not anticipating a pressure increase after drilling through the Upper Marine Shale". 293 This does not correspond to the record which shows that the increase of the mud weight to 9.1 ppg occurred at a lower level, after drilling had reached the depth of 485m, close to, at or below the Upper Marine Shale.


292 Sequence of Events: Well Control Chattak 2, Exhibit C-19. ↩
293 Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slides 31 and 32. ↩

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941 Mr Wright recognises that the “exact depth the mud density was increased is not recorded” and suggests that “it likely would have been started when the first gas shows were observed at 562m”.294 He also opines that, when a flow check was made at 567m, it was likely that the mud weight was “still 8.9 ppg or possibly approaching 9.0 ppg".295

942 BAPEX points out in its Reply PHB: “according to the Niko Recommended Mud Program from Mi-Swaco, the mud weight was planned to be at least 9.0 ppg".296 The Chattak 2 Well Proposal, to which BAPEX referred, does indeed contain a page presenting a Drilling Fluid Proposal by Mi Swaco which includes information about the drilling mud and indicates 9.0 ppg for the mud weight. Another page of this proposal is entitled “Drilling Program” and includes a column for the Drilling Fluid. This column shows for the upper wellbore with a 17 ½” Hole “Mud Density 8.6 – 9.2 ppf” and for the lower wellbore, starting at the casing shoe at depth of about 300m, a 8 ½” Hole (which continues to and through the Reservoir) “Mud density – as hole conditions dictate”.297 The Tribunal concludes that the Drilling Programme does not provide much assistance in determining the weight of the drilling mud used for drilling through the Reservoir.

943 The Tribunal notes that the Sequence of Events recorded that the mud weight “was 9.1 ppg”; and it did so in the passage quoted above that described the drilling below 590m. This might suggest that the weight of 9.1ppg occurred only during that phase of the drilling. That is, however, not certain. The Tribunal concludes from the explanations of Mr Wright that the increase of the mud from 8.9 ppg to 9.1 ppg does not occur instantaneously but occurs over time. It considers the facts that the drill team had increased the mud weight during the previous days as the drilling progressed and that the Sequence of Events document notes that the top of Sands 1 and 2 was expected at 550m.

944 This makes it more likely that the increase started before that depth had been reached. While the evidence shows only that 9.1 ppg had been reached at the depth of 807m, the Tribunal assumes that this weight was reached progressively and that, by the time the top of Sand 1 had been reached, it may have been at least at 9.0 ppg and possibly 9.1 ppg. The Well Proposal provided that the mud weight be determined “as hole conditions dictate”. When the drilling team increased the mud weight to 9.1 ppg on Day 8, the dictate of the well must have been the expected drilling through Sands 1 and 2, for which


294 Wright V page 6, lines 16-17. ↩
295 Wright V page 6, lines 23 – 24; Sequence of Events: Well Control Chattak 2, Exhibit C-19. ↩
296 B-PHB2, paragraph 56, referring to the Chattak 2 Well Proposal, Exhibit C-15, page 16. ↩
297 Exhibit C-15, page 15. ↩

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the Well Proposal had indicated an “Initial Pressure” of 852.8 psia.298 No other circumstances have been indicated that would justify this increase. The most likely time for the increase of the mud weight to 9.1 ppg on Day 8 therefore would be before entering the Reservoir. The Tribunal assumes that when the drilling reached the top of Sand 1 the mud weight was 9.1 ppg.

7.5.2.4 The effective mud weight

945 Ryder Scott point out that the mud weight recorded in the Drilling reports “is the mud weight as it sits stationary in the mud pits (static mud weight)”. They explain that the pressure exerted on the formation, the effective mud weight, is higher than the static mud weight recorded in the mud pit. The argument was first presented in a general manner, Ryder Scott referring in their first report to

... several factors that would allow formation pressure in excess of mud weight pressure to be controlled as long as drilling is moving forward.299

946 In a later report Ryder Scott developed the argument and presented the "additional factors” that increase the back pressure exerted by the mud against the formation pressure. Ryder Scott listed the following three factors:

1. As the well is being drilled the mud is being circulated and there is a resulting increase in the pressure exerted on the formation as a result of the mud being pumped down the wellbore. The increased effective mud weight is referred to as the Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD).

2. The effective mud weight is further increased by the weight of cuttings that are displaced from the formations that are being drilled through as the drilling progresses to deeper depth and are suspended in the mud column.

3. In addition to the two factors which result in a significant increase in effective mud weight over the static mud weight, a mud cake forms across the wall of permeable formations which further helps to control the formation pressures.

947 Ryder Scott concluded:

It is not until drilling is stopped and the drill assembly is pulled out of the hole that these additional factors cease to be operative and it becomes


298 Exhibit C-15, page 11. ↩
299 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 62. ↩

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obvious that the static mud weight is not sufficient to hold back the formation pressure. This is exactly what seems to have happened when the Chattak-2 blew out. 300

948 Gaffney Cline addressed the ECD and the cuttings argument. They responded to the argument when it was first made, pointing out that the Ryder Scott qualification applied “as long as drilling is moving forward”. They explained:

This can be safely discounted because, as stated above, the well was regularly flow checked and was under complete control while drilling was paused and remained under control while conducting a wiper trip up to the depth of 466m.301

949 Mr Wright responded to the subsequent more developed comments of Ryder Scott, pointing out that, while the drilling traversed the Reservoir, “Flow checks were conducted throughout this section but particularly at: 559m, 567m, 592m”. He described the flow checks:

These typically last for 15 to 30 minutes each where drilling is stopped, and pumps turned off and well is monitored for flow. It is also common to circulate the volume of the hole to remove cuttings when taking multiple flow checks. The effect of circulating while drilling referred to by Ryder Scott would not have been present during these periods.302

950 The flow checks and their result are reported also in the “Sequence of Events” report: “they did flow checks three times. Flow check was OK (static)”.303

951 The Drilling Report records a cleaning operation after the drilling had reached the level of 807m at 18:00h. This operation was performed during a pause before the Wiper Trip started one hour and 50 minutes later, at 19:50. During this period, the report records, during the first 50 minutes: “circulate the hole clean", followed by another 50 minutes: “Take single shot survey”. 304

952 Mr Wright describes this action:

This first involves, circulating the entire volume of mud in the hole (down the drillstring and back through the annulus to surface), typical one or two times. This removes all cuttings from the borehole. The pipe is moved


300 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 20(b) at page 8, emphasis added. ↩
301 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 57. ↩
302 Wright V, page 6; The location of the flow checks were recorded in "Chattak 2 Well Control Incident and Blowout – Draft Report, Exhibit C-21. ↩
303 Sequence of Events: Well Control Chattak 2, Exhibit C-19. ↩
304 Exhibit C-20, page 26. ↩

[Page 288]

up and down during the circulation by one stand of drillpipe approximately 30m. When that is complete the pumps are stopped, and pipe disconnected at the rig floor and a survey tool (to measure the inclination at the bottom of the hole) is run on a wireline through the drillstring to the bit. The survey is taken, and the tool retrieved.

953 Mr Wright points out that during this operation the pumps are turned off. He concludes that the mud was static and free from cuttings:

This is another period that the effect of circulating while drilling referred to by Ryder Scott would not have been present (along with the absence of any cuttings).305

954 At the Hearing, Mr Wright confirmed:

So now there is no cuttings in the mud. So you've got 9.1 ppg clean mud to the top of the S1 sand. That's 870psi.306

955 Mr Wright also considered the adjustments that would have to be made to the calculation of the reservoir pressure as a result of these factors in Ryder Scott's list. He considered the “shallower flow checks”, while the drill traversed Sands 1 and 2: accounting for the cuttings in the mud and assuming that the wellbore was not circulated when taking the flow checks,307 he would “add approximately 0.1 ppg to the clean mud density”. When the hole was circulated clean before the wiper trip, that removed all cuttings. This meant that no adjustment had to be made; the weight of the static mud was effective; nevertheless: “No mud gain was observed”,308 i.e. no influx of gas from the Reservoir. Mr Wright confirmed this at the Hearing: at the flow check at 807m: "you've got 9.1ppg clean mud to the top of S1". 309

956 Concerning the third additional factor mentioned by Ryder Scott, the mud cake, Mr Wright simply states: “Any addition to the mud density by filter cake would be much smaller". 310

957 At the Hearing, Ryder Scott referred to the additional factors at two occasions. In his presentation on Day 1, Mr Nowicki stated that Ryder Scott did not agree with Gaffney Cline and Mr Wright in his recent report “that these are minor factors". He mentioned the cuttings and the difference between stationary


305 Wright V, page 7. ↩
306 HT 2021 Day 2, page 146 and Exhibit CH-2, slide 6. ↩
307 At the Hearing, Mr Wright accepted that there was "no indication in the reports that they circulated the well when they took the flow checks", HT 2021 Day 3, page 121. ↩
308 Wright V, page 6, line 22. ↩
309 HT 2021 Day 2, page 146. ↩
310 Wright V, page 6, lines 31 -32. ↩

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mud and the mud that is “actually circulated”; he added that “perhaps the most important item is going to be the mud cake”. He was asked by the Tribunal about his comments to the explanations of Mr Wright that the additional factors had been removed. He explained that his experience was not that of a drilling engineer and added “I don't have any reason to believe that Mr Wright is incorrect on that, but I also don't believe I can verify it. So he might be right and he might be wrong. But we will still have the issue of the mud cake [...] assistance in controlling the mud cake”. He confirmed that he could not comment on the question whether the cuttings were removed; but "I don't [...] think the cake is not properly explained”, adding “I believe that is going to be factor number one in controlling ...”311

958 When he continued his explanations, he referred again to the “two factors that are actually going to increase the effective mud weight – that being equivalent circulating density and the cuttings” and presented a slide in which the assertions were repeated that Ryder Scott had made prior to Mr Wright's explanations just referred to.312 He asserted that all of these factors “are in play as long as a well is actively being drilled. They are not negated during temporary drilling pauses.” He did not provide any explanations for these assertions but said that the Tribunal had to look at Mr Wright's explanations "and see if you believe what he's saying or not”. And he added: “I have no opinion on it. I'm not qualified to make an opinion on it".313

959 Another reference to the additional factors and Mr Wright's comments on them was made in another slide of Ryder Scott's opening presentation: “Without any supporting calculations, the Wright Report of November 5, 2021 expresses the opinion that these additional factors are minor. Ryder Scott disagrees. Collectively these factors are more than sufficient to account for the +- 90 psia difference between Ryder Scott estimated reservoir pressure and that of GCA”.314 No support for this assertion was provided and in Mr Nowicki's oral presentation the slide with this assertion was skipped over. Since Mr Novicki had said on the previous day that he was not qualified to render an opinion on Mr Wright's explanations, it is not clear how Ryder Scott arrived at this assertion.315

960 Mr Nowicki placed particular emphasis on the third factor, the mud cake, also referred to as filter cake. When he confirmed Ryder Scott's earlier position on the additional factors, he addressed specifically “the mud cake that forms


311 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 130 - 140. ↩
312 HT 2021 Day 1, page 142, referring to Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slides 28 and 29. ↩
313 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 144 - 145. ↩
314 Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 54. ↩
315 HT 2021 Day 2 page 25 (slide 53) and page 29 (slide 56). ↩

[Page 290]

across the walls of permeable formations” stating that “this further helps to control the formation pressure”. In support, he relied on an exhibit that had been attached to Ryder Scott I. That exhibit is a “Modified Schlumberger Well Services diagram of the environment close to ta wellbore during drilling and logging”. The diagram shows how the “liquid from [the drilling] mud or mud filtrate passes into permeable formations as the well drills through those formations"; and it states: “During this process, a residue or mudcake is deposited on the walls of the wellbore across the permeable formations”.316 Mr Novicki confirmed that the mud cake protected the wellbore against incoming gas; but he did not explain how such protection operates and how it affects the calculation of the reservoir pressure.

961 Gaffney Cline's experts confirmed that mud cake forms during the drilling process. Mr Seager referred to “little platelets of elements that stick to the wall. And the purpose of the mud cake is to stop the leaking into the formation. It will always leak a little bit, but we don't want to lose mud into the formation”. He also pointed out that there “would be no mud cake as the well first drilled into the top of Sand 1. It takes a while to build up and form”; and “when you first drill into the sand, the sand is virgin, it's open, there is no mud cake build-up”. Mr Seager concluded that, at the depth of 567m, when the second flow check in the Reservoir was performed, “there would be no mud cake, no”.317

962 During the discussion on that subject, the Tribunal referred to earlier explanations of Mr Abel who considered a possible relationship between mud cake and the blowout. 318 Indeed, in the Decision on Liability, the Tribunals recorded explanations by Mr Abel and Mr Wright about removal of filter cake during the wiper trip. Mr Abel mentioned “to wipe the hole and get rid of the filter cake which you do not want”. The Tribunals concluded in that decision that they had not seen in the record any indication that the removal of the filter cake was the reason for the wiper trip. 319

963 While both Mr Seager and Mr Wright had confirmed the build-up of mud cake and its usefulness in limiting the flow of drilling mud into the formation, they also questioned the relevance of mud cake in controlling the reservoir pressure. Mr Seager stated that mud cake was “not, in my view at least, a major factor in controlling pressure from the formation into the wellbore"320. Mr Wright was categoric. He referred to the discussion


316 Ryder Scott I, Exhibit 1. ↩
317 HT 2021 Day 2, page 120. ↩
318 HT 2021 Day 2, pages 119 and146. ↩
319 Decision on Liability, paragraphs 600 to 604. ↩
320 HT 2021 Day 2, page 120. ↩

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... about possible mud cake causing a back pressure. I've been taking well control schools for 40 years and I've never, ever seen one comment about mud cake holding gas pressure in.321

964 Two of the Questions which the Tribunals invited the Parties to address in the Post-Hearing Briefs concerned these additional factors, viz. the factors that add weight and their importance for determining the reservoir pressure.

965 BAPEX mentioned specifically Equivalent Circulating Density (ECD) and cuttings. Mud cake was not included in the list of adjustments that have to be made to the recorded mud density.

966 With respect to ECD, BAPEX referred to testimony of Mr Wright about a situation where the ECD increased the mud weight by 0.8 ppg. This situation related to events during drilling of Chattak 2A when the drilling crew was circulating the hole clean. 322 The Claimant pointed out that drilling was stopped during the flow checks at 567m, very near the top of Sand 1, at 592m, 633m and 807m; no adjustments were needed as “there would be no mud circulating during each survey". 323

967 The Claimant accepted that “the only adjustment that might be made would be for the potential presence of cuttings in the mud when the flow checks were taken, if it is assumed that the well bore was not circulated out before taking the flow check”. The Claimant accepted that taking the presence of cuttings into account would increase the mud weight of 8.9 ppg by 0.1 ppg, corresponding to adding ~10 psi to 850 psi. 324

968 BAPEX explained that drilled cuttings, “if not circulated out properly, can result in an increase in mud density up to 1.5 ppg"; 325 the Claimant objected, pointing out that no supporting evidence was cited by BAPEX.326 In its Reply PHB, BAPEX agreed that Niko was correct in stating that the only adjustment to mud weight at the time of the flow checks would be the presence of cuttings. It also agreed “with the formula that Mr Wright used to calculate the mud weight increase due to the presence of cuttings", increasing the mud weight at the flow check at 567m by 0.1ppg. BAPEX contested, however, Mr Wright's


321 HT 2021 Day 2, page146. ↩
322 HT 2021 Day 4, pages 95 - 98. ↩
323 C-PHB 1, paragraph 74. ↩
324 C-PHB 1, paragraph 75. ↩
325 B-PHB 1, paragraph 64. ↩
326 C-PHB 2, paragraph 22. ↩

[Page 292]

calculation of the effective mud weight and the value of the static mud weight to which the 0.1ppg have to be added.327

969 The Tribunal notes that the final submissions seem to have clarified that during the flow checks there was no circulation in the well. The ECD effect therefore does not apply during these periods. The incidents during which the ECD increases the effective mud weight, as relied upon by BAPEX, do not affect the determination of the Reservoir pressure by reference to the mud weight. What matters is an increase of the effective mud weight throughout the period during which the Reservoir pressure had to be contained by the drilling mud.

970 Concerning the cuttings, BAPEX states that the increase of the effective mud weight occurs “if not circulated out properly”. That is also the position of the Claimant. There is no evidence that, during the flow checks in the Reservoir, the well was circulated out. However, when the drilling reached 807m the hole was circulated clean. It has not been alleged that this operation was unsuccessful, and that cuttings remained in the mud.

971 Concerning the mud cake, it is undisputed that, as drilling progresses, mud cake forms in the wellbore. This mud cake reduces the flow of drilling mud into the formation. Ryder Scott have asserted that such mud cake also has the reverse effect of preventing formation gas to enter the wellbore, an assertion that has been contested by Mr Seager and Mr Wright.

972 The Schlumberger diagram to which Ryder Scott referred does not provide any support for their assertion. It states that mud cake forms on the walls of the wellbore, but it says nothing about the effect on the pressure in the wellbore. Moreover, there are no explanations how the mud particles that settle on the walls of the wellbore increase the strength of resisting the pressure of the gas in the formation or increase the back pressure exercised by the mud itself. Ryder Scott also have not explained or even asserted that, on 7 January 2005 by 19:30 h, drilling mud had accumulated on the walls of the wellbore freshly drilled and that the mud cake so formed increased the weight of the drilling mud from which it was formed. The Tribunal is not persuaded that, at the time when the Chattak 2 well was cleaned from cuttings and the flow was stopped, mud cake increased the mud weight beyond the static mud weight as measured in the mud pits.

973 The Tribunal concludes that none of the additional factors described by Ryder Scott were operative: the static mud weight, as it was used on 7 January 2007, when the drilling of Chattak 2 passed through Sand 1 and


327 B-PHB 2, paragraphs 54 – 56. ↩

[Page 293]

Sand 2, may be used for determining the formation pressure of these two sands; no increase must be made to reflect any additional factors in a higher effective mud weight.

974 The Tribunal has no basis to doubt that on Day 8, by 19:50, the mud was clean of cutting and the well was not circulated; and it does not believe that any mud cake that may have formed increased the static mud weight. By that time and until the wiper trip had reached 466 m there is no evidence for gas flow into the well. The static mud weight resisted the pressure from the Reservoir. The Tribunal concludes that the Reservoir pressure must have been below the back pressure exercised by the drilling mud of 9.1 ppg static weight with no increase for effective mud weight.

7.5.2.5 Converting mud weight into Reservoir Pressure

975 The Claimant converts the 9.1 ppg mud weight into 883 psia Reservoir Pressure at the top of Sand 1.328 Ryder Scott estimated pressure at the top of the Reservoir is 954 psia but did so not based on the mud weight of Chattak 2 but, as explained above, by reference to pressure measurements of other reservoirs.329

976 The First Gas Loss Committee considered 9.1 ppg mud weight and determined the pressure in the Reservoir at 903.62 psia and explained:

Reservoir pressure at mid-point of reservoir Sands 1 & 2 @1879 ft (573m) assuming a balanced mud condition with 9.1 ppg mud just prior to the blowout as per Drilling Report, 903.62 psia.330

977 The Claimant explains the difference between 903.62 psia Reservoir pressure of the Committee with that of Gaffney Cline by referring to “the Committee's deeper reference point”.331 The Committee explained that pressure value it adopted was based on the mid-point of the Reservoir, assumed to be at 573m, while the reference point of Gaffney Cline is at the top of the Reservoir. At the Hearing, Mr Seager of Gaffney Cline responded to the Tribunal's questions332 by stating that the First Gas Loss Committee “used the same methodology that we used [...] they assumed that the maximum pressure in the reservoir was equivalent to 9.1 ppg mud, and they took that down to the depth which


328 C-PHB 1, paragraph 32, relying on Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 54. Gaffney Cline I, page 14, states 886 psia as the equivalent to 9.1 ppg. ↩
329 Exhibit RH-4, slide 33. ↩
330 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 5. ↩
331 C-PHB 1, paragraph 32. ↩
332 HT 2021 Day 2, pages 73 and 78. ↩

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you've just mentioned. So if you do that, that's what you get.”333 In its Post-Hearing Brief, the Claimant sought to demonstrate the correspondence of the two values by a graphic representation of the pressure gradients of the mud and the aquifer. And it referred to the testimony of Mr Wright, who had insisted that “you need to calculate the pressure at the top and work your way down ...”334

978 BAPEX responded by pointing out that “the reference depth is a key difference between Ryder Scott's pressure calculation and that of Gaffney Cline. The Committee, like Ryder Scott, used the reservoir mid-point pressure, which is the appropriate pressure to use for volumetric calculations.”335 BAPEX does not provide support for the mid-point as the appropriate reference. The Committee, too, does not explain why it chose the mid-point as reference.

979 BAPEX further pointed out that Mr Seager, at the Hearing, and Gaffney Cline in their second report, asserted that 9.1 ppg mud-weight corresponds to 883 psia equivalent pressure at the top of Sand 1 and stated that “the reservoir pressure in Sand 1 cannot exceed that number. It is physically impossible: otherwise the well would have suffered influx and possibly a blowout, and it did not.”336 BAPEX referred to Gaffney Cline's gas gradient pressure estimate to show that a calculation on that gradient would lead to a result that also was above the 883 psia as the highest possible pressure at the top of Sand 1.

980 The Tribunal notes the difference between the Parties concerning the depth at which the Reservoir Pressure must be calculated. The difference was demonstrated at the Hearing during the cross examination of Mr Wright. BAPEX's Counsel invited him to calculate the reservoir pressure assuming the 9.1 ppg mud weight by reference to the mid-point of the Reservoir at 605.5m. Mr Wright responded that this did not make sense but performed the calculation nevertheless.

981 BAPEX's Counsel and Mr Wright agreed that the formula for the calculation was as follows: the depth in feet (divided by 0.3048) multiplied by the ppg value, multiplied by 0.052 as “a constant that converts pounds per gallon into feet to psi", plus 14.7 to bring psi to psia. The formula produced 957 or 955 psia: (605.5 ./. 0.3048 x 9.1 x 0.052) +14.7 = 955 psia, as calculated by Mr Wright.337


333 HT 2021 Day 2, page 78. ↩
334 HT 2021 Day 3, page 123. ↩
335 B-PHB 2, paragraph 21 at page 13. ↩
336 HT 2021 Day 2, page 64, the Transcript uses psi, but the CH-1, slide 4 shows that this is a typographical error and psia is meant; the Gaffney Cline reference is Gaffney Cline II, paragraphs 53 and 54. ↩
337 HT 2021 Day 3, pages 123 - 125. ↩

[Page 295]

982 When Mr Wright was asked in re-direct whether the calculation he was asked to perform by reference to the mid-point of the Reservoir was “an appropriate calculation for determining the pressure of the reservoir” he responded:

Not for using the mud weight to determine the pressure, no. If you're going to use mud weight, you need to take it at the top.

[...]

If you're going to use mud weight to determine the pressure in the reservoir, you need to do it at the top, because that's going to be the smallest pressure differential. As you go deeper into the reservoir, you're just getting more and more overbalance with the depth of the bit.

983 Mr Wright also was asked in re-direct to invert the operation, to take the mid-point (605m) pressure of 957 psia to the top at 560m; he made a rough estimate and concluded that the corresponding mud weight would be “9.55 [...] around 10 ppg".338

984 Mr Wright explained at the Hearing “from a drilling point of view, the highest mud gradient that you need to deal with is the top of the reservoir”.

As you drill down the wellbore, if you drill into the top of the sand, the pressure is going to increase as you go to the middle of the sand because of the mud gradient. But the pressure at the top of the sand is very nearly the pressure at the bottom of the sand. But the mud weight at the bottom of the sand is much higher than it is at the top of the sand. So you get a bigger pressure differential between the mud at the bottom than you have with the mud at the top. And that's a point you're concerned about with well control, which is what I'm thinking of.

[...]

So that's why I was saying earlier that you need to calculate the pressure at the top and work your way down; or you need to calculate the pressure at the gas-water contact, based on the salinity of the water, and work your way up. So using mud density to go to the middle doesn't make sense from either direction.339

985 Mr Wright illustrated the pressure differential, the difference between the pressure gradient of the mud and that of the gas by the following slide, which shows the difference in slope of the mud gradient (green) and the gas gradient


338 HT 2021 Day 3, pages 127 - 129. ↩
339 HT 2021 Day 3, pages 120 - 121 and 123 - 124. ↩

[Page 296]

(red). As a result of the difference in gradient, the gas pressure of the Reservoir “at the top of the sand is very nearly the pressure at the bottom of the sand” but “the mud weight at the bottom of the sand is much higher than it is at the top of the sand”.

72 psi 18 psi Pressure of the gas at the top of the reservoir is based on the density of the gas which in this case is much smaller than water (0.433 psi/ft)
560m
Pressure = 852.4 psi – 0.0184*40/.3048 = 850 psi
9.1 ppg Pressure Gradient
Mud Gradient line 0.4727 psi Gas Gradient Line 0.0184 psi/ft Gas Zone
Water Gradient line 0.433 psi Reservoir thickness
77 psi
600m
GWC Pressure = 0.433 *600/.3048 = 852.4 psi
Water Drive Pressure at gas water contact is based on density of water and its depth. In this case 0.433 psi/ft x depth

Reference: Observations on and Reply to Third Supplemental Expert Report prepared by Ryder Scott dated October 29, 2021, Page 8

986 While there were differences between the experts about the correct gradients and their locations on the graphs presented, it appeared undisputed that, as shown on this drawing, the gas and the mud gradients do not run in parallel.

[Page 297]

987 This is common ground, as the following drawing shows. The drawing was first shown in Gaffney Cline's second report. At the Hearing, Ryder Scott presented it to show the points on which they disagreed with Gaffney Cline: the drawing shows the gas gradient (grey, green, blue and brown) almost vertical 340 and the mud gradient (orange slope) almost diagonal. The disagreement of Ryder Scott concerns the location of the water gradient (blue) but not the slope of the gas and mud gradient:341

Figure 6: Analysis of Chattak Sand 1 Pressures

Chattak Pressure Analysis

Pressure (psia)
Depth (mss) 500.0 600.0 700.0 800.0 900.0 1000.0 1100.0 1200.0 1300.0 1400.0
400.0 [Chart data not transcribed]
450.0
500.0
550.0
600.0
650.0
700.0
750.0
800.0

[Chart annotations]

Overpressure of 100 psi would result in immediate blowout

Top of Sand 1

.433 psi/ft defines only the slope of this line.

The line could be shifted up or down

[Chart legend]

988 Considering the difference in the slope of the two gradients, the Tribunal agrees with Mr Wright that, when calculating the Reservoir Pressure on the basis of the mud weight, reference should be made to the top of the sand, where the pressure difference is the smallest. It is important to bear in mind that the mud weight does not measure the Reservoir Pressure, but the pressure exercised by the mud weight resisting the pressure from the gas in the Reservoir. Therefore, it presents the upper limit of the Reservoir Pressure; the pressure of the gas may be less but not higher than the back pressure of the mud weight – otherwise a kick would occur. As the drilling moves down


340 In a comparative table, Gaffney Cline, at Gaffney Cline IV Appendix III, indicate the gas gradient in psi/m at 0.059 psi/m and 0.064 psi/m for their own calculation and for Ryder Scott, respectively. ↩
341 HT 2021 Day 2, page 23 and Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 55. ↩

[Page 298]

the borehole, the back pressure of the mud weight increases; but the pressure of the gas does not increase at the same rate. The increased mud weight therefore does not represent an increased Reservoir Pressure. As Mr Wright insisted, the mud weight at mid-point “does not make sense” for determining the Reservoir Pressure.

989 The Tribunal considers these explanations plausible and therefore took the formula on which BAPEX's Counsel and Mr Wright agreed and applied it, using the same mud weight of 9.1 ppg at the top of Sand 1 (562m) where, according to Mr Wright, it should be applied.342 At this depth, the formula produced a pressure of 887 psia.

990 The Tribunal concludes that, on top of Sand 1 at 562m, when the drilling entered the Reservoir, the mud weight exercised a pressure of 887 psia. As no gas entered the borehole at that time, the pressure in the Reservoir cannot have been greater than 887psia.

991 On the basis of the evidence and explanations by the experts, the Tribunal understands that the increase of the pressure exercised by the mud as the drilling progressed is not relevant for the determination of the reservoir pressure, since the mud gradient differs from that of the gas. In the drawing shown above the gas pressure increased only from 850 psi to 852.2 psi from 560m to 600m depth, assuming a gas gradient of 0.0184 psi/ft. It has not been argued that the pressure gradient of the gas is substantially higher.

992 This pressure differential between the gas pressure and the mud pressure confirms Mr Wright's statement: determining the pressure exercised by the mud at mid-point of the Reservoir “does not make sense”.

993 The Tribunal concludes, based on the formula agreed between BAPEX's Counsel and Mr Wright and a mud weight of 9.1 ppg, that the back pressure of the mud weight was 887 psia. As no gas from the Reservoir entered the wellbore when the drilling entered Sand 1, Reservoir pressure cannot have exceeded 887 psia. As the increase of the mud weight from 8.9 ppg to 9.1 ppg probably was progressive and may not have reached 9.1 ppg by the time the drilling entered Sand 1, the Reservoir pressure may have been less than 887 psia but not more.

994 This upper limit of the Reservoir pressure has been determined by a mud weight of 9.1 ppg, assuming the weight increase had reached that level when drilling traversed both Sand 1 and Sand 2. Contrary to BAPEX that assumes pressure connection of the two Sands, the Claimant treats the two Sands as separate. It nevertheless presents only one value for the Reservoir Pressure.


342 Wright V, page 6. ↩

[Page 299]

While the two Sands, if they are not pressure connected, may have different formation pressure, the upper limit of these possibly different pressures remains 887 psia, the back pressure corresponding to 9.1 ppg.

995 The Tribunal noted that the Second Gas Loss Committee used a different method to determine the initial Reservoir Pressure. The method used a computer model which was run with industry software by Fekete and does not seem to have relied on the mud weight. The Committee determined the Reservoir Pressure separately for Sand 1 and Sand 2, calculating 835 psia for Sand 1 and 915 psia for Sand 2 with an average of 875 psia.343

996 Similarly, Fekete also applied a different method for determining the gas loss, using a formula that applied the factor for the fresh water gradient of 0.433 to the depth in TVD, without including the mud weight; and they calculated the Reservoir pressure separately for Sand 1 and for Sand 2, reaching values similar to those of the Second Gas Loss Committee, 829 psia for Sand 1 and 910 psia for Sand 2344 and an average of 870 psia.

997 As the Tribunal determined on the basis of the mud weight that the Reservoir pressure could not have exceeded 887 psia and other calculations have produced lower values, the Tribunal accepts the initial Reservoir Pressure of 883 psia, which the Claimant confirmed in its Post-Hearing Brief. 345

7.5.2.6 The Reservoir Pressure on 4 September 2005 (Chattak 2C)

998 After the second blowout, Niko had a Data Acquisition Well, Chattak 2C, drilled. This well reached into Sand 1 and provided data from the upper half of this Sand.346 The data obtained by that well on 4 September 2005 included measurements of the reservoir pressure from Sand 1, providing a basis for measuring the reduction of that pressure as a result of the loss of gas since the start of the first blowout on 7 January 2005.

999 The Fekete Study considered these measurements and observed:

It is clear that gas has been lost from Sand 1 as indicated by the depleted pressure measured by the SFT in September 2005. No pressure data exists to confirm whether any gas was lost from Sand 2 but if gas was


343 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 4 and C-PHB 1, paragraph 33. ↩
344 Fekete Study, Exhibit C-70, page 22. ↩
345 C-PHB 1, paragraph 32. ↩
346 See Ryder Scott I, paragraph 12. ↩

[Page 300]

flowing from Sand 2 during the blowout, then it is highly likely that Sand 1 and Sand 2 achieved pressure equilibration.

1000 Fekete conclude that the process of producing pressure equilibrium of the two Sands was completed after about 100 days, i.e. by the time the Chattak 2C data were taken. They had estimated the initial reservoir pressures for Sand 1 and Sand 2 at 829 and 910 psia respectively; and determined the Chattak 2C pressure data for Sand 1 at 762 psia. 347

1001 In the Arbitration some confusion occurred because Ryder Scott assumed in their first report that the pressure data were relevant for a date in April 2006. They explained that documentation and information provided subsequently enabled them to determine that the relevant date was 4 September 2005, the date of Chattak 2C.348 Once they had corrected the relevant date, Ryder Scott stated that

... there is agreement that the pressure in the reservoir had dropped to approximately 746 psia as a result of the uncontrolled flow from the reservoir through September 4, 2005.349

1002 Gaffney Cline conclude from the Chattak 2C data that it shows that

... the reservoir pressure in Sand 1 as measured by well Chattak 2C is about 750 psia at a depth of 560mss...”350

1003 Gaffney Cline also produced a table showing data from the Chattak 2C measurements. The TVD depth in mss ranges from 554.4 to 570.3 mss and the Formation Pressure ranges from 747.6 psia to 749.4 psia. At the TVD level of 559.5 mss, the indicated pressure is 748.4 psia.351 Compared to this table, both values indicated by the experts find some support.

1004 The Tribunal choses the middle value and determines the Reservoir Pressure on 4 September 2005 was in Sand 1 at a depth of 557 mss 748 psia.

7.5.3 Geology, stratigraphy and lithology

1005 The geology of the Chattak field and the lithology of some of its strata are relevant for a number of issues concerning the drilling of the wells and the


347 Exhibit C-70, pages 22 – 24. ↩
348 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 38; Ryder Scott III, paragraph 14. ↩
349 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 20 (c), at page 10. ↩
350 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 72. ↩
351 Gaffney Cline II, Table 6 at page 28. ↩

[Page 301]

gas loss caused by the blowouts. Some of the relevant features of this geology have been addressed in the Decision on Liability. 352

1006 The stratigraphy of the Chattak West field around the Chattak wells can be seen in the drawings reproduced above in Section 7.5.1. Other information can be gathered from drilling proposals, drilling reports and other representations, several of which have been reproduced or are discussed in the course of the Award. The Marginal Field Evaluation (MFE) of February 2000, for instance, contains a section on the geological setting and reproduces drilling reports from the Chattak 1 well and other information.

1007 The MFE identified four reservoirs, each consisting of two sands. Two of these, Sands 3 - 6 at a depth betweeen1080m and 1281m, had been produced by Chattak 1. The reservoir concerned by this case consists of Sands 1 and 2. It is sealed by the Regional Seal or Upper Marine Shale. The material above is referred to as the Overburden.

1008 The First Gas Loss Report, when presenting the effect of the Chattak 2 blowout during the phase of the initial flare from 7 to 9 January 2005, also represented the strata of the underground. 353 The strata were presented differently and with different nomenclature in the report of GeoMechanics Technologies in an interpretation using the data from the Chattak 2 C well log (Exhibit R-48):354

Formation TVD depth, meters
Overburden 0
[Chart data not transcribed]
Thin Shale 317
334
Intermediate Sand
Upper Marine Shale 482
[Chart data not transcribed]
Sands 1 and 2 552

Figure 1 Stratigraphic column of the Chattak 2C Well


352 In particular, see Decision on Liability, Section 8.2.2. ↩
353 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, Annex 16. ↩
354 GeoMechanics I, Figure 1 at page 6. ↩

[Page 302]

Well:Chattak-2

[Image of a wellbore schematic with the following labels:]

Depth (m): 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800

Component-1 Massive Fissure of gas

Casing & Cement

Sandstone (mudstone)

Claystone (stringer)

Tipam Sandstone

485m drilling breakout

485-560m Seal UMS

Sands 1&2

807m

1009 In this Award the formation above the Upper Marine Shale (Regional Shale) will be referred to as the Overburden for the entire formation from the surface to the Upper Marine Shale; other expressions used for the entire Overburden are “Upper Sands” or “Dupi Tila”. In the evidence and argument, a distinction is sometimes made between the upper and the lower part for this formation: GeoMechanics used Overburden only for the upper part of this formation and referred to its lower part, separated from the upper part by a

[Page 303]

“Thin Shale”, as Intermediate Sand; they explain that according to BAPEX Dupi Tila describes the upper part and Tipam Sand the lower part. The Committee used Dihing and Dupi Tila for the upper part and Tipam for the lower part. In the MFE, the upper part is Dihing Group the lower part Dupi Tila. 355

1010 The layer between the upper and lower part of the Overburden is described by the Committee as Claystone (stringer) and by GeoMechanics as Thin Shales (or Girujan Clay); these layers and the issues relating to them will be discussed below in Section 7.5.4. Mr Hughes identified thin shales below 350m and 400m and opined that they trapped gas that had escaped from the Reservoir. He described the area of these traps as Intermediary Sands.356

1011 The Overburden is sometimes represented as flat; the drilling records from wells at different locations indicate, however, that it is not at the same depth or at the same location; as shown below in Section 7.7.5, the Regional Seal that forms the bottom of the Overburden, also is represented in a dome shaped fashion. This is presumably an explanation why the depth of the overburden varies in different representations which refer to different wells. The First Gas Loss Committee determined that the Chattak 2 well situates the bottom of Overburden (Tipam sandstone) at 485 m; Mr Wright situates it for Chattak 2B also at 485m, GeoMechanics for Chattak 2C at 482m and Niko's proposal for Chattak 3 at 518m.357

1012 The lithography of the Overburden is described by the First Gas Loss Committee as “sandstone (massive)”.358 The second Committee describes it as "highly unconsolidated stand stone” with a porosity of 35%.359 The geological depth prognosis in the Chattak 3 proposal the lithology for the Overburden is indicated as “Sandstone, mudstone”. The Sequence of Events report about the drilling of Chattak 2 observed that “Formation was mostly medium to coarse grained SST from 306 m onwards. 360 Ryder Scott describes the Overburden as “predominantly composed of permeable unconsolidated sandstone". 361


355 E.g. Marginal Field Evaluation, Exhibit R-41, Stratigraphy and Petroleum Geology of Bangladesh, page 24. ↩
356 HT 2021 Day 4, page 37 and RH-6, slide 17. ↩
357 Exhibit R-35 and C-265, page 11. ↩
358 Exhibit R-1, Annex 16. ↩
359 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, Section 4.1 at page 5. ↩
360 Sequence of Events: Well Control Chattak 2, Exhibit C-19. ↩
361 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 65(a). ↩

[Page 304]

1013 Gaffney Cline estimated the gas saturation in the Overburden (“Shallow Formations"), based on porosity of 30%.362 The Claimant summarised the method adopted for this estimate, explaining that Gaffney Cline distinguished between the (1) “residual gas saturation” that existed prior to drilling of Chattak 2, (2) the “critical gas saturation”, which is the saturation point “at which gas first becomes mobile in a porous material that is initially saturated with oil and/or water”, and (3) the areal extent over which gas migrating from the reservoir may have extended. Gaffney Cline considered that unconsolidated sand in the Overburden and assumed various degrees of initial saturation between 1 – 3%, porosity of 30% and calculated on the basis of these parameters the degree of gas saturation (or “absorption”). 363

1014 Mr Wright gave the following description of the Overburden in the context of his discussion of the gas flow when the first blowout occurred:

... these sands are really young and they are poorly cemented and potentially unconsolidated as you move closer to the surface, and that's why you get fluidisation: these sands are filled with water. As the gas pushes the water through the sand, it tends to fluidise it. And you can see that clearly when you see the craters at the surface: it's just like quicksand.364

1015 The Regional Seal or Upper Marine Shale, also described as “Girujan Clay”, is at differing depth, again depending on the location of the well. For Chattak 2, the First Gas Loss Committee indicated a depth from 485m – 560m.365 Other depth indicated are 482m – 552m (GeoMechanics for Chattak 2 C) and 482m – 570m (Chattak 3 well proposal).

1016 The lithography of the Regional Seal is generally described as clay or Girujan Claystone.366

1017 The geological structure of the Reservoir is one of the disputed issues for the loss estimate according to the Material Balance method: In particular, the Parties and their experts disagree about the question whether Sand 1 and Sand 2 are pressure connected, forming a single reservoir, or whether they


362 Gaffney Cline I, paragraphs 32-40; Gaffney Cline III, Table 3 at page 20; Hearing Presentation CH-1, slide 25. ↩
363 C-PHB 1, paragraphs 40 and 41, relying on Gaffney Cline I, paragraphs 34 and 35; also Exhibit CH-1, slides 26 and 27. ↩
364 HT 2021 Day 4, page 84. ↩
365 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, Annex 16; also graphic representation above Section 7.5.1. ↩
366 Noble Smith and Associates: review and approval of the Chattak 3 drilling programme for insurance purposes, 20 October 2005, Exhibit C-275; see also CMD, paragraph 334. ↩

[Page 305]

are separated with separate GWC. The issue is discussed under the heading “compartmentalisation” below in Section 7.7.5.

1018 It is, however, uncontested that for Chattak 2 the top of the Reservoir is at 560m.367 In Chattak 1, the top of the Reservoir is indicated at 570m and that of Sand 2 at 625m.368

1019 The Well Proposal for Chattak 3 shows Sand 1 as Tipam sand between 570m and 589m with a potential hydrocarbon of 25, a Shaly Sand of 10m potential hydrocarbon and another Sand (Sand 2 target) of 25m of potential hydrocarbon between 623m and 670m and shales, separating the sands of 8m and 7m. The bottom of the Reservoir is at 670m where a layer of “Siltstone, sandstone” of 46m starts. 369

7.5.4 Shale stringers

1020 Shale stringers or thin shales are layers of clay that are found in the Overburden. The First Gas Loss Report, for instance, presented them as “Claystone (Stringers)” of which two are shown at a level around 350m and below 400m.370 Dr Bruno of GeoMechanics used the expressions: “thin shale or clay stringer”371 The Tribunal uses “shale stringer” and similar expressions as synonyms without thereby expressing an opinion about their size or shape.

1021 BAPEX and its experts argued that gas emanating from the Reservoir “was trapped by impermeable formations in the sands above the reservoir”. The principal conclusion that BAPEX drew from this assertion was that the gas so trapped “created serious hazards for drilling and production activities" that continued to persist. 372 The resulting hazards made it too risky or economically unviable to produce gas from the Reservoir. BAPEX claimed also for the gas that remained in the Reservoir but could no longer be produced. The Tribunal noted that after the two blowouts neither Niko nor BAPEX and the Government considered that the development had become technically unfeasible; the Tribunal excluded that, when they concluded the JVA, the Parties knew or even contemplated such consequences. The loss, if it


367 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, Annex 16, Gaffney Cline II, FN 49 at page 22; Wright V, page 7, line 29; also HT 2021 Day 3, pages 121 - 122. ↩
368 Figure of Chattak 2 Well Proposal, Exhibit C-15, page 6. ↩
369 Exhibit C-265. ↩
370 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, Annex 16. ↩
371 HT 2021 Day 4, page 54, ↩
372 BAPEX's Amendment to the Memorial on Damages, and Respondents' presentation on 19 November 2020, slide 35 and HT 2020 Day 1, page 43. ↩

[Page 306]

occurred, was found not recoverable under the Bangladesh Contract Act and the JVA.373

1022 In this context, the Tribunal considered argument of BAPEX and its experts, including the plurality of representation of the shale stringers which, in BAPEX's case, were the principal causes for this claim. BAPEX continues to rely on the “impermeable formations” trapping gas; it does so no longer for claiming for a loss of the gas remaining in the Reservoir but in the context of the quantification of gas trapped in the Overburden and the explanation for the Chattak 2A blowout. The trapping formations are referred to “shale stringers" and similar expressions.

1023 Ryder Scott insisted on the frequency and importance of the shale stringers. They relied on the 3D seismic data and asserted: “Wherever reasonable good 3D seismic data is present in the overburden section, there is evidence of bedding", an expression defined by Gaffney Cline as “presence of layers of different rock types”.374 Ryder Scott also state that no relevant evidence was available from the records of Chattak 2 and Chattak 2A and assert: “All of the wells in the Chattak West field for which quantitative logs were obtained (Chattak 1, 2B and 2C), showed numerous layers in the overburden section capable of trapping gas.”

1024 At the Hearing, Ryder Scott defended their position concerning the “interval of concern", the “shale (clay) stringers between the depth of 335 and 360 meters TVD in the Chattak-2A". They repeated that the Chattak 2B well “shows numerous shale stringers within the entire overburden section above the Upper Marine Shale including within the interval of interest”.375

1025 Mr Hughes, for instance, referred to a slide similar to the second of the BAPEX representations shown above in Section 7.5.1, to explain his opinion that gas trapped below shale stringers below 350m and 400m form intermediary sands. 376 GeoMechanics identified "Thin Shale” at 317m and “Intermediate Sand" at 334m.377

1026 Dr Bruno of GeoMechanics at the Hearing identified shale layers on extracts of the drilling logs of Chattak 2B and Chattak 2 C and explained:


373 Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, Section 9.2. ↩
374 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 17(a); definition from Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 33(b). ↩
375 Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 67. ↩
376 HT 2021 Day 4, page 37. ↩
377 GeoMechanics I, Table 1 at page 12. ↩

[Page 307]

... We have shale layers at that same 350 interval .... if you review well log 1, there was also shale indicative at that level.

So we had shale indicated in four out of five wells, and that was the reason that we put a shale layer in our model. Not only did we have shale, but we also had gas shows in the logs. We had gas shows not only in well 2A: there's a gas show in well 2B mud log, right around that interval. So the combination of seeing shale layers, seeing gas shows, gives us confidence that there is indeed a stringer at that level of some reasonable thickness.378

1027 After the Hearing BAPEX presented its new loss quantification based on the Flow Rate Method, asserting that the gas escaping from the Reservoir, asserting that “it is quite clear that the overburden is capable of absorbing very large volumes of gas”. It quantified the quantity of absorbed gas at 62.4Bcf and added: “BAPEX estimates that as much as 50 BCF could also have been trapped by impermeable shale stringers and other features in this large area of overburden through which the gas flowed.”379

1028 The Tribunal notes the Claimant's statement that

Niko (and the experts it retained) do not dispute, nor have they ever disputed, that there is evidence of some limited and discontinuous shale stringers in the overburden. The issue is whether BAPEX has proven that shale stringers have trapped large quantities of gas below surface. They have not, and Niko submits the evidence is to the contrary.380

1029 Concerning BAPEX's new assertion of 50Bcf of gas trapped by shale stringers, the Claimant responds: “This bald assertion is made without any supporting evidence or analysis, including an explanation as what are the new ‘other features' they allege would have this effect".381

1030 With respect to the earlier versions of gas being trapped by shale stingers, Gaffney Cline had asserted that “there was no evidence of any continuous sealing formation in the sand layers above Sands 1 and 2 that could have trapped to gas”. Concerning 3D seismic data, they asserted that the “seismic survey indicates only sand layers, which are very porous and cannot trap the


378 HT 2021 Day 4, page 55, referring to Exhibit RH-5, slides 7 and 8. ↩
379 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 42 and 43. ↩
380 C-PHB 1, paragraph 38. ↩
381 C-PHB 2, paragraph 16(d). ↩

[Page 308]

gas" and data indicating bedding “clearly indicates this bedding fades away before getting to the regional seal over the structure”.382

1031 Concerning the representations of gas trapped by shale stringers presented by BAPEX's experts, the Tribunal has reproduced copies of some of these representations of shale stringers in the Overburden. The great diversity in these representations raises doubts with respect to at least some of them. In any event, they did not attempt to link the graphic to the evidence on which they relied.

1032 Gaffney Cline noted that there were claystone streaks of varying thickness and frequency reported in the mud logs but “there were no continuous claystone streaks to act as a seal in the shallow sands above Sands 1 and 2”. They found that this conclusion was supported by seismic data. They examined the evidence about gas saturation and, based on 30% porosity, determined the increase of gas until critical saturation would be reached. They concluded that this subsurface increase could be between 0.3 and 3.08Bcf, with a most likely increase of 1.21Bcf.

1033 Considering Ryder Scott's explanations that excluded evidence from some wells and certain logs, Gaffney Cline argued that it was “unreasonable to simply reject this data in making an evaluation of the lithology of the upper sands". And they argued:

Importantly, to the extent emphasis is to be placed on the wireline logs, all such logs from Ch-2B and Ch-2C (including the mudlogs from all wells), show only background levels of gas in the shallow formations. There are no indications of any higher level of gas saturation such as would be seen if there were indeed an accumulation of gas underneath a shale stringer.

1034 Gaffney Cline concluded that there were no “significant shale stringers in the shallow sand formation that could exist over a large enough area to form a trap for any substantial quantity of gas” and confirmed its prior estimate of 0.057Bcf.383

1035 At the Hearing, Mr Seager of Gaffney Cline accepted in response to a question from the Tribunal that elsewhere in the Overburden, where none of the wells were drilled, there were shale stringers that had the right shape and the right


382 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 33(a) and (b). ↩
383 Gaffney Cline IV, paragraphs 27 (emphasis in the original) and 28, reference to Gaffney Cline III, Table 3 at page 20. ↩

[Page 309]

length to trap gas; but he pointed that there was no evidence that was in fact the case. 384

1036 The Tribunal considered that there is extensive evidence for shale stringers. This evidence is provided by indications in the drilling reports; it is also provided by indications in the First Gas Loss Report that shows “Claystone (Stringers)" at around 350m and above 420m; and, as pointed out by Dr Bruno, 385 the “Claystone (Stringer)” is shown in the Chattak 2A well proposal.

1037 These indications are, however, isolated signs of such shale stringers. In order for these shale stringers to trap larger quantities of gas, they must be connected and have the right shape. GeoMechanics had shown in its first report presentations assuming connected shale shales trapping large quantities of gas.386 At the November 2021 Hearing he accepted, however, that that the quantities shown were for the “purpose of illustration” and explained that he “wouldn't assign any accuracy to that”.387

1038 The evidence does not support continuity between the clay stringers that could be seen in the drilling reports:

... I would grant that they are in fact discontinuous, meaning they may not line up, and that's because of the nature of the geology there.

1039 And he agreed with Mr Oletu, one of the Gaffney Cline authors, that the clay stringers have a lens or lentil shape, which divert the flow of the gas but does not trap the gas:

This is a deltaic and fluvial environment. You would expect these muds to be laid down in lenses, as Mr Oletu has testified. They will be not necessarily continuous until they get thick, such as the marine shale which was laid down in a marine environment. But they are there, and they do act to retard vertical migration of gas ...388

1040 The Tribunal concludes that the evidence in the record shows shale stringers in the Overburden; the evidence does not support the assumption that significant quantities of gas were trapped in the Overburden.


384 HT 2021 Day 2, page 93. ↩
385 HT 2021 Day 4, page 58. ↩
386 For examples see Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, Section 9.1.1. ↩
387 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 16 - 17. ↩
388 HT 2021 Day 4, pages 57 and 58. ↩

[Page 310]

7.5.5 The causes of the Chattak 2A blowout and liability for
the subsequent loss of gas

1041 As explained, the blowout of the Chattak 2A relief well occurred on 24 June 2005; the initial flare lasted until 7 July 2005 when the well bridged. Considering some conflicting statements about the duration of this initial period, the Parties agreed that the period between the Chattak 2A blowout and its bridging, for purposes of gas loss calculations, is approximately 12 days in duration.389

1042 In the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, the Tribunal decided that Niko's liability for the first blowout extended to gas that escaped from the Reservoir after the second blowout on 24 June 2005 “unless it is established (i) that the bridging of the Chattak 2 wellbore, assumed to have taken place on 9 January 2005, obstructed the wellbore at the Regional Seal and reduced the flow of gas from the Reservoir and (ii) that the second blowout removed the obstruction and reactivated the flow of gas”.390 The Tribunal explained:

The decision about the question whether the gas that escaped from the Reservoir during the second period, between 24 June 2005 and 9 October 2005, is recoverable loss, depends on a decision about the correct scenario [concerning the events at the second blowout]. Such a decision requires that any relevant evidence and the experts of the Parties be heard in the next phase of the arbitration.391

1043 The Parties disagree about the causes of the Chattak 2A blowout and, consequently, about responsibility for the loss during this initial period. The critical point for this issue relates to the question whether the Chattak 2A blowout was caused by the relief well hitting an accumulation of gas that continued to flow until the well bridged or by the blowout establishing a connection with the Reservoir through which the gas flowed again unrestricted in a manner similar to the Q1 flow of the first blowout.

1044 BAPEX considers the loss as part of the Chattak 2 blowout and attributes the loss to Niko:

Simply put, the Chattak 2A well did not reach the Upper Marine Shale and thus could not have affected the Reservoir. The second blowout merely released to the surface gas that had already escaped due to the


389 See above, Section 4.7.6and below Section 7.6.4. ↩
390 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraph 773(ii). ↩
391 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraph 264. ↩

[Page 311]

first blowout or was already flowing from the Reservoir underground at a high rate.

[...]

... the gas would not have escaped during this period but-for the Chattak 2 blowout. In contrast, and as Niko again concedes, even without the second blowout, there would have been a continued gas flow due to the first blowout until the Reservoir depleted.

1045 Mr Hughes opined that

... the 2A relief well encountered a large volume of high pressure gas at 422 meters, 60 meters above the Marine Shale.

1046 Mr Hughes situated the blowout of the Chattak 2A well some 7 meters from the Chattak 2 wellbore and concludes that it was not possible for the two wells establishing contact. The gas that flowed through the Chattak 2A well had been accumulated before the blowout. Mr Hughes represented the situation by the following two drawings:392

Chattak 2A Well Blows Out
June 24, 2005

[Image of a wellbore schematic with the following labels:]

Legend: Wright bridge location range (305-352m), Hughes bridge location range (250-420m), Gas, Gas Flow

Depth markers: 0m, -300m, -400m, +500m, -600m

Stratigraphy: Overburden, Sandstone, Shale Stringers, Sandstone, Shale Stringers, Sandstone, Marine Shale, Sand 1, Localized Shale, Sand 2

See, e.g., Wright Sept. 30, 2021 Rpt. p. 10; C-043.


392 Exhibit RH-6, slides 13 and 16. ↩

[Page 312]

Chattak 2 and 2A Separation at 422m TVD

[Image of two wellbores with the following labels:]

Chattak 2A, Chattak 2

8.5in, 7m, 1:1 Scale, 8.5in

Depth markers: 417m, 418m, 419m, 420m, 421m, 422m, 423m

Legend: Gas, Gas Flow

See, e.g., C-043; Wright Sept. 30, 2021 Rpt. p. 10; C-053; Hughes Aug. 20, 2021 Rpt. p. 12.

1047 The Claimant explains that the Chattak 2A blowout restored an open flow to the surface by connecting the Chattak 2A well to the Chattak 2 wellbore. During the first 40 hours of the Chattak 2 blowout, the gas flowed unrestricted. When the well bridged, the flow reduced because the gas faced the backpressure of the Overburden. The Claimant accepts that there is no clear evidence for the cause of the second blowout. The Claimant is of the view that

It is much more likely that Chattak 2A encountered a washed-out area around the Chattak 2 wellbore which caused the loss of drilling fluid and direct communication with and flow from the pressured reservoirs.393

1048 At the Hearing, the Claimant summarised the position as follows:

The Claimant's position is that but for the Chattak 2A blowout, there would have been a continued, very restricted flow out of that wellbore, of the rates and quantities addressed by the experts.

What happened with Chattak 2A is that it opened a completely new channel, a large wellbore channel, back to the surface. And for that ten-day period in particular of high flow rates out of the reservoir, that high


393 C-Gas Loss Calculations, paragraph 20(e)(ii), referring to Gaffney Cline III, paragraphs 65-66 and 70. ↩

[Page 313]

flow rate of gas would not have occurred but for the Chattak 2A blowout.

[...]

We're not saying that the drilling of the Chattak 2A well created channels. What we're saying is that when the Chattak 2A well blew out -- and as expressed indeed by Mr Grace in his well incident report -- is that it ended up, by some mechanism -- and the experts differ on this -- but it ended up, by some mechanism, re-establishing direct communication with the Chattak 2 wellbore into the regional shale and into the sands to allow for that, again, massive flow of gas. 394

1049 Mr Wright illustrated this explanation of the Chattak 2A blowout by the following drawing:395

Chattak 2A

Figure 5

  • Choke system cut-out after ~5hrs.
  • After ~ 6hrs flow ignited and flowed for 11 days, then bridged and the flow again diverted underground.
  • During the surface blowout, the vast majority of the gas flowing to surface would be directly from Sands 1&2.
  • The total gas volume exiting sands 1 and 2 would have also increased during the 2A blowout to surface (prior to 2A bridging)
    • Relative to the post bridging period of Chattak 2, due to the lower back pressure on the reservoirs than when flowing totally underground against the formation pressure with broaches to the surface.
[Image of a wellbore schematic with the following labels:]
Chattak 2A, Chattak 2
Bridge
Chattack 2A Total losses @ 436m
Top of DP-341m
Discontinuous Clay Stringers in Chattak 2. not observed 2A
8.5 OH washed out to unknown diameter
Unconsolidated Sand fluidized by gas and water
Marine Shale
S1
S2
9.1 ppg mud (from drilling)
8-1/2" Hole
Section Depth @ 807m

Reference: John Wright Report / Demonstrative Figure 5
Sequence of Events from Exh. C-045 - R.Grace, Events at Niko Resources - Chattak 2A Relief Well.

1050 In response to the explanation of BAPEX and Mr Hughes, the Claimant confirms, as discussed above in Section 7.5.4, that it accepts that there are shale stingers in the Overburden:

To be clear, Niko (and the experts it retained), do not, nor have they ever disputed, that there is evidence of some limited and discontinuous shale stringers in the overburden. The issue is whether BAPEX has proven that


394 HT 2021 Day 4, pages 77 - 78. ↩
395 Exhibit CH-9, slide 11. ↩

[Page 314]

shale stringers have trapped large quantities of gas below surface. They have not, and Niko submits the evidence is to the contrary.396

1051 The Claimant insists on the relevance of the shape of the stringers: it points out that Dr Bruno agreed with Mr Oletu that the shale stringers were primarily of lenticular nature which means that they could divert but not trap the gas.397 And the Claimant and its experts argued that, if there had been a shale stringer capable of trapping gas at the location of the Chattak 2A blowout, the quantity so trapped would have been very small. Mr Seager illustrated this position by the following drawing, showing a shale stringer with trapped gas near the Chattak 2 and 2A wells:398

Figure 5: Chattak Wells' Trajectory and Hypothetical Shale

Chattak Wells' Trajectory relative to Chattak-2

[Chart with the following labels:]

X-axis: Relative Distance from Chattak-2 (m)

Y-axis: Well Depth m TVD ss

Labels: Cone of hypothetical trapped gas, Radius, Height

Legend: Chattak-2, Chattak-2A, Chattak-2B, Chattak-2C, Chattak-1, Top of Girujan Clay

1052 The explanation of this drawing concluded as follows:

The maximum volume that would be “trapped” by such a shale layer was only 0.057 Bsc.

1053 Mr Wright showed a picture of the Q1 flare of the Chattak 2A blowout, stating:


396 C-PHB 1, paragraph 38. ↩
397 C-PHB 1, paragraph 38, referring to HT 2021 Day 4, pages 57 – 58 and Day 3, pages 99 – 100. ↩
398 Exhibit CH-1, slide 25, discussed at Day 2, page 93. ↩

[Page 315]

This kind of jet fire, flowing for eleven days, no way came from a small amount of trapped gas below any discontinuous shale.399

Chattak 2A

Picture of jet fire after ignition in Chattak 2A

  • After 11 days the 2A well bridged
    • Chattak 2 bridged after flowing for only 1 day.
    • The gas volume lost during the 2A pre-bridging flow would be greater than the Chattak 2 pre-bridging flow, due to the increased time.
  • This kind of jet fire would not flow for 11 days from a small volume of trapped gas above the Marine Shale
  • This has a direct connection to S1 and S2 from the Chattak 2 wellbore

Chattak 2A - Exhibit C-313 - 2005.06.26 - Chattak 2A Blowout flame photo
Sequence of Events from Exh. C-045 - R.Grace, Events at Niko Resources -
Chattak 2A Relief Well.

[Photograph of a large gas flare from a well.]

1054 The Tribunal notes that the circumstances and causes of the Chattak 2A blowout were considered by the Second Gas Loss Committee which envisaged the possibility of the two opposing explanations which correspond to the theories adopted by the Parties:

Flow calculation requires modeling. The committee discussed two alternate flow models. The first assumes that the Relief well hit an accumulated gas close to the 1st blowout well and only accumulated gas has been burning without communication with the main reservoir. The second assumes that after initial burning of some accumulated gas the Relief well had direct communication with the first blowout well and since then gas had been flowing from the main reservoir (Sands 1 & 2 of Chattak West). From the intensity of the flame, water and sand that came out of the well it was concluded that the second scenario is the most likely model.

[...]

Regarding the second blowout, there are two different perceptions on what has actually happened. One assumes that the relief well first


399 HT 2021 Day 4, page 112 and Hearing Exhibit CH-9. ↩

[Page 316]

penetrated into an area of accumulated gas around the 1st blowout well and the other theorizes that a direct interception of the 1st blowout well occurred.400

1055 The first of these scenarios relies on the existence of a large shale stringer, capable of trapping a quantity of gas of such importance that it nourished the 12 days flow of a high quantity of gas at the rate of 148.2 MMcfd burning with a high flame. The Respondents had relied on “impermeable formations in the sands above the reservoir” and other causes to support the second head of gas loss, arguing that the accumulation of gas in the Overburden created drilling hazards of such importance that the gas remaining in Sands 1 and 2 was no longer recoverable. The Tribunal considered this claim in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision and concluded that, assuming the allegation was correct, this head of loss was not recoverable.401

1056 Since then, the issue of accumulation of gas in the Overburden continued to be argued by the Parties and their experts in the context of the quantification of the lost gas and the causes of the Chattak 2A blowout.

1057 Considering these causes, the Tribunal concluded in Section 7.2.4, that the evidence does indeed show clay stringers in the Overburden. It noted the concurring opinion of Dr Bruno and Mr Oletu that these shale stringers are expected to have the shape of lenses and are not continuous. The quantity of gas that may have accumulated below them, therefore, must have been relatively small. The Tribunal noted the explanation in one of Mr Wright's Reports, Wright III, which appears to the Tribunal as reflecting correctly the evidence produced:

For the approximately 12 days the Chattak 2A well was flowing to surface through the casing, the flow rates would be similar to that of the original Chattak 2 blowout before it bridged (minus the 5-1/2 months of reservoir depletion and flow friction through a smaller annulus in Chattak 2A). The fire size was significant and over 30m in height. The hydraulic connection was almost certainly directly to the Chattak 2 blowout borehole and the S1 and S2 sands. The flowrate and duration was not consistent with flow coming through a charged sand matrix above the Marine Shale as suggested by Mr. Hughes.402

1058 From the evidence produced, the Tribunal concludes that the most likely course of events is that to which the Second Gas Loss Committee had given


400 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, pages 4 and 8. ↩
401 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, Section 9 and conclusion at paragraph 399. ↩
402 Wright IV, page 11. ↩

[Page 317]

preference, and which Mr Wright described. The Tribunal summarises its understanding as follows:

1059 The Chattak 2A well did not reach the opening in the Regional Seal through which the gas escaped into the Overburden. The bridge in the Chattak 2 well did obstruct the wellbore and reduced the flow from the Reservoir; as discussed in Section 7.5.5, this obstruction did not occur at the Regional Seal but somewhere above in the wellbore. The second blowout probably hit some accumulated gas, as assumed by the Second Committee. The Tribunal concludes from the evidence that the quantity of any possibly accumulated gas that may have caused the second blowout does not explain the large quantity of gas the escaped during the initial period and burnt in a high flame. The Tribunal accepts that the flow in this quantity was caused by a connection of the Chattak 2A well to the Chattak 2 wellbore and, through this wellbore and the opening in the Regional Seal, to the Reservoir. The consequence was that the gas flowed again at AOF through an open hole. This increased the flow rate of gas which until then faced the pressure differential with the Overburden.

1060 This increase in the flow rate is due to the Chattak 2A blowout for which Niko is not responsible. The quantity of this increase is discussed below in Section 7.6.4.

7.5.6 Niko's liability for gas lost after the completion of the
Chattak 2B relief operation

1061 In the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, the Tribunal decided that the loss caused by “gas continuing to escape from the Reservoir [after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation] is recoverable” as part of Niko's liability.403 The Tribunal considered the Claimant's allegations that

(i) drilling one or several production wells, as proposed by Niko since May 2005, would have caused the rate of any seepages after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation to diminish and eventually cease; and

(ii) the failure of BAPEX and the Government to approve Niko's proposals of production wells and the conditions for such approval were not justified and therefore prevented Niko from mitigating the loss.


403 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraph 275; the quoted passage made the proviso that the loss was recoverable “to the extent to which the loss of gas escaping from the Reservoir after the Chattak 2A blowout is recoverable"; this proviso has been decided above in Section 7.5.6. ↩

[Page 318]

1062 Argument and evidence on the issues related to these allegations was reserved in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision. 404

1063 The Claimant had argued that it was ready, willing and able to undertake in 2005 new production wells, which would cause seepages from the Reservoir to cease substantially. BAPEX refused to allow any drilling to take place and then made its consent subject to unreasonable conditions. The Claimant holds BAPEX responsible for any losses caused by ongoing seepages.

1064 The Respondents asserted that, on 7 March 2006, following the Government's consent, BAPEX did approve Niko's proposed work programme for drilling; but Niko refused to accept the “more than reasonable” conditions for the approval. BAPEX contested that, had Niko been allowed to drill the proposed wells, the operations would have been successful at producing gas in commercially viable quantities and would have mitigated the loss of gas.

1065 The Tribunal considered the argument and evidence presented by the Parties in this respect and identified the decisive issues in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision. The identified issues concerned the questions

(i) would drilling one or several production wells, as proposed by Niko since May 2005, have caused the rate of any seepages after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation to diminish and eventually cease?

(ii) was the failure of BAPEX and the Government to approve Niko's proposals of production wells or the conditions for such approval justified if such wells would have been capable of reducing and stopping any continuing seepages?405

1066 The Parties addressed these issues in written submissions and at the Hearing. At the end of the Hearing, the Tribunal included a further related issue in Question 19 for the Parties to address in their Post-Hearing Briefs:

Assuming the flow from the Reservoir had not been completely stopped and BAPEX would have accepted that Niko drill one or several production wells,

19. when could the production have started and when could the resulting reduction in pressure have caused the remaining flow from the Chattak 2 well have stopped?


404 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, Section 8.3.2 and specifically paragraph 287. ↩
405 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, Section 8.3.2, the issues were identified in paragraph 287. ↩

[Page 319]

1067 The Tribunal considers in this Section the issues of Niko's liability for gas that escaped after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation, in particular any mitigation of gas losses by production wells and BAPEX's alleged responsibility for not having approved the drilling of such wells and then having made approval subject to unreasonable conditions. The quantities of any gas lost after 9 October 2005 for which Niko is liable will be addressed below in Section 7.6.6.

7.5.6.1 The case for mitigation of gas losses by the production
wells proposed by Niko

1068 In the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, the Tribunal had qualified its decision on Niko's liability for gas that escaped after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well on 9 October 2005 by the proviso that the value of any lost gas was recoverable,

... only for gas that would have escaped the Reservoir despite a production well, provided it is established that BAPEX failed without justification to approve that Niko drill such a production well.406

1069 The Claimant's case on this issue is presented as a case of mitigation. For "the factual background relevant to mitigation”, the Claimant relied on its CMD and Mr Adolph's fourth witness statement.407 In the CMD the Claimant had responded to BAPEX's BMD in which BAPEX had held Niko “responsible for the lack of development of the Chattak field in the aftermath of the blowouts".408 In its response, the Claimant asserted that “BAPEX Breached the Joint Venture Agreement” and “BAPEX Prevented the Development of Chattak West”.409 It sought compensation for the loss caused by that alleged breach and requested that this loss be set off against the claims of BAPEX. The Tribunal denied the set off, concluding that the claims invoked by the Claimant were time-barred.410 This does not exclude that Niko relies on these events in defence against the claims of BAPEX and the Government for their loss. The Tribunal will therefore consider the mitigation defence when determining Niko's liability for the loss of gas after 9 October 2005.

1070 The legal basis for Niko's mitigation case and the relevant legal standards were presented at the Hearing.


406 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraph 773(iv). ↩
407 HT 2021 Day 1, page 73, referring to CMD, paragraphs 315 - 395 and WS Adolph IV, paragraphs 7 - 38. ↩
408 BMD, Section IV B, pages 50 - 67. ↩
409 CMD, titles of sections X.B and X.C. ↩
410 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision. Section 12 and Section 13.5. ↩

[Page 320]

1071 BAPEX presented the relevant legal standard by relying primarily on English law authorities. It stated:

Niko bears the burden of proof of showing two elements (1) that there was a course of action which it would have been reasonable to expect the injured party – here BAPEX – to take; and (2) that it would have avoided all or an identifiable part of BAPEX's loss.411

1072 Relying on English and other cases and legal writings, BAPEX presented the following principles:

1073 The Claimant concurred generally with these principles:

... as I understand it, there is not much dispute on the relevant legal principles governing the issue of burden of proof and mitigation, and indeed it would be surprising if there were. These are relatively well-settled principles. But I do want to clear up what I respectfully consider


411 HT 2021 Day 1, page 20 and Exhibit RH-2, slide 2 with references. ↩
412 Quoted from RH-2, slides 2 and 3, where the references to the quoted passages are indicated; some of these principles were quoted at HT 2021 Day 1, pages 20 – 21. ↩

[Page 321]

to be some over-extension as to the operation of those legal principles in this case.413

1074 While contesting the manner in which the principles were applied by BAPEX to the present case, the Claimant expressly accepted in substance the two principal elements for mitigation, as they were proposed by BAPEX at the Hearing and quoted above:

... a step that ought reasonably to have been taken, and that would have had the effect of mitigating all or some of the loss.414

1075 Having heard the Parties' argument about the applicable legal standard, the Tribunal sought confirmation of the understanding that the English law of contract principles can be relied upon to determine the mitigation issue under Bangladesh law. Referring to a position presented by the Respondents, the Tribunal enquired from the Claimant confirmation

...that there is no dispute between the parties that English law contract principles on mitigation are applicable as part of the law of Bangladesh, and therefore, unlike perhaps on some of the other issues earlier in this case, we can treat the English law cases as being relevant to our determination as to what the legal principles are. Is that right?

MR COLE: Yes, that is correct, Professor McLachlan.415

1076 Against the background of this agreement on the relevant legal principles, the Tribunal considered the mitigation action at issue. This action concerns the drilling of production wells, an action that Niko proposed to take. BAPEX, as the injured party, was not expected to take any mitigation action, except that it had to approve them. In the terms of BAPEX's definition the first question is therefore whether it “would have been reasonable to expect the injured party – here BAPEX” to approve the drilling of the production well as proposed by Niko.

1077 The Claimant's position is, in summary, that “Chattak West could and should have been produced” and the “main conditions stated by BAPEX at the JMC meeting no. 6 were unreasonable”;416 and that “there is no dispute in the contemporaneous evidence that production of Sands 1 and 2 would reduce and eventually eliminate any seepages of gas from those sands”. It contested that BAPEX's position with respect to the approval of the proposed


413 HT 2021 Day 1, page 63. ↩
414 HT 2021 Day 1, page 72. ↩
415 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 81 - 82. ↩
416 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 74 and 75. ↩

[Page 322]

production wells was reasonable. It pointed out that the approval of Niko's proposed production wells would have been a matter of the ordinary course of business in the context of the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture:

... it is difficult to conceive of something that could be more ordinary course of business in the context of a joint venture contract to drill and produce gas [than] to drill and produce gas. So the measure being proposed by Niko, that is the drilling of a new well, is very clearly in the ordinary course of business.417

1078 Concerning the conditions presented by BAPEX at the 6th JMC meeting on 7 March 2006, the Claimant did not consider them as dealing with “impediments to going forward with developing the field and drilling the wells” but as “an attempt unilaterally to rewrite the parties' agreement in the JVA".418

1079 The Claimant recommended focusing “on what the record shows rather than reinterpretation of the record” and advised against statements “of what a given party was thinking at a given point in time, where those are unsupported either by witness evidence or by the contemporaneous record”.419

1080 BAPEX asserts that “BAPEX's conduct was indeed reasonable”; and it contests that “the additional wells would have actually mitigated damages”.420 More generally, it states that, in order to appreciate the reasonableness of BAPEX's decision, the entire context in which this decision is taken must be considered:

It is not just Niko's proposal to advance with the additional wells that needs to be considered, it's the entire context of what was happening at the same time.421

1081 To highlight this more general context, BAPEX insisted at the Hearing on the sequence of events. It presented a chart with the timeline situating the proposals for production wells in the context of the blowouts and related events and recommended that the Tribunal pay particular attention to this timeline.422


417 HT 2021 Day 1, page 71. ↩
418 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 73 - 75. ↩
419 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 82 - 83. ↩
420 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 20 and 52. ↩
421 HT 2021 Day 1, page 22. ↩
422 HT 2021 Day 1, page 21. ↩

[Page 323]

1082 The context which the Tribunal was invited to consider was described at several occasions, including in the following terms:

BAPEX acted more than reasonably. What BAPEX had to consider was the risk of a possible third blowout -- which was a very real risk -- and the possible environmental and health consequences that could result. It was weighing that huge risk against maybe, possibly, kind of saving some gas.

When you look at what BAPEX had before it, it acted very reasonably, it acted very rationally. And if it had not pumped the brakes, if it had not set some conditions for the way forward, it could have potentially been behaving negligently and not in compliance with the duties it owed to its shareholders and to the public at large.423

1083 BAPEX argued that it would have been “irresponsible” for BAPEX to “permit[..] Niko to drill one or several production wells into Sands 1 and 2” and insisted that it was reasonable to make further drilling subject to the prior success of the relief operation and on the adoption of a budget. This sequence or conditionality is a point that BAPEX in the Arbitration considered “basic” and “super-important”.424 BAPEX also described this condition as a “quality control measure”, important also in the interest of the local population and the environment.

1084 In its PHB, BAPEX summarised its position by stating

As to Niko's purported “mitigation” claim, BAPEX's decision not to allow Niko to drill a new production well absent proof that Chattak 2B was successful, among other quality control measures, was entirely justified. BAPEX had every reason to proceed with caution in light of Niko's negligent drilling practices, which resulted in two blowouts, one failed kill well operation, and a failed flow test. Moreover, Niko had not shown to BAPEX then – nor has it proven to the Tribunal today – that drilling those new wells would actually salvage any viable gas. When weighing Niko's desire to drill new wells, without proof that doing so would salvage gas, against the risk to the local population and environment in the likely event that Niko's drilling would exacerbate the problem, BAPEX rightly determined that the risk as too great. The decision to prioritize safety over


423 HT 2021 Day 1, page 40. ↩
424 HT 2021 Day 1, page 46. ↩

[Page 324]

speculative commercial gains was more than reasonable in these circumstances.425

1085 The Tribunal addresses the mitigation issue, as it was invited to do by BAPEX, in its broader context, considering the events described by the Parties in their submissions, the documentary evidence and testimony, including the events on the timeline presented by BAPEX at the Hearing. It does so by reference to the evidence about circumstances prevailing at the time and the positions actually taken, not those that could have been taken. It explained this already in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, when it identified the decisive issues:

As pointed out by the Claimant, the question must be considered by reference to the circumstances and explanations actually given at the time in response to the drilling proposals presented by Niko and not by reference to circumstances that the Respondents' experts may have observed over ten years after the proposals were made.426

1086 When considering this context, it appears important for the Tribunal to note that Niko's proposals for drilling wells were made and discussed by the Parties in the context of the JVA. This agreement provides for Niko's right and obligation concerning the development of the Chattak field and for the manner in which these rights and obligations were to be exercised. The proposal of production wells in the present case, therefore, differs from the situation in which the injured party is presented by a proposal from an otherwise unrelated party. In the present case, as BAPEX has highlighted, there is a history of “the parties” relationship” that must be considered. This includes both the terms of the contract between the Parties, the breach of that contract by Niko's negligence as established by this Tribunal having caused the first blowout,427 and other events in the development of this relationship and the manner in which the Parties dealt with them at the time.

1087 Concerning production of gas under the JVA, the Claimant refers to Article 24.2 of the JVA which confirms that Niko “shall have the right to produce annually a volume of optimum deliverable Petroleum of each reservoir of individual Gas Field”.428 The production operations which Niko prepared and submitted for approval are based on Niko's rights under the JVA. They must also be seen in light of its obligations, including the qualification in Article


425 B-PHB1, paragraph 6. ↩
426 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraph 287(ii). ↩
427 As discussed at the Hearing, recorded at HT 2021 Day 1, pages 76 - 78. ↩
428 CMD paragraph 391. ↩

[Page 325]

24.2, that prescribes that Niko's production must follow “good reservoir management practices”.

1088 When describing the “entire context”, in which it invited the Tribunal to consider the production wells, BAPEX stated that, as a result of the blowouts, their effects on the population and other action especially during 2005, it was “losing confidence in Niko's abilities”.429 BAPEX does not, however, argue that it put into question the JVA and Niko's rights under it. There is no indication that BAPEX took the position that Niko was no longer entitled to produce gas from the Chattak (West) Field, as provided by the JVA. Nor is there any indication that, at the time, BAPEX considered it “irresponsible” to permit Niko to drill one or several production wells into Sands 1 and 2, as BAPEX argued in the Arbitration. In the context of the debate about drilling production well, the continued application of the JVA was not in question.

1089 BAPEX did, however, insist on the strict application of the JVA terms, in particular with respect to decision making. BAPEX pointed out that Article 6.1 of the JVA requires decisions on work programmes and budgets to be submitted to the JMC; and decisions at the JMC must be taken “unanimously". As JV partner, BAPEX, therefore, had to consent to such decisions and had the power to prevent them from being taken validly.

1090 When BAPEX failed to consent to proposals from its JV partner Niko and when it subjected its consent to conditions, the situation may be considered from the perspective of the duties of joint venture partners and a breach of these duties. The Tribunal has considered Niko's breach of contract claim elsewhere and does not intend to reconsider it here. In the context of the issue considered here, the contractual framework nevertheless remains relevant; but additional considerations related to mitigation must also be taken into account, in particular the question whether insisting on strict application of JVA procedural requirements was reasonable from the perspective of mitigation.

1091 The drilling of production wells and the conditions for their approval must also be seen against the fact that, since 7 January 2005, gas was escaping from the Reservoir in an uncontrolled flow. As alleged by BAPEX, this flow continued after 9 October 2005, possibly in reduced quantities. There has been some argument that gas production from the Reservoir would not stop gas seeping through an incompletely sealed opening in the Regional Seal caused by the blowout (an issue that is considered separately). At the time when Niko proposed the additional wells there was, however, no denial that


429 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 22 and 23 et passim. ↩

[Page 326]

production of gas would reduce the loss of gas caused by the blowouts: obviously, gas that is produced is not lost in the sense of the loss of gas claim in the Arbitration.

1092 While it is conceivable that the mitigation of gas loss through producing wells could have arisen soon after the first blowout, the evidence before the Tribunal shows that, in fact, the issue of mitigation by production wells arose only after the Chattak 2B relief operation had been completed and BAPEX questioned the success of this operation. In any event, there is no request by the Claimant to reduce Niko's liability for gas loss prior to 9 October 2005 on grounds of BAPEX's failure to approve the drilling of production wells that had been proposed by Niko before that date.

1093 The Tribunal will consider first the proposals for production wells as they evolved over time and BAPEX's position taken on them. It will then consider in Section 7.5.6.5, whether, for the purpose of the Claimant's mitigation defence, it must be assumed that the proposed production wells, had they been authorised, would have avoided all or part of the loss of gas after 9 October 2005.

7.5.6.2 The proposals for production wells

1094 Mr Adolph stated that, despite the first blowout, “both Niko and BAPEX continued to regard the Chattak field as viable for development and production” and “Niko continued to prepare and submit proposals for the development of the Chattak field”, including “specific well proposals for drilling of a new production well”.

1095 Before the first blowout, the Chattak 2 well proposal had been submitted to BAPEX on 14 December 2004. Niko commenced drilling without awaiting a JMC meeting or a reaction from BAPEX.430 After the Chattak 2 blowout, the programme for the Chattak 2A relief well was approved at the 4th JMC meeting on 22 February 2005.

1096 The first “Drilling and Evaluation Program” for the Chattak 3 production well was submitted by Niko's letter to BAPEX, dated 3 May 2005.431 The letter stated that drilling would start “following the completion of the Relief Well". The programme was attached to the letter.432 Niko requested that


430 See Decision on Liability, paragraph 192; the well proposal and the cover letter of 14 December 2004 were produced as Exhibit C-15. ↩
431 Exhibit C-36. ↩
432 Both Parties refer to an updated version of the programme, dated 16 October 2005 (showing “June 2005" on pages 1 -24 and "October 2005" on pages 25 – 42); the versions produced by the Parties differ slightly, the Respondent's version (Exhibit R-35) ends with page 34, without the Appendix which is ↩

[Page 327]

BAPEX sign and return a copy of the programme, failing which “approval will be considered as complete”.433

1097 BAPEX responded to this proposal on 12 June 2005, identified a number of technical modifications that had to be made and requested that the well be drilled to a depth of 1750m so as to permit production from the lower Sands. BAPEX explained the reason for the deeper drilling:

... since blowout occurred at these two target sands during drilling well Chattak #2, BAPEX proposed to keep the option to drill up to 1700m for extraction of gas from the lower horizons in case the initial targets (sand 1 & 2) are not successful.434

1098 Niko accepted all but two of the requested modifications,435 including the change in the depth, and presented a revised programme by a letter dated 19 June 2005,436 explaining that in the attached version the programme had been revised to reflect BAPEX's comments and concerns. With respect to the two items of BAPEX's requested modifications, Niko explained why it did not consider it necessary; it has not been alleged that BAPEX objected to the omission or insisted on the changes.

1099 In the letter, Niko invited BAPEX to return the signed copy of the programme “as soon as possible so that planning work can continue”.

1100 The revised programme identified the objectives of the well: Sands 7 & 8 /1555m as "Primary Objective/depth" and 1 & 2 Sands/560m as “Secondary Objective”. The targets were presented as follows:

This well will be drilled to evaluate (log) the 1&2 sands (which is the zone that blew out on Chattak 2) and to evaluate and test a number of deeper sands. They are the sands 3&4, and 5&6 (which have produced approximately 27bcf of gas) and sands 7&8. Actual completion zone will be determined after logging.437


included in the Claimant's version (Exhibit C-265) on pages 35 – 42. BAPEX also referred to and produced a "West Chattak Field Marginal Gas Field Development Plan, dated May 2005 (Exhibit R-248, referred to in BMD paragraph 109 and FN 149); the substance of this document does not refer to the Chattak 2 blowout and seems to predate it.
433 Exhibit C-36. ↩
434 The 12 June 2005 letter has not been produced. Its content can be understood from Niko's letter of 19 June 2005, Exhibit C-40, and BAPEX's letter of 22 November 2005, Exhibit C-4; the quoted passage is taken from this latter document. ↩
435 The two proposed modifications which Niko did not accept were the addition of a “packer” and a sub-safety valve (SSSV); details about the function of these devices at BMD, page 52, FN 156 and 157. ↩
436 Exhibit C-40. ↩
437 Both Parties refer to an updated version of the programme, dated 16 October 2005 (showing “June 2005" on pages 1 -24 and "October 2005" on pages 25 – 42). ↩

[Page 328]

1101 The programme contained a section on Drilling Hazards which mentioned the Chattak 2 blowout and the possibility of “charging in the shallower sands”:

Down to top of the regional seal at +/-482m there is no evidence of shallow gas. However, there was a blow out on the Chattak 2 well and there may be charging in the shallower sands. This gas should bleed off after the relief well is complete. This well has been designed with a precautionary diverter string down to the top of the regional seal.438

1102 Shortly after the submission of the revised version of the Chattak 3 programme, the blowout at the Chattak 2A relief well occurred on 24 June 2005. Niko prepared the proposal for another relief well, Chattak 2B and as preparation for the relief operation, the proposal of a Data Acquisition well, Chattak 2C.

1103 BAPEX commented on these proposals in a letter of 27 July 2005, considering some aspects as satisfactory, requesting changes with respect to others and making recommendations on specific points.439 In that letter BAPEX also noted the two “terrible” blowouts and expressed firmly its disapproval, stating inter alia:

This is absolutely in contravention of clause no. 6 & 7 of Preamble part of the JVA.

and

BAPEX seriously feel that frequent changes of drilling proposals by Niko indicates its professional incompetence. Therefore, BAPEX feel that Niko should abide by article No – 2.7 and other relevant article of the JVA and also should devote themselves to highest professional skill.

1104 The proposal and BAPEX's comments were discussed at the 5th JMC meeting on 28 July 2005, and modifications were agreed.

1105 The minutes of that meeting440 include an item on the design of the wells and the supervision of their implementation. BAPEX had raised concerns in the letter of 27 July 2005, in the sense that


438 Exhibit C-265, page 12. ↩
439 Exhibit C-2; the relevant passage of this letter is also recorded in the minutes of the JMC meeting, Exhibit C-3, as Discussion Point. ↩
440 Exhibit C-3. ↩

[Page 329]

... relief well design should be reviewed by a third party independent consultant and BAPEX personnel should be on the location and involved in the meetings at the site when critical decisions are made.

1106 The minutes record the “Outcome of Discussion" as follows:

BAPEX has reservation with regard to the acceptability of GSM and APA and requests that Niko ensures proper supervision of these consultants in all stages of the work. Niko agreed to include Bapex personnel in site meetings and decisions. Niko will provide more information on APA's past history with relief well design and execution.

1107 Concerning financial matters, BAPEX had “opined that the costs of the Wells 2B and 2C should be excluded from the Investment Multiple”. The minutes record differing positions of the Parties on this point:

Niko stated that it is not clear what insurance coverage will be afforded to the 2B and 2C wells, however, any costs paid for by insurance will not be included in the investment multiple.

Bapex stated that costs for Wells 2B and 2C, whether it is covered by insurance or not, should not be included in the investment multiple.

1108 At the meeting the programmes for Chattak 2B and Chattak 2C were approved; the approval was recorded as follows:

The parties mutually agree that the Drilling Programs for the Chattak Relief Well Operation (Well 2C and Well 2B) as prepared by GSM Inc. on behalf of the Joint Venture, as further modified in the meeting, was acceptable and should be executed by Niko as planned and as soon as possible.

1109 With respect to the further development of the Chattak 3 proposed drilling programme, Mr Adolph mentions “several iterations” until the programme was approved.441 The programme seems to have been subject to further technical discussions. BAPEX confirmed in its letter of 22 November 2005 that it had approved the Chattak 3 drilling programme on 2 August 2005, subject to prior completion of the relief operation:

After several technical deliberation/revisions the proposal was finally accepted by BAPEX on 02-08-2005 to drill the well upto 1750m on


441 WS Adolph, paragraph 173. ↩

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condition of Niko's successful operations of the Chattak # 2B relief well.442

1110 The conditional approval and the sequence of steps leading to it were summarised by BAPEX in its letter of 22 November 2005:

Niko at first submitted proposal to drill the development well Chattak #3 on 03-05-2005 for drilling 800m (TD) with a view to produce gas from reservoir sands 1 & 2. But since blowout occurred at these two target sands during drilling well Chattak # 2, BAPEX proposed to keep the option to drill upto 1700m for extraction of gas from the lower horizons in case the initial targets (sand 1 & 2) are not successful. After several technical deliberation/revisions the proposal was finally accepted by BAPEX on 02·08·2005 to drill the well upto 1750m on condition of Niko's successful operations of the Chattak # 2B relief well.443

1111 Following the conditional approval of the programme or the Chattak 3 production well, Niko submitted a budget for that programme on 31 August 2005. BAPEX pointed out that that budget was only for the well as it had originally been planned up to a depth of 880m, although by that time Niko had accepted drilling to deeper horizons. The budget for drilling to a depth of 1750m was submitted by Niko on 24 October 2005. In its letter of 22 November 2005, BAPEX confirmed that the budget had been submitted and stated that the proposal “has not yet been approved ”.444

1112 The Chattak 2B relief well operation was completed on 9 October 2005. Mr Grace, who had directed the operation, reported on the performance and the result of the Chattak 2B operation in his End of Well Report, dated 29 November 2005. He concluded: “It appears that the Chattak 2 is finally under complete control. However, only time will tell for sure.”445

1113 The question of the success of this operation gave rise to differences between Niko and BAPEX, as will be discussed below in Section 7.6.6.1. These differences impacted the Parties' position on the question whether condition for BAPEX's approval of the Chattak 3 Programme had been met.

1114 On 22 October 2005, Niko wrote to BAPEX confirming the substance of a meeting of BAPEX and Niko on 20 October 2005. Niko presented its position according to which the drilling approval had been given already in 2004 but


442 BAPEX's letter of 22 November 2005, Exhibit C-4, confirmed in WS Adolph I, paragraph 173. ↩
443 Exhibit C-4. ↩
444 Exhibit C-4. ↩
445 Exhibit C-266. ↩

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accepted that the approval of the 2005 – 2006 budget was required by the JVA:

Niko is of the opinion that approval for drilling Chattak development wells was given at the Third JMC Meeting of February 28, 2004 as part of the revision of the scope of work in the JVA. However, be assured we are also committed to finalizing an approved Budget for 2005 — 2006 as required in the terms of the JVA.

1115 Niko added that BAPEX had approved the “detailed technical Drilling Program for Chattak 3”; therefore, it was moving the Chattak 2B rig to the Chattak 3 location to start producing gas by the end of the year; it also stressed the urgency of the budget approval and of the agreement to proceed with the Chattak 3 spudding to avoid standby costs:

In addition, Bapex has approved the detailed technical Drilling Program for Chattak 3. [Niko] therefore started moving the rig (Century Rig #2) from Chattak 2B to Chattak #3 once the killing operations were completed. We now anticipate that the rig will be ready to spud Chattak #3 on October 26 or 27.

With the approaching Eid-ul-Fitr period it is important that we work towards getting all approvals in place prior to the holidays to avoid any delays in spudding Chattak #3 and proceeding with other projects. If the Budget approvals and agreement to proceed with spudding of the well cannot be completed prior to the holiday break there could be significant standby costs for all rig and support equipment.

[...]

If work is allowed to proceed as soon as possible at Chattak we are confident that we will be able to drill the required wells, complete construction of production facilities, and start Chattak gas production by the end of 2005. Given this scenario we will be able to produce approximately 20 – 30 mmscfd of gas that can be added to the production levels in Bangladesh at a time when the demand for gas is at an all time high.446

1116 Two days later, on 24 October 2005, Niko submitted a revised budget proposal, as BAPEX later confirmed, which reflected the change in the depth


446 Exhibit C-276, emphasis in the original. ↩

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of the Chattak 3 well.447 The Tribunal is not aware of any requests by BAPEX for any other changes to Niko's 24 October 2005 budget proposal.

1117 Niko also submitted a proposal for drilling another production well, described as Chattak 4. The Tribunal understands from the record that this proposal was presented before the end of October 2005.448 BAPEX produced a revised version of the Chattak 4 well proposal, dated “November 2005".449 Both BAPEX and its experts relied on the proposal in a different context;450 they did not point out any objections made by BAPEX at the time against the proposal, nor was the proposal approved by BAPEX. The revised Chattak 4 proposal provided for drilling into and producing from Sands 1 and 2, with a spud date of 1 December 2005, following immediately the completion of Chattak 3.

1118 In a meeting on 30 October 2205, Mr Jamaluddin, the Managing Director of BAPEX, informed Mr Adolph about the outcome of a BAPEX Board of Directors meeting. Niko summarised the meeting with Mr Jamaluddin in a letter of the same day:451 the approval of the 2005-2006 budget had been deferred until it could be presented to Petrobangla, which meant that the JMC meeting of the BAPEX-Niko Joint Venture could take place only after the Eid holiday period. Niko requested immediate approval of Chattak 3, reserving final approval for a subsequent JMC meeting:

[Niko] requested that some projects that are critical for providing additional gas production for Bangladesh be approved now, with the understanding that final approval is contingent on a JMC Meeting. In particular, the installation of the compressor at Feni and the drilling of the Chattak 3 well were requested for approval.

1119 Concerning BAPEX's observations about continued seepages at the surface and the failure of the Chattak 2B relief operation,452 Niko wrote:

Drilling of Chattak 3 in no way should be related to the results of the killing of the Chattak 2 blowout. We are continuing to monitor all environmental indicators in and around Chattak 2 blowout area and all


447 As mentioned in BAPEX's letter of 22 November 2005, Exhibit C-4, page 3. ↩
448 Reference to the proposal is made in Niko's letter of 30 October 2005, Exhibit R-244. ↩
449 Exhibit R-64. ↩
450 BMD, paragraphs 138 (FN 209) and 182 (FN 307); Ryder Scott I, paragraph 45 and FN 34. ↩
451 Exhibit R-244. ↩
452 The question whether the Chattak 2B relief operation did indeed stop the flow from the Reservoir is considered below in Section 7.6.6. ↩

[Page 333]

signs continue to point in a positive direction that the killing of Chattak 2 has been successful.

If [Niko] is allowed to move forward with drilling of Chattak 3, we will be able to provide much needed gas production for Bangladesh by the end of 2005. Furthermore, Chattak 3 is simply part of the minimum commitment by [Niko] under the terms of the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA). [Niko] plans to immediately spud well Chattak 4 following the drilling and completion of Chattak 3. These two wells combined with the construction of a gas plant and tie in with the Jalalabad Gas Transmission and Distribution System Ltd. (JGTDSL) would allow [Niko] to produce an additional 30 – 40 mmscfd into the Bangladesh gas distribution network.453

1120 At the meeting of 30 October 2005, Niko informed BAPEX that it was planning to spud Chattak 4 immediately upon drilling and completion of Chattak 3.454

1121 Niko wrote two letters to BAPEX, dated 13 November 2005. In the first of these letters,455 Niko summarised a meeting it had with BAPEX on 8 November 2005 and recorded the disagreement about the success of the Chattak 2B relief operation. Despite this disagreement Niko stated its preferred go-ahead plan for Chattak was

... to drill Chattak 3 immediately to allow gas to be produced from the reservoir (i.e. Tipam Sands 1 and 2) while continuing to monitor and observe the outcome of the kill operations at Chattak 2.

1122 Niko mentioned as its first option: “Drill Chattak 3 and put gas on production thus producing more gas for Bangladesh while also de-pressuring the zone of the blowout”; and it listed the benefits of its preferred option:

  1. Production of more gas for Bangladesh by the end of 2005.
  2. De-pressuring of the Tipam gas Sands #1 & #2 to minimize any further seepage that might be occurring.
  3. Minimize the standby time which began as of October 25. This solution is consistent with sound international practices.

1123 Another option listed by Niko was to re-enter Chattak 2C and “complete this well as an observation well with the ability to monitor the reservoir pressure”.


453 Exhibit R-244, emphasis in the original. ↩
454 Exhibit R-244. ↩
455 Exhibit C-60. ↩

[Page 334]

Niko explained that the well could be set up “for monitoring of the reservoir pressure in the Tipam Sands #1 & #2 while we are producing these reserves. This work could be undertaken by continuing to utilize the rig effectively while working out the final approvals on Budget 2005 – 2006”. Niko also pointed out:

Demobilizing the rig for the purposes of moving out of the country is not our preferred option however should there be no approvals for productive work to utilize the rig Niko would have no other choice than to terminate the drilling rig and related services agreements and demobilize the rig.

1124 Niko also pointed out that, if no further drilling work would be done, the rig would be demobilised to Chittagong and it would be likely that Century Drilling, the owner of the rig, would remove it from Bangladesh.

1125 In the other letter of 13 November 2005,456 Niko stated that it “had previously received approval for the Chattak 3 Drilling Programme” and asserted that “the expenditure for drilling this well were confirmed in the JMC Meeting No. 3 wherein the full field development costs for the Chattak field were approved”. The letter noted that BAPEX had disagreed with this position and had required review and approval of the 2005 – 2006 by the BAPEX Board, followed by a JMC meeting “to confirm and approve” the Budget “including the drilling of the Chattak 3 well”.

1126 Niko noted that

... the drilling rig moved and rigged up on Chattak 3 and was ready to drill by October 25, 2005, [Niko] agreed to delay the spudding of Chattak 3 until the Board of Directors of Bapex could meet on October 29, 2005.

1127 Mr Adolph explained in his first witness statement the advantages of continuing relief operations by drilling a new well:

There was also considerable cost efficiency in drilling a new well contemporaneously with relief well operations. This was because a rig, crew and ancillary service providers had been secured and were on site. As such, significant mobilisation and rig move costs would be saved.457

1128 In the second letter of 13 November 2005, Niko also stated that BAPEX declined to hold a JMC meeting on 31 October 2005, as requested by Niko; standby costs for the rig continued at the cost of USD50'000 per day, amounting, at the date of the letter, to a total of USD750'000. The plan for re-


456 Exhibit C-61. ↩
457 WS Adolph I, paragraph 172. ↩

[Page 335]

entering the Chattak 2C well was confirmed “to re-establish communication with the reservoir to allow the well to be utilised as an observation well allowing continuous measurement of reservoir pressure. This work should take approximately 5 – 7 days”. Niko also stated:

All costs associated with the drilling rig to date will be included in the calculation of the Investment Multiple for the JVA.

1129 The letter concluded by emphasising that Niko was commencing the restoration of the blowout area, including a gas collecting system to collect any latent gas seepages and added:

We will continue to monitor the situation but firmly believe the aforementioned actions coupled with commencement of production for the Tipam Sands to de-pressure the sand is the sound technical way forward for all concerned.

1130 BAPEX responded by a letter dated 22 November 2005.458 It confirmed that on 31 August 2005, Niko had submitted a budget for Chattak 3 for drilling to a depth of 800m, which subsequently was adapted to the 1750m version. BAPEX also pointed out that Niko had submitted a “revised budget proposal on 24-08.2005 against depth of 1750 which has not yet been approved”; but the "technical proposal was accepted with option of 1750”. BAPEX concluded:

From the above points and scenario it is quite evident that there was no specific approval for Chattak well no. 3 in 3rd JMC meeting. Moreover, technical proposal for undertaking of drilling operations at # 3 has been conditionally approved by BAPEX as stated above. But the financial proposal for this purpose has not yet been approved. Hence it is not understood by us that how without successful accomplishment of relief well operation and without specific approval Niko has moved the rig and rigged up on Chattak # 3 and was ready to drill from October 25, 2005.

1131 In the letter, BAPEX also objected to the movement of the rig in preparation of drilling the Chattak 3 well, declaring it as a “unilateral decision/risk of [Niko]"; it stated that the standby costs were at Niko's sole expense, adding “BAPEX in no way can share/bear the responsibility of this sort of unauthorised expenses and hence this can never be considered in calculating Investment Multiple of the JVA”.

1132 BAPEX added that its “officers on observation of relief well are reporting the presence of many alive gas burning around the relief well(s)”. It attributed the


458 Exhibit C-4. ↩

[Page 336]

seepage to gas flowing from the formation and doubted the success of the Relief well. BAPEX concluded:

Therefore BAPEX will share the responsibility of expenses of Chattak Gas Field only after the approval of Chattak #3 development well budget by the next JMC – 6.

We would therefore advise, please keep continued observation and monitor the situation of relief operation. BAPEX will do the needful when we become fully convinced that the next drilling operation would be safe and success.459

1133 Mr Adolph explained that “Given the absence of approval for further work from BAPEX, the demobilisation of the Century rig commenced in November 2005 and was completed on 14 December 2005”.460

1134 Mr Adolph also reported about an opinion by Noble Smith. He explained that, during this time and as a requirement for the insurance cover, Niko had "the independent petroleum consulting firm of Noble Smith and Associates (“Noble”) review and approve the drilling programme before the Chattak 3 well could be attached to the policy”. Noble's report, dated 20 October 2005, approved the drilling programme and stated in particular:

The casing design, mud programme, cementing programme, drilling procedures and well control equipment are all considered by NSAL to be appropriate for the forecast subsurface conditions and in accordance with good industry practice.461

1135 Mr Adolph did not state that BAPEX was informed of that report or received a сору.

1136 In his fourth witness statement, Mr Adolph stated that Niko “continued to press for BAPEX approval to proceed with the Chattak 3 well and further development of the Chattak Field”.462 Niko also intervened with the Ministry where Mr Adolph was received by Mr Mahmudur Rahman, Advisor, Energy & Mineral Resources Division, on 12 February 2006.

1137 No progress was achieved at that meeting, and, on 13 February 2006, Niko wrote to Mr Rahman, with copy inter alia to BAPEX. Niko insisted on the


459 Exhibit C-4. ↩
460 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 26. ↩
461 Exhibit C-275, Section 4, Conclusions, quoted in WS Adolph IV, paragraph 22. ↩
462 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28. ↩

[Page 337]

action that had to be taken, including the urgency of the Chattak 3 well to avoid further loss of gas:

It is important to note that Niko is convinced that depletion of the reservoir at Chattak as soon as possible is an important step to ensure that any potential further gas losses eliminated. We believe our partner Bapex shares this opinion and supports the need to move forward with drilling in Chattak.463

1138 As quoted above, BAPEX insisted that the “Chattak #3 development well budget [had to be approved] by the next JMC – 6”. The 6th JMC meeting was eventually held on 7 March 2006. It has not been explained why the meeting was not held any earlier. From the minutes of the meeting464 it appears, however, that BAPEX first sought from the Government approval for the work programme, as stated in item 2 of the meeting minutes:

BAPEX informed that Government of Bangladesh had approved the work program of Chattak (West).

1139 The agenda of the meeting included in items 2 and 3 review/discussion and approval of the 2005-2006 budget. The approval in item 2 was subject to six conditions which concerned primarily financial matters, as they shall be discussed below in Section 7.5.6.4. Apart from the engagement of a consultant “on behalf of BAPEX to ensure full-time supervision/overseeing” no modifications of “work program of Chattak (West)” was required by the conditions.

1140 Concerning the budget for Chattak 3, item 3 of the minutes recorded:

BAPEX also stated that since approval of GOB has been given for work programme of Chattak (West) BAPEX would accord approval of Budget for Chattak (West) for a total amount of US$ 12.290 M including G&A Capital & Operating expenses subject to the fulfilment of terms and conditions as enumerated in item – 2.

1141 The minutes also recorded Niko's disagreement on items 2 and 3. Mr Adolph explained that “Niko's objection was driven by the unreasonable and inappropriate demand that it pay all Government and Petrobangla compensation claims, and the BAPEX position that Niko's capital investment


463 Exhibit R-283. ↩
464 Exhibit C-66. ↩

[Page 338]

in the Chattak facilities be excluded from the investment multiple”.465 The Claimant concludes

The Minutes made clear that BAPEX (and the Government) had approved the work program and USD 12.29 million budget for Chattak West (that Niko had previously submitted), but that the approval was subject to the fulfilment of the above six conditions. This is critically important. This this demonstrates that there were no issues with the work program (including the previously approved Chattak 3 drilling program) or budget submitted by Niko.466

1142 BAPEX considers the six conditions fully justified but otherwise does not contradict the substance of this statement.

1143 Following the 6th JMC meeting, Niko continued to request approval for drilling the production wells. Mr Adolph stated that “Over the following years, Niko continued to push for approval to proceed with the development of the Chattak Field to no avail”. He described again the approaches for going forward, drilling Chattak 3 and Chattak 4 and re-completion of Chattak 2C, with the following preferences:

Niko's preferred approach was to immediately drill the Chattak 3 well to assess the commerciality of the lower Sands and, assuming they proved to have commercial reserves, use the Chattak 3 well to produce those Sands. If they did not, then Chattak 3 could be used to produce Sands 1 and 2. If the Chattak 3 well was to be used to produce from the lower Sands, Niko's initial proposal was to then drill a new well, Chattak 4, to a depth of 800m to produce from Sands 1 and 2 and Niko provided BAPEX a well proposal for this Chattak 4 well. Another interim option proposed by Niko, considering both economic and technical aspects, was to recomplete the Chattak 2C well, either at its existing depth to produce from Sand 1, or to deepen it and complete it for production from both Sands 1 and 2.467

1144 With respect to the Chattak 2C re-completion, Mr Adolph referred to the Chattak 2C recompletion programme, revised 27 March 2006. He explained that the well had been spudded on 1 August 2005 “to gather data” in support of the Chattak 2B relief operation; it was then “left so that it could be


465 WS Adolph, paragraph 28. ↩
466 CMD, paragraph 355. ↩
467 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 30; references to Niko's 30 October 2005 letter, Exhibit R.244, and the November 2005 version of the Chattak 4 proposal, Exhibit R-64. ↩

[Page 339]

completed in the Sand 1. The bottom hole of the well is well positioned to be used as a producer in the future life of the field.”468

1145 Mr Adolph explained that BAPEX did not authorise the recompletion and “as an interim step in the hope of ultimately obtaining approval to proceed with the recompletion of Chattak 2C”, Niko requested and was granted approval for a “short term testing program in its current condition”. Niko proceeded with the test; “the well was put on gas production on 5 June 2006 flowing to the flare stack at the gas facility”. During the second stage of the flow test problems arose, the well pugged and the test had to be abandoned.469

1146 Mr Hughes and Mr Adolph disagree about the work and the cost for restoring the Chattak 2C well. Mr Hughes pointed out that the “pressure gauge and slickline stuck in the tubing” would have to be removed; he opines that some of the casing “no doubt has collapsed”; cleaning out the open hole “would result in an enlarged, washed out hole” requiring further work; and the constant seeping would lead to the loss of a portion of the anticipated reserves in Sand 1.470 Mr Adolph is of the view that the required work can be done by "a very simple and cost-effective method to complete the well at some USD 100'000 per day” and a total of approximately USD 1 million.471

1147 Niko continued to consider Chattak 2C as a potential means for producing Sand 1 or, if deepened, Sand 2. On 13 February 2007, it submitted to BAPEX its proposed work plan and budget for the 2007 – 2008 year;472 on 15 February 2007, it wrote to Petrobangla, referred to its investments and asserted: “We now anticipate that well 2C could be ready for production following approximately 7 days of rig work to prepare the well for production. Some lead time is required to secure a rig for the work.” And “Chattak 3 could be put on production in a very short time”, with lead time for securing the rig and supporting services.473 Niko's “Evaluation of Commerciality” document of August 2007 provided for production from Chattak 2C, Chattak 4 and Chattak 3. Chattak 3 was to target several zones, starting with the deepest target, Sands 7 and 8. Chattak 2C was a recompletion of the existing well and Chattak 4 “would be drilled should the recompletion attempt on Chattak 2C prove unsuccessful”.474


468 Exhibit C-277 and WS Adolph IV, paragraph 31. ↩
469 WS Adolph IV, paragraphs 33 and 34 and Exhibit R-62, Testing Program in Chattak 2C, April 2006. ↩
470 Hughes I, pages 5 and 6; discussed also in BMD, paragraph 137. ↩
471 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 39(a) and (b). ↩
472 Exhibit C-297. ↩
473 Exhibit C-298. ↩
474 Exhibit R-61, Section 3. ↩

[Page 340]

1148 The Claimant475 and Mr Adolph referred to other proposals and reminders; Mr Adolph asserted more generally:

We repeated on numerous occasions, both in writing and in discussions with BAPEX that if they were concerned that the Chattak 2B relief well had not completely sealed the reservoirs, the best solution was to start producing the reservoirs, or at least from the upper reservoir of Sand 1 to produce the gas that they believed was still escaping from the Chattak 2 well.476

1149 Summarising this development, the Tribunal notes that Niko's Chattak 3 well proposal was approved by BAPEX on 2 August 2005. In the Arbitration BAPEX asserted that the approval “was no longer applicable since Niko had caused a second blowout and had been required to build Chattak 2C and 2B, all of which were not anticipated when the May 2005 program was developed".477 As pointed out by Mr Adolph, the “second blowout had occurred on 24 June 2005 – more than a month prior to the approval”;478 and the Chattak 2C and 2B wells were approved at the 5th JMC on 28 July 2005. The Chattak 3 programme was thus approved by BAPEX with full knowledge of the second blowout and the need for the Chattak 2C and 2B wells. No objections had been raised to the drilling programme for Chattak 4 or to the re-entry of Chattak 2C.

1150 The Tribunal concludes: on 6 August 2005, the Chattak 3 proposal had been technically approved. In October 2005, the Chattak 4 proposal was submitted by Niko to BAPEX and remained without objections. Re-entering Chattak 2C as an Observation Well was mentioned by Niko on 13 November 2005 and later considered also as a possible production well. The revised budget, as required by BAPEX was submitted by Niko on 24 October 2005. BAPEX took position on these proposals by the approval at the 6th JMC meeting on 7 March 2006, subject to six conditions. The justification of the time it took BAPEX to take position and the of the six conditions are a contested issue between the Parties that shall be considered next.


475 CMD, paragraphs 365 – 389. ↩
476 WS Adolph, paragraphs 38 and 29. ↩
477 BMD, paragraph 116. ↩
478 Adolph IV, paragraph 10. ↩

[Page 341]

7.5.6.3 BAPEX's conditions for delaying approval of further drilling after the completion of the Chattak 2 B relief operation

1151 When emphasising at the Hearing “the entire context” in which the issue of the delayed approval of the production wells must be seen, BAPEX highlighted the events in the village of Tengratila, “families are being evacuated, school buildings are being condemned, arsenic is being found in water, gas is being located in a 1-kilometer radius”. It also stated that during the period from July to November 2005, “BAPEX is losing confidence in Niko's abilities. It's expressing its concern for safety and the need to have a drilling consultant”. It states that, the revised Chattak 3 proposal “identifies the possible risk of a third blowout” and quotes from Mr Grace's report on the Chattak 2B relief operation concluding about the success of that operation, “only time will tell".479

1152 BAPEX described its considerations in the following terms:

What BAPEX had to consider was the risk of a possible third blowout – which was a very real risk -- and the possible environmental and health consequences that could result. It was weighing that huge risk against maybe, possibly, kind of saving some gas.480

1153 The Claimant advised that the Tribunal should focus “on what the record shows rather than reinterpretation of the record”; and Mr Adolph asserted that Niko sought early production in order to minimise losses:

Niko's position following the blowout was that production of Chattak should be started as soon as possible, because if gas was indeed being lost after the blowout of Chattak 2, such losses would be minimized and mitigated if a new well was drilled and production was started.481

1154 BAPEX described the situation after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation by referring to Niko's letter of 30 October 2005. It highlighted the passage in which Niko stated the “Drilling of Chattak 3 in no way should be related to the results of the killing of the Chattak 2 blowout” and the announcement of spudding Chattak 4 immediately following the drilling and completion of Chattak 3. It described the “tension between the parties”: Niko pushing ahead and BAPEX “pumping the brakes":


479 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 22 - 23. ↩
480 HT 2021 Day 1, page 40; similarly in B-PHB 1, paragraph 84 and FN 102 ↩
481 WS Adolph I, paragraph 171. ↩

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We have Niko, who has crashed two cars, and has its foot on the gas of a third car and is risking the possibility of a third crash. And meanwhile, BAPEX is pumping the brakes and trying to slow down the progress to say, "If we're going to reach that third destination, we need to proceed cautiously and carefully".482

1155 It would have been negligent, so BAPEX contends, if it had not “pumped the brakes":

When you look at what BAPEX had before it, it acted very reasonably, it acted very rationally. And if it had not pumped the brakes, if it had not set some conditions for the way forward, it could have potentially been behaving negligently and not in compliance with the duties it owed to its shareholders and to the public at large.483

1156 Having heard at the Hearing the explanations about BAPEX “weighing the huge risk" of a possible third blowout and the possible environmental and health consequences, the Tribunal asked where the “technical concerns” described by BAPEX were expressed, compared to the financial concerns about the treatment of investment costs related to the drilling of the wells and related matters. BAPEX referred to the letter of 22 November 2005 where it “gave a technical approval to Chattak 3” but made it conditional:

...while BAPEX is saying from a technical standpoint, Chattak 3 may be acceptable, [BAPEX] is saying that is conditional on Chattak 2B being successful, the kill-well operation being successful.484

1157 BAPEX insisted that the success of the kill-well was a “super-important point"; if it was not successful, there would be “gas permeating throughout the site" with the risk of ignition. In the correspondence, it was “abundantly clear, that BAPEX's priority and biggest concern is the safety of proceeding with the additional production wells”.

1158 Considering BAPEX's argument and the evidence on the record, the Tribunal notes that BAPEX insisted on the prior success of the Chattak 2B relief operation. BAPEX treated this prior success as a condition for its approval. There is, however, no contemporaneous evidence on record that BAPEX considered the risks described in the Arbitration as a reason for delaying its approval for the drilling: Niko had modified its proposal to meet BAPEX's technical requests and BAPEX approved the programme so modified, subject


482 HT 2021 Day 1, page 28, relying on Niko's letter of 30 October 2005, Exhibit R-244, and Exhibit RH-2, slide 18. ↩
483 HT 2021 Day 1, page 40. ↩
484 HT 2021 Day 1, page 46. ↩

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only to the success of the relief operation and a decision by the JMC meeting, including agreement on the budget.

1159 The record shows that, when delaying the drilling of production wells after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation, BAPEX presented two reasons: (i) the prior adoption of the 2005–2006 budget and (ii) the success of the Chattak 2B relief operation. The Tribal will examine these reasons. There is no evidence that the other concerns raised by BAPEX in the Arbitration were raised at the time.

1160 Concerning the prior adoption of the budget, Niko had taken the position that approvals for drilling of Chattak development wells had been given at the 3rd JMC Meeting of 28 February 2004.485 BAPEX contested that at that meeting there was a “specific approval for Chattak well # 3”.486

1161 In 2005, Niko accepted that a budget for 2005-2006 remained to be adopted. At the 4th JMC meeting on 22 February 2005, it was agreed that the “2005-2006 Budget must be prepared and presented to the Joint Venture for approval”. It was also agreed that a JMC meeting should be held “as soon as possible” and that Niko would prepare the 2005-2006 budget and submit it with a proposed agenda for that meeting.487 At that occasion, costs related to the blowout were discussed, specifically “the method for payment of all costs for the relief well drilling and the replacement well to a depth of 807 meters”. The minutes of the JMC recorded:

Niko confirmed that all costs were being covered by an insurance claim for these costs. It was confirmed that Niko would prepare a separate letter to the Joint Venture members to confirm the situation.

1162 The minutes also state that such a letter had subsequently been sent on 6 March 2005 to BAPEX.488

1163 When it presented the Chattak 3 proposal with its letter of 3 May 2005, Niko presented this well as “the replacement well for Chattak 2 that was lost due to an uncontrollable gas release”.489 No mention was made about a budget.

1164 Critical issues of cost allocation arose and were discussed subsequently in the absence of an approved budget for 2005-2006: at the 5th JMC meeting on 28 July 2005, the JV Partners discussed a letter in which BAPEX had expressed to Niko various concerns, including the question whether and to


485 Letter of 22 October 2005, Exhibit C-276, item 3. ↩
486 BAPEX letter of 22 November 2005, Exhibit C-4. ↩
487 Minutes of the 4th JMC, Exhibit C-31. ↩
488 Exhibit C-31, item 10. ↩
489 Exhibit C-36. ↩

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what extent the costs of Chattak 2C and Chattak 2B should be included in the Investment Multiple of the JV or should be excluded from it and remain at the expense of Niko. While BAPEX took the position that such costs had to be excluded from the Investment Multiple, Niko wished to reserve the outcome of its insurance claim for these costs.

1165 The first transmission of a budget proposal is evidenced only for 31 August 2005; in its letter of 22 November 2005, BAPEX recognised that Niko submitted a budget for Chattak 3 on 31 August 2005; but BAPEX criticised that this budget was only for drilling to a depth of 800m and not for a well of 1750m, as had been accepted by Niko with the revised Chattak 3 programme.490

1166 In its letter of 22 October 2005, Niko recognised that “an approved Budget for 2005 – 2006 [is] required in the terms of the JVA” and assured BAPEX that it was "committed to finalising” such a budget.491

1167 The budget was then submitted on 24 October 2005, as recognised by BAPEX on 22 November 2005:

Finally Niko has submitted a revised budget proposal on 24-10-2005 against depth of 1750m which has not yet been approved.492

1168 Review of budget at a meeting of BAPEX's Board of Directors was announced:

Bapex then requested that the Budget 2005 - 2006 must be reviewed and approved by the Bapex Board of Directors followed by a JMC meeting to confirm and approve the Budget 2005 - 2006 including the drilling of the Chattak 3 well.493

1169 On 30 October 2005, the Managing Director of BAPEX informed Niko that, at the Board Meeting the approval of the Budget 2005–2006 had been deferred until a presentation of the Budget to Petrobangla could be made. A meeting of the JMC had to be deferred after the Eid holidays and no date was fixed. Given this delay, Niko requested that some projects, including the Chattak 3 well,


490 BAPEX's letter of 22 November 2005, Exhibit C-4; both the Claimant in CMD, paragraphs 337 and 339, and Mr Adolph in WS Adolph I, paragraph 173, rely as evidence only on this letter of BAPEX. ↩
491 Exhibit C-276. ↩
492 BAPEX letter of 22 November 2005, Exhibit C-4. ↩
493 Quoted from the account given in Niko's letter of 13 November 2005, Exhibit C-61. ↩

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... be approved now with the understanding that final approval is contingent on a JMC meeting.494

1170 BAPEX's Managing Director held another meeting with Niko on 8 November 2005, after he had visited the Chattak 2 blowout area two days before. Niko reported on this meeting on 13 November 2005. It recorded the disagreement about the success of the Chattak 2B relief operation. BAPEX concluded from the lack of agreement on this matter, that, apart from a compressor for the Feni field, work under the Budget 2005-2006 could not be approved. Niko stated that its “preferred go-ahead plan for Chattak was to drill Chattak 3 immediately to allow gas to be produced from the reservoir”.495 In this and the other letter of 13 November 2005496 Niko set out the different options for proceeding in the situation so created.

1171 In response to these two letters, BAPEX summarised events. Referring to Chattak 3, BAPEX confirmed that “the financial proposal for this purpose has not yet been approved” and questioned the move of the rig in preparation of drilling Chattak 3. Confirming its doubts about the success of the relief operation, BAPEX stated:

Therefore BAPEX will share the responsibility of expenses of Chattak Gas Field only after the approval of Chattak # 3 development budget by the next JMC – 6.

1172 The 6th JMC meeting was held only on 7 March 2006, about five months later. At that meeting BAPEX approved the budget in the terms quoted above, “since approval of GOB has been given for work programme of Chattak (West)”.

1173 The Tribunal concludes that BAPEX withheld approval of the budget since the time it had been submitted on 24 October 2005. BAPEX has not indicated any item of the budget with which it disagreed. The reasons on the record for this delay in approval relate to the doubts about the success of the Chattak 2B relief operation and the unexplained long time it took for the Government to approve the work programme, which BAPEX had approved already. The Tribunal concludes, since 24 October 2005 no justification has been shown for BAPEX to withhold, on grounds related to the budget, its approval of the drilling of production wells.


494 Niko's letter of 30 October 2005, summarising the meeting with Mr Jamaluddin of the same day. Exhibit R-244. ↩
495 Exhibit C-60. ↩
496 Exhibit C-61. ↩

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1174 The other principal ground invoked by BAPEX at the time for failing to allow Niko to proceed with the drilling of Chattak 3 was the condition of the prior successful completion of the relief operation.

1175 BAPEX argued at the Hearing, that Niko recognised that the approval of Chattak 3 “was conditional upon successful completion of Chattak 2A.497 It concluded that Niko itself “understood that proceeding with Chattak 3 is conditional on the successful kill-well operation. That was understood.”498 The argument was based on Niko's letter of 3 May 2005,499 with which it presented the proposal for Chattak 3. The letter simply says that “Drilling this well will commence following the completion of the Relief Well.” This is a simple statement of a logic sequence in the use of the drilling rig. The Tribunal does not see in this letter a recognition by Niko that the drilling of Chattak 3 is conditional on the successful completion of the relief operation.

1176 BAPEX states that, when it approved on 2 August 2005 the revised drilling programme for Chattak 3, it did so “on condition of Niko's successful operations of the Chattak # 2B relief well”. The approval of 2 August 2005 has not been produced in the Arbitration; the Parties rely on a confirmation with the quoted passage in BAPEX's letter of 22 November 2005.500 The assertion of the conditionality in the 2 August 2005 letter has not been contested.

1177 In the letter of 22 November 2005, BAPEX stated “it is evident that Niko failed to show their competence and efficiency in formulating plan for relief well operations”. It also stated that its officers reported “many alive gas burning in around the relief well(s)” and concluded that it was “not fully convinced that the relief operation of the ill fated Chattak #2B_Relief well is a success”. It continued by the previously quoted passage about the budget and concluded:

We would therefore advise, please keep continued observations and monitor the situation of relief operation. BAPEX will do the needful when we become fully convinced that the next drilling operation would be safe and success.

1178 In the Arbitration, BAPEX insisted on the prior success of the relief operation, justifying it by explaining that “BAPEX's priority and biggest concern is the safety of proceeding with the additional production well”.501 As explained above, BAPEX insisted that the success of the kill-well was of high


497 Exhibit RH-2, slide 6 under the date of 3 May 2005 and HT 2021 Day 1, page 25. ↩
498 HT 2021 Day 1, page 48. ↩
499 Exhibit C-36. ↩
500 Exhibit C-4. ↩
501 HT 2021 Day 1, page 46. ↩

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importance; otherwise there would be “gas permeating throughout the site” with the risk of ignition.

1179 In the PHB,502 BAPEX described this condition as a “quality control measure”, important in the context of mitigation:

As to Niko's purported “mitigation” claim, BAPEX's decision not to allow Niko to drill a new production well absent proof that Chattak 2B was successful, among other quality control measures, was entirely justified.

1180 The Tribunal considered that BAPEX had raised its “reservations” against the consultants that Niko had engaged for the Chattak 2B relief well and the Chattak 2C observation well. These were addressed at the 5th JMC meeting on 28 July 2005, as quoted above. Shortly thereafter, BAPEX approved the Chattak 3 drilling programme, “on condition of Niko's successful operations of the Chattak # 2B relief well”. The Tribunal concludes that any prior concerns had been considered by BAPEX when it gave this approval.

1181 The relief well was completed without any complaint about the drilling. Indeed, when, in its letter of 22 November 2005, BAPEX declined to allow drilling to commence, it did not allege that drilling the production well would be unsafe. The complaint that was raised by BAPEX in the Arbitration was that seepages continued, suggesting that the opening in the Regional Seal had not been completely sealed. BAPEX has not explained why any inadequacy in the sealing of this opening should raise or increase doubts in the capacity of Niko and its consultants concerning the drilling of a production well or otherwise speak against the drilling of a production well.

1182 The Tribunal also considered BAPEX's concern that the continuing seepages after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation increased the “gas permeating throughout the site” with the risk of ignition. The Tribunal accepts that, depending on the importance of the incomplete sealing, this is a justified concern. Indeed, in the Arbitration, BAPEX persisted in its position that the Chattak 2B relief well was not successful and that after 9 October 2005, 74.45 Bcf escaped from the Reservoir.503 In order to reduce the seepages, and thereby the related risk, Niko had insisted on the need for producing the gas from the Reservoir. Doing so would not just have been “saving some gas”, as stated by BAPEX; it would also have contributed to reducing risks caused by continued seepages. In such a situation, the Tribunal sees no justification in BAPEX's position: instead of approving the remedy which Niko had proposed for the seepage, it advised Niko to keep observing how the gas was escaping.


502 B-PHB1, paragraph 6. ↩
503 B-PHB1, Table 1 at page 23; of the total loss of 109 Bcf, only 34.55 had escaped by 9 October 2005. ↩

[Page 348]

1183 The Tribunal also notes that, despite its stated continued belief that the relief well operation was not successful, BAPEX and the Government approved the drilling programme on 7 March 2006. No changes of the programme previously adopted were required. The only condition that related to the drilling was the “full-time supervision/overseeing” for which a consultant should be engaged on behalf of BAPEX.

1184 The Tribunal concludes that, in the eyes of BAPEX and the Government, the concerns about Niko's lack of qualification and the serious risks of drilling a production well had been overcome and the previously approved drilling programme could be implemented without change, subject only to BAPEX being assisted in its supervision by a consultant.

1185 For all these reasons, the Tribunal does not consider that BAPEX's condition of prior successful completion of the relief operation was justified.

1186 The Tribunal concludes that insisting on the prior success of the relief operation before allowing Chattak 3 to be drilled unreasonably prevented mitigation operations to reduce the loss of gas that continued to escape.

7.5.6.4 The 6th JMC meeting on 7 March 2006 and BAPEX's conditional approval of the work programme

1187 The JMC meeting No 6, held on 7 March 2006 was attended on the side of BAPEX, by Mr Jamaluddin, the Managing Director, Mr Baqi, the General Manager, Geological Division and others; and on Niko's side by Mr Adolph, Vice President/Country Manager, Mr Goyal, Senior Finance Manager and others. The minutes of the meeting, with the letterhead of BAPEX, were signed without qualification by these and other members of the respective delegations.

1188 The meeting dealt with matters general to the Joint Venture activity and with matters specific to the Feni field and to the Chattak field. Item 2 of the meeting minutes dealt the further work in the Chattak field and stated:

BAPEX informed that Government of Bangladesh had approved the work program of Chattak West subject to the fulfilment of following conditions.

1189 The following six conditions were formulated, as listed in item 2 of the minutes of the meeting:504

i) During the drilling operations to be conducted by Niko as operator, in Chattak gas field, a consultant shall be engaged on behalf of BAPEX


504 Exhibit C-66. ↩

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to ensure full-time supervision/overseeing. All expenses in this regard shall be charged to JV as investment multiple.

ii) Costs incurred by Niko in connection with the drilling of Relief Wells 2A and 2B and Data Acquisition well 2C shall not be added to the investment multiple

iii) Approval of the work program submitted by Niko will not have any effect on compensation claim placed by Govt./Petrobangla.

iv) Niko shall have to give due consideration to the compensation claim of the Govt./Petrobangla.

v) Niko will not undertake any development work in future without the prior approval of the JMC. All investments made by Niko without the approval of the JMC in drilling Chattak # 2 well, installation of process plant in Chattak, construction of pipe line for supplying gas from Chattak gas field and procurement of vehicle in the name of BAPEX will not be added to the investment multiple of the JV. However, the operation and maintenance cost of the JV. However, the operation and maintenance cost of the process plant and the pipe line shall be added to the investment multiple of the JV.

vi) After successful commencement of development activities in Chattak (West) gas field, approval for development activities in Feni shall be given subsequently.

1190 The minutes also record the position of Niko in the following terms:

Niko did not agree to the conditions required for the development of Chattak (West) as discussed, and therefore no agreement was reached.

Further discussion and resolution of the work program is required.

1191 In item 3 of the minutes the 2005–2006 Budget was addressed: With respect to the Feni field BAPEX agreed operating and related costs and the compressor. BAPEX also agreed the budget items for Chattak:

Regarding approval of Budget 2005 – 2006 [Feni] BAPEX also stated that sine approval of GOB has been given for work program of Chattak (West) BAPEX would accord approval of Budget for Chattak (West) for a total amount of US$ 12.290 M including G & A Capital & Operating expenses subject to fulfilment of terms and condition as enumerated in item - 2.

1192 Niko's disagreement regarding the 2005-2006 Budget was recorded:

[Page 350]

Niko did not come to an agreement or understanding with BAPEX on this issue.

1193 Mr Adolph, who had attended the meeting on behalf of Niko, commented in his first witness statement in particular on condition (iv):

BAPEX has indicated that Niko would have to pay all amounts declared by the various Government committees to be owed to the Government as compensation for alleged losses resulting from the blowouts. As described above, Niko considers the Government committees' findings to be baseless. Consequently, Niko has been unwilling to agree to such an unreasonable and inappropriate condition. The minutes of the JMC meeting held on 7 March 2006 record that Niko must “give due consideration” to the compensation claim of the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla as a condition of approval. I attended this meeting and confirm that BAPEX declared that the Government of Bangladesh was insisting that such claims be paid.505

1194 Mr Adolph developed his comments about the 6th JMC meeting in his fourth witness statement, commenting each of the conditions and making general observations:506

While the Minutes reflect that Niko did not agree to the conditions, which is accurate, Niko's objection was driven by the unreasonable and inappropriate demand that it pay all Government and Petrobangla compensation claims, and the BAPEX position that Niko's capital investment in the Chattak facilities be excluded from the investment multiple. Our view was that development if the Chattak Field should proceed and disputes over such matters should be resolved under the dispute resolution process provided in the JVA.

1195 Mr Baqi, who had attended on BAPEX's side, produced a witness statement in which he referred to the minutes of the 6th JMC meeting, BAPEX's agreement to Niko's work programme and the conditions for such approval. He did not comment the substance of the meeting and of the conditions for BAPEX's approval.507

1196 BAPEX asserted that the conditions for the approval of Niko's work programme for Chattak were reasonable:


505 WS Adolph I, paragraph 174. ↩
506 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28. ↩
507 WS Baqi, paragraph 9. ↩

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These conditions were more than reasonable. It would have been a failure of BAPEX's own responsibility to let Niko continue drilling without additional mechanisms of protecting the State's natural resources and citizens' safety, following Niko's demonstration of its incompetence.508

1197 BAPEX discussed these conditions, one by one, in further detail at the Hearing.509

1198 The Claimant discussed the conditions and the interpretation given to them by BAPEX, relying primarily on Mr Adolph's witness statements. It focused on condition (iv) and on those concerning the costs of the process plant and the pipeline. It asserted that “the main conditions stated by BAPEX at JMC meeting no. 6 were unreasonable”; they were “an attempt unilaterally to rewrite the parties' agreement in the JVA”.510 It stated:

... none of these dealt with impediments to going forward with developing the field and drilling the wells; instead they were conditions that addressed the financial aspects. And those could very well have been addressed at a later date [...] So holding up development of the field based on those considerations was not reasonable.511

1199 The Tribunal has examined each of these conditions:

1200 Among the six conditions, recorded verbatim above, there is one that is directly related to the drilling operations. This is condition (i), which does not impose any modifications to the drilling programme, but requires that a “consultant be engaged on behalf of BAPEX to ensure full-time supervision/overseeing”.

1201 BAPEX explained this condition by its objective to “make sure that these are successful, let's make sure that these are safe”.512 Mr Adolph observed in his fourth witness statement that condition (i) “was similar” to the one recorded in the 4th JMC meeting for Chattak 2B and 2C, and stated that “the additional oversight of drilling operations [...] was not objectionable to Niko [...] and Niko would not have allowed it to stand in the way of obtaining approval to proceed with the development of the Chattak Field".513

1202 The Tribunal notes that, as pointed out by Mr Adolph, BAPEX had previously made a similar request with respect to Chattak 2C and Chattak 2B; the


508 BMD, paragraph 134. ↩
509 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 31 - 41; for details see below. ↩
510 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 73 - 75. ↩
511 HT 2021 Day 1, page 85. ↩
512 HT 2021 Day 1, page 32. ↩
513 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(a). ↩

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request was resolved by Niko agreeing to include BAPEX personnel in site meetings and decisions; the request was recorded and adopted at the 4th JMC meeting on 28 July 2005.514 The Tribunal also observes that condition (i) confirms that the “drilling operations [are] to be conducted by Niko as the operator”. No reservations are made as to the qualification of Niko to perform these operations. The condition concerns the "full-time supervision/overseeing” of these operations by BAPEX, a right that BAPEX has as the JV partner. The consultant is to be engaged “on behalf of BAPEX" to provide this supervision/overseeing.

1203 The Tribunal notes that this condition does not seem to seek an increase in BAPEX's rights with respect to the drilling operations. As a JV partner it has rights of “supervision/overseeing” and the JVA does not prescribe how these rights are exercised. The change brought by this this condition would have been financial: “all expenses in this regard shall be charged to JV as investment multiple”. In the circumstances it is understandable that BAPEX wishes to have qualified assistance in its supervision of BAPEX's JV activity and that the costs of this assistance be part of the project costs.

1204 The Tribunal concludes that condition (i) in substance is a financial condition. Given confirmation of Niko as “operator” of the drilling operations" and given the experience with Niko's activities in the Chattak field, it does not appear unreasonable that BAPEX requires the assistance of a “consultant” for its supervision/overseeing and that the expenses for that consultant be part of the project costs. In view of this consideration and of Mr Adolph's comments about Niko's position, Tribunal does not find condition (i) unreasonable.

1205 Among the other five conditions, the Tribunal notes that condition (iii) does not seem to have given cause for concern to Niko: The Claimant described it as "essentially a without prejudice provision”515 and referred to Mr Adolph's explanation that “Niko had never asserted and was not taking the position that it would only proceed with the development of the Chattak Field if [the compensation claims] were dropped”.516 The Tribunal does not find condition (iii) problematic.

1206 The remaining four conditions related to financial aspects. The Claimant described them as “an effort to extract extra-judicial relief from Niko”:

1207 Condition (ii) concerned costs of Chattak wells 2A, 2B and 2C. Mr Adolph had explained in his witness statement that the Chattak 2A costs would be covered by Niko's insurance claim; but that there was some uncertainty


514 Minutes of the 4th JMC, Exhibit C-3. ↩
515 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 80 - 81. ↩
516 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(c). ↩

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whether insurance proceeds would have been sufficient to also cover some of the costs of the Chattak 2B and 2C wells. He opined that “Niko was likely to agree to absorb any uninsured costs” of these wells but stated that, if a dispute remained, it had to be submitted to the contractual dispute resolution process.517

1208 At the Hearing, BAPEX referred to the 4th JMC meeting, held on 22 February 2005, at which the Chattak 2B Relief Well Drilling Programme was accepted and where Niko indeed had made the statement about the insurance cover. That decision concerned Chattak 2A, the only additional well in issue at the time.518

1209 The situation seems to have become more complicated as a result of the second blowout when two additional wells had to be drilled. When Chattak 2B and 2C was discussed at the 5th JMC on 28 July 2005, Niko stated that it was not certain that the insurance would cover also these additional wells. BAPEX insisted that the costs for these wells should not be included in the Investment Multiple, whether they were covered by insurance or not.519 The difference about the uncovered costs was not resolved at the 5th JMC meeting and remained open until the 6th JMC meeting, as it appears from Mr Adolph's witness statement. BAPEX explained the position taken in condition (ii): Niko was responsible for the damage and had to bear the costs:

So BAPEX's position is: "You messed up: you pay. Get it from the insurance, get it out of pocket, we don't care, but you can't charge the joint venture.520

1210 At the time, the issue of Niko's liability for any of these costs was controversial between the Parties. The Tribunal decided in the Arbitration that Niko is liable for the damage caused by the first blowout but not for those caused by the second blowout. By making the implementation of the Chattak work programme dependent on Niko renouncing any possible claims to include the uncovered costs in the Investment Multiple, BAPEX posed a condition for Niko's mitigation operation that was not necessary for its safe implementation. The Tribunal concludes that condition (ii) was not justified as a condition for allowing Niko to proceed with the mitigation operations in the Chattak field.


517 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(b); also paragraph 28(e)(i). ↩
518 Exhibit C-31. ↩
519 Exhibit C-3, item 10. ↩
520 HT 2021 Day 1, page 36. ↩

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1211 The conditions against which Niko had the most serious objections were conditions (iv) and (v), which it considered as “the deal-breakers”.521

1212 Condition (v) had two parts: the first sentence confirmed that “any development work in future” required “prior approval of the JMC”. ВАРЕХ highlighted this condition as a measure to deal with “an operator who repeatedly showed such dangerous incompetence” and stated that this condition “imposed by BAPEX merely reinstated Niko's obligations under the JVA to obtain prior approval of the JMC”.522 It referred to Article 6.1 of the JVA and confirmed that this first sentence was “simply a codification of Niko's obligations under the joint venture agreement”.523

1213 The Claimant does not object to this sentence; and Mr Adolph asserted that "Niko considered that it had acted in accordance with the JVA and had received the approval of the JMC for all prior work".524 This part of condition (v) is uncontroversial.

1214 The condition also refers to the “procurement of vehicle in the name of BAPEX”. The matter seems to have been resolved during the same JMC meeting: item 5 of the minutes refers to the “return of the vehicle” and states that “BAPEX would send a letter accepting Niko's proposal”. However, BAPEX brought up the matter at the Hearing in the context of condition (iv).

1215 The Claimant's objections concerned the remaining points in the provision that followed the first sentence.525 The Claimant argued that the provision sought to exclude from the Investment Multiple “the installation of process plant in Chattak”,and“construction of pipeline for supplying gas from Chattak gas field”. The Claimant argued that

... the process plant for processing gas from Chattak and the pipeline for transporting gas were critical to producing gas from the field, whether for commercial purposes or for mitigation purposes, because you have to treat the gas before you can transport it away from the field. So these were important items that were relevant for mitigation.526

1216 Mr Adolph had pointed out that

... these facilities were specifically part of the JVA and the approved work plan and budget. It was unacceptable to Niko that they not be included,


521 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 85 - 86. ↩
522 BMD, paragraph 134. ↩
523 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 37 - 38. ↩
524 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(e). ↩
525 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 85 - 86. ↩
526 HT 2021 Day 1, page 86. ↩

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particularly when BAPEX would have still benefitted from their construction once gas production began. As with the demand to pay all of the claims of the Government and Petrobangla, Niko considered this an unreasonable and inappropriate condition. Niko was of the view that the dispute over any compensation was to be resolved under the dispute resolution process under the JVA.527

The Claimant argued that a condition excluding “essential equipment for producing gas from Chattak” from the cost recovery under the JVA was “entirely unrelated to the technical issues”.528

1217 The Tribunal noted that the provision to which the Claimant objects does not exclude the listed components from the Investment Multiple, as the Claimant argues. The exclusion applies only to investments made by Niko “without the approval of the JMC”. The condition is significant because, by the time of the 6th JMC meeting, Niko had performed a large part of the work on the gas plant and the pipeline. In his first witness statement, Mr Adolph reported:

Niko built a pipeline to service the Chattak field, as well as a gas plant and associated facilities, such as a gas collection system.529

1218 In his fourth witness statement, Mr Adolph explained the work that had been carried out on the pipeline and the gas plant. The pipeline was practically completed, except for a short (approximately 200 meter) tie-in to the existing system; the work on the gas plant (a gas dehydration/processing facility) had progressed to the point that “the only remaining work was the commissioning of all the main dehydration equipment and start-up of the gas processing facility".530

1219 When Niko wrote to the Ministry of Energy on 18 February 2007, it relied on its investment in the gas plant and the pipeline in support for its statement that Niko was “uniquely positioned to continue with further drilling activities”, and was

confident that a significant supply of gas can be put on stream in Chattak almost immediately once the Feni wells are completed due to the fact that we have already invested significant capital to prepare the gas plant, pipeline, and receiving facilities at Chattak.531


527 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(e)(ii). ↩
528 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 78 - 79. ↩
529 WS Adolph I, paragraph 184. ↩
530 WS Adolph IV, paragraphs 52 and 53. ↩
531 Exhibit C-299, quoted at CMD, paragraph 369. ↩

[Page 356]

1220 Insofar as the gas plant and the pipeline are concerned, it appears therefore that the second part of condition (v) concerns past investments made by Niko. The same seems to be the case with respect to “drilling Chattak #2 well"; according to Mr Adolph “this was the first time occasion that any suggestion had been made that the Chattak 2 well expenditures should not be included in the investment multiple".532

1221 The question whether and under what conditions these past investments may be included in the Investment Multiple is distinct from the mitigation work for which Niko sought the approval of BAPEX. While the work on the gas plant and on the pipeline may be necessary requirements for producing gas from the Reservoir, BAPEX has not shown that the settlement of any related past investments is necessary for Niko's drilling of the proposed production wells. The same applies for investments for drilling of Chattak 2.

1222 The Tribunal concludes that the second sentence in condition (v) was not justified as a condition for allowing Niko to proceed with the mitigation operations in the Chattak field.

1223 Condition (iv) required that “Niko shall give due consideration to the compensation claim of the Gvt./Petrobangla”.

1224 The Claimant relied on Mr Adolph who stated that BAPEX required that Niko had to pay the amounts assessed by “the various Government committees” and that, at the JMC meeting, BAPEX declared that the Government insisted on that payment. Mr Adolph referred to the 6th JMC meeting firmly asserted in his first witness statement, dated 28 May 2014,

I attended this meeting and confirm that BAPEX declared that the Government of Bangladesh was insisting that such claims be paid.533

1225 He confirmed the assertion in his fourth statement and added:

... BAPEX was very clear that this meant Niko would have to pay all amounts declared by the various Government committees to be owed as compensation for alleged losses resulting from the blowouts. Niko considered this an unreasonable and inappropriate condition. Niko disputed the claims and was of the view that the dispute over any compensation was to be resolved under the dispute resolution process under the JVA:


532 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(e)(i). ↩
533 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 174. ↩

[Page 357]

1226 The Claimant explained: “As subsequently sought in the Money Suit, these compensation demands were in excess of USD100M”.534

1227 At the Hearing, BAPEX asserted that the condition, as recorded in the minutes of the JMC meeting, may be read as requiring Niko “to give some thought on these points”. It also stated “if Niko didn't like that, it could have indicated so and tried to negotiate or agree to some lesser amount. But we see no engagement by Niko, we just see a summary dismissal of BAPEX's concern”. And it asserted that Niko is “trying to circumvent the court decision by bribing an official so that it wouldn't have to satisfy the compensation claim.535

1228 The Tribunal considered the evidence about the meaning of condition (iv): Mr Adolph made a clear assertion in two of his witness statements. He appeared at the Hearing and was not questioned about this assertion. The Tribunal also noted that the 6th JMC meeting was also attended by Mr Baqi who made a witness statement, dated 27 October 2015, some one and a half year after Mr Adolph's first witness statement. In his witness statement, Mr Baqi insisted on the importance of JMC approval for drilling programmes and referred to the approval for Chattak 2A, Chattak 2B, Chattak 2C and Chattak 3. He referred specifically to the minutes of the 6th JMC meeting.536 He explained that he examined the Chattak 3 well proposal in comparison with the Chattak 2 casing design.537 And he described in detail the procedure leading to the JMC approval of Chattak 2A. He did not contradict or comment the assertion that Mr Adolph had made in his witness statement of 2014.

1229 The Tribunal concludes that Mr Adolph's testimony remained uncontradicted.

1230 The Tribunal also considered the interpretation that BAPEX proposed for the wording of condition (iv), suggesting that it meant “to give some thought on these points”. The Tribunal notes that, by the time of the 6th JMC, Niko had received the reports of the Gas Loss Committees, had considered them and recorded its own conclusion, stating where it disagreed. The Tribunal does not find it plausible that the Government required Niko again “to give some thought" to the claims. In particular, the condition is not expressed as a suggestion but as a command: “Niko shall have to give due consideration ...”.

1231 Moreover, as a condition for the approval of the work programme it must be presumed that some concrete action is required from Niko. That may have the meaning which Mr Adolph understood, i.e. accepting the claims as they were


534 CMD, paragraph 353. ↩
535 HT 2021 Day 1, page 39. ↩
536 WS Baqi, paragraph 9. ↩
537 WS Baqi, paragraph 15. ↩

[Page 358]

made; it may also include the possibility for Niko to negotiate for “a lesser amount”, as BAPEX argued at the Hearing.

1232 In any event and irrespective of the exact meaning of the words used, this condition required from Niko action that was unrelated to the work programme and not necessary for its safe performance. It was not a justified condition for allowing Niko to proceed with the mitigation operations in the Chattak field.

1233 BAPEX also sought to justify condition (iv) by asserting that it was concerned about Niko using a Toyota Land Cruiser provided to a Minister as corruption to avoid having to pay compensation. BAPEX asserted that “BAPEX was a bit frustrated that Niko is trying to circumvent the law” and “wouldn't have to satisfy the compensation claim”.538 When asked by the Tribunal whether there was any evidence on the record for this concern being relevant for BAPEX's determination with respect to the decision at the 6th JMC meeting, BAPEX explained that it was “not going to be airing its dirty laundry in a JMC meeting or any correspondence” but that “the logical inference can be drawn that it did affect BAPEX's perspective of Niko".539

1234 The explanation appears surprising: as pointed out above, the “procurement of a vehicle in the name of BAPEX” was referred to in condition (v) and the issue had been settled at the same 6th JMC meeting and was recorded in item 5 of the minutes. Mr Adolph explained the story of the vehicle in his second witness statement;540 he confirmed the explanations in his fourth witness statement, referring inter alia, to discussion at the 5th JMC.541

1235 The minutes of the 5th JMC meeting, signed by representatives of both BAPEX and Niko (including Mr Baqi and Mr Adolph), record the positions of BAPEX and Niko concerning “Provision of Vehicle for Bapex and Return of Same”. BAPEX stated that it “asked Niko to take back the car and to ensure that the cost of the car will not be added to the investment multiple of the JVA ...”. Niko referred to a letter from BAPEX dated 9 May 2005 by which “BAPEX requested, agreed, and accepted from Niko the delivery of a vehicle for use by BAPEX for the purposes of joint venture petroleum operations ...”. Niko continued by stating that “Niko did deliver to BAPEX a vehicle (a Toyota Land Cruiser), for those purposes mentioned above, duly registered in the name of Bapex. Niko recognises that BAPEX no longer requires the use of the vehicle for the purposes of the joint venture petroleum operations”. The vehicle


538 HT 2021 Day 1, page 39. ↩
539 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 41 - 44 and 60 - 62. ↩
540 WS Adolph II, paragraphs 15 - 20. ↩
541 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(e)(iii). ↩

[Page 359]

should be returned to Niko and “BAPEX should therefore complete all paperwork, registrations and actions in this regard”. It results from the minutes that, at the 5th JMC meeting, the Parties disagreed about the question whether the costs of the vehicle should be included in the Investment Multiple.542 The matter was settled at the 6th JMC, mentioned above.543

1236 The Tribunal concludes that, at both at the 5th and the 6th JMC meetings, the question of the Toyota Land Cruiser was addressed openly and recorded in the minutes. There is no indication that this question had any impact on the position of the BAPEX or the Government concerning the payment of the “compensation claim” and the position with respect to condition (iv).

1237 The Tribunal confirms its conclusion that condition (iv) was not justified for allowing Niko to proceed with the mitigation operations in the Chattak field.

1238 Condition (vi) required that Niko had to accept all of the other five conditions and await “successful commencement of development activities in Chattak (West) gas field” before BAPEX would approve further development of the Feni field. Niko considered the condition as “unacceptable and inappropriate”.544 BAPEX justified this condition by the two blowouts and the “unsuccessful kill-well operation” and explained:

So BAPEX is saying, “Can you prove that you're capable to do this successfully and safely first? And then we'll let you go and drill in some other areas as well”. But also, more importantly, this is a non-issue because ultimately Feni went ahead.545

1239 When the Tribunal asked about the relation of this condition concerning work in the Feni field with drilling a well in the Chattak field, BAPEX explained:

... it concerns BAPEX wanting to move step by step in terms of the production and wanting to ensure that it was safe.546

1240 The Tribunal noted that BAPEX and the Government had accepted that the Chattak programme could be implemented. It is not persuaded that this development required that the development of another field be delayed.


542 Minutes of the 5th JMC meeting of 28 July 2005, Exhibit C-3, Agenda item 3. ↩
543 WS Adolph II (17 January 2017), paragraphs 15-20 and WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(e)(iii). ↩
544 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(f). ↩
545 HT 2021 Day 1, page 40. ↩
546 HT 2021 Day 1, page 50. ↩

[Page 360]

1241 The Tribunal concludes that condition (vi) was not a justified condition for the allowing Niko to proceed with the mitigation operations in the Chattak field.

1242 In conclusion on BAPEX's conditions for approving Niko's proposed work programme of Chattak (West), the Tribunal notes that the drilling programmes for the production wells which Niko had proposed are approved. None of the conditions to which this approval is subject require any adjustment to Niko's programmes; Niko may proceed with them without any changes. No further methods for avoiding risk to the population or the resource need be applied. The approval is not conditioned by the prior success of the Chattak 2B relief well.

1243 This understanding of the position taken by BAPEX at the 6th JMC meeting indicates that the Government and BAPEX were satisfied that any concerns about risks, safety and efficiency that they may have had were adequately taken into account by the work programme proposed by Niko. The continuing seepages and the concern about insufficient sealing of the blowout did not require delaying the implementation of the work programme. Conditions (ii) (ii), (iv), (v) and (vi) did not provide for “additional mechanisms of protecting the State's natural resources and citizens' safety”, as BAPEX asserted in the Arbitration, but sought to resolve pending financial issues in favour of BAPEX. They can therefore not be accepted as justified conditions for allowing Niko to proceed with mitigation action in the Chattak field.

1244 The Tribunal concludes that BAPEX found Niko's mitigation action acceptable but made its approval of this action subject to conditions that, in the circumstances, were not justified or reasonable for the implementation of such action by Niko.

1245 BAPEX also argues that Niko failed to engage with BAPEX about the conditions. It asserts that Niko did not engage “in an attempt to move forward reasonably, safely, successfully” and that, instead, Niko “summarily dismissed those conditions”.547 BAPEX relies for this assertion on a passage in the minutes of the 6th JMC meeting which it quotes as follows: “Niko did not agree to the conditions”; and “Niko didn't say “This is okay, we'll go ahead and agree to that'. It gave a blanket denial, unwilling to consider BAPEX's legitimate concerns”.548 With respect to condition (iv) BAPEX argued that Niko could have said it did not like paying the full compensation claim and could have “tried to negotiate or agree to some lesser amount”.549


547 HT 2021 Day 1, page 32. ↩
548 HT 2021 Day 1, page 34. ↩
549 HT 2021 Day 1, page 39. ↩

[Page 361]

1246 The Claimant pointed out that, as discussed in the context of the jurisdiction issue, Niko did engage with the Government and BAPEX on the compensation issues and proposed ICSID arbitration as early as 2007; and it stated: “we have presentations on what BAPEX was thinking back in 2005/2006 that, in our submission, are not supported by the record".550

1247 Mr Adolph described in his fourth witness statement Niko's position on each of the six conditions.551 He stated in particular that “BAPEX declared that the Government of Bangladesh was insisting that such claims be paid".552 Mr Adolph also stated that “Niko repeatedly expressed the view that any disputes over compensation should be addressed pursuant to the dispute resolution process under the JVA”.553

1248 The Tribunal notes that, in the minutes of the meeting, the words recording that Niko "did not agree to the conditions ...” are followed by the words “as discussed”. The Tribunal concludes that Niko did not “summarily dismiss" the conditions, but discussed them. It is indeed more credible on an issue of such importance that, as explained by Mr Adolph, Niko presented its views on the conditions of BAPEX and the Government and that the words "as discussed” in the minutes refer to a discussion in this sense.

1249 In any event, the critical point, in the Tribunal's view, is that BAPEX made the above identified unjustified conditions and, when Niko did not accept them, BAPEX did not withdraw them, neither at the JMC meeting or any time thereafter: to the Tribunal's knowledge, BAPEX has never withdrawn the conditions which the Tribunal found unreasonable.554 The Tribunal's conclusion with respect to the conditions as stated above is confirmed.

1250 The Claimant described the development subsequent to the 6th JMC meeting and its attempts to start production from the Reservoir with BAPEX's approval. These attempts were pursued unsuccessfully until Niko commenced this Arbitration. BAPEX then announced on 24 May 2012 that it preferred not to convene a JMC meeting until the award in the Arbitration would be received.555 The Claimant's account has not been substantially contradicted.


550 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 84 - 85.
551 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28
552 WS Adolph I, paragraph 174.
553 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 28(c).
554 CMD, paragraphs 365 and 362.
555 See in particular CMD, paragraphs 361 – 389.

[Page 362]

7.5.6.5 Would the proposed production wells have salvaged any commercially viable gas?

1251 BAPEX contests that drilling production wells “would salvage any commercially viable gas”;556 it also argues that, because of the alleged failure of Chattak 2B to stop the flow from the Reservoir, all the gas in the Reservoir was lost.557

1252 BAPEX also denies that the Claimant established the success of the alleged mitigation operation. It argues that the Claimant failed to prove “that the drilling of production wells after the blowout would have been successful and led to the commercial production of gas" and that “drilling those new wells would actually salvage any commercially viable gas”.558

Even if Niko had proven that BAPEX's decision was not justified (quod non), Niko has not established that it could have successfully drilled a production well, that drilling a production well would have reduced the flow of gas from the Chattak 2 wellbore, and that such a well would have produced commercially valuable gas.559

1253 BAPEX highlighted the risks of further drilling in the Chattak field, pointing out that Niko's drilling had suffered two blowouts and that Niko had mentioned the risk of a third blowout out as a cause for serious concern.560 Niko itself had flagged this risk in the drilling programme for Chattak 3 pointing out that “there may be charging in the shallower sands”.561

1254 Mr Hughes opined in his first report that “Subsurface soils above Sands 1 and 2 have now become unstable to the point where trying to drill a new well through those formations would cause undue risk [...] at the worst, another blowout if a pocket of gas in a charged up formation is released to the surface while drilling”.562 At the Hearing563 Mr Hughes stated that “Drilling Risks Remain for Future Wells 2C, 3 and 4”.564 He referred to “the presence of gas around the location” and asserted that the "subsurface soils are unstable due to waterflows around the Chattak 2B" well and that the “intermediate sands above the upper marine shale are still charged with gas”.565 Mr Hughes also


556 B-PHB 1, paragraph 6.
557 B-PHB1, paragraph 10.
558 B-PHB 1, paragraph 6 and 12.
559 B-PHB1, paragraph 7; similarly at HT 2021 Day 1, page 17; also pages 41 and 53 seq.
560 HT 2021 Day 1, page 40.
561 HT 2021 Day 1, page 27.
562 Hughes I, page 3.
563 HT 2021 Day 6 at 10.46 pm; the Hearing closed at 10.54.
564 Exhibit RH-15, slide 7.
565 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 181 - 182; and Exhibit RH-15, slide 8.

[Page 363]

asserted that the methods used during the 2B relief operation for the killing of the blowout well caused damage to the upper marine shale and the Overburden.566

1255 The Claimant asserts that “there is no dispute in the contemporaneous evidence that production of Sands 1 and 2 would reduce and eventually eliminate any seepages of gas from those sands.567 The Claimant refers specifically to “the joint report of BAPEX and Niko of 30th to 31st March 2010”568 and states that the joint statement in item 6 of this report “echoed statements made by Niko within months of the blowouts". For the Claimant this is one of the many occasions at which Niko had insisted on the production of gas from the Reservoir as a solution to any seepages after the Chattak 2B operation.569 The Claimant also stated that the JVA had created Niko's right to produce gas from the Chattak field.570

1256 The Claimant discussed the argument and evidence, including the reports of the experts about the risks that would prevent the safe development of Sands 1 and 2.571 It referred to the experience of Chattak 2A, 2C and 2B and considered it “a full answer to this risk”; and it referred to the analysis of Chattak 3 drilling programme by Mr Wright who found that the programme "completely planned for and managed these risks".572

1257 The Tribunal notes that, when Niko proposed to drill production wells in 2005 and thereafter, there was no doubt that these wells could successfully be drilled and would produce gas. At that time and thereafter these wells were considered suitable, and indeed the joint report of BAPEX and Niko representatives of 30 and 31 March 2010, to which the Claimant refers,573 contains the following recommendation:

To drill new well and produce gas from the field as soon as possible that may stop such seepages, as the pressure would be diverted to the well.


566 HT 2021 Day 5, pages 50 - 54.
567 HT 2021 Day 1, page 73.
568 HT 2021 Day 1, page 73 states 30th and 31st October 2010; this is obviously an erroneous date: the passage expressly refers to Exhibit C-95, which contains the joint report attached to letters of 30 and 31 March 2010. On this report, relating to a joint visit on 20 February 2010, see also CMD, paragraph 383.
569 CMD paragraph 383 with reference to Joint Report of BAPEX and Niko Representatives, dated 30 and 31 March 2010 (March 2010 Joint Report), Exhibit C-95.
570 CMD, paragraph 391.
571 CMD, pages 55 - 73.
572 CMD, paragraph 205 and Wright III, Opinion on Chattak 3 Well Programme's Adequacy for execution in 2005.
573 HT 2021 Day 1, page 74; the transcript indicates erroneously the date of 30 and 31 October 2010.

[Page 364]

This appeared to be the only viable long term solution of this present problem.574

1258 Mr Hughes had pointed out: “If Chattak No 2B well was partially successful in reducing flows from Sands 1 and 2 into the Chattak wellbore, then Sands 1 and 2 could be produced from Chattak Wells No 2C and 4” but contested that such production would “provide a preferential pathway for any gas from Sands 1 and 2 to flow from the Chattak No 2 wellbore”.575 The point will be discussed below in Section 7.6.6.3. In the present context, the Tribunal notes that Mr Wright had pointed out that “produced gas will draw down the reservoir volume and reduce the pressure faster than an assumed leak in Chattak 2 alone”. In any event, it appears obvious to the Tribunal that producing gas from the proposed wells “would salvage any commercially viable gas”, contrary to what BAPEX seems to believe.

1259 As to the concerns of BAPEX about risks faced by drilling production wells, the Tribunal considered above in Section 7.5.4 the allegations concerning shale stringers and the large quantities of gas trapped by them. It concluded that the evidence in the record does not support the assumption that significant quantities of gas were trapped in the Overburden.

1260 The Tribunal also notes that BAPEX had reviewed the Chattak 3 well proposal and, after it had been modified according to its requests, approved it. Niko had successfully drilled and operated production wells in the Feni field and the drilling programme for Chattak 3 shows that it had learned the lesson from the Chattak 2 blowout. The programme states expressly that there were “a number of lessons learnt during the relief well and these are incorporated into this program. Extreme caution to be taken in drilling this well”.576 Contrary to BAPEX, which took the reference to the risks as a cause for concern, the Tribunal finds these passages reassuring: as the blowout in the Moulavi Bazar field had shown, blowouts are an inherent risk and the Chattak 3 drilling programme shows that they were taken seriously Mr Wright showed this in his analysis of the programme: “The mitigation measures programmed by Niko were reasonable and reflective of good oilfield practice to reduce the risk of any unsafe occurrence”.577 It has not been argued that the precautions taken in the Chattak 3 programme did not apply also to the proposed Chattak 4 well.


574 March 2010 Joint Report, Exhibit C-95.
575 Hughes III, paragraph 38.
576 Exhibit C-265/R-35, page 12, emphasis in the original.
577 Wright III, paragraph 207.

[Page 365]

1261 Concerning production from Chattak 2C, Mr Hughes had asserted that "recompletion of the Chattak No 2C well is problematic” due to the need for cleaning out this well and what the assumption that the Chattak 2B kill operations “undoubtedly caused irreparable formation damage to Sand".578 Gaffney Cline contested these categoric statement and found that the alleged formation damage was unlikely.579

1262 The Tribunal concludes that the evidence does not support an assumption that the production wells could not have been successfully drilled. It also concludes that production of gas from the Reservoir would have reduced the losses that otherwise would have been caused by gas continuing to escape from the insufficiently sealed blowout. The question when production wells would have reduced or stopped this continuing flow after 9 October 2005 will be considered below in Section 7.6.6.3.

1263 BAPEX also argued that by the time production would have started, the Reservoir would have been depleted. BAPEX states that the hypothetical production could not have commenced before July 2007 and by that time “any production would have been minimal because by that point in time the reservoir was substantially depleted”.580 The argument is contradicted by BAPEX's own claims: for the period after 1 July 2007 it seeks compensation at a rate of 7.4 MMcfd with a total of 54.18 Bcf for lost gas.581 The argument is also contradicted by Ryder Scott, the Respondents' expert, who presented a table showing a gas production profile from Chattak 2-C re-entry and Chattak 4 starting in on 1 July 2007. At a flow rate lower than that assumed by BAPEX's claims, this table shows production lasting until 2019 with a total of 9.754 Bcf.

1264 The Tribunal concludes that the argument of prior depletion is not supported by the evidence.

1265 BAPEX also argued that Chattak 3 was not intended to produce from Sands 1 and 2 and that, therefore, producing gas from this well was not a measure to mitigate losses from these Sands.582

1266 The Claimant responded that originally Chattak 3 had been proposed for Sands 1 and 2. At the request of BAPEX the priority was shifted to Sands 7 and 8; but production from Sands 1 and 2 was reserved. The programme


578 Hughes III, paragraph 33.
579 Gaffney Cline III, paragraph 56.
580 HT 2021 Day 1, page 53.
581 B-PHB 1, Table 1 at paragraph 53: until 30 September 2016 at the rate of 7.4 MMcfd declining thereafter to zero by 31 December 2020, i.e. a total of 26 Bcf for loss to surface, plus 28.16 Bcf for subsurface loss.
582 HT 2021 Day 1, page 41 and 53.

[Page 366]

provided that the well would be drilled to the full depth of the known sands; when passing through Sands 1 and 2, some testing would be performed, including pressure tests to “determine whether or not any additional pressure depletion had occurred” and provide “logging information that would have [...] allowed for more specific ability to assess the gas-water contacts in Sands 1 and 2".

1267 The Claimant emphasized that the decision about which sands would be produced by Chattak 3 was reserved in function of what information was gathered from the drilling.583 It quoted from the Drilling Program:

This well will be drilled to evaluate (log) the 1&2 sands (which is the zone that blew out on Chattak 2) and to evaluate and test a number of deeper sands. They are the sands 3&4, and 5&6 (which have produced approximately 27bcf of gas) and sands 7&8. Actual completion zone will be determined after logging.584

1268 When BAPEX had questioned the success of the Chattak 2B relief operation, Niko proposed a modification of the programme. In the first letter of 13 November 2005, reporting on the meeting of 8 November 2005 with Mr Jamaluddin, the Managing Director of BAPEX, Niko wrote:

Niko stated that the preferred go-ahead plan for Chattak was to drill Chattak 3 immediately to allow gas to be produced from the reservoir (i.e. Tipam Sands 1 and 2) while continuing to monitor and observe the outcome of the kill operation at Chattak 2.585

1269 The Tribunal concludes that using Chattak 3 for immediate production of Sands 1 and 2 remained an option.

1270 Niko also presented a proposal for Chattak 4 which targeted Sands 1 and 2. The proposed spud date was 1 December 2005, following immediately on the completion of Chattak 3 and using the rig that was on site. The recompletion of Chattak 2C would “have put on production from at least the tip of the Chattak 1 sand”. The wells also would have provided additional information, including a “further pressure test to determine whether or not any additional pressure depletion had occurred”.

1271 The Tribunal concludes that the plan to drill Chattak 3 to the Sands 7 and 8 did not exclude production from the Reservoir, depending on the assessment of the results of the drilling or possible reorganisation, as


583 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 88 and 90 – 93.
584 Exhibit C-265/R-35, page 12.
585 Exhibit C-60.

[Page 367]

proposed by Niko on 8 and 13 November 2005. In any event, Chattak 4 and re-entry in Chattak 2C targeted production from the Reservoir. The “work program for Chattak (West)” that BAPEX approved only with unreasonable conditions therefore included production wells intended to mitigate losses from continuing seepages.

1272 BAPEX also argued that Chattak 3 was designed as a commercial well not one for mitigation: In response to a question from the Tribunal, BAPEX argued during the Hearing that Chattak 3 was presented as a “commercial operation. Chattak 3 wasn't going to be a mitigation well. This was primarily a commercial operation, subject to commercial considerations”.586

1273 In a different context, the Claimant stated that the scope of what was required for production of gas had to be considered “whether for commercial purposes or mitigation purposes”.587

1274 The Tribunal noted that the evidence does indeed show that Niko emphasised the commercial interest of gas production by the Chattak 3 well. Only after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation and only after the success of this operation had been put in question, mitigating the losses caused by the possibly continuing flow of gas from the incompletely sealed blowout became a concern. In its letter of 13 November 2005, Niko pressed for the start of production and mentioned, in addition to the commercial reason of producing gas for the market in Bangladesh, the effect of “De- pressuring of the Tipam gas Sands #1 & #2 to minimize any further seepage that might be occurring.”588 From then on, the mitigating effect of the production wells had been clearly presented and was repeatedly emphasised, including in the joint BAPEX/Niko report of 30/31 March 2010.589

1275 The Tribunal does not believe that the mitigation effect of the production wells is put into question by the fact that the proposal also had a commercial purpose and was made in the context of the JVA. Niko made it clear that these wells would also serve to mitigate the losses. BAPEX was thus made aware that, by refusing that Niko proceed with the production from the Reservoir or making it subject to the conditions the Tribunal considered unreasonable, it prevented Niko from mitigating gas losses.

1276 On the general issue examined in this Section, the Tribunal concludes: BAPEX had raised concern about incomplete sealing and continuing flow of gas from the Reservoir after the completion of the Chattan 2B operation.


586 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 58 - 59.
587 HT 2021 Day 1, page 86.
588 Exhibit C-60.
589 March 2010 Joint Report, Exhibit C-95.

[Page 368]

BAPEX and the Government were made aware that allowing Niko to drill and produce gas from the Reservoir would avoid or at least reduce further loss. BAPEX first delayed its approval of such drilling and, at the 6th JMC meeting, sought to make the approval conditional on financial advantages and other conditions which were unrelated to the concerns for safe and efficient performance of the mitigation work. BAPEX therefore unreasonably prevented Niko's mitigation action. The evidence in the record does not lead the Tribunal to assume that this action would not have permitted to reduce the loss of gas after 9 October 2005. BAPEX therefore may not claim for losses of gas that could have been avoided if production wells had been approved and gas would have been produced as requested by Niko. The condition posed in paragraph 773(iv) of the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision is met and Niko's liability is limited to gas that would have escaped the Reservoir despite a production well.

1277 BAPEX's refusal to permit drilling into the Reservoir also prevented that additional information be provided about the continuing seepages and, more generally, about the development of the Reservoir pressure.

7.6 Flow Rate assessment

7.6.1 Overview of the Parties' positions

1278 The Gas Loss Committees had subdivided the loss into three quantities: as they had been adopted in the Gas Loss Reports,

1279 This division was also applied in the Arbitration. In addition, the time of the flow analysis distinguishing between

1280 The Tribunal adopts these distinctions as far as practicable.

[Page 369]

1281 BAPEX also made a distinction based on information from the Chattak 2C well records, which provided, for the date of 4 September 2005, pressure information for the Material Balance assessment.

1282 The Claimant relied essentially on the Gas Loss Reports and the Gaffney Cline reports, differing from the Gas Loss Reports only with respect to the Q3 losses. Invited to present its latest position after the November 2021 Hearing, the Claimant stated that it “had not changed its position in respect of these volumes as set forth in its prior submissions and as quantified by [Gaffney Cline]". It presented its quantification in the following table which showed the losses, the part for which the Claimant accepted liability and the quantities that the Gas Loss Committees had assessed:590

Table 1: Summary of Most Likely Quantification of Gas Lost

Category Niko GLC 1 GLC 2
Liable Not Liable
(i) Gas loss to surface
before bridging (Q1)
Chattak 2 0.453 Bcf¹ 0.453 Bcf¹ [no change]
Chattak 2A 1.804 Bcf ² 1.804 Bcf ²
(ii) Gas loss to surface
after bridging (Q2)
Chattak 2 0.332 Bcf³ 0.332 Bcf³ [no change]
Chattak 2A 0.215 Bcf⁴ 0.188 Bcf⁵ 0.376 Bcf⁵
(iii) Gas trapped in the
overburden (Q3)
Chattak 2
and 2A
1.210 Bcf Scenario 1:
72.370 Bcf ⁶
Scenario 2:
8.214 Bcf ⁷
Scenario 1:
“unlikely”
Scenario 2:
8.214 Bcf ⁷

590 C-PHB1, paragraph 48.

[Page 370]

Totals (assuming Niko not liable for Chattak 2A Q1 and Q2 increase and, in the event the GLC's larger volumes of Q3 loss are being considered, an allocation of those volumes between the blowouts per paragraph 9 above (i.e. 74% allocated to Chattak 2 and 26% to Chattak 2A) 2.21 Bcf 1.992 Bcf (based on Scenario 1 for Q3) 54.339 Bcf (based on Scenario 2 for Q3) 6.863 Bcf (as Scenario 1 "unlikely" based on Scenario 2 for Q3) 6.863 Bcf

Table Notes:

¹ 271.7 MMscfd for 40 hours (or 1.67 days)

² 148.2 MMscfd for 12.17 days. Note that, per the Second Gas Loss Committee Report, page 6, the flow modeling estimated flow rates over time that resulted in a total volume of 1.8 Bcf lost, from which the average rate of 148.2 MMscfd was calculated (the model predicted the flow rate starting at 159 MMscfd and reducing to 146 MMscfd over the stated 12.17 day period). With regard to the different statements of the time period for the Chattak 2A pre-bridging flow (as set forth in the Parties communication to the Tribunal of 20 December 2021), Niko submits that the time frame stated in the Committee's report is the best evidence of the actual time period of the flow (as was modeled) given that it was prepared very shortly after the event and intended to reflect the information then available.

³ 2 MMscfd for ~166 days (9 January - 24 June)

⁴ 2 MMscfd for ~107 days (25 June - 9 October)

⁵ Niko: 2 MMscfd for ~94 days (7 July - 9 October); Committee: 4 MMscfd for ~94 days

⁶ The Second GLC does not state how it would account for the 12.17 days of the Chattak 2A pre-bridging flows in estimating the potential loss underground. Niko has calculated this volume based on assuming the Scenario 1 volume of 271.7 MMscfd for 273 days (9 January - 9 October) and then subtracting the 1.804 Bcf estimated to have escaped during the Chattak 2A pre-bridging flow.

⁷ Consistent with note 6, Niko has calculated this volume based on assuming the Scenario 2 volume of 31.47 MMscfd for 261 days (9 January - 24 June and 7 July - 9 October)

1283 The Claimant thus quantified the total loss due to both blowouts at 4.2 Bcf and accepted liability for the loss of 2.21 Bcf. It pointed out that this quantification was supported by Gaffney Cline's material balance estimate of a total loss of 4.0 – 4.7 Bcf by 4 September 2005.591

1284 BAPEX considered the assessment on the basis of flow rates as unreliable and contested the quantifications by the Claimant and its experts. Until after the November 2021 Hearing, BAPEX and its experts determined the total quantum of lost gas over a given period by using a material balance method and derived from this total an average daily rate, as described above in Section 7.3. In their Fourth Report, dated 29 October 2021, Ryder Scott confirmed:


591 C-PHB1, paragraph 51.

[Page 371]

Due to the inability to calculate the rate of gas escaping from the reservoir at any point in time with any degree of certainty, Ryder Scott rejected rate-time as a reliable gas loss method.592

1285 With this approach Ryder Scott determined that for the eight months period from the Chattak 2 blowout to the reference date for the Chattak 2C pressure measure on 4 September 2005, 30.2 Bcf escaped Sands 1 and 2.593 It applied this quantity to the periods identified by the Tribunals in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision. It accepted the Committee estimates of 0.453 Bcf for Q1 and 2 MMcfd for Q2 and calculated the subsurface losses by the following formula:

(30.2 BCF - .453 BCF - (.002 BCF/day x 239 days))/241 days= .1225 BCF/day

1286 On this basis, Ryder Scott produced the following table showing its assessment of the losses, broken down into the period up to the second blowout and the following period until the completion of the 2B relief operation:594

Ryder Scott Estimated Gas Loss by Period
Version 2

Loss Period Number of Days Loss
Estimate(BCF)
Comments
Beginning Ending
1/7/2005 6/24/2005 168 21.36 .453 + (166 x .002) +(168 x.1225)
6/25/2005 10/9/2005 106 13.19 (106 x .002) + (106 x .1225)
Total 1/7/2005 to 10/9/2005 274 34.55

Table 4 Ryder Scott gas loss estimate by period using alternate approach.


592 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 19.
593 Confirmed by Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 21 and by BAPEX at the November 2021 Hearing: HT 2021 Day 1, page 12.
594 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 25 at page 12.

[Page 372]

1287 For period 3, starting with the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation, Ryder Scott produced two versions, one assuming that the flow continues until depletion of the Reservoir, the other allowing for production from Chattak 2C and 4. The calculation was presented in the following table:

Ryder Scott Estimated Gas Loss Period 3

No Successful Sand 1/2
Completions
Successful Completions 2C
and 4
EUR(BCF) 74.94 74.94
Losses @ end of
Period 2(BCF)
34.33 34.33
Estimated
Production(BCF)
0.00 9.75
Estimated Period 3
Losses(BCF)
40.61 30.86

Table 5 Estimated Period 3 gas losses with and without successful completions in the Chattak-2C and
Chattak-4.

1288 Ryder Scott denied the usefulness of the distinction between Q2 and Q3 and insisted that only the quantity that flowed out of the Reservoir was relevant:

In Ryder Scott's opinion, the distinction between gas flowing to the surface and gas flowing in the subsurface is not meaningful in assessing the amount of gas lost from the Sand 1/2 reservoir due to the Chattak-2 well blowout. The only relevant number is the amount of gas that flowed out of the reservoir at the Upper Marine Shale. All of the gas that escaped the reservoir during periods 1 and 2 was lost due to the Chattak-2 well blowout. This is true whether it had flowed to the surface, was making its way to the surface, or was trapped underground.595

1289 In its first Post-Hearing Brief BAPEX confirmed that

...it never accepted that the gas lost from the Reservoir should be determined by attempting to ascertain rates of flow at and below the surface and estimating how much gas was observed at the surface and held in the overburden. This is because the Chattak 2 blowout made the collection of most of the relevant data impossible, and Niko did nothing


595 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 28.

[Page 373]

to measure gas flow at the surface in the first 10 years after the blowout, and never measured gas flow over the vast majority of the area where gas flow at the surface was observed. [...]

1290 BAPEX denied the Committee's estimates in general terms: “... all three components are highly speculative. None of them can be considered to have a 'high level of confidence', as Niko attributes to Q1.”596

1291 Nevertheless, in response to the Tribunal's invitation, BAPEX presented in its first Post-Hearing Brief for the first time an estimate based on the Flow Rate Method:

Despite the lack of data, BAPEX has estimated the surface and underground flows as accurately as possible based on the information in the record.

1292 It summarised the results of these new estimates as follows:

For flow to surface prior to the bridging of Chattak 2 0.453 Bcf

For the gas to surface after the bridging of Chattak 2 31.81 Bcf

For the gas lost underground 74.1 Bcf597


596 B-PHB 2, paragraph 12.
597 B-PHB 1, paragraph 52.

[Page 374]

1293 This was followed by a table setting out “BAPEX' calculation of gas flow and cumulative volumes from 5 January 2005 to 2021:598

CHATTAK WEST GAS FIELD - GAS FLOW HISTORY 2005 - 2019

EVENT DATES FLOW
PERIOD
TOTAL FLOW
PERIOD
SURFACE
FLOW RATE
SUB-SURFACE
FLOW RATE
SURFACE
LOSS TOTAL
SUB-SURFACE
LOSS TOTAL
PROD'N F/
C-2C & C-4
CUMULATIVE
TOTAL
LOSSES
CUMULATIVE
COMMERCIAL
LOSSES
(Ryder Scott EUR)
CHATTAK 2
BLOWOUT
1/7/05 - 1/9/05 1.67
DAYS
1.67
DAYS
271.7
MMCFD
0
MMCFD
0.45
BCF
0
BCF
0.45
BCF
0.45
BCF
FLOW BEFORE
CHATTAK 2A OPS
1/9/05 - 6/24/05 166.33
DAYS
168.00
DAYS
7.4
MMCFD
123.0 - 113.5
MMCFD
1.23
BCF
19.68
BCF
21.36
BCF
21.36
BCF
CHATTAK 2A
BLOWOUT
6/25/05 - 7/7/05 12.17
DAYS
180.17
DAYS
148.2
MMCFD
0
MMCFD
1.80
BCF
0
BCF
23.16
BCF
23.16
BCF
FLOW BEFORE
CHATTAK 2C INFO
7/7/05 - 9/4/05 59.83
DAYS
240.00
DAYS
7.4
MMCFD
111.7 - 109.9
MMCFD
0.45
BCF
6.59
BCF
30.20
BCF
30.20
BCF
FLOW BEFORE
CHATTAK 2B OPS
9/5/05 - 10/9/05 35
DAYS
275.00
DAYS
7.4
MMCFD
109.9 - 108.2
MMCFD
0.26
BCF
4.09
BCF
34.55
BCF
34.55
BCF
FLOW AFTER
CHATTAK 2B OPS
(33% OF PREV. FLOW)
10/10/05 - 6/30/07 630
DAYS
905.00
DAYS
7.4
MMCFD
31.9 - 21.6
MMCFD
4.66
BCF
15.59
BCF
54.80
BCF
54.80
BCF
CHATTAK 2C & 4
ON PRODUCTION
(TOTAL 5.0 MMCFD)
7/1/07 - 6/22/09 722
DAYS
1627.00
DAYS
7.4
MMCFD
21.6 - 17.1
MMCFD
5.34
BCF
11.71
BCF
3.09
BCF
74.94
BCF
74.94
BCF
FLOW UNTIL
80% OF OGIP
6/23/09 - 9/30/16 2657
DAYS
4284.00
DAYS
7.4
MMCFD
16.7 - 0
MMCFD
17.61
BCF
16.45
BCF
109.00
BCF
74.94
BCF
RESIDUAL
UNDERGROUND
GAS FLOWING
TO SURFACE
10/1/16 - 12/31/20 1,553
DAYS
5837.0
DAYS
7.4 - 0
MMCFD
0
MMCFD
3.05
BCF
TOTALS 31.81
BCF
74.10
BCF
3.09
BCF
109
BCF

1294 The calculation in this table leads to an estimated 31.81 Bcf599 of loss to the surface and 74.1 Bcf loss underground. The total is 109 Bcf. BAPEX adds 27.24 Bcf, explained as “24% of OGIP remaining in the Reservoir after pressure equilibrium”, and reaches the total loss of 136.25 Bcf.600 BAPEX decided, however, to limit its claim to the EUR of 115 Bcf, as “agreed in the JVA".601

1295 The Claimant objected to this new quantification and requested “that the Tribunal accord no weight to those portions of the Respondent's submission


598 В-РНВ 1, paragraph 53 and Table 1.
599 Elsewhere in its calculations BAPEX adds to the surface loss 3.09 Bcf for the gas that would have been produced if Niko had been allowed to produce gas after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation; see B-PHB1, paragraphs 84 and 85 and FN 106.
600 B-PHB 1, paragraph 54.
601 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 54 and 131.

[Page 375]

that (a) purport to express new opinions without support in the existing evidentiary record or (b) advance claims or legal theories not discussed at the hearing in November”. BAPEX objected to this request and the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No 33. In its decision, the Tribunal did “not exclude or disregard any of the passages in the Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief but [gave] both Parties an opportunity to respond to their opponent's Brief [...] limited to rebuttals of statements in the opponent's Brief and may not produce new evidence”.602

1296 In that response the Claimant asserted that in its Post-Hearing Brief BAPEX had presented“new arguments with no support in the record that, as the Tribunal recognized, is impermissible. Because there is no record support for these new assertions, the Tribunal can accord no weight to them and they must be disregarded”.603 With respect to BAPEX quantifications based on the Flow Rate Method, the Claimant asserted that they

... do not represent a flow rate analysis. Rather, they are engineered by BAPEX to fit a number of assumptions that are new, unsupported by the record, and in some respects inconsistent with BAPEX's prior evidence.604

1297 The Claimant developed this assertion by reference to specific points in BAPEX's new presentation, objecting in particular to the new rates for the flow to surface and to that for the subsurface flow. These shall be considered in their relevant context.

7.6.2 Period 1 - Q1: Chattak 2 initial flare

1298 As explained above in Section 7.2.1.1, the First Gas Loss Committee assessed a flow rate of 271.70 MMcfd and, for the 40 hours from the blowout to the bridging of the Chattak 2 well, a total of 0.453 Bcf.

1299 The Claimant and Gaffney Cline supported this estimate.605 The Claimant concluded that “the Q1 estimates reflect the use of known and reasonably estimated data in formula that are commonly used in the industry. As a result, those estimates can be considered to have a high level of confidence".606


602 PO No 33, paragraph 12; see also above Section 4.7.6.
603 C-PHB 2, paragraph 2.
604 C-PHB 2, paragraph 5.
605 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 30(a)(ii), and Gaffney Cline II, Appendix IX, paragraph 2(i); endorsed by CMD, paragraph 244 and developed at paragraphs 260 - 273.
606 C-PHB 1, paragraph 17.

[Page 376]

1300 BAPEX observed in the First Post-Hearing Brief that the Committee calculated the rate for Q1 “from theoretical equations contained in petroleum reservoir engineering textbooks” and added:

These equations required values for a large number of variables and/or constants to be input and the data available to support the values that were used was limited, often non-existent. The Committee itself admitted that the calculated rate for this component of 271.7 million cubic feet per day (“mmcfd”) was at best “conservative”. The record does not contain values more certain than those the Committee used, and BAPEX will not speculate to propose different values. Thus, to the extent the Tribunal determines it is necessary to fix a rate for this period, BAPEX does not object to it using the Committee's value of 271.7mmcfd.607

1301 In response to the Tribunal's question 8, BAPEX states in its Post-Hearing Brief that for “gas to the surface during the first 40 days [recte: hours] of the Chattak 2 blowout [...] BAPEX accepts the Gas Loss Committee's estimates, as there is no data that would permit a more accurate determination”.608 In the Table in which BAPEX presents its “Gas Flow History 2005 – 2019”, the value indicated for the period 7 – 9 January 2005 is 0.45 Bcf.

1302 In the Second Post-Hearing Brief, BAPEX criticises the estimate for Q1 by stating:

Even though the equation used to calculate the rate is an industry standard equation, it involves approximately 12 input parameters, most of which (including all important ones), have no supporting data. Inputs of all the important parameters were estimates, and the range of possible input values for these parameters is wide.609

1303 BAPEX states that the “range of uncertainty” of input values “is wide”; but it does not provide support for alternatives to these ranges and refers again to the Committee's statement about the conservative nature of the estimate. BAPEX then concludes that “therefore 271.7 mmcfd can be regarded as the low end of the possible range of rates gas exiting in the reservoir during the Q1 period".610 BAPEX does not propose any other value for this range.

1304 The Tribunal notes that the First Gas Loss Committee's assessment used an uncontested formula and indicated the values it applied to each of the factors.


607 B-PHB 1, paragraph 22.
608 B-PHB 1, paragraph 51.
609 B-PHB 2, page 9, paragraph 12.
610 B-PHB2, page 9, paragraph 12.

[Page 377]

The process thus was verifiable and both Parties were in a position to examine both the formula and the values of each factor.

1305 The Claimant accepted the Q1 quantity despite the apparent contradiction concerning the Reservoir Pressure that has been highlighted above in Section 7.5.2.5.

1306 In its First Post-Hearing Brief BAPEX accepted the Committee's estimate for Q1. While it criticised in the Second Post-Hearing Brief some of the values or their range in the Committee's assessment and pointed out the contradiction between the Committee's and Gaffney Cline's estimate of the Reservoir Pressure, it did not withdraw its acceptance and did not propose an alternative value for Q1.

1307 The Tribunal concludes that the gas lost as a result of the “main flare” of the Chattak 2 blowout, i.e. Q1, the first component of the gas lost during first period, is assessed as 453 MMcf or 0.453 Bcf.

7.6.3 Period 1 - Q2 and Q3: Chattak 2 after bridging until the Chattak 2A blowout

1308 This Section concerns the period from 9 January to 24 June 2005, When assessing the losses after the bridging of the first blowout well, the Gas Loss Committees described loss quantity Q2 as “Gas losses to the surface”, when "gas escapes in progressively smaller flames and gas still continues to bubble out from around the crater created by the blowout” and the loss quantity Q3 as "subsurface gas losses” when “a huge volume of gas from reservoir Sands 1&2 must have been flowing/charging into the massive sands above the Upper Marine Shale”.611

1309 The Committees estimated the loss to the surface at 2MMcfd; the Second Committee assumed that following the second blowout the loss was doubled to 4MMcfd. The two scenarios which the First Committee adopted for the subsurface gas losses produced 558 MMcfd, which the Committee reduced to 271.7 MMcfd, and 31.47 MMcfd. The Second Committee considered the result of the first scenario as “unlikely”.

1310 In its comments at the time, Niko regarded the 2 MMcfd surface losses as “reasonable and within the realm of possibility" and did not object to the increase to 4 MMcfd after the second blowout. It objected to the Q3 quantification in the First Committee but signed the report of the Second Committee.


611 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 7.

[Page 378]

1311 The Government and Petrobangla claimed in the Money Suit for 3 Bcf for “Gas burnt at the Chattak field”, which presumably included the gas lost at surface, and 50.89 Bcf subsurface loss, consisting of 5.89 Bcf “Sub-surface loss" and 45 Bcf “Additional Sub-surface loss".612

1312 In the Arbitration, the Parties disagreed with respect to the methodologies; as explained above, the Respondents did not present a Flow Rate based assessment until BAPEX's first Post-Hearing Brief.

7.6.3.1 BAPEX's Flow Rate assessment for Q2 and Q3

1313 BAPEX quantified the gas losses using the material balance method, as explained in Section 7.6.1. Based on its assessment of the losses according to this method, Ryder Scott arrived on a pro rata basis to a subsurface loss of 1225 MMcfd; it accepted the First Gas Loss Committee's rate of 2MMcfd for the surface loss.613

1314 This position was confirmed by BAPEX at the Hearing, where BAPEX again relied on Ryder Scott IV.614 Ryder Scott (Mr Nowicki) then confirmed that the Tribunal should reject the estimates using the flow rate method, as presented by the Gas Loss Committees and Gaffney Cline.

1315 In response to the Tribunal's question about the manner in which the Committee calculated the flow rate, Ryder Scott recognised that this was “a very detailed topic”. Mr Latham then stated that the calculation of the open flow rate of Q1 was “very theoretical and physically impossible” and "mechanically kind of hard to set up”. For the period thereafter, Mr Latham asserted that “in both cases they estimated 2 million cubic feet per day coming out of the reservoir for a certain number of days thereafter”. Mr Latham also

... encourage[d] the panel to look at the input data used in the two primary blowout calculation rates in committee reports1 and 2. If you look closely, you will notice very quickly that in certain cases they write them in, but they don't know what they are. And they don't acknowledge that, except for a couple of instances. But the numbers that they mention – for example, permeability in the committee 1 report, they say they don't know what it is. And then they assume a 313 millidarcy permeability. Is that right? Nobody knows.615


612 Money Suit Complaint, Exhibit C-6, page 56.
613 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 24.
614 HT 2021 Day 1, page 108.
615 HT 2021 Day 1, page 132 and 135.

[Page 379]

1316 Concerning Q3, Ryder Scott proposed to treat Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 for the First Committee's estimate as a high and a low estimate and created a "mid-estimate” at the mid-point between the two, a rate of 158 MMcfd.616. The Claimant objects to the creation of such an “artificial ‘mid-point”, which “even the Second Committee never did".617 The Tribunal notes that the First Committee adopted two scenarios and treated them distinctly; the Second Committee also treated them distinctly. Neither the First nor the Second Committee created a “mid-estimate” or mentioned it as a possible approach. The Tribunal sees no basis for the modification of the Committee's Q3 estimates as proposed by Ryder Scott.

1317 In its First Post-Hearing Brief, BAPEX confirmed its position that “Material balance is the only scientifically justified method to estimate gas losses when flow rates cannot be measured because it is based on significant known data rather than anecdotal observations and unsupported assumptions”.618 BAPEX nevertheless responded to the Tribunal's invitation

...to present gas loss calculations based on flow rates and indicate the evidence for quantities assumed. BAPEX uses the Gas Loss Committee Reports as a starting point for this analysis and provides support for variations from the Committee's finding based on the evidence in the record.619

1318 The rates presented by BAPEX apply the distinction between loss at surface and sub-surface loss.

1319 Concerning the loss at surface, BAPEX refers to the uncertainties about the rate of 2MMcfd and describes it as “essentially an assumption based on anecdotal observations”. The explanations of Gaffney Cline in support of the Gas Loss Committee's estimate of 2MMcfd is contested in the following terms:

Thus, Gaffney Cline didn't independently calculate a rate based on available data, but instead ran an unspecified simulation to “verify” it.620

1320 Challenging the 2 MMcfd rate, BAPEX points to the wide area in which seepages were observed and stated that this rate is too low. It refers to what it describes as the “only measurements in the record of the rate of flow at the surface over a wide area”. It finds these measurements in the report of Mr Steven Wilson of 23 March 2016, recording the result of his six-day site visit


616 HT 2021 Day 1, page 122-123; RH-4, slide 19 and Table 1 at page 4 of Ryder Scott IV.
617 C-PHB 1, paragraph 50.
618 B-PHB 1, paragraph 15.
619 B-PHB 1, paragraph 21.
620 HT 2021 Day 6, page 135.

[Page 380]

in 2016. As BAPEX explains, Mr Wilson had “calculated that the flow rate at the surface within the 500-meter area would range between 1.05 and 7.4mmscfd".621

1321 BAPEX selected the upper value in Mr Wilson's report and explained this as follows:

He conservatively calculated the that flow rate at the surface within the 500-meter area would range between 1.05 and 7.4 mmscdf. Considering that by 2016 it is likely that surface emissions had begun to decline as the Reservoir depleted, it is appropriate to assume that the rate of flow at the surface starting on 9 January 2005 was at least the 7.4mmcfd calculated by Mr Wilson. Because there is no data on which to base a higher rate, BAPEX uses a surface loss rate of 7.4 mmcfd to calculate loss based on flow rates. Since there is no data to indicate that the rate changed because of the Chattak 2A blowout, BAPEX assumes this rate would remain constant until it begins to decline at the end of the flow from the Reservoir.622

1322 During the second period (after the bridging of the first blowout) the rate of 7.4 MMcfd is applied by BAPEX from 9 January 2005 to 9 October 2005, the date at which the Chattak 2B relief operation was completed. The period is, however, subdivided by reference to the Chattak 2C date of 4 September 2005 and interrupted from 24 June to 7 July 2005, the “flare” period of the Chattak 2A blowout.

1323 Table 1 at paragraph 53 of BAPEX’First Post Hearing Brief shows the following amounts for these periods of flow at surface, calculated at 7.4 MMcfd, except for the period of Chattak 2A main flare:

Total loss at surface claimed for period 2 3.74 Bcf

1324 Concerning the subsurface losses, BAPEX points out that, by the Q3 rate, the Committees did not base their quantification “on the absorption or


621 B-PHB 1, paragraph 8.
622 B-PHB 1, paragraph 24, relying on Wilson I, page 99, paragraph 6.6.2.

[Page 381]

trapping of gas below the surface”, a “theory posited by GCA and Claimant”. In BAPEX's reading Q3 is a flow rate assessment:

For Q3, the Committees were determining the rate of flow in the overburden from the Chattak 2 borehole through the Upper Marine Shale, independent of the amount of gas absorbed or trapped.623

1325 BAPEX quoted from the report of the First Gas Loss Committee which posited that “charging into the adjacent porous and permeable sandstone layers will go on at very high volumes in view of their vast lateral extent” and concludes that "charging” in this context is a synonym for “flowing”. And it quotes the passage about the “huge volume of gas from reservoir Sands 1&2 must have been flowing/charging int the massive sands above the Upper Marine Shale” which concluded by leaving open where this gas ended up:

Whether this gas is accumulating under various localised seals or migrating from the well location to accumulate under larger seals/claystone/siltstone layers for future escaping can not be verified now.624

1326 When discussing its new approach of the Q3 quantity, BAPEX adopts a flow rate approach to the quantification of the subsurface loss. It stated in its first Post-Hearing Brief that it “accepts Committee's Scenario 1 approach to the subsurface flow rate”. Commenting on the location of the bridging of the Chattak 2 well, BAPEX“considers that the flow rate from the Reservoir through the borehole in the Upper Marine Shale would be approximately 123 mmcfd immediately after the Chattak 2 well bridged, which would decline steadily at the rate of 1.5% per month”.625

1327 BAPEX justifies its acceptance of the Committee's Scenario 1 approach by stating that “the evidence in this proceeding has shown that the location of the bridging of the Chattak 2 well was well above the Upper Marine Shale”. It then compares the level of the bridge adopted by the First Committee with that of Mr Hughes and “Based on this” declares that the flow rate from the Reservoir was 123 MMcfd. The reasoning supporting this daily rate is worded as follows:

However, the Committee assumed for Scenario-1 that the Chattak 2 well bridged at 305 meters. Mr. Hughes concluded that the Chattak 2 well bridged somewhere between 250m and 420m. Based on this, BAPEX considers that the flow rate from the Reservoir through the borehole in


623 B-PHB 1, paragraph 36, with quotations from First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 8.
624 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 10.
625 B-PHB 1, paragraph 33, emphasis added.

[Page 382]

the Upper Marine Shale would be approximately 123 mmcfd immediately after the Chattak 2 well bridged, which would decline steadily at a rate of 1.5% per month.626

1328 BAPEX points out that calculating the gas escaping the Reservoir leaves no justification for adding quantities of gas lost at surface. The losses flowing or charging into the Overburden

... would include not only the gas that is absorbed into the overburden, but also gas that is laterally deflected away from the wellbore due to the bridging of the Chattak 2 well and the presence of shale stringers. Some of this deflected gas would be permanently absorbed in the pore spaces over the vast volume of overburden into which the dispersed gas is flowing and some would be trapped by localised impermeable shale stringers. The rest would eventually reach the surface within a large radius from the wellbore.627

1329 In support of this new flow-rate estimates, BAPEX emphasises the difference between the Q1 and the Q3 flow rate, explaining that the

... flow through a borehole during the initial period of the blowout and flow from the Reservoir after bridging through substantially larger area of porous media. In general, the maximum flowrate through a wellbore (pipe flow) depends on the pressure gradient along the wellbore, diameter of the hole, and a friction factor. In contrast, the maximum flow from a wellbore radially into a porous media depends on the radial pressure gradient, the permeability of the formation, and the size of the cross sectional area of contact.628

1330 BAPEX then presents its new approach by referring to the “area into which the flow occurs” when escaping from the Reservoir. It distinguishes between the area during the flow before bridging, when this area is the “cross sectional area of the hole or pipe”, and

... the post-bridging scenario [when] the relevant cross sectional area of flow is roughly equal to the circumference of the hole multiplied by the length of open hole between the top of Upper Marine Shale and the location of the bridge, multiplied by porosity.

1331 Assuming the depth of the bridge at approximately 352m, as used by Mr Wright, the open hole between the Upper Marine Shale and the bridge would


626 B-PHB 1, paragraph 33.
627 B-PHB 1, page 11, paragraph 9.
628 B-PHB 1, paragraph 31 with reference to the testimony of Dr Bruno, HT 2021 Day 6, pages 26 - 28.

[Page 383]

be some 133m. BAPEX calculated the cross-sectional area for the blowout scenario at 41’925m², which constitutes a very large area through which the gas would flow into the Overburden. BAPEX explained that

...the area into which gas can flow into the formation is more than 740 times larger than the area of the borehole alone. Even though the pressure gradient into the formation is smaller than the gradient up the borehole, there is little doubt that the capacity for lateral flow into the formation after bridging exceeds the flow up the wellbore before bridging. If the bridge of the Chattak 2 well was located many meters above the upper marine shale, it did essentially nothing to stem the flow out of the Reservoir. This is consistent with the Committee's Scenario-1 where the maximum flow rate into the overburden would have been 558 mmcfd, limited by the flow through the Upper Marine Shale of 271.7 mmcfd.629

1332 In the context of this discussion of the flowrate, BAPEX also addresses the quantification of the gas absorbed or trapped in the Overburden and responds to Gaffney Cline's quantification of the “Gas Trapped below the Surface”. BAPEX insists on the large extent of the Overburden into which the gas flows; it sees in this extent the principal difference with Gaffney Cline. It states:

The primary difference between BAPEX's and GCA's best estimate of absorbed gas of 1.21 BCF is the geometry and magnitude of overburden volume estimated to contain absorbed gas. Although the estimated quantity of gas that has actually been absorbed into the overburden as a result of the Chattak 2 blowout is subject to considerable uncertainty, it is quite clear that the overburden is capable of absorbing very large volumes of gas.


629 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 31 and 32.

[Page 384]

1333 In support of this difference in volume, BAPEX presents a new image of the flow of the gas in the Overburden and the volume of the space affected by this flow. It contrasts this new image with the representation concerning the spread of the gas rising through the Overburden as it had been presented in Gaffney Cline's first report:630

Figure 5 - Volume Affected by Permanent Increase of Gas Saturatic

[Image of a diagram showing a cone-shaped volume underground.]

Labels on diagram:

1334 BAPEX questions this representation and argues:

In reality, after the Chattak 2 bridged, gas would have been diverted laterally with considerable force over the entire cross section of the uncased wellbore between the bridge and the Upper Marine Shale, calculated above to be as much as 740 times bigger than the size of the wellbore. As a result, the overburden volume containing absorbed gas is many times larger than the volume found within the GCA cone. The gas would not flow to surface in the shape of a geometric cone, but spread at the bridge like water hitting a plate, as shown by Dr Bruno at the Hearing, and then continue to spread as it rises, like a cloud of smoke in the air.631


630 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 39 at page 24.
631 B-PHB 1, paragraph 39; the reference to Dr Bruno's testimony is at Day 4, page 60.

[Page 385]

1335 BAPEX presents the following image of this distribution, which appears for the first time in its first Post-Hearing Brief:632

[Image of a diagram showing gas distribution underground.]

Fig 1. Absorbed Gas Volume

Labels on diagram:

1336 BAPEX considered the lateral movement of the gas “forced laterally out of the wellbore after bridging” as the “main factor determining the size of the volume of absorbed gas” and asserted

BAPEX assessed a number of possible absorbed gas scenarios with lateral gas expulsion distances (radii) ranging from 500 to 1500 meters, the latter being largest estimated distance of gas flow at the surface. [...] BAPEX used estimates of overburden porosity, critical gas saturation and initial gas saturation within the range of those indicated in GCA's First Expert Report.

1337 BAPEX does not present any details of its calculation, nor does it rely on an expert report having proceeded with such an assessment. It states that

[t]he results of the estimated absorbed gas quantities for each of these scenarios is a distribution of outcomes. The distribution yielded a low estimate of absorbed gas of 29.7 BCF, a best estimate of 62.4 BCF, and high estimate of 130.9 BCF.633


632 B-PHB 1, page 18.
633 B-PHB 1, paragraph 42.

[Page 386]

1338 BAPEX seeks to reconcile this assessment with the 136.3 Bcf of Ryder Scott's best estimate of OGIP by presenting numbers that add up to the following calculation:634

62.4 Bcf absorbed gas

34.9 Bcf gas at surface635

27.3 Bcf “20% remaining in the Reservoir"


124.6 Bcf

- 136.3 Bcf OGIP as estimated by Ryder Scott


11.7 Bcf balance

1339 BAPEX explains this balance is gas that “would be trapped under shale stingers and other low permeability formations”. BAPEX concludes:

... the best estimate of the gas from the Chattak 2 blowout absorbed and trapped in the overburden is 74.1 Bcf.636

1340 The Tribunal concludes from Table 1 in B-PHB1, that BAPEX's assessment at flow rates for period 2 from 9 January to 9 October 2005, produced a total loss at 34.10 Bcf.637 During this period, BAPEX assesses that gas escaped at surface at the rate of 7.4 MMcfd, except for the period of the Chattak 2A main flare where the rate was 148MMcfd; the total of the flow to surface is assessed at 3.74Bcf. The subsurface rate for this period except during the 12.17 days of the Chattak 2A main flare (where the rate is zero), started at 123 MMcfd and reduced 15% per month, produced a total of 30.36 Bcf.

1341 Since the total claimed includes both the gas in the Overburden and the gas at surface, the Tribunal concludes that, in this calculation, the total of 30.36 Bcf and the rate of 123 MMcfd are not the quantity of the gas flowed into the Overburden but only that part of the gas from the Reservoir that remained in


634 BAPEX presents "Ryder Scott's Best Estimate of OGIP of 136.3 BCF" at B-PHB1, paragraph 73; also at paragraph 76 and FN 116.
635 As presented above and as shown in the table at paragraph 53 B-PHB1, the total loss to surface after bridging of the first blowout and "before Chattak 2B OPS" is 3.74Bcf, adding the 0.45 Bcf for the loss before the bridging brings this total to 4.19 Bcf. The number in the calculation includes the total until 31 December 2020 of 31.81 Bcf. The difference between the 31.81 Bcf of total surface loss shown in the table at paragraph 53 and this estimate of 34.9 Bcf is explained by BAPEX's assumption that 3.09 Bcf of gas that would seep to surface after the completion of the Chattak 2 relief operation until 22 June 2009, when the EUR of 74.9 Bcf, assumed by BAPEX, would be reached and no further gas could escape from the Reservoir; see B-PHB1, paragraphs 84 and 85 and FN 106.
636 B-PHB 1, paragraph 43, bold in the original.
637 Table 1 at B-PHB1, shows 34.55 Bcf for the entire period until 9 October 2005, including 0.45 Bcf for the initial flare (Q1) on 7 and 8 January 2005.

[Page 387]

the Overburden, trapped or absorbed. In Table 1, the total of subsurface loss shows 74.1 Bcf for all periods, as announced above as absorbed gas (62.4 Bcf) and the residual amount, named “trapped under shale stringers” (11.7 Bcf).

7.6.3.2 The Claimant's position on Q2 and Q3 for the first period

1342 Niko accepted the Q2 estimate of the First Gas Loss Committee but objected to the estimate for Q3. Niko's representative on the Second Gas Loss Committee signed the second report without objection. That report confirmed the Q2 estimate of the First Committee, adding 2MMcfd for the Chattak 2A blowout. With respect to Q3, the Second Report stated that the second blowout “did not change the process suggested in the first blowout gas loss report" but found that the First Committee's Scenario 1 for Q3 “seems unlikely".

1343 In the Arbitration, the Claimant accepted with respect to the surface loss that "the Q2 losses are not capable of being estimated through the use of data and formulas". Instead, so contends the Claimant, the Committees, “along with Niko, were able to rely on contemporary observations, villagers reports and activities, and extensive gas emissions testing throughout the area”. The Claimant referred specifically to the passage in the First Gas Loss Report mentioning “surface indications” as the basis for the estimate. The Claimant explained that “GCA, applying their knowledge, expertise and experience, considered this a reasonable estimate".638

1344 The Claimant referred to the 3 Bcf for Surface Loss in the Money Claim and stated that there was “no real dispute here”. It relied on the first report of Gaffney Cline, “estimating that the volume of gas lost at the surface of the blowout was 2.97 in the most likely case”.639 In the passage to which the Claimant referred, Gaffney Cline stated:

Gas lost at the surface: GCA's estimate in the most likely case of 2.97 Bcf lost at the surface, either through the wellbore and immediate surrounds or through other surface fissures and leaks, are not inconsistent with the numbers stated in the “Money Suit” in respect of gas lost at the surface (3 Bcf), which is roughly based on the conclusions derived by the Committees.640


638 C-PHB 1, paragraph 18
639 C-CD.2, paragraph 289, referring to Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 11.
640 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 11, bold in the original.

[Page 388]

1345 Gaffney Cline explained how it reached the surface loss of the 2.97 Bcf: they “agree[..] with the calculations by the Committees for the gas at the surface”; noting that “those calculations were made prior to the final ‘killing' or plugging of the blowout”. In their calculation the volumes in the Committee report were “adjusted to reflect the actual date when each event took place”. This “calculation” consists simply in taking the estimates of the Gas Loss Committees and extrapolate them over the entire period from the first blowout on 7 January 2005 to the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation on 9 October 2005; it includes both the quantities before bridging (at 271.7 and 148.2 MMcfd) and those thereafter (at 2 and 4 MMcfd).641 Counting the Q1 period for the Chattak 2 blowout at 1.67 days, the entire period in this calculation is 273.67 days and the average rate would be 10.85MMcfd.

1346 Gaffney Cline concluded:

There is no real debate as regards the amount of gas lost at the surface between the Committees’3 Bcf and GCA's 2.97 Bcf.642

1347 The Tribunal observes that “the Committee's 3 Bcf" is the amount for “Gas burnt" in the Money Suit, derived from the Gas Loss Reports; and “GCA’s 2.97 Bcf" is an adjustment of the Committees' estimates to the actual flow periods. In other words, the two amounts are based on the First Gas Loss Committee's estimates; there is no independent estimation by Gaffney Cline.

1348 In the context of the “Reservoir Model Simulation”, which produced the estimates of the quantities trapped in the Overburden (see below), Gaffney Cline also stated that, with the assumptions for one of the cases in the simulation, the result was “a total flow at the surface through the upper sands of approximately 2MMscf/day”.643 At the Hearing, Mr Oletu explained that Gaffney Cline applied “an in-house simulation to model if that 2MMscfd was reasonable [...] to model the response in subsurface using a simple model and see if you come close to this estimate [...] with the assumptions that we have, you come close to this number”.644

1349 Based on these considerations, the Claimant accepts for the surface loss the 2MMcfd rate estimated by the First Gas Loss Committee and the increase after the second blowout, but denied liability for this increase.

1350 With respect to the subsurface loss (Q3), the Claimant adopted an approach different from that of the Committees: it rejected the flow rates calculated by


641 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 30.
642 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 31.
643 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 44.
644 HT 2021 Day 3, page 73.

[Page 389]

the First Committee and relied instead on Gaffney Cline's analysis of the gas that could be absorbed in the Overburden.

1351 The Claimant rejected the first scenario of the First Gas Loss Report. The Claimant pointed out that the Second Gas Loss Committee had noted that the log data of relief well Chattak 2A showed that no gas had accumulated in the upper sands and that therefore the higher estimate of the First Report regarding the Q3 losses “was unlikely”.645

1352 The Claimant also pointed out that the flow rate calculated by the First Gas Loss Committee for Scenario 1 of Q3 was 558 MMcfd, that the Committee realised that this rate was not possible and that it adopted the rate of 271.7 MMcfd without any analysis:

The Committee actually undertook an effort to calculate the volume flowing into the overburden in the shallow bridge scenario and arrived at an estimate of 558 mmcfd. Recognizing that this result was not possible considering that the open hole flow rate of 271.7 mmcfd would be the maximum possible flow rate, the Committee simply used this rate instead without any analysis as to how the maximum flow rate up the open wellbore to atmosphere could also flow unimpeded into the water laden overburden. As set out in Niko's PHB, GCA conducted a detailed analysis and modelling of gas flow into and through the overburden in reaching their conclusions as to gas flow rates and saturation.646

1353 In a footnote of C-PHB1, the Claimant referred to the two scenarios: Scenario 1 estimate of 271.7 MMcfd and Scenario 2 estimate of 31.47 MMcfd. It asserted that both scenarios had to be rejected, noting that

... the Committee's actual “calculation” of the supposed flow rate into the overburden resulted in an estimated rate of 558 mmscfd, or more than double the flow rate through the open wellbore (271.7 mmscfd). This resulted in the Committee rejecting this calculation and simply assuming the charging rate would therefore be the same as the estimated high open flow rate of 271.70 mmscfd. In other words, they rejected their own calculation. However, they continued to use the same clearly unreliable calculation for their Scenario 2, which resulted in an estimated flow rate of 31.37647 mmscfd. Thus, their lower estimate should also be rejected as having been derived from an unreliable calculation.648


645 C-CD.2, paragraph 175.
646 C-PHB 2, paragraph 11.
647 This seems to be typo; the Scenario 2 rate of Committee 1 is 31.47 MMcfd.
648 C-PHB 1, FN 39, emphasis in the original.

[Page 390]

1354 The Claimant also pointed out that applying the rate of 271.7 MMcfd for the calculation of Q3 would lead for the entire period from the first blowout until 9 October 2005 to a total gas loss of 75.335 Bcf, more than Ryder Scott's EUR volume of 74.94 Bcf: “In other words, the Scenario 1 estimate of the Committee would have resulted in all of the recoverable gas in the reservoir having escaped before 9 October 2005".649

1355 The Claimant insisted on the critical importance of the pressure differential for determining the flow rate. Relying on Gaffney Cline, it explained:

As they also explained, after the formation of bridges in both Chattak 2 and 2A, any gas flow through the Marine Shale (driven by the upward pressure being exerted by the reservoirs – the weighted average initial pressure exerted by the combined Sands 1 and 2 being estimated at 879 psia) would be constrained by the downward hydrostatic pressure exerted by the water saturated overburden (estimated to be about 670 psia). The rate at which the gas will flow is driven, in large measure, by that pressure differential. Additionally, as the Parties (and GCA and Ryder Scott) now agree, the reservoir pressure at 4 September 2005 was ~750 psia, thus considerably reducing the pressure differential by that point in time.650

1356 Apart from the pressure differential, the Claimant identified two other important elements in respect to which the Parties differed: the presence of shale stringers capable to trap gas and the capacity of the material in the Overburden to “absorb” gas.

1357 With regard to both these elements the Claimant asserted that

BAPEX has not provided any analysis as to the capacity of the overburden to “trap” gas: whether under shale stringers of sufficient lateral extent and shape capable of trapping gas, or “absorbed” in the pore spaces. BAPEX and some of its experts, postulate (in different ways and configurations) that there could be a multitude of shale layers in the overburden. However, BAPEX has not introduced any evidence to analyse or quantify the volume of gas allegedly trapped.

1358 With respect to shale stringers, the Claimant emphasized that the issue was not whether shale stringers existed, but whether they trapped large quantities of gas: the Claimant explained:


649 C-PHB 1, paragraph 49.
650 C-PHB 1, paragraph 34.

[Page 391]

Niko (and the experts it retained) do not dispute nor have they ever disputed, that there is evidence of some limited and discontinuous shale stringers in the overburden. The issue is whether BAPEX has proven that shale stringers have trapped large quantities of gas below surface.

1359 The Claimant also stressed the importance of distinguishing

... between gas “trapped” by such shale stringers and gas flow that may be diverted by such, as suggested by Dr Bruno to be the effect of the shale stringers that both he and Mr Oletu agreed would be lenticular in nature (i.e. shaped like lenses, not concave) that would divert or retard vertical migration, as opposed to trapping it.651

1360 The conflicting positions concerning shale stringers have been discussed above in Section 7.5.4.

1361 The approach adopted by the Claimant for the quantification of Q3 consisted in quantifying the gas absorbed in the Overburden, or rather the capacity of the Overburden to absorb gas. In this respect, the Claimant relies on Gaffney Cline who “considered and modelled the physical capability of the overburden to trap gas".652 In their first report, they made an assessment of the “Gas Trapped Below the Surface”.653 They considered the claims in the Money Suit (5.89 Bcf for “Subsurface loss” and 45 Bcf for “Additional Subsurface loss") and opined that, for such quantities of gas to be trapped in the Overburden a “continuous seal above Sands 1 and 2” would be necessary; Gaffney Cline found that there was no evidence for such a seal.

1362 Gaffney Cline accepted that there was evidence for some gas in the Overburden. Some of that gas was present already when Chattak 2 was drilled (background gas). They made assumptions about the geology of the Overburden and its porosity and the initial gas saturation (pre-blowout); and they calculated the additional gas that could be added until “critical gas saturation" would be reached and gas would become mobile. Gaffney Cline stated that they “verified the assumption using published correlations” and explained:

In this case, GCA considered that the upper sands are unconsolidated and that they had an initial gas saturation between 1% to 3%. Using a porosity of 30%, the calculated critical gas saturations were 7%, 7.3% and 7.6% for corresponding initial gas saturations of 1%, 2% and 3%, respectively. Therefore, the increase in gas saturation resulting from the


651 C-PHB 1, paragraphs 37 and 38.
652 C-PHB 1, paragraph 27.
653 Gaffney Cline I, paragraphs 32 – 40.

[Page 392]

passage during the blowout would be 6.3%, 5.3% and 4.6%, respectively.654

1363 With respect to the volume of gas Gaffney Cline assumed the gas flow from the Reservoir in the shape of an inverted cone, as shown in Figure 5 presented above in Section 7.6.3.1, Gaffney Cline calculated the possible increase of gas in the Overburden until it reached the critical gas saturation. It assumed three values for the radius of the cone base (250, 530 and 840m) and reached as the limits for increase in the gas in the Overburden: a low case of 0.3 Bcf, a Most Likely case of 1.21 Bcf and a High case of 3.08 Bcf.

1364 On this basis, Gaffney Cline calculated the total loss resulting from the blowouts as 3Bcf to the surface plus, as most likely case, 1.21 Bcf for gas trapped in the Overburden. They presented the summary of this calculation in Table 2 of their first report:655

Table 2 - Summary of Gas Lost (Bcf)

Surface Sub-Surface Total
Low 2.97 0.30 3.27
Most Likely 2.97 1.21 4.18
High 2.97 3.08 6.05

1365 Gaffney Cline then “test[ed] these assumptions” by a Reservoir Model Simulation, modelling the impact of different levels at which the Chattak 2 blowout bridged: at the casing shoe (305m) and at the estimated location of the drill bit (466m). The simulation also used changing factors for “permeability, the critical gas saturation, the relationship between vertical and horizontal permeability[..] and the reservoir simulator model's grid size (granularity or level detail)”.656 Gaffney Cline stated that, in the assumptions for one of the cases in the simulation, the result was “a total flow at the surface through the upper sands of approximately 2MMscf/day” and that through this exercise Gaffney Cline calculated that the volume of gas potentially


654 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 38.
655 Gaffney Cline I, page 25.
656 Gaffney Cline I, paragraphs 41 and 42.

[Page 393]

trapped below the surface was as shown in the table above, with the most likely result being 1.21 Bcf.657

1366 In their third report, Gaffney Cline explained the purpose of their simulation study:

We have conducted sensitivity simulation studies which show that it makes no material difference at what depth the bridge in the Chattak 2 well happened – gas flow rates and hence losses would be about the same (see Appendix III).658

1367 Appendix III is entitled “Simulation Sensitivity to Position of Ch-2 Bridge” and states:

In order to gain an understanding of the potential impact on subsequent gas flow rates of the location of the bridge that occurred in Ch-2 on 9 January 2005, we conducted some simulation sensitivity runs. There were carried out using the commercially available IMEX52 simulator. This is also the model that was prepared and used for the Initial GaffneyCline Report (para. 41–49).

Three depths were selected for the location of the bridge based on the existing reservoir model: just below the 13-3/8” casing shoe (which was at 303 m), just above the regional shale at 422 m, with an intermediate case at 371 m. Input files for the three cases are provided as exhibits.

1368 These calculations present the Claimant's estimate of the quantity of gas that accumulated in the Overburden. They do not produce a flow rate for this quantity. Indeed, the Claimant explained that “it is not possible to know how much of this saturation was in place during period 1 as a result of the Ch-2 blowout and how much may have arisen during period 2”. Gaffney Cline took “the most conservative position” and allocated it pro rata over periods 1 and 2.659

1369 The Tribunal is aware that Gaffney Cline's Q3 quantification does not seek to estimate the flow at a daily rate. A daily quantity may, however, be calculated by allocating Gaffney Cline's best estimate of 1.21Bcf for the total quantity of trapped gas to the 273 days from 9 January to 9 October 2005. This produces a daily quantity of 4.43 MMcf for the increase of gas in the Overburden. Adding this quantity to the 2MMcfd for the flow at surface, the Tribunal understands that the Claimant's rate for the total flow from the Reservoir


657 Gaffney Cline I, paragraphs 39(b), 40.
658 Gaffney Cline III, paragraphs 41, 45 and 49. See also Gaffney Cline IV, paragraph 10.
659 Gaffney Cline III, paragraph 36; this allocation is also reflected in C-PHB1, Table 1 at paragraph 48.

[Page 394]

from the bridging of Chattak 2 to the completion of the Chattak 2B would be 6.43MMcfd.660

1370 In response to BAPEX's quantifications presented in B-PHB1, the Claimant states:

Importantly, they are dependent upon and require the Tribunal to accept the unreliable opinion of Ryder Scott as to the OGIP of the Sand 1, 1.1 and 2 reservoirs as a starting point. Additionally, BAPEX makes a number of mischaracterizations and misstatements as to the record evidence. Niko submits that these factors, along with meritless legal propositions, invalidate BAPEX's arguments as to flow rates and quantification of surface and underground gas losses, OGIP in a compartmentalized sands scenario, and BAPEX's assertion that Niko ought to be bound by the OGIP/EUR estimate from the Marginal Field Evaluation (“MFE”).661

1371 Specifically with respect to BAPEX's new quantification of the surface loss based on Mr Wilson's observations in 2016, the Claimant points out that Mr Wilson had estimated the “current gas flow out of the surface” at a total between 1.05MMcfd and 7.4MMcfd.662 The Claimant argues that there was no evidence for applying the 7.4mmcfd flow rate as opposed to the 1.05mmcfd rate as a “constant surface emissions rate from 2005 to 2016" and describes Mr Wilson's opinions as to his 2016 measurements and flow analyses as “wholly unreliable”. Referring to BAPEX's proposal to derive the 2005 flow rate estimates from Mr Wilson's work in 2016, the Claimant states that “Mr Wilson was not prepared to offer such an opinion in his report (and be tested on it in cross examination)”.663

1372 Concerning BAPEX's new theory concerning the subsurface flow, the “Rate of Gas Flow from the Reservoir/Gas Lost Underground”, the Claimant contest BAPEX's description of the analysis by which the First Gas Loss Committee reached the 271.7 MMcfd; and it contests the process by which, based on a different bridging location, BAPEX arrived at the rate of 123 MMcfd.664 The Claimant continues by stating that

...BAPEX's experts did not conduct any quantitative analysis of flow rates arising from the Chattak 2 (or 2A) blowout, let alone flow rates into


660 This rate does not include the additional 2MMcfd estimated by the Second Gas Loss Committee after the bridging of the Chattak 2A blowout for which the Claimant denies responsibility.
661 C-PHB 2, paragraph 5.
662 Wilson I, paragraph 6.6.2.
663 C-PHB 2, paragraph 10, also paragraphs 91 - 93.
664 C-PHB 2, paragraphs 11-13.

[Page 395]

the overburden, thus leaving the GCA analyses as the only supported analyses in the record.665

1373 The Claimant responds to BAPEX's new quantification, stating:

BAPEX presents, without any supporting expert evidence, a new calculation of the surface area of the formation inside the wellbore between a hypothetical bridging location and the Marine Shale. It then makes the evidential leap that this areal calculation means “there is little doubt that the capacity for lateral flow into the formation after bridging exceeds the flow up the wellbore before bridging” and that the bridging of Chattak 2 “did essentially nothing to stem the flow out of the Reservoir".

1374 The Claimant contests that Dr Bruno provided the support for BAPEX's new calculations and points out that

... he acknowledged that “it's harder to flow into water-saturated sands for the same cross-sectional area.” While he went on to say “[a]ll things being equal, the larger surface area can flow a lot more fluid or gas than a smaller surface area”, the fact is that all things are not equal when comparing (a) rapidly expanding gas flow up an open hole to surface against only atmospheric pressure with (b) flow in a bridged (as opposed to sealed) wellbore into a rock formation with restricted permeability and the hydrostatic backpressure of water from surface. Indeed, Dr. Bruno was clear that surface area alone would not determine the rate of flow, but that permeability of the formation and the pressure differential are also significant factors that will affect the rate of gas flow into the intermediate sands.666

1375 The Claimant refers to Dr Bruno's testimony at the November 2021 Hearing when he stated that “GeoMechanic's modelling was not intended to offer any quantitative assessment of gas flowing into, through or trapped below surface, only qualitative indications of flows based on their model's assumptions”; the Claimant concludes:

Unlike GCA GeoMechanics (Dr. Bruno) did not purport to present any quantitative analysis of flows into the overburden from the reservoirs, nor did they address the GCA analyses and opinions.667


665 C-PHB 2, paragraph 14.
666 C-PHB 2, paragraph 15 and reference to Dr Bruno's testimony recorded at the HT 2021 Days 4 and 6.
667 C-PHB 2, paragraph 15 and FN 19.

[Page 396]

1376 The Claimant objects to the “entirely new depiction” in BAPEX's Figure 1, reproduced above, as an attempt to “introduce new and unsupported evidence" and points out omissions and deficiencies of the “depicted saucer shape of the new BAPEX area of absorption” and the “postulated expansive accumulation of gas” which “does not follow the physics of gas flow under gravity".668

7.6.3.3 The Q2 loss: evidence for gas escaping at the surface and the Tribunal's analysis of the loss quantified on that basis

1377 Considering the “contemporary observations” and the “surface indications” on which the Committees based their 2MMcfd assessment, which Gaffney Cline, "applying their knowledge, expertise and experience, considered [...] a reasonable estimate", the Tribunal examined the evidence for emissions at the surface. Witnesses and experts have testified about such emissions, visible in the form of flames and as bubbles in water, the Gas Loss Committees reported about them and other documents, in particular Monitoring Reports, have mentioned them.

1378 The First Gas Loss Report, dated 4 June 2005 stated that from “10 January [2005] to date”

Big bubbles can be seen in the main crater (similar to well Haripur-1 which blew-out in 1955), gas escaping along a 1 km surface fault-line as well as to all adjacent areas, a small fire continues to burn in a fracture near pit (Ref. Picture at Annex 14).669

1379 In a letter of 1 or 4 June 2005, in which Niko comments on the report of the First Gas Loss Committee and which is attached to that report, Niko commented on the Q2 quantification by reference to an opinion of Mr Grace, its consultant for the relief wells, “based on his experience”:

[Niko] has employed the services of Mr Bob Grace of GSM Inc. (a worldwide expert on relief well drilling) and his estimate of the gas that is bubbling to surface, based on his experience, would be in the range of 1mmscf/day to 5 mmscf/day.


668 C-PHB 2, paragraph 16.
669 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 3.

[Page 397]

Therefore, the rate of 2 mmscf/day used in the calculation of Q2 is within the realm of reason.670

1380 The Second Gas Loss Report contained several passages about gas escaping at the surface, including the following:

After the bridging of the [Chattak 2] well, the flames subsided and gas had been escaping through observed and perhaps undetected seepage and leakage around the blowout (Q2).

1381 It explained these losses as follows:

... the high-pressure gas had been leaking through the ground via different fissures, fracture and holes in and around the blowout crater. The extent of this seepage has been observed at hundreds of meters away from the blowout crater.

1382 The Report continues by stating that after the Chattak 2A blowout “this seepage changed dynamically at a number of places". It referred to information about Niko's monitoring of gas seepages that ignited. Mr Adolph addressed Niko's monitoring of seepages and flame height:

Niko had, by this time, engaged consultants to conduct an environmental monitoring program, which among other things included the observation and recording of flame heights and seepages from cracks. Niko provided this information to BAPEX on a bi-weekly basis. However, I do not know the extent to which the data collected by the environmental monitoring team regarding flame heights and seepages was taken into account by the Second Lost Gas Committee.671


670 Niko's letter of 1 June 2005 to the Convener and the other members of the Committee, produced as Annex 20 to the First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 63, paragraph 7.
671 WS Adolph I, paragraph 140.

[Page 398]

1383 The Second Gas Loss Committee reports about the “flame heights at different locations in and around the two craters created by the first blowout". The Report reproduced a hand drawn map (unscaled) showing the monitoring locations:

Flame heigh Sketch

[Image of a hand-drawn map showing locations of flames.]

Text on map:

Numbered locations on map: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.

[Page 399]

1384 It also shows a graph recording the flame heights at these locations as they varied from 10 February to 28 July 2005, pointing out that “most of the flames varied between 5 and 15 ft. Although few flames reduced in size, a number of flames also picked up to 20 feet”:672

[Image of a line graph showing flame heights over time.]

Flame Height

Chart Details:


672 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 6 and Annexes G1 and G2.

[Page 400]

1385 It appears that this table in the Second Gas Loss Report is based on data in the Monitoring Reports by Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Niko's environmental consultants.673 These reports regularly contained graphs showing the flame height at different locations around the Chattak 2 blowout. The 8th Monitoring Report, dated 18 August 2005, contained the following graph covering a period similar to that in the Second Gas Loss Report:674

[Image of a line graph showing flame heights over time.]

Chart Details:

Figure 15. Flame height measured at 14 locations around the Chhatak 2 Blowout
February 4, 2005 to July 16, 2005. Shading indicates measurements
taken after blowout of Chhatak 2A on June 24, 2005.

1386 Starting with the report dated 9 April 2005, successive Monitoring Reports provide further information about the evolution of the flame height: The Second Monitoring Report contained a first record of the flames, indicating that during a first phase after the bridging of the well the number of locations where flames were recorded and, as the above graph shows, also the flame height increased.

Initially there were few flames identified. Over time, few more flames were also located. There were only 5 flames burning until February 5th,


673 See above Section 3 and below Section 9.2.2.2.
674 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Eighth Environmental Monitoring Report, 18 August 2005 (Eighth Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit R-116, page 21.

[Page 401]

2005 and number grew to 11 on February 28th. The number of flames essentially stayed unchanged until March 10th, 2005.675

1387 The Third Monitoring Report, dated 3 May 2005, stated:

As of April 20, 13 flames are visible among them 6 have the height of over 10 feet. Three flames are burning at the maximum height of approximately 17 feet each.676

1388 The Fourth Monitoring Report, dated 23 May 2005, stated:

Height of all flames are essentially unchanged except flame #7 which started increasing from April 23, 2005 to a height of 15 foot.677

1389 The Fifth Monitoring Report recorded a reduced number of flames over 10 feet;678 and the Sixth Monitoring Report stated:

Interestingly immediately following the second blowout the flames in the crater from the first blowout were relatively unaffected.679

1390 The Monitoring Reports also measured at selected locations the air quality, including the LEL levels which may be an indication of gas seepages that did not ignite to form flames. The 8th Monitoring Report stated:

LEL thresholds have been exceeded from time to time in some locations and are used as a basis for ongoing safety program including relocations.680

1391 Mr Kelly worked on the Chattak site from February 2005 for approximately 17 months overseeing “the HSE monitoring of surface gas seepages and other safety impacts in the surrounding territory”.681 He described the procedures of the gas monitoring programme and the HSE policy applied to all Niko on- site safety personnel and Crown Agents, “approximately 5 to 10 individuals at all times”, assisting in the “constant monitoring for the presence of gas


675 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Second Environmental Monitoring Report, 9 April 2005 (Second Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit R-79. ↩
676 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Third Environmental Monitoring Report, 3 May 2005 (Third Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit C-35, page 16. ↩
677 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Fourth Environmental Monitoring Report, 23 May 2005 (Fourth Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit R-115, page 17. ↩
678 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, 27 June 2005 (Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit C-46, page 20. ↩
679 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, 28 July 2005 (Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit C-47, page 20. ↩
680 Eighth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-116, page 18. ↩
681 WS Kelly, paragraphs 12 and 13. ↩

[Page 402]

emissions that might pose a safety and health risk”. 682 Concerning the locations of the emissions and their importance, Mr Kelly testified that

... the most significant surface impacts of the blowouts reflected by higher levels of surface emissions and cracks

were observed along a “definite North/South-oriented trend line”; and:

Additional concentrations of smaller surface impacts where surface gas seepages were also detected extended to an area a few hundreds meters to the East and Northeast of the blowout site. Sporadic and lesser impacts were later observed along the dominant North-South trend line at further distances from the Chattak 2 well site, more to the North. There were also some sporadic gas seepages from small cracks in the rice paddy to the South when the land was dry. However, once the monsoon rains flooded the rice paddy, there were no detectable gas bubbles or readings from the water to the South of the Chattak site.683

1392 Concerning the type of information he and his team collected he explained:

We did continue to check for concentration, never volume, never pressure.684

1393 Mr Wilson conducted during February 2016 a six day long on-site investigation “to identify the source of current gas emissions in the area surrounding Chattak 2 and Chattak 2A”.685 He concluded that there was

... evidence of current gas migration from the ground around the well head of Chattak 2/2A and the surrounding area in the form of:

a) Bubbles of methane in ponds, water in the bottom of trenches and other standing water;

b) Elevated methane concentrations emitted from floor slab cracks in buildings;

c) Methane seepage from the ground being used to power stoves in houses;


682 WS Kelly, paragraph 17. ↩
683 WS Kelly, paragraph 25. ↩
684 HT 2021 Day 6, page 99. ↩
685 Wilson I, paragraph 2. ↩

[Page 403]

d) Elevated methane concentrations in monitoring wells and in groundwater wells; and

e) Measurable surface emissions of methane from the ground and water surface.686

1394 Concerning the quantities of gas lost through these surface losses:

1395 The First Gas Loss Committee Report stated:

It is impossible to accurately calculate the amount of gas loss daily in these processes, but going by the surface indications the average escaping rate is estimated at about 2.0 mmcfd.687

1396 The Second Gas Loss Committee Report noted:

Surface seepage flow in addition to the surface gas loss due to the first blowout (Chattak 2) has to be estimated as well. As no new hole has been drilled into the cap-rock, gas loss estimation due to charging will remain unchanged. However, any such loss will continue until a successful kill of the 1st blowout.

[...]

It can be reasonably assumed that 2MMscfd gas is still leaking through these old locations due to the 1st blowout.

[...]

It is impossible to accurately quantify the leakage gas but from the above observations it can be securely estimated at 2 MMscfd. This is in addition to the 2 MMscfd continuing leakage due to the first blowout.688

1397 The Tribunal notes that, apart from the two Gas Loss Committees, the record shows no other contemporary attempt to estimate the quantity of surface loss based on actual observations of the escaping gas. The Tribunal is aware of measurements by Niko and Mr Wilson; from the record the Tribunal concludes that these measurements did not occur during Period 2 but only late in Period 3: Niko's gas traps from 2015 to 2021689 and Mr Wilson's flux boxes in 2016. These measurements will be discussed separately below.


686 Wilson I, paragraph 3. ↩
687 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 7. ↩
688 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, pages 3, 6 and 7. ↩
689 See e.g. Gaffney Cline IV, paragraph 30(iii). ↩

[Page 404]

1398 The possible range of the daily surface rate, which Niko communicated to the Convener of the First Gas Loss Committee, was based on Mr Grace's experience. All other contemporary records about gas loss to the surface at best provide information about flame height or LEL percentage, but no information about the quantity of gas. That applies also to Mr Kelly and his HSE team, who were in charge of constant monitoring for the presence of gas in 2005/6 and therefore they must have had the most detailed information about the gas escaping at the surface. They were, however, primarily concerned at the time with safety and no estimate about the quantity of gas emitted to the surface has been provided by them.

1399 Those who did provide or comment on estimates of gas quantities close in time to the blowouts have emphasised the difficulty if not impossibility of such quantification and the uncertainty of the result. The difficulties and uncertainties were recognised also during the Arbitration.

1400 BAPEX emphasised that observations of gas emissions at the surface “would necessarily miss the majority of the gas flowing because natural gas escaping into the atmosphere, even at high flow rates, is invisible absent external features such as flames or bubbles, and no surface or underground flow measurements were taken.” It described the quantification of the surface as relying on “anecdotal visual observation” and characterised the result as “not probative".690

1401 The difficulty of quantifying the surface gas loss is increased by the variations in the flows. The Second Gas Loss Committee stated that

... the high-pressure gas had been leaking through the ground via different fissures, fracture and holes in and around the blowout crater.691

1402 And, as Mr Wright explained, the gas moves to the surface through “fluidised channels" and the “flowrate will fluctuate as some channels close and others open up".692

1403 Neither the Gas Loss Committees in their reports nor Mr Adolph who attended the Second Gas Loss Committee meetings explain how, by observing flames and bubbles or receiving information from others, they proceeded to reach the conclusion that the quantity that escaped to the surface was 2MMcf per day.

1404 During his testimony at the November 2021 Hearing, Mr Latham brought the issue to the point:


690 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 17, 4. ↩
691 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 6. ↩
692 Wright IV, Section 2.1.2, paragraph 6, and Figure 3. ↩

[Page 405]

And frankly, I'm very concerned about how one looks at a leak on the surface and tells me that it's 2 million cubic feet a day.693

1405 Tribunal agrees and concludes: The reports of the Gas Loss Committees and the available information about their observations provided in the Arbitration do not allow any confidence in the estimate of the daily surface flow rate and the quantities of gas that escaped at the surface.

1406 BAPEX relies on Mr Wilson's report and the measurements he made in 2016:

The only measurements in the record of the rate of flow at the surface over a wide area are those Steve Wilson took in February of 2016.694

1407 During the six days of his 2016 visit to the site, Mr Wilson conducted a technical investigation, which he “considered to be a preliminary investigation in order to understand the scale of any issue at the site”.695 This preliminary investigation included a “walkover survey” and monitoring and testing. Mr Wilson “observed that Niko was completing large scale surface emission rate tests in the Niko compound [...] but I have not seen all the results of this, nor any risk assessment by Niko”; and he explained: “Much of the results of the monitoring by Niko are not included in the monitoring reports (only summary graphs or tables in some of the reports)”.696

1408 Mr Wilson's report about the results of the walkover survey contain the following passages:

The results of the walkover survey indicate that there are significant emissions of gas from the ground in places within the site compound and the surrounding area. The gas emissions are evident where there are ponds or standing water on fields or in trenches. Gas can be seen bubbling up through water. There is also evidence of emissions where water has dried out, in the form of circular depressions left in the ground surface. Based on this there is likely to be emissions from dry areas that cannot be seen....697

and:

In places the emissions are causing spouts of water from water supply wells and ponds (Figure 4.4). This indicates a very fast flow rate of gas from the ground. The absence of gas in places and the concentrated flow


693 HT 2021 Day 1, page 125. ↩
694 B-PHB 1, paragraph 24. ↩
695 Wilson I, paragraph 4.1.2. ↩
696 Wilson I, FN 11 and paragraph 4.1.3. ↩
697 Wilson I, paragraphs 4.2.1. ↩

[Page 406]

causing spouts of water indicates to me that the emissions are not uniform across the area and are most likely being influenced by the shallow geological conditions below the site. Impermeable clay soils may block flow in some areas and direct it to other locations via sand layers. There may also be more fractured zones of soil or rock that along which gas will flow preferentially.698

1409 Part of the investigation were 19 flux boxes placed in the area around the blowouts at locations identified in his first report.699 Mr Wilson explained that “Flux chamber tests measure how fast gas is coming out of the ground surface”; in some locations funnel tests were used.700 He reported:

The results show that surface emissions are highly variable. In the Red Zone in the Niko Compound for instance, where there are clearly points of very high surface emissions, there are also areas with much lower emissions. The scale and extent of emissions will be largely driven by the underground geology, especially shallow depth and there is scant information to allow it to be properly assessed.

1410 Mr Wilson used "flux data and the walkover information to define three main areas where there is gas migration” and opined on the emission rates in these areas: In the inner area, including the “Red Zone within the Niko Compound around the location of Chattak 2 and areas adjacent Abdul Kashamin's ponds", Mr Wilson assumes an “overall surface emission rate to be “12 to 4001/h/m² and approximate area = 15,000m². The surface emission rate may be up to 16001/h/m² at point locations; Mr Wilson states that this rate could cause "local health and safety or environmental hazards”. In the middle area “there is evidence of significant and widespread emissions of gas interspersed with areas of no gas emissions”. In this area the surface emission rate also “may be up to 1600 1/h/m² at point locations ...”. In the outer area “there is no evidence of significant and widespread emissions of gas occurring at present” and the “overall surface emission rate in this area is assumed to be at negligible level”.701

1411 On the basis of these and other sources of information, Mr Wilson estimated the "current flow out of the surface” per day at

... between 1.05 MMscfd and 7.4MMscfd.


698 Wilson I, paragraph 4.2.6. ↩
699 Wilson I, after Table A5.1 at page 132. ↩
700 Wilson I, paragraph 4.4.1. ↩
701 Wilson I, paragraphs 4.4.5 and 4.4.7. ↩

[Page 407]

The total gas loss since 2005 (after the final well kill operation) is estimated to be between 704MMscf and 22,959MMscf from the 500m radius plus a further 2,419 to 6,839MMscf from the highly disturbed area.

1412 The statement is qualified:

This is a rough estimate and makes no allowance for loss of pressure and reducing flows over time (i.e. flows would have been higher just after the blowout).702

1413 At the November 2021 Hearing Mr Wilson confirmed that the measurements were taken by 19 flux boxes and explained: “That's the maximum we could do in the time available”.703 He also identified a text that expressed “a valid or accepted methodology for measuring gas emissions”.704

1414 Concerning the locations where the flux boxes were placed, he explained:

I don't deny that we have not complied with the special requirements for this. But equally, no one had done any flux-chamber testing to measure surface emission rates prior to 2015 [...] equally, the Niko flux chambers don't comply with this either.705

1415 At the Hearing Mr Wilson also accepted that the “19 flux boxes fell well short of what was recommended” in “accepted methodology”;706 and all of the boxes that registered no gas from Mr Wilson's middle and outer zones were not used in the calculations.707

1416 Mr Wilson also identified the “large degree of uncertainty” in his estimates:

I've been quite open about this -- that we had limited time and there is a big degree of uncertainty -- I think I actually stated that in the report -- there is a large degree of uncertainty in these estimates and using these tests, without a doubt, yes.708


702 Wilson I, paragraph 6.6.2. ↩
703 HT 2021 Day 6, page 36. ↩
704 Exhibit R-458, confirmed at HT 2021 Day 6, page 37. ↩
705 HT 2021 Day 6, page 38. ↩
706 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 39 – 40. ↩
707 HT 2021 Day 6, page 46. ↩
708 HT 2021 Day 6, page 39. ↩

[Page 408]

1417 In response to the question whether the quality and quantity of measured gas emissions data impacts the reliability of any extrapolations made based on that data", Mr Wilson replied:

It does, and that's why I've not given -- you know, I've not stated a value; I've given a range. And I've identified that there is a great deal of uncertainty in it, yes.

Q. Do you accept then, sir, that the gas emissions ranges that you have provided and put into evidence are highly uncertain?

A. Yes, I do accept that, yes.709

1418 The Tribunal has carefully examined the reports of Mr Wilson about the investigations during the short period available on site and the analysis described in the reports. It noted the difficulties highlighted by those having considered an estimate of the surface flow rate, including Mr Wilson. And it noted that the estimate which Mr Wilson produced as the result of his “preliminary investigation” in 2016 is “highly uncertain”. The flow rate in 2016 may be within the range of 1.05 to 7.4 MMcfd; it may confirm the rate estimated by the Gas Loss Committees in 2005 or that proposed by BAPEX in 2022; but it may also be outside the range assumed by Mr Wilson. The Tribunal is unable to rely on it to estimate the rate at which gas escaped at the surface in 2005 and the period thereafter.

1419 The evidence about the flames, bubbles and seepages at the surface suggests that substantial quantities of gas escaped at the surface and that these quantities may well have been above the flowrate of 2MMcfd, estimated by the First Committee and confirmed by Gaffney Cline. In the Tribunal's view based on the evidence before it, the attempt of the Committees to make an estimate of these quantities “going by surface indication” is an impossible exercise and no explanation was provided about the manner in which, on the basis of such indication, consisting essentially “on anecdotal observations”, the Committee determined a daily rate of gas flow, a rate that included not only the visible evidence of flames and bubbles but also the possibly more frequent invisible emissions of gas that had not ignited. The measurement at some selected locations ten years after the blowouts, in the Tribunal's view may well be of use for an assessment of the gas at surface in 2015 and thereafter; the Tribunal is not persuaded that these measurements may serve for estimating gas flow at surface in 2005.


709 HT 2021 Day 6, page 48. ↩

[Page 409]

1420 The Tribunal concludes that the evidence available for estimating the quantity of gas that escaped at the surface is unreliable and insufficient for reaching an estimate in which the Tribunal would have confidence. The Tribunal therefore does not fix a rate of gas loss at surface for Period 1; it considers other methods for taking account of the surface gas.

7.6.3.4 The subsurface flow, Q3: the critical factors, the approaches adopted and the Tribunal's analysis and conclusion

1421 The Q3 quantification for Period 1 concerns the flow of gas out of the Reservoir, charging into the Overburden, from 9 January to 24 June 2005, starting when the first blowout bridged and ending with the second blowout. Apart from BAPEX's claims for the incomplete sealing of the blowout well, the claim for the gas loss quantified by the Q3 flow rate during this period is the highest component of the flow rate quantification and the decision on this component is determinative also for the assessment of the flow in the following periods

1422 The Tribunal noted that the Parties and their experts identified critical factors for the flow rate assessment and starts by identifying these factors. It then examines the flow rate quantification by the Committees and by the Parties in light of these factors.

1423 The Parties and their experts have identified two critically important factors for the subsurface flow rate: (i) the difference between the pressure of the gas flowing from the Reservoir and the pressure in the Overburden against which this gas must flow (the Pressure Differential) and (ii) the area through which the gas can flow into the Overburden, an area which is determined to a large extent by the location of the bridge (the Surface Area). They also discussed the permeability of the Overburden.

1424 Concerning the Pressure Differential, the Claimant contrasted the weighted average initial pressure from the Reservoir (estimated at 879psia) with the “downward hydrostatic pressure exerted by the water saturated Overburden (estimated to at about 670psi) and concluded:

The rate at which the gas will flow is driven, in large measure, by that pressure differential.710

1425 It emphasised the difference between the Q1 flow through the open borehole and the Q3 flow into the Overburden:


710 C-PHB 1, paragraph 34. ↩

[Page 410]

... one need only consider the patent difference between an open wellbore to surface as the flow path (pre-bridging), and the gas needing to flow into and through hundreds of meters of water-filled overburden post- bridging to appreciate that the flow rate of gas out of the reservoir would be materially lower after the well bridged.711

1426 Relying on Gaffney Cline's Third Report, the Claimant explained the situation in a more detailed manner:

a. The high rate of flow out of the reservoirs (as reflected by high pre- bridging flows for each blowout) is only possible when the flow occurs up an unrestricted wellbore from the reservoir to the atmosphere.

b. Once the wellbore bridges and the surface blowout ceases, it is impossible for the gas to continue flowing out of the reservoir at the same rate.

c. The flow rate of gas depends significantly on both the pressure of the source (in this case, the pressure in Sands 1 and 2) and the pressure against which the gas is flowing. Pre-bridging the gas faces very limited backpressure. Post-bridging the gas is flowing against the backpressure of the water-bearing formations above the Regional Shale (assuming the bridge is above the Regional Shale) which results in a much lower flowrate from the reservoir sands.712

1427 Gaffney Cline described the constraints determining the post-bridging flow, including the following passage:

... the situation after the wellbore bridges and any flow through the Marine Shale must then enter the shallow rock formations. These are saturated with water which exerts a hydrostatic pressure on the gas (based on a column of water from the surface) with an estimated pressure of about 670 psi. The gas must now force itself into the water-bearing formations (with a lower permeability than an open wellbore) which results in a much lower flowrate from the reservoir sands.713

1428 Mr Wright confirmed the importance of the Pressure Differential but emphasised the variations in the flow rate due to channels that open in the Overburden; he concluded that, as a result, the flow “will ebb & flow as the channels open & close":


711 C-PHB 1, paragraph 14. ↩
712 C-Gas Loss Calculations, paragraph 20, relying on Gaffney Cline III, paragraphs 37 – 39. ↩
713 Gaffney Cline III, paragraph 39(ii). ↩

[Page 411]

When bridging occurs, the back pressure on the reservoir increases initially to the fracture pressure at deepest part of the bridge, for example at 352mTVD, 339m TVDSS. The flowrate will decrease to a back pressure of approximately 776 psi (assuming 13 ppg frac gradient). See Figure 3.

After some period of time the flowing gas pushing the water through the sand matrix will fluidize the sand through multiple channels and the back pressure will reduce again, lower than fracture pressure. It would be composed of sand, water and gas hydrostatic and friction. Water hydrostatic is approximately 500 psi. The flow rate will increase.

The flowrate will fluctuate as some channels close and others open up.714

1429 At the November 2021 Hearing Mr Wright summarised:

The flow will spread below the shale stringers and find places to break through to the surface. Once fluidised channels are formed the flow is not constrained by fracture pressure but will ebb & flow as the channels open & close.715

1430 BAPEX recognises the relevance of the “pressure gradient” and the difference in this respect between the Q1 and Q3 situation.716 However, it assumed a shallow location of the bridge and concluded that the resulting lateral flow, as shown in the drawing reproduced above in Section 7.6.3.1, was predominant.

1431 For BAPEX, the critical factor was the Surface Area through which the gas can flow into the Overburden and the lateral flow of the gas: the gas that flows out of the opening in the Upper Marine Shale flows into the borehole and from there into the Overburden. The higher the bridge the larger the surface in the borehole through which the gas may flow into the Overburden:

... gas would not be exiting the reservoir from a small hole above the Upper Marine Shale after the Chattak-2 bridged. Instead it would be exiting laterally with considerable force over the entire surface of the wellbore between the top of the reservoir and point of bridging. This created between 250m and 420m of open whole [recte: hole] communication between the gas exiting the reservoir trough the Chattak 2 wellbore and an overburden described by John Wright as


714 Wright IV, page 6, Section 2.1.2. ↩
715 Exhibit CH-3, Figure 3. ↩
716 B-PHB 1, paragraph 31. ↩

[Page 412]

“unconsolidated sand”. The result would be an absorbed gas cloud with a very broad base, with limited restricting pressure, not the tip of a cone with restricting pressure equivalent to a full column of water, as assumed by Gaffney Cline.717

1432 In support of the lateral spread of the gas, BAPEX relied on Dr Bruno's presentation at the Hearing:

The gas would not flow to surface in the shape of a geometric cone, but spread at the bridge like water hitting a plate, as shown by Dr Bruno at the Hearing, and then continue to spread as it rises, like a cloud of smoke in the air.718

1433 For the flow through the Overburden, BAPEX also refers to Mr Wright's explanations about his experience in Alaska and Moulavi Bazar blowouts:

[M]ovement of gas and water through the shallow, unconsolidated or poorly cemented sands had completely lowered the fracture gradient of that sand. [...]

[G]as is flowing up and pushing the water out of the way [to] get to the surface through these vents. But we were able to pump water into it at close 3 to 50 barrels a minute with no back-pressure.

So that means there's going to be channels all the way to the top. You've got sand that's unconsolidated, and once you find these unconsolidated channels that have worked their way up, they can fill with gas. So you've got gas and water now working up.719

1434 BAPEX recognised that the exact depth of the bridge was unknown but calculated that, at a bridge depth of about 352m, “the cross sectional area for the blowout scenario” would be 41'925 in²”, an area that is “more than 740 times larger than the area of the borehole alone”.720

1435 While accepting that “the pressure gradient into the formation is smaller than the gradient up the borehole”, BAPEX attributed less importance to the Pressure Differential, asserting that “it did essentially nothing to stem the flow out of the Reservoir”. In the passage quoted above, BAPEX emphasised the lateral flow.:


717 В-РНВ 2, paragraph 17, quotations omitted. ↩
718 B-PHB 1, paragraph 39, reference to Dr Bruno's testimony HT 2021 Day 4, pages 60 – 62; and explanations at HT 2021 Day 6, pages 26 – 28. ↩
719 HT 2021 Day 4, page 109, quoted at B-PHB 2, paragraph 18. ↩
720 B-PHB 1, paragraph 32. ↩

[Page 413]

... there is little doubt that the capacity for lateral flow into the formation after bridging exceeds the flow up the wellbore before bridging. If the bridge of the Chattak 2 well was located many meters above the upper marine shale, it did essentially nothing to stem the flow out of the Reservoir. This is consistent with the Committees' Scenario-1 where the maximum flow rate into the overburden would have been 558 mmcfd, limited by the flow through the Upper Marine Shale of 271.7 mmcfd.721

1436 The Claimant challenges these explanations, relying also on the testimony of Dr Bruno and quoted him: “it is harder to flow into water-saturated sands for the same cross-sectional area”.722 While emphasising that “the larger area can flow a lot more fluid or gas than a smaller surface area”, Dr Bruno recognised that "[a]nother factor is, of course, the pressure difference”. The Claimant refers to Dr Bruno who

... was clear that surface area alone would not determine the rate of flow, but that permeability of the formation and the pressure differential are also significant factors that will affect the rate of gas flow into the intermediate sands.723

1437 Dr Bruno brought it to the point:

Well, basically, your flow rate is dependent on pressure difference and cross-sectional area into which you are flowing.724

1438 The Tribunal notes that, despite the difference in emphasis, both Parties and their experts recognise the relevance of both the Pressure Differential and the Surface Area as determining the rate at which the gas can flow out of the Reservoir into the Overburden.

1439 The Tribunal concludes from these explanations of the Parties and their experts that a reliable quantification of the flow into the Overburden must take account both of the Pressure Differential and of the Surface Area through which the gas can flow, depending largely on the location of the bridge.

1440 The experts also attributed some importance to the permeability: Gaffney Cline included permeability of the Overburden as one of the factors in their Simulation. In their first report they presented in Figure 6 a curve showing


721 B-PHB 1, paragraph 32. ↩
722 C-PHB 2, paragraph 15 and FN 18, relying on the testimony of Dr Bruno, HT 2021 Day 6, page 28 ↩
723 C-PHB 2, paragraph 15. ↩
724 HT 2021 Day 6, page 28. ↩

[Page 414]

“Gas Loss as a Function of Permeability of sands above the Regional Seal”.725 Ryder Scott discussed permeability in their own reports, for instance in the context of the Chattak 1 Microlog and considered the “highly permeable shallow sand formations characteristic of the Chattak West Field area above the Upper Marine Shale and the likely existence of localized low permeability shale units trapping gas up their trapping capacity”.726

1441 Considering the formulae applied by the First Gas Loss Committee in its calculation of the Q3 flow rate, the Tribunal notes that all three of these factors are taken into account. For the calculation of this rate in the 2 scenarios, the Committee used formulae similar to that it had used for the Q1 rate, but with varied factors.

1442 In Scenario 1 the Committee adopted a formula which identified the Pressure Differential, the Surface Area and other factors. The Pressure Differential consisted of the following values:

1443 Concerning the Surface Area the First Gas Loss Committee assumed that it was of a “vast lateral extent”. It examined as possible locations of the bridge (i) the casing shoe at 305m and (ii) the assumed location of the drill bit at 466m. The Committee considered that the “gas flowing at the initial high rates (and velocity) must have cut the wall opposite the drill bit enough to maintain the flow rate around AOR of the well.” It found that it was “quite possible" that, after the bridge formed at the casing shoe at 305m “gas can now flow past the drill bit unabated to other sands at rates similar to the initial conditions of minimal restrictions in the wellbore (i.e. @ AOF)”. The Committee concluded:

... it is most likely that gas from the reservoir sands 1&2 is now charging into the adjacent porous and permeable sandstone layers of Tipam, Dupitila, etc. It is also quite possible that charging int these layers will go on at very high volumes in view of their vast lateral extent in the Suma Basin, until equilibrium is reached with the gas reservoirs.727


725 Gaffney Cline I, Figure 6 at page 26. ↩
726 Ryder Scott I, paragraphs 14, 15, 53 and Ryder Scott II, paragraph 11(b). ↩
727 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, pages 7 – 8. ↩

[Page 415]

1444 Concerning the “Formation Permeability” the Committee had noted “unknown” when defining the factors for Q1. For Scenario 1 of Q3, the Committee noted:

1445 Ryder Scott, BAPEX's experts, made special reference to the use of permeability in the Committee's formula, as an example of the unreliability of the exercise. When encouraging “the panel to look at the input data” used by the Committee in the calculations, Mr Latham referred to the assumption of 313 millidarcy, as quoted above, and stated that nobody knew how this value was reached.728

1446 Mr Seagar of Gaffney Cline had an answer to Mr Latham's concern: by reference to the Q3 quantification he explained how the value for permeability was reached after Q1 had been quantified and opined that this was reasonable:

The Gas Loss Committee then used that rate in the inflow performance formula to calculate the formation permeability of 313 mD. Not, as Ryder Scott suggested, they randomly assumed that number; no. They back- calculated it and then saw that that was reasonable, given what is known about sands of that quality. There is no measurement of permeability. But is the number reasonable? Yes, it is.

[...]

The fact that the rate coming from the vertical flow calculation gave a reasonable estimate for permeability for Sands 1 and 2 tends to support the reasonableness of the flow rate calculated using the vertical flow formula.729

1447 Scenario 2 situated the bridge at the assumed level of the drill bit, adopting the following value.

1448 By reference to that level, the Pressure Differential was the result of the following values:


728 HT 2021 Day 1, page 123 and 135. ↩
729 HT 2021 Day 2, page 70 and 71. ↩

[Page 416]

1449 The deeper location of the bridge in this scenario allowed gas to flow into the Overburden only through a 19m window, with a much smaller Surface Area. The Committee explained: “Gas would then flow only into the lower part of Tipam sands from the gas sands through the 8-1/2 hole created in the Upper Marine Shale”. The assumed backpressure from the Overburden therefore is higher in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1. The pressure of the gas is determined by reference to the location at which it faces this backpressure, when it exits the Regional Shale (UMS) above the Reservoir. The Committee explained that the gas “can flow both laterally and vertically in unlimited quantity until equilibrium is reached with the gas reserves”.

1450 The formula also had the following factor:

1451 Considering the flow rate calculated by the First Committee, the Tribunal notes with respect to Scenario 1 that the Committee's calculation resulted in a flow rate of 558 MMcfd., which the Committee considered impossible, as the charging rate into the upper formation “can not be greater than the AOF of the gas reservoir Sands 1&2”. It replaced the result of its calculation by the rate of 271.70 MMcfd which it had calculated for Q1 at AOF.

1452 The Committee reached this new number, not by making corrections in the formula or in the values adopted for the factors in that formula. It simply used another number that had been calculated for a different situation That other number had been calculated for a pressure differential that did not prevail after the bridging, when the gas no longer could flow through the open wellbore at AOF but had to flow against back pressure of the Overburden.

1453 The Tribunal also considered that the rate adopted by the Committee for its Scenario 1 is in contradiction with its quantification of the surface rate at 2MMcfd: in its explanation supporting Scenario 1, the First Committee had assumed an unrestricted (“unabated”) flow of gas to surface. It considered that the

... wellbore gas flowing at the initial high rates (and velocity) must have cut the wall opposite the drill bit enough to maintain the flow rate at around AOF of the well. Thus, it is quite possible that following stoppage of gas exit to the surface by restrictions created around the 13 3/8” shoe and above the 8 1/2" drill hole gas can now flow past the drill bit


730 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 9. ↩

[Page 417]

unabated to other sands at rates similar to the initial conditions of minimal restrictions in the wellbore (i.e. @AOF).731

1454 If after the bridging “gas can now flow past the drill bit unabated to other sands at rates similar to the initial conditions" it is difficult to understand how the gas observed at the surface would be limited to 2 MMcfd. The Tribunal discussed above the flow rates at surface and noted that substantial quantities of gas escaped at surface; but it saw no indication that these quantities were in the range of the initial flare before bridging.

1455 If, however, the gas “charging” into the Overburden would have been absorbed or trapped there, the subsequent drilling would have encountered large quantities of gas. As discussed above in Sections 7.5.3 and 7.5.4, the Tribunal concurs with the Second Gas Loss Committee and the Claimant, concluding that the evidence about the “absorptive capacity” of the Overburden and about the capacity of shale stringers to trap gas in substantial quantities does not support such an assumption.

1456 The Tribunal concludes that the rate which the First Gas Loss Committee adopted for Scenario 1 is not the result of a flow rate calculation but an assumption. In the circumstances described, this assumption is not plausible as it is in contradiction with the rate adopted by the Committee for the surface flow and with the evidence about the quantities of gas absorbed or trapped in the Overburden. The Tribunal sees no justification for basing the Q3 flow rate on the estimate according to Scenario 1.

1457 In Scenario 2 the values for certain factors of the formula were modified compared to Scenario 1, leading to a different pressure differential and a different surface area, as explained above. The result is a flow rate of 31.47 MMcfd.

1458 The Second Gas Loss Committee considered the Q3 quantification of the First Committee. Its task was to quantify the loss after the second blowout. It did so for Q1 and for Q2 in section 4.1 and 4.2 of its report. For Q3, the Second Committee took a different approach and referred to the work of the First Committee, concluding that the estimate “will remain unchanged". It justified this approach as follows:

As no new hole has been drilled into the cap-rock, gas loss estimation due to charging will remain unchanged. However, any such loss will continue until a successful kill of the 1st blowout well.732


731 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2. ↩
732 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 3. ↩

[Page 418]

1459 In section 4.3, the Committee described the subsurface loss and explained its reference to the estimate of the First Committee:

The gas loss estimation report of the first blowout estimated a range of values in gas loss due to the above-mentioned possibilities. The 2nd blowout of the Relief well (Chattak 2A) did not change the process suggested in the first blowout gas loss report. The principal reason behind the conclusion is that the Relief well did not create a new hole in the cap rock for further loss through charging.

1460 The Committee then added “some observations during the drilling of Relief well Chattak 2A [that] can shed some light on charge gas situation”. These observations concerned drilling records of the first and the second blowout, the causes of the second blowout and the flame height of the Chattak 2A blowout. The final observation concerned the two scenarios of the First Committee:

The first report assumed two scenarios for the calculation of the third component of the gas loss. Scenario-1 assumed the bridging of the well beneath the casing shoe (303 m) and Scenario-2 assumed the bridging at the drill bit position (466m). From the log data of Chattak 2A well, it can be observed that no gas accumulation was encountered in the upper Tipam/Dupitila sand layers. As a result, the possibility of Scenario-1 for the higher estimate of the third loss component (Q)) as described in the first report seems unlikely.733

1461 The Tribunal concludes that the Second Gas Loss Committee determined that for Q3, “the gas loss estimation due to charging” remained “unchanged” from the estimate of the First Committee, except that Scenario 1 seemed “unlikely”. In the Tribunal's understanding this means that, for the Second Gas Loss Committee, the loss for Q3 is estimated according to Scenario 2 of the First Committee. This estimate is “unchanged” for the first and the second blowout. The “unchanged” rate of 31.47 MMcfd calculated for Scenario 2 is intended to apply “until a successful kill of the 1st blowout well”.

1462 The Tribunal considers next the effect of this conclusion by the Second Gas Loss Committee for BAPEX and Niko: Both of them were represented on the Second Committee. Niko had also been represented on the First Committee and had objected to the Q3 quantification by that Committee. In the letter attached to the First Committee's report, it stated that the “value estimated for Q3 is not reasonable and more data and observations are required to be able to determine a reasonable value (if any) on the gas that may have been


733 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, pages 7 and 8. ↩

[Page 419]

lost in this manner”. Niko added that “a range of estimates of 0 bcf to 50 bcf is too wide a range for agreement amongst the Committee”. 734 Similar objections had been raised by Niko's representative during the work of the Second Committee in his comments on a draft of the Second Committee's report.

1463 The Second Gas Loss Committee referred to this disagreement on the Q3 rate and explained the positions in section 4:

Niko, at the time of the first blowout committee report agreed that the third component (gas charge) could be reasonably speculated to be between 0 bcf and 50 bcf. However, they mentioned that it was too wide a range and requested to remove any estimation of the quantity until adequate data and observation is undertaken to help determining a reasonable value for Q3. Comments and observations will be made in this regard (Section 4.3).735

1464 In section 4.3 of its report the Committee addressed the request for “adequate data": in the quoted passage it considered the two scenarios in the light of the new information produced by the Chattak 2A drilling. The new information provided by “the log data of Chattak 2A well” led the Committee to the conclusion that Scenario 1 was “unlikely”. Disregarding the result of Scenario 1 removed the wide range between 0 and 50 Bcf; what remained was Scenario 2.

1465 Mr Adolph, then Niko's Vice President and Country Manager, testified about contacts with Dr Stocker, Niko's representative on the Second Gas Loss Committee. He stated that Niko received a draft of the Committee's report and Dr Stocker prepared a report with his objections and concerns. Niko forwarded Dr Stocker's report to the Convener of the Committee, asking that it be taken into account before the Committee's report was finalised. Mr Adolph pointed out the Committees reference to the absence of accumulations of gas in the Overburden, rendering Scenario 1 “unlikely”. Mr Adolph also stated that only very few of Dr Stocker's comments were taken into account in the final version of the Committee's report. He concluded nevertheless that the estimated losses were higher than Dr Stocker believed appropriate but "the difference was not large and could be accounted for by a divergence of opinion regarding particular factual assumptions which underpinned the conclusions".736


734 Niko's letter of 1 (4) June 2005; First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, at pages 32 – 33. ↩
735 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 3. ↩
736 WS Adolph I, paragraphs 144 and 142. ↩

[Page 420]

1466 The Tribunal notes that the representatives of both BAPEX and Niko signed the Second Committee's report without qualification or reservation, thus extending to the Q3 estimate based on Scenario 2. No objections were raised subsequently against that report and its conclusion. The amount determined by the First Committee for Q3 at the Scenario 2 rate (5.885 Bcf) was then claimed in the Money Suit by the Government and Petrobangla as Schedule B Subsurface loss.737

1467 The Tribunal concludes that in 2005, by signing the Second Committee's report without reservation, the representatives of BAPEX and Niko reached agreement on the Second Gas Loss Report, which included limiting the First Committee's Q3 estimate to Scenario 2 and the adoption of that estimate “unchanged” for Period 2.

1468 In the Arbitration, the Parties adopted positions that differ in particular with respect to Q3 from those of the Committees and seek relief more favourable than that resulting from the Q3 conclusion in the report of the Second Committee adopted by their representatives at the time. The Tribunal now considers the argument and evidence presented by the Parties in support of their flow rate estimates differing from Scenario 2, including their replies to the Tribunal's Questions 3 to 5 which focused on these estimates.

1469 The Claimant did not adopt a flow rate for the Q3 quantity as the Committees had done but, as explained in Section 7.6.3.2, relied on Gaffney Cline's analysis of the gas that could be absorbed in the Overburden. The Claimant explained:

... the only difference between GCA and the Committees was in regard to Q3 volumes, and in estimating that volume they did not use the same method. GCA used its gas saturation analysis, not a flow rate analysis ...738

1470 The Claimant presented the two “principal differences between the First Gas Loss Committee and GCA”: the first difference concerned the information about the gas in the subsurface which was unavailable to the First Committee, which it expected from the Relief Well and which was available to Gaffney Cline. The second difference resulted from the fact that Gaffney Cline “considered and modelled the physical capability of the overburden to trap gas".739


737 Money Suit Complaint, Exhibit C-6, page 76; the claimants in the Money Suit added a claim under Schedule C "additional sub-surface loss" for 45 Bcf; added to the amount in Schedule B, this produced a total practically identical with the First Committee's total for Scenario 1 (50.808 Bcf). ↩
738 C-PHB 1, FN 80 at page 25. ↩
739 C-PHB 1, paragraphs 26 and 27. ↩

[Page 421]

1471 The Tribunal notes that the first of these differences applied to the First but not to the Second Committee. The latter had information from the Relief Well available and drew the consequences by no longer pursuing the rate resulting from Scenario 1.740 The second difference identifies the specific nature of Gaffney Cline's approach and is critical for the assessment of the Claimant's method for quantifying the Q3 loss.

1472 While the Committee used a formula or equation producing a rate at which gas flowed from the Reservoir into the Overburden, Gaffney Cline analysed the capacity of the Overburden to absorb gas. It determined 1.21Bcf as “the maximum volume that can be accumulated in the shallow sands with any excess gas reaching and escaping from the surface”. This is “a static quantity prior to the Ch-2B killing operation in October 2005”. Gaffney Cline recognised it was not possible to know when this maximum was reached.741

1473 The Claimant described the Gaffney Cline calculations and the factors used for it:

GCA undertook modelling and sensitivity simulation to estimate the flow rate into and through the overburden following bridging of Chattak 2 using varied assumptions as to the permeability of the upper sands, the % of incremental gas saturation of the pore spaces (i.e. assuming different residual (pre-blowout) gas saturation and maximum, or “critical”, gas saturation), the relationship between vertical and horizontal permeability (i.e. the ratio of horizontal flow to vertical flow), and the depth of the bridge in the Chattak 2 well.742

1474 The factors identified by the Claimant and by Gaffney Cline do not include factors critical for the calculation of a flow rate, in particular “the pressure of the source" nor the “pressure against which the gas flows", the factors which determine "significantly” the flow rate of gas and on which the Claimant and its experts insisted repeatedly.743 The purpose of Gaffney Cline's calculation was not, as the Claimant asserted in the quoted passage, to “estimate the flow rate into and through the overburden". Gaffney Cline calculated the absorptive capacity of the Overburden; nowhere did it identify the flow rate alleged by the Claimant.

1475 The only rate presented by the Claimant for the flow after bridging of Chattak 2 is the 2 MMcfd rate for flow at the surface. As explained above, this rate and any other estimate of the surface rate made on the basis of the evidence in


740 This is also the conclusion drawn by Gaffney Cline IV, paragraph 5. ↩
741 Gaffney Cline IV, paragraph 36. ↩
742 C-PHB 1, paragraph 34. ↩
743 See above this Section and e.g. C- Gas Loss Calculations, paragraph 20, relying on Gaffney Cline III. ↩

[Page 422]

the record are unreliable. It follows that the Claimant's quantification of the loss after the Chattak 2 well bridged consists of an unreliable flow rate at the surface and the estimation of the gas that can be trapped or absorbed in the Overburden but does not seek to quantify the flow of gas out of the Reservoir.

1476 The Tribunal is not persuaded that such an estimate captures the full amount of the gas that escaped from the Reservoir into the Overburden after the bridging of the first blowout.

1477 During the course of the proceedings, BAPEX and its experts did not present a Flow Rate assessment, considering that, given the available evidence, the Flow Rate methods could not be applied. When it presented for the first time a Flow Rate quantification in its Post-Hearing Brief, BAPEX asserted that it “accepts Committee's Scenario-1 approach to the subsurface flow rate, as the evidence in the proceeding has shown that the location of the bridging of the Chattak 2 well was well above the Upper Marine Shale”.744

1478 The Q3 rate then proposed by BAPEX differs both in number and method of calculation from that of the Committees: instead of the 558/271.7 MMcfd of the First Committee, BAPEX “considers that the flow rate from the Reservoir through the borehole in the Upper Marine Shale would be approximately 123 mmcfd immediately after the Chattak 2 well bridged, which would decline steadily at a rate of 1.5% per month”.745

1479 BAPEX asserts that “for variations from the Committee's finding” it would provide support “based on the evidence in the record”.746 However, it does not present a modified version of the Committee's formula, nor does it specify what variations it made to that formula and the underlying assumptions in order to assert the modified rate.

1480 The only information BAPEX provides for the new daily flow rate concerns the assumed depth of the bridging of the Chattak 1 flow. It points out that the Committee had situated this depth at 305m and Mr Hughes between 250m and 420m; and it continues stating: “Based on this”, it reached a flow rate not of 558 MMcfd nor of 271.7 MMcfd but of 123 MMcfd. From these explanations it is not apparent how the rate of 123 MMcfd of BAPEX was calculated and how it was based on the Committee's Scenario 1 approach.

1481 BAPEX did present a calculation of the Surface Area, calculating that at a depth of ~352m depth there would be 133m “of open hole length through which gas flowed upwards and then laterally into the porous media”; that


744 B-PHB 1, paragraph 33. ↩
745 В-РНВ 1, paragraph 33. ↩
746 B-PHB 1, paragraph 21. ↩

[Page 423]

would amount to a Surface Area of 41’925 in², an area that “is more than 740 times larger than the area of the borehole alone”. BAPEX does not explain how this surface area is reflected in its determination of the flow rate.

1482 BAPEX recognised that the “Reservoir pressure is relevant in determining the flow rate”, but does not indicate what reservoir pressure it assumed for its flow rate estimate; and it does not indicate what pressure in the Overburden it assumed, except for the unquantified assertion that, at a location “many meters above the upper marine shale, it did essentially nothing to stem the flow out of the Reservoir".747

1483 The Claimant objected to these explanations in BAPEX's Post Hearing Brief, arguing that they constituted “an effort to introduce impermissible new evidence”, “misrepresents the evidence” and stated that the “new calculation of the surface area” was “without any supporting expert evidence”. And it states that “BAPEX's experts did not conduct any quantitative analysis of flow rates arising from the Chattak 2 (or 2A) blowout, let alone flow rates into the overburden".748

1484 The Tribunal notes BAPEX has not shown that “the flow rate [... of] approximately 123 mmcfd” presented in its first Post Hearing Brief follows the approach of the First Gas Loss Committee's Scenario 1 approach or that it is the result of a Flow Rate quantification in another form. BAPEX has not shown that in determining this 123 MMcfd rate, it considered the factors identified by the Parties as critical and it has not shown how those factors to which it referred were taken into account in its determination.

1485 The Tribunal concludes that BAPEX's quantification of the Q3 rate at 123 MMcfd is unsupported and cannot be accepted.

1486 At the Hearing the Tribunal requested guidance from the experts for determining whether the Claimant's experts, the Committee or the Respondent's experts were right in their flow rate estimates.749

1487 At the Hearing Ryder Scott presented the daily rates of the First Gas Loss Committee, and the Tribunal asked Ryder Scott how the Committee reached the flow rates. Mr Nowicki replied that this was “a detailed topic”. Mr Latham criticised the Committees for having used “absolute open flow", as the Committees had done for calculating Q1; he opined that this was “very theoretical and physically impossible to emulate”.750


747 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 32 - 34. ↩
748 C-PHB 2, paragraphs 11 – 15. ↩
749 HT 2021 Day 2, page 11, quoted above. ↩
750 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 123 and 125. ↩

[Page 424]

1488 With respect to the formulae used by the Committees, Ryder Scott, as they had done in their reports, insisted on the uncertainty about the assumptions made since “the available dataset is not sufficient".751 The discussion on this subject concluded by Mr Latham insisting on verification of the “input data”, as quoted above, with permeability given as the only example.752

1489 Apart from their criticism about the use of an “absolute open flow” and their inability to understand the permeability factor adopted in the Committee's formula, points to which Gaffney Cline responded, Ryder Scott provided no other explanation to assist the Tribunal in the examination which Mr Latham had encouraged.

1490 Gaffney Cline stated in their first report that they agreed “with the calculations made by the Committees for the gas lost at surface”.753 In their second report, they confirmed that this statement included the Q1 gas loss of 40 hours at 271.7 MMcfd; for the subsurface loss, Gaffney Cline assessed not a flow rate but the “residual gas saturation in the shallower formations”.754

1491 At the Hearing, Gaffney Cline presented the formula for calculating Q1. They explained that they verified the values used for the equation applied for the estimate of Q1 and found them reasonable.755 Mr Saeger made the point that the formulae used by the first Gas Loss Committee were “industry standard":

What I wanted to show was the formulas that were used and the fact that they are indeed industry standard formulas.

1492 And he described the process adopted by the Committee:

The Gas Loss Committee selected the known information and made some reasonable assumptions for unknown data to put into this calculation to derive a rate for the loss calculation during the Chattak 2 blowout.756

1493 In the context of the Q1 flow rate, Mr Seager was asked at the Hearing Mr Seager by the Tribunal about Gaffney Cline's own calculations and the assumptions made. He explained:

No, sir, we reviewed the calculations – of course, we first checked that the formulas were correct, and we reviewed the calculations and the


751 HT 2021 Day 1, page 130 and Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slides 21 and 22. ↩
752 HT 2021 Day 1, page 135. ↩
753 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 30. ↩
754 Gaffney Cline II, paragraphs 2 and 4. ↩
755 See in particular the discussion at the Hearing, HT 2021 Day 2, pages 68 – 81. ↩
756 HT 2021 Day 2, page 69. ↩

[Page 425]

assumptions and we deemed them reasonable, we adopted those assumptions as our estimate, based on the rate-time methodology.757

1494 On the slide that accompanied these explanations, Gaffney Cline explained that the industry standard used by the Committee concerned the gas flow rates “during the blowout and after the well bridged”, thus including the calculations for Q3.758

1495 Gaffney Cline did in fact consider the Committee's formulae not only in the context of Q1 but also the formulae for Q3. In particular, they explained the Committee's determination of the Permeability factor, which had remained “unknown” in the presentation of the formula for the Q1 open flow but was specified for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. Mr Latham of Ryder Scott stated that "nobody knows” how the Committee assumed the Permeability value of 313 millidarcy. As quoted above in the context of the discussion about this Permeability as one of the critical factors for Q3 flow rate, Mr Seager's explanations were quoted. They show that Gaffney Cline examined the First Committee's formulae for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 and determined, at least for the Permeability factor, that the estimate was reasonable and supported "the reasonableness of the flow rate calculated using the vertical flow formula".759

1496 Considering the First Committee's Scenario 2 calculation against this background, the Tribunal notes that both Gas Loss Committees used a formula to calculate the flow of the gas escaping from the Reservoir during the initial flare of the blowout. Gaffney Cline verified this calculation. They found that the formula used was industry standard and that the values adopted for the factors in in the formula used “known information and made some reasonable assumptions for unknown data”; and Gaffney Cline accepted the result.

1497 After the Chattak 2 well bridged, the gas could no longer flow through the wellbore at AOF but had to find its way against the back pressure of the Overburden. The First Committee applied the same approach for calculating the flow of gas after the well bridged, using a formula that resembled that for Q1. It preserved some factors, modified and added others. The Second Committee decided that the estimation “remain unchanged".

1498 The Tribunal considers this to be a reasonable approach. Indeed, having examined the argument and evidence, including the opinions of the Parties' experts, the Tribunal has seen no other attempt to quantify Q3, the flow of


757 HT 2021 Day 2, page 77. ↩
758 Exhibit CH-1, slide 9. ↩
759 HT 2021 Day 2, pages 70, 71 and 80. ↩

[Page 426]

gas escaping the Reservoir after Chattak 2 bridged. The calculation based on Scenario 1 produced a result that the Committee itself considered impossible; the Tribunal found the replacement value adopted by the Committee unsupported. These objections do not apply to the calculation according to Scenario 2.

1499 The Tribunal found the only objection raised by the Claimant against this Scenario 2 calculation in the Claimant's First Post-Hearing Brief, where the Claimant asserted that the result of the Scenario 2 calculation should be rejected. The Claimant did so not on the basis of an analysis of the formula and its results, as for instance Gaffney Cline had done at the Hearing in support of the First Committee's Q1 formula, but in a footnote in that brief: in that footnote the Claimant noted that the Committee had rejected the result of its Scenario 1 calculation. The Claimant went on to assert that the Scenario 2 calculation should also be “rejected as having been derived from an unreliable calculation”. No other reason was given for this rejection.760

1500 The Tribunal is not persuaded by this rejection. Apart from its summary nature, presented without any analysis in a post-hearing submission, the rejection appears contrary to the conclusions of the Second Gas Loss Committee, signed by Niko's representative. The Claimant's summary rejection also is difficult to reconcile with the comments of Gaffney Cline about the work of the Committees. As just quoted, Gaffney Cline found that the First Committee used industry standard inflow and vertical flow equations to estimate gas flow rates “during the blowout and after the well bridged”; and Gaffney Cline described as reasonable the steps of the First Committee in determining one of the factors in the Q3 scenarios. There is no indication that Gaffney Cline considered the First Committee's calculation of Scenario 2 as "unreliable”.

1501 In conclusion, the Tribunal is not prepared to reject the Committee's Q3 calculation according to Scenario 2 as “unreliable”.

1502 The Tribunal is aware that some of the factors used in the formula applied in Scenario 2 have been discussed controversially between the Parties. No attempt has been made by the Parties and their experts to adapt the formula and the result it produced to any variations in these factors. The Tribunal accepts this result as it was presented by the Committees.

1503 Having considered the argument and evidence of the Parties and their experts and all of the available methodologies presented, the Tribunal does not accept that the flow rate based quantifications proposed by BAPEX and by the


760 C-PHB 1, FN 39 at paragraph 26. ↩

[Page 427]

Claimant adequately quantify the gas flowing out of the Reservoir into the Overburden and that either of them should be preferred to the rate calculated by the First Gas Loss Committee for Scenario 2. Having concluded that the Second Committee had adopted this rate for Q3 in a report which the representatives of both BAPEX and Niko accepted and which, for the reasons set out above, the Tribunal found reasonable, the Tribunal adopts the estimated flow rate of 31.47 MMcfd.

1504 The Tribunal is aware that the flow of gas out of the Reservoir over time reduced the pressure in the Reservoir. As a result of the reduced pressure differential, the flow rate also reduced. The First Committee did not provide for a reduction of the daily flow over time. It applied the flow rates for a period of 187 days, from 9 January to 15 July 2005, the “capping target” of the Chattak 2A relief well.761 The Tribunal concludes that the rates determined by the First Committee present an average rate over that period. The Tribunal accepts this approach and applies the flow rate of 31.47 MMcf for the entire period considered in this Section, from 9 January to 24 June 2005:

1505 The Tribunal also considered how the flow at surface, estimated by the Committee and the Claimant at 2MMcfd, relates to Q3 quantity, described as the gas "charging into the Sands above the Upper Marine Shale”. This is the gas that flowed out of the Reservoir, which means that the quantity so measured is the total loss resulting from the blowout. It is not limited to the gas that remained “trapped” or “absorbed” in the Overburden.

1506 Some confusion was created by the fact that both Committees quantified the gas lost to the surface separately from the gas “charging” into the Overburden and added the surface loss to that “charging”. BAPEX observed the contradiction and contested the justification of this distinction between Q2 and Q3. Ryder Scott in their fourth report, as quoted above, had opined that the distinction was not meaningful:

In Ryder Scott's opinion, the distinction between gas flowing to the surface and gas flowing in the subsurface is not meaningful in assessing the amount of gas lost from the Sand 1/2 reservoir due to the Chattak-2 well blowout. The only relevant number is the amount of gas that flowed out of the reservoir at the Upper Marine Shale. All of the gas that escaped the reservoir during periods 1 and 2 was lost due to the Chattak-2 well blowout. This is true whether it had flowed to the surface, was making its way to the surface, or was trapped underground.762


761 First Gas Loss Report, Exhibit R-2, page 3, Section 3.3. ↩
762 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 28. ↩

[Page 428]

1507 Similarly, BAPEX relied on the First Committee's rate according to scenario 1 and derived from it a single rate. It stated that this rate “would be divided between gas that was reaching the surface at any given moment and the gas that was underground at that moment, whether permanently absorbed in the Overburden, trapped under the shale layers, or making its way to the surface".763

1508 The Tribunal agrees, a calculation that determines the quantity of gas that flows out of the Reservoir quantifies the lost gas. There is no justification for adding to that quantity an estimate of the gas that escaped at the surface.

1509 The Tribunal concludes that for the period from the bridging of the first blowout on 9 January to the second blowout on 24 June 2005, i.e. Q2 and Q3, gas escaped from the Reservoir at the rate of 31.47 MMcfd. The Total loss during this period is 166 days at 31.47 MMcfd resulting in a total of 5,224 MMcf or 5.224 Bcf.

7.6.4 Period 2 - Q1: Chattak 2A initial flare

1510 The second blowout occurred on 24 June 2005; the escaping gas ignited in a high flame that lasted for some 12 days until 7 July 2005. The Tribunal determined above in Section 7.5.6 that Niko was not responsible for the increase in gas flow due to the Chattak 2A blowout but was responsible for the quantity of gas that would have continued to flow in the absence of the new blowout. In the present Section, the flow of the main flare (Q1) is determined and the allocation between the part for which Niko is responsible and that for which it is not.

1511 The duration of this initial period of the Chattak 2A blowout was addressed in the report of the Second Gas Loss Committee, dated 27 August 2005, which recorded the event as follows:

After drilling up to a depth of 436m MD (422.5m TVD), at 0300 hrs on Friday, June 24, 2005, the hole suddenly lost total mud and subsequently gas kicked in. By 0710 hrs the control of Relief well (Chattak 2A) was totally lost. At 1300 hrs the well caught fire and the rig fell at about 1430 hrs.

1512 The Committee's Report noted that “the Relief well chocked off on July 7, 2005.764


763 B-PHB1, paragraph 33. ↩
764 Exhibit R-4, pages 3 and 5. ↩

[Page 429]

1513 The Report of Mr Grace, dated 4 July 2005, describes the circumstances of the Chattak 2A blowout and indicates the same hour for the blowout: the well kicked on 24 June 2005 at 0300 hrs.765 With respect to the time of the bridging, a time different from that of the Gas Loss Report is indicated by the Sixth Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2005: “On 5 July, 2005 at 21:30 the Chattak 2A blowout bridged subsurface and breached to the surface on the east side of the rig forming a crater”.766

1514 The conflicting information about the time when the blowout bridged was considered on Day 4 of the Hearing. The Parties consulted and on 14 December 2021 informed the Tribunal about an agreement concerning the duration of the initial period of the second blowout. They noted that the dates in the Committee's Report produced a duration of 12.17 days (or 292 hours) and those reported in the Grace Report and the Sixth Monitoring Report was for 11.77 days (or 289 hours). In the communication, the Parties informed the Tribunal that they

... agree that the period between the Chattak 2A blowout and its bridging, for purposes of gas loss calculations, is approximately 12 days in duration.767

1515 In their Post-Hearing Briefs both Parties based the quantification of the initial period on 12.17 days.768 The Claimant explained the agreed duration by submitting that “the time frame stated in the Second Committee's report is the best evidence of the actual time period of the flow (as was modelled) given that it was prepared very shortly after the event and intended to reflect the information then available".769


765 Exhibit C-45, page 7. ↩
766 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 1. ↩
767 See above, Section 4.9.10. ↩
768 B-PHB 1, Table 1 at page 23; C-PHB Table 1, Table note 2. ↩
769 C-PHB 1, page 24, Table note 2. ↩

[Page 430]

1516 The Committee quantified the loss during the initial flare during this period of 12.17 days from the blowout on 24 June to the bridging on 7 July 2005 not by a formula but by using the Fekete software, entering data as listed above,770 including reservoir pressure and AOF. The exercise produced flow rates decreasing from 159 MMcfd to 146 MMcfd and an average rate of 148.2 MMcfd. These results were presented in the following table:

Chattak 2A
Time AOF Wellhead Flow (MMscfd) Gp (MMscf)
(h) (d)
1 0.04 505.00 159 6.6
2 0.08 479.00 157 6.6
4 0.17 455.00 156 13.0
8 0.33 434.00 154 25.8
16 0.67 414.00 152 51.0
32 1.33 398.00 151 101.0
64 2.67 380.00 149 200.0
128 5.33 365.00 148 396.0
256 10.67 351.00 146 784.0
292 12.17 349.00 146 219.0
Total 1803.1 (MMscf)
1.80 (Bcf)
Avg Rate 148.2 MMscfd

So the cumulative gas loss from June 24, 2005 to July 7, 2005 through the burning of the main flame is estimated at 1.80 Bcf (Q2A1).

1517 Both Parties accept this quantification: BAPEX entered in its Table 1 in B- PHB1 the value of 1.80 Bcf; the Claimant entered 1.804 Bcf.

1518 The Tribunal notes that the Parties come to the same conclusion for the two decimal places and therefore determines the flow during the main flair (Q1) from 24 June to 7 July 2005 (12.17 days at 148.2 MMcfd on average) at 1.8 Bcf.

1519 The First Committee had determined the Scenario 2 rate for the time until the success of the relief well which it assumed to occur by 15 July 2005. The Tribunal accepted this rate as the average over the assumed period. The Tribunal determines therefore that, in the absence of the Chattak 2A blowout, gas would have continued to flow from the Reservoir at the rate of 31.47 MMcfd, the Scenario 2 rate of the First Committee.


770 See Section 7.2.3.1. ↩

[Page 431]

1520 This increase in the flow rate due to the Chattak 2A blowout for which Niko is not responsible is measured by the difference between the Q1 rate, as agreed by the Parties, and the Scenario 2 rate: 148.2 – 31.47 = 116.73 MMcfd.

1521 Consequently, Niko is not liable for the 116.73 MMcfd, the daily gas loss during the flare (Q1) of the Chattak 2A blowout, i.e. the rate that exceeded the rate at which gas would have continued to flow in the absence of the Chattak 2A blowout: 116.73 MMcfd x 12.17 days = 1,420.6 MMcf or 1.421 Bcf. Niko's liability for the loss of Q1 continues to run during this period at the average rate of 31.47 MMcfd.

7.6.5 Period 2 - Q2 and Q3: Flow from the Reservoir after the Chattak 2A bridging

1522 As recorded above in Section 7.6.3, the Second Gas Loss Committee noted the gas flow to the surface since bridging of the Chattak 2 well on 9 January 2005 and described the development after the second blowout. It reported about gas leakages on the surface and documents received from Niko concerning flame heights and LEL readings between 23 June and 14 July 2005 in a passage of which a more complete extract is quoted above in Section 7.2.3.2:

Before and after the extinction of the main flame in Relief well (2A) on July 7, 2005 gas started leaking though the ground on several new locations. Assuming pressure release due to the burning of the main flame, ground leakage due to the 2nd blowout is ignored prior to July 7, 2005. According to the documents supplied by Niko, it is seen that no new location was added for monitoring gas emission after the 2nd blowout. It measured gas emission near crater of Chattak·2 blowout site in terms of percentage of lower explosive limit (%LEL»). A number of locations around the old blowout were added progressively showing increasing gas emission. After the 2nd blowout on June 24, 2005 all those old locations around the first blowout site shows further increase in gas emission. Out of 55 measuring points, 21 of them show 100% LEL on June 23, 2005 and 36 locations show 100% LEL on July 14, 2005.

1523 The Second Committee noted that this “second blowout created numerous new locations of gas leakages” and continued by reporting that

Members of this committee observed gas coming out at different locations 4/5 hundred meters away from the blowout site in the water-submerged low land as well. This was observed while the main flame was still burning. Ground cracking, gas leakage, and water coming out of tubewells have been reported from locations as far as a kilometer from

[Page 432]

the blowout site. Apart from the observable places, it can be concluded that gas is leaking from a number of undetected places.

1524 Like the First Committee, the Second Committee found that accurate quantification was impossible but concluded that gas to surface had increased to 4MMcfd:

It is impossible to accurately quantify the leakage gas but from the above observations it can be securely estimated at 2 MMscfd. This is in addition to the 2 MMscfd continuing leakage due to the first blowout.771

1525 Concerning the subsurface losses (Q3) the Committee referred to the estimate of the First Committee and stated:

The 2nd blowout of the Relief well (Chattak 2A) did not change the process suggested in the first blowout gas loss report. The principal reason behind this conclusion is that the Relief well did not create a new hole in the cap rock for further gas loss through charging.

1526 The Committee added some comments on the causes of the blowout and its consequences, including the observation that scenario-1 concerning subsurface loss of the first blowout seemed unlikely. The Report stated that the Q3 estimation “remain[ed] unchanged”, which meant, as explained above, that the 31.47 MMcfd rate continued to apply.

1527 BAPEX subdivides the period between bridging of the Chattak 2A well on 7 July 2005 and the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation, distinguishing between the time before and after 4 September 2005, the date when the data from the Chattak 2C well was obtained, described as the "Chattak 2C Information".

1528 Concerning the surface loss, BAPEX applies the same rate as for the preceding period, 7.4 MMcfd, with totals of 0.45 Bcf and 0.26 Bcf for the two subperiods.

1529 For the subsurface loss, BAPEX continues the calculation it had adopted for the subsurface loss of the first blowout, viz. 123 MMcfd, declining steadily at the rate of 1.5% per month. For the first sub-period (9 January to 4 September 2005) the subsurface loss is quantified at the rate of 123 – 113.5 MMcfd, for the period thereafter until 9 October 2005 BAPEX sets the rate of 109.9 - 108.2 MMcfd and totals of 6.59 Bcf and 4.09 Bcf, respectively for the two sub- periods.


771 Exhibit R-4, page 7. ↩

[Page 433]

1530 The Claimant's position is that it is not liable for the Q1 flow of the Chattak 2A blowout; it accepts, however, liability for surface gas at the rate of 2 MMcfd from the date of the second blowout on 24 June 2005 until 9 October 2005, i.e. a total of 0.215 Bcf. The Claimant denies liability for the additional 2MMcfd. The subsurface loss, as explained above, is not quantified by a flow rate but by a total amount of 1.21 Bcf, calculated by reference to the absorptive capacity of the Overburden. Gaffney Cline attributed this amount to the Chattak 2 blowout.772 Gaffney Cline explained:

As stated, it is not possible to know how much of this saturation was in place during Period 1 as a result of the Ch-2 blowout and how much may have arisen during Period 2 from flow from either Ch-2 or Ch-2A. We took the most conservative position of assuming that the entire volume derives from Ch-2 and have divided it pro-rata to Periods 1 and 2.

1531 The Claimant qualifies this allocation to period 1, stating that it applies “in the context of the GCA estimates” but not if a higher amount were estimated for this loss:

Niko accepts [Gaffney Cline's allocation to period 1] as a reasonable approach in the context of the GCA estimates, considering that the potential allocation of these volumes does not materially alter the damages quantification. If, however, the Tribunal does not accept these opinions and estimates of GCA and concludes that some larger quantity of gas was somehow trapped underground, then Niko submits that such volume determined to be lost sub-surface should be allocated between the Chattak 2 and 2A blowouts.

1532 In case the Tribunal concluded that a larger volume of gas was lost underground, the Claimant requests an allocation “based on the weighted periods of post-bridging flows created by the two blowouts”; as an example, the Claimant considers the 2MMcfd estimates, leading to an allocation 74: 26 to the period 1 and period 2.773

1533 The Tribunal assumes that, after the Chattak 2A bridging, the flow reverted to the situation prior to the Chattak 2A blowout: the gas flowing from the Reservoir had to flow against the pressure in the Overburden. Mr Wright opined:

If the new bridge was inside the Chattak 2A wellbore (as depicted in Figure 6) the underground flow should be similar to the flow prior to the


772 Gaffney Cline II, note 2 at Table 1 on page 6. ↩
773 C-PHB 1, paragraph 8 and 9 and Table 1 at page 24. ↩

[Page 434]

Chattak 2A blowout (minus reservoir pressure depletion due to higher flowrate during 2A surface blowout).774

1534 The Tribunal examined whether the increase of the surface rate, which the Second Committee adopted, required an adaptation of the Tribunal's Q3 rate of 31.47 MMcfd adopted in Section 7.6.3.4:

1535 The decision of the Second Gas Loss Committee to increase the surface rate by an additional 2MMcfd was based, like the estimate of the First Committee, on “surface indications”. The Second Committee also mentioned expressly that "members of this committee observed” certain emissions and referred to “documents supplied by Niko”. In addition to these observations, the Second Committee had at its disposal information provided by Niko, presumably monitoring reports by Niko's environmental consultants.775 It also had a drawing showing the locations of flame height measurements and a graph showing measured height of flames at these locations.776 The Committee does not explain how, from the Committee's “observations” and the documents supplied by Niko, it reached the conclusion that the estimated surface flow doubled between 4 June and 27 August 2005, the dates of the two reports.

1536 The Tribunal considered the documents from Niko to which the Committee referred, concerning LEL readings and flame heights near the crater of the Chattak 2 blowout. This crater is above the Chattak 2 wellbore to which, according to the Committee's and the Tribunal's conclusion, the Chattak 2 A blowout connected. The Committee found that “all those old locations around the first blowout site shows further increase in gas emissions”. The conclusion is based on 55 LEL measuring points. The number of these points that showed 100% LEL increased during the period from 23 June to 14 July 2005 from 21 to 36. While records of the flame height readings are shown in Annexes G1 and G2 of the Report, no records of the LEL readings are shown.


774 Wright IV, page 11. ↩
775 See below Section 9.2.2.2. ↩
776 Exhibit R-5, Annexes G1 and G2. The drawing and the graph are reproduced above in Section 7.6.3.2. ↩

[Page 435]

1537 The Monitoring Reports of Niko's consultants regularly contain graphs with readings from the monitoring of LEL and flame heights measure points. The Sixth Report, dated 23 July 2005 and sent to the DoE on 28 July 2005, i.e. before the Second Committee's Report, dated 27 August 2005, contained the following graph about LEL levels:

Figure 14. LEL level at different locations in the area

[Chart showing LEL levels over time]

Y-Axis: Gas Emission Level (ppm), from 0 to 30 in increments of 5.
X-Axis: Monitoring Date, from 14-Mar-05 to 30-Jun-05.
Legend:

1538 The graph seems to show an increase in LEL readings already in May 2005, before the second blowout and towards the end of June a spike in one measure point only. The later readings in the graph, as they will be considered in the next Section, show that the readings in this measuring point declined in July 2005.

1539 Concerning the flame heights measurements the graph attached to the Committee's report does not seem to show any increase in the curves after the second blowout. Indeed, some curves even decline in June 2005. This coincides with an observation in the Sixth Monitoring Report:

Interestingly immediately following the second blowout the flames in the crater from the first blowout were relatively unaffected.777


777 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 20. ↩

[Page 436]

1540 The Tribunal concludes that the monitoring records do not show any substantial increase in the levels of LEL and flame heights.

1541 This raises doubts about the visual observations of the Second Committee. Its observations are subject to the difficulties highlighted above in Section 7.6.3, which led the Tribunal to conclude that the evidence in this case does not provide a basis for a reliable estimate of the surface loss. For the same reason the Tribunal does not believe that the Second Committee's increase in the surface rate justifies a modification of the rate at which the gas flowed out of the Reservoir after bridging of the Chattak 2A well.

1542 The Tribunal concludes that, when the Chattak 2A well bridged, the gas continued to flow from the Reservoir as the First Committee had estimated in Scenario 2. That Committee had quantified its rates on the assumption that the flow would be capped on 15 July 2005, and the Tribunal concluded that the rates were average rates for the entire period. As it turned out, the blowout was not capped on 15 July 2005.

1543 When the Second Committee considered the Q3 flow and decided in its report, dated 27 August 2005 that “gas loss estimation due to charging will remain unchanged", it noted that the “any such loss will continue until the successful kill of the 1st blowout well". Based on a letter from Niko, the Committee assumed the most likely date for the kill of the well to be 15 October 2005.778 The Committee did not see a need for adjusting the rates estimated by the First Committee; the Parties did not criticise the Second Committee for not having done so. The Tribunal accepts to prolong the average flow rate until the end of Period 2, the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation on 9 October 2005.

1544 The Tribunal therefore quantifies the gas loss for which Niko is responsible during Period 2, from 25 June to 9 October 2005 as 107 days at 31.47 MMcfd, amounting to a total of 3’367.29 MMcf or 3.367 Bcf.

7.6.6 Period 3: the post 9 October 2005 gas loss for which Niko is liable

1545 In Section 7.5.6 above, the Tribunal confirmed its decision that Niko was responsible for any gas that escaped the Reservoir after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well; but that BAPEX failed to approve Niko's proposals for production wells and, therefore may not claim for the loss of quantities of gas that could have been avoided by the proposed production.


778 Second Gas Loss Report, Exhibit Annex R-4, page 7. ↩

[Page 437]

1546 The Tribunal now examines whether, despite the Chattak 2B relief operation, any gas escaped the Reservoir after 9 October 2005 and, if so, how that flow would have been affected by the production of gas, as proposed by Niko and prevented by BAPEX.

7.6.6.1 Did the Chattak 2B relief operation stop the flow from the Reservoir?

1547 The Parties disagree whether the Chattak 2B relief operation was successful in stopping the flow from the Reservoir.

1548 The Claimant submitted:

... that the preponderance of the evidence strongly indicates that the Chattak 2B relief well was indeed successful in sealing the Sands 1 and 2 reservoir.779

1549 And, it relied on Mr Wright whose “ultimate conclusion is that the most likely outcome is that the Chattak 2B kill operation was successful”.780

1550 The Claimant also quoted the 12th Monitoring Report that stated “with certainty [...] the uncontrolled release of gas from the reservoir has been stopped".781

1551 It relied on the “unrefuted, and irrefutable, evidence of the immediate and substantial reduction in the surface flows” and referred to the monitoring reports that Niko had communicated with its letter to BAPEX, dated 8 November 2005.782

1552 At the November 2021 Hearing the Claimant referred to Mr Wright's conclusion about the success of the Chattak 2B relief operation and referred to “extensive contemporaneous evidence of immediate and substantial reduction in gas flows at surface immediately following the Chattak 2B kill operation”. At that occasion, the Tribunal invited the Claimant to indicate the complete reference for its evidence “for the complete sealing in your Counter- Memorial".783

1553 The Claimant produced its response on 13 December 2021 relating to “Contemporaneous Evidence of the Reduction in gas flows at surface


779 CMD, paragraph 230. ↩
780 HT 2021 Day 5, page 91, referring to Wright IV, page 35. ↩
781 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, 12th Environmental Monitoring Report, 8 December 2005 (12th Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit C-62, page 3, quoted at C-PHB1, paragraph 94. ↩
782 CMD, paragraphs 231 and 232, referring to Exhibit C-60. ↩
783 HT 2021 Day 5, page 91 and 93; see also above Section 4.7.5. ↩

[Page 438]

immediately following the Chattak 2B kill operation”. It listed references to the Claimant's prior submissions, contemporaneous correspondence, Monitoring Reports and witness statements.

1554 Concerning emissions that were observed after 9 October 2005, the Claimant explained that, as expected at the time

... gas seepages would continue for sometime but would progressively abate as the charged overburden slowly seeped to surface.

... the declining rate is consistent with the slow migration (and thereby depletion) of gas entrained in the shallow subsurface sands slowly migrating to the surface and not a continued leak from the reservoir sands.784

1555 In its first Post-Hearing Brief, the Claimant refers to Gaffney Cline III in which a success of 90% was taken as example and the corresponding loss was calculated. The Claimant corrected the calculation, explaining that it had admitted liability for only 2 MMcfd loss after the bridging of the Chattak 2A well, totalling 0.25 Bcf.785 It contests Mr Wilson's report about seepages and his conclusions as “unreliable”.786

1556 BAPEX takes the position that the “attempt to kill the blowout through drilling the Chattak 2B well has ‘[c]learly [...] not been successful ...”. Relying primarily on Wilson I, the Respondent stated in March 2016:

The gas that is currently being emitted on the Niko Compound and throughout Tengratila, and which has been continuously flowing at the surface since the first blowout in 2005, is from the Chattak 2 well.787

1557 The Respondent continued by discussing the reports of their experts, in particular those of Mr Wilson and of GeoMechanics and concluded:

... the expert evidence and observations demonstrate that it is highly likely that the gas being emitted in the area immediately around the Chattak 2 wellhead and in the area 500 meters around the well is gas that continues to flow from the incompletely sealed Chattak 2 well.788


784 CMD, paragraphs 232 and 241 (b). ↩
785 C-PHB 1, paragraph 89, referring to Gaffney Cline III, paragraph 42, and referring to the partial success of 10% continued flow assumed by GeoMechanics I, Section 5.2. ↩
786 C-PHB 1, paragraph 93. ↩
787 BMD, paragraph 143. ↩
788 BMD, paragraph 157. ↩

[Page 439]

1558 BAPEX also relies on the third report of Mr Hughes, in which he examines the work of the Chattak 2B relief operation and concludes that the operation was partly ineffective. He concluded:

The end result was that the Chattak No. 2B relief well operation might have slowed the flow from Sands 1 and 2 but did not completely shut off flow from the Chattak No. 2.789

1559 In its response of 21 December 2021 to the Claimant's submission on evidence for Chattak 2B's success, BAPEX wrote:

... Claimant has no empirical evidence that the relief operation completely sealed the Chattak 2 wellbore and Claimant has no explanation for the testimony from its own witnesses – well expert Mr. John Wright, and Niko's employee, Mr. Adolph – which show that the kill well operations were not successful in completely sealing the Chattak 2 wellbore through the Marine Shale. Notably, this response completely sidesteps the elephant in the room: according to Niko's own measurements through 2021, significant gas was being released out of the ground in the immediate vicinity of the Chattak 2 wellbore.

1560 BAPEX referred to the evidence relied on by the Claimant and mentioned other evidence including testimony at the Hearing. It insisted that the evidence on which the Claimant relied did not prove the complete sealing of the blowout well but only reductions in the continuing gas emissions after 9 October 2005. BAPEX concluded:

... reduction in gas flows at the surface, even if proven, does not “establish[.] that the relief operation completely sealed the Chattak 2 opening in the Regional Shale”, BAPEX is entitled to compensation for “gas that escaped after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well on 9 October 2005”, no matter Claimant's alleged evidence on surface flow reductions. In any event, BAPEX's responses in the chart above have shown that Niko's evidence does not even prove the limited alternative proposition it decided to address.790

1561 In its Post-Hearing Brief, BAPEX wrote in response to the Tribunal's Question 17, that reduction in the flow by the Chattak 2B operation should not be considered as a “partial success”, as gas continued to flow. It added:

BAPEX accepts, however, that the Chattak 2B relief operation could have reduced the flow of gas from the Reservoir through the Chattak 2 borehole


789 Hughes III, paragraph 28. ↩
790 BAPEX's Response of 21 December 2021 on Chattak 2B Kill Operation, paragraphs 4 and 9. ↩

[Page 440]

in the marine shale by as much as 67%. This percentage is based on the flow rate analysis above, the assumption that flow at the surface stopped in 2020, and Ryder Scott's OGIP calculation.791

1562 Despite this acceptance of a flow reduction by 67%, BAPEX quantifies its loss from the surface flow at the rate of 7.4 MMcfd during the period before 9 October 2005 and thereafter until 30 September 2016 and only thereafter reduces the rate gradually to zero.

1563 Following its determination in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision about the Niko's liability after 9 October 2005, the Tribunal now must decide whether, in fact, the Chattak 2B relief operation did succeed and if not, what quantity of lost gas is recoverable.

1564 The Tribunal considers first whether there is evidence from the relief operation itself that allows a conclusion about the success of the Chattak 2B kill operation, showing that it permanently stopped the flow of gas from the Reservoir.

1565 The Chattak 2B relief operation was described by Mr Robert Grace of GSM Consulting, who was responsible for the relief operation, in his “End of Well Report”. The report concluded that the blowout well was under control, but added a qualification. The final steps of the relief operation were described as follows:

... a second kill attempt was made on October 9, 2005. One thousand barrels of 19 ppg kill mud was followed by 750 barrels of 16 ppg kill cement with a thickening time of approximately one hour.

The cement was displaced to the 7 inch casing shoe, the drillpipe was pulled to the crown and the Chattak 2B was shut in. The plan, at that point, was to observe the well for an extended period to assure that it was indeed dead.

Almost immediately, the activity associated with the Chattak 2 blowout began to subside. As of this writing, it is continuing to subside. Of the 14 water wells being monitored at the time of the blowout, only two continue to flow. Of all of the fires being monitored, only a few continue to burn with greatly reduced intensity. It appears that the Chattak 2 is finally under complete control. However, only time will tell for sure.792


791 B-PHB 1, paragraph 78. ↩
792 Exhibit C-266, pages 6 and 7. ↩

[Page 441]

1566 Responding to the opinion of Mr Hughes on which BAPEX relied, Mr Wright considered his report and analysed it on the basis of the evidence and his own experience with the relief of operation of the 1997 Moulavi Bazar blowout in Bangladesh, in which he was involved.793 Concerning the success of the relief operation, he opined:

Due to the uncertainty in the Chattak 2 borehole volumes, bridging depths, flow channels, etc., there are numerous scenarios that will result in different outcomes with respect to the success of Chattak 2B kill operations permanently stopping the gas flow from Sands 1 and 2. I disagree with Mr. Hughes that most of these scenarios result in failure of achieving the objective. For illustration, I have chosen two scenarios for discussion. One with a borehole volume of less than 1500 bbls and a second with a borehole volume of more than 3250 bbls.

1567 Mr Wright analysed these two scenarios and concluded that, “there is a very good chance” that the first scenario would seal the wellbore; “based on the evidence and [his] experience, this is the more probable case”. Concerning the second scenario he opined that “there is also a good chance that [... it] would also have sealed the wellbore”.794

1568 The Tribunal notes that the opinions produced by the Claimant express a high degree of confidence in the success of the operation but no certainty. They do not exclude that some gas may continue to escape from the Reservoir. As Mr Grace concluded “only time will tell for sure”. The Tribunal concludes that this evidence does not provide certainty.

1569 The Tribunal therefore turns to indirect evidence and examines the evidence about gas escaping at the surface after 9 October 2005, measured or otherwise visible when burning or as bubbles in water. Much of the evidence relates to these observations.

1570 The Claimant relied on the exchanges in meetings and correspondence between BAPEX and Niko shortly after the completion of the relief operation and the evidence produced during these exchanges.795 Mr Adolph wrote in this first witness statement:

I reported to BAPEX that the 2B relief well had been a success at a meeting on 16 October 2005. I recall BAPEX questioning whether Chattak 2 had actually been killed, and in particular they pointed to the fact that flames were still visible around the blowout site. I explained that the


793 Wright IV, page 27. ↩
794 Wright IV, pages 27 and 35. ↩
795 Submission of 10 December 2021, pages 2 – 4. ↩

[Page 442]

flames were likely being fuelled by residual gas that had escaped into the sandstone above the regional seal before the well was killed, and that these flames would diminish and extinguish over a relatively short period of time.796

1571 These exchanges were described in further detail in Mr Adolph's fourth witness statement.797 They reflected the following documented development:

1572 A delegation from BAPEX visited the blowout site on 6 November 2005. Thereafter BAPEX and Niko met on 8 November 2005. Niko wrote in the first 13 November 2005 letter to BAPEX, confirming Niko's position:

Niko's Country Manager stated that Niko's opinion was that the killing of Chattak 2 had been successful and was evidence by considerable data from various environmental indicators (gas emissions from cracks, water flow in tube wells, water levels in kua wells, LEL % levels in various locations, etc.).

1573 The letter referred to six annexes which showed the readings from monitors for the named indicators; and it continued:

In contrast to the observations of all of the international experts engaged on the relief well operations (such as Bob Grace - GSM Inc, Randal Glaholt - Tera Environmental Consultants, Crown Environmental Agencies - Dhaka, APA Engineering - Calgary, and Niko's insurers and adjusters), the Bapex MD noted that after a recent trip to Chattak Field by Bapex representatives on Saturday, November 6, 2005, the Bapex consensus was that there were no significant changes in conditions at the blowout site. Therefore, Bapex stated that it should be considered that the killing of the Chattak 2 well had not been successful. 798

1574 BAPEX responded on 22 November 2005, that Niko's statement about the successful accomplishment of the relief well operations was not agreed.

Our officers on observation of relief well are reporting the presence of many alive gas burning in around the relief well(s). Reports as on today, there is no room to consider these as latent gas seepage, but coming from the formation. BAPEX is not fully convinced that the relief operation of the ill fated Chattak #2 development well by Chattak # 2B Relief well is a success. Therefore BAPEX will share the responsibility of expenses of


796 WS Adolph I, paragraph 109. ↩
797 WS Adolph IV, paragraphs 23 – 26. ↩
798 Exhibit C-60. ↩

[Page 443]

Chattak Gas Field only after the approval of Chattak # 3 development well budget by the next JMC - 6.799

1575 Mr Adolph wrote in his first witness statement, following Niko's discussion with BAPEX about continuing flames:

Shortly thereafter, the flames diminished, and eventually extinguished, indicating that all remaining gas that had escaped above the regional seal prior to the well kill had finally made its way to the surface.800

1576 The graphs attached to Niko's letter of 13 November 2005 show the flow rates from tube wells and Kua wells, flame heights, LEL levels and active cracks.801 Theses graphs of emissions are also shown in many of the Monitoring Reports, including the 12th Monitoring Report, dated 8 December 2005.802 The passage from this report on which the Claimant relies reads as follows:

Based on detailed analysis of the pumping rates, pressures, and permeability of the reservoir rock it was determined with certainty that over 90% of all well control materials used were successfully pumped up the blowout well bore as per the objective of the geometric well control program and that the uncontrolled release of gas from the reservoir has been stopped. Well control experts from GSM Well Control predicted that with the successful completion of the well kill that gas above the regional geological seal would gradually vent to surface.803

1577 The 12th Monitoring Report also contains a section entitled Impact of Relief Well Completion with the following text:

After completion of the relief well gradual positive changes were observed in a number of daily monitored environmental indicators which strongly support the contention that the well kill was successful. As is highlighted in the sections which follow, indicators such as flame height, flame number, number of artesian flowing tube wells, number of cracks with venting gas, gas presence in tube wells and kua wells, gas presence around the main blowout areas all show substantial progressive reduction.


799 Exhibit C-4. ↩
800 WS Adolph I, paragraph 110. ↩
801 Attachments to Exhibit C-60. ↩
802 12th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-62; the letter by which this Report is transmitted to the DoE is dated 18 December 2005. ↩
803 12th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-62, page 3, also quoted at the submission of 10 December 2021, page 5. ↩

[Page 444]

1578 The section on Flame Height of the 12th Monitoring Report shows the following photograph about the Chattak 2 crater before and at two dates after the 9 October 2005 completion of the 2B operation, on 13 and on 25 October 2005:

Plate 12 View north to Chhatak 2 crater, Sept 29, 2005, 0647 hrs.

Plate 14 View north of Chhatak 2 crater, October 25, 2005, 0954 hrs.

Plate 13 View north of Chhatak 2 crater, October 13, 2005, 0656 hrs.

[Page 445]

1579 The Monitoring Report provides explanations about the evolution of the flame height and a graph:

The Joint Ventures environmental team has been monitoring daily, the location and height of a series of flames in and adjacent to the Chhatak 2 crater since February 4, 2005. Updated flame height profiles of the Chhatak 2 blowout are shown in Figure 19 below. Within days of the well kill procedures on October 4, 2005 flame height and number of flames began to decrease. This trend has continued through to the present. Between October 4, 2005 and November 28, 2005 the number of active monitored flames declined by 72% from 18 to 5 active flames.

1580 Similar information is provided about the other indicators of emissions, including measurements of the LEL level:

Figure 15. LEL level at different locations in the area (March 16, 2005 – November 28, 2005).

Y-Axis: Gas Emission Level (ppm), from 0 to 50 in increments of 10.

X-Axis: Monitoring Date, from 9-Mar-05 to 4-Dec-05.

Legend:

Annotations on graph:

1581 Despite this evidence for a sharp drop in gas at surface, there were, during the years after October 2005, repeated incidents of reported gas emissions in the Chattak field; the Tribunal cites the following examples:

1582 In October 2008, the Monitoring Report described “several gas bubbles coming out from various places and ponds of adjacent villages”. The incident was given high priority and Niko's “most senior Field Manager was sent to the site:

It was informed that there were several gas bubbles coming out from various places and ponds of adjacent villages. Local UNO and District administration were also noticed this issue. Giving high priority, Niko

[Page 446]

management sent one of its most senior Field Manager Mr. John Brens to the site. Along with Niko's site HSE supervisor Mr. Norman Reberio Field Manager Mr. John Brens visited the site on 19th & 20th October 2008. Mr. Abdullah Al Mamun from BAPEX was also present on 20th October 2008. We are confident that the blowout control was successful but that there remains some residual gas in the soil overburden that continues to be emitted, which is expected to over a prolonged period. Besides, that natural shallow gas deposits are also present and maybe contributing the current gas release.804

1583 On 17 July 2009 Niko wrote to Petrobangla, describing the seepages observed as a phenomenon related to heavy rains. Niko states that there had been

... small seepages observed in the Chattak Gas Field at different places intermittently. Such seepages increase after heavy rain and particularly in the monsoon season as the rain water pushes the accumulated and trapped gas up. It is our understanding that, after the blow-out subsurface accumulated gas is released through different locations and would take years to deplete completely, therefore this is an expected phenomenon, which we have been observing in our post blow-out monitoring. The increase in gas seepage during the rainy season has also been observed in the past years.

1584 The letter closes with a reference to a production well, stating that the

... ultimate solution would be to responsibly produce gas from the field. Once the field goes on production, the pressure reduction will minimize gas leaking from the field.805

1585 In January 2010 gas seepages were again reported; the reports included “unauthorised connections” collecting gas for domestic use. After separate visits by BAPEX and Niko delegations, a joint visit by the Managing Director of BAPEX and a Niko delegation was organised on 20 February 2010.

1586 The report of this visit, 806 signed by BAPEX's Managing Director, Niko's Manager Commercial and the other members of the delegation mentioned seepages at several locations, including around a “pond adjacent to the north boundary of the gas field” and in a house near the pond. The report added that "this house was built after the blowout incidents. The house owner received compensation from [Niko]”.


804 Niko Monthly Monitoring Report, October 2008, Exhibit C-92, page 15. ↩
805 Exhibit C-93. ↩
806 March 2010 Joint Report, Exhibit C-95. ↩

[Page 447]

1587 One of the other gas connections observed was “a historical seepage and was there before drilling of wells”. The connection is shown in one of the photographs attached to the report:

Gas collection from a historical seepage before any drilling of well.

Close up view of the above.

[illegible]

1588 The report of this visits further records the words of caution that the “team especially the Managing Director of BAPEX advised the inhabitants of the houses and the villagers to be aware of the issue and to use fire with maximum safety in their daily life”.

1589 The recommendations in the report concerned Niko's protective fencing and continued monitoring and unauthorized gas connections; and it recommended production as “the only viable long term solution":

To drill new well and produce gas from the field as soon as possible that may stop such seepages, as the pressure would be diverted to the well. This appeared to be the only viable long term solution of this present problem.

1590 The report concludes by an explanation about the seepages as a normal event after a blowout:

After any blowout, it is normal that gas seepages are observed in the surrounding area. The seepage observed near the Chhatak Gas Field is small in nature, but needs to be monitored regularly.

1591 The letter, dated 31 March 2010, by which Niko sent a copy of the report to Petrobangla, reports about the seepages, the “intervention of Local Administration and Police, after notification by Niko on the unsafe practice” and the "caution signs in the seepage areas" posted by Niko. It concludes by stating that "it would be prudent to produce gas from the field. Once field goes

[Page 448]

on production it may further eliminate the chances of any gas leaking out otherwise from the field". 807

1592 After the end of the monitoring reports by Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Niko continued monitoring. Niko's monitoring reports frequently contain information about seepages and the gas connections for domestic use. The report for July to September 2011, for instance, reported about the bubbling in Kashem's Pond and explained:

Kashem installed four 3” pipe and five ½” pipe to supply gas to the locals.

[...]

Gas connection: As per report, about 80 shops and houses took gas connection that Kashem supplied.

[...]

Reporting: Local Police has been regularly reported about the above mentioned hazardous gas connections. UNO and the UP Chairman are also aware about the gas connections.

[...]

It has been reported that Kashem is now preparing to sell gas by filling in cylinder.808

1593 It appears from the Monitoring Report for October – December 2013 that by that time Mr Kashem's gas connection network was on the decline:

As per report, few locals took gas connection from Kashem but now it is almost ineffective due to reduced seeping gas pressure.809

1594 The flows seem to have increased again in October 2014, apparently caused at least in part by heavy rains. The Monitoring Report for October – December 2014 reported for October increased gas bubbling and concerns of the local population:

During the unusually heavy rains experienced during the present monitoring period Niko noticed observed what appeared to be more intense gas bubbling at the surface than has been observed in prior periods. It suspected that the high water content in the surrounding sub


807 March 2010 Joint Report, Exhibit C-95. ↩
808 Niko Monitoring Report July – September 2011, Exhibit C-97, pages 4 and 8. ↩
809 Niko Monitoring Report October - December 2013, Exhibit R-231, page 4. ↩

[Page 449]

soils may have been driving more near surface gas from the shallow subsoils to the surface than has typically been observed. Very active gas "boils" were observed in water-filled trenches around the site of the 2005 well site blowout. The largest gas "boil" offsite, was observed at the northeast corner of "Kashem's pond".

Community interactions were dominated by the concerns of some villagers regarding presence of gas seepages in their household areas.

1595 An incident of local gas conveyance was mentioned and inspections by local authorities who “ordered the locals to disconnect all illegal gas connection”.810

1596 The report also provided explanations about the source of the gas:

These seepages are believed to be a combination of naturally-occurring shallow/near surface methane and some residual gas from the 2005 Chattak blowout. Gas seepages from the surface are most easily observed during the rainy season when the land is water covered and gas bubbles are apparent. This phenomenon is wide spread in this part of Bangladesh.

Methane gas bubbling from various water-filled shallow trenches/ drainages and impoundments on and offsite was observed to increase in some locations. There have been at least 3 unusually heavy rain periods this season. Niko suspect that the high water content in the surrounding sub soils is causing more flushing of gas present in the sub soils to surface than would otherwise have occurred. Niko note that gas bubbling in the area was known to occur prior to Niko drilling in the Chattak field.811

1597 The emissions increased in November of that year. The Managing Directors of BAPEX of SGFL “along with other associated officials” visited the site on 15 November 2014. Details of the “increased intensity of gas boiling and bubbling” at various locations are provided. Mr Kashem, a “local landowner”, “had removed most of the insecure gas connection from his pond as directed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sunamganj”. The emissions caused “grievances” of the local community; one family had to be evacuated:

As with October, community interactions were dominated by complaints concerning gas seepage in and near local households, namely those of Hobibur, Imran, Habib, Parvin and Jasim. Among them Hobibur's family


810 Niko Monitoring Report October - December 2014, Exhibit R-143, Executive Summary, page (i). ↩
811 Niko Monitoring Report October - December 2014, Exhibit R-143, page 4. ↩

[Page 450]

was evacuated by the local authority due to the presence of elevated gas pressure being detected in his house. The locals also identified one tube-well exhibiting artesian flow. The water levels in Kua wells are rises. Active Gas "boils" are also observed at Latif pond, Shamim pond and Ismail Pond beside Kashem pond.

1598 The events seem to have attracted broader interest and the Managing Director of BAPEX

... gave interview on behalf of BAPEX to number of print & electronic media journalists that after a blowout it is normal phenomenon that gas seepages were observed in the surrounding area and that the overall risk appeared to be low due to the low apparent pressures.812

1599 The report continues by mentioning advice given by BAPEX to the villagers concerning the fire risk and the suggestion for solving the problem of gas emissions. The report about this visit closes by the following statement:

Government needs to drill new well immediately and produce the gas to the pipeline so that the pressure will be reduced.813

1600 In December 2014 the “overall gas emission situation was improving when the intensity of some of surface gas release is lessening the gas field & the surrounding area”. Mr Kashem resumed collecting gas and “connected to some houses for cooking”.814

1601 On 2 July 2015 a field trip to the site took place, convened by the General Manager of SGFL with members from Petrobangla and BAPEX. The report referred to the visit in November 2014. The report included a section on gas seepages which stated that the “committee observed huge gas seepages are still continuing in and around the Chhattak gas field”. The seepages were observed surrounding the cellar of the two blowouts, at “numerous cracks and fissures” from inside and outside “the field boundary” (presumably the BAPEX/Niko compound). The report refers to a “follow-up report on 23rd June 2015” by “ATN Bangla, a private Satellite Television Channel”. The report continued by attributing the seepage either to a failure of the relief operation or to a “huge quantity of gas” charged in the Overburden:

It seems that the so called successful relief well Chhattak 2B did not seal the first blowout well Chhattak 2 or huge quantity of gas was charged in


812 Niko Monitoring Report October – December 2014, Exhibit R-143, Executive Summary, pages (i) and (ii), pages 4, 12, Table of "grievances” at pages 20 and 21 and page 23. ↩
813 Niko Monitoring Report October - December 2014, Exhibit R-143, page 23. ↩
814 Niko Monitoring Report October – December 2014, Exhibit R-143, Executive Summary, page (ii) and page 23. ↩

[Page 451]

the Tipam Sandstone above the Upper Marine Shale (UMS) during Chhattak 2 well blowout which is seeping out for the last ten years and still continuing. We have seen another blowout in 1997 in nearby field named Moulavi bazar (presently operated by Chevron) in the same basin where no gas seeping or even not a single gas bubbling could be observed after six months on successful plugging by a relief well. [...]

1602 The committee observed the “prevailing seepages” and pointed out that the Reservoir was depleting.815

1603 Mr Adolph described this period following the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation:

Based on the environmental monitoring that was carried out in the months following the blowouts, and then reported observations from Niko's personnel over the years, the surface gas emissions did continue to abate, both in the intensity and number of observable emissions locations. Emissions also reportedly waxed and waned with the changes in seasons (i.e. monsoon and dry seasons) and surface water levels. Over time the emissions were too low to permit any accurate sense of their abatement by visual observation, however, emissions were continuing to occur although more focussed in areas close to the location of the Chattak-2 well.816


815 Supplemental Report of the Review Committee on Field Trip on 2nd July 2015, Exhibit R-14, with explanations at HT 2021 Day 5, pages 78 – 80. ↩
816 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 44. ↩

[Page 452]

1604 He described Niko's digging of test holes and small trenches and the extension of the programme in 2010. In 2015 Niko took further steps “to measure the flux rate of observed surface gas emissions in the trenches at the Niko compound". It consisted in constructing flux tents or gas traps in the trenches that had shown the highest emissions. Mr Wilson presented at the Hearing photographs of such a flux tent together with photographs of an ESG flux chamber and an ESG Funnel, as he used for his own testing in February 2016.817

Measurement of Gas Emission Rates

Section 4 of Wilson Expert Report and Section 4.1 of Wilson Second Supplemental Report

Surface emission rates measured by ESG and Niko

Both used accepted methods

Both gave results of similar order of magnitude

Niko Flux Tent

ESG Flux Chamber

ESG Funnel With Flow Measuring Instrument

1605 Mr Adolph described in some detail the programme that consisted of three traps; a fourth trap“was constructed approximately 150m south of the Chattak 2 well area, next to the South boundary of the Niko compound where there was no observable surface gas bubbling. 818

1606 These traps were shown on a map showing Blowout Impact Monitoring, prepared by Niko following the blowouts in 2005 to identify the locations of seepages and surface cracks. Mr Adolph explained that the map was updated on a few occasions to include the trenches and traps constructed by Niko in 2015 as well as the locations of surface emissions monitoring conducted by the Respondents' experts in February 2016. The 2020 version of the map was produced in the Arbitration as Exhibit C-284.


817 Exhibit RH-7, slide 7. ↩
818 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 46. ↩

[Page 453]

1607 Referring to this map, Mr Adolph explained

As reflected in the mapping, and consistent with both my and the reported observations at the time of the blowouts, the principal impacts, including the locations of the surface gas emissions, followed a very distinct and relatively narrow North/South trend line passing through the location of the Chattak 2 well extending 250-300m to the North and South of the well's location, with less severe impacts (smaller surface crack and crack points) extending 150-250m to the East/Northeast and 100-150m to the Southeast. In my view, and based on the observed and reported impacts from the blowouts, the impacts are inconsistent with the very general 500m radius impact/exclusion zone that is suggested in the reports of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hughes submitted by BAPEX.819

1608 The monthly average flux rates measured in the three traps over the period from September 2015 to March 2020 were shown in the following graph:820

Gas Emissions at Chattak Gas Field
Monthly Average Flux Rates (for each Trap) & Average Flux Rate (for all 3 Traps)

Left Y-Axis: Gas Flux (scf/day/ft²), from 0 to 100 in increments of 10.

Right Y-Axis: Average Gas Flux for All 3 Traps (scf/day/ft²), from 0 to 45 in increments of 5.

X-Axis: Dates from Sep/15 to Mar/20.

Legend:


819 WS Adolph IV, paragraph 55. ↩
820 Exhibit C-283 contains tables with the data from each of the three Traps and the graphic presentation reproduced above in the text. ↩

[Page 454]

1609 Mr Adolph provided explanations about the developments in these three traps shown on the graph. For instance, he explained the spike of emissions in January 2016 by an earthquake in the region:

Although I was not present at the time, reports from Niko site personnel and villagers were that the earthquake shook the village area significantly and increased surface emissions of gas were observed more broadly following the earthquake.

1610 He also pointed to a relationship between weather seasons and emissions:

Finally, it can also be seen that there is a pattern to the emissions intensity that mimics the weather seasons. The rainy monsoon season in Bangladesh typically lasts from June to October. Apart from the major spike in January 2016 following the earthquake, emissions intensities measured at the Traps generally increased during the monsoon season. This too is consistent with the reported observations of the Niko site personnel and villagers

1611 Gaffney Cline comment the information from these gas traps, noting the results of the measurement and the limit of the exercise:

From 2015 – 2021 the average daily rate measured at the gas traps declined from about 0.02MMscf/d until the rates became too small to measure in early 2020. The total measured quantity of gas during that period was only 0.02Bsc. It is not possible to know either the quantity of gas that was escaping that was not measured, or what quantities were in prior years, although it is noted that the rates were declining over the period for which they were measured.821

1612 Mr Wilson commented on these explanations of Mr Adolph and the measurements, pointing out that Niko's rates in 2020 were higher than his own in 2016:

In the compound where NIK[O] did measure, the rates of emission of methane from the ground recorded by Niko up to February 2020 are higher than the rates measured and used in my assessment in 2016. Although the Niko flux tent data shows that surface emission rates have reduced in one location, there has been little or no change in two other locations up to February 2020.822


821 Gaffney Cline IV, paragraph 30(iii) at page 10. ↩
822 Wilson III, paragraph 4.1.8. ↩

[Page 455]

1613 Mr Wilson commented on these explanations at the Hearing and concluded:

The emission rates measured by Niko in 2016 are high and suggest the gas is being replenished from a source at depth

Elevated methane concentrations at shallow depth in the ground and at the ground surface suggest methane is continually being replenished from a source at depth

The highest concentrations and gas emission rates were found nearest the Chattak 2 well bore

The source of the gas at the surface is thermogenic and not biogenic

The emission rates measured by Niko are similar to the values I used to estimate gas lost from the surface in the Wilson Expert Report.823

1614 During the course of his explanations, he presented the following graph:824

Measurement of Gas Emission Rates

Niko (C-283) and ESG (R-129) results are consistent

Niko's gas trap measurements in Traps 1 to 3 were in the system of trenches I observed on my visit in 2016 - in the epicentre of the blowout with gas boiling from the ground

Trend line shows there would have been higher rates prior to the start of the tests

High rates at surface indicate gas is being replenished from depth

Gas Emissions at Chattak Gas Field
Monthly Average Flux Rates (for each Trap) & ESG results in February 2016

Y-Axis: Gas Flux (l/h/m²), from 0 to 1,400 in increments of 200.

X-Axis: Dates from Dec/14 to Oct/21.

Legend:

Annotations on graph:

Data from Niko gas traps
(Exhibit C-283 – updated May 2021 version) converted to I/h/m²


823 HT 2021 Day 5, page 87. ↩
824 Exhibit RH-7, slide 8 or 9 (the slides were not numbered). ↩

[Page 456]

1615 Mr Wilson commented this graph at the Hearing, explaining the trend in the emissions and concluding that the flowing gas “replenished from the depth":825

The results that are shown there are traps 1 to 3, which were in the system of trenches I observed on my visit in 2016 in the epicentre of the blowout, where you can see the gas boiling up through the water in the trench system. You can see on there, particular on the one with the highest results, the grey line, which was trap 3, there are seasonal variations; and then superimposed on those seasonal variations, there are some -- what appear to be random variations. But you can see that there is a trend line that shows that there would have been significantly higher emission rates prior to the start of the testing in 2015. And indeed, they only started this testing when -- I think it is in Brian Adolph's witness statement, where he said that it became difficult to assess the gas emissions visually, so they then started to do these gas-trap tests.21 Again, these high emission rates indicate that the gas replenished from depth.

1616 Mr Wilson compared his own measurements with those of Niko and presented the following table:826

Estimate of Gas Loss at the Surface

Niko's results suggest higher surface emission rates in the Inner Zone than I assumed in my estimates of gas loss from the surface

The gas emissions are reducing over time as would be expected as pressure in the ground reduces

May have ceased altogether in 2021 – Not clear because measurements are intermittent and I have not been able to complete my own testing

Gas emissions from the ground would have been much higher prior to the start of the Niko testing

Comparison of Assumed Gas Loss Surface Flux and Niko Flux Results for February 2016

Wilson/Niko
designation
WILSON
Surface emission rate (l/h/m²)
range assumed in February 2016
(Wilson Expert Report, Table 5.2)
NIKO
Surface emission rate
measured (l/h/m²)
February 2016
(Exhibit C-283)
Minimum Maximum
Inner area
(Wilson) / Very
high intensity
zone (Niko)
12 400 918
Inner Area
(Wilson) /
Medium intensity
zone (Niko)
12 400 151 to 307
Middle area
(Wilson) / Low
intensity zone
(Niko)
0.1 3 Below limit of detection
of test (not stated)
Outer area
(Wilson)
0.007 0.1 Not tested

825 HT 2021 Day 5, page 82. ↩
826 Exhibit RH-7 slide 9 or 10. ↩

[Page 457]

1617 Mr Wilson commented on this table at the Hearing, explaining that his values in this table were taken from his first report in which he made some estimates of how much gas would have been lost out of the surface, just based on these measurements;827 “based on these tests” he made “an estimate or a judgment” about the flow rate in terms of litres per hour per square meter; that the minimum flow rate, in terms of litres per hour per metre squared, based on these tests, would be 12, and a maximum of 400. In what he had defined as the “inner area” (corresponding to the “very high intensity zone” and the “medium intensity zone” of Niko); the values of Niko were “pretty close, [...] within the range of the values that [he had] assumed”. And he had “used these values for the previous ten years, when it's clear that emissions were higher than that in those previous ten years”. 828

1618 BAPEX referred to the measurements by Niko and by Mr Wilson and concluded that these measurements showed that there were “high rates of surface emissions indicate[ing] that gas was replenishing from the Reservoir, the Chattak 2B operation did not kill the Chattak 2 blowout”.829

1619 In cross examination, Mr Wilson explained that the emission rates which he presented in his report were “based on judgment":

They're based on judgment, taking into account what we've just talked about: the fact that you've got limited data. So clearly I would not take the highest values that we measured, which are 1,000 or 10,000 times higher than 400, for the very reasons that I've just talked about.

So it's a judgment call. You know, you've got to apply professional judgment. Otherwise you'd get an even wider range that wouldn't be of any use to the Tribunal, in my opinion.830

1620 He explained that his flux box study and testing was generally in accordance with the guidance in an accepted methodology; but the constraints under which he was working did not allow him to comply with the spatial requirements of this methodology for these measurements and the number of monitoring stations; and that that has an impact on the reliability of the collected data. 831

1621 The Tribunal notes that these uncertainties, reservations and criticism concern the methods by which test locations were selected and the results


827 See above Section 7.6.3.3. ↩
828 HT 2021 Day 5, pages 82 - 83. ↩
829 B-PHB1, paragraph 82 and FN 100. ↩
830 HT 2021 Day 6, page 41. ↩
831 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 37 - 39; see also above, Section 7.6.3.3. ↩

[Page 458]

were extrapolated in quantitative emissions. It nevertheless remains that Mr Wilson did measure emissions and some of his flux boxes and other measurements showed in 2016 gas at the surface and slightly below.

1622 Similarly, the measurements from three flux boxes placed by Niko showed that between 2015 and 2020 gas continued to flow at the locations where Niko had placed them.

1623 The Tribunal concludes from these opinions and the evidence on which they rely that shortly after the completion of the Chattak 2B operation, emissions decreased sharply, as shown by the graphs of flame height, LEL measurements and water wells. Nevertheless, gas continued to seep at the surface until 2020 and perhaps beyond.

1624 Different opinions have, however, been presented about the origin of the seeping gas.

1625 There are indications in the record of emissions of biogenic gas;832 but they are few and not supported by analysis.

1626 Mr Glaholt testified that, during his visit to the site in December 2013 he observed that “there were natural gas bubbles coming up in the rice paddies bordering the roads and higher ground of our facility.”833

1627 Mr Wilson explained the origin of biogenic gas and its occurrence:

Naturally occurring shallow/near surface methane will be from the marshy clay and Peat below the flat paddy field areas of the site (this does not underlie the higher ground). Given that the area is widely underlain by the marshy clay and Peat deposits this biogenic gas is likely to be widespread, but it is different from the thermogenic sources identified in all the gas emissions that were tested during the Technical Investigation.834

1628 The Claimant criticised Mr Wilson's explanations about biogenic sources.835 BAPEX responded by insisting on the difference in origin and location:

The pre-existing gas vents were only in the low lying wetland areas. They are not in the village or compound area which is on sand and sandstone. They were minor compared to the emissions caused by the blowouts. As Mr. Wilson explained at the Hearing, the biogenic gas in wetlands would


832 E.g. Niko Monitoring Report October - December 2014, Exhibit R-143, quoted above. ↩
833 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 6. ↩
834 Wilson I, paragraph 5.6.5. ↩
835 C-PHB 1, FN 178. ↩

[Page 459]

not produce the kind of bubbling seen in the trench system in the Niko compound. Figure 4.7 of Mr. Wilson's First Expert Report further shows that all the gas in the areas where we found emissions was thermogenic and not biogenic. This again confirms that any emissions from the wetlands are very small and insignificant when compared to the gas flow from the reservoir, and that their source was biogenic, not thermogenic.836

1629 Mr Wilson accepted that there “are sources of biogenic gas in the area but the tests indicate that the gas that has been sampled is predominantly thermogenic. The rate of gas flow out of the ground that has been measured is not consistent with the flows likely to occur from biogenic sources”; and he concludes:

Testing has shown that the gas that has been observed currently issuing from the ground is from a thermogenic source (i.e. the gas that was in the deep gas reservoir below the Chattak site) and is almost certainly the result of continued seepage from the reservoir sands penetrated by the Chattak 2 well as a result of the blowout. A negligible proportion of the gas may be from naturally occurring shallow biogenic sources (e.g. the Alluvium) but this has no real significance.837

1630 At the Hearing, Mr Wilson confirmed in response to a question from the Tribunal:

We did laboratory analysis of the gas samples that we took from the monitoring wells that we installed in the site, and the laboratory analysis, three different types of laboratory analysis all show that it's thermogenic gas and not biogenic gas.838

1631 The Tribunal is aware of the limited scope of Mr Wilson's investigation and that instances of biogenetic gas emissions may have escaped his attention. Mr Wilson's investigation, nevertheless, extended to a relatively large area and different locations. It also is aware that other observations about biogenic gas emissions provide few details for assessing their importance. In any event, the gas measurements by both Niko and Mr Wilson, as far as the Tribunal understands, concerned only thermogenic gas.

1632 The Tribunal concludes that the observations of surface emissions relate primarily, and the measurements exclusively, to thermogenic gas.


836 B-PHB 2, paragraph 44(f). ↩
837 Wilson I, paragraphs 5, 5.6.5, 6.2.3. ↩
838 HT 2021 Day 5, page 87. ↩

[Page 460]

1633 While there has been no assertion that the thermogenic gas emissions in the Chattak region were from a source other than the Chattak field, it has been argued that at least some of the gas seepages are “historic seepages"; their origin is said to be older than the Niko drillings and primarily relate to the Chattak 1 well.

1634 In the testimony about the observations during his visit to the site in December 2013, Mr Glaholt mentions, in addition to the bubbles in the rice paddies referred to above, “bubbling in the Chattak 1 well cellar, indicating that there was an ongoing leak of gas from the Chattak 1 well. This well had been drilled by BAPEX's predecessor in 1959 and shut in around 1985".839

1635 Mr Kelly reported gas seepages in the “cellar of the old Chattak 1 well” and was told that this was an old phenomenon:

We did observe gas seepage in the cellar of the old Chattak 1 well. However, I was advised that gas in the cellar had been observed in Niko's early visits to the site long before the drilling of Chattak 2 was started. This was believed to have likely been attributable to a casing leak, a poor cement job in that well, or corroded fitting of the surface steel piping.840

1636 Mr Wilson, too, discussed emissions at the Chattak 1 well. Referring to the October-December 2014 Monitoring Report, quoted above, Mr Wilson states that “minor bubbling is consistent with the bubbles I saw in Chattak 1 and is significantly less than some of the gas seeps identified elsewhere that are caused by the blow-out.”841

1637 He reported about his own observations:

I have also seen some bubbling in the Chattak 1 well head but it is much lower than that I observed around the Chattak 2 and on my visit was limited to the water in the well cellar. There was no evidence of seepage in the surrounding area of the Niko Compound.842

1638 At the Hearing he described the testing with an ESG funnel at that location. The conclusion of the exercise was:

... we could see sort of a small trickle of bubbles coming up through the water [...] we couldn't record a flow rate: it wasn't coming up quickly


839 Glaholt I, paragraph 6. ↩
840 WS Kelly, paragraph 26. ↩
841 Wilson I, paragraph 5.6.5. ↩
842 Wilson I, paragraph 5.6.2, similar observation at paragraphs 4.4.4 and 6.2.4. ↩

[Page 461]

enough to record a flow rate on that meter. So it was below the limit of detection of the instrument. 843

1639 The Claimant also refers to the joint BAPEX/Niko Report about the site meeting on 20 February 2010, quoted above which, according to the Claimant, “Shows that both BAPEX and Niko accepted the existence of some seepages predating the blowouts”.844 The passage on which the Claimant relies refers to information from unidentified “local people” about a gas collecting point “few hundred meters away from the gas field”. It is supported by the two photographs reproduced above in this Section.

1640 Mr Wilson refers to these photographs and assumes that they “are possibly the same ones I saw at a greater distance from the Chattak 2 well during my walkover survey”. He states that he had “no information to confirm that these pre-dated the blowouts” and adds that “these gas collection points were local in nature and may be collecting biogenic gas”.845 There is indeed, apart from the reference to the unidentified “local people”, no evidence or even information about the origin of the collecting point on the photographs, or about the gas which it collected.

1641 When discussing the installations of collecting gas for domestic use, Mr Wilson accepted that “in some, but certainly not all cases, this may have been occurring since before the blow out”.846 Again, there is no basis for assuming that these cases of collecting points pre-dating the Chattak 2 blowout used gas from the Reservoir.

1642 Mr Wilson pointed out that

[t[here was no reference to gas seepages in the area in the Environmental Impact Assessment prepared by Niko in 2004, prior to drilling of Chattak 2. Evidence from villages and Bapex staff confirm this. If such seepages existed, it would normally have been noted and assessed in the EIA to create a baseline for comparison to seepage caused by an event such as the blowouts under consideration here. The lack of a reference in the EIA is a strong indication that significant seepage did not exist.847

1643 The Tribunal agrees with this observation. As discussed in further detail below in Section 9.2.2.1 and 9.2.2.5, further to an express requirement of the


843 HT 2021 Day 5, pages 80 - 81. ↩
844 Submission of 10 December 2021, page 7, referring to March 2010 Joint Report, Exhibit C-95. ↩
845 Wilson I, paragraph 5.6.4. ↩
846 Wilson I, paragraph 4.2.5. ↩
847 Wilson I, paragraph 6.2.4. ↩

[Page 462]

JVA,848 Niko prepared a detailed EIA and submitted it jointly with BAPEX to the DoE as requirement for the environmental clearance. This EIA contains detailed presentations of the environmental baselines and an equally detailed section on potential impacts, including impact on air. These include an obligation to “minimise gaseous emissions into the atmosphere”. The obligations in the field of environmental management include the “reduction of emission to local air [...] the production of greenhouse gases” and regulations of risk management.849 Gas seeping from the prior well on the compound that the BAPEX/Niko planned to take over would have been an important matter to raise in the EIA. The Claimant has not indicated that the EIA did contain a reference to leakages from the Chattak 1 well and has not argued that the omission of such a reference was irrelevant for the issue considered here.

1644 The Tribunal concludes that the seepages from the Chattak 1 well are of marginal importance and negligible for determining the emissions post-completion of the Chattak 2B operation. The emissions observed on the surface around the Chattak 2 well following 9 October 2005 are from the Chattak 2 blowout.

1645 The critical difference between the Parties concerns the question whether all of the gas observed on the surface had escaped the Reservoir before 9 October 2005 or whether at least some of this gas escaped later and demonstrates that the relief operation was not completely successful in sealing the Reservoir.

1646 No criteria have been mentioned in the information regarding surface gas after 9 October 2005, to distinguish the gas that escaped from the Reservoir after that date from gas that had escaped before and remained in the Overburden. The Tribunal therefore examined whether its analysis could be assisted by information about what may be called the “depletion period of the Overburden gas”, i.e. the time it would take gas in the Overburden to escape at the surface. The Tribunal addressed therefore Question 18 to the Parties:

Assuming the relief operation stopped the flow from the Reservoir on 9 October 2005, for how long would the gas that had escaped already but had not reached the surface have taken to reach the surface? In other words, how long would gas continue to reach surface?


848 JVA, Article 27.3. ↩
849 Exhibits R-72 and C-13, Sections 4, 5 and 7, in particular section 7.1.4 and 7.3.4.4. ↩

[Page 463]

1647 The Claimant stated that no expert evidence had been presented by either Party “providing an analytical response to this question”.850

1648 And it relied on GCA to support “slow migration” of the gas:

GCA opined that the decreasing (and total) flows measured by the Niko Gas Traps was “consistent with the slow migration (and thereby depletion) of gas entrained in the shallow subsurface sands slowly migration to the surface and not a continued leak from the reservoir sands. 851

1649 The Claimant also states that “it now appears to be the case based on the Niko Gas Trap data” that “gas entrained deeper in the Overburden would stop seeping to surface” within “~15” years. It criticised Mr Wilson for having failed to provide any technical analysis to support this opinion that this would occur within 10 years of a successful Chattak 2B well kill.852 The Claimant does, however, not state that, in its opinion, the period of some 15 years is the period that it would take after a complete sealing of the Reservoir for any mobile gas in the Overburden to reach the surface.

1650 BAPEX asserted that, if the blowout well is sealed, the flow of gas at the surface would stop “soon afterwards”. It gave the following explanation:

The only reason gas is still coming to the surface is because gas is continually flowing from the reservoir. If that was stopped then surface flows would stop, soon afterwards, because the driving pressure would be cut off. Any remaining excess gas in excess of the trapping capacity of the sands would flow primarily due to buoyancy up to the surface in a relatively short period of time.853

1651 Relying on a passage in Gaffney Cline I, BAPEX asserts that Gaffney Cline assumed “that gas flow at the surface would have stopped within 94 days after the Chattak 2B well operation”. The Claimant contests this statement: “GCA made no such statement”.854 Indeed, in Gaffney Cline I, the number of 94 days is used for the calculation of the gas lost during the period from bridging of Chattak 2A on 7 July and the “plugging” of 9 October 2005,855 i.e. 94 days.


850 C-PHB 1, paragraph 90. ↩
851 C-PHB 1, paragraph 90. ↩
852 C-PHB 1, paragraph 91. ↩
853 B-PHB 2, paragraph 42. ↩
854 C-PHB 2, paragraph 17(c). ↩
855 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 30(a). ↩

[Page 464]

1652 BAPEX also provides estimates of 5 and 6 years. In the B-PHB1, BAPEX states:

Based on its estimate of volumes flowing from the Reservoir, BAPEX estimates that the mobile gas that escaped from the Reservoir prior to 9 October 2005 would have reached the surface within 5 years.

1653 In support of this statement, BAPEX relies on the testimony of Dr Bruno and the case of the Aliso Canyon gas blowout mentioned by him.856

1654 Relying on analysis of the surface emissions rates from the Niko flux tents by Mr Wilson, BAPEX also asserts that

... if the Chattak 2B relief operation had sealed the well, any remaining gas in the sub surface would have been depleted within 6 years at the very least. 857

1655 GeoMechanics presented in their first report models to examine the situation after 9-months of gas flow into the Overburden at the rate of 50MMcfd and a complete sealing thereafter. They compared this situation with that modelled showing the situation at the end of 10 years. Three variations are presented, one for a continuous thin shale layer, one for discontinuous shale layers and one with no thin shale layers. In all three variations,

...relatively little gas saturation remains near the surface after 10 years. This is inconsistent with the field observations of continuing gas leakage to the surface in 2015, 10 years after the blowout incident.858

1656 Dr Bruno confirmed this result at the hearing and added an example from his own experience, related to the Aliso Canyon gas storage blowout, “the largest gas blowout in the history of the United States” for which “it took six or seven attempts to finally kill the blowout”. When the well was finally killed

... the gas measurements at the surface abated within four months. Within four months, they moved all those families back into their homes.859

1657 Dr Bruno continued by indicating a much longer period:


856 B-PHB 1, paragraph 81. ↩
857 B-PHB 2, paragraph 42; in FN 151, BAPEX explains that the “6 years' time frame is based on the emission rates referred to by Mr Wilson in his Hearing Presentation, Exhibit RH-7, Slide 9, p. 13. ↩
858 GeoMechanics I, paragraph 5.1.1 and 5.1.2; confirmed at the Hearing at HT 2021 Day 5, page 61. ↩
859 HT 2021 Day 5, pages 61 - 62. ↩

[Page 465]

... only five or six years after the killing of that blowout, there's no gas, or very minimal, non-measurable gas, at the surface.860

1658 Mr Wilson reads the GeoMechanics models to show that “gas saturation would have been reduced significantly within 9 months of the blow out if it had been sealed completely”. 861 It is, however, not clear that the models of GeoMechanics show the reduction in gas saturation during 9 months after the sealing of the blowout.

1659 The Tribunal also examined the evidence concerning the time by which the seeping of gas at the surface actually stopped or become so low that it could no longer be measured.

1660 The Claimant asserts

... the fact that the Niko Gas Trap data shows the cessation of measurable flow at surface by November 2020.862

1661 BAPEX assumes in B-PHB1 that

... flow at the surface stopped in 2020 ...

1662 It asserts in its second Post-Hearing Breif, dated 9 May 2022:

Gas is still flowing from the surrounding ground at high rates.863

1663 The evidence discussed above has shown that throughout the period until 2020 surface gas emissions were observed. The Niko Gas Traps from 2015 to 2020 and Mr Wilson's Flux Chambers actually measured the emissions. From the quoted passage above, the Tribunal concludes that the Claimant accepts that until 2020 at least some emissions were measurable; this is confirmed by the graph shown above of emissions measured in Niko's Gas Traps until February 2020.

1664 Both Mr Wilson and Niko measured emissions at selected locations. The latter criticised the former as follows:

Mr Wilson excluded or substituted selected data points, and used curated data set to provide gas seepage ranges over his large area zones.

and


860 HT 2021 Day 5, page 63. ↩
861 Wilson I, FN 46 at page 59. ↩
862 C-PHB 2, FN 35, at page 12. ↩
863 B-PHB 2, paragraph 44(c). ↩

[Page 466]

The 13 locations employed by Mr Wilson within his 785,000 m² area, are grossly out of proportion with the standard recommendations, and certainly are not regularly spaced.864

1665 The Tribunal has quoted above the recognition of Mr Wilson, in his report and at the Hearing, that “there is a great deal of uncertainty” on his emission rates.

1666 BAPEX rejects the Claimant's criticism and concludes:

Mr Wilson has provided a range of values in the absence of any data from Niko.865

1667 The data from Niko's Gas Traps, as recorded in the above emissions rates from 2015 to 2020, are from three traps that recorded gas; a fourth trap did not record measurable flow. Mr Seager of Gaffney Cline explained at the Hearing that the cumulative losses captured by the traps, as shown in Gaffney Cline II, amounted to 0.02 Bcf;866 but he accepted that it is “not known how much gas escaped from areas outside the traps or how much was lost prior to the installation of the traps”; the quantity of 0.02 Bcf “was merely to indicate the level of gas that was being captured by the traps”.867

1668 Mr Wilson states that “Niko's flux tent measurements after February 2020 are sporadic because no measurements were taken during some months because of COVID”.868 BAPEX asserted that “according to Niko's own measurements through 2021, significant gas was being released out of the ground in the immediate vicinity of the Chattak 2 wellbore.”869

1669 The Tribunal concludes that the emissions actually measured by Mr Wilson and Niko are only part of the emissions that actually occurred. They are the minimum of the emissions that did occur at the times of the measurement; the end of emissions at the locations where measurements were taken does not mean that elsewhere on the surface emissions also stopped.

1670 The Tribunal considered that 15 years of emissions after a complete sealing of a blowout well would be longer than the time required, according to the experts of BAPEX, for all the gas trapped or absorbed in the Overburden to reach the surface. As mentioned above, Dr Bruno referred to the very large blowout in Aliso Canyon where four months after the blowout was killed the surface emissions abated and after five or six years there was no longer any


864 C-PHB 1, paragraph 92 and FN 173 at page 47; emphasis in the original. ↩
865 B-PHB 2, paragraph 44(b); emphasis in the original. ↩
866 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 95. ↩
867 HT 2021 Day 6, page 159 and Exhibit CH-12, slide 8. ↩
868 Wilson III, paragraph 4.1.9. ↩
869 Submission of 21 December 2021, paragraph 4. ↩

[Page 467]

measurable gas.870 The report about the field trip by Petrobangla, BAPEX and SGFL in November 2014 to the Moulavi Bazar blowout “in the same basin where no gas seeping or even not a single gas bubbling could be observed after six months of successful plugging by a relief well”.871

1671 Similarly short periods were mentioned by Niko in 2005, for instance when, in the Environmental Management and Mitigation Plan for Relief Well (Well #2A), dated 23 May 2005, it announced that seepage would stop in 2 months:

After successful drilling of the relief well and killing of the blow-out Well #2 the ground situation will improve significantly. Gas emission from cracks, artesian flows of the wells and blowing points will be stopped. This effect is expected to happen in 2 months from now.872

1672 In this context, the Tribunal considered the explanations of Gaffney Cline about the critical gas saturation and the absorptive capacity of the Overburden. Gaffney Cline explained that critical gas saturation marks the limit of gas that can be retained in porous materials:

The critical gas saturation is the saturation at which gas first becomes mobile in a porous material that is initially saturated with oil and/or water. If, for example, the critical gas saturation is 5%, gas will not flow until its saturation exceeds 5%. When the gas passed through the sands above the regional seal to the surface, it increased the gas saturation of those sands.

1673 Gaffney Cline calculated the increase of residual gas in the Overburden by the gas caused by the blowout in three scenarios, producing 0.3, 1.21 and 3.08 Bcf. It considered the value of 1.21 Bcf as the “most likely case”. 873 Consequently, “this volume of gas represents the maximum volume that can be accumulated in the shallower sands with any excess gas reaching and escaping from the surface”.874 This is the quantity which the Claimant allows for “Gas trapped in the overburden (Q3)”875 for the entire period from 9 January to 9 October 2005. The date when this quantity was reached was left undetermined, but Gaffney Cline “took the most conservative position of


870 HT 2021 Day 5, page 63, quoted above. ↩
871 Supplemental Report of the Review Committee on Field Trip on 2nd July 2015, Exhibit R-14, quoted above. ↩
872 Environmental Management and Mitigation Plan for Relief Well (Well #2A), dated 23 May 2005, Exhibit R-78, pages 44 - 45. ↩
873 Gaffney Cline I, paragraphs 36 and 39. ↩
874 Gaffney Cline III, paragraph 36. ↩
875 C-PHB 1, Table at paragraph 48. ↩

[Page 468]

assuming that the entire volume derives from Ch-2 and have divided it pro-rata to Periods 1 and 2".876

1674 The effect of the sealing by Chattak 2B is described by Gaffney Cline as follows:

However, when it stopped flowing from Sands 1 and 2 due to the killing of the blowout by the Chattak-2B well on October 9, 2005, the gas saturation of the upper sands would gradually decrease until the point of critical gas saturation.

Accordingly, in the sandstone layers above Sands 1 and 2, through which the gas migrated after the well-control incident, the final gas saturation will be the critical gas saturation.

1675 BAPEX draws the conclusion that gas could not continue flowing at surface after a successful sealing; a continuing flow is the sign for incomplete sealing:

Gas that is trapped in the ground is exactly that – trapped and immobile and held in place. The only reason gas is still coming to the surface is because gas is continually flowing from the reservoir. If that was stopped then surface flows would stop, soon afterwards, because the driving pressure would be cut off. Any remaining excess gas in excess of the trapping capacity of the sands would flow primarily due to buoyaпсу ир to the surface in a relatively short period of time.877

1676 Gaffney Cline's quantified at 1.21 Bcf the gas trapped in the Overburden. In fact, the quantity may be higher but, as the Claimant pointed out, the drilling records of Chattak 2A, 2B and 2C do not support BAPEX's assertion about large accumulations of gas in the Overburden.878 Similarly, the records of Chattak 2A led the Second Gas Loss Committee to find it unlikely that large quantities of gas were trapped in the Overburden.

1677 These considerations confirm the Tribunal's doubts about the assertion that the gas that had gathered in the Overburden by 9 October 2005 alone would take 15 years or more to escape at the surface.

1678 Moreover, when facing gas emissions on the surface after 9 October 2005, Niko repeatedly insisted that a production well would solve the problem of the seepages; and that production of the gas from the Reservoir would be “the


876 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 36. ↩
877 B-PHB 2, paragraph 42. ↩
878 C-PHB 2, paragraph 16(f). ↩

[Page 469]

only viable long term solution”.879 Proposals of production from the Reservoir as a solution may be taken as an indication that the problem to be solved is continued escape of gas from the incompletely sealed blowout well.

1679 Considering all this evidence and argument, the Tribunal concludes that at least some of the gas that observed or measured at the surface after 9 October 2005 originated from the Reservoir. The Tribunal concludes that the Chattak 2B relief operation did not completely seal the blowout well.

7.6.6.2 The flow rate after 9 October 2005

1680 When seeking to determine the quantum of the gas flow due to the incomplete sealing, the Tribunal considered the emissions at surface, and specifically those measured in the three Gas Traps in the context of the other evidence referred to above. The Tribunal concludes from this evidence that, during the period after 9 October 2005, gas emissions (visible as bubbles or burning and invisible) were substantial; at times so important that, concerned by the situation, delegations from Niko and BAPEX or from the authorities and the press came to Tengratila and to the site. And they were so substantial that, at times, they could be used for domestic purposes in Tengratila. Through one of these networks of gas connections, as recorded by Niko's Monitoring report, Mr Kashem supplied “about 80 shops and houses” by the network he had set up.880

1681 The Tribunal bore in mind the conclusions it reached when it attempted to quantify Q2 in Period 1 and Period 2, i.e. the gas flow at surface after the bridging of Chattak 2 and Chattak 2A. It concluded in Section 7.6.3.3that the evidence available for estimating the quantity of gas that escaped at the surface was unreliable and insufficient for an estimate in which the Tribunal could have confidence. For the same reasons, the Tribunal does not have sufficient confidence in estimates of the daily rate or the total of the gas that escaped to the surface during Period 3 or during the period of measurement (2015 – 2020). Neither Niko nor Gaffney Cline have attempted to estimate the gas escaping at locations other than at the four Gas Traps. The Tribunal has no doubt that the total surface gas during 2015 – 2020 period is higher than that recorded in the three Gas Traps.

1682 The Tribunal concludes that emissions at surface are a useful indication of continuing gas flow; but they are an insufficient base for quantifying these


879 As noted above, this solution was echoed in March 2010 Joint Report, Exhibit C-95, and several Monitoring Reports (Niko Monitoring Report August October 2010, Exhibit C-96; Niko Monitoring Report July - September 2011, Exhibit C-97). ↩
880 Niko Monitoring Report July – September 2011, Exhibit C-97, pages 4 and 8, quoted above. ↩

[Page 470]

emissions and, in the circumstances of the present case, attempts as those of Mr Wilson are “highly uncertain”, as he freely accepted.

1683 The Tribunal therefore considered quantification of the Period 3 loss by reference to the flow from the Reservoir, as it had been quantified during the previous periods. Quantifying the gas loss in Period 3 by reference to the quantity of gas that escaped from the Reservoir avoids not only the need for attempting to quantify the elusive gas at surface but also the need for determining whether and in what proportion the gas escaping at surface was already trapped in the Overburden on 9 October 2005.

1684 In its Post-Hearing Brief, BAPEX proposed a quantification by reference to the prior flow rates. It accepted that

... the Chattak 2B relief operation could have reduced the flow of gas from the Reservoir through the Chattak 2 borehole in the marine shale by as much as 67%.881

1685 This assessment is expressly based on “Ryder Scott's OGIP calculation” and the assumption that flow at the surface stopped in 2020; based on the Ryder Scott calculations the stop of flow in 2020 is explained by the complete depletion of the Reservoir's EUR, assumptions which the Tribunal has not accepted. Moreover, the Tribunal notes that BAPEX's claimed quantification does not apply this 67% reduction of the prior flow rate but the rate of 7.4 MMcfd, the upper end of Mr Wilson's quantification which BAPEX applies for the surface flow through the period from 9 January 2005 to 30 June 2016, decreasing only thereafter.882

1686 In any event, considering the change in the flow to surface, as measured by the flame heights, the LEL levels and water levels in the Monitoring Reports, the reduction of flow appears to be more than two thirds. As noted above, the Monitoring Reports show sharp declines in the measurements. The 20th Report of 23 July 2006 records that “No flames were burning by January 2006 and still (on May 31, 2006) this stipulation goes on”; by 30 October 2005 “no further gas was detected” in the air quality monitoring and by 26 May 2006 only three of 21 wells remained with “detectable gas 76% LEL, 73% LEL and 93% LEL respectively”.883 Gas emissions nevertheless continued to occur but were reported differently, as described above.


881 B-PHB 1, paragraph 78, quoted above. ↩
882 B-PHB 1, Table 1, at page 23. ↩
883 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, 23 July 2006 (20th Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit C-69, pages 30, 28 and 14. ↩

[Page 471]

1687 A different approach was proposed by GeoMechnics. In their first report they considered

... scenarios in which some residual leakage through the Upper Marine Shale continues for 10 years. That is, we consider a situation in which the Chattak 2B Relief Well has sealed 90% of the leak, but allows 10% of the rate to continue (5 MMscfd).884

1688 The same assumption for the degree of sealing is made by Gaffney Cline. The basis of a 90% success, they calculate the 10% residual flow at 0.4 MMcfd:

If it is deemed that the Ch-2B well did not completely seal the blowout wells, Gaffney Cline considers, based on the information available, that any additional seepage after October 9, 2005 would be minimal. Assuming, by way of example, that the kill operation was only 90% successful, it could be speculated that in the order of 0.4 MMscf/d would continue to leak through the Girujan Regional Clay.

1689 The Claimant refers to this calculation and the flow rate to which the 10% would be applied. As the Claimant admitted only 2 MMcfd as attributable to Chattak 2, the “speculated” rate would be only one half of that calculated by Gaffney Cline.885

1690 The Tribunal is aware that these calculations are based on assumptions and do not state that they are the result of an analysis of flow data. The Tribunal notes, however, that Gaffney Cline opines “based on the information available” that the additional seepage would be minimal. The example of a 90% success rate thus is not without any relation to the evidence in the file.

1691 In the absence of any other evidence, the Tribunal has considered the 90% success rate. This rate falls into the range that appears reasonable to the Tribunal. The Tribunal therefore adopts this rate.

1692 The Tribunal concludes, the Chattak 2B relief operation was successful at 90%. Consequently, for quantifying the flow after 9 October 2005 the rate at which gas flowed out of the Reservoir until the completion of the Chattak 2B operation must be reduced to 10% thereof.

1693 This prior rate had been assessed by the Tribunal at 31.47 MMcfd on average. Given the decreasing Reservoir pressure resulting from this flow over the ten months from the bridging of the Chattak 2 well to 9 October 2005, the Tribunal assumes that the flow rate also declined. In their profile for the Post-


884 GeoMechanics I, paragraph 5.2, page 23. ↩
885 C-PHB 1, paragraph 89. ↩

[Page 472]

Blowout Gas projections, Ryder Scott assumed a 15% annual decline, taking into consideration the depletion of the Reservoir due to the uncontrolled flow caused by the Chattak 2 blowout.886 The Tribunal considers this a reasonable assessment and applies it to the average flow rate at the end of the 10 months period until 9 October 2005. This brings the rate down by 10/12th of 15%, i.e. 12.5%, from 31.47 MMcfd to 27.537 MMcfd. Reduced to 10% brings the rate for post 9 October 2005 seepages to 2.754 MMcfd.

7.6.6.3 The quantity of gas lost during Period 3 if gas production had been approved

1694 The Tribunal concluded above in Section 7.5.6 that Niko's liability for gas lost in Period 3 was limited to the gas that would have escaped the Reservoir, if Niko had been allowed to drill production wells and produce gas from the Chattak field as it had proposed.

1695 It is uncontested that the approval of a production well would not reduce the flow of gas immediately: gas would continue to flow for some time until the well was drilled, the installations for delivering gas were completed and the flow of the gas would start. Even thereafter, the effect of production would not be immediate; the Parties disagree about the time it would have taken until the uncontrolled flow through the blowout well would have reduced and ceased.

1696 Considering this situation, the Tribunal asked in Question 19:

Assuming the flow from the Reservoir had not been completely stopped and BAPEX would have accepted that Niko drill one or several production wells, when could the production have started and when could the resulting reduction in pressure have caused the remaining flow from the Chattak 2 well have stopped?

1697 Concerning the first part of Question 19, the start of production, BAPEX responded to the Tribunal's question that “production from such wells could not have begun until 1 July 2007”. BAPEX relies on a statement by Mr Hornaday and concluded: “Both Niko and BAPEX agree that 1 July 2007 is the earliest date on which production of gas from the Reservoir could have begun.” 887 BAPEX also relies on Mr Hughes' third report where he stated:

If drilling operations had commenced in November 2005 as Niko desired, then they could have completed operations on the Chattak No. 3, Chattak No. 2C, and Chattak No. 4, 5 and 6 and demobilized the drilling rig by


886 Ryder Scott III, paragraph 24. ↩
887 B-PHB 1, paragraph 84. ↩

[Page 473]

the end of April 2006. Production facilities, a compressor, and a salt water disposal well would follow, and first production from Chattak No. 2C and/or Chattak No. 4 could commence on July 1, 2007 as Mr. Hornaday projected. (See Figure 21).888

1698 The Claimant accepted the 1 July 2007 date for the calculation of its own damage set-off claim but added that production could have started on 1 July 2006:

With regard to when production could have begun, Niko accepted the use of 1 July 2007 as a reasonable but conservative date for determining the start of production for the calculation of damages. Niko submits that production could have started as early as 1 July 2006 had ВАРЕХ permitted the further drilling to occur on a timely basis.889

1699 It explained the calculation as follows:

Completion of the drilling of additional wells, had it been initiated when Niko proposed, could have occurred by March 2006: Hornaday 4WS, para 58. The majority of the processing facilities had already been constructed other than the installation of 200 meters of the 16-inch pipeline for tie-in of the gas line at Jalalabad which would permit commissioning of the pipeline and plant facilities: Hornaday 4WS, paras 42-46, Workpaper 5 (PDF34).890

1700 The Tribunal notes that, contrary to BAPEX's assertion, the 1 July 2007 date is not agreed as “the earliest date on which production of gas from the Reservoir could have begun”. Mr Hornaday presented it as a “particularly conservative” assumption in the context of Niko's damages set-off claim aligned with Scenario A of BAPEX's own damage calculation. Mr Hornaday's statement does not exclude a possible earlier production start. The Tribunal therefore examines the Claimant's allegation that production could have started as early as 1 July 2006.

1701 The Tribunal considered that, when Niko proposed drilling of Chattak 3, the required drill rig was on site, performing the relief operation. As Niko explained at the time, it could have been used for drilling production wells immediately after the completion of the relief operation. In order to commence gas production after the completion of the drilling, the well had to be connected to the gas plant and to the pipeline connecting it to the network.


888 Hughes III, paragraph 39. ↩
889 C-PHB 1, paragraph 96. ↩
890 C-PHB 1, FN 184 at page 49. ↩

[Page 474]

This additional work had been well advanced. All of this is supported by documentary evidence discussed above.

1702 The Tribunal notes that in 2005 – 2007, when the production of gas from the Chattak field was actively pursued by concrete proposals, Niko announced that production could start within a short period. It is uncontested that in October 2005, upon completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation, the drilling equipment and team were available and drilling of production wells could have started shortly thereafter; BAPEX's experts proceed on the same assumption.891 The completion of the work from the start of drilling to the start of production was announced to require only a short period, six months or less:


891 Brattle I, paragraph 18, Scenario A, with reference to Ryder Scott I, paragraph 50 [recte: 41] and Exhibit 4; Ryder Scott in turn refer to Hughes I, page 3. ↩
892 Exhibit R-25 and C-265, page 5. ↩
893 Exhibit C-276. ↩
894 Exhibit R-244. ↩
895 Exhibit R-64, page 4. ↩
896 Exhibit C-60. ↩

[Page 475]

7 days of rig work to prepare the well for production. Some lead time is required to secure a rig for the work”.

1703 Niko announced that “Chattak 3 could be drilled and put on production in a very short time frame”. Discussing the necessary approvals requested from BAPEX, Niko concluded that

[o]verall, we anticipate that it is reasonable to start production of gas from Chattak 6 months following these approvals.897

1704 Both Mr Hughes and Mr Hornaday presented an estimate for the time required thereafter until production could start.

1705 Mr Hughes described the drilling operations as including Chattak 3, Chattak 2C and Chattak 4, 5 and 6. He assumed that this could be completed by the end of April 2006. He then assumed that “production facilities, a compressor and a salt water disposal” would have to be installed during the following 15 months until production could start on 1 July 2007;899 in his first report he assumed that production could start only on 1 January 2008,900 a date that was also adopted by Ryder Scott and the Brattle Group. None of these reports explained how the period of 15 or 20 months for the facilities connecting the well to the net was calculated.

1706 Mr Hornaday presented his calculation as part of Niko's set-off claim for damages and explained that, in order “to provide the Tribunal with a common platform from which to undertake the assessment of damages”, he based his calculations on the approach and model that the Brattle Group, had prepared


897 Exhibit C-298. ↩
898 Exhibit C-299. ↩
899 Hughes II, paragraph 39. ↩
900 Hughes I, page 3. ↩

[Page 476]

for BAPEX.901 He assumed completion of drilling in March 2006 and then allowed 15 months until start of production, which he considered particularly conservative. He explained:

For the post-blowout scenario, I have assumed a production start date of July 1, 2007, based on a conservative assumption that the wells would have been brought onstream 15 months after completion of drilling in March 2006. This is particularly conservative given that the majority of the production facilities had already been constructed in the intervening period.902

1707 Mr Hornaday also referred to the Commerciality Report of May 2007903 as the basis of the processing plant, pipeline and future compression, of which a majority had already been completed, and described the production facilities that remained to be completed; they included

... installation of 200 meters of the 16-inch pipeline, commissioning of the pipeline and plant facilities prior to the start-up of production, and installation and commissioning of compression facilities four years after start-up.904

1708 Niko reported on this advanced state of the gas plant and pipeline work at repeated occasions, referred to above. Mr Adolph testified about it in his fourth witness statement, confirming that only 200m of pipeline and the commissioning of “all the main dehydration equipment and start-up of the gas processing facility” remained outstanding.905

1709 The Tribunal notes that the time allowed from start of drilling to the start of production differs substantially between (i) the announcements made by Niko when seeking approval for the start of production in 2005 and 2007 and (ii) the assumptions in the damage calculations by BAPEX's experts and Mr Hornaday in 2016 and thereafter. The Tribunal notes that the former group of time periods was presented when operations at Chattak were ongoing or in concrete planning. Their reliability could have been verified in the relatively short periods announced if BAPEX had allowed Niko to drill and start production. In contrast, the other much longer periods are assumptions made in the abstract in the course of damage calculations without a time schedule and any perspective of verification by implementation. These assumptions do not refer to the time estimates made when Niko made concrete proposals to


901 WS Hornaday IV, paragraphs 6 and 12. ↩
902 WS Hornaday IV, paragraph 58. ↩
903 Exhibit R-61. ↩
904 Hughes IV, paragraphs 42 and 46. ↩
905 WS Adolph IV, paragraphs 52 and 53. ↩

[Page 477]

start production and they do not explain why the work for connecting the well to the network, that had been largely completed, required 15 or 20 additional months after the completion of the drilling.

1710 Faced with this difference, the Tribunal has a clear preference for the contemporaneous estimates made by Niko in 2005 – 2007, in the context of concrete proposals for production wells. These estimates are for six months or less, starting from the expected approval that should have been given before the end of 2005.

1711 The Tribunal therefore accepts the alternative date proposed by the Claimant and assumes that gas production could have started on 1 July 2006 if BAPEX had approved Niko's drilling proposals.

1712 Concerning the second part of the Tribunal's Question 19, for how long would the seepages from the blowout well have continued after the start of production, the Tribunal assumed that Niko would have started by drilling Chattak 3, followed by Chattak 4 and by the re-entry of Chattak 2C.

1713 Chattak 3, in the version eventually approved, had as primary objective Sands 7 and 8; the Reservoir (Sands 1 and 2) were the Secondary Objective.906 These objectives were adopted in response to BAPEX's proposal “to keep the option to drill up to 1700m for extraction of gas from the lower horizons in case the initial targets (sand 1&2) are not successful”. The Drilling and Evaluation Program, modified to respond to this proposal, provided an explanation for the relation between these objectives:

This well will be drilled to evaluate (log) the 1&2 sands (which is the zone that blew out on Chattak 2) and to evaluate and test a number of deeper sands. They are the sands 3&4, and 5&6 (which have produced approximately 27bcf of gas) and sands 7&8. Actual completion zone will be determined after logging.

1714 As discussed above in Section 7.5.6.5, the Claimant pointed out that the drilling would provide “logging information” relevant for the assessment of the GWC and of the pressure depletion after the measurement in September 2005. Concerning the mitigation issue, production from Sands 1 and 2 by Chattak 3 remained a possibility which would be available if the lower sands did not prove to be commercial reserves. The priorities in the target sands may have changed after 9 October 2005; the production profiles in Niko's


906 Exhibit R-35 and C-265, Well Data Sheet at page 5; see also above Section 7.5.6.2. ↩

[Page 478]

Chattak West Commerciality Reports included Chattak 3 for the production from Sand 3.907

1715 Chattak 4 was scheduled to be drilled as soon as the drilling of Chattak 3 was completed. If it turned out that the lower sands in Chattak 3 proved to have commercial sands, Niko had announced that production from these sands would have priority. In that event, Mr Adolph explained that “Niko's initial proposal was to then drill a new well, Chattak 4 to a depth of 800m to produce from Sands 1 and 2.

1716 Chattak 2C was the Data Acquisition Well, drilled in September 2005. In October 2005, Niko proposed to re-enter the well “for monitoring of the reservoir pressure in the Tipam Sands #1 & #2 while we are producing these reserves”. Later it was also proposed as a production well for at least Sand 1 and possibly also for or Sand 2.908

1717 From the information provided to the Tribunal in the Arbitration, the Tribunal concludes that one, possibly two or all three of these wells would have been available for producing gas from the Reservoir.

1718 Responding to the Tribunal's Question 19, BAPEX asserted that a production well would have added a new channel for the gas to flow but would not have affected the flow through the incompletely sealed blowout well:

... any new production wells, even if commercially successful, could never have caused the flow of gas from the Reservoir through the Chattak 2 wellbore to stop prior to the depletion of the Reservoir. Gas flow through Chattak 2 wellbore in the Upper Marine Shale and the flow from any new production wells would have continued together until the Reservoir was depleted. It is not the case that new production wells would immediately relieve significant pressure upon their completion; they would release pressure gradually over time as they and the Chattak 2 wellbore flowed. Any additional outlets for gas from the Reservoir created by new wells would lead to the Reservoir to empty faster, but it would not have stopped the flow from the Chattak 2 well. 909

1719 In Table 1 presenting the loss calculation, BAPEX assumes from 1 July 2007 to 22 June 2009 flow from the two new production wells, Chattak 2C and Chattak 4 at a combined rate of 5MMcfd and a continued flow from the Chattak 2 wellbore at the rate of 7.4MMcfd. This flow would continue until 30


907 Chattak West Commerciality Report, 1 July 2007, Exhibit C-72, page 29, and Chattak West Evaluation of Commerciality, August 2007, Exhibit R-61, page 22. ↩
908 E.g. in Evaluation of Commerciality, August 2007, Section 6 production, Exhibit R-61. ↩
909 B-PHB 1, paragraph 85. ↩

[Page 479]

September 2016, the time when, according to BAPEX, the Reservoir would have reached 80% of OGIP and stopped flowing. BAPEX also asserts that the flow in the production wells would have stopped already on 22 June 2009 "because that is when the EUR of 74.9 Bcf would be reached".910

1720 BAPEX relies on the opinion of Mr Hughes who opined that the two new production wells

... will not provide a preferential pathway for any gas from Sands 1 and 2 to flow from the Chattak No 2 wellbore. The underground flow from the Chattak No 2 is too strong and the gas will continue to take the path of least resistance up through the Marine Shale.911

1721 On the Claimant's side, Gaffney Cline differentiate between the flow through the new production wells and that through the Chattak 2 wellbore; the latter flow “would likely continue for some period”; but the production wells would be the "path of least resistance” and “would become the predominant flow path":

In our opinion, it is indisputable that the new offtake points of the Ch- 2C and Ch-4 production wellbores would be the “path of least resistance”, not any residual leakage (if any) through the Girujan Regional Clay. While some residual seepage through a partially sealed (and even unsealed) Ch-2 wellbore would likely continue for some period, the increased flow through production at Ch-2C and Ch-4 would become the dominant flow path for gas from the reservoir.912

1722 Mr Wright emphasised the differences in the backpressure of the two types of wells, the “sand productivity, pressure and completion size” for the production wells and the “water gradient above the Marine Shale” against which the seeping blowout well would flow:

A new production well drilled anywhere in the reservoir will produce gas volumes based on the sand productivity, pressure and completion size. That produced gas will draw down the reservoir volume and reduce the pressure in the reservoir faster than an assumed leak in Chattak 2 alone. Most relief wells drilled, before intersect wells were possible, drilled into the reservoir that was blowing out and were produced at a high rate to lower the pressure and capture as much hydrocarbons as possible. In many cases this would result in the blowout well watering out and being killed. The S1 reservoir pressure at the top of the reservoir recorded in 2C


910 B-PHB 1, FN 106 at page 33. ↩
911 Hughes III, paragraph 38. ↩
912 Gaffney Cline III, paragraph 58. ↩

[Page 480]

on September 4, 2005 was already below a freshwater gradient. Additional production would have reduced that faster until such time that the water gradient above the Marine Shale would stop the flow.913

1723 Gaffney Cline made the same point by relying on the backpressure of the water in the Overburden. They had seen no evidence that gas was still escaping from the Reservoir but, if it were escaping

... the rate would decline as the reservoir pressure depleted until it reached the pressure of the water in the overburden.914

1724 The Tribunal has considered above in Section 7.6.3.3 the argument of the Claimant and its experts about the pressure differential and its effect on the flowrates. The Claimant had emphasised that

... any gas flow through the Marine Shale (driven by the upward pressure being exerted by the reservoirs [...]) would be constrained by the downward hydrostatic pressure exerted by the water saturated overburden [...]. The rate at which the gas will flow is driven, in large measure, by that pressure differential.915

1725 On the basis of these considerations concerning the pressure differential, the Tribunal rejected the flow rate for the Q3 Scenario 1 of the First Gas Loss Committee, calculated at 558 MMcfd and reduced by the Committee it to 271 MMcfd, equal to that of the flow through the open hole against only atmospheric pressure. For the same reason the Tribunal is not persuaded by the argument of Mr Hughes when he treats at an equal footing the flow through the production wells and the seepage through the incompletely sealed Chattak 2 wellbore. It accepts the position of Mr Grace and Gaffney Cline with their argument that, contrary to the back pressure in the production wells, the seepage will be determined by the hydrostatic pressure in the Overburden.

1726 The Tribunal concludes that both the production wells and the Chattak 2 seepages are driven by the pressure of the Reservoir, but it would become increasingly difficult for the gas escaping into the Overburden, as the depletion of the Reservoir reduced its pressure, to face the backpressure from the Overburden. The gas in the production well would not face this backpressure and, according to Niko's production programmes, would be assisted by a compressor. The seepage from the Chattak 2 blowout well would have stopped before the stop of flow from the production well.


913 Wright IV, paragraph 3.11. ↩
914 Exhibit CH-12, slide 8. ↩
915 C-PHB 1, paragraph 34. ↩

[Page 481]

1727 As the Claimant rightly pointed out, “there is no evidence in the record that provides direct projections as to when the reduction in pressure due to production (and any ongoing gas seepage) would cause the remaining flow from the Chattak 2 well to have stopped".916 Any additional engineering calculations that the Parties could provide would be based on assumptions which were controversial in the Arbitration and which the Tribunal had to decide. Some of these assumptions, in particular the production profile which impacts the pressure reduction, may also depend on decisions of the JVA members.

1728 The Tribunal considered the OGIP and the RGIP, as they will be discussed below in Section 7.7 and other information in the record. It accepted that the seepage from the Chattak 2 blowout well will not stop immediately with the start of production of gas from the Reservoir but will progressively decline. Having considered the evidence and the Parties argument, the Tribunal fixed the period of that decline at three years. At the end of this period of three years after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation pressure equilibrium would be reached, bringing the seepage to an end.

1729 Counting a linear decrease over three years from 2.754 MMcfd to zero, i.e. calculating the full production over three years and dividing it by two, the Tribunal concludes that, if production had been allowed after 9 October 2005 and would have started in July 2006, the average rate of uncontrolled flow out of the Reservoir until 8 October 2008, would have been 1’508 MMcf or 1.508 Bcf. The Tribunal therefore decides that Niko's liability for Period 3 is limited to 1.508 Bcf.

7.6.7 Overall gas loss based on Flow Rate assessment

1730 Having considered all of the available evidence, argument and expert opinion, the Tribunal reached, on the basis of the flow rate method, the following quantities of lost gas for which Niko is responsible:

(i) For Period 1, initial flare (Q1): 0.453 Bcf
(ii) For Period 1, quantities Q2 and Q3: 5.224 Bcf
(iii) For Period 2, all quantities: 3.367 Bcf
(iv) For Period 3, all quantities 1.508 Bcf
Total loss 10.552 Bcf

916 C-PHB 1, paragraph 95. ↩

[Page 482]

1731 During period 2, an additional loss of 1.421 Bcf occurred during the initial flare of the Chattak 2A blowout, for which Niko is not responsible.

7.7 Material Balance Assessment

1732 As explained above in Section 7.3, the Material Balance method compares volume of the Original Gas in Place (OGIP or GIIP) with the reduced volume at some later date. The OGIP must be distinguished from the volume of gas that may economically be extracted, the Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR). While only a reduction of the EUR constitutes a loss to be quantified, the Parties and their experts have assumed that, in the present case, the gas loss can be estimated by reference to the OGIP.

1733 In the present case, no OGIP measurement was available. The estimated OGIP quantities, presented before and during the Arbitration varied widely. Gaffney Cline explained the difficulty in determining OGIP, which cannot be measured but must be inferred from other data:

[T]he volumes of gas contained in subsurface reservoirs cannot be measured by direct means. Rather, the quantity in the reservoir is inferred from the data that are available. This inference necessarily introduces a degree of uncertainty into the estimate of volumes.917

1734 Although Gaffney Cline explained that dealing with this inherent uncertainty “is well defined and understood by industry participants [...] more closely akin to actuarial tables and mathematical probabilities”, widely differing values for the OGIP values for Chattak Sands 1 and 2, the Reservoir, have been presented.918

7.7.1 The range of OGIP estimates

1735 In the Arbitration, the Claimant relies on Gaffney Cline's Best OGIP Estimate of 25.6 Bcf and BAPEX on that of Ryder Scott of 136.253 Bcf. These estimates are presented as part of a range from low to high estimates set out below. These estimates also include those for the intermediate sand referred to as Sand 1.1 or Sand 1B, which constitutes one of the major controversies in the debate between the Parties about the OGIP value.


917 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 22. ↩
918 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 22. ↩

[Page 483]

1736 Gaffney Cline presented the range in the following table showing that its best estimate is within a range from 14.9 Bcf to 44.1 Bcf:919

Table 8: GIIP (Sands 1, 1.1 & 2)

Unit GaffneyCline GIIP (Bcf) Ryder Scott GIIP (Bcf)
Low Best High Low Best High
Sand 1 6.2 11.6 23.4
Sand 1.1 2.9 4.3
Sand 2 8.7 11.2 16.4
Total 14.9 25.7 44.1 45.8 136.25 240.11

1737 Ryder Scott presented in their first report a table that showed three estimates for OGIP and EUR. One of these was compartmentalised into Sands 1, 1.1 and 2; the other two assumed a single reservoir; the estimates are, as shown in the tables above and below, in a range from 45.8 Bcf to 240.11 Bcf:920

Chattak West Field
Estimated Remaining Recoverable Contingent Gas Resources
As of January 7, 2005(Date of Chattak-2 Blowout)
Gas volumes are in MMcf @ 14.73 psia and 60°F

Sand 1C(Low Estimate) 2C(Best Estimate) 3C(High Estimate)
OGIP
(MMcf)
EUR
(MMcf)
RF
(%)
OGIP
(MMcf)
EUR
(MMcf)
RF
(%)
OGIP
(MMcf)
EUR
(MMcf)
RF
(%)
1A 4,778 2,389 50.0%
1B(1.1) 6,306 3,153 50.0% 136,253 74,939 55.0% 240,112 144,067 60.0%
2 34,727 17,363 50.0%
Sand 1/2 45,811 22,906 50.0% 136,253 74,939 55.0% 240,112 144,067 60.0%

1738 Prior to these estimates by the Parties' experts in the Arbitration, several other estimates were made, some of which played a major role in the debate about the correct quantification of the OGIP.

1739 The Respondents produced a “Reserves Study Chattak Gas Pool”, dated October 1978. The study estimated OGIP of the “Chattak Gas Pool from well performance” before the closure of the Chattak 1 well in 1985.921 Ryder Scott relies on this study for some of its calculations, in particular for the Reservoir Pressure, by relying on “initial formation pressure for the Sand 3/4 and Sand


919 Gaffney Cline II, Table at page 33, paragraph 74. ↩
920 Ryder Scott I, Table at page 6, paragraph 11; the complete table also shows estimates for Sands 3and 4, Sands 5 and 6 and Sands 7 and 8; these are not relevant for the present issue and have been omitted. ↩
921 Exhibit R-66. ↩

[Page 484]

5/6 reservoirs which were produced from the Chattak 1. This, not static mud weights, is the best data available to estimate the initial reservoir pressure of the Sand 1/2 reservoir.”922

1740 The first estimate of OGIP of Sand 1 and Sand 2 is probably a document presented by the Claimant and referred to as the Dart Document. It is undated but attached to a transmission from the Director of Dart Technical Services to Niko, dated 14 June 2004.923 The Claimant explains that “it reflects an analysis of the Chattak field date following the cessation of production from the previously produced Sands 3 – 6 and appears to pre-date the Marginal Field Evaluation”. The Dart Document shows OGIP values of 9.62 Bcf for Sand 1 and 8.43 Bcf for Sand 2, a total of 18.05 Bcf.

1741 Prior to the conclusion of the JVA, Niko and BAPEX conducted a Marginal Field Evaluation (MFE) for Chattak, Feni and Kamta, the three fields then considered for further development. The MFE is dated February 2000. It was later attached as Annex B to the JVA of 16 October 2003. The MFE showed for Chattak Sands 1 and 2 “Proven and Probable Reserves" of 191 Bcf as “unrisked” and 115 Bcf as “Risked”.924 Ryder Scott treated the “risked” 115 Bcf as EUR;925 and BAPEX explained that the “risked” quantity “reflect the most likely volume of gas commercially producible from the much larger volume of gas estimated to be in the reservoir”.926 This understanding of the "risked" MFE estimate has not been contested. The Claimant treats the 191 Bcf as OGIP. As the relationship between EUR and OGIP is determined by the Recovery Factor and the Parties have identified, in the course of their submissions, a Recovery Factor between 50% and 75%,.927 the Tribunal has applied this factor to 115 Bcf EUR; this would produce an OGIP value between 153 Bcf and 230 Bcf. The Tribunal therefore accepts 191 Bcf as OGIP of the MFE.

1742 Niko's Chattak 2 Well Proposal, dated 14 December 2004, contains as Appendix I the Reserve Estimate, dated 24 October 2004 showing estimated OGIP at 114.710 Bcf and EUR 90.434 Bcf. In a separate table the


922 Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 34. ↩
923 Exhibit C-255. ↩
924 Exhibit R-41, Figure 14. ↩
925 Ryder Scott IV, Table 3 at page 7. ↩
926 B-PHB 1, paragraph 125. ↩
927 Ryder Scott at the Hearing: "a recovery factor for most gas reservoirs is typically going to be between 50% and 75%", HT 2021 Day 1, page 116 and Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit-RH-4, slide 8. In response to the Tribunal's Questions 23 and 24, the Claimant referred to Gaffney Cline's ratio of 75%; C-PHB 1, FN 189 at page 50. ↩

[Page 485]

recoverable quantities are shown as 24 Bcf as minimum, 90 Bcf as most likely and 241 as maximum.928

1743 Niko's Chattak 3 Well Proposal, in its Updated version, dated 16 October 2005, does not identify gas quantities; it does, however, identify the depth of the Sands.929

1744 Niko's Chattak 4 Well Proposal, dated November 2005, shows OGIP at 116.606 Bcf and EUR at 87.739 Bcf; in a separate table the recoverable quantities are shown as 24 Bcf as minimum, 88 Bcf as most likely and 241 Bcf as maximum.930

1745 Niko commissioned Fekete Associates to assess the lost gas from the two blowouts. The report is dated 8 December 2006. It estimates the OGIP for both Sand 1 and Sand 2 at most likely 41.23 Bcf, with a minimum of 26.66 Bcf and a maximum of 63.11 Bcf. Separate values are given for Sand 1 alone: most likely 15.89 Bcf, 13.27 Bcf minimum and 19.17 Bcf maximum. The estimates for remaining gas make allowance for the blowouts.931

1746 Niko prepared a Chattak West Commerciality Report. The report was transmitted to BAPEX with a letter, dated 1 July 2007.932 A revised version is dated August 2007.933 The report does not contain OGIP estimates, and the estimation of recoverable gas take account of the blowouts.934


928 Exhibit C-15, page 11 and Table at page 4. ↩
929 Exhibit C-206 and R-35. ↩
930 Exhibit R-64, page 18 and Table at page 17. ↩
931 Exhibit C-70, Tables at page 26. ↩
932 Exhibit C-72. ↩
933 Exhibit R-61. ↩
934 C-PHB 1, p 42, FN 23. ↩

[Page 486]

1747 The OGIP quantities presented in these estimates can be summarised as follows:

18.05 Dart Document, prior to 14 June 2004 and to MFE;
191.00 MFE, February 2000/JVA October 2003;
114.71 Chattak 2 well proposal, December 2004;
116.606 Chattak 4 well proposal, December 2005;
41.23 Fekete Report, December 2006;935
25.60 Gaffney Cline I, May 2014;
136.3 Ryder Scott, 21 March 2016;
25.70 Gaffney Cline II, August 2020.

7.7.2 Limits to the Tribunal's examination: agreed EUR quantity, estoppel and shifted burden of proof

1748 The Parties and their experts discussed many aspects of OGIP and EUR and the different factors to be considered in the estimates of the relevant quantities. Before considering these aspects, the Tribunal addresses BAPEX's arguments, which would limit the scope of the Tribunal's examination: according to these arguments, developed in BAPEX's Post-Hearing Brief the Parties had agreed on the quantity of EUR in the MFE, the Claimant is estopped from pursuing quantifications of OGIP and EUR different from those resulting from the values in the MFE; in any event, so BAPEX contends, the burden of proof which it has for quantifying the loss for which it claims shifted to Niko because of Niko's liability for the first blowout.

1749 BAPEX argues that the Parties agreed on EUR 115 Bcf as best estimate for Sands 1 and 2. It relies on the Marginal Field Evaluation (MFE), dated February 2000, that had been prepared jointly by Niko and BAPEX and was attached to the JVA of 16 October 2003; the MFE states:

the Chattak West Field has “potential recoverable reserves” that “Sandstones 1&2 have 115 Bcf untested”.936

935 Ryder Scott's table dates this report of 8 December 2005; this is obviously a typographical error; the correct year is 2006, as shown be Exhibit C-70. ↩
936 JVA Annex B, full text of the report produced as Exhibit R-41, page 7 and Figure 8. ↩

[Page 487]

1750 BAPEX argues that the Parties “made their joint calculation an integral part of the JVA through incorporation of Annex B [... and] agreed in their binding contract that for the Sand 1/2 Reservoir the best estimate EUR (“potential recoverable reserves”) was 115 BCF”.937 It refers to Ryder Scott “[r]ecognising the serious deficiencies" of the available data and attributed the lack of data to the Chattak 2 blowout. BAPEX concludes that Niko is bound by the EUR in the MFE and is estopped from asserting different values:

In these circumstances, Niko should be held to the value for EUR agreed to by Niko and BAPEX in the JVA as the minimum threshold. Indeed, Niko is contractually bound by these values and should not be permitted to benefit from the uncertainty created by its own wrongful conduct to evade the Parties' agreement in the JVA on EUR. BAPEX relied on these gas reserve determinations and Niko's asserted technical capabilities in making its decision to enter into the JVA. Niko cannot in good faith assert different values in an effort to reduce its damages for its breach of the JVA and is estopped from doing so.938

1751 BAPEX also argues that Niko's responsibility for the Chattak 2 blowout makes it responsible for uncertainties about the loss, shifting the burden of proof to Niko. At the Hearing it argued:

BAPEX does not have the burden to prove facts that are uncertain because of, or in the context of, the blowout. The burden falls on Niko to prove these uncertain events somehow limit the damage to BAPEX.

1752 BAPEX gave the following examples for the effect of this argument:

For example, there is a dispute between the parties regarding the original pressure in the Sand 1/2 reservoir. The only reason that there's not a precise figure for that pressure is because the Chattak 2 well blew out before that measurement could be taken. Similarly, had the Chattak 2 well not blown out, we would have precise data on the gas-water contact and the lithology of Sand 1 and 2 to determine the reservoir volume.

BAPEX is confident that it has been able to demonstrate original reservoir pressure and the volume of reservoir using the data available. But to the extent the Tribunal finds these facts are uncertain, it cannot deny BAРЕХ compensation based on that [un]certainty; it must require Niko to prove

937 B-PHB 1, paragraph 87. ↩
938 B-PHB 1, paragraph 91. ↩

[Page 488]

BAPEX is not entitled to compensation on its claims in this uncertain environment.939

1753 In support of its arguments about the burden of proof, BAPEX quotes from an ICSID Award by Veeder, Gomez and Fortier:

... the fact that this exercise [of assessing the value of the loss] is difficult is due directly to the Respondent's breaches of the two BITs which have made it almost impossible for the Claimants to show [their loss ...] it would be wrong in principle to deprive or diminish the Claimants of the monetary value of that lost opportunity on lack of evidential grounds when that lack of evidence is directly attributable to the Respondent's own wrongs.940

1754 And it relies on another ICSID Award by van Houtte, Veeder and Sammartano:

Where a claimant as the innocent party has difficulty in proving its compensation ... because of the wrongdoer's acts or omissions, the wrongdoer should not be permitted to escape liability for compensation as a direct result of the difficulty or resulting uncertainty for which that wrongdoer is responsible. At that point, the evidential burden regarding uncertainty shifts from the innocent party to the guilty party. Otherwise, the guilty party would profit unfairly from its own wrong.941

1755 Referring to these cases, BAPEX asserts that

the burden of proof lies with the party responsible for the uncertainty. Otherwise, Niko would profit from its own wrongdoing.

and that

the party creating the uncertainty marshal evidence to establish the disputed facts. If that evidence does not exist due to that party's wrongdoing, the party fails to meet its burden.942

939 HT 2021 Day 1, page 15. ↩
940 Gemplus, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/3 & ARB(AF)/04/4, Award (16 June 2010) (Veeder, Gomez, Fortier), Part XIII, paragraph 13-99, CLA-54; quoted at HT 2021 Day 1, page 13 and RH-1, slide 5. ↩
941 Marco Gavazzi and Stefano Gavazzi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/25, Award (18 April 2017) (van Houtte, Veeder, Sammartano), paragraph 224, RLA-478, quoted at HT 2021 Day 1, page 13 and RH-1, slide 6. ↩
942 B-PHB 1, paragraph 13, relying on the two cases just quoted and on Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award (25 Aug. 2014) (Veeder, Rowley, Crook), paragraph 8.68, CLA-39. ↩

[Page 489]

1756 The Claimant states that BAPEX's arguments concerning the MFE are “an entirely new theory advanced only in the BAPEX PHB” and should be rejected outright. The Claimant points out that the “MFE was a joint ‘study report' and recognized the inherent uncertainties associated with the estimates of OGIP/EUR in the MFE”. It asserted:

... there is no contractual promise in the JVA that bound, in any way, the Parties to an estimate of reserves in any of the reservoirs. The MFE was a joint “study report” and recognized the inherent uncertainties associated with the estimates of OGIP/EUR in the MFE.943

1757 The Claimant also points out that the shortage of data and the resulting uncertainty existed when the MFE was prepared; Niko provided additional data subsequently, through the 3D seismic study and the Chattak 2 drilling records; it is not responsible for the remaining uncertainty. Finally, the test for estoppel is not met and “BAPEX does not begin to explain in the BAPEX PHB how the test for estoppel is met in these circumstances”:944 The Claimant disagrees that the EUR values in the MFE were “gas reserve determinations” as BAPEX asserts. The areal closure was estimated; the recoverable reserves were “potential”.

Given both Parties were aware the 115 Bcf was an estimate, Niko cannot be precluded from using the better, more accurate data that has since become available to provide a more reliable estimate of OGIP and EUR. Indeed, that is purportedly what BAPEX also sought to do in retaining and submitting the evidence of Ryder Scott in 2016. BAPEX's plea to now have the Tribunal reject all of the expert analysis regarding OGIP, EUR and lost gas submitted over the past 8 years is a meritless ploy borne out of desperation.945

1758 The Tribunal notes concerning the asserted agreement on EUR at 115 Bcf, that the MFE makes it clear that the “potential recoverable reserves” were an estimate concerning an “untested” well, based on limited data. While “Both partners agree with the proposed recoverable reserves established for the three fields", the study points out that the “limited drilling and seismic data constrained the interpretation of each individual field”. The study also indicates the consequences of the study:

Niko Resources Ltd. feels confident, based on the results of this evaluation, to proceed to the next phase by signing a joint field

943 C-PHB 2, paragraph 34. ↩
944 C-PHB 2, paragraphs 33 - 45. ↩
945 C-PHB 2, paragraphs 41 and 42. ↩

[Page 490]

development plan which will commence with a work program for the Chattak Field.946

1759 This indicates that the study provided a shared basis for proceeding with the project, limited to the Chattak and the Feni Fiels (to the exclusion of Kamta); but there is no indication in the MFE, in the JVA or in any other evidence in the record that the Niko/BAPEX agreement on the “proposed recoverable reserves” constitutes a guaranty by Niko that Sands 1 and 2 of Chattak in fact contain 115 Bcf recoverable gas. The JVA that was concluded subsequently to the MFE and to which this study was attached, does not provide that Niko is bound to the EUR estimate. To the contrary, Article 23.3.4 addresses the case that “Chattak (West) turn out to be non-commercial” and provides that the cost of one well may be added to the Investment of Chattak East.947 In other words, not only was there no guarantee by Niko to produce the estimated EUR quantity from Sands 1 and 2, the Parties even considered that no commercial quantities would be produced from the entire Chattak West Field. Niko would not be liable in that event but was provided with the possibility of recovering some of the abortive costs through production from Chattak East.

1760 The Tribunal concludes that the MFE and the JVA do not contain a commitment binding Niko to the 115 Bcf EUR quantification of Chattak (West) Sands 1 and 2; there is no agreement that would require in the present case to quantify OGIP by reference to the 115 Bcf EUR value.

1761 Concerning the estoppel argument, BAPEX had produced several international arbitration cases that defined the principle along the following lines:

Estoppel is a recognised general principle of law that has been applied by many international tribunals. Of the essence to the principle of estoppel is detrimental reliance by one party on statements of another party, so that reversal of the position previously taken by the second party would cause serious injustice to the first party.948

1762 The Claimant expressed the principle as follows, explaining that the "authorities cited in BAPEX PHB footnote 114 are to the same effect":949


946 Exhibit R-41, page 5. ↩
947 Exhibit C-1. ↩
948 Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, Decision on Preliminary Objections (27 July 2006) (Caflisch, Stern, van den Berg), paragraph 159, RLA-438, quoted in B-PHB 1, FN 114 at page 36. ↩
949 C-PHB 2, paragraph 40, and FN 77 with reference to C-CMD, paragraphs 148 – 150. ↩

[Page 491]

The legal test for estoppel was set out in Niko's Counter-Memorial on Damages as follows:

  1. If parties engaged in a transaction share an assumed state of facts or law, as communicated by one and acquiesced to by the other; and
  2. One party conducts itself in a detrimental fashion in reliance on the assumed state of facts or law; then
  3. The other party is estopped from denying the assumed state of facts or law, if it would be unjust or cause prejudice to the other.

1763 The Tribunal notes that the MFE does not show that BAPEX, as it alleged, relied on Niko's representations and its “asserted technical capabilities”. The MFE is a joint study, “utilizing all available seismic and well data supplied by BAPEX"; it listed the sources, including “direct knowledge from the experienced staff of BAPEX who drilled the three original discovery wells over Chattak, Feni and Kamta Fields”.950 In any event, it is not apparent how BAPEX relied on the EUR estimate in the MFE and the detriment that would have resulted from such reliance.

1764 The Tribunal concludes that it sees no basis for BAPEX preventing Niko, on grounds of estoppel, from relying on OGIP estimates different from those resulting from the EUR quantity estimated in the MFE.

1765 Concerning the burden of proof argument, the Tribunal notes that BAPEX accepted that “the general burden of proving its losses lies with BAPEX”. Niko's burden relates to “specific allegations of the purported impact of intervening events”.951 At the Hearing BAPEX gave as example, as quoted above, the original reservoir pressure and the Gas Water Contact; in the PHB, it referred specifically to the Chattak 2A blowout and the Chattak 2B kill well operation. In addition, BAPEX states that Niko bears the burden of proof “because its wrongful conduct led to loss and destruction of evidence”.952 BAPEX then makes the statements concerning the burden of proof and uncertainty attributed to the party being found responsible for it.

1766 In the present case, the difficulty in establishing the quantities of OGIP and EUR and the resulting uncertainty are due to the fact that the gas was in the underground and these quantities cannot be measured directly; they are estimated by reference to a number of factors, based on the available evidence.


950 Exhibit R-41. ↩
951 B-PHB 1, paragraph 11. ↩
952 B-PHB 1, paragraph 12. ↩

[Page 492]

1767 Some of this evidence, such as the logs of Chattak 1, existed at the time of the MFE and was used for the EUR estimate therein; other evidence was provided by the 3D seismic study obtained by Niko and by the logs of Chattak 2 that survived the first blowout. Based on the available evidence a variety of OGIP and EUR estimates were made prior to the Arbitration and, during the Arbitration, by the Parties' experts. The process has inherent uncertainties which led to very different conclusions and led the experts to present a high, a low and a best estimate.

1768 The experts of both Parties succeeded in estimating OGIP and EUR, determining, on the basis of the available evidence, such factors as reservoir pressure and GWC. Niko did not have an obligation to provide additional evidence concerning these factors. The Tribunal held Niko liable for negligence in the design and implementation of the Chattak 2 well with the direct consequence of the first blowout and the resulting loss of gas. BAPEX has not explained how the non-availability of such additional evidence is also a direct consequence of Niko's negligence in the design and drilling of Chattak 2.

1769 In any event, the experts of both Parties are confident that, with the available evidence, they could estimate the OGIP and EUR.

1770 In particular, BAPEX and its experts, while pointing out the difficulties, asserted that the lost gas, including OGIP, could be estimated by the Material Balance method. Ryder Scott stated:

In the case of the Sand 1/2 reservoir, the data set available to estimate the inputs to the material balance calculation is less than ideal in certain areas. Thus, there is a range of uncertainty surrounding some of those inputs. However, there is sufficient information to estimate all the material balance inputs within a relatively narrow range if the proper analysis is performed using the appropriate data.953

1771 Ryder Scott characterised the available evidence as “significant known data”; and it asserted that “reasonable inputs to the material calculation can be developed from the available data”.954 And BAPEX confirmed the statement of Ryder Scott: data were known or could be estimated “if the proper analysis is performed using the appropriate data, which Ryder Scott did".955


953 HT 2021 Day 1, pages 118 and 129 - 130, quoted from Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 16. ↩
954 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 20. ↩
955 See above Section 7.3. ↩

[Page 493]

The Tribunal notes BAPEX's explanation that “OGIP and EUR for any given reservoir are never known with absolute certainty”.956 The evidence available was sufficient for the experts of both sides to prepare estimates in which they had confidence; each of the experts explains why their demonstration is to be preferred. There is thus not a situation where the loss cannot be proven and the conclusion depends on the burden of proof. In this situation the Tribunal will have to reach its conclusion on the basis of the evidence available, with the help of the explanations of the experts.

7.7.2.1 The relevance of the OGIP and EUR estimates in the MFE and in the Chattak 2 and Chattak 4 Well Proposals

1772 In the BMD, BAPEX argued that the Claimant and its experts “have attempted to belittle [the gas loss] by drastically reducing Niko's own prior estimates of the original gas in place ...”. BAPEX pointed out that the OGIP estimate of 25.9 Bcf on which Gaffney Cline's estimate of 4.2 Bcf lost gas was based, was 78% lower than the estimate of 116.6 Bcf in the Chattak 4 well proposal of November 2005 and of the 115 Bcf joint determination by Niko and BAPEX in the MFE, attached to the JVA. They add that Niko's and GCA's explanation, attributing the “enormous discrepancy” to the data from the 3D seismic study and those from the Chattak 2C well, is not credible because these data were available to Niko when it prepared the Chattak 4 well proposal.957

1773 Ryder Scott had highlighted the differences in their first report958 and developed it subsequently. At the Hearing, Ryder Scott referred to the Claimant's characterisation of the Ryder Scott loss estimate as “inflated by the unreliable and erroneous estimate of Ryder Scott as to the amount of gas initially in place”.959 Ryder Scott responded and found support for their own estimate by stating that

Ryder Scott's Best Estimate OGIP of 136.3 Bcf for the Sand 1/2 reservoir is reasonably well aligned with Niko's own internal Most Likely estimate of 116.6 Bcf as presented in the Chattak 4 Well Proposal. This review also clearly shows that the GCA Best Estimate OGIP of 25.7 Bcf as reported in GCA 2 is dramatically lower than Niko's internal estimate of 116.6 Bcf.960

956 B-PHB 2, paragraph 18. ↩
957 BMD, paragraphs 181 and 182. ↩
958 Ryder Scott I, paragraphs 43 - 45 and 48. ↩
959 CMD, paragraph 243 ↩
960 HT 2021 Day 2, page 31 and Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 57. ↩

[Page 494]

1774 The Claimant pointed out that there was agreement between the experts "that the areal extent of the reservoirs is not the 15 km² originally estimated in the MFE (or even the 10 km² stated in the Niko Chattak 4 well proposal), and therefore there is good reason to suspect that risked reserves, EUR, and OGIP were in fact overstated.”961 The Claimant explained the large difference between the OGIP and EUR in the MFE and in Niko's Chattak 2 and Chattak 4 Well Proposals by stating that they arose "from Gaffney Cline's interpretation of the 3D seismic (compared to Niko's prior analysis)".962

1775 The Claimant relied on the first witness statement of Mr Adolph who had explained the circumstances of the 3D seismic study:

After the JVA was signed, Niko proposed, and BAPEX accepted, to conduct a 3D seismic acquisition project over the Chattak field in February 2004. The seismic study would be a significant additional expense, but would produce a substantial amount of additional technical information regarding the potential for gas in the Chattak field.963

1776 The study was performed and “in May/June 2004 Niko Resources acquired a 200 square kilometres 3D seismic survey”.964 Ryder Scott characterised the data from this survey as of “very high” significance and explained: “The 3D seismic data provides a good image of the top surface of the Sand 1/2 reservoir. This image is a very important factor in determining the lateral extent of the reservoir."965

1777 Ryder Scott also pointed out that, when the Chattak 2 and the Chattak 4 Well proposal were prepared, the results of the Chattak 3D study were available; they pointed out that the Chattak 4 Well Proposal stated expressly that it was prepared “using the available geological well data from Chattak 1 and geophysical data from the 3D seismic survey”.966 They insisted that Niko's well proposals for Chattak 2 and Chattak 4 used the 3D seismic information. They concluded:

This clearly shows that the Niko internal estimates of OGIP (116.6 BCF) and EUR (87.7 BCF) were made using the exact same data (including the 3D seismic survey) that was available to Ryder Scott and to GCA.967

961 C-PHB 2, paragraph 51. ↩
962 CMD, paragraph 257 ↩
963 WS Adolph I, paragraph 19, with reference to the minutes of the Third JMC meeting of 28 February 2004, Exhibit C-12. ↩
964 Marginal Field Development Plan, May 2005, page 23, Exhibit R-248. ↩
965 Exhibit RH-4, slide 26. ↩
966 Exhibit R-64, page 17; see also Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 62. ↩
967 Ryder Scott IV, paragraph 20(a)(i); also Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 64. ↩

[Page 495]

1778 The Tribunal had noted the substantial difference between the OGIP and EUR estimates in Niko's well proposals in 2004 and 2005 and those at which Niko's consultant in the Arbitration arrived. Mr Adolph had provided in his first witness statement information about the Chattak 2 Well Proposal and those thereafter, but did not discuss the Reserve Estimates.

1779 It was Mr Hornaday who had addressed some aspects of these reserves. At the Hearing he testified about Niko's earlier estimates and the role of the information from the 3D study:

1780 Mr Hornaday had explained in is fourth witness statement that, in calculating Niko's production losses for which Niko had raised a set-off claim,968 he had based himself on the “original producible reserves” of Sands 1 and 2, as estimated in Gaffney Cline II,969 25.7 Bcf gas in place of which 19.28 Bcf recoverable.970 At the Hearing, he was questioned by the Tribunal about the Chattak 2 and the Chattak 4 Well Proposal and the 3D seismic data.971

1781 Mr Hornaday identified Mr Dupuis who is recorded in the Reserve Estimates for both proposals as the Reserve Estimator.972 Mr Dupuis was employed by Niko as reserve engineer. Mr Hornaday stated that Mr Dupuis had the appropriate expertise except that he was not a geologist or geophysicist; he would rely on others for the necessary input, in particular on “Tina” and “Keith”, two geologists, identified in the Reserve Estimate for the area and for the Net Pay (to be specifically discussed below, see also the Glossary).

1782 Mr Hornaday himself had not seen the estimates at the time but he explained the commercial considerations: Niko's opinion, prior to drilling Chattak 2, was based on

... the production from Chattak 1 and the seismic and well logs, we were confident, or certainly confident enough to invest in the drilling of Chattak 2. [...] we mobilised a rig in the country and we were committed contractually committed to drill the well, and the seismic was run during the same year that we were mobilising.

So, my recollection of the decision is the company had already decided to go ahead and drill, make the investment and drill Chattak 2, and the results of Chattak – of the 3D seismic did not affect that decision.

968 See Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, Sections 12 and 13.5. ↩
969 WS Hornaday IV, paragraph 12(a). ↩
970 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 79(a). ↩
971 HT 2021 Day 6, page 105. ↩
972 Exhibit C-15, page 11 and Exhibit R-64, page 18. ↩

[Page 496]

[...]

PROFESSOR MCLACHLAN: [...] did the availability of 3D seismic data assist Niko in arriving at its calculations as to the exploitability of the Chattak 2 field. Sands 1 and 2?.

[MR HORNADAY]: No. I don't believe so. Not in the decision to invest in the drilling.973

1783 Mr Hornaday also explained that he “did oversee the company reserve evaluation process and public reporting of those figures, which is a statutory requirement”. The reserves “would not make the threshold of being reportable publicly".

[At] the time period that these documents were prepared, Niko did not prepare an in-house full reserve estimate using the 3D, nor did we engaged any third-party company, such as Ryder Scott or Gaffney Cline, to prepare them. [...] 3D seismic is not sufficient information to “book” reserves. And oil and gas companies are very focused you know, on reserves because it's really the value of your corporation.

So these are estimates, but I can attest that there was no updated or reserves estimates, you know, that would go into our corporate filings done in that time period.974

1784 Questioned about Niko's Evaluation of Commerciality, dated August 2007, Mr Hornaday confirmed that, based on the Chattak 2C measurements, the then Remaining Gas in Place (adjusted OGIP) was “re-evaluated”. The new evaluation was17.47 Bcf for Sand 1 and 36.27 for Sand 2, with a total of 53.74 Bcf; of these quantities the recoverable gas, “re-evaluated, August 2007" was 38 Bcf (compared to 115 Bcf “JVA Feb. 2000”).975 He explained the changes, stating that Niko “had remapped it and prepared in-house estimates” in 2007. He added:

... the 3D showed us that the structure was much steeper [...] the area of closure and productive interval was much smaller. So we came, I think, to the number of 633 acres, which is about 2.4 square kilometres or something.

[...]

973 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 111 - 112. ↩
974 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 115 - 116. ↩
975 Exhibit R-61, pages 5 and 3. ↩

[Page 497]

The 3D was acquired in 2004. You know, 3D has many uses [...] the plan at the time was to get to be able to book reserves and really know what they are, you needed the well.976

1785 Mr Hornaday continued by emphasising the additional information that the drilling of the well itself would provide. Niko considered that in early 2005 it would drill a well, “or conversely drilled Chattak 3, you would have got a wealth of information” and that would “make the quality of my assessment far better". And in late 2005 “we were in a similar position because we were hoping to drill Chattak 3 and get all of that information”.977

1786 He also confirmed, relying on his “relatively extensive experience reporting reserves”, that the well proposals, the Evaluation of Commerciality and the estimates of Gaffney Cline and Ryder Scott would not meet the regulatory definition of “reserve".978

1787 The Tribunal considered that the EUR estimates in the MFE, jointly prepared by BAPEX and Niko, did not have available the information from the 3D survey. BAPEX and its experts recognise that this survey provided important additional information. The OGIP and EUR estimates of Ryder Scott, on which BAPEX relies, assume, like Gaffney Cline, a productive area which is much smaller than that assumed for the reserve estimates in the MFE. The thrust of the argument made by BAPEX and Ryder Scott in the context of Niko's prior estimates concerns the Chattak 4 Well Proposal. The Reserve Estimates in this proposal were prepared at a time when Niko had available the same information as that on which Gaffney Cline presented estimates substantially below that in the Well Proposal. The Tribunal focuses on this argument of BAPЕХ.

1788 Considering this argument, the Tribunal notes that Niko's earlier OGIP and EUR estimates differed substantially from those of Gaffney Cline and were of similar magnitude as those of Ryder Scott. The Tribunal therefore examined the assumptions and data on which the estimates of Niko, Gaffney Cline and Ryder Scott relied.

1789 Mr Hornaday had not seen the Chattak 4 Well Proposal and there was no other testimony explaining how the OGIP and EUR values were estimated and what data were used. There is therefore no testimony about the data that drove the reserve estimates in the well proposals, apart from the more policy-


976 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 119 and 121. ↩
977 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 121 and 122. ↩
978 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 123 and 124. ↩

[Page 498]

oriented considerations reported by Mr Hornaday. However, the documents themselves provide some information:

1790 The Well Proposal for the Chattak 2 well, the well that suffered the blowout, showed in the table Volumetric Reserves Estimate as OGIP 114.710 Bcf and as EUR 90.434 Bcf. A year later and after two blowouts, the Chattak 4 Well Proposal showed an OGIP value that had increased to 116.606 Bcf and a EUR value that had slightly decreased to 87.739.979 Both proposals also contain a separate table entitled Reserves Estimated for Sands 1&2;980 the Chattak 3 Well Proposal does not contain this table but the Marginal Gas Field Development Plan, dated May 2005 contains it with the same value as the Chattak 2 proposal. This table shows values for Net Pay, Area and Recoverable and for each of these categories minimum, most likely and maximum values. The values for all of these categories are identical for Chattak 2 before the blowouts and for the Development Plan and for Chattak 4 thereafter, except for the Recoverable in the Chattak 4 proposal. There, the minimum and maximum remained unchanged over the year but the “most likely” is reduced from 90 Bcf in Chattak 2 to 88 Bcf in Chattak 4.

1791 The comparison of these numbers raises doubts in the reliability of the estimates; it is not certain that, as BAPEX asserted, “the Chattak 4 well proposal certainly made full use of the 3D seismic data”.

1792 Moreover, comparing the information about the data used by Gaffney Cline and by Niko for the Well Proposals, one notes that the proposals assume a production area that is about five times as large as that assumed by Gaffney Cline: 10 km² compared to 2.0 km². Considering that the Net Pay Height both for the well proposals and for Gaffney Cline is similar, the difference between the OGIP and EUR values of the well proposals and Gaffney Cline's estimates appears far less surprising than asserted by BAPEX and Ryder Scott.

1793 Ryder Scott also state what they consider having been Niko's “motivation” for the OGIP and EUR estimates: “Niko's internal assessment of the Sand 1/2 reservoir OGIP and EUR when they had no other motivation than to provide the best possible assessment of the reservoir to support their business decisions".981


979 These differences were discussed between the Tribunal and the Ryder Scott experts without a conclusion at HT 2021 Day 2, pages 40 - 47. ↩
980 The table in the Chattak 2 proposal also shows estimates for Sands 7 and 8. ↩
981 HT 2021 Day 2, page 49, quoted from Exhibit RH-slide 64. The Claimant asserts that this is a mid-point figure and the comparable pressure at the top of Sand 1 is 1'073 psia (C-PHB 1, FN 27 at page 42). The statement is contested by BAPEX at B-PHB 2, last page of Annex 2; but no other figure is given for the pressure at the top of Sand 1. ↩

[Page 499]

1794 Mr Hornaday's testimony, quoted above, provides a more complex picture of Niko's concerns when the Chattak 2 and Chattak 4 Well Proposals were prepared. Mr Hornaday testified that, by the time these proposals were prepared, the investment decision had been taken. Indeed, the evidence discussed in detail elsewhere in this Award shows that, in the case of both proposals, the drilling rig was already available: the well proposal for Chattak 2 was presented to BAPEX on 14 December 2004, two weeks before the drilling of the well started at the end of the month; when the Chattak 4 Well Proposal was presented in November 2005, the rig had been used for the Chattak 2B relief well and Niko had moved it already to start drilling Chattak 3, followed by Chattak 4. It is therefore apparent that the OGIP and the EUR estimates in the well proposals were not the driving motivation for the decision to drill the wells.

1795 The Tribunal concludes that, when the Chattak 2 and Chattak 4 well proposals were prepared, the “best possible assessment of the reservoir” was not the driving or even the only motivation of Niko in the decision to proceed with drilling the well.

1796 This conclusion is confirmed by the Chattak 3 Well Proposal. This proposal was prepared after the first blowout and confirmed after the second blowout. By that time the recoverable gas had been reduced as the result of the blowout and some additional information had become available from the wells that had been drilled. If OGIP and EUR were critical information for the decision to drill a new well, one would expect that the estimates prior to the blowouts would be reconsidered, and the well proposal would contain the adjusted estimates. The Chattak 3 Well Proposal, as produced in the Arbitration, does not contain the table with the Reserve Estimate, as it had been contained in the Chattak 2 Well Proposal. BAPEX reviewed the proposal and requested changes, most of which Niko implemented; there is no indication that BAPEX requested that Reserve Estimates had to be added to the Chattak 3 Well Proposal.

1797 The Tribunal concludes that, in the circumstances in which the well proposals were prepared, neither Niko nor BAPEX considered Reserve Estimates as an essential component of the well proposals. After all, the well proposals were describing the well that was planned, the drilling operation and related matters. The decision to invest in drilling the well is a separate matter and, as explained by Mr Hornaday, had been taken already.

1798 In these circumstances, one would not necessarily expect that Reserve Estimates in the Well Proposals were prepared with the same standard of care as that applied by experts commissioned specifically for estimating OGIP, EUR and the loss of gas. Mr Novicki of Ryder Scott confirmed that he had

[Page 500]

“never seen a fulsome analysis by Niko of the 3D seismic data";982 no such analysis has been presented in the Arbitration and no one alleged having seen one. While the 3D seismic data were available to Niko when it prepared the well proposals, there is no evidence that a “fulsome analysis” as it would be required for a reliable resource estimate was performed by Niko. Indeed, Niko did not rely on the Reserve Estimates in the well proposals but had the reserves estimated by outside specialists. In July 2007 and again in August 2007 Niko presented to BAPEX a Chattak (West) Commerciality Report based on this re-evaluation.983 The Tribunal therefore considers the Reserve Estimates in the well proposals of limited probative value.

1799 This being said, the Tribunal notes that both well proposals indicate the productive area of the Reservoir in a range from 4 to 16 km², with a most likely area of 10 km². This size is smaller than that estimated in the MFE at 15km2 or more, with the then available 2D data. It is therefore likely that the Reserve Estimates took account of the information from the 3D survey. These Estimates interpreted this information differently and reached an area much larger than that on which both Gaffney Cline and Ryder Scott rely. As explained above, considering this difference in the interpretation of the information from the 3D survey, the difference in the OGIP and EUR estimates between the Reserve Estimates in the well proposals and Niko's estimates based on Gaffney Cline's work is not as surprising as “dramatically lower” and "drastically reduced” as it appeared to Ryder Scott and BAPEX.

1800 In view of these considerations the Tribunal does not consider the OGIP and EUR estimates in the Chattak 2 and Chattak 4 well proposals as persuasive to the extent that it should override estimates by specialists engaged specifically for reserve estimates. The Tribunal evaluates the estimates on which the Parties rely by considering the factors which the Parties and their experts consider critical for their estimates of OGIP and EUR.

7.7.3 The factors critical for the OGIP and EUR estimates

1801 Noting the large differences between the OGIP and EUR estimates, highlighted by BAPEX and Ryder Scott and the discussion about the factors driving these differences, the Tribunal submitted to the Parties Question 14:

The Tribunal also noted that, apart from the quantifications by the experts in the arbitration, other quantifications of OGIP were made at different occasions before and after the blowouts. What are the

982 HT 2021 Day 3, page 7. ↩
983 Exhibit C-72, letter of 1 July 2007 with the Report; based on the Assessment of lost Gas by Fekete Associates, dated 8 December 2006, Exhibit C-70, and WS Adolph I, paragraph 39; and Evaluation of Commerciality, August 2007, Exhibit R-61. ↩

[Page 501]

differences in assumptions or underlying data, to the extent they are known or can be derived, that explain these differences?

1802 In response the Claimant produced the following Table, which contained assumptions for all of the estimates to which Ryder Scott and BAPEX referred.984 In addition, the table included the Dart Study, an earlier estimation, undated but prior to 14 June 2004, where OGIP for the two Sands was estimated at 18.05Bcf (9.62 + 8.43)985 and Niko's August 2007 Commerciality Report:986

Table 2: Comparison of Relevant OGIP Factors

Net Pay Height/Thickness¹ Area² Reservoir Pressure³ OGIP Bcf
S1 S1.1 S2 Total S1 S2 S1 S2
DartDoc ⁴ 21m 0m 18m 39m N/A 850 psig 930psig 9.62 8.43
MFE ~12m ⁵ 0m ⁵ ~22m ⁵ 34m ⁵ 15km2 ⁶ N/A 191.0 ⁷
Ch2WP ⁸ 0m 30m 10km2 852.8 psia ⁸ 114.7
Ch4WP 0m ⁹ 30m ⁹ 10km2 ¹⁰ [750 psia ¹¹] 116.606 ¹²
Fekete 17.4m ¹³ 0m ¹⁴ N/A ¹⁵ N/A ¹⁵ ~2.3km2 ¹⁶ 829psia¹⁷ 910psia ¹⁷ 15.89¹⁸ 25.34 ¹⁸
Aug'07Com 18.6m ¹⁹ 0m ¹⁹ 18.3m ¹⁹ 36.9m 2.56km2 ²⁰ [868psia²¹] N/A ²² N/A²³
GCA ²⁴ ~17m Some²⁵ ~18m 35m 3.97km2 ²⁵ 883 psia 25.7
RS ²⁴ 15m 12.5m 32.9m 60.4m 4.95km2 ²⁶ 1073 psia²⁷ 45.811

984 C-PHB 1, Table 2 at page 40; notes at pages 40 – 42 omitted. ↩
985 Exhibit C-255; it is a document attached to a message without further explanations from Dart Technical Services to Niko, dated 14 June 2004. ↩
986 Exhibit R-61. ↩

[Page 502]

1803 BAPEX responded to the Tribunal's question by referring to the table that Ryder Scott had produced in their Third Supplemental Report and at the Hearing and which contained the OGIP quantities listed above; the table does not show “assumptions and underlying data", as the Tribunal had invited them.987

Estimates of OGIP and EUR for the Chattak West Sand 1/2 Reservoir
Niko and Niko Gas Loss Consultants

Document Name Estimate of Document Date Estimated OGIP-Bcf Estimated Eur-Bcf Comments
SD 1/2 Total Field % of Total SD 1/2 SD 1/2 Total Field % of Total SD 1/2
Earlier
Niko Bapex Joint Venture Agreement (C001) Niko 10/16/2003 Not Reported Not Reported 115.0 285.0 40.35% Volumes reported as "risked" Proven and Probable Reserves. Based on 2D seismic.
3D seismic survey acquired May/June 2004
Chattak-2 Well proposal Original(C012) Niko 12/14/2004 114.7 Not Reported 90.4 Not Reported Volumes reported as "Most Likely Case" Based on 3D seismic.
Chattak-2 well blew out 1/7/2005
Report of the Committee on Gas Losses caused by Blow-out in Chattak-2: 6/4/2005
Chattak-2A well blew out 6/24/2005
Report of the Committee on Gas Losses Caused by Chattak 2A Relief Well Blowout: 8/27/2005
Chattak-2B reached TD 9/3/2005. SFT pressures obtained 9/4/2005.
Chattak-2B reached TD 10/9/2005
No additional data to impact OGIP and EUR estimates for Sand 1/2 reservoir after Chattak-2B
Chattak-4 Well Proposal (R-064) Niko 12/5/2005 116.6 Not Reported 87.7 Not Reported Volumes reported as "Most Likely Case" All data currently available was avilable for this evaluation. No data driven revisions after this point.
Fekete Gas Loss Asssessment(C-070) Fekete Associates 12/8/2005 41.2 Not Reported Not Reported Not Reported Volumes reported as "Most Likely". Fekete engaged by Niko to estimate gas losses.
Gaffney Cline 1st Expert report Gaffney Cline & Associates 5/29/2014 25.6 Not Reported Not Reported Not Reported Volumes reported as "Most Likely". Gaffney Cline engaged by Niko to estimate gas losses
Gaffney Cline 2nd Expert report Gaffney Cline & Associates 8/20/2020 25.7 Not Reported 19.3 Not Reported Volumes reported as "Best", Gaffney Cline engaged by Niko to estimate gas losses.
Later

Niko's OGIP and EUR revision based on 3D seismic data occurred here.

The GCA OGIP estimate is even 38% lower than that of the first firm Niko engaged to estimate gas losses, Fekete,

1804 In its Reply Post-Hearing Brief BAPEX commented and criticised Niko's table and its annotations.988 It did not produce a systematic presentation of the “assumptions and underlying data”, as the Tribunal had requested and the Claimant had presented in its table 2.

1805 Considering the explanations of the experts, the Tribunal assumed that the principal difference between the experts concerned the connection between the sands of the Reservoir. By Question 9, the Tribunal invited the Parties to state whether this assumption was correct and, by Question 10, it invited the Parties to indicate the remaining factors that explain the difference in the quantification of OGIP.

1806 The Claimant responded that the difference about the question whether the sands were one reservoir or were separate accumulations of gas, “resolves a significant measure of the difference between the Parties about OGIP and EUR”. Referring to the Ryder Scott's low estimate of 45.811 Bcf, which presented estimates for three separate layers (Sands 1A, 1B and 2), the


987 Ryder Scott IV, Table 3 at page 7 and Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 59; also reproduced in B-PHB 2, Annex I, comments on note 20. ↩
988 B-PHB 2, paragraphs 58 – 69 and Annex I. ↩

[Page 503]

Claimant concluded that the “difference in OGIP estimates is reduced to ~20 Bcf".989

1807 Concerning “the remaining factors which explain any material difference” between the Parties' experts, which the Tribunal had invited the Parties to address in Question 10, the Claimant referred to the formula for OGIP that Gaffney Cline had presented

Gas initially in place (GIIP) = K * Area * Net Pay * Ø * Sg / Bg

where K is a units conversion constant. With Area in acres and Net Pay in feet, K is equal to 43.56 x 10-6 to give GIIP in Bcf.990

1808 The Claimant identified “key factors to be considered” by the Tribunal as

  1. (i) reservoir mapping,
  2. (ii) GWC and net pay height in each Sand (along with the related areal extent of the productive portion of the Sand unit),
  3. (iii) water resistivity factor which drives the assessment of water saturation in the Sands and, therefore, the portion of the Sand unit that is expected to contribute to the flow of hydrocarbons (the net pay height); and
  4. (iv) initial pressure.991

1809 In response to Question 10 BAPEX stated:

The biggest difference between the OGIPs indicated by Ryder Scott and GCA is the level of the gas-water contact (“GWC”).992

1810 In its comments on the Claimant's reply to Question 10, BAPEX addresses several other factors, in particular Water Saturation, GWC and Reservoir Pressure.993

1811 In a footnote BAPEX listed


989 C-PHB 1, paragraph 52. ↩
990 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 33, using Ø for porosity and Sg/Bg for formation volume factor, converting volumes in the reservoir to volumes at standard conditions at the surface. ↩
991 C-PHB 1, paragraph 56. ↩
992 B-PHB 1, paragraph 58. ↩
993 B-PHB 2, paragraphs 27 - 52. ↩

[Page 504]

The factors influence the calculation of estimated OGIP are estimates for the following parameters:

As indicated above, EUR will be OGIP multiplied by recovery factor.994

1812 The Tribunal concludes that there is a large degree of common understanding with respect to the critical factors for the OGIP estimation. It will commence the examination by considering the productive area, which is one of the factors of reservoir mapping and with respect to which there is a large degree of consensus between the experts.

7.7.4 Reservoir mapping – the productive area

1813 Concerning reservoir mapping, the Claimant explained:

It is important to understand what is, and is not, driving this significant difference. Notably, the experts' respective interpretations of the available data, including the 3D seismic, regarding the structure of the upper Sands is very similar and produces no material variation in their respective estimates of GIIP for Sands 1 and 2.995

1814 The Parties base their opinion on the productive area on the 3D survey of June 2004, referred to above.


994 B-PHB 1, FN at page 36. ↩
995 CMD, paragraph 246. ↩

[Page 505]

1815 Gaffney Cline produced the following image of the top of Sand 1, as it was presented by Gaffney Cline and Ryder Scott:996

Figure 1: Comparison of Top Structure Map for Sand 1

[Image of two topographical maps side-by-side]

Notes:

  1. Ryder Scott's map was digitized from their Appendix D16.
  2. Just for the purpose of comparison, the same most likely GWC (from GaffneyCline's analysis) at 593 mss is shown in blue on both maps. The areas are about the same.
  3. Ryder Scott's interpreted GWC of 686 mss is shown on their map in red, illustrating the much larger area (5.7 km²) that they consider gas-bearing.

1816 Concerning the size of the area on top of Sand 1, Gaffney Cline stated that their estimate was very close to that of Ryder Scott:

Gaffney Cline's estimate of the productive area of 2.017 km2 is based on the top Sand 1 structure map and the most likely GWC at 593 mss. Using the Ryder Scott map and the same GWC depth would give an area of 2.1 km2, so the only substantive reason for the large difference in estimated gas in place is that of the GWC depth rather than mapping.

996 Gaffney Cline II, page 9. ↩

[Page 506]

1817 BAPEX objected in its Reply Post Hearing Brief that the Figure 1 “is not a completely accurate depiction of the Ryder Scott structural interpretation” BAPEX identified the location of the Ryder Scott's depiction of the “Top Sand 1/2 Structure”, where it is presented as follows:997

[Image of a topographical map]

RYDER SCOTT COMPANY
PETROLEUM CONSULTANTS
CHATTAK WEST FIELD
Onshore, Bangladesh
Top of Sand 1/2
Structure
Depth Conversion with Function
Contour Interval
10 meters
Scale: 1:25,000 Date: 12-2015 Figure: D-1

[Page 507]

1818 BAPEX explains that the process used by Gaffney Cline to digitalise the Ryser Scott map "creates some degree of distortion”. It accepts that the “distortions do not greatly impact the estimated productive areas” but it would have a significant impact in particular on the average depth of the reservoir:

The distortions do not greatly impact the estimated productive areas that would be associated various estimates of the GWC, but would have a significant impact on other calculations that are made from the structure map. Most notable would be the calculation of the average depth of the reservoir.998

1819 At the Hearing, Mr Nowicki, presented with the two maps in Gaffney Cline's presentation, confirmed that “they appear to come up with the same numbers using both maps”. He stated that in the best-case scenario Ryder Scott estimated that the extent of the single reservoir was approximately 5.7 km2; in the low case scenario, assuming compartmentalisation, Sand 1 has an area of some 1.3 km², Sand 1.1 an area of 1.4 or 1.5 km² and Sand 2 an areal extent of 2.149 km2.999

1820 Concerning the area of Sand 1.1 (or 1B), it was established at the Hearing by reference to the Ryder Scott working papers1000 that the upper and lower levels of separation of Sand 1.1 (or 1B) were the same as those of Gaffney Cline; the difference was that Gaffney Cline considered Sand 1.1 as water bearing whereas Ryder Scott assumed that it contained some producible gas.

1821 The Tribunal notes that as stated by the Claimant the experts' respective interpretation of the 3D seismic overlying the Chattak West Field are very similar and do not result in any material differences between their OGIP estimates.1001 The Tribunal concludes that the size of the productive area at the top of Sand 1 can be assumed to be in the range of 2 km² as calculated by Gaffney Cline. Other values were shown in low and high estimates, e.g. in Gaffney Cline's table 71002 or in the support for Ryder Scott's low estimate.1003 Ryder Scott also indicated in their best case scenario an areal extent of the single reservoir at approximately 5.7 km2.1004 Different


997 Ryder Scott I, Appendix D. ↩
998 B-PHB 2, paragraph 29. ↩
999 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 176 – 177, with reference to Exhibits CH-5, CH-6 and CH-8. ↩
1000 Exhibits CH-4 to CH-8 and HT 2021 Day 3 pages 29 – 39. ↩
1001 C-PHB 1, paragraph 57 with reference to Gaffney Cline II, paragraphs 34 – 35, Figure 1; HT 2021 Day 2, page 101, Exhibit CH-1, slide 31 and HT 2021 Day 3, page 43. ↩
1002 Gaffney Cline I, page 32. ↩
1003 See C-PHB 1, note 26 to Table 2, page 42, with further references. ↩
1004 HT 2021 Day 6, page 175. ↩

[Page 508]

values were also given for the productive areas of the two other sands in the Reservoir.1005

7.7.5 Compartmentalisation: three gas bearing sands or one?

1822 The issue of Compartmentalisation concerns the geological structure and the question whether and in what manner the Reservoir is subdivided into separate sands. Prior to the Arbitration the Reservoir was understood to consist of two sands, Sand 1 and Sand 2.

1823 It is now accepted that Chattak 1 and Chattak 2 are separated by an interval that was described by Gaffney Cline as Sand 1.11006 and by Ryder Scott as 1B.1007 The existence of the three sands is undisputed; the difference between the experts concerns the question whether these sands are pressure connected or not and whether there is a single or separate GWCs.


1005 For Ryder Scott's estimate of the areal extent and the Net Pay height as it is assumed for the high estimate in the table at page 6 of Ryder Scott I, see HT 2021 Day 6, pages 177 – 179. ↩
1006 Gaffney Cline I, pages 14 – 16. ↩
1007 Ryder Scott I, Table at paragraph 11, page 6. ↩

[Page 509]

1824 The three sands appear in a Petrophysical Analysis of Chattak 11008 which was reproduced in the BAPEX-Niko MFE of February 2000.1009 It shows Sands 1 and 2 as gas bearing (the “Net Pay” being shown in green in the second column from the right); between these two sands is an interval, later described as Sand 1.1 or 1B, with some gas but predominantly water which is not marked as having Net Pay. This identification was confirmed the Ryder Scott in cross-examination:1010

[Image of a map and a well log chart]

Figure: 13


1008 This is the title given to the reproduction of the document in the Chattak 2 Well Proposal. ↩
1009 Exhibit R-41, page B-32. ↩
1010 HT 2021 Day 6, pages 165 – 169. ↩

[Page 510]

1825 This log is also reproduced in Niko's well proposals for Chattak 21011 and Chattak 4,1012 with the difference that the upper and the lower intervals showing Net Pay are identified as Sand 1 and Sand 2, respectively.

1826 The proposals for Chattak 3 and Chattak 4 also contain another table (2.2 Geological Depth Prognosis) showing two “targets” (Sand 1 target and Sand 2 target, each 25m thick), presumably expected to be gas bearing; these two target sands are separated by an interval described as “Shaly sand”, 10m thick. Contrary to Sand 1 and Sand 2, this “Shaly Sand” is not identified as "target".1013

1827 The Fekete Report presents the two sands in the following drawing:

[Image of a geological cross-section diagram]

Figure 9: Structural Interpretation


1011 Exhibit C-15. ↩
1012 Exhibits C-15 (Chattak 2) and R-64 (Chattak 4, page 12). ↩
1013 Exhibits C-265 (Chattak 3, page 11) and R-64 (Chattak 4, page 9). ↩

[Page 511]

1828 Gaffney Cline presented the Reservoir in a form similar to that adopted by Fekete; but in the range between Sand 1 and Sand 2, which Fekete had described as Claystone, Gaffney Cline identified another Sand, as it had been shown in the well proposals 3 and 4 as “Sandy shale”. It described this shale as Sand 1.1 and, in the most likely and the high case scenarios, assumed that it was gas-bearing. It did not present any estimate of the gas volume for each of these three Sands. Instead, it adopted three scenarios with different GWCs and reached OGIP values between 14.4 Bcf and 39.3 Bcf, with a “most likely volume of 25.6 Bcf”.1014 They presented the most likely scenario as follows:

Scenario 3: “Most Likely” Case – Sand 1 Gas-Water Contact at 584 mss

[Image of a geological cross-section diagram]

1829 Ryder Scott responded in their first report, noting the “interval” described by Gaffney Cline as Sand 1.1. They wrote:

The GCA report appears to recognise that the interval identified as a “Claystone” in the Fekete Report is in fact a permeable sandstone as this appears to be the unit described as Sand 1.1. [...] However, GCA interprets the Sand 1.1 as having gas saturation only down to a depth of 581 meters TVD which is essentially the top of Sand 1.1 in the Chattak-1.

1830 The explanations continue by identifying what Ryder Scott consider the correct values for the water saturation for the 1.1 interval and conclude:


1014 Gaffney Cline I, paragraph 26. ↩

[Page 512]

The misinterpretation of this interval by GCA results in an underestimation of net pay and an interpretation of vertical reservoir compartmentalisation that is not supported by the data.1015

1831 Ryder Scott refer to the shale breaks at 588m and 616m. They consider compartmentalisation for one of their estimates but treat it as of low probability and opine that a single reservoir is the appropriate interpretation:

While we believe it would be reasonable to consider the possibility that these shale breaks would vertically compartmentalise Sand 1/2 for a 1C (Low Estimate) case, shale breaks of this magnitude are not likely to extend significant distances laterally. Therefore, the probability that these minor shale breaks would in fact result in any vertical compartmentalisation at the reservoir level is low. For this reason we believe that the appropriate interpretation of Sand 1/2 for a 2C (Best Estimate) case is that it contains a continuous gas column from the top of Sand 1/2 at 565 meters MD (564 meters TVDSS) to the most likely GWC at 697 meters MD (686meters TVDSS) as shown in Exhibit 6.1016

1832 In discussing this conclusion and confronting it with those of the Fekete report and Gaffney Cline I, Ryder Scott rely primarily on information from the Chattak 1 drilling log and considerations concerning GWC, water saturation (Sw) and resistivity, pay height and reservoir pressure. While their best estimate assumes that Sands 1, 1.1 and 2 are pressure connected, have a single GWC and form a single reservoir, Ryder Scott's low estimate is based on “vertical compartmentalisation” and presents three separate sands, all gas bearing and unconnected, with the following OGIP: 4.778 for Sand 1 (referred to as 1A), 6.306 Bcf for Sand 1.1 (1B) and 34.727 Bcf for Sand 2.1017

1833 As they consider their best estimate of Sand 1 and Sand 2 (including the interval described by Gaffney Cline as Sand 1.1) as a “single reservoir with a single GWC",1018 Ryder Scott refer to the sands in the Reservoir as “Sand 1/2”.

1834 In their second report, Gaffney Cline explained that they calculated OGIP (or GIIP) “deterministically for Sands 1, 1.1 and 2 on the basis of the geological, petrophysical and fluid properties” shown in a table with their assumptions for Area, gross rock volume (GRV), Net/Gross Pay, porosity and water saturation and a gas formation volume factor. The new estimates increased the volumes for the low estimate from 14.4 Bcf to 14.9 Bcf, for the high


1015 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 54. ↩
1016 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 55; Exhibit 6 to this report shows well log data of Chattak 1, in which "Minor Shale Breaks" are marked. ↩
1017 Table at paragraph 11 at page 6; reproduced above. ↩
1018 Ryder Scott, paragraph 56 et passim. ↩

[Page 513]

estimate from 39.3 Bcf to 44.1 Bcf and for the best estimate from 25.6 Bcf to 25.7 Bcf. They showed the OGIP estimates for the three Sands in the table produced above and explained the difference for the best estimate by stating that the “small difference results from the updated GWC for Sand 1 and minor revisions to the mapping”.1019

1835 Gaffney Cline compared their new results with those of Ryder Scott and explained that the “significant difference” was “primarily due to differences in GWCs for the different sands”. They presented the three Sands in Figure 9, showing gas in red and water in blue:

Figure 9: West-East Cross Section Using GaffneyCline's Gas-Water Contacts

[Image of a geological cross-section diagram]

Note: Each reservoir sand has its own GWC. GaffneyCline interprets Sand 1.1 as water-bearing and, in the best and high estimate cases, has assumed that there is gas above the top of the sand higher in the structure, as shown in the figure above.


1019 Gaffney Cline II, note at Table 8 at page 33. ↩

[Page 514]

1836 Below this figure representing the compartmentalisation as it understood it, Gaffney Cline presented Figure 10 showing its understanding of the Ryder Scott position:

Figure 10: West-East Cross Section Using Ryder Scott's Single Gas-Water Contact

[Image of a geological cross-section diagram]

Note: Ryder Scott assumes that all sands (1, 1.1 and 2) are in pressure communication with a common GWC.

[Page 515]

1837 Concerning the “shale breaks” between the three sands, of which Ryder Scott considered that their lateral extension would not likely extend over “significant distances”, Gaffney Cline reproduced the lithography logs for Chattak 1, Chattak 2C and Chattak 2B to show that the shale breaks at the Sand 1. They concluded that Ryder Scott's assumption was "questionable”.1020 They juxtaposed logs from the three wells to illustrate the continuity of the shale separation between Sand 1 and Sand 2:1021

Figure 5: Shale (Clay) Streak below Sand 1 Penetrated by Existing Wells

[Image of multiple well logs and a map juxtaposed]

1838 Ryder Scott contested this demonstration. They referred to the lithology of Chattak 2B and stated that the material at the level of the shale breaks below Sand 1 was not pure silt but “a combination of shale, silt and sandstone”; that material would be more permeable and would not ensure separation: "Such a lithology is not likely to provide the total seal that would be needed for the vertical compartmentalisation interpreted by GCA”.1022

1839 The Tribunal notes that it is undisputed that, at the location of Chattak 1, shale breaks separate the three sands. Traces of these shale breaks can be seen at the location of Chattak 2C (for the separation between Sand 1 and Sand 1.1) and Chattak 2B. Gaffney Cline rely on these traces and argue that,


1020 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 48. ↩
1021 Gaffney Cline II, Figure 5 at page 19. ↩
1022 HT 2021 Day 2, pages 17 – 19, Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slides 45, 46 and 47. ↩

[Page 516]

in the absence of any other information, “Ryder Scrott's assumption that these shale breaks do not extend over significant distance, the basis for their interpretation of a single gas column for Sands 1, 1.1 and 2, is questionable”.1023

1840 There is, however, no direct evidence to show, in the words of Ryder Scott, that these shale breaks “extend across the entire productive area of the reservoir”.1024 The Parties and their experts therefore rely on other information to determine whether these three Sands are separate or pressure connected with a single GWC.

1841 BAPEX identifies as the “biggest difference between the OGIPs indicated by Ryder Scott and GCA is the level of the gas water contact (“GCW").”1025 BAPEX and its experts also consider other factors and among Gaffney Cline's “interpretative errors" they identify the “incorrect interpretation of Sand 1.1 as water productive due to faulty log analysis resulting from the incorrect determination of formation water resistivity (Rw)."1026

1842 The true difference between the Parties and their experts, thus, is not whether there are three compartments but whether the three compartments are pressure connected and whether there is one GWC or several. This difference is addressed in the next section.

7.7.6 Net Pay and GWC

1843 BAPEX emphasises that “a productive area is a function of surface area and GWC depth, not just surface area”.1027 The Claimant explains “The estimated GWC and Net Pay height also drive the areal extent of the specific Sand unit, and thus are the dominant drivers of their respective separate accumulation OGIP estimates”.1028 And it points out that the “biggest difference between the OGIP's indicated by Ryder Scott and GCA is the level of the gas water contact (“GWC”)”.1029

1844 Concerning Net Pay, Gaffney Cline estimated it for Sands 1 and 2 at 35m (15m for Sand 1 and 20m for Sand 2).1030 Ryder Scott assumed a Net Pay of


1023 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 48. ↩
1024 HT 2021 Day 2, pages 19-21, Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 48. ↩
1025 B-PHB 1, paragraph 58. ↩
1026 B-PHB 1, paragraph 60. ↩
1027 B-PHB 2, paragraph 34. ↩
1028 C-PHB 1, paragraph 58. ↩
1029 B-PHB 1, paragraph 58. ↩
1030 Gaffney Cline II, Table 5 at page 26. ↩

[Page 517]

55m and for the low estimate some 45m.1031 In the compartmentalised low estimate, the Net Pay was for Sand 1 some 15m and for Sand 1.1 some 12.5m.1032

1845 Prior to the Arbitration, BAPEX and Niko had estimated in the MFE the Net Pay at 34m (between 26m low and 40m high).1033 In Niko's well proposals 2 and 4 Net Pay was shown at 30m (between 20m low and 50m high).1034

1846 As shown in the previous Section, prior to the Arbitration the Reservoir was identified as consisting of two sands, Sand 1 and Sand 2. In some documents the two sands are treated together with a single value, in others the separation between the two sands is shown with an area between them. The BAPEX/Niko MFE shows the two Sands, each with Net Pay, in between a sand with more water than gas and no Net Pay. This is also reflected in Niko's Well Proposals that show Sand 1 and Sand 2 as target, separated by shales of 7 and 8 meters and 10m of Shaly Sand, not identified as target. The Fekete Report shows Sand 1 and Sand 2 with separate GWCs. It provides a Net Pay estimate of 17.4m for Sand 1. No Net Pay estimate is presented for Sand 2; if one took the relation of the OGIP estimates for the two sands in the Fekete report, the Net Pay would be in the order of some 27.75m and a total of 40.75.1035 Ryder Scott criticise Fekete's determination of the GWC, arguing that the data necessary or applying the method for this determination was not available.1036

1847 Concerning compartmentalisation and GWC, Gaffney Cline's first report envisages four scenarios, each of which with separate GWCs for Sand 1, Sand 2 and for the intermediate stratum, described as Sand 1.1.

1848 A similar approach was adopted in the low estimate of Ryder Scott's first report, which shows separate OGIP and EUR estimates for what is described there as Sands 1A, 1B and 1C. Ryder Scott did not indicate the GWC used for these estimates; but BAPEX confirmed that “each subunit in a compartmentalised reservoir would have its own GWC that would determine


1031 HT 2021 Day 6, page 170; Mr Nowicki stated that for the low estimate, Net Pay was "something less than" 55m and added "Maybe like 10 meters less than that, something like that" and accepted that it was somewhere in that range of 45m. No other number has been presented by Ryder Scott or BAPEX. ↩
1032 HT 2021 Day 3, pages 34 - 35. ↩
1033 Exhibit R-41, Figures 14 at page 33. ↩
1034 Exhibit C-15 (Chattak 2 Well Proposal), page 4, and Exhibit R-64 (Chattak 4 Well Proposal), page 17. In the Reserve Estimates of both proposals the Net Pay height is given as 98.4 feet, corresponding to some 30 m. ↩
1035 Exhibit C-70, Table showing Net Pay for Sand 1 at page 20. OGIP estimates of 15.89 Bcf in Sand 1 and 25.34 Bcf in Sand 2 at page 1. ↩
1036 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 61. ↩

[Page 518]

the volume of its gas bearing formation”.1037 At the Hearing it was established that, in that low estimate, the “lowest know gas” for Sand 1, marking the “estimated reservoir limit for that low estimate” was 577mss; for Sand 1.1 it was 605mss.1038 The GWC for this low case was estimated at 669mss.1039

1849 It is in the best and in the high estimate of their OGIP and EUR estimates that Ryder Scott assume a single estimate for the three Sands to which they thereafter refer as “Sand 1/2". They argue:

... there are no wet intervals between the top of Sand 1 and the gas-water-contact (GWC) calculated using a 65% Sw cutoff which is 697 meters, MD (686 meters TVDss).

1850 According to Ryder Scott there is a continuous column of gas from 686mss to 554mss1040:

... we believe that the appropriate interpretation of Sand 1/2 for a 2C (Best Estimate) case is that it contains a continuous gas column from the top of Sand 1/2 at 565 meters MD (554 meters TVDSS) to the most likely GWC at 697 meters MD(686 meters TVDSS) as shown in Exhibit 6.

Ryder Scott's 2C (Best Estimate) interpretation of Sand 1/2 is a single reservoir with a single GWC.1041

1851 Gaffney Cline developed their position in their second report: Based on log analysis and “historical well and geological reports”, they concluded that Sand 1 contained gas down to 577 mss, as seen in Chattak 1. For Sand 2 Gaffney Cline estimate the GWC at 633 mss, between 621 mss and 650 mss.1042

1852 With respect to Sand 1.1, Gaffney Cline stated that log analysis “indicates high water saturation such that commercial production of gas is very unlikely, and the interval will most likely produce water. Gaffney Cline interprets this zone to be a water-bearing interval with water up to (WUT) the top of the sand at 581 mss in Chattak 1”. They find support for this conclusion in the Dart Report which did not include Sand 1.1 in the gas in place calculation, "suggesting that it was not considered pay quality”. They explain that


1037 B-PHB 1, paragraph 58; the Claimant has "no doubt that Ryder Scott used, and would use if undertaking a proper and independent analysis, distinct GWC for each Sand in a true compartmentalised reservoir scenario” (C-PHB 2, paragraph 21). ↩
1038 HT 2021 Day 3, pages 33 and 35. ↩
1039 HT 2021 Day 3, page 38, referring to Exhibit CH-7. ↩
1040 BAPEX also asserts the top of Sand 1 at ~525mss (B-PHB 2, paragraph 49). ↩
1041 Gaffney Cline I, paragraphs 55 and 56. ↩
1042 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 47(iv). ↩

[Page 519]

Chattak 2 encountered Sand 1.1 in a structurally higher position than did Chattak 1 so it is possible that Sand 1.1 although water-bearing in Chattak 1, could contain a small volume of gas at the crest of the structure.

1853 Gaffney Cline continued by references to Chattak 2A and 2B reflecting changing height of Sand 1.1 as a result of the domed shape of the shale separations which is reflected in the depiction of the Sands in the Section 7.7.5. They explain that they “included gas volume in Sand 1.1 above the WUT of 581 mss in Chattak 1 in the best and high-case scenarios”. In their low estimate, Gaffney Cline assume that Sand 1.1 “is entirely water-bearing (i.e. without any gas updip of the top of the sand in Chattak 1).”1043

1854 Gaffney Cline criticised Ryder Scott's reliance on a reservoir pressure higher than that derived from the Chattak 2 mud weight, as discussed above in Section 7.5.2.

1855 Gaffney Cline presented a comparative table showing the depth of the GWC in the three sands:1044

Table 4: Gas-water Contacts for Sands 1 and 2

Reservoir Unit GaffneyCline Contacts (mss) Ryder Scott Contacts (mss)
Low Best High Low Best High
Sand 1 577 593 609
Sand 1.1 (Note 1) 581 581 686 686 686
Sand 2 633 633 633

Notes

  1. In the low case, Sand 1.1 was assumed to be entirely water-bearing.
  2. There is no variation in GaffneyCline's contact for Sand 2 because the contact is seen in the Chattak-1 wellbore.
  3. Ryder Scott assumes that Sands 1, 1.1 and 2 are in communication with a common contact at 686 mss. They mention low and high cases, but no details were provided.

1856 Fekete calculated the GWC for Sand 1 between ~586.5 mss (highest) and ~593.1 mss (lowest). The calculation was based on a reservoir pressure of 868 psia at the top of Sand 1, derived from the 9.1 ppg mud weight from the Chattak 2 drilling logs.1045 For Sands 2, Fekete calculated the GWC at ~639.3 mss as most likely and ~663.6 mss as the lowest.1046


1043 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 47(ii) and (iii) and FNs 34 and 37. ↩
1044 Gaffney Cline II, Table 1 at page 6. ↩
1045 Exhibit C-70, page 17. ↩
1046 Exhibit C-70, page 18. ↩

[Page 520]

1857 Ryder Scott accepted that the Fekete estimates used a technique that “results in a reliable estimate of the GWC in many instances, if the data required to perform the analysis is available and properly analysed”. They criticised the calculation, arguing that the most significant parameter in the analysis was “demonstratively incorrect”; the key assumption being the reservoir pressure derived from the mud weight in Chattak 2.1047

1858 The Tribunal considered the critical assumptions, driving the different OGIP estimates of the Parties and their experts. It noted a large degree of consensus about the critical factors.

1859 In response to the Tribunal's Question 10, BAPEX had identified compartmentalisation, pressures in the Reservoir, formation water resistivity and determination of Rw as critical factors driving the biggest difference between Ryder Scott's OGIP estimate based on a pressure connected single sand and the compartmentalisation on which Gaffney Cline's OGIP estimate, but also the Fekete report and Ryder Scott's low estimate were based.1048

1860 Similarly, Ryder Scott had identified as driving considerations, as quoted above, that (i) “there are no wet intervals” between the top and the bottom of this column of gas, which relates critically to the question whether Sand 1.1 is water or gas bearing; and (ii) they doubt that the shale breaks separating the Sands extend wide enough to compartmentalise the sands. Ryder Scott also emphasised the initial reservoir pressure as one of the by far most significant factors driving the difference between the gas loss estimates of Ryder Scott and those of GCA.

1861 The Claimant accepted that the separate GWCs for Sand 1 and Sand 1.1 are not known but are capable of being estimated with other data. The most critical data for estimating the maximum depth of the GWC for Sand 1 is the maximum formation pressure at the top of Sand 1”.1049It also stated that the assessment of the GWC in each unit is “driven, in part, by the experts' respective assessment of water saturation (Sw)”. The different conclusions of the experts as to “what portions of the Sand units will likely produce gas”, i.e. the question whether an interval is wet or can produce gas, are largely a function of their water resistivity analysis”.1050

1862 The Tribunal has accepted already the argument concerning the extent of the shale break (Section 7.7.5); the evidence does not allow a final determination whether the shale breaks extend over the entire area and isolate the sands. It


1047 Ryder Scott I, paragraphs 61 and 62. ↩
1048 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 58 – 60. ↩
1049 C-PHB 2, paragraph 21. ↩
1050 C-PHB1, paragraph 55. ↩

[Page 521]

also has determined that the initial reservoir pressure at the top of Sand 1 was below the pressure of 887 psia as exercised by the 9.1ppg mud weight and not 954 psia, as argued by BAPEX; this leads to the dismissal of BAPEX's argument based on the reservoir pressure. The critical questions that remain relate to water saturation and resistivity.

7.7.7 Water or gas saturation (Sw and Sg), resistivity and the GWC

1863 The Tribunal understands that the critical issue for determining whether there is a single sand, pressure connected and with one GWC or separate sands lies in understanding the situation below Sand 1, which is essentially in Sand 1.1. Ryder Scott considers Sand 1.1 gas bearing, which means that the shale above Sand 2 does not isolate this sand and Sands 1 and 2 are in pressure connection, forming a single reservoir. For Gaffney Cline there is below Sand 1 a layer of water with a GWC different from that of Sand 2; above Sand 2 there are one or two further layers of gas.

1864 In this situation the critical question is whether Sand 1.1 is gas bearing or water bearing:

1865 Gaffney Cline say that at the location of Chattak 1 it is water bearing, at the location of Chattak 2, where the dome shaped shale is slightly higher, there is some gas. Mr Oletu of Gaffney Cline pointed to the shape of the structure and

...the structure is higher at the point where Chattak 2 penetrated the reservoir. And at that point you will have hydrocarbon.

But now if you move away from that up-dip, and what we say “down- dip”, or you move down in the structure, you will find water.

[...]

So at the point where Chattak 2 drilled, you will find evidence of gas in 1.1. At the point where Chattak 1 drilled there's evidence that that what you would produce in Chattak 1 would be water at Sand 1.1. Which means that the [water] contact is somewhere between where Chattak 1 drilled into Sand 1.1 and where Chattak 2 drilled into Sand 1.1.1051

1866 Ryder Scott say Sand 1.1 is gas bearing and connected with the gas in Sand 2. Mr Nowicki responded to Mr Oletu's explanations:


1051 HT 2021 Day 3, page 135. ↩

[Page 522]

We do have a different interpretation. We interpret both wells to be gas- productive in the unit that Gaffney Cline identifies as 1.1.1052

1867 The Parties and their experts have addressed this difference of opinion by reference to two sources of information.

1868 The first reference is the Petrophysical Analysis of the Chattak 1 well, as it was presented in the MFE;1053 it was copied above at the start of Section 7.7.5. The representation shows for each layer whether gas or water was encountered, or both. For Sands 1 and Sands 2, the document shows predominantly gas and Net Pay. For what later was called Sand 1.1 or Sand 1B, one can see some gas but more water; no Net Pay is shown.

1869 The interpretation was discussed during the cross-examination of Mr Nowicki. He was asked whether he considered this segment as wet. He responded that Ryder Scott was “not treating it as wet”. Eventually he accepted, however, that it was “probably not likely to produce volumes [of gas] that are economic”; and one “wouldn't even attempt [producing gas]. You would complete it up in the higher part of the sand”.1054 And Mr Nowicki accepted that in the MFE, “BAPEX and Niko at the time, interpreted no productive capacity of the Sand 1.1 or Sand 1B sand”.1055

1870 In the view of the Tribunal this means that, considering the petrophysical analysis, Sand 1.1 was “wet”, i.e. water bearing at the location of Chattak 1.

1871 The second reference relied on the resistivity logs and the hydrocarbon saturation (Sg) and water saturation (Sw). Ryder Scott explained that in a hydrocarbon (gas) reservoir there is in the space between the sand grains a combination of water and gas. The gas or water saturation is expressed in a percentage.1056


1052 HT 2021 Day 3, pages 135 – 136. ↩
1053 Exhibit R-41, page 33, Figure 13. ↩
1054 HT 2021 Day 3, pages 39 – 40. ↩
1055 HT 2021 Day 6, page 168. ↩
1056 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 14. ↩

[Page 523]

1872 At the Hearing, Ryder Scott explained hydrocarbon and water saturation by the following presentation:1057

The pore spaces between sand grains in an oil or gas (hydrocarbons) reservoir always contain some combination of hydrocarbons and formation water.

  • The percentage of the pore spaces
    occupied by gas is called the gas
    saturation (Sg)
  • The percentage of the pore spaces
    occupied by water is called the
    water saturation (Sw)
  • Sg + Sw must equal 100%.
  • Sg + Sw can't exceed 100%

Grain

Water

Oil or Gas

1873 The Tribunal concludes that it has to be expected that the gas bearing Sands in the Reservoir also contained some water. The question therefore is what is the level of water saturation at which the formation can be treated as gas bearing?

1874 Ryder Scott explain that the level of water saturation that is considered necessary for allowing economic production of hydrocarbons is expressed as the Sw cutoff: this value “which represents the maximum Sw value that would allow for the economic production of hydrocarbons, is between 60% and 70% in most settings”. When the water saturation exceeds the Sw cutoff, the production of the remaining gas is not considered sufficient for economic production. Ryder Scott used 60% for their low estimate, 65% for their best estimate and 70% for their high estimate.1058

1875 Ryder Scott also explained that formation water is saline and therefore has high conductivity to electric current, while oil and gas have low conductivity and high resistivity. The “resistivity at 100% water saturation is designated 'Ro'".1059

1876 Gaffney Cline emphasised that the “resistivity of a 100% water-bearing interval and the resistivity of formation water are critical input parameters in estimating the water saturation and thereby the hydrocarbon saturation of an


1057 Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 39; HT 2021 Day 2, page 9. ↩
1058 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 14 ant page 7. ↩
1059 HT 2021 Day 2, page 10. ↩

[Page 524]

interval”. In the present case, resistivity of the formation water was interpreted from resistivity logs in Chattak 1.1060 Gaffney Cline point out that

It is generally accepted in the industry that water salinity increases with depth. Thus, as noted above, the resistivity of a water-bearing interval will decrease with depth.1061

1877 Both Parties insisted on the importance of the correct identification of the resistivity: The Claimant explained that the difference between the experts about what portions of the Sand units will likely produce gas is “largely a function of their water resistivity analyses and conclusions”;1062 and “this factor is a major driver of differences in the experts' GWC estimates and the resulting Net Pay thickness and productive areal extents of the reservoirs, and thus their separate reservoir OGIP estimates”.1063 The Claimant contested the assumption of Ryder Scott and stated that their “purported grievances with GCA's resistivity curve arise from Ryder Scott's own use of inapplicable and unrepresentative data”.1064

1878 BAPEX identified as one of the reasons why Gaffney Cline's best OGIP estimate was “dramatically lower” than that of Ryder Scott the “incorrect interpretation of Sand 1.1 as water productive due to faulty log analysis resulting from the incorrect determination of formation water resistivity (Rw)”.1065 Mr Nowicki of Ryder Scott pointed out that the difference of the Parties on this issue was driving the interpretation of Sand 1.1 (or interval B) as water producing; the impact on the estimated volume of gas in the Reservoir, in the words of Mr Nowicki was “very significant”.1066

1879 The experts of both sides calculated water saturation of the different layers in the Reservoir.

1880 Ryder Scott calculated resistivity at 6 Ohm.m and presented in Exhibit 6 of the first Report the water saturation of the Repertoire, as recorded in the Chattak 1 logs. Ryder Scott noted: “Sw values which are likely to produce high water cuts are not seen until below the most likely GWC at 697 MD.”1067


1060 Gaffney Cline II, Appendix V, page 72. ↩
1061 Gaffney Cline II, Appendix V, pages 72, 73 and 75. ↩
1062 C-PHB 1, paragraph 55. ↩
1063 C-PHB 1, paragraph 64. ↩
1064 C-PHB 1, paragraph 69, FN 129. ↩
1065 B-PHB 1, paragraph 60. ↩
1066 HT 2021 Day 2, pages 14 – 16. ↩
1067 Ryder Scott I, Exhibit 6 at page 27. ↩

[Page 525]

1881 Gaffney Cline pointed out that Ryder Scott's calculation relied on data from a reservoir different from Sands 1 and 2:

Ryder Scott applied formation water resistivity from a separate deeper sand which is likely to be of different salinity which would therefore yield different results and conclusions as to the hydrocarbon content of the formation.1068

1882 In their own calculation, Gaffney Cline reached resistivity at 12.6 Ohm.m and explained their method of calculation in Appendix V of their second report. They concluded that it was “not possible that Sands 1 and 2 were originally in pressure communication. Well Chattak-1 found a gas-water contact in Sand 2 at a depth of 633mss”.1069


1068 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 21(ii). ↩
1069 Gaffney Cline II, Appendix V and paragraph 53. ↩

[Page 526]

1883 Gaffney Cline also produced in their second report a comparative representation of these calculation. In Figure 3, on which the representation below is based, they showed in column 7 the water saturation at different levels of the Reservoir, representing the estimate of Gaffney Cline in blue and that of Ryder Scott in red; the Sw cut-off was set at Sw <65% and represented by a blue dotted line through column 7.1070 Ryder Scott did not consider that its water saturation estimate was correctly represented and produced the comparative figure in the following shape, in which “additional annotations and symbols [were] added by Ryder Scott in brown color”:1071

Figure 3: GaffneyCline's vs Ryder Scott's Log Interpretation Chattak-1 (Sands 1, 1.1 & 2)

[Image of a geological log interpretation chart with annotations]

A Most likely to produce gas on the basis of both GaffneyCline and Ryder Scott analyses with average Sw < 65%

B Likely to produce water as per GaffneyCline analysis (Ave Sw>65%) while Ryder Scott considers interval to produce gas (Sw <65%)

C Most likely to produce gas as per both GaffneyCline and Ryder Scott analyses with average Sw < 65%

Resistivity curves

D GaffneyCline considers interval to have residual gas but will likely produce water (average Sw>65% and is below water contact) while Ryder Scott considers interval likely to produce gas (Sw <65%)

E Inaccurate representation of Ryder Scott Sw curve Interval water bearing by GaffneyCline's interpretation while Ryder Scott considers interval be gas bearing with Sw ≤65%)

F GCA Sw curve clipped @ 100% Interval water bearing by both GaffneyCline's and Ryder Scott's interpretation

Legend
Track 1: Depth m MD
Track 2: Depth m TVDSS
Track 3: Formation Units
Track 4: SP (green)
G Track 5: Resistivity Curves: SN (pink), LN (blue), Lateral (Red)
Blue dot line - Ro of 12.6 ohm.m used by GaffneyCline
Red dotted line - Ro of 6 ohm.m used by Ryder Scott
Track 6: Microlog inverse (red), Microlog normal (blue)
Track 7: Water Saturation
Sw estimated by GaffneyCline (blue)
Sw estimated by Ryder Scott (red)
Sw cut off line of 0.65 (blue dash line)

1884 This figure was presented by Ryder Scott at the Hearing. Ryder Scott did not discuss the manner in which the Ro factor was calculated by Gaffney Cline and by Ryder Scott. In particular, they did not point to any errors in the calculation of the Ro factor by Gaffney Cline and they did not explain why the


1070 Gaffney Cline Figure 3 at page 14. ↩
1071 Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 41, presented at HT 2021 Day 2, pages 11 – 12. ↩

[Page 527]

estimate of 6 Ohm.m was preferable over that of 12.6 Ohm.m. They explained, however, that the Ro value of 12.6 Ohm.m caused Gaffney Cline to make two mistakes: “they incorrectly interpret interval B [Sand 1.1] as water-producing and they also calculate a gas-water contact for Sand 2 that is too shallow”. Ryder Scott also stated: “In order for the GCA Ro value of 12.6 Ohm.M to be correct, the formation water salinity would have to increase from 4800 ppm to 9500 ppm over an interval of only 17 meters TVD. Such a dramatic salinity increase is, at a minimum, highly unlikely.”1072

1885 The two curves were also discussed during the cross-examination of Mr Nowicki. Mr Nowicki confirmed that the difference between the Ro factors used by the experts has “a direct correlation with your estimated water saturation, or Sw”. He disagreed that in Figure 3 the red curve was an accurate representation of the Ryder Scott Sw curve. He could point to a “major misrepresentation” in the lower segment F; with respect to segments A to E “none of it appeared exactly correct” but he could not identify these differences “without further analysis”. When asked about the comparison of the two curves, Mr Nowicki accepted that, if Ryder Scott had used the 12.6 Ohm.m, the Ryder Scott line in segment B would shift to the left: “They would be much closer if the same Ro was used in the calculation of water saturation".1073

1886 The Tribunal concludes that the principal difference of the experts concerning water saturation was the Ro factor.

1887 Ryder Scott identified “the correct wet zone resistivity (6 ohm.m)”.1074 They explained that the formation where the water was analysed was separated from the location referred to by Gaffney Cline by “an interval of only 17 meters TVD".1075

1888 Gaffney Cline used resistivity at Ro 12.6 Ohm.m. They explained that they estimated this value “from the Long Normal (LN) resistivity log across the water-bearing sandstone interval (700 to 730m MD) in Sand 2 in Chattak 1. This interval is in the water-bearing section of Sand 2 below even the Ryder Scott gas water contact for Sand 2”.1076 They compare their approach to that of Ryder Scott

Ryder Scott picked their Ro value of 6 ohm.m from the water-bearing sand that underlies the Sand 2 formation. This water sand is separated by a


1072 HT 2021 Day 2, page 11 and Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4. ↩
1073 HT 2021 Day 3, pages 44 - 52. ↩
1074 Ryder Scott I, paragraph 58. ↩
1075 HT 2021 Day 2, page 12 and Ryder Scott presentation, Exhibit RH-4, slide 42. ↩
1076 Ryder Scott II, Appendix V, page 76. ↩

[Page 528]

clay unit that is more than 10 m thick from the water-bearing section of Sand 2, as described in the Chattak-1 composite log (Figure A1). Ryder Scott then applied this Ro value in the evaluation of all the objective sands in Chattak-1.

1889 By reference to the logs of Chattak 1, Gaffney Cline explain that

... the resistivity of the water sands below Sand 2 is less than the resistivity of the water at the base of Sand 2. Also, the resistivity of the water sand at the base of Sand 2 is less than the resistivity of water intervals above Sand 1.

[...]

It would not be reasonable to assess that the water resistivity below Sand 2 is representative of the water resistivity within Sand 2.

[...]

The resistivity from another water-bearing sand below the interval of interest is lower based on the resistivity depth trend and this will be unrepresentative.1077

1890 Commenting Ryder Scott's approach, Gaffney Cline state that it is “not appropriate" and give the following reason:

Because the Ro that Ryder Scott uses is taken from a water-bearing formation that is clearly isolated from Sand 2 by a 10m thick clay, it is not appropriate to use that value when information is available from within Sand 2.

1891 This explanation, concluded in Gaffney Cline's second report, dated 20 August 2020, was not challenged by Ryder Scott and BAPEX. Indeed, as just mentioned, Ryder Scott confirmed the interval that separated the water- bearing section below the GWC within Sand 2 from the sand below the Reservoir, specifying that it was 17 meters thick.

1892 The Tribunal notes that it has not been challenged that the Chattak 1 logs provided the information for estimating a Ro factor of formation water from the Reservoir itself. It also has not been shown or even asserted by BAPEX that Gaffney Cline's explanations about their estimate of this Ro factor was erroneous. The Tribunal concludes that it has no reason to doubt that the


1077 Gaffney Cline II, Appendix V, pages 73, 75 and 76. ↩

[Page 529]

Ro factor of 12.6 Ohm.m used by Gaffney Cline is a correct estimate of resistivity in the Reservoir.

1893 The Tribunal also notes that there has been no explanation by Ryder Scott or BAPEX why the resistivity of formation water within the Reservoir should be determined by reference to the resistivity of the water in a lower formation outside the Reservoir. The Tribunal also noted that Ryder Scott considered that the difference in salinity between the two locations was “dramatic”. The Tribunal concludes that the differences resulting from Ryder Scott's unjustified choice of the Ro factor is significant.

1894 Considering column 7 in Figure 3 shown above, the Tribunal notes that, in segment B representing Sand 1.1, the blue line representing the water saturation based on Gaffney Cline's Ro factor is entirely to the left of the line representing the 65% Sw cut off. In other words, in other words, in Chattak 1 the entire Sand 1.1 is water-bearing; the gas in that segment is below the level of commerciality. The Tribunal also notes the testimony of Mr Nowicki: if Ryder Scott had used the 12.6 Ohm.m, the Ryder Scott water saturation line would shift to the left: “They would be much closer if the same Ro was used in the calculation of water saturation".

1895 The Tribunal concludes that the analysis of water saturation and the resistivity of the formation water confirm the petrophysical analysis: at Chattak 1 Sand 1.1 is water-bearing. Consequently, the assertion of Ryder Scott that there are no wet intervals between the top of Sand 1 and the GWC at 686 mss is not confirmed.

1896 The Tribunal notes that in response to the Tribunal's Question 10, BAPEX had identified compartmentalisation, pressures in the Reservoir, formation water resistivity and determination of Rw as critical factors driving the biggest difference between Ryder Scott's OGIP estimate based on a pressure connected single sand and the compartmentalisation on which Gaffney Cline's OGIP estimate, but also the Fekete report and Ryder Scott's low estimate were based. The Tribunal examined the different view of the experts concerning the Reservoir Pressure above in Section 7.5.2. It concluded that Ryder Scott wrongly rejected the determination of the Reservoir pressure by reference to the mud log of Chattak 2, as the First Gas Loss Committee and Gaffney Cline had done. The Tribunal now finds that Ryder Scott's choice of the Ro factor also was not justified and produced an incorrect Rw value for Sand 1.1.

1897 The Tribunal concludes that Ryder Scott's assumption of a single, pressure connected Sand 1/2 is not supported by the evidence on the record. The estimate of OGIP therefore must be based on assuming two separate Sands, Sand 1 and Sand 2, with separate GWCs, and Sand 1.1 (or 1B) that

[Page 530]

is at least partly water saturated but, at a higher location in the dome- shaped Sand, may have some gas which may or may not be commercially producible.

1898 Ryder Scott's estimates 2C and 3C are not based on these assumptions; the Tribunal does not consider them further. The correct assumptions are applied by the following three OGIP estimates: Gaffney Cline's OGIP estimate,1078 the 1C (low estimate) estimate of Ryder Scott1079 and of the Fekete Study.1080 Therefore, all three of these estimates meet criteria which the Tribunal has determined as essential. They consist of the following OGIP estimates, low, best and high in Bcf:

Fekete26.6641.2363.11
Gaffney Cline14.925.744.1
Ryder Scott (separate Sands)45.811

1899 The Claimant noted that the difference between Ryder Scott's estimate based on separate Sands and the best estimate of Gaffney Cline (GCA) was around 20 Bcf and submitted:

the ~20 Bcf difference between the OGIP estimates of GCA and Ryder Scott, assuming separate accumulations, is principally driven by their respective interpretation of the depth of the GWCs in Sands 1.1 and 2 and the resulting net pay heights and areal extents of the separate reservoirs.

1900 The Claimant supported this conclusion by stating that GCA's

... assessment of the GWCs (including their water saturation analysis) and resulting net pay and areal extents is not only more reliable than that of Ryder Scott, but it is also more consistent with all other historical analyses of the petrophysical data, including in particular the joint analysis of Niko and BAPEX reflected in the Marginal Field Evaluation. 1081

1901 Considering the OGIP estimates of Gaffney Cline, the Tribunal notes that in 2006 Niko engaged a specialist consultant to estimate OGIP and the gas loss. Contrary to the estimates which were attached to Niko's Well Proposal, Fekete presented a systematic analysis and recorded the assumptions in its report.


1078 Gaffney Cline II, Table 8 at page 33. ↩
1079 Ryder Scott I, Table at page 6. ↩
1080 Fekete Study, Exhibit C-70, Figure 16 at page 25. ↩
1081 C-PHB 1, paragraph 71. ↩

[Page 531]

These assumptions differ in some respects from those of Gaffney Cline and in other respects from those of Ryder Scott. The difference between the “Most Likely" OGIP value estimated by Fekete and that of Gaffney Cline is somewhat smaller than that between the estimates of Gaffney Cline and Ryder Scott, but nevertheless in a similar order of magnitude. Moreover, the Fekete Most Likely estimate is below Gaffney Cline's high estimate and thus within the range of estimates which Gaffney Cline considered.

1902 In view of these considerations and taking into account that, in the circumstances of this case, all estimates of OGIP are based on data which are subject to uncertainty and possible errors, the Tribunal decides that the Most Likely estimate of Fekete represents a fair solution for the complex, controversial and uncertain exercise of determining the OGIP value for the application of the Material Balance method. The Tribunal therefore decides that the OGIP of the Reservoir was 41.23 Bcf.

7.7.8 The Tribunal's conclusion on the OGIP of the Reservoir

1903 The Claimant noted that the difference between Ryder Scott's estimate based on separate sands and the best estimate of Gaffney Cline was around 20 Bcf and submitted:

the ~20 Bcf difference between the OGIP estimates of GCA and Ryder Scott, assuming separate accumulations, is principally driven by their respective interpretation of the depth of the GWCs in Sands 1.1 and 2 and the resulting net pay heights and areal extents of the separate reservoirs.

1904 The Claimant supported this conclusion by stating that GCA's

assessment of the GWCs (including their water saturation analysis) and resulting net pay and areal extents is not only more reliable than that of Ryder Scott, but it is also more consistent with all other historical analyses of the petrophysical data, including in particular the joint analysis of Niko and BAPEX reflected in the Marginal Field Evaluation. 1082

1905 Considering the OGIP estimates of Gaffney Cline, the Tribunal notes that in 2006 another consultant was retained by Niko to estimate OGIP and lost gas. Contrary to the estimates which were attached to Niko's Well Proposal, Fekete presented a systematic analysis and recorded the assumptions and steps in its report. These assumptions differ in some respects from those of Gaffney


1082 C-PHB 1, paragraph 71. ↩

[Page 532]

Cline and in other respects from those of Ryder Scott. The difference between most likely OGIP value estimated by Fekete and that of Gaffney Cline is somewhat smaller than that between the estimates of Gaffney Cline and Ryder Scott, but nevertheless in a similar order of magnitude. Moreover, the Fekete most likely estimate is below Gaffney Cline's high estimate and thus within the range of estimates which Gaffney Cline considered.

1906 In view of these considerations and taking into account that, in the circumstances of this case, all estimates of OGIP are based on data which are subject to uncertainty possible errors, the Tribunal decides that the most likely estimate of Fekete represents a fair solution for the complex, controversial and uncertain exercise of determining the OGIP value for the application of the Material Balance method. The Tribunal therefore bases its loss calculation on OGIP volume of the Reservoir at 41.23 Bcf.

7.7.9 Calculating the loss based on the OGIP

1907 The Material Balance method determines the gas loss by comparing the OGIP to the volume of gas remaining in the Reservoir at the end date. For this calculation, the experts of both Parties have referred to the loss of pressure in the Reservoir.

1908 Fekete calculated the quantity of gas remaining in September 2005 “by dividing the hydrocarbon pores volume by the current formation volume”.1083 Neither Gaffney Cline nor Ryder Scott have applied this approach and neither of them has commented on it. The Tribunal therefore prefers to apply the method which the experts of both sides have considered and seem to have applied.

1909 Gaffney Cline explained that the Material Balance method

... estimates gas lost by applying the pressure loss in the reservoirs from the assumed starting pressure to that measured in September 2005.

and:

While there are a number of factors that affect the lost gas calculation, the pressure loss assumption is the principal driver.

and:


1083 Exhibit C-70, page 25. ↩

[Page 533]

... the calculation of gas loss is more complicated than merely considering the assumed loss of reservoir pressure, but the pressure calculation is indicative of the order of magnitude of the change in gas volume.1084

1910 Ryder Scott explained that it calculated the gas loss

... using the material balance method based on an initial average reservoir pressure of 957 psia, and the drawn down average reservoir pressure measurement of 746 psia as reflected in the Chattak-2C Testing Program document.1085

1911 Gaffney Cline demonstrated the application of the pressure drop for the calculation of the gas loss: the percentage of pressure drop is applied to the OGIP to determine the gas loss. They showed that the losses estimated by the two expert groups, applying the Material Balance method corresponds closely to this relationship:

... the amount of gas lost is closely proportional to the change in pressure. It is not exact due to the not-quite-linear relationship between pressure and voluте.1086

1912 Adopting this approach, the Tribunal compared the initial Reservoir Pressure which it determined to be 883 psia with the pressure of 748 psia on 4 September 2005,1087 a pressure drop of 135 psia corresponding to 15.30%. Applying this percentage to the OGIP of 41.23 Bcf, as determined by the Tribunal, produces a loss of 6.31 Bcf during the period from 7 January to 4 September 2005.

1913 The loss so calculated by the Tribunal and Ryder Scott is the loss that occurred by 4 September 2005. The loss for which Niko is liable (i) does not include the increase of gas loss that occurred during the initial period of the Chattak 2A blowout (from 24 June to 7 July 2005) but (ii) includes part of the loss after 4 September 2005.

1914 Concerning the loss during the period between the first blowout and 4 September 2005, the Tribunal decided above in Section 7.6.4 that the additional loss that occurred during the initial flare of the Chattak 2A blowout was caused by this blowout for which Niko is not liable. When estimating the gas loss by the Flow Rate method, the Tribunal quantified this additional loss


1084 Gaffney Cline III, paragraph 17(ii), page 4, FN 2 and page 7, FN 16. ↩
1085 Ryder Scott III; paragraph 14; the correction that Ryder Scott made concerned the date of the drawn down value not the method of calculation (see above Section 7.5.2.6). ↩
1086 Gaffney Cline at the Hearing, HT 2021 Day 2, pages 65 to 69; quotation from Exhibit CH-1, slide 7; similar demonstration at Gaffney Cline III, paragraph 32. ↩
1087 See above Sections 7.5.2.5 and 7.5.2.6. ↩

[Page 534]

at 1.421 Bcf. As Niko is not liable for this additional loss, the corresponding quantity must be deducted from the volume of gas quantified by the Material Balance method.

1915 Concerning the loss after 4 September 2005, Ryder Scott proposed using the average daily loss during the period quantified by the Material Balance method (the reference period from 7 January to 4 September 2005) and applying this average to the period thereafter. As Ryder Scott stated this “average daily rate is the most reasonable method to allocate gas loss to specific periods based on the available data”.1088 The Tribunal notes, however, that during the reference period, the gas loss exceeded the “normal” flow at two occasions, the initial flare of the two blowouts; as these occasions were not repeated after 4 September 2005, the Tribunal deducts the exceeding quantities before calculating the daily average. For the Chattak 2A blowout, this exceeding quantity has been determined, as just stated. Concerning the initial flare, the Tribunal notes that the flow during the first 40 days has been agreed at 0.453 Bcf. It deducts this period and the two days of their flow from the quantity of gas estimated for the reference period and calculates the average daily rate as follows:

(6.31 – 1.421 – 0.453) / 239 days = 0.0186 Bcfd or 18.6 MMcfd

1916 During the approximately 9 months until 4 September 2005, the pressure had declined by 15.3%. The Tribunal assumes that during the approximately one month until the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation, the pressure dropped by another 1.7% (corresponding to 0.32 MMcfd) to 18.3 MMcfd. The Tribunal applied this rate to the 35 days from 5 September 2005 to the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation on 9 October 2005, producing 640.5 MMcf or 0.641 Bcf.


1088 Ryder Scott III, paragraph 22. ↩

[Page 535]

1917 For the period after 9 October 2005, the Tribunal assumed that the flow of gas was reduced to 10% of the previous flow and decided that Niko is liable for the loss decreasing to zero over three years.1089 Applying the reduction to 10% the rate of 18.3 MMcfd, the reduced rate post-9 October 2005 is 1.83 MMcfd. As the Tribunal assumed over the three-year period a linear reduction of the flow to zero, the calculation arrived at 1.002 Bcf for the period after 9 October 2005.1090

(i) On this basis, the Tribunal calculated the gas loss according to the Material Balance method in Bcf at For the period from 7 January to 4 September 2005 6.31
(ii) Quantity during this period for which Niko is not liable (1.421)
(iii) For the period from 4 September to 9 October 2005 0.641
(iv) For the period after 9 October 2005 1.002
(v) Total loss for which Niko is liable 6.532

7.8 Conclusion on the quantity of lost gas

1918 Both Parties and their experts argued that the Material Balance method was a suitable method for estimating gas loss. The Claimant and Gaffney Cline followed the Gas Loss Committees which quantified the gas loss by the Flow Rate method; BAPEX eventually presented also an estimate based on the Flow Rate method, applied according to its own views about this method.

1919 As explained above in Section 7.3, the Tribunal decided to apply both methods, starting with the Flow Rate method, which the Gas Loss Committees had applied; and followed by the Material Balance calculation as a “cross check".

1920 The Tribunal also compared the result of its Material Balance calculation with other gas loss estimates by that method:

1921 The Gas Loss Committees did not apply this method since they did not have the necessary data, the date from the Chattak 2C well being available only after 4 September 2005.


1089 See above Section 7.6.6.3. ↩
1090 (1.83 x 365/2 = 334 MMcf per year) x 3 = 1,002 MMcf or 1.002 Bcf. ↩

[Page 536]

1922 Fekete did adopt the Material Balance method. It calculated the quantity of gas remaining in September 2005 “by dividing the hydrocarbon pores volume by the current formation volume”.1091 They distinguished between two scenarios, assuming in Scenario 2 that Sand 1 and Sand 2 had been pressure separated and reached pressure equilibrium in approximately 100 days after the first blowout. In this scenario, Fekete reached the best estimate for the gas loss by September 2005 of 5.82 Bcf (with minimum of 3.51 and maximum of 9.37).1092

1923 Neither Gaffney Cline nor Ryder Scott have applied Fekete's approach to calculating the gas remaining and neither of them has commented on it. The Tribunal therefore preferred to apply the method which the experts of both sides have considered and seem to have applied.

1924 Ryder Scott presented three OGIP estimates, only one of which was based on pressure separation between Sand 1 and Sand 2, as the Tribunal had also adopted. This estimate for OGIP was 34.727 Bcf. Applying to this value the pressure differential of 15.3%, as adopted by the Tribunal on the basis of its assessment of the initial Reservoir Pressure,1093 the gas loss by 4 September 2005 would be 5.313 Bcf.

1925 Gaffney Cline's estimate, based on an OGIP value lower than that estimated by Ryder Scott in their Sand-separated scenario, lower than that of Fekete and lower than that of the Tribunal, reached 4.17 Bcf.

1926 All these estimates of the gas loss according to the Material Balance method, including the Tribunal's estimate of 6.31 Bcf by 4 September 2005, the 6.532 Bcf estimated by the Tribunal as the loss for which Niko is liable, are substantially below the 10.552 Bcf estimated by the Tribunal according to the Flow Rate method. The Tribunal concludes that its estimate by the Flow Rate method was not confirmed by the “cross check” based on the Material Balance method.

1927 The Tribunal therefore decides to adopt the average between its results according to the two methods as its gas loss estimate. The resulting quantity of lost gas is 8.542 Bcf. The Tribunal decides that Niko is liable for this quantity of lost gas.


1091 Fekete Study, Exhibit C-70, page 25. ↩
1092 Fekete Study, Exhibit C-70, page 26. ↩
1093 See above Section 7.5.2. ↩

[Page 537]

8

VALUATION OF THE GAS LOST

8.1

The presentation of the valuations

1928 The Gas Loss Committees quantified the gas which, in their opinion, was lost as a result of the two blowouts. They did not put a value to this loss.

1929 In 2006, Petrobangla requested Niko to settle the gas loss by delivery free of charge of the quantities of gas corresponding to those estimated by the Committees, reserving some of the losses to be quantified later and the balance to be paid “at the market price”.1094

1930 In the Money Suit, brought on 27 May 2008, the loss claimed by the Government and Petrobangla for the gas loss in the three categories (gas burnt, sub-surface loss and additional sub-surface loss) was quantified in BDT, but calculated at USD 1.75 per Mcf as corresponding to BDT 70.19.1095

1931 In the Arbitration, the Claimant denied liability in its first Memorial concerning the Compensation Declaration of 27 September 2013 and did not address the quantum of the gas loss and its valuation. BAPEX responded on 30 January 2014 asserting that it had no dispute with Niko and did not take position concerning the quantum of the gas loss and its value. In its Reply of 29 May 2014, the Claimant requested the Tribunal, “in the event that the Tribunals find liability on the part of Niko”, to “fix the amount of any compensation due for any damages to BAPEX, its predecessors, assignors, successors or assigns".1096

1932 The first valuation of the gas loss was presented by BAPEX in its Memorial on Damages of 25 March 2016. In this memorial, BAPEX quantified the damage to itself and to the Government that, in its position, Niko must compensate. In support of this position, BAPEX presented a Quantum of Damage Expert Report, dated 24 March 2016 by Mr Paul R. Carpenter of the Brattle Group (Brattle I).

1933 Following the Tribunal's Decision on Liability of 28 February 2020 and further to the Tribunal's consultation with the Parties and its Procedural Order No 24 of 3 April 2020, the Parties updated their quantum and valuation submissions on 7 September 2020, the Claimant by its Counter-Memorial on Damages, and BAPEX by its Amendment to Memorial on Damages.


1094 Money Suit Complaint, Exhibit C-6, paragraph 60. ↩
1095 Legal Notice, Exhibit C-5, paragraph 13 and Money Suite Complaint, Exhibit C-6, paragraph 72 and Schedules A – C. ↩
1096 C-CD, paragraph 315(b). ↩

[Page 538]

1934 In its Counter Memorial, the Claimant produced the fourth witness statement of Mr Hornaday in which he presented a different valuation of the gas loss (WS Hornaday IV).1097 Mr Hornaday adopted the approach and model of Brattle I, with the intention “to provide the Tribunals with a common platform from which to undertake the assessment of damages”.1098 As quoted by the Claimant, Mr Hornaday clarified that this “does not imply that I agree with every aspect of how the Brattle Report was constructed”.1099 Mr Hornaday applied the Brattle model to a number of different assumptions, in particular the quantity of gas loss and the start date for production.

1935 In its Amendment to Memorial on Damages, BAPEX adjusted its valuation of the gas loss, relying on an Updated Quantum of Damages Report, dated 7 September 2020 (Brattle II).

1936 Following the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss of 18 May 2021, the Tribunal discussed with the Parties at the Case Management Conference of 8 June 2021, the status of their submissions on the valuation of the lost gas. Further to that discussion and the Procedural Order No 27 of 30 July 2021, BAPEX presented its Submission on Quantum for Updated Gas Loss Calculations of 20 August 2021 (B-Gas Loss Calculation Update), together with Brattle III and the Claimant presented its Reply on Quantum for Updated Lost Gas Calculations of 1 October 2021 (C-Gas Loss Calculation Update) together with Mr Hornaday's fifth witness statement (WS Hornaday V).

1937 At the November 2021 Hearing the Tribunal invited the Parties also to comment on two questions concerning the valuation of the losses, one concerning the loss of BAPEX, and the other the losses of Petrobangla and the Government.1100 In its First Post-Hearing Brief, BAPEX addressed these questions and provided updated quantum calculations. It referred to the position taken by the Claimant in its submission of 1 October 2021. Niko responded to BAPEX's submission in its Post Hearing Reply Brief.

1938 In the previous Section of this Award, the Tribunal determined that Niko is responsible for the loss of 8.542 Bcf of gas. It now determines the compensation that Niko owes the BAPEX and the Government for this loss.


1097 WS Hornaday IV with Appendix A: Niko Model Workpapers. ↩
1098 WS Hornaday IV paragraph 6. ↩
1099 CMD, paragraph 296, referring WS Hornaday IV, paragraph 6. ↩
1100 Tribunal's Questions for Day 6 of the Hearing, reproduced as Annex C to the Summary Minutes of the Hearing. ↩

[Page 539]

8.2

The loss of BAPEX

1939 In the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, the Tribunal decided with respect to the loss of BAPEX that

BAPEX is entitled to compensation for its share under the JVA of the value of the gas that escaped from Sands 1 and 2 of the Chattak field (the Reservoir) at a price to be determined.1101

1940 Valuing BAPEX's entitlement requires the determination of the monetary value of 8.542 Bcf lost gas and the time when this value would have been earned.

8.2.1

BAPEX's revenue

1941 BAPEX quantified its loss as “its share of the revenue that would have been generated from the production of gas from the Chattak Field had Niko not procured the JVA through corruption and caused the blowouts”.1102 The quantification was not modified since the Tribunal held that the JVA had not been procured through corruption.

1942 In Brattle I, BAPEX's quantum expert presented a calculation of the revenue BAPEX would have received in the absence of the blowouts. Dr Carpenter considered two situations: (i) the gas that was lost due to the blowouts and (ii) the gas that remained in the Reservoir but was produced at a later time. For this delayed production, Dr Carpenter proposed two scenarios: Scenario A: development of “the damaged field [...] soon after the blowout” with start of the production in 2008, corresponding to a delay in one year and Scenario B: development of the field at the time of his report in 2016, with start of production in 2018 and a delay of 11 years.

1943 In calculating the revenue, Dr Carpenter took account of


1101 Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, paragraph 773. ↩
1102 BMD, paragraph 211. ↩
1103 Brattle I, para. 48, referencing Ryder Scott Report, Exhibit 4, Scenario 1. ↩

[Page 540]

1944 On this basis, Dr Carpenter calculated the value of the lost gas and that of the gas produced with delay and deducted the revenue BAPEX would have received from the sale of the gas produced with delay. These calculations were made for the three possible prices and the two Scenarios.1107


1104 Brattle I, paragraphs 52 - 54. ↩
1105 Brattle I, page 24. ↩
1106 Brattle I, paragraphs 40 - 42. ↩
1107 Brattle I, Tables 7 and 8. ↩

[Page 541]

1945 BAPEX claimed for the highest amount in these valuations, USD 118.1 million for Scenario B, assuming a gas price of USD 2.7/Mcf.1108

1946 When Mr Hornaday adopted the Brattle damages model in his fourth witness statement, he modified the assumptions relating to the original producible gas reserves in Sands 1 and 2 and the volume of gas lost from the blowout. With respect to the gas that was not lost but produced with delay, Mr Hornaday assumed that BAPEX refused to permit Niko to develop the Chattak field and drill production wells; this prepared the damages on which Niko's set off claim was based. He asserted that “post-blowout development could have and should have started immediately after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well”. He moreover contested the assumptions made in the Brattle report about the production of the gas remaining in the Reservoir.1109

1947 Concerning the gas price, Mr Hornaday considered that the three prices used in the Brattle report “provided a reasonable range of prices to which the JV and Petrobangla may have agreed"; he pointed out, however, that “Petrobangla was unmoveable on its offer of $1.75 for the Feni gas production after protracted negotiations”.1110 Niko submitted that “the appropriate price assumption to use” for lost gas valuation is USD 1.75 per Mcf.1111

1948 In calculating the revenue that BAPEX would have earned in the absence of the blowouts, Mr Hornaday relied on the production schedule of Gaffney Cline, assuming completion of drilling in April 2005 and start of production on 1 July 2006. He agreed on the revenue sharing table that had been produced in the Brattle report but produced his own estimate of the capital investment and the operating costs. He quantified BAPEX's loss depending on the three possible gas prices at USD 2.2, 2.9 and 3.4 million.1112

1949 Based on this assessment, the Claimant requested that, assuming BAPEX has proven a loss directly resulting from the first blowout, the Tribunal fix the amount of that loss to be USD 2.2 million or less.1113

1950 In the submission following the Tribunal's Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, BAPEX stated that the Decision “did not alter how losses to BAPEX from its share of the JV revenue should be calculated". Based on Brattle III and new production schedules by Ryder Scott, BAPEX calculated this loss for each of the three prices in four cases: each of the three periods adopted with respect


1108 Brattle I, Table 8 and BMD, paragraph 388. ↩
1109 WS Hornaday IV, paragraphs 3 - 11. ↩
1110 WS Hornaday IV, paragraphs 37 ↩
1111 CMD, paragraph 298. ↩
1112 WS Hornaday IV, Table 1 at paragraph 17. ↩
1113 CMD, paragraph 457. ↩

[Page 542]

to the gas loss quantification (case 1 to 3). The fourth case concerned valuation of the loss assuming BAPEX had authorised Niko to develop the Chattak field in November 2005 and if the Chattak 2B relief well operation had reduced but not prevented the escape of Gas from the Reservoir.

1951 On this basis BAPEX claimed USD 142 million for the lost gas, if the Tribunal finds that the Chattak 2B relief well operation completely failed to stop the flow of gas from the Reservoir, and USD 127 million, if instead the relief operation had slowed but did not completely stop that flow.1114 BAPEX recognised that the price of USD 1.75 “represents the only gas price agreed between Petrobangla and Niko for gas under the JVA. This is the price BAPEX uses to formulate its request for relief”.1115

1952 In its reply to this submission of BAPEX, the Claimant noted that BAPEX had accepted that USD 1.75 was the best estimate of gas price and agreed this position.1116 The Claimant also referred to a request made by the Tribunal during the CMC of 8 June 2021 to address the possibility that the Tribunal might find a quantity of gas to be lost that was different from the quantities estimated by the Parties' respective experts. The Claimant reported that the Parties had been unable to reach agreement on a method for calculating damages per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) and presented its own rate for valuation.

1953 The Claimant based the proposed rate for its own valuation on the Brattle III valuation model. It presented the following table from Mr Hornaday's fifth witness statement.1117 Mr Hornaday had taken from Table 1 of Brattle III the amounts for the quantities of loss in the four cases and the corresponding losses in USD at an assumed price of USD 1.75/Mcf and calculated BAPEX's damages per Mcf in USD (USD 0.80/Mcf for cases 1 and 2). Mr Hornaday also added in columns 4 and 5 the corresponding amounts in BDT. The Claimant presented this table as Table 1 below. The Claimant explained that it divided the numbers of BAPEX's compensation claim by the quantity of claimed lost gas to reach a rate per Mcf using the agreed price of USD 1.75. The same


1114 B-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 32. ↩
1115 B-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 31. ↩
1116 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 67. ↩
1117 WS Hornaday V, Table 4 at page 9. ↩

[Page 543]

operation is made to “reflect the damages calculated by Brattle converted to BDT using the average foreign exchange rates for the applicable periods”:1118

Table 1: Brattle Summary of Damages to BAPEX as of June 30, 2021, in USD per Mcf and BDT per Mcf

Compensable
Gas Loss
(Bcf)
[1]
BAPEX Damages
Excluding Pre-
Award Interest
in USD
($, millions)
[2]
BAPEX Damages
per Mcf of
Compensable Gas
Loss
in USD
($/Mcf)
[3] = [2] / [1]
BAPEX Damages
Excluding Pre-
Award Interest
in BDT
(Tk, millions)
[4]
BAPEX Damages
per Mcf of
Compensable Gas
Loss
in BDT
(Tk/Mcf)
[5] = [4]/[1]
Assumed JV Price ($/Mcf) $1.75 $1.75 $1.75 $1.75
Case 1: Gas Lost in Period 1
(Jan 7, 2005 to Jun 24, 2005)
21.1 16.9 0.80 1,281 60.8
Case 2: Gas Lost in Periods 1 & 2
(Jan 7, 2005 to Oct 9, 2005)
34.3 27.6 0.80 2,088 60.8
Case 3: All Gas in Sands 1 and 2 74.9 60.2 0.80 4,559 60.8
Case 4: All Gas in Sands 1 and 2
less Volume Potentially
Recoverable Post-Blowout
65.2 55.4 0.85 4,195 64.4
Sources and Notes:
[1][2]: Second Supplemental Brattle Report, Table 1
[3] = [2]/[1]
[4]: Exhibit C-310, Table 4, Column [4]
[5] = [4]/[1]

1954 As can be seen, the rate per Mcf calculated by the Claimant was identical for the three cases concerning the three periods for the gas flow quantification; only case 4 differed slightly. For the three cases the rate was USD 0.80 or BDT 60.8 per Mcf. The Claimant added:

Niko agrees to the use of BDT 60.8/Mcf for the limited purpose of providing the Tribunal with a method for calculating BAPEX's damages per Mcf in the event it rejects Niko's gas loss estimates and resulting damages quantification.1119

1955 The question concerning the valuation of BAPEX's gas loss, as the Tribunal submitted it to the Parties during the November 2021 Hearing was drafted as follows:

Concerning the loss of BAPEX, the Claimant stated in its Reply on Quantum for Lost Gas Calculations that, while not fully agreeing with the model used by the Respondents' expert, Brattle, the Claimant adopted this model. The Claimant did however make a number of modifications to the model used by Brattle. It also made a proposal concerning the application of this model in case the Tribunal concludes on a quantity of


1118 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, Table 1 at page 29 and explanations at paragraph 70 – 72. The Claimant refers to Exhibit C-310, Table 4, for the calculations and the exchange rates used. ↩
1119 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 72; similar at paragraph 70. ↩

[Page 544]

compensable gas that is different from those used by the Parties in the Brattle model.

The Tribunal would like to receive from the Parties further explanations on the model as proposed by Brattle and the Claimant's modifications to it, including its adaptation to the quantities of compensable gas different from those used in the model and its modifications by the Claimant.

1956 BAPEX responded to the Tribunal's question in its first Post-Hearing Brief. It confirmed that Brattle calculated damages of USD 0.80/Mcf and noted that “Niko also calculates damages of $0.80/Mcf". BAPEX concludes:

Given that the loss per Mcf is the same regardless of the volume of gas lost, applying this price to a volume different from those considered in Brattle's scenarios is reasonable.1120

1957 BAPEX also mentions that for case 4 (post-blowout delayed production of the remaining gas) the rate would be USD 0.85/Mcf, the same rate as the Claimant had calculated. Applied to the USD 2.2 million calculated by the Claimant for the 2.8 Bcf gas loss as quantified by the Claimant, BAPEX states that the rate would be USD 0.78/Mcf [recte: 0.786, or 0.79].1121

1958 While mentioning the Claimant's calculation of USD 0.80/Mcf as rate for cases 1 to 3, BAPEX does not mention the BDT value calculated by the Claimant and does not object to the Claimant's calculation of BDT 60.8/Bcf as equivalent to USD 1.75/Bcf.

1959 The Tribunal notes that the Parties have agreed on a sales price of USD 1.75 per Mcf of gas and have both calculated a revenue per Mcf for the quantification of the gas loss caused by the first blowout for which Niko is liable. The Claimant has calculated this revenue both in USD and BDT; BAPEX has calculated it only in USD but has not objected to the Claimant's calculation of the BDT equivalent of this quantum.

1960 Concerning the production of the gas that remained in the Reservoir despite the blowouts (Brattle case 4), the Tribunal explained above in Section 7.5.6.2that Niko proposed since May 2005 the drilling of additional wells to develop the Chattak field and to mitigate the loss caused by the uncontrolled flow. In Sections 7.5.6.3 and 7.5.6.4, the Tribunal concluded that BAPEX unreasonably prevented such further development of the Chattak field. The Tribunal therefore does not accept BAPEX's claim assuming Niko's liability


1120 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 101 – 102. ↩
1121 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 102 – 103. ↩

[Page 545]

for the delayed production of the gas remaining in the Reservoir. BAPEX's claim quantified in case 4 of the Brattle valuation therefore is dismissed.

1961 The Tribunal concludes that BAPEX's loss of 8.542 Bcf of gas for which Niko is liable is to be valued at the rate of USD 0.80/Mcf, corresponding to BDT 60.8/Mcf and amounts to a total USD 6'833’600.

8.2.2 The timing of the loss

1962 The Claimant considered the “Date of Assessment of Damages”, relying on the basic principle that the “aim of a damages award is to put the claimant as near as possible in the position that they would have been in had the contract been properly performed”. Relying on Chitty on Contracts, the Claimant points out that the “default rule to the assessment of damages is that they should be valued as at the date of breach”; but it accepts that there may be circumstances justifying the application of a different date of assessment. And it quotes from an English case stating the principle “that the victim of a breach of contract is entitled to damages representing the value of the contractual benefit to which he was entitled but which he has been deprived”.1122

1963 The principles are elementary and uncontested; the Tribunal sees no need to develop them further. It concludes that, in the present case, it must determine when BAPEX would have received that part of the revenue it would have received in the absence of the first blowout for which Niko is liable. ВАРЕХ and its experts present production profiles and calculate the related revenue. The Claimant “does not dispute that a possible approach to determining an appropriate assessment date is to rely on production models to show what may have happened in terms of production in the ordinary course, determined as of the date of calculation, so long as all inherent risks associated with the uncertain revenue projections are taken into account”.1123

1964 The revenue in question is the USD 6'833’600 which BAPEX would have received if no blowout had occurred. The Tribunal therefore examines the production schedule in the absence of the blowout.

1965 In December 2004, shortly before the start of drilling Chattak 2, Niko presented the Chattak Field Development Plan, dated December 2004.1124 The information contained in this plan included Niko's expectations concerning the production, sale and revenue from the projected development of the Chattak field. BAPEX relied on this plan as evidence for Niko's plans


1122 CMD, paragraphs 284 and 285, quoting from Chitty on Contracts, 33rd edition of 2019, CLA-283, and Golden Strait Corporation v. Nippon Yuseri Kubishika Kaisha [2007] UKHL 12 at 7j – 8a, CLA-284. ↩
1123 CMD, paragraph 288. ↩
1124 Exhibit R-47. ↩

[Page 546]

concerning the market for the gas produced and its price.1125 So did Dr Carpenter in Brattle I.1126 Mr Hughes relies on Niko's field development plan for his Scenario 1, assuming no blowout.1127 Dr Carpenter in turn relies on Mr Hughes Scenatio 1.1128

1966 Mr Hornaday and the Claimant rely on a production profile developed by Gaffney Cline. That profile is based on Gaffney Cline's “most likely case”, apparently without considering Niko's Chattak Field Development Plan of December 2004.1129 Gaffney Cline explained that they were “instructed to estimate the likely forecast production of gas from Sands 1, 1.1 and 2 in the best case ..."; for Scenario 1 (“no blowout occurred”, Gaffney Cline used “initial reservoir conditions before either blowout occurred. Gas in place is estimated as 25.7 Bcf with recovery estimated as 19.28 Bcf”.1130 Appendix X to Gaffney Cline show MMscfd production rates for different scenarios, including scenario 1.

1967 The December 2004 Chattak Field Development Plan foresees three development wells, Chattak 2, Chattak 3 and Chattak 4, and three “option wells". Investment for the project, including all six wells, is planned to start before the start of production and continue during years 1 and 2. The production is shown as being spread over 13 years with a total of 147 Bcf. During the first year of production, a daily production rate of 50MMcfd is foreseen and an annual production of 18 Bcf. The expected average gas price throughout the duration of production was shown as USD 2.50/Mcf. During that first year of production, BAPEX's share was shown as USD 11 million.1131

1968 Gaffney Cline assume that, absent the blowout, “only one well would have been drilled to produce from Sands 1 and 2 [as] opposed to the Brattle Report model assuming two wells based on the Ryder Scott production model. This is principally due to the lower estimated original producible reserves for Sands 1 and 2 estimated by Gaffney Cline. I also consider it unlikely that the JV would have drilled two wells to produce from Sands 1 and 2 absent the blowouts".1132


1125 BMD, paragraphs 215 and 216. ↩
1126 Brattle I, paragraph 52. ↩
1127 Hughes I, page 6. ↩
1128 Brattle I, paragraphs 61 – 63. ↩
1129 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 28 and WS Hornaday IV, paragraph 22, FN 5 and paragraph 30 and Workpaper 4. ↩
1130 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 79. ↩
1131 Exhibit R-47, Section 3.3.1 and Table at page 32. ↩
1132 Gaffney Cline II, paragraph 22. ↩

[Page 547]

1969 Gaffney Cline assumed for Sands 1, 1.1 and 2 production over 13 years and a total of 19.28 Bcf; during the first six years they assume a daily production rate of 5.5 MMcfd.1133 Based on this assumption, Mr Hornaday presented during the first six years an annual production from Sands 1 and 2 of 2.008 Bcf and a production from Sands 3 to 8 of 10.512 Bcf, a total annual production of 12.520 Bcf.1134

1970 The Tribunal notes that, in the absence of the blowouts, the drilling of Chattak 2 would have been completed by April 2005. The start of production required additional work for the gas plant, the connecting pipeline and related installations. As discussed above in Section 7.6.6.3, the work on these installations advanced during the course of 2005 and, despite delays that may have occurred due the blowouts, Niko announced in October 2005 that production could start by the end of 2005. The Tribunal therefore concludes that, in the absence of the blowout, production could have started no later than the end of 2005.

1971 According to the Chattak Field Development Plan, 18 Bcf would have been produced in 2006, the first year of production, generating a revenue for BAPEX of USD 11 million. BAPEX would have earned the amount which Niko owes as compensation. According to Mr Hornaday only 12.520 Bcf would have been produced during the first year of production, of which 2.008 Bcf from the Reservoir. The expected production from the Reservoir was lost (for which Niko is liable up to the quantity of 8.542 Bcf) and the production from Sands 3 – 8 was delayed, initially due to the blowout (later due to the failure of BAPEX to approve the drilling proposals of Niko). When determining the relevant date for the compensation, the Tribunal therefore relies on the total quantity of gas that would have been produced during the first year. The Tribunal concludes that, in the absence of the blowout, the Niko/BAPЕХ Joint Venture would have produced during the year 2006 a quantity of gas exceeding that which Niko is liable to compensate.

1972 According to Article 11.1.3 of the GPSA for the Feni field, which reflects also the payment conditions for gas from the Chattak field,1135 the gas delivered would have had to be paid within 45 days. The Tribunal concludes that the gas would have been paid as deliveries progressed. By the end of 2006, the Joint Venture would have been paid for the gas delivered and BAPEX would have received its share.


1133 Gaffney Cline II, Appendix X. ↩
1134 WS Hornaday IV, Workpaper 4; in year 6 the production from Sands 3 to 8 is slightly reduced (to 9.969 Bcf) which leads for that year to a reduction of the total production from 12.520 Bcf to 11.977 Bcf. ↩
1135 See below Section 8.2.2. ↩

[Page 548]

1973 The Tribunal concludes that the loss which Niko must compensate occurred during the course of the year 2006.

8.2.3 The currency

1974 In its Reply on Quantum for Updated Lost Gas Calculations, the Claimant proposed, as explained above, a rate for Mcf to quantify BAPEX's gas loss. For this purpose, Mr Hornaday had calculated BAPEX Damages, as presented by Dr Carpenter in Brattle III in USD and derived a rate per Mcf. This rate was presented both in USD and in BDT. The Claimant produced this table in the submission, stating that it “agrees for the Tribunal to use the figure of BDT 60.8 for BAPEX's damages per Mcf of lost gas”. The Claimant emphasised the BDT number and did not mention the USD number which also had been shown in the Table.

1975 When BAPEX, in its first Post-Hearing Brief, also accepted a rate per Mcf it mentioned only the USD rate (USD 0.80/Mcf) and added “Niko also calculates damages of $0.80/Mcf".1136

1976 The Tribunal notes that there is no difference between the Parties concerning the exchange rate between the USD rate and the BDT rate: the Claimant presented the rate in the two currencies and BAPEX accepted the USD equivalence to the BDT rate accepted by the Claimant. They differ, however, with respect to the currency in which the compensation is to be expressed.

1977 BAPEX claims compensation for its losses in USD.1137

1978 The Claimant argues that it is “elemental” that compensation for its loss must be paid in Bangladesh taka, as “the currency in which that loss was suffered”. In addition, it relies on Article 11.1.4 of the GPSA, which provides that the sales proceeds due to BAPEX according to the JVA

... shall be paid in local currency (converted from Dollars to local currency at the exchange rate applicable on the date of payment).

1979 The Tribunal notes that both Parties have referred to the GPSA price as the reference in the valuation of the gas loss.1138 And they have referred to the GPSA in other contexts. In particular, Niko stated in the Chattak Field Development Plan of December 2004:


1136 B-PHB 1, paragraph 10. ↩
1137 B-PHB 1, paragraph 133(b). ↩
1138 See e.g. BMD, paragraphs 215-216; WS Hornaday IV, paragraphs 34 – 37. ↩

[Page 549]

Niko Resources Bangladesh Ltd. is currently negotiating a Gas Purchase and Sales Agreement in Feni, which it believes will also apply to the Chattak gas field.1139

1980 The agreement for the gas from the Feni field was intensely negotiated and eventually concluded on 27 December 2006. While Dr Carpenter states that in 2009 Niko and BAPEX agreed to request that Petrobangla increase the price of Feni gas,1140 there is no indication that any other changes were contemplated for the application of the GPSA to deliveries from the Chattak field. The Tribunal assumes that, in the absence of the blowouts, the gas from the Chattak field would have been sold to Petrobangla at the terms for the sale of the Feni gas.

1981 The Tribunal concludes that the share of BAPEX would have been paid as provided in Article 11.1.4 of the GPSA. The Tribunal decides that BAPЕХ should be compensated at USD 6'833’600 converted into BDT at the exchange rate applicable on the date of payment.

8.3

The loss of the Government

1982 BAPEX asserted that there “is no question that the Government has sustained severe injury due to the blowouts”.1141 The Claimant argues that, if properly valued, the Government and Petrobangla had no loss at all.

1983 In the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, the Tribunal held that

BAPEX is entitled to recover on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh any difference between the JVA price, as determined according to paragraph 773 above, and the price the Government or Petrobangla paid to comparable gas producers in Bangladesh for the quantities of gas lost for which the Claimant must compensate BAPEX according to paragraph 773.1142

8.3.1 The positions of the Parties and their evolution

1984 BAPEX stated that natural gas was the primary source of electricity production in Bangladesh and calculated the loss caused to the Government by reference to increased costs producing electricity. BAPEX asserted:


1139 Exhibit R-47, Section 5.7; quoted by Brattle I, paragraph 52. ↩
1140 Exhibit R-170; referred to in Brattle I, paragraph 53. ↩
1141 BMD, paragraph 227. ↩
1142 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraph 774. ↩

[Page 550]

... the loss of Chattak West undoubtedly contributed to the shortage of domestically-produced natural gas. Due to the shortage of domestic natural gas, Bangladesh has been compelled to resort to power generation through rental power plants fuelled primarily by HSFO and diesel.

1985 BAPEX calculated the damage to the Government

... as the net fuel cost saving to the Government if the Chattak gas had been available to generate electricity replacing more expensive fuel sources such as imported diesel and high-sulphur furnace oil (HSFO)1143

1986 Dr Carpenter of the Brattle Group, on whose report BAPEX relies, produced a table showing the prices that Petrobangla paid other IOCs pursuant to each of the PSCs during the period from 2005 to 2015:1144

Table 9. Gas Prices Paid by Petrobangla to IOCs

Jalalabad
($/Mcf)
Chevron
Moulavibazar
($/Mcf)
Bibiyana
($/Mcf)
Cairn
Sangu
($/Mcf)
Tullow
Bangura
($/Mcf)
Average
($/Mcf)
Start Date of PSC: February 1999 March 2005 March 2007 June 1998 May 2006
2004-2005 2.75 2.68 N/A 2.91 N/A 2.78
2005-2006 2.75 2.68 N/A 2.92 2.32 2.67
2006-2007 2.75 2.69 2.78 2.92 2.33 2.69
2007-2008 2.73 2.68 2.78 2.92 2.33 2.69
2008-2009 2.73 2.68 2.78 2.92 2.33 2.69
2009-2010 2.73 2.68 2.81 2.92 2.33 2.69
2010-2011 2.73 2.68 2.74 2.92 2.32 2.68
2011-2012 2.76 2.69 2.76 2.91 2.31 2.69
2012-2013 2.76 2.68 2.76 N/A 2.32 2.63
2013-2014 2.76 2.68 2.76 N/A 2.32 2.63
2014-2015 2.76 2.67 2.76 N/A 2.32 2.63
Average 2.75 2.68 2.77 2.92 2.32 2.69
Source and Notes: Petrobangla. Data are presented by fiscal year (July-June).

1987 Dr Carpenter explained the “virtually constant gas price” shown in this table: “PSCs generally provided for a gas price indexed to the market price of Singapore HSFO, subject to a price floor and ceiling [...] The price ceiling has been below the HSFO market price during between 2005 and 2015”.1145 He explained the pricing system in the PSCs as follows:


1143 BMD, paragraphs 231 and 227. ↩
1144 Brattle I, Table 9 at paragraph 54. ↩
1145 Brattle I, FN 55 at page 22. ↩

[Page 551]

Under the PSCs, Petrobangla paid the prices shown in Table 9 to the operator for the cost recovery gas and the operator's share of profit gas (i.e., gas produced above the cost recovery gas). Petrobangla received also a share of the profit gas, for which it did not pay the operator. Because the profit split between Petrobangla and the operator could vary among IOCs, the average price paid to the IOCs may not be relevant to the contract with the JV, which may have a different profit sharing rule. To account for potential differences in profit sharing rules, I calculated the average cost of IOC gas to Petrobangla: total payments to the IOCs divided by total gas produced by the IOCs. Table 10 shows that the average gas cost paid by Petrobangla over the 2006-2014 period was $1.67/Mcf.

1988 Dr Carpenter divided the Total Petrobangla Payments to IOCs by the Quantity of Gas produced by the IOCs to arrive at the Average Cost to Petrobangla. This Average Cost varies from year to year; during the period from 2005 to 2014 the variance was between USD 1.41/Mcf and USD 1.95/Mcf, with a weighted average of the entire period of USD 1.67/Mcf.1146 He updated the table adding the numbers for the years until 2019, which brought the weighted average for the longer period to USD 1.52/Mcf.1147 Dr Carpenter mentioned that the numbers are “slightly overstated” because the payments include payment for condensate.


1146 Brattle I, Table 10 at paragraph 55. ↩
1147 Brattle II, paragraph 20. ↩

[Page 552]

1989 The result of Dr Carpenter's initial calculation is shown in the table below:

Table 10. Cost of IOC Gas to Petrobangla

Fiscal Year Quantity of Gas
Produced by IOCs
(Bcf)
Total Petrobangla
Payments to IOCS
($, millions)
Average Cost to
Petrobangla
($/Mcf)
2005-2006 170 280 1.65
2006-2007 204 310 1.52
2007-2008 273 531 1.95
2008-2009 328 525 1.60
2009-2010 373 526 1.41
2010-2011 368 565 1.53
2011-2012 390 654 1.67
2012-2013 438 799 1.82
2013-2014 439 791 1.80
Total / Weighted Average 2,984 4,980 1.67
Source: Workpaper 4.

1990 Dr Carpenter placed this average price under the PSCs (USD 1.67/Mcf) in relation to the price paid by Petrobangla to the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture and concluded that the average price under the PSCs would correspond to a price of USD 2.77/Mcf:

Given the profit sharing formula between BAPEX and Niko specified in the JVA, the $1.67/Mcf average gas cost to Petrobangla translates into a price of $2.77/Mcf for the JV. In other words, if Petrobangla paid Niko $2.77/Mcf, it would source gas from Niko at the average cost of IOC gas to Petrobangla.

[Page 553]

1991 To allow for condensate in the payments and the resulting “slightly overstated” numbers for Petrobangla's payments to the IOCs shown in Table 10, Dr Carpenter used USD 2.70/Mcf as the “equivalent JV price” and concluded that

... the equivalent JV price [... USD 2.70/Mcf...] is close to the average price paid by Petrobangla to other IOCs for profit gas and cost recovery gas.1148

1992 Dr Carpenter assumed that “Bangladesh would have used the additional gas [from Chattak 2] to substitute for higher-cost fuels”. The loss to Bangladesh would be the price difference between electricity production with “high-cost fuels and producing it with gas sourced from the JV at the price Petrobangla and the JV would have negotiated.”1149

1993 The loss claimed by BAPEX on that basis was USD 896 million, later modified to 857 million.1150

1994 The Claimant argued that the cost of replacement fuel was a consequential loss and therefore excluded by the law of Bangladesh and by the JVA, as discussed in the Decision on Liability. The Claimant requested a declaration that losses by the Government are excluded from recovery by the JVA.1151

1995 Following the Tribunal's Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, BAPEX relied on Brattle III, which presented a “revised approach to quantifying damages to Bangladesh rel[ying] on the difference between the highest price that Petrobangla paid to other domestic producers [...] and the price that it would have paid the JV for Chattak gas”. In support of this argument, Dr Carpenter presented Table 9 of Brattle I in a modified version: now reflecting “Gas Prices Paid by Petrobangla to Domestic Producers”, it was extended to 2019 and in the column on the right the subject “Average” was replaced by “Maximum"; the average value of this column increased from USD 2.69/Mcf to USD 2.85/Mcf.1152

1996 Dr Carpenter argued that “the value of the Chattak gas to Petrobangla is best measured by the highest price that it paid to alternative producers [...] Had Chattak gas been available to Petrobangla, Petrobangla could have reduced its purchases of gas from other sources, and the rational choice would have


1148 Brattle I, paragraph 56. ↩
1149 Brattle I, paragraphs 76 and 78. ↩
1150 BMD, paragraphs 240 and 400 (h). This figure was subsequently updated to USD 857 million: see Amendment, paragraph 99; Brattle II, Table 2 at page 5. ↩
1151 CMD, paragraphs 75 - 82 and paragraph 452. ↩
1152 Compare Brattle III, Table 7 at paragraph 16 with Brattle I, Table 9 at paragraph 54. ↩

[Page 554]

been to reduce purchases from the most costly source”. In Table 7 of his report, Dr Carpenter identified the prices for gas from the Cairn's Sangu field as the highest until 2021 and Chevron's Jalalabad Bibiyana fields thereafter.1153

1997 The Claimant objected to this calculation, arguing that the Brattle valuation, by using the nominal price under the PSC contracts, disregarded “the actual cost to the Government of PSC gas”. The Claimant pointed out that in Brattle I, Dr Carpentier had explained the need to consider the actual cost of PSC gas rather than the nominal PSC price and quoted from Brattle I: “the average price paid to the IOCs may not be relevant to the contract with the JV". And it quoted from Brattle II where it was stated that at times the “average cost drops to $1.52/Mcf”. The Claimant also relied on the negotiations for the GPSA where the Government and Petrobangla contended that the profit gas received for free in PSCs had to be considered in comparing PSC gas prices to the JVA gas price.1154

1998 Relying on the terms of the PSC for Block 9 of the Bangura field, that had been produced in the Arbitration, the Claimant argued:

It is indefensible to disregard the huge volumes of free gas that Petrobangla receives in PSCs. [...] For example, during the 2016-2017 fiscal year the Contractor for the Block 9 PSC invoiced Petrobangla for only 56.6% of the gas received from the Bangura field, with the remaining 43.4% comprising Petrobangla's share of the production, which Petrobangla received without payment. It is fanciful to suggest that the nominal price for 56.6% of the total volume of gas Petrobangla received meaningfully represents the economic arrangement under the PSC, without taking into account the substantial volumes of gas Petrobangla received for no price at all. The cost, or effective price, to Petrobangla of the gas it received from the Bangura field in that fiscal year was USD 1.31 per MCF.

1999 The Claimant compared this “effective price” of USD 1.31/Mcf to the average nominal price for that year of USD 2.314 Mcf and described BAPEX's valuation as an attempt “to show losses where there are none”.1155

2000 The Claimant added that over the period addressed in Brattle III, “the effective average cost to the Government and Petrobangla was USD 1.52/Mcf” and concluded that


1153 Brattle III, paragraph 16 and Table 7. ↩
1154 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraphs 74 – 78, quoting from Brattle II, paragraph 20. ↩
1155 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 80. ↩

[Page 555]

It was cheaper for Petrobangla to look to PSC gas for supply than to acquire JVA gas at USD 1.75/Mcf.1156

2001 The Claimant also objected to relying on the highest price instead of the average price, adding that, under its PSC for the Sangu field, Petrobangla was not entitled to reduce its purchases from that source. It concludes that for these reasons:

... the Tribunal should dismiss the claim of the Government and Petrobangla for lack of evidence of any loss.1157

2002 In the November 2021 Hearing that followed these submissions, the Tribunal addressed the Parties as one of the questions for Day 6 the following invitation:

The Tribunal also wishes to hear the Parties on the loss of Petrobangla and the Government. In this respect, the Tribunal noted the Claimant's argument concerning “the actual cost to the Government of PSC gas” that should be used instead of the “PSC ‘price' as the measure of damages”. The Tribunal wishes to hear the Parties, in particular on this argument and the related evidence presented by the Claimant.1158

2003 BAPEX addresses the question in its first Post-Hearing Brief, pointing out that in the Heads of Recoverable Loss the Tribunal had decided that the relevant criterion was the price paid by the Government not its costs. BAPEX accepts that under PSCs it obtains gas free of charge but argues that this is compensation for the rights granted under the relevant PSC, specifically the gas field as the natural resource. Under these contracts part of the gas may be sold by the company and the price for that part of the gas is relevant.

The IOC is entitled to the remaining portion of the gas produced to compensate the IOC for its contribution to the joint effort. That IOC's gas, which the Government does not own, is then transacted. The Government buys it from the IOC at the price agreed in the PSC. This establishes the market value of the gas.1159

2004 BAPEX also contested the Claimant's argument according to which it was better off not having access to the Chattak gas because it would have had to pay more for it than what it paid to the IOCs. BAPEX asserts that there were gas shortages which eventually led to LNG purchases in significant amounts


1156 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 83. ↩
1157 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph, 87. ↩
1158 Tribunal's Questions - Day 6. ↩
1159 B-PHB 1, paragraph 113. ↩

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as from 2018. Even before the LNG purchases started the Government was willing to pay for gas well above USD 1.75/Mcf.1160

2005 Concerning the question whether the highest or the average price should be determining, BAPEX argues that if Petrobangla were to substitute Chattak gas for gas purchased from other PSCs “it would make economic sense to reduce purchases of the most expensive gas”. BAPEX does not contest the Claimant's argument according to which Petrobangla could not have replaced gas from the Sangu field (the most expensive one) by gas from the BAPEX/Niko JV, because the PSC required Petrobangla to buy all the gas; but it argues that the next highest PSC price (Bibiyana) is only about USD 0.15/Mcf lower.1161

2006 BAPEX now claims on behalf of the Government USD 126 million and, with pre-award interest until 3 March 2022, USD 162 million; the largest part of this amount relates to the loss after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation.1162 The claimed amount for the loss during period from the first blowout on 7 January 2005 to the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation on 9 October 2005, is USD 38 million. The calculation of this amount in Brattle III assumes a JV price of USD 1.75/Mcf “reduced purchases from the most costly source” from among the prices to IOCs in Bangladesh under PSCs.1163

2007 In its Post-Hearing Reply Brief, the Claimant disagrees that only the IOC share of the gas produced under a PSC was subject to a market transaction. The record showed, according to the Claimant, that the price for PSC gas was fixed in the PSC itself. The large volumes of gas that were for Petrobangla's exclusive benefit were part of the bargain in the PSC arrangements and must be taken into account”; “any comparison of JVA prices and PSC prices must take into account the free gas allocated to Petrobangla under PSCs”. And it disagreed that the Government could reduce purchases of PSC gas.1164

8.3.2 Substitution for fuel at the highest alternative price or additional gas?

2008 BAPEX's and Brattle's original valuation was based on the assumption that, if the Chattak 2 blowout had not occurred, the Government or Petrobangla would have used the gas from the Chattak field to replace fuel for power


1160 B-PHB 1, paragraph 118. ↩
1161 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 119 – 122. ↩
1162 B-PHB 1, paragraph 133(c) and Table D9 at page 48. ↩
1163 B-PHB 1, Table D9 and Brattle III, Table 8 at page 11 and paragraph 16. ↩
1164 C-PHB 2, paragraphs 45, 46 and 49. ↩

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stations imported in the form of expensive HSFO and diesel. They continue to argue that it would have been the most expensive fuel that would have been replaced by the Chattak gas. In the new calculation the fuel that is being replaced is no longer imported HSFO and diesel but gas from other producers operating under PSCs.1165

2009 While the comparison between Chattak gas and other domestic gas is responsive to the Tribunal's Decision in the Heads of Recoverable Loss, that decision does not require the substitution argument. Considering argument and evidence relating to the Government's loss resulting from the gas loss caused by the blowouts, the Tribunal has difficulty in accepting this argument:

2010 BAPEX's relies on “excess demand and the gas shortages” in Bangladesh.1166 In 2016 Dr Carpenter wrote in Brattle I: “Over the past ten years, demand for gas from the power generating sector [the main user of natural gas in Bangladesh] exceeded supply". He explained that the “gas shortfall arose continuously from around 2005"; by 2010 “about 500 mmcfd was unmet demand, i.e. the amount was not delivered to the existing gas customer” and contributed to power shortages.1167

2011 Information from Niko confirms the need for additional supplies of gas. In its Marginal Gas Field Development Plan, dated 2005, it wrote:

At the present time, the Bangladesh gas market has a limited supply of natural gas and a growing demand. An ever-expanding economy places pressure on ethe existing natural resources present in Bangladesh. The potential for sales in a growing marketplace is favourable ...

[...]

5.3 Window of Opportunity

As gas is in short supply all over Bangladesh marketplace, there is no better time than the present to find and produce new supplies of natural gas.1168

2012 The importance of gas from the Chattak field was stressed repeatedly by Niko, pointing out that new production wells after the blowouts were important for meeting the demand in Bangladesh. For instance, in October 2005, Niko


1165 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 119 - 122. ↩
1166 B-PHB 1, paragraph 117. ↩
1167 Brattle I, paragraphs 32, 30 and 85. ↩
1168 Exhibit R-248, page 29, Sections 5.1 and 5.3. ↩

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described these proposals as “critical to providing additional gas production for Bangladesh".1169

2013 In view of this evidence, the Tribunal has no doubt that there was demand for additional gas at the time when, absent the blowout, the Chattak 2 well would have been ready to supply it. In these circumstances, the Tribunal finds it not credible that Petrobangla would have reduced the supply from its PSC suppliers to accommodate the supply from Chattak 2. In view of this conclusion, the question whether, under the terms of the PSC, Petrobangla had the right to reduce the quantity of gas taken under some of the PSCs does not arise.

2014 The question therefore is not what savings Petrobangla could have made by reducing its supplies from more expensive suppliers and replacing it by the Chattak 2 gas but what value the additional gas would have had for Petrobangla, bearing in mind that according to Article 24.3 of the JVA the gas is to be sold “on the Bangladesh domestic market”.

8.3.3 The comparison between the GPSA price and the PSC prices

2015 In its Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss the Tribunal used the expression “JVA price” for the price that Petrobangla paid to the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture. In their submissions the Parties also use this expression or “JV price". In their argument about the prices paid to the IOCs which are understood to be the “comparable gas producers in Bangladesh”, the Parties refer generally to PSC prices or IOC prices. There is some inconsistency in the use of the terms for the two types of contracts. The PSC prices are agreed in the Product Sharing Contract; the JVA price is not agreed in the Joint Venture Agreement between the parties to the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture but would have to be agreed in a Gas Purchase and Sale Agreement. The Tribunal therefore used for this price the term GPSA price.

2016 While the Parties in a first phase of the discussion about the valuation of the gas loss prepared alternative scenarios for three different GPSA prices, there is now agreement1170 that, for the purpose of this valuation, it is assumed that in the GPSA the price of USD 1.75/Mcf would have been agreed.

2017 It is also undisputed that under the PSCs, Petrobangla receives gas for which it pays and gas free of charge, referred to also as profit gas. Dr Carpenter described the arrangement as follows:


1169 Exhibit R-244. ↩
1170 WS Hornaday V, paragraph 3(c) and B-PHB 1, Tables at paragraph 131. ↩

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Under the PSCs, Petrobangla paid the prices shown in Table 9 to the operator for the cost recovery gas and the operator's share of profit gas (i.e., gas produced above the cost recovery gas). Petrobangla received also a share of the profit gas, for which it did not pay the operator.1171

2018 BAPEX relies on the prices paid by Petrobangla to IOCs pursuant to the PSCs shown above in Table 9. For BAPEX the distinction between the price for which Petrobangla pays and the profit gas concerns “two types of gas”. The gas delivered free of charge is the Government's “share of production from the reserves it owns”; the other type is the Government or Petrobangla “purchases from the portion of the reserves that goes to the IOC to compensate it for its participation in the PSC”; it is this type of gas that is “actually transacted in the market, i.e., bought and sold at the agreed market price”.1172

2019 The Claimant argues that the prices in Table 9 are “nominal prices" and these “nominal PSC prices cannot be compared with the JVA price”. The Claimant explains that the nominal price alone does not correctly represent the price that Petrobangla pays for the gas; both the profit gas supplied free of charge and the nominal price must be considered. What is relevant is the “effective price”, taking account both of the profit gas and of the gas to which the nominal price applies. It has not been challenged that the Average Cost to Petrobangla, as they are shown in Table 10 above reflects the effective price. The Claimant referred to the average in this table as the “effective average price".1173

2020 The Tribunal notes that both explanations about the contracts and their prices have in common that the nominal price and the profit gas are part of the contractual arrangement under which an investor develops a gas field and produces gas from it. In that arrangement, the nominal price in the PSCs is the remuneration of the investor; as understood by BAPEX, it compensates the IOC for the financial and technical contribution to the development of the resource. Another part of this arrangement is the delivery of free gas which compensates Petrobangla or the Government for the availability of the resource from which the gas is produced. Insofar it is correct that the “effective price” for the gas under a PSC is not just the nominal price specified im the PSC but includes the gas free of charge to which Petrobangla is also entitled. As a result, under the PSC, Petrobangla effectively pays less than the nominal price for the gas, which it receives. The free gas and the gas for which Petrobangla pays are part of the PSC operation.


1171 Brattle I, paragraph 55. ↩
1172 B-PHB 1, paragraph 112. ↩
1173 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 83. ↩

[Page 560]

2021 Understood in this manner, the PSC arrangement is different from the contract for the gas sold by the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture under the GPSA. Under the GPSA, Petrobangla pays the contract price calculated by the multiplication of the number of cubic feet of gas supplied with the unit price without any additional supply of profit gas. The Seller under the GPSA receives only the price so calculated and does not receive a share of the profit gas, as the Operator does under a PSC.

2022 The Tribunal concludes that the price under the PSCs is different from the price under the GPSA. The former is part of a revenue sharing arrangement, the latter is sales transaction.

2023 This being said, the “comparable gas producers in Bangladesh” to which the Parties refer in the discussion about the valuation of the Government's loss are the IOCs, operating under PSCs. The question therefore is whether the PSC prices and the GPSA price can be made comparable.

8.3.4 Making the GPSA price and the PSC prices comparable

2024 One of the principal differences between the PSC and the GPSA consists in the provision concerning the allocation of profits from the development and production of the resource, viz. the natural gas. In the PSC, the contract provides for this allocation by the provisions on the profit gas. In the arrangements for the development and production of the Chattak field there is also a provision for the allocation of the profits; but it is in the JVA and not in the GPSA. As discussed above in Section 7.2, BAPEX receives a share of the profits of the production of Chattak gas.

2025 This sharing of profits occurs in a different legal instrument. In the negotiations about the GPSA for the Feni gas, Petrobangla insisted on this difference. The Claimant produced extracts from minutes of meetings during the negotiations of the Feni GPSA:

c. By buying IOC's Gas at a higher than the well head price (the price at which marketing companies buy from production companies), Petrobangla compensate[s] its loss from its profit gas.

d. Petrobangla is not a party to this JVA, & as such there is no scope for Petrobangla to compensate its loss by purchasing this gas. On the other hand, as per JVA BAPEX will have a share of profit.1174


1174 Minutes of the meeting on 24 July and 4 August 2004, Exhibit C-321; quoted in C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 76. ↩

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2026 BAPEX is a 100% subsidiary of Petrobangla. The link of the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture with Petrobangla is highlighted also in the JVA itself, which provides in paragraph 14 of the Preamble that the “responsibilities and obligations of Petrobangla and Government in all relevant Articles, Annexes and Amendments under this JVA has been assign to BAPEX”. And in Article 24 the JVA provides that “BUYER of the JV's gas shall be Petrobangla or a designee of Petrobangla”, unless Petrobangla does not provide a “market outlet” in Bangladesh.

2027 In other words, the free gas which reduces the cost to Petrobangla expressed in the nominal price under the PSC, in this case accrues with BAPEX. When comparing the cost of the gas under the PSC with the price paid by Petrobangla to the Joint Venture, the contractual context must be considered and the operation must be seen in its entirety. In this comparison it must be taken into account that the financial benefit which Petrobangla receives as profit gas under the PSCs, accrues to it indirectly through its ownership of ВАРЕХ.

2028 Once the price in the GPSA and the profit share to BAPEX under the JVA are understood as part of the investment package, the loss calculation should not consider the GPSA price in isolation but must include allowance for the profit share of BAPEX under the JVA.

2029 Dr Carpenter had calculated the average costs to Petrobangla, as shown above in Table 10; this average takes account both of the nominal price and of the profit gas; it can thus be taken as a representation of the “effective average price”; the Claimant describes it by this term. In Brattle I, Dr Carpenter had calculated the Total Weighted Average at USD 1.67/Mcf, which he updated in the table in Brattle II for the period until 2019 with a total weighted USD 1.52/Mcf. The Claimant relies on the updated version of this table in Brattle II to reach its conclusion that it “was cheaper for Petrobangla to look for PSC gas for supply than to acquire JVA gas at USD 1.75/Mcf”.1175

2030 To make the GPSA price comparable to the effective price paid by Petrobangla to the IOCs under the PSCs, Dr Carpenter calculated the nominal price that would correspond to the effective average price. He described the calculation as follows:

Given the profit sharing formula between BAPEX and Niko specified in the JVA, the $1.67/Mcf average gas cost to Petrobangla translates into a price of $2.77/Mcf for the JV. In other words, if Petrobangla paid Niko

1175 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 83. ↩

[Page 562]

$2.77/Mcf, it would source gas from Niko at the average cost of IOC gas to Petrobangla.

2031 Because of the “slightly overstated” average net prices paid by Petrobangla (due to the inclusion of condensate), the “equivalent JV price would be somewhat lower than $2.76/Mcf. I use a price of $2.70/Mcf, which is close to the average price paid by Petrobangla to other IOCs for the profit gas and cost recovery gas” shown in Table 9.

2032 The Tribunal concludes from these explanations that the “average cost to the Government and Petrobangla”, calculated at USD 1.67/Mcf (or USD 1.52/Mcf for the period until 2019) must be compared not to the GPSA price of USD 1.75/Mcf but to USD 2.70/Mcf. Contrary to the Claimant's assertion that the PSC prices were cheaper for Petrobangla than the GPSA price, the demonstration of Dr Carpenter shows that it was Chattak gas, at the GPSA price, that was cheaper.

2033 The Tribunal notes that the demonstration by Dr Carpenter, as just quoted, is contained in a report on which the Claimant commented; it follows immediately the paragraph which the Claimant quoted in extenso.1176 The demonstration made in Brattle I nevertheless remained without contradiction.

2034 Considering the arguments about the differences between the GPSA price and the PSC prices and the demonstration of Dr Carpenter, the Tribunal sees another approach for rendering the two prices comparable: Petrobangla pays for the gas delivered under the GPSA and, indirectly, for the profit shares which BAPEX receives free of charge under the JVA. The GPSA price thus covers both elements which must be considered when determining the cost of Petrobangla. From this perspective, the GPSA price must be compared to the effective price.

2035 The Tribunal determined above that, in the absence of the blowouts, the quantity of gas for the loss of which Niko is liable would have been delivered in 2006 and the payment for this quantity would have had to be made by Petrobangla before the end of that year. The Tribunal assumes that the loss occurred during this period.

2036 The approach of Dr Carpenter considers: in Table 10 of Brattle I, the Average Costs to Petrobangla are USD 1.65/Mcf for the fiscal year 2005-2006 and USD 1.52/Mcf for the fiscal year 2006-2007; the average between these two amounts is USD 1.59/Mcf. The difference between the GPSA price, adjusted


1176 At paragraph 74 of C-Gas Loss Calculation Update the Claimant quotes Brattle I, paragraph 55; the passage with the explanation justifying the USD 2.70/Mcf GPSA price taking account of the profit sharing in the JVA. ↩

[Page 563]

as per Brattle I (USD 2.70/Mcf), and Petrobangla's average effective payments to the comparable gas producers is USD 1.115/Mcf.

2037 The alternative approach described by the Tribunal compares the GPSA price of USD 1.75/Mcf to the average nominal PSC prices found in Table 9 of Brattle I: for fiscal years 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, the average prices are USD 2.78/Mcf and USD 2.67/Mcf, respectively; the average between these two amounts is USD 2.73/Mcf. According to this approach, the difference between Petrobangla's price to other producers and the GPSA price is USD 0.98/Mcf.

2038 As Dr Carpenter's approach was presented in the Arbitration since 2016 and remained uncontradicted, the Tribunal adopts his valuation of the gas loss. The loss of the Government and Petrobangla caused by the 8.542 Bcf for which Niko is liable, using the USD 1.115/Mcf price, amounts therefore to USD 9'524'330.

2039 The loss which this payment compensates was determined by reference to prices that were all expressed US Dollars. No payments in BDT were considered. The Tribunal concludes that loss occurred in US Dollar. The payment for its compensation also must be made in US Dollar.

8.3.5 Mitigation and production uncertainties

2040 The Claimant argued that “Petrobangla and the Government failed to prove mitigation of damages”.1177 The argument relates essentially to the loss of gas after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well operation and possible mitigation of that loss by drilling new wells and producing gas from the Reservoir.

2041 The Tribunal has considered above in Section 7.6.6, the question of the success of that relief operation and the responsibility for the gas loss that may have occurred after 9 October 2005. The Tribunal determined Niko's liability for the limited quantities of gas that, in the Tribunal's opinion, continued to seep from the Reservoir and the responsibility with respect to reduction of further losses by producing gas from the Chattak field. No further determination is required.

2042 The Claimant also argues that BAPEX's quantification of the gas loss fails to reflect uncertainties of operating in Bangladesh.1178 It had presented this argument in its Counter-Memorial on Damages 1179 and referred to this


1177 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, Section III.C. ↩
1178 C-PHB 2, Section II.C.2. ↩
1179 Paragraphs 276 to 283. ↩

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argument in the Reply on Quantum for Updated Lost Gas Calculations. It then replied in its Post-Hearing Reply Brief1180 to new argument in BAPEX's Post-Hearing Brief.

2043 The argument responds to BAPEX's case according to which the gas in the Reservoir can no longer be produced; only Sands 3 to 8 remain for production. The quantification is based on the comparison of the reserves in the Reservoir before and after the blowout. In a later variation the reason for this approach to quantification is based on the assumption that, despite the Chattak 2B relief well operation, gas continued to flow from the Reservoir with the effect that no producible gas remained in it.

2044 The Claimant argues that the “projected production is a purely hypothetical exercise” and should be treated as claim for loss of an opportunity1181 and states that the “asserted damages are based on a model that deducts the results of one set of uncertain projections from another set of uncertain projections."1182 The Claimant discussed “risks that could have the effect of halting, reducing or delaying production the realization of revenue by the joint venture.1183 It argues that the Tribunal should apply a “significant” “measure of discount".1184

2045 BAPEX denies that there is uncertainty. It argues that uncertainty about the reserves is reflected in the estimate qualified as “risked” and delay in the development would not affect the total production, just its timing. Delay in receipt of payment would be covered by interest.1185

2046 When determining the gas loss for which Niko is liable, the Tribunal accepted liability for the gas that according to the estimates escaped from the Reservoir during Periods 1 and 2. The uncertainty about these quantities are part of the estimate and need not be considered separately. With respect to Period 3, the Tribunal has accepted that Niko is liable for an estimated quantity of gas that would have been lost even if further wells would have been drilled and gas would have been produced from the Reservoir.

In that context, BAPEX had raised arguments to show that it had not been established that the production wells would have been successfully drilled


1180 Paragraphs 50 to 53. ↩
1181 C-CMD, paragraphs 279 and 277. ↩
1182 C-Gas Loss Calculation Update, paragraph 109. ↩
1183 CMD, paragraph 282. ↩
1184 CMD, paragraphs 279 and 283. ↩
1185 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 123 – 126. ↩

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and would have produced commercially valuable gas. The Tribunal dismissed these objections.1186

8.4 Interest

2047 BAPEX requests “pre-award and post-award interest on all sums awarded”.1187 Dr Carpenter stated that he was “instructed that the legally appropriate pre-award interest I 6-month LIBOR + 2% calculated without compounding”. He produced a table showing the sums for interest on the amounts he had valued.1188 In the tables showing the claimed losses in several scenarios, BAPEX includes columns for pre-award interest.1189

2048 In its Memorial on Damages, BAPEX referred to the Tribunals' decision on the Payment Claim and submits that the interest decision should be applied also to BAPEX's and the Government's losses. BAPEX submitted that the same approach should also be applied to the post-award interest.1190

2049 The Claimant objected to the claim for pre-award interest in its Counter-Memorial on Damages.1191 It stated that the Tribunals' decision on interest in the Payment Claim was based on a statutory entitlement und the Bangladesh Sale of Goods Act, for non-payment of the Joint Venture's invoices.1192 These provisions were not applicable to BAPEX's and the Government's gas loss claims. The Claimant argued that, as a matter of substantive law pre-award interests was contractually excluded by Article 27.2 of the JVA. As “a form of compensatory damage” the interest claim was dependent on special circumstances and required evidence to prove a damage.

2050 The Claimant also considered the claim for interest under the procedural law of ICSID and wrote:

In the further alternative, should the Tribunal determine that the procedural law of ICSID governs the granting of pre-award interest, it is at the Tribunals' discretion whether to award it and whether to do so for only a part of the period claimed. For the reasons of BAPEX's failures to prove any damages, bring this claim in a timely manner, mitigate its losses, and for having materially delayed the ultimate resolution of the

1186 Section 7.5.6.5. ↩
1187 B-PHB 1, paragraph 133(f). ↩
1188 Brattle II, paragraph 16 and Table 4. ↩
1189 B-PHB 1, Tables at pages 47 – 49. ↩
1190 BMD, paragraphs 392 – 397. ↩
1191 CMD, paragraphs 437 – 447. ↩
1192 CMD, paragraph 439 with reference to the Decision on the Payment Claim, paragraphs 234 – 236. ↩

[Page 566]

Compensation Declaration by its conduct throughout, the Tribunal should decline to award any pre-award interest to BAPEX.

2051 Prior to the November 2020 Hearing, the Tribunal submitted to the Parties a list of questions which included the following questions concerning the interest claim:

  1. Is pre-award interest recoverable under clause 27.2 of the JVA?
  2. Do the other grounds invoked by the Claimant exclude such interest?
  3. Is the rate of the claimed interest justified, in light of the objections raised by the Claimant?
  4. If the Tribunal finds that a LIBOR based rate is applicable, how should the rate be defined, once LIBOR is no longer quoted?1193

2052 In the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, the Tribunal noted that, the Respondents had not addressed these questions at the November 2020 Hearing. The Tribunal therefore reserved its decision on the interest claim.1194 The Claimant noted the decision and pointed out that BAPEX had also not addressed the question subsequently.1195

2053 In the First Post-Hearing Brief BAPEX justifies the claim by stating:

...pre-award interest should be awarded because it would compensate Respondent for the delay in receiving compensation. Money loses value over time. Interest rates provide compensation for that loss of value. In the event that the Tribunal concludes that damages must be awarded in BDT, then pre-award interest rate should also be denominated in BDT and would be higher than the USD 6M LIBOR + 2 claimed by the Respondent.1196

2054 The Claimant did not respond to these observations by BAPEX. These observations by BAPEX address the Tribunal's question only in part.

2055 The Tribunal has considered in detail the law and practice in Bangladesh concerning interest.1197 Both Parties referred to these explanations.

2056 Concerning the principle, the Tribunal noted that Section 61(2) of the Bangladesh 1930 Sale of Goods Act provides that the Court “may award interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the amount of price”. It has not been


1193 List of questions sent to the Parties by the Secretariat on 16 November 2020. ↩
1194 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraphs 677 – 680. ↩
1195 C-Gas Loss Calculation, paragraph 106 and 107. ↩
1196 B-PHB 1, paragraph 130. ↩
1197 First Decision on the Payment Claim, Section 8, paragraphs 231 – 275. ↩

[Page 567]

argued that the provision is applicable to the claims of BAPEX or the Government.

2057 The Tribunal noted that this Section of the Civil Procedure Code provides powers for the courts to order the payment of pre-award and post-award interest:

Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, when further interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged, from the date of the decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit.

2058 Leaving aside the question of characterisation of the law on interest, the Tribunal notes that this provision leaves to the courts to decide whether interest is to be paid. Similarly, tribunals in ICSID proceedings have assumed the power to make this decision.1198

2059 BAPEX has not provided any evidence about a specific damage caused by the fact that the compensation for the gas loss has not been paid by the Claimant. BAPEX and its expert Brattle have, however, insisted on the situation on the energy market in Bangladesh and the shortage of gas. In these circumstances, the Tribunal accepts that the loss of BAPEX, Petrobangla and the Government consists not only in the value of the gas but also in the unavailability of the compensation for this unavailability of gas.

2060 The Tribunal therefore accepts that the gas loss claims for losses of BAPEX and the Government bear interest.

2061 As part of the damage, the unavailability of the compensation arose at the time when the gas loss occurred. As explained above, the Tribunal assumes that, in the absence of the blowouts, a quantity of gas would have been produced in 2006 sufficient to cover the compensation ordered by the Tribunal. The Tribunal therefore decides that interest starts running from the 1st of January 2007.

2062 Concerning the rates of interest, the Tribunals noted in the First Decision on the Payment Claim that there is in Bangladesh no statutory rate for interest


1198 See e.g. Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, 1 June 2009, paragraph 595; Infracapital F1 S.à r.l. and Infracapital Solar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/18, Award, 2 May 2023, paragraph 187. ↩

[Page 568]

on payments in default. For interest on payments in taka, the Parties agreed that the rate of 5% was reasonable.1199

2063 In the context of the discussion on the rate to be applied in that decision, the Parties provided several references concerning interest on payments in US Dollar. Having considered this information, the Tribunals decided on six-month LIBOR + 2%. This is also the rate which BAPEX claims for the US Dollars claims. The Claimant submitted that the interest claim should be dismissed and did not propose a rate.

2064 Since the Tribunal's decision in 2014, difficulties occurred with respect to the LIBOR reference. Quotations have been discontinued. In consultation with the Parties the Tribunal therefore replaced the LIBOR rate by reference to the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR); the date for changing the reference was 20 November 2020.

2065 The Parties have not provided any information that would lead to interest rates different from those on which the Tribunals' decisions concerning the Payment Claim were based. This Tribunal will therefore apply these rates also to the sums awarded for the gas loss.

2066 In the proceedings on the Payment Claim, the Claimant requested compound interest. The Tribunal decided in the Second Decision on the Payment Claim that interest on the amounts awarded on the payments due from Petrobangla to Niko shall be compounded annually.1200

2067 In the proceedings on gas loss, Dr Carpenter explained in Brattle I that his instructions were on interest “without compounding”. He confirmed in Brattle II and Brattle III that he was calculating pre-award interest without compounding.1201 BAPEX however quotes the passage from the Second Decision on the Payment Claim which specifies “compounded annually”. BAPEX notes the addition concerning compounding and “maintains that there is no logical reason that post-award interest in this case could not be applied on the same basis”. It quotes from the Second Decision on the Payment Claim that

... the Tribunals accept that compounding is a commercial reality firmly established in international commercial relations and therefore presumed to be a regular element of damages when money owed is withheld. Consequently, the Tribunals are of the view that in international

1199 First Decision on the Payment Claim, paragraph 238. ↩
1200 Decision on the Implementation of the Decision on the Payment Claim, Section 7 and paragraph 167 (ii). ↩
1201 Brattle II, paragraph 16 and Brattle III, paragraph 13. ↩

[Page 569]

commercial relations a claim for compound interest does not require any specific evidence.1202

2068 The Tribunals also considered in this decision the interval or rest. They wrote:

While commercial practice is firmly established with respect to the principle of compounding, the intervals (or rests) for compounding vary considerably.

2069 The Tribunals examined the practice with respect to the intervals and the Claimant's argument and evidence related to the issue. They concluded:

... the Claimant has not established a basis for compounding interest at an interval shorter than annual. In the absence of such evidence, the Tribunals consider that a conservative approach to the requisite interval for compounding is warranted. The Tribunals order that interest must be compounded annually.1203

For the decision now to be taken, this Tribunal concludes that BAPEX seeks interest compounded annually. The reasons it explained in the Second Decision on the Payment Claim apply here, too. The Tribunal concludes that the sums awarded for gas loss shall bear interest, compounded annually, from 1 January 2007 until complete settlement. On sums awarded in Bangladesh Taka the rate shall be 5% p.a. and on sums awarded in US Dollars the rate shall be six-month LIBOR + 2% until 19 November 2020 and thereafter 180-day average SOFR + 2%.


1202 Decision on the Implementation of the Decision on the Payment Claim, paragraph 147, quoted in BMD, FN 808 at page 213. ↩
1203 Decision on the Implementation of the Decision on the Payment Claim, paragraphs 151 and 164. ↩

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9 ENVIRONMENTAL LOSSES

2070 The Environmental Losses which are the subject of the present Section have been described, examined and assessed in various reports and submissions; and some of these losses have been the subject of discussions and agreements between the local population and its representatives with Niko or have otherwise been settled. The Tribunal has considered certain aspects of these losses in some of its earlier Decisions, in particular in the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss

2071 Before considering specifically the environmental losses that remain to be determined by it, the Tribunal sets out below the context in which the losses and the related claims arose and describes the past action in their respect. This description of the context complements the descriptions in other parts of this Award and does so with a specific focus on the loss and damage caused to the population of Tengratila and the environment.

9.1 The context of the Environmental Losses

9.1.1 The Tengratila village and its inhabitants

2072 The Niko site in the Chattak gas field, where the first and the second blowout occurred, is located in the village of Tengratila, in the far northeast of Bangladesh. The village and its surroundings are characterised by a rural context in a remote part of Bangladesh. During the years from 1959 to 1985 a major change was introduced in this context by the development and production for 25 years of a natural gas well (Chattak 1), which introduced new activities and a rapid growth of the population.

2073 The new project under the BAPEX/Niko Joint Venture was located on the same compound on which the Chattak 1 well had produced gas, which meant that the new operations under the JVA were not expected to require “any alteration or disturbance of any land area outside the Chattak gas field compound".1204

2074 As explained by BAPEX, the village of Tengratila “is located in the Dowarabazar Upazila of the Sunamganj District, in Sylhet Division, and falls under the local administration of the Surma Union, which, until 2011, was part of the Lakshmipur Union”.1205


1204 EIA, Exhibit C-13, pages 2 and VIII. ↩
1205 BMD, paragraph 320, relying on WS Shahjahan, paragraph 3. For a map of Bangladesh, situation Tengratila, see above Section 3. ↩

[Page 571]

2075 BAPEX explained that “Residents of Tengratila conceptualise their village as divided into at least five different localities: Tengratila proper, Ajabpur, Girish Nagar, Koiyajuri and Shantipur”. Md. Shahjahan clarified that “Tengratila, Ajabpur, and Girish Nagar are the closest to the Niko compound.”1206

2076 Relying on the First Expert Report by Betton, Borthwick and Leinster (BBL I), who had visited Tengratila from 3 to 9 February 2016, BAPEX explained:

Tengratila, Ajabpur, and Girish Nagar are clustered right around the Niko Compound. These small villages comprise “some 200 buildings, including dwellings, school buildings, a Mosque, community buildings, shops and other small businesses.” Interspersed throughout the villages are fruit trees, small gardens and ponds used for fish cultivation. The entire area is surrounded by rice paddies.1207

2077 Concerning the number of inhabitants, BAPEX relied on Niko's June 2004 EIA report and stated that “there were ‘about 7058 inhabitants in the study area', covering a five kilometre radius from the project site”. BAPEX added:

When gas exploration first began in the late 1950s, “[o]nly 15-20 families lived in” Tengratila, whereas in 2004 “600-650 families ha[d] their homes around the gas plant site.” The majority of those migrated to the area in search of a better life and converted the surrounding land into productive agricultural land. The 2001 official census reported that Tengratila, Ajabpur and Girish Nagar collectively had a population of 2,062. By 2011, this number had increased to 3,387.1208

2078 The First Environmental Losses Report stated:

There are 1400 families in Tengratila village and 600 families in Ajabpur village. The total population of these two villages is about 5000.1209

2079 The 2004 EIA Report, from which the quotation about increase in the number of families is taken, reports on a public consultation that had taken place prior to the drilling of the Chattak 2 well. This consultation confirmed that the “overwhelming (90% families) number of settlers in and around the Tengratila gas plant migrated” from other parts of the country during 1942 to 1962 to Tengratila “for better working opportunities and better living


1206 WS Shahjahan, paragraph 2. ↩
1207 BMD, paragraph 322, relying on BBL I, paragraph 148. ↩
1208 BMD, paragraph 321, relying on the EIA, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, pages 4, 111 and 112, and for the numbers of inhabitants in 2001 and 2011 on the census records by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Exhibits R-166 and R-120. ↩
1209 First Environmental Losses Report, attached to the Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 5; see also the same Report in a different translation, Exhibit Annex R-1. ↩

[Page 572]

scope".1210 In the context of this consultation, the participants in the consultation reported that,

... when they settled here, the Gas plant site was covered by the flora, mainly bushes. There was insufficient agricultural land. Gradually the land was converted to agricultural land and for settlement. [...] During the consultation period it has been noted that Tengratila site rapidly developed when the gas supply started from this Gas Plant. The local residents got many opportunities like jobs in the company, road and communication facilities linked with the Dowarabazar thana complex, different growth centers and Sunamganj district town. Tengratila Bazar was also established and developed during this period. On hearing of possibilities of re-opening the gas site, most of the families welcomed any development activities. They were hopeful if it is started they will get job and working opportunities will increase.

Before 1959 the economic condition of the Tengratila villagers was very poor. Their sole occupation was limited to fishing activities, agricultural and day labor. When the gas plant site was established, local community members were engaged in different occupations like company jobs, businesses, small trading, shops, poultry, vegetable gardening, farming activities. During this period their socio-economic condition was improving and people were happy. The women contributed much to this development process.1211

2080 The BBL I Report of 23 March 2016 added some further explanations about Tengratila and the Tengratila villages:

Many of these [buildings of the villages] are set amongst trees, which provide shade and may also produce fruit. Many houses have associated vegetable plots and there are also large areas within the village set aside for vegetable production. The main arable farming land is given over to rice paddies and these surround the village in all directions. At the time of the visit [BBL Experts from 3 – 9 February 20161212] these were in various stages of production, some flooded, some recently planted and others were dry with rice growing whilst others were apparently fallow and awaiting the next stage. Also in and around the village are a number of fish ponds which are used for the production of fish. Some ponds are used as breeding areas for the production of fingerling fry, which then

1210 EIA, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, page 112. ↩
1211 EIA, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, page 111. ↩
1212 BBL I, page 10. ↩

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are transferred to other ponds for growing on to marketable size. A total of 17 ponds were observed during our site visit.

An open area adjacent to both the school and the Niko Compound is essentially a play area for the school children who use it during breaks in the school day and after school. Cricket is played on a regular basis on this ground.1213

2081 The 2004 EIA Report had recorded that the Tengratila “population had already experienced activities of the whole range of gas exploration and production project cycle during the period when BAPEX operated its gas exploration and production project”1214 and had benefitted from the opportunities outside the agricultural and fishery sector, as described above.

2082 BAPEX produced in 2016 a “map roughly locating the three villages in relation to the Chattak gas filed, along with certain key landmarks and indication of the current gas intensity», showing also the contours of the Niko compound, the two blowout wells (Ch2 and Ch2A) and the earlier Chattak 1 well (CH1):1215


1213 BBL I, 23 March 2016, paragraphs 148 – 149. ↩
1214 EIA, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, page 110. ↩
1215 BMD, page 170, Figure 12. ↩

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TENGRATILA AND SURROUNDING AREA

Legend:

Scale:

.25 .50 .75 Kilometers

Prepared by: International Mapping

2083 BAPEX also provided some further information about the economic activity of the inhabitants of Tengratila:

Perhaps unsurprisingly for a place where many people are engaged in subsistence agriculture, the district in which Tengratila is located, Sunamganj District, is the seventh poorest district in Bangladesh, with 26% of its population living below the poverty level in 2010. A portion of agricultural production is also sold for basic spending income. Some inhabitants of Tengratila also keep fish ponds. According to the 2004 ΕΙΑ report, people are also engaged in “businesses, small trading, shop[keeping], poultry [raising], [and] vegetable gardening.” The Chattak gas field apparently generated some jobs for the local inhabitants, but a study conducted in 2008 observed that the major occupation in the area is farming and that “[m]ost of the families of the study area [...] were agricultural based.”1216

1216 BMD, paragraph 323, relying on WS Shahjahan, paragraph 9; K. Sohel, “Rangpur has the highest poverty rate,” Dakha Tribune, 28 August 2014, Exhibit R-210; ΕΙΑ, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, p. 111, WS Glaholt I, paragraph 50; Z. Ahmed, A Development Disaster of Bangladesh: The Impact of Tengra Tila (Niko-Chhatak) Gas Field Blowouts on the Livelihood of the Local Communities (2009) (Ahmed), Exhibit R-123, page 35. ↩

[Page 575]

9.1.2 The Blowouts: overview of the events

2084 The two blowouts that occurred in the Chattak field, in particular their causes and the responsibility for them, have been described and discussed in several prior decisions of the Tribunal and in the present Award. In order to situate the specific context for the environmental damage, the Tribunal presents here available information about how the blowouts manifested themselves in the surrounding environment and their immediate consequences. The circumstances specific to each category of environmental damage claimed is presented in further detail in the context of each claim.

9.1.2.1 The First Blowout

2085 The first blowout occurred on 7 January 2005. It was accompanied by a very loud noise and consisted in the escape of large quantities of gas which ignited, burning in a high flame, and the ejection of sand and debris from the well which spread over the BAPEX/Niko compound and beyond.

2086 These immediate effects were described in the report on “Well Control Chattak-2”, reporting on the drilling of the Chattak 2 well and the blowout. The report is undated, but it appears that it was prepared shortly after the blowout. It summarises the development of the blowout during the wiper trip and the attempts of the drilling crew to control it. The report then continues to describe the development in the evening of 7 January 2005 and the following morning:

It was noticed that ground started cracking near bell nipple. Mr. Zhang told everybody to go to a safer place; so we left the location.

Rig power was shut down. Gas was burnt thru flare line for 90 min. The fire came down slowly after 90 min. We were at safe distance from rig. We heard loud sound coming from inside the well. Part of rig area started cracking & gas came up.

Entire crew were taken to a safe place with security by car.

At about 0400 hrs, we heard a loud sound & gas started coming up vigorously. We came to know that at 0430 hrs, rig submerged into ground. Gas was coming up continuously with louder & louder sound. At 0655 hrs, gas caught fire & continue burning. Then, we tried to leave that place by boat, but failed due to angry mob. Finally, Rajat & Pattapong

[Page 576]

reached Chattak jetty at 1645 hrs. Geoservices unit#89 & tool container went into underground.1217

2087 The events then were described in the Chattak 2 Well Control Incident and Blowout – Draft Report, dated 11 January 2005 which confirmed that in the morning of 8 January the derrick “fell and disappeared into the crater” and that at 6:55 the “flare ignited and well flowed out of control”. It then reported:

There were no injuries or fatalities. The flow was sweet dry gas with no liquids of any description.

On 9 January 2005 at 09:30am, flow diminished and extinguished.

Area inspection indicated small flares through fissures in and around the drill site.

Gas flare continues to decrease daily. The field is being monitored with daily site visits.

Full investigation is underway by all parties concerned.1218

2088 Following an enquiry of 15 January 2005, Niko's then Vice President Bangladesh Operations, Mr Peter Mercier, wrote on 16 January 2005 to the Department of the Environment of the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), explaining that he just returned from a visit to the site and reported that the escaping gas was reducing. About the situation on site he reported:

Two water wells are flowing clean water.

The gas release has polluted around the well site. The pollutants are comprised mostly of mud and sand and water. They have flooded the rice field north of the location. The diesel fuel tanks on site have been emptied and the fuel is being stored at a tank near the jetty.

Clean up and removal of salvageable items has begun. Location construction will begin in the next few days for the construction of the relief well.

Niko has engaged an environmental specialist named Mr Randall Glaholt. He had been to the site a year ago prior to any construction drilling. Mr Glaholt is currently obtaining a Bangladesh visa and will

1217 Sequence of Events: Well Control Chattak-2, Exhibit C-19. ↩
1218 Chattak 2 Well Control Incident and Blowout – Draft Report, 11 January 2005, Exhibit C-21. ↩

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arrive in Dhaka the latter part of this week. We are also in the process of hiring a safety expert to assist with the operation on site.

Regarding the affected residents nearby, Niko is currently negotiating settlement with the all affected residents.1219

2089 Mr Glaholt, the environmental specialist announced by Mr Mercier, arrived on site on 22 January 2005 1220 and prepared an Environmental Site Inspection Report, dated 26 January 2005.1221 In that report he presented a “General Description of the Incident", described the blowout itself in terms similar to those of the Well Control Report, just quoted, with some additional information: he mentioned that at about 4:30 on 8 January, when the drilling rig collapsed,“villagers and non essential personnel were instructed to evacuate the area near the well site”. The flare that was created when the gas ignited at 6:55 was “approximately 100 m in height” and was accompanied by projections of “bricks and a large quantity of soil around the well site and surrounding area, including portions of the village of Tengratila”. This gas flare

... burned aggressively for approximately 21.5 hours before self extinguishing at about 09:30 hrs on January 9, 2005. The escaping gas again self-ignited by 12:00 hrs on January 9. 2005: however, at this point the fire was significantly reduced and confined to a series of smaller burn areas peripheral to the blowout crater.

2090 Concerning the composition of the escaping gas, Mr Glaholt explained in his second witness statement:

The gas produced by the Chattak 2 well blowout was a pure, dry and sweet natural gas mixture – it contained no salt water, liquid hydrocarbons, or hydrogen sulfide. Including butanes, 99% of the West Chattak gas stream is comprised of natural gas products that are within North American specifications for commercial use indoors and outdoors for heating and cooking.1222

1219 Produced as annex to the First Environmental Losses Report which in turn was attached with the letter to the Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis). ↩
1220 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 6 and 12. ↩
1221 Environmental Site Inspection Report, dated 26 January 2005 (Environmental Site Inspection Report), Exhibit C-25. ↩
1222 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 11 with reference to Niko's letter to BAPEX, 14 December 2004, Exhibit C-15, Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23; Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25, see below. ↩

[Page 578]

2091 BAPEX produced photographs taken following the first blowout, including the following ones about the initial flare:1223

and

2092 The ejection of soil and debris from the well during the initial period was described as follows:

During the first two days of the blowout, escaping gas created a geyser of native sand/soil and some drilling mud (KCI polymer-based). Projection of material around the well bore has created a broad cone of soil approximately 2 m+ high around well centre which has filled with water/mud to an undetermined depth. Soil/sand debris has been most conspicuously spread over portions of an area approximately 200 m x 400 m adjacent to the well site, though some fine dust has been reported as far as 2 km away.1224

1223 Exhibit R-124 consists of the 83 photographs for which no information about date and exact location is provided. ↩
1224 Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25, page 2. ↩

[Page 579]

2093 The Glaholt Report continues by describing the effect of the geyser of soil and debris:

Mineral debris blown from the well has variably blanketed adjacent ground, paddy. vegetable plots, fruit trees and native vegetation in a generally northwest direction with some accumulations exceeding 10 cm.1225

2094 In his second witness statement, Mr Glaholt described the ejection of debris from the blowout well as follows:

In the first moments of the blowout, some sand and soil was thrown up into the air. This was spread primarily over the Niko site and to a lesser degree within about 300m to the West. With respect to any other materials involved in the blowout, any liquid hydrocarbons on site were subject to incineration. It is my view (and was my observation at the time) that by far the vast majority of drilling mud involved in the blowout remained on site, as did any other potentially deleterious substances. To the extent any of the drilling mud was spread off of the Niko compound, it did not contain any harmful chemicals [...]. Indeed, by the time that I arrived at the site in January 2005, any potential contaminants had burned off. No hydrocarbon sheen was apparent on any standing water in the vicinity of the Niko site.1226

2095 Some of the photographs produced by BAPEX show the accumulation, with higher deposits on the BAPEX/Niko Site than in the surrounding areas:


1225 Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25, page 2. ↩
1226 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 12, referring to Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23; Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25. ↩

[Page 580]

[Page 581]

2096 The Glaholt Report of 26 January 2005 also mentioned direct effects of the blowout on the aquifer and the surface water; it stated:

The blowout has produced an undetermined volume of water and has pressurized near-surface aquifers resulting in positive flow from at least seven water wells. Two formerly dry paddy areas have become flooded and are also being used for containment of excess flow from the well site.

2097 The development during the following days was described as follows:

As of January 26, 2005, 18 days after the initial release, small fires continued to burn from fissures in the ground around the rim of the blowout crater and un-combusted gas continued to boil up through ponded water at the crater and the flooded paddy immediately north of the crater. A relatively large gas boil was in evidence along the north edge of the paddy, approximately 15 m from dry ground close to habitations in Tengratila. Sampling of voids associated with small cracks in the ground immediately north of the paddy and south of the crater near NIKO buildings revealed the presence of elevated levels of combustible gas.

2098 The BAPEX photographs contain examples of what seems to represent one type of such smaller fires after the initial flare:

[Page 582]

2099 The section on the General Description of the Incident in the Glaholt report concludes by reporting on materials and “potentially deleterious substances” on the BAPEX/Niko site, preceded by the description of some other aspects of the blowout:

As of January 26, 2005, there have been no injuries associated with the blowout. Heat from the initial flare has killed or heat-damaged a number of trees (including mango, coconut, betel nut and bamboo) and herbaceous vegetation within approximately 200 m of the well site. Some local vegetable, rice and pineapple crops have been partially blanketed by soil thrown from the well site area. At least two fish ponds appear to have been adversely affected. Significant natural habitat for wildlife species is not present in the area and so is unaffected. As mentioned, a total of seven water wells (two on NIKO property, five in the village of Tengratila) have been documented with positive flow which previously required hand pumping. Vibration of the earth and projectiles caused by the blowout has resulted in some minor structural damage to local buildings. Fire has destroyed one residence and one of NIKO's office buildings. A power line support has been weakened as a result of soil liquefaction associated with gas release.1227

2100 The report then describes the environmental action taken. It starts by action taken on the BAPEX/Niko site, in particular with respect to potentially


1227 All quotations from Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25, page 2. ↩

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deleterious substances and continues with the action affecting the area outside the site:

  1. A 1 km security zone was immediately established around the blowout area following the blowout. Security personnel have been actively trying to keep local villagers from the site.
  2. Three residences have been evacuated immediately north of the well site.
  3. Two sections of additional security fence are being installed to better control site access and ensure public safety.
  4. A powerline to the village has been temporarily shut off and will be reestablished along a more secure alignment.
  5. Liquid flow from the well area is being contained within the dike system of two rice paddies.
  6. Three 125-barrel diesel fuel tanks were subsequently removed from the site and approximately 50 cubic meters of diesel associated with them was removed for subsequent re-use.
  7. Excavation and recovery of equipment and buildings adjacent to the blowout site continues.
  8. A post-impact environmental audit and monitoring program has commenced in collaboration with Crown Agents Services Limited (CASL).1228

2101 The report concludes by information about the Post-Impact Environmental Audit and Monitoring Programme, as this will be discussed below in Section 9.2.2.

2102 The First Environmental Losses Report, dated 17 January 2005,1229 based on a one-day visit of the site on 10 January 2005 and discussions with local persons and other sources consulted by telephone and newspaper articles, contains some of the information described above; it also contains some additional and some contradicting information, in particular:

2103 The height of the initial flare is confirmed as “about 100 meters”, and its diameter is stated to have been 5 meters. The report adds that “there was


1228 Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25, page 3. ↩
1229 Exhibit Annex R-1; the Report with some of its annexes is produced in a different translation as Annex to the Second Environmental Losses Report of 13 April 2005, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis). ↩

[Page 584]

heavy heat and sound, deadly earthquake was recorded within 4 km surrounding of the burning well No 2. Sand and stones started blowing out towards all sides along with the ablaze”. It also contains information about the effect on the inhabitants of Tengratila and Ajabpur.

Once the fire incident took place with a deadly sound including a strong earthquake on the morning of 01-08-2005, it was announced on the mosque's loudspeaker and the villagers were asked to take shelter at a safe distance. Although it was possible to secure peoples' lives, the safety of personal assets was not certain. Because of the rapid abandonment of households, looting of daily consumable goods of the villagers including cattle, TVs, and valuable, movable property took place. Forcefully erupted sand-stone emanated, which along with extreme heat and noise, an earthquake, and the fire, made the villagers frightened. Several households and more than one hundred shops of the market located at the eastern boundary of the gas well were closed. [...] The supply of gas and electricity in said area was stopped immediately after the accident. To date, the villagers have not returned to their homes. [...] Household goods of the villagers including wealth and environment were widely damaged.1230

2104 The report also provides information on other damage and losses which shall be discussed in further detail below in Section 9.5.

2105 On 24 January 2005 Safety Boss Inc, a Canadian well control and safety consultant engaged by Niko, provided a “Summary Report Covering the Period from Jan 09 to Jan 12, 2005".1231 Personnel of this firm had arrived on site on 9 January 2005, inspected the site with the objective of determining the required action.1232 Concerning the events before the arrival of Safety Boss personnel, the report mentioned the initial high flame and the “tremendous amounts of debris including sand, rocks, bricks and smaller parts of drilling equipment”; it added: “Gas flow reported through fissures up to 100m away with the main part of the flow being concentrated within the crater”.

2106 The report then described, based on the authors' own observations, the crater that had formed around the wellbore and the deposits of the debris ejected by the blowout.

The wellbore crater was oval shaped approximately 70m by 30m, with the long axis being from hole center to SSE, the banks around the crater

1230 Quoted from Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 6. ↩
1231 Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23. ↩
1232 See WS Adolph I, paragraph 52. ↩

[Page 585]

were 5 to 10m above the original GL. Numerous small fires (10 to 20) were burning all around the crater bowl with the larger fires being along a fissure extending approximately 40m SSE from well center. Maхітит flame height was 15m. Outside of the crater the entire area within 100m of well center including all the equipment was covered with sand and surface dirt to a depth of .5 to 2m deep. The conductor pipe with an internal csg string was visible approximately 5m below GL, both pipes are badly abrasion eroded, no drill pipe was visible. The drilling rig mast and substructure had completely disappeared.

2107 Safety Boss advised that “with virtually no surface wellhead remaining surface intervention was no longer possible” and a relief well was required. The report made a number of recommendations.

Priority Issues

1 – Public safety is the primary concern. There are numerous residents in the immediate area, some as close as 60m (all distances are from well center), many within 200m, as well there have at times been several hundred spectators encroaching within the potential hazard area.

Gas flow up through the ground is unpredictable, the gas will seek the path of least resistance to surface, and as flow channels collapse or become plugged the flow goes elsewhere. The usual circumstances is for the majority of the flow to concentrate near the well center and/or to areas where there is less overburden pressure such as mud pits, sumps, water wells and other depressions,

The most serious safety concern is the potential accumulation of unignited or non-burning gas vapors drifting into areas where people are. The longest isopleth of a burnable fuel/air mixture, commonly known as a 100% LEL (lowest explosive level) is thought to be 100m from well center at flow conditions as reported at 10 AM on 10 Jan.

As long as the fire(s) remains burning this risk is minimal.

The flow rate or fire size waxes and wanes over a period of a few hours however the overall flow rate over the observation period covered by this report has continued to diminish substantially. An approximate estimation is that the flow has diminished by 60 to 95%.

2108 The report continues by providing recommendations concerning Niko's operations followed by a summary:

[Page 586]

Although much national attention has been focused on this event it is in relative terms not a serious event. In evaluating this it is important to note the following;

1 – No injuries or loss of life occurred.

2 – The gas flow was & is dry and sweet, likely 100 % methane with no H2S.

3 – Environmental damage is minimal involving formation sand, displaced surface soil and near surface soil and it is contained almost entirely within the Niko owned land.

4 – No salt water or liquid hydrocarbons were involved.

2109 To put the observations into perspective, Safety Boss pointed out that, prior to the inspection of the Chattak 2 blowout, the company had been involved in 5 separate losses of well control events in Canada during the period from 10 December 2004 to 8 January 2005. Three of them were similar to the Chattak 2 blowout, “with a pressure and fluid flow broaching to surface outside the tubular, all three also involved the loss of the drilling rig involved”.

2110 The First Environmental Monitoring Report, dated 28 February 2005, started by some background information about the blowout. In addition to the information about the flare and the subsequent smaller fires, it provided information about the spread of the soil and debris ejected from the wellbore and other effects:

This material formed a cone of soil around the blowout crater approximately 4m high. Particulate material projected from the well bore was also spread by the prevailing wind in a north westerly direction over portions of the village of Tengratila and outlying agricultural lands. In some cases bricks and other objects projected from the well site penetrated Corrugated Galvanised Iron Sheet (CGI) roofing of village residences. Heat from the initial gas flare damaged trees and other vegetation within approximately 200m of the well site. Ground vibration during the blowout was sufficient to crack the walls and foundations of several structures in Tengratila and Niko Chhatak compound. Escape of gas into the near surface sedimentary layers has raised the water table and created artesian flow at a number of tube wells in the immediate

[Page 587]

area. Monitoring of gas release from cracks in the ground in proximity of the well site has result in longer term evacuation of some residents.1233

2111 Further information about the spread of debris was provided in the Second Environmental Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005:

Soil fallout from the blow-out was spread over a wide area primarily west of the well site due to prevailing westerly windfall at the time of the incident. An area of more concentrated soil fallout did occur over an area of approximately 0.15km2.1234

1233 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, First Environmental Monitoring Report, 28 February 2005 (First Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit C-29, page 1. ↩
1234 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, page 18, a map is shown at page 17 and photographs at page 18. ↩

[Page 588]

2112 This report also contains a satellite image showing the approximate area of “soil fallout” and the zone of damaged trees:1235

Figure 8. Satellite image showing approximate zone of damaged trees (red line) and soil fallout (grav line) following the blowout.


1235 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, page 17, the present image is taken from the Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, page 13, which is of better quality. ↩

[Page 589]

2113 After the high flame extinguished on 9 January 2005, gas continued to escape from the ground near the blowout well and in increasing distances. The gas manifested itself by artesian flowing tube wells.1236 When it escaped through a water surface, the gas manifested itself by bubbles and occasionally more violently in boiling points, as shown below.1237 In other locations the gas ignited in smaller flames. The monitoring reports regularly reported on these emissions, including the measure of the LEL of escaping gas to indicate the risk of ignition.

Plate 1. Blowing point at the south side of the boundary wall

2114 The First Monitoring Report also mentions the evacuation of families from risk areas. It reports that “families from danger prone areas” were evacuated and states that “until now 42 families are evacuated and are being paid monthly compensation for their living”.1238 Their number of the evacuated families increased, as the risk assessment progressed. The number soon reached 57 and by early August 2005, after the second blowout, had reached 100. The return of the families commenced in November 2005 when 23


1236 See below in Section 9.5.2. ↩
1237 Plate 1 in Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, page 12. ↩
1238 First Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-29, page 6. ↩

[Page 590]

families returned to their residencies, after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well; the return was completed by April 2006. The 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2016, summarises the operation:

In August 5, 2005, the Joint Venture in collaboration with its safety specialists, Safety Boss, had relocated a total of 100 families to safer locations based on LEL readings. Locations of these relocated households are graphically presented in Figure 20. No additional relocations were required between August 5 and the present time. The Joint Venture has been paying monthly compensation of TK 10,000 per family per month over the temporary relocation period. With completion of the relief well program and continued reduction in risk a total of 23 families were allowed to move back to their residences in November, 2005. Gas levels in households and shops were monitored at 5 day intervals. By the beginning of April all houses and shops were gas free. Villagers have reoccupied their original homes and shops or in some cases chosen to build new sites with compensation they have received.1239

2115 In the Arbitration both sides produced witness statements recording their recollection about the blowouts.

2116 The Claimant produced witness statements of Mr Adolph and Mr Glaholt. Mr Adolph's first witness statement, dated 28 May 2014, explains that he travelled to Bangladesh on 16 January 2005.1240 His explanations about the first blowout are largely based on the reports discussed above.

2117 Mr Glaholt explains in his first witness statement, dated 29 May 2014, that he arrived in Bangladesh on 22 January 20051241 and refers to his report of 26 January 2005, quoted above. He comments the reports on the Environmental Loss Committees that will be discussed below in Section 9.2.1 and opines that the damage “alleged” in these reports “bears no resemblance to the effects that Crown and I observed and documented in the course of our extensive monitoring activities”.1242

2118 Concerning the evacuation of families, Mr Glaholt states that in “the immediate aftermath of the first blowout, Niko oversaw the evacuation of all families residing within an area of one square kilometre of the blowout site”. He continued by stating:


1239 Niko to Department of Environment, attaching 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 42. The document produced with that Exhibit number does not contain a Figure 20. Further details on the evacuations and the return are contained in WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 37 – 42. ↩
1240 WS Adolph I, paragraph 59. ↩
1241 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 12. ↩
1242 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 32. ↩

[Page 591]

Following this initial evacuation, Niko management and its environmental and safety team conducted an ongoing assessment as to the appropriate size of the evacuation zones and continued to investigate any reports of significant new gas release or damage to structures that might pose a health and safety risk to occupants. Considerations related to community and employee safety were overseen by an independent safety consultancy firm, Safety Boss Inc., who had been engaged by Niko in the immediate aftermath of the first blowout. A further 57 families were evacuated between 3 March 2005 and 10 April 2005, and another 23 between 11 April 2005 and July 20051243

2119 Mr Glaholt lists the heads of loss described in the Environmental Losses Reports and discusses each of them as shall be considered below in Section 9.5.

2120 BAPEX produced two witness statements, dated 5 and 6 March 2016, respectively, which record the recollection of their authors about the blowout events.

2121 Mr Farid Uddin Ahmed explained in his witness statement that he was the headmaster of the Tengratila Secondary School between 1998 and 2015. The school is very close to the Niko compound.1244 His witness statement contains the following passages:

When the first blowout happened, I was at my home. I heard a loud noise and went to the hill overlooking the Niko compound. My neighbors did the same. Then I saw an explosion. Sand, rocks and black smoke shot into the sky, like a rainbow, and landed on the buildings in the village. Like many others, I ran away to find my family and make sure they were safe. We took refuge at the primary school in Tilagaon, where my wife taught, about 2 kilometers away. We could feel the vibrations from the blowout even there. We were scared and we decided to stay at the home of a friend who lives in Lakshmipur, about 5 kilometers away. We spent two nights there.

Once we saw that the fire had died down, we decided to return home to Tengratila. When I returned home, the earth and the houses were still shaking and vibrating. Sand and rocks covered the village, and some sand continued to rain down from the sky. My house had lots of cracks

1243 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 38. ↩
1244 For the damage to the school and its activity, see below Section 9.5.7. ↩

[Page 592]

in the wall. I received Tk 10,000 from Niko as compensation for the damage to my home, but it cost me about Tk 50,000 to repair.

2122 Mr Ahmed also described the damage to vegetation and trees (see below Section 9.5.1), to his school and students (see below Section 9.5.7) and his fish ponds, a head of claim for which BAPEX decided not to claim.1245

2123 The damage to Mr Ahmed's house had been assessed by the officers that went to the affected houses and prepared the Local Losses Report. The damage to Mr Ahmed's house is recorded under item No 118 of the report:

Semi-concrete building 32/12 feet. One column with R.C.C. column has received cracks. 14/10 feet

and

A concrete wall of tin shed kitchen has received a crack. 14/10 feet.1246

2124 In the Local Losses Report, these items are valued each at BDT 5'000, i.e. BDT 10'000, as reported in Mr Ahmed's witness statement.

2125 Mr Md. Shahjahan explained in his witness statement that from 1970 to 1986 he was headmaster of the Tengratila secondary school and subsequently held other public functions in the Doarabazar Upazila. At the time of his witness statement he lived in the Girish Nagar section of Tengratila, less than one kilometre northeast of Niko's compound. He explained that, because of his functions, "villagers come to [him] to discuss their problems”; therefore, he is “familiar with the harms suffered by the inhabitants of Tengratila following the two blowouts in 2005 at the Niko compound”.

2126 In his witness statement he wrote:

The blowouts were scary events. When the first blowout happened, I was at home and heard a very loud sound. I felt the ground shaking up and down. Many people fled from their homes. Afterwards, sand covered the village and three kilometers around. The second time there was a blowout, the explosion was louder. Sand blanketed the village again. After the blowouts, we noticed that gas was coming out of the ground, producing bubbles in places where water accumulated on the ground. It was worse after the second blowout. Never before had we observed bubbles or gas seepage like this in our community. The smell of the gas disturbs our community.

1245 ВМЕС, paragraph 19. ↩
1246 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 45. ↩

[Page 593]

The sound of the explosions damaged people's ears. People ran away from the Niko compound, and in so doing, hurt themselves by tripping and falling. More concerning, after the blowouts, community members began to complain to me about health problems that had previously been rare in our community. After the second blowout, people came to me to complain about the problems they had breathing.1247

2127 Mr Shahjahan also testified about health consequences (see below Section 9.5.5) and damage to vegetation (below Section 9.5.1). Concerning damage to buildings, Mr Shahjahan wrote:

The force of the blowouts cracked the walls of our homes. Although Niko compensated some people for this, it was not enough to make up for the costs associated with most people's displacement and for the repair of homes.1248

2128 The Local Losses Report records under item No 131 that “Md. Shahjahan Master" in Girgish Nagar village suffered loss described as

Tin shed room with concrete walls. (100/16 feet). Two walls have received cracks in two places which need to be broken down for repairing

and

The R.C.C. roof of the veranda has partially cracked which leaks water.

2129 The loss was assessed in the same way as that of Mr Ahmed and recorded in the Local Losses Report, each item at BDT 20'000, i.e. BDT 40'000.1249

2130 Further information about the blowout and damage caused by it will be discussed below in the context of specific claims in Sections 9.4 and 9.5.

9.1.2.2 The Second Blowout

2131 The second blowout occurred in Chattak 2A on 24 June 2005. Like in the first blowout the rig was lost1250 and escaping gas ignited in a high flame and debris from the well was ejected.

2132 In the morning of the following day, 25 June 2005, the Crown Offices team on site sent a first report to Mr Glaholt.1251 The report mentioned:


1247 WS Shahjahan, paragraphs 6 and 7. ↩
1248 WS Shahjahan, paragraph 13. ↩
1249 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 48. ↩
1250 Robert Grace, Report on the Relief Well Operation, 4 July 2005, Exhibit C-45, page 9. ↩
1251 Daily Environmental Report, 25 June 2005, Exhibit C-42. ↩

[Page 594]

2133 An Inspection Team set up on instruction of the MoEF, arrived at the site in the afternoon of 25 June 2005 and in the evening of the same day met Mr Md. Jafar Siddique, Deputy Commissioner, Sunamgonj who was quoted to have said:

... losses caused by blowout in the relief well do not spread widely like the blowout explosion that happened in well no. 2 of the Chhatak Gas Field Development Project on 01/07/2005. The blaze caused by the blowout has still been flaming intensely through the drilling pipe. He says, since the current fire incident, the officer in charge of local police station is staying in the place of incident along with members of law enforcement teams.

[Page 595]

The Team itself

... found the flame caused by the blowout of relief well had been flaming intensely from ground-level to 100-150 foot height. Heat of this fire can be felt from a distance of 500 meters.

It reported:

While inspecting the place in the field, the team observed that coconut trees, bamboo clusters, and other nearer trees, have been burnt partly or completely due to the fire caused by the blowout in the relief well drilling. Since the people of the surrounding area were not in their houses due to safety reasons after the first blowout, there was no instant loss of human life caused by the current explosion.

[...]

During inspection it seemed that, the new fire is scorching the trees round the relief well with its high heat, and this damage is going on round the well of at least 1 kilometer diameter. Due to blow-out, the underground gas is spurting out debris, which is catching fire and getting spread few kilometers round the well. Due to the blow out in January, it was marked that the debris shot out and fell in Sunamganj City situated 15 KM from here. After discussion with the local residents it came to our knowledge that, after the current blowout the debris fell out and hit the bodies of local residents which caused their eyes to burn and skins to itch. The inspection team is of the opinion that such debris will shoot out and cause the top soil of this agriculturally fertile country side to get severely damaged.

[...]

Due to repeated blasts the houses are developing faults and gas bubbling was on the rise in various fishing ponds and rice fields. All the damaged wells in the vicinity, had water gushing out due to upward gas pressure; the local residents complained that this water contained arsenic. All the drinkable water wells and deep wells do not yet have any more water fit to use.1252

2134 The 6th Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2005, the first after the Chattak 2A blowout, contains information about this blowout at various places:


1252 Report of the Inspection Team, forming Appendix A to the Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5 (bis), pages 1 and 2. ↩

[Page 596]

The second blowout vented through the drilling rig for several hours before igniting. On July 5, 2005 at 21:30 the Chhatak 2A blowout bridged subsurface and breached to the surface on the east side of the rig forming a crater. The rigs diesel electric motors and mud tanks fell into the crater. Two diesel fuel tanks in this area ruptured and burned.1253

2135 About the flame the report stated that the gas “self-ignited"

... and during more intense activity had a flame height of 60-80m. After initial flare the well bridged and cratered resulting in a cluster of smaller burning areas east of the rig.1254

2136 A subsequent report specified:

The blowout of the Chhatak 2A Relief Well on June 24, 2005 self-ignited, initially producing a flare estimated at over 100m in height. This burned intermittently during the first two weeks after the blowout. The well cratered on July 5th causing the wellhead flare to go out but igniting gas flares in the Chhatak 2A craters. [...] The flame height in the Chhatak 2A craters has gradually reduced since early July (Plate 9). By mid September no flames remained in the vicinity of Chhatak 2A but had become more active in and around Chhatak 2 (Plate 10).1255

2137 The 6th Monitoring Report also stated:

The recent blowout of relief well (Chhatak Well #2A) generated intense heat within about 200m of the blowout, however, the zone of heat damaged vegetation did not extend past that already being affected by the original blowout with the exception of a grassy, recently reclaimed area on Joint Venture property along the south margin of the Chhatak 2A well. Approximately one week after the initial Chhatak 2A blowout the well projected conspicuous heavy sand deposits over an area extending approximately 200m northwest of the well site Plate 2.1256

1253 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 1. ↩
1254 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 20. ↩
1255 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Tenth Environmental Monitoring Report, 3 October 2005 (Tenth Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit R-136, page 27. ↩
1256 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 16. ↩

[Page 597]

2138 A subsequent report illustrated this explanation about the deposits by the following photograph:1257

Plate 9. Close up view of soil fallout on vegetation northwest of Chattak 2A, July 7, 2005.


1257 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 27. ↩

[Page 598]

2139 The 6th Monitoring Report illustrated the effects of the blowout and the deposits on the Niko site by the following photograph:1258

Plate 3. Blowout of Chhatak Well #2A (on June 24, 2005) Projected Sands

2140 Under the heading of Health and Social Welfare the 6th Monitoring Report asserted that the Chattak 2A blowout

... was confined to a small area within areas already disturbed by the original blowout. The Joint Venture kept the villagers well informed about the danger, precaution and emergency since the starting of the drilling of the relief well ....1259

2141 Nevertheless, the Report also noted:

After the 2nd blowout the villagers were upset and attacked Mr. Abu Sayed, local representative of the Joint Venture. However, the anger ended there no further attack of such kind occurred since then. The Joint Venture is actively promoting ongoing community involvement in the project and also educating the community time to time.1260

2142 The Third Environmental Losses Report, dated 15 September 2005, relied on the Inspection Report discussed above. It reported that the Committee


1258 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 18. ↩
1259 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 22. ↩
1260 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 26. ↩

[Page 599]

itself visited the site on 17 July 2005 and consulted with “affected people, NIKO representatives, local officers of different government organisations, public representatives elected from local administration etc.”. It concluded that

... after the second blowout, the impact zone has increased towards the east. The committee considers that the trend of distorted reaction on the ecosystem and environment has been increased after the blowout. It has instantly been apparent to members of the Committee that the harm due to air pollution and amount of losses of trees, soils, and water resources has been increased.1261

2143 Mr Glaholt stated in his First Witness Statement, dated 29 May 2014:

The second blowout did not require further evacuation of homes. As might be expected, when the second blowout occurred, some people fled their homes out of fear, but as far as I am aware they all returned to their homes by the end of the following day. Furthermore, there were no complaints recorded from villagers about structural damage to their homes in the aftermath of the second blowout. This fact is recorded in the sixth Monitoring Report dated 23 July 2005.1262

2144 In his witness statement, dated 6 March 2016, Mr Shahjahan recorded his recollection of the second blowout quoted above in the context of the first blowout.

2145 None of the witnesses were questioned at a hearing on these statements.

9.1.2.3 The principal features of the blowouts

2146 Considering the evidence before it, the Tribunal concludes that the first blowout manifested itself in two main events:


1261 Third Environmental Losses Report, 15 September 2005, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 4. ↩
1262 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 39. ↩

[Page 600]

fruit and crops; the pressure of the gas raised the water table and produced water flow from water wells.

2147 Importantly, there was no physical injury to the team on site; some mention was made about persons from the surrounding vilages being hurt or injured, in particular when running away from the blowout site. While damages to houses, trees and fruit, fishes etc was meticulously recorded and claimed for each of the affected families, identified and named, no information about claims for physical injury by named persons has been mentioned in the Arbitration. It was reported that the event caused shock and fear in the population of these villages. The related trauma and indirect health effects are discussed below in Section 9.5.5. Families living close to the site were evacuated for security reasons; their number increased, as the risk assessment progressed. The number of families evacuated had reached 100 by early August 2005. Their return started in November 2005 and was completed by April 2006.

2148 The buildings of the two schools and a mosque near the site were damaged and, for security reasons while the relief well drilling went on, schooling was moved to temporary facilities build by Niko in a safe distance.

2149 More details about the damage on air, soil, water, health and the environment will be discussed in Sections 9.4 and 9.5 below in the context of the respective claims. The compensation paid already by Niko will be discussed below in Section 9.3.1.

2150 The Parties expressed different opinions about the dimension of the blowouts in comparison to similar events.

2151 BAPEX described the blowouts as “one of the worst environmental disasters in the Bangladesh history”.1263 In the context of this statement, BAPEX does not refer to the blowout that had occurred seven years earlier at Moulavi Bazar, only some 50 km away from the Chattak field. The First Environmental


1263 BMD, paragraph 241. ↩

[Page 601]

Losses Committee found that the Chattak 2 blowout was “only the reoccurrence of the blowout” at Moulavi Bazar on a site operated by Occidental Petroleum.1264 No information about the damage caused by that earlier blowout has been provided. Counsel for the Respondents stated, however, that the compensation that the Government had received by 2016 from the settlement with Occidental Petroleum “ha[s] amounted to approximately a billion dollars”,1265 a multiple of what the Government claimed in the Money Suit for both Chattak blowouts. The Moulavi Bazar blowout thus would seem at least of equal gravity as that at Chattak 2.

2152 For Dr Borthwick, whose report was produced by the Respondent, the blowouts are “a broad ranging environmental disaster of undefined proportion, across atmospheric, water, soil, social and economic spheres”.1266 He opined that an incident of the nature that occurred at Chattak “would be classed as 'catastrophic' in the industry and placed it the context of "[s]imilar major hydrocarbon pollution events” that caused damages “valued in the hundreds of millions and billions of dollars” and referred to the “most infamous well blowout in recent time, the BP Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico [that] had a settled damage value of $40 billion”. In his Observations Regarding Losses, Dr Borthwick opined:

Based on my professional experience, an incident of this nature would be classed as “catastrophic” in the industry. While amazingly there were no casualties, the potential of the incident was for mass casualties, multiple fatalities and extensive environmental damage. Considering other historical incidents, damages would fall within the range of hundreds of millions of dollars, as illustrated by other catastrophic disasters from the literature:


1264 Exhibit Annex R-1, Appendix 1 and below Section 9.2.1.1. In the report, the location is referred to as "Manguchora"; the circumstances of this event are summarised in the Tribunal's Decision on Liability, Section 8.2.1. ↩

1265 Statement at the February 2016 Hearing (HT 2016 Day 1, page 271, lines 14 – 21), quoted in the Decision on Liability, paragraph 509. ↩

1266 Borthwick, paragraph 4.23. ↩

[Page 602]

2153 Dr Borthwick does not mention the Mulavi Bazar blowout. In his assessment of the importance of the Chattak blowouts, he does not refer to the evidence in the Arbitration; in particular he does not refer to the contemporary reports about the blowouts and their impact, quoted above. He refers neither to the reports by the committees set up by the Government, nor to the Monitoring Reports nor to the report of Safety Boss whose representative had arrived two days after the first blowout and who compared the Chattak 2 blowout to other blowouts in which the company had been involved in the preceding months. Three of these blowouts were of a similar nature, involving the loss of the rig. The company concluded in its report:

The loss of the rig and associated equipment is certainly unfortunate as is the displacement of the surrounding residents but it is important to note that Niko's pre-event safety measures were successful in preventing loss of life and / or injury to the associated workers and the public.1268

2154 Mr Glaholt, who had arrived on site on 22 January 2005, objected to Dr Borthwick's characterisation of the Chattak blowouts in the category of the BP Deepwater Horizon incident, “the 2013 derailment of 74 rail cars carrying crude oil at Lac Megantic in Quebec, Canada and the Exxon Valdez super tanker grounding resulting in an oil spill off the coast of Alaska 1989”. Mr Glaholt asserted:


1267 Borthwick, paragraphs 2.5 and 5.6. ↩

1268 Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23, page 3. ↩

[Page 603]

To be clear, there is absolutely no cogent scientific evidence to support a comparison between any of these events and the blowout. Crude oil spills and dry sweet natural gas blowouts are in no way similar.1269

2155 The Tribunal will examine the claims for environmental loss on the basis of the evidence concerning the Chattak 2 blowout for which Niko is liable and treat with caution the classification of the blowout as “catastrophic” based on “professional experience” without reference to the evidence in the Arbitration.

2156 The Tribunal examines the claims before it in their own right and in light of the evidence before it. While the absence of death and serious injury is a fortunate aspect of the Chattak blowouts, and while these blowouts appear to be in a category of catastrophes different from those at Deepwater Horizon or of the Exxon Valdez, the Tribunal is conscious of the suffering and loss they caused to the people affected and of the damage to the environment. It considers them with sympathy for those affected and with the impartiality and fairness which its role requires.

9.2 Prior Assessments and related evidence

9.2.1 The Government reports on environmental losses

2157 Following each of the blowouts, the Government formed committees to deal with the issues arising, each of which issued reports. Two of these reports, produced in the Arbitration, concerned the environmental losses caused by the first blowout; a third report was produced after the second blowout. A separate committee assessed the losses of the local population for immediate compensation by Niko. The Tribunal has discussed these reports in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision1270 and presents here the parts relevant for this Award.

9.2.1.1 The First Environmental Losses Report

2158 The Government's First Environmental Losses Report,1271 dated 17 January 2005, was prepared by the “Committee for Estimation of Environmental and Forestry Losses caused by the fire created in Tengratila Gas Field in Sunamgonj”, formed by a decision of the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) on 9 January 2005, two days after the first blowout. The Committee comprised members of the MoEF. Its convener was Mr Khan


1269 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 14. ↩

1270 Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, Section 10.2.1. ↩

1271 First Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-1; the quotes are from the slightly different translation attached to the Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis). ↩

[Page 604]

M. Ibrahim Hossain, Additional Secretary and Director General, Department of Environment in that Ministry.

2159 The Report states that the Committee members visited the site on 10 January 2005 and thereafter were “informed about latest situation of the place of incident on telephone and other sources”. They spoke with representatives of the local authorities and of the population and consulted newspaper reports of the incident. They also considered the latest report by Niko1272 and questioned Mr Kashem (or Qasim) Sharif, the President of Niko, about measures taken by the company.

2160 This Committee considered the reasons for the blowout and observed, as mentioned above, that it was “only the recurrence of the blowout which took place in the Maguchora well of Sylhet in 1997”, blaming Niko for having made a “similar fault” as “Occidental Oil Company” had committed in 1997.1273 It mentioned a report by Niko according to which “the surrounding environment has been damaged by the mud, sand and contaminated water caused by blowout".

2161 Apart from the effect on the local population, as quoted above, the Report describes specific losses which shall be considered below in the sections dealing with the specific categories of losses, viz.:

2162 The Report also states that more time was required to estimate the environmental losses and adds:

[T]o estimate the environmental losses, we need to wait one or more harvest seasons, and then on the collection of systemic data and information and after analyzing the same, the proper amount of losses can be estimated. There is no need for the formation of a separate committee to estimate the environmental losses. This Committee can


1272 Presumably the report of Mr Mercier of 16 January 2005, referred to above in Section 9.1.2. ↩

1273 The place of this incident is also referred to as Moulavi Bazar. ↩

[Page 605]

estimate the losses by co-opting competent representative from the local administration and concerned department of field level.

2163 In conclusion, the Committee made recommendations with respect to the prevention of future incidents as well as the assessment of the environmental losses:

(1) In light of above discussion, instruction can be issued to this Committee to submit a supplementary report after 6 (six) months, since it may take a long time to estimate the environmental losses. The amount of environmental losses will be mentioned in said complementary report.

(2) Measures can be taken through the competent authority of the government upon estimating the amount of overall losses by inter- ministerial committee and compensation can be realized.

9.2.1.2 The Second Environmental Losses Report

2164 A new Committee was then formed on 4 February 2005, which produced the Second Environmental Losses Report on 13 April 2005.1274 The mandate of this new Committee was “to estimate the losses relating to environmental damage due to the fire that spread in the Tengratila Gas Field”. The convener was again Mr Khan M. Ibrahim Hossain, Additional Secretary and Director General, Department of Environment in the MoEF. Representatives of BAPEX and Niko were among the six members of this Committee, which co-opted three “specialists” to “facilitate its activities”.

2165 The Committee inspected the site on 4 April 2005 in the presence of “Professor Moinuddin Bahar, representative of the Honorable Member of Parliament Mr Kalimuddin Ahmed and [of an] Officer of Doarabazar Subdistrict". The Committee members observed at this occasion

... the gradual increase of the impact zone toward the north and south since the blowout. Blowout bubbles, debris, seepages, contaminated mud-water, etc. have been spread over the surrounding 2-3 km of the main Crater. The Committee observed that the level and impact of the adverse reaction has been increasing gradually on the environment and neighboring area after the blowout.1275

2166 At a meeting on the following day the Committee heard the District Police Superintendent, Additional Deputy Commissioners, Agricultural Officers, Fishery Officers, and Forestry Officers, “including representatives of all the


1274 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis). ↩

1275 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 2. ↩

[Page 606]

concerned organizations”. In its subsequent deliberations the Committee also considered “... information collected by the committee at field level over time, the information submitted by NIKO Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd., the report of losses of forest assets in the light of the survey conducted by Forestry Division, and opinions given by the Deputy Commissioner of Sunamganj, the Police Superintendent, the Fishery Officer, the Agricultural Officer”.

2167 In its Report, the Committee considered and quantified the losses and required remedial measures in the following eight categories:

(1) Losses caused by atmospheric pollution

(2) Damage to vegetation, i.e. forest resources

(3) Losses of agriculture and fisheries

(4) Damage to water resources

(5) Losses of soil resources

(6) Losses of ecosystem

(7) Health effects

(8) Impact on education and livelihood.

2168 In each of these categories the Report identifies amounts for (i) immediate losses, such as the pollution caused by the release of CO2 or losses to the "production of trees” and “production of crops” and the “losses to education and social lifestyle" of 200 students; (ii) for actions of remediation, such as estimated costs to “supply and install two deep tube wells for 600 families”, the "[r]ehabilitation of [400] traumatised people”; and (iii) long term damage and remediation, such as “20 years for 4 hectares of land” as “costs due to loss of sequestration facility for CO2” and the “[c]ost over 20 years to restore the ecosystem”.

[Page 607]

2169 The Report then presents the assessment in the form of the table below:1276

Para. No. Type of Losses Unit Price Amount of losses Remarks
1. Losses due to Air Pollution:
(a) Pollution caused by release of CO2 (created due to burning of gas) BDT 960 38185714.20 739776.79 tons of CO2 have been released due to burning of 1.5 billion cubic methane gas
(b) Release of CO2 due to burning of trees Do 314880.00 128 tons for 4 hectares, 32 tons in every hectare
2. Losses of trees and forest resources
(a) Losses related to production of trees and forest resources - 14653224.40 As per estimation of Forestry Division
(b) Re-plantation cost - 8176900.00 Do
(c) Cost due to loss of sequestration facility for CO2 BDT 6400/ hectare 512000.00 20 years for 4 hectares of land
(d) Cost due to loss of sequestration facility of CO2 in agriculture Same as above 7360.00 Cost has been estimated against loss of 5% of the forest over 23 hectares of land.
3. Losses of agriculture and fisheries - - The Committee formed by the Deputy Commissioner concerned will estimate the losses, which are to be included in this account.
4. Losses of water resources
(a) Sources of drinkable water - 20000000.00 Costs estimated to supply and install two deep tube wells for 600 families.
(b) Aquifer - 40000000.00 Purification cost estimated.
(c) Fishery Pond - 5000000.00 Purification cost estimated.
(d) Damage to agricultural production - 100000.00 Production cost estimated.
5. Losses of soil resources
(a) Deadly affected area - 5000000.00 Losses of production of crops for 3 years.
(b) Semi-affected area - 5000000.00 Losses of production of crops for 2 years.
(c) Less affected area - 2500000.00 Losses of production of crops for 1 year.
6. Losses of environmental system
(a) Rehabilitation cost - 10000000.00 Cost over 20 years to restore the ecosystem.
(b) Management cost - 5000000.00
7. Losses related to health
Rehabilitation of traumatized people BDT 400,000 per person 160000000.00 For 400 people

1276 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), Table at page 5. ↩

[Page 608]

Para. No. Type of Losses Unit Price Amount of losses Remarks
8. Losses to education and social lifestyle BDT 200,000 per 40000000.00 200 students
Total amount of losses BDT 354450078.60 only

2170 This assessment forms the basis for the claim that BAPEX now pursues in the Arbitration. The assessment of those losses for which BAPEX continues to claim shall be considered below in Sections 9.4 and 9.5.

2171 The Report records that representatives of Niko attended the final meeting of the Committee on 12 and 13 April 2005 and adds:

The NIKO Representative agreed with all the measures considered for estimation of the losses. However, the emanation of the supposed quantity of gas and the amount of losses in different sectors are not acceptable to them in the current stage. He proposed that the Committee reach a collective decision through discussion and more time. Since it was mandatory to submit the report within a shorter timeframe, the NIKO Representative did not sign the Report prepared by the Committee relating to the environmental losses, but he (NIKO) submitted the written statement (copy enclosed).

2172 In the version of the Report produced by the Respondents the only attached written statement by Niko is the letter of 16 January 2005, quoted above in Section 9.1.2, in which Mr Mercier, Niko's Vice President Bangladesh Operations explained that he had just returned from a visit to the site and reports on his observations.

2173 The Claimant produced the letter which Mr Adolph, Niko's Country Manager, addressed to the convener of this committee on 13 April 2005 with the reference “Niko's response to DoE Estimate of Environmental Costs”. Niko expresses agreement in principle

... with the various sectors which have been considered in the impact evaluation and many of the technical concepts being applied. However, at the present time, we cannot accept the valuations of loss related to such things as estimations of gas volume released, water resource damage, soils resources, and others.

Given that the uncontrolled release is still occurring and relief well drilling has not been completed, we believe in many cases it is premature to draw conclusions as to the actual environmental effects or costs. Niko is engaged in an active and intensive environmental monitoring program to

[Page 609]

track environmental change and community impacts associated with the accident. Once the blowout is controlled and stopped BAPEX-NIKO and the Government will be in a much better position to assess environmental damage and any costs arising.

2174 Niko refers to the ongoing assessment of the “direct community damages” and the assessment by the Local Losses Committee and the compensation that it is paying to affected families, as shall be discussed below in Section 9.2.1.4. It asserts its

... willingness to continue an open, transparent, and informed dialogue with DOE and all other government bodies charged with the responsibility of evaluating the effects of the accident at Chattak 2.

2175 In the Arbitration, the Claimant contests the Second Environmental Losses Report, points to differences with the Monitoring Reports and asserts that the losses quantified in this Report

... do not accurately reflect what the environmental monitoring personnel on the ground observed and documented following the blowout. The Second Environmental Losses Report is also grossly deficient from an evidentiary perspective. Its authors were appointed by the Government of Bangladesh and cannot be regarded as impartial sources. Additionally, none of the authors have provided any sworn witness statement evidence in this arbitration. Moreover, and perhaps most fundamentally, their conclusions regarding damage, as stated in the Second Environmental Losses Report, are untethered to any objective and direct evidence of impacts at the blowout site and surrounding area. Indeed, it is wholly unclear whether there was any direct and objectively credible evidence collected, much less relied on, by the Committee members to ground their sweeping conclusions. In any event, if there was such evidence, it has not been disclosed or entered into the record by BAPEX.1277

9.2.1.3 Third Environmental Losses Report

2176 Shortly after the second blowout, the MoEF instructed on 30 June 2005 the formation of the Third Environmental Losses Committee which produced its report dated 15 September 2005 (Third Environmental Losses Report).1278


1277 CREC, paragraph 38, referring in particular to WS Glaholt I, paragraph 32. ↩

1278 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis). ↩

[Page 610]

2177 The Committee was composed of seven members from the MoEF, the Ministry of Finance and BAPEX; the convener was Mr Janav Hasan Mahmud Delwar, Additional Secretary and Chairman, Bangladesh Forest Industry Development Corporation. As its members did “not have sufficient technical knowledge and scientific concept about all the matters to consider the sectors of environmental losses properly”, the Committee co-opted “one soil specialist, one underground water specialist and one environmental specialist”. It also co-opted the Additional Deputy Administrator (Revenue) in order “to maintain the coordination with District Administration".

2178 The assignment of the Committee was “to estimate the long-term potential losses including earlier environmental losses due to the second [blowout]. In fact, however, the scope of its activity and assessment was broader: it reviewed the assessment of the Second Environmental Loss Committee and concluded that its “materials or points of environmental losses [...] are facts and are accurate”. It considered the “environmental and ecosystemic losses that have occurred due to the 2 consecutive explosions”. It included losses that had been assessed by the District Administration, which Niko had paid in the assessed amount, and which had been “distributed [...] among those concerned”. It added that the “current Committee did not estimate the losses of this sector anew”; but it observed that “the matter of rehabilitation of the affected people was not considered in any earlier report” and decided to include this matter in its report.

2179 The Committee noted that, immediately after the blowout, an inspection team comprising of four members from the MoEF inspected the place of the blowout on 25 – 26 June 2005 and prepared a report to the MoEF, discussed above in Section 9.1.2.2. The Committee “used the recommendations of the said report to estimate the instant and long term environmental losses” and attached the report to its own report.1279

2180 The Report of the Inspection Team records the statement of the Deputy Commissioner Sunamgonj that the “losses caused by the blowout of the relief well do not spread widely like the blowout explosion that happened in well no. 2 [...]". It also records observations that “the new fire is scorching the trees [a]round the relief well”, “water gushing out due to upward gas pressure” and that the "residents complained that this water contained arsenic”. The Report refers to the earlier valuation of environmental damage and states that “the extent of environmental damage due to the current relief well blowout is hard to assess and finalize instantaneously". The Report closes by a number of


1279 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), Section 2.3 and Appendix A. ↩

[Page 611]

recommendations especially with respect to safety measures and monitoring by Niko.

2181 The Third Environmental Losses Report summarises findings of the Inspection Team and concludes that it was instantly apparent to the members of that team “that the harm due to air pollution and amount of losses of trees, soils, and water resources has been increased”. The Report described the committee's activities and the delegation of the loss estimation to different departments. The Committee also examined whether

... NIKO had taken the environmental clearance certificate systematically or not, and which conditions were in the clearance certificate issued by the Department of Environment and so on. Moreover, the report on all other accidents, namely Magurchora, Haripur, etc., were also reviewed.

2182 In the Third Environmental Losses Report, the losses “that have occurred due to 2 consecutive explosions” are grouped in 111280 categories which are similar to those adopted by the Second Committee, but differ in some respects. The points considered in each of these categories and the assessed loss in them shall be considered below in Sections 9.4 and 9.5 to the extent that they are relevant for the claims to be decided by the Tribunal. The assessment distinguishes between the assumptions that the relief well succeeded or failed. In the former case the total was BDT 768'023٬973 (corresponding to some USD 12 million), in the latter BDT 845′583٬973 (corresponding to some USD 13 million).1281 The assessment is set out in a table which shows the conclusion for each of the eleven heads of loss:

Total amount of environmental losses

S.I No.. Type of losses Unit Price Amount of loss (BDT) Remark
1. Loss due to air pollution
(a) CO2 emission-related pollution (due to burning of gas) BDT 990/per ton 278,019,864.00 280,828 tons of CO2 emitted by burning 2.98 billion cft methane
(b) CO2 emitted by burning of trees Do 405,900.00 82 tons per hectare, 410 tons in 5 hectares, and 15 USD per ton
2. Loss due to displacement
(a) Repairing of houses 80,000 per house 7,840,000.00 Repair cost is applicable for tin-shed and half-concrete tin-shed

1280 The Report lists 12 categories, but states that one of the categories (the losses of gas resources) was the resort of another committee. ↩

1281 Calculated by Niko at BDT 64.07 per USD, the average yearly exchange rate for 2005 listed by OANDA (See C-CD.2, FN 239). ↩

[Page 612]

S.I No. Type of losses Unit Price Amount of loss (BDT) Remark
(b) Construction of house with land 500,000 per house 49,000,000.00 Construction cost is applicable for tin shed or semi-concrete tin-shed (with land)
3. Business losses
a) Shop repairs 100,000 per shop 9,100,000.00 For business costs and capital
b) Construction of new shop in flexible place 500,000 per shop 45,500,000.00 Construction cost of shops in suitable place and business capital
4. Loss of vegetation
a) Loss of vegetation - 33,073,311.00 As per estimation of Forestry Division
b) Cost for loss of CO2 sequestration facility 6600/hectare 825,000.00 for 25 years in 5 hectares of land
5. Loss in agriculture sector
a) Losses in agriculture sector - 4,319,316.00 Amount of losses has been estimated by the committee of the Deputy Commissioner concerned
6. Loss in fishery sector
a) Losses in fishery sector - 2,757,477.00 Do
b) Natural environment restoration cost in pond 200,000 per pond 4,800,000.00 Re-digging and ecosystem development cost to restore each of the 24 ponds
7. Loss of water resources
a) Reconstruction of water supply system - 20,200,000.00 To drill a tube-well at a distance of 5 km, and to supply water in two affected villages using pipeline
b) Restoration of affected aquifer - 49,500,000.00 Purification cost estimated
8. Loss of soil resources
a) Deadly affected area - 2,000,000.00 Material cost estimated to restore the fertility of the land in affected area. Losses relating to 10 years of food safety, cultivation risk, agricultural and environmental damage would also be estimated.

[Page 613]

S.I No. Type of losses Unit Price Amount of loss (BDT) Remark
b) Very affected area - 7,000,000.00 Losses in crop production of 3 years
c) Semi-affected area - 50,000,000.00 Losses in crop production of 2 years
d) Less affected area - 3,043,105.00 Losses in crop production of 1 year
9. Loss in ecosystem
Cost in long-term ecosystem management - 20,000,000.00 20-year ecosystem reconstruction program
10. Damage to health
a) Rehabilitation for traumatized people 2 years @ BDT 2500/per year/per person 65,040,000.00 For 1084 affected people (197 families, per family consists of 5.5 members)
b) Hospital setup cost - 50,000,000.00 Onetime allotment. Mainly for the area of Tengratila and Ajobpur & surrounding
c) Operation cost per year 5,000,000 25,000,000.00 Operation cost for minimum 5 (five) years
11. Losses of education and social livelihood
a) Losses of education and social livelihood BDT 400,000.00 per person 157,600,000.00 two persons from every family, that is total 394 students of 197 families, one-off
b) Development/setup of Primary and High School - 10,000,000.00 Having modern facilities
c) Operation cost BDT 1,000,000 per year 50,00,000.00 Operation cost of minimum 5 years.
d) setup of sports field, open field and club, and promotion of environment - 5,000,000.00 For Tengratila, Ajobpur, and surroundings
e) Operation cost BDT 500,000 per year 2,500,000.00 Operation cost for minimum 5 years
Total losses (if the relief well is successful) 768,023,973.00 (seven hundred sixty-eight million, twenty-three thousand, nine hundred seventy-three)
Total losses (if the relief well fails) 845,583,973.00 (eight hundred forty-five million, five hundred eighty-three thousand, nine hundred seventy-three)

2183 As explained by BAPEX in the BMD, the Government and Petrobangla claimed in the Money Suit for the environmental losses, as quantified in this Report.1282 They claimed for the full amount, assuming that the relief well failed and without deducting the amounts which Niko had paid following the assessment by the District Administration. Following the Tribunal's Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, BAPEX changed its position and now claims


1282 BMD, paragraphs 329 – 330. ↩

[Page 614]

based on the quantification in the Second Environmental Losses Report with subsequent adjustments.

2184 The Claimant points out that the Third Report took no account of the monitoring and reporting contained in the bi-weekly and monitoring reports prepared by Niko's team of environmental consultants".1283

2185 Mr Adolph stated:

Niko was not invited to participate in the work of the [Third Environmental Losses Committee1284] or to provide input into its deliberations or report. “In addition, Niko did not receive – at least contemporaneously – copies of any of the Environmental Committee reports.

When Niko did eventually become aware of these reports, it regarded them as absurd, given that the conclusions stated in them appeared to take no account of any of the extensive monitoring and reporting contained within the bi-weekly monitoring reports that had been prepared by Niko's team of environmental consultants, Crown.1285

9.2.1.4 Local Losses Report and follow-up assessments

2186 Further to a decision of the Energy and Mineral Resources Division of 2 March 2005, a committee for the estimation of local losses (the Local Losses Committee) was formed, which produced its report on 8 June 2005 (the Local Losses Report).1286 This Committee was chaired by Mr Md. Jafar Siddique, the Deputy Commissioner Sunamganj. The following members were mentioned as attendees of a Committee meeting:

Sl. No. Name & Designation Signature
1 Mr. Abdur Rashid, D.D.A.E, Sunamganj
2 Mr. Chandra Kumar Chakma, Addl. Police Super, Sunamganj
3 Mr. Md. Mohibuzzaman, Upazila Nirbahi Officer, Doarabazar
4 Dr. Asit Baran Dey, Deputy Civil Surgeon, Sunamganj
5 Mr. S A Wahab, District Fishery Office, Sunamganj
6 Mr. Md Mojammel Haque, District Relief & Rehabilitation Officer, Sunamganj
7 Mr. Amirul Haque, Chairman, No. 7 Laxmipur Union, Doarabazar
8 Mr. Syed Mohteshamul Islam, NIKO Representative

1283 C-CD.2, paragraph182. ↩

1284 Mr Adolph and the Claimant treated the First and the Second Environmental Losses Committees as one and the Second Report an "update" of the First; the Third Environmental Losses Committee, in their writings, is therefore the Second Committee. ↩

1285 WS Adolph I, paragraphs 148 – 149. ↩

1286 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis). ↩

[Page 615]

2187 The Report explained that in preparing the estimate of the local losses “an effort was taken to inspect in the field and to estimate the losses” with the assistance of several concerned officers of the Doarabazar Sub-district, the UP Chairman concerned and the Sub-district Executive Officer.1287

2188 The Report describes how the information was gathered with the assistance of the local authorities:

The authorized officers went to the affected houses in the field and prepared the report of losses. 165 families, 118 businessmen, and 4 firms were enlisted as affected in the report. The amount of losses of every affected individual (family) has been estimated separately.

2189 Annexures A, B and C to the Report listed the names and assessed damage of each of the 165 families (a total of BDT 10’149’776), 118 businessmen (a total of BDT 608’600) and 4 institutions (a total of BDT 568’624) and, adding these sums, a grand total of BDT 11’327'000. The details of this assessment were presented for each of the families, businessmen and institutions in three Evaluation Charts.

2190 The Evaluation Chart for the losses of each of the 165 Families considers four categories of losses:

(a) Damage to houses in the affected area;

(b) Affected fruit garden and trees;

(c) Crops damaged land and vegetable fields; and

(d) Affected fishery.1288


1287 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 1. ↩

1288 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 1 and Annexure A, pages 1 – 52. ↩

[Page 616]

2191 It records for each family the losses in these categories. It does so in great detail, recording the number of trees in each species and, where applicable the quantity of fruit, the affected surface area, damage to the houses and related assets (referred to as “infrastructure”). Each item of loss is assessed separately and comments are provided on method of assessment. The below example of one of the 165 families may serve as demonstration of the care that was taken in the preparation of this assessment:

Sl. No. Full Address of the Head of the Victimized Families with Their Names/Designation and Father's/Husband's Name Factual Description of Damages Approxima te Value of Damages Comment
01. Jamal Uddin, Father-Late Tofazzol Hossain Village-Tengratila 8 jackfruit trees (big) have been partially burnt by heat. As a result production has decreased by 50%. (8 x 25 Jackfruit x Tk 50/=) x 50% 5,000/= Each of the jackfruit trees produces 25 jackfruits. Each jackfruit costs Tk. 50/= Has been considered only for sale in the market.
Agro 20 areca trees (big) have been totally burnt in their tops (20 Piecesx400/= timber value) + (20 x 400/= x 0.50) 12,000/= Each of the areca trees values Tk. 400. Produces 400 nuts x 0.50/=
Production in 2 Lichi trees (medium) has been decreased by 50% (24000 Pieces x 0.80/=) × 50% 3,200/= Each of the medium lichi tree produces 4000 pieces of lichi @ 0.80/=
2 coconut trees (partly burnt). Production decreased by 50% (2x 100 Pieces x @10/=) × 50% 1,000/= Each of the coconut trees has 100 coconuts @ 10/=
2 guava trees (medium). 50% (2 x 500 × 4/=) x 50% 2,000/= Each of the guava trees has 500 guavas @ 4/=
2 bamboo thickets have been burnt totally (2 x 20 Pieces of bamboos x @ 60/=) 2,400/=
Sub-Total (A) 25,600/=
Infrastructural Removing the mud walls of 3 rooms L/S. Three houses are newly walled by mud, Skilled worker = 60 x @ 200/= 5,000/=

12,000/=


Each person 200/=
Unskilled workers 150 x @ 150/= 22,500/= Each person 150/=
G.I Sheet 172.00 cft @ 191.90 33,007/=
Plain sheet ridging =24.00 meter @=38.53/= 925/=
Cost of mud [illegible] 5,000/=
Repairing of doors and windows 5,000/=
Sub-Total (B) 83,432/=
Grand Total (A + B) 1,09,032/=

[Page 617]

2192 The same approach was adopted for the presentation of the losses of each of the 118 “Business Persons/Shop Owners of Tengrabazar".1289 The assessment appeared less complex than in the case of the families, as the following example shows:

List of the Victimized Business Person /Shop Owners of Tengrabazar

SI. No. Detailed address with name/designation, father's/husband's name of the victimized business person/shop owners Factual Description of Damages Approximat e Value of Damages Comment
1 Md. Abdul Khaleque, Shop owner, father's name – Ator Ali House built with tin, walls are of tin, work-shop 21/14 feet 10,000/- Jointly
2 Mosharrof Hossain, father's name - Muslem Uddin (tenant) Work-shop of iron/steel work. Remained closed for 1 month. 10,000/-
3 Fazlul Haque, father's name – Hakim Ali Tin shed shop. Tin damaged due to 35/15 feet stones. 10,000/-
4 Mozul Haque, father's name – Hakim Ali
5 Safaz Uddin, father's name – Hakim Ali
6 Saidul Amin, father's name – Late A. Mannan (tenant) Poultry shop. 50 hens died. @ 80/= Shop is closed. Profit each day 200/= 4,000/=
1,400/=
Total = 5,400/-

2193 In the third category, the following four institutions, with a total assessment of BDT 568'624 were assessed:1290

List of the Institutions Victimized by Fire at Tengratila Gas Field in Sunamganj District

Si. No. Name of the Victimized Institutions Factual Description of Damages Approximate Value of Total Damages Comment
1. Tengratila Secondary School, Tengratila Infrastructural damages, Estimation annexed (Infrastructure) 3,05,124/00
2. Tengrabazar Jame Mosque, Tengratila Infrastructural damages 2,00,000/=
3. Tengratila Govt. Primary School, Tengratila Infrastructural damages 50,000/=
4. Shurma Club, Tengratila Bazar Branch Infrastructural damages 13,500/=
Total = 5,68,624/=
(Five lac sixty eight thousand six hundred twenty four taka)

1289 Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), Annexure B, pages 1 – 10. ↩

1290 Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), Annexure C, page 4. ↩

[Page 618]

2194 A letter of the District Administrator of Sunamganj, dated 11 August 2005, referred to the assessment as presented in the Local Losses Report and stated:

Almost the entire amount has been distributed to the affected families.1291

2195 The Report also records compensation paid by Niko further to the assessment and further payments assured by Niko. These will be discussed below in Section 9.3.1. The Report points out that the Local Losses Committee did not assess long-term damages:

The measures related to losses for the long-term effect on the land and environment of the area concerned caused by the fire is not covered under this committee. The permanent adverse effect on the agricultural land, gardens, fishery, and trees of the affected area observed by the committee would cause a larger type of danger to the locality. In that case, it would be required to estimate losses separately.1292

2196 Niko participated in the activities of this committee and its participation is recorded in the Report. In his witness statement, Mr Adolph states:

In contrast to the experiences with the other two Environmental Committees, Niko was frequently updated by the Local Loss Committee. From time to time, Niko had the opportunity to provide its perspective on the Local Loss Committee's work and findings, through Niko's nominated representative, Mr Syed Moteshamul Islam.1293

2197 When commenting the draft of the Second Environmental Losses Report in the letter of 13 April 2005, as quoted above in Section 9.2.1.2, Niko referred to the ongoing efforts of assessing directly with the concerned population the losses suffered by them.

Conversely, we do feel costs for many direct community damages (eg. damaged houses, crop loss in current crop year, burned trees, lost business, and health) could be dealt with and awarded to affected community members soon after the Deputy Commissioners SubCommittee has completed its work.1294

2198 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, engaged by Niko for environmental monitoring, also contributed to the work of the Local Losses


1291 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), last page. ↩

1292 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 1, paragraph 4. ↩

1293 WS Adolph I, paragraph 152. ↩

1294 Niko letter of 13 April 2005, Exhibit C-32, and mentioned in Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), Section 9.2.1.2. ↩

[Page 619]

Committee, in particular by an “Inventory List of 55 Relocated Families to a Safer Area", which provided details about each of the families, the members of each family and their activity, their location and the distance from the blowout and a description of the damage.1295

2199 While the Local Losses Report sought to assess all local losses that had been claimed before its completion, further losses had to be assessed.

2200 The Local Losses Report itself made the following reservation:

At the end of estimation of the losses and preparation of the list of losses, several applications were found, which were not possible to verify immediately due to lack of proper evidence. If the government considered it as proper and allowed extended time for the committee, the measures related to compensation of the applicants could be verified.1296

2201 Following the second blowout the Local Losses Committee also assessed related losses related to the second blowout. The list of these local losses is attached also to the Third Environmental Losses Report. It contains the names of another 32 families, showing damage between BDT 6'000 and BDT 20'000 and a total of BDT 344'000. The damage for each of the families was described globally:

Compensation for the debris on homes and plants that was produced from the heated clay underground and flowed ash, to remove broken branches, Village trees and for the temporary suffering caused by the Gas Field Mishap on 24-06-05 for the second time.1297

2202 Mr Siddique, the Deputy Commissioner of Sunamgonj, communicated the assessment to Niko by a letter of 31 August 2005, containing the following passages:

Due to the exploration [sic] of 2nd time in Tengratila Gas field area as for the compensation of 32 victimized families Total Tk.3,44,000/- was fixed as losses. Regarding payment of the amount as for compensation, a decision is made also in the meeting of dated 23/8/05.

In the above mentioned condition, the losses of the three families excluded from the list of victims of the conflagration of dated 7/1/05 and as for the compensation of victims of conflagration of 2nd time dated 24/06/05 32 families respectively Tk. 7,37,520/- and Tk. 3,44,000/-


1295 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, Appendix A, pages 36 – 112. ↩

1296 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 1. ↩

1297 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis). ↩

[Page 620]

Total Tk. 10,81,520/- (Ten lac eighty one thousand five hundred twenty) as for the compensation of the victims of Tengratila Gas field conflagration, the Niko Resource Ltd. may be issued order.1298

2203 Mr Adolph explained that this request was fully met by payment from Niko, as had been the losses quantified in the Local Losses Report. He also mentioned a subsequent request in a letter of 4 January 2006,1299 containing the following passages:

On 26/06/2005, a total of 625 family was variously affected including more new 09 (nine) families due to 2nd time fire explosion at the Gas field. These affected people are continuously demanding for compensation to the Government.

Due to 2nd time fire explosion a house was burnt to dust due to gas bubbling at the house premises and the amount of loss was taka 1,33,000/- (One Lac and Thirty Three Thousand Only).

A minimum total amount of Taka 31,25,000/- (Thirty one lacs and Twenty Five Thousand Only) may please be paid among 625 affected families @ Taka 5,000/- (Five Thousand) per family as forthcoming Holy Eid-Ul-Azha and taka 1,33,000 (One Lac and Thirty Three Thousand Only) can be paid to the house owner of one burned house.1300

2204 The Claimant asserts that all these assessments were paid by Niko, as shall be discussed below in Section 9.3.1.

9.2.2 The EIA and the Monitoring Reports of the Government and Crown Agents/Tera

2205 The Claimant and its consultants prepared and submitted to the DoE a number of monitoring and inspection reports, before and after the blowouts. A committee formed by the DoE also presented reports in 2005 and a review committee constituted by Petrobangla produced reports in 2015. In 2016, the Respondents criticised the reports that Niko had presented and claimed time and funding for further monitoring and assessment, a claim that was addressed by the Tribunal in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision.


1298 Letter from the Deputy Commissioner, Sunamgonj to Niko, 31 August 2005, Exhibit C-50. ↩

1299 WS Adolph I, paragraphs 165 and 166. ↩

1300 Letter of the Deputy Commissioner, Sunamgonj, to Niko, dated 4 January 2006, Exhibit C-63. ↩

[Page 621]

9.2.2.1 The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in 2004 and Environmental Clearance

2206 Further to the regulations applicable in Bangladesh and the JVA, the Joint Venture had to submit an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Since the site had been developed previously by BAPEX, the DoE exempted the Joint Venture from the obligation of submitting an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) that otherwise is required for projects of the kind.1301 The Joint Venture submitted to the DoE the Terms of Reference for the Detailed ΕΙΑ (TOR).1302 The DoE approved this ToR on 20 March 2004, setting out specific requirements for the EIA.1303

2207 The EIA Report was prepared by Resources & Environmental Management Services, Dhaka (REMS) and by the Niko-BAPEX Joint Venture1304 and dated June 2004.1305 The EIA Team was identified as follows:1306

1.9 The EIA Team

The professional team responsible for the specialist studies and analysis of information comprised of the following individuals:

Professional Area of responsibility
Syed Md. Iqbal Ali Adviser
Dr. Feroz Kabir Team Leader (EIA and Environmental Management Specialist)
Dr. Kazi Noor Newaz Ecologist, EIA & Environmental Management Specialist
Abdul Alim GIS/GPS Survey Specialist
Olena Reza Socio-Economist
Ikbal Hossain Environmental Survey Specialist
2 Nos Surveyors

2208 The EIA contains in particular chapters on "4. Existing Baseline Environmental Data”, including information about Ambient Air Quality, Soil Characteristics and Agricultural Land Types, Ecosystems and Water Resources Use and on “5. Socio-Economic Baseline Conditions within 5 Km Radius”, as well as “9. Environmental Management and Mitigation Plan: General Considerations” including a section on “Disaster Management and


1301 EIA Report, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, page VIII. ↩

1302 Introduction and table of contents produced as Annex II to EIA Report, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, pdf pages 154 – 158. ↩

1303 Approval letter produced as Annex II to EIA Report, Exhibit R-72 and C-13. ↩

1304 EIA Report, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, cover page and Preface. ↩

1305 EIA Report, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, discussed in BBL I, section 5.2.3 and CMD, paragraph 141, relying on WS Glaholt II, paragraph 16. ↩

1306 EIA Report, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, page 6. ↩

[Page 622]

Emergency Response” and “10. Environmental Monitoring, Institutional Development and Financial Arrangements”.

2209 The EIA Report was submitted to the DoE as part of the application for an Environmental Clearance, which was received by the DoE on 26 June 2004.1307 The application was granted by a letter dated 28 August 2004,1308 subject to a number of terms and conditions. These included directions in cases of “any blowout or damage”, “emergency response plan”, rehabilitation or compensation in cases of damage or loss of property, monitoring and reporting. The clearance was granted for one year, requiring timely renewal.

2210 Mr Glaholt reported that, when the term of the certificate expired, Niko applied and was granted a renewal of the certificate in August 2005. These renewals of the Environmental Clearance Certificate were repeated every year until the 2016 – 2017 renewal year. Mr Glaholt added:

After Niko's application for the 2016-2017 renewal year, on 13 March 2017 the Sylhet office of the DOE suspended Niko's environmental clearance until the disposal of the ICSID arbitrations and due to the non- operational nature of the site. Prior to this, I am not aware of the DOE expressing any concern with Niko's annual applications to renew its environmental clearance.1309

2211 The Tribunal notes that these renewals were granted after the Third Environmental Losses Committee had examined the obligations that the Niko/BAPEX Joint Venture had assumed in relation to the Environmental Clearance Certificate.1310

9.2.2.2 Post-blowout monitoring and inspection reports

2212 When the first blowout occurred on 7 January 2005, Niko organised the monitoring and assessment of the damage. It engaged Mr Randal Glaholt and his company Tera Consultants Ltd (Tera) “to implement and oversee a comprehensive environmental monitoring programme”.1311 Mr Glaholt and Tera performed the monitoring in cooperation with Crown Agents Services Limited (Crown Agents), “an international development company with offices in Dhaka", providing inter alia environmental consultancy services”.1312


1307 BBL I, paragraph 59. ↩

1308 Exhibit R-75. ↩

1309 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 16; see also CMD, paragraph 141. ↩

1310 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 5. ↩

1311 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 8. ↩

1312 WS Adolph I, paragraph 116. ↩

[Page 623]

Mr Adolph explains that Niko had engaged Crown Agents previously for assistance in the preparation of the EΙΑ.1313 Mr Glaholt explained:

I was engaged on a full-time basis to oversee the monitoring of any environmental and social impacts in the aftermath of the first blowout. Early on I procured and oversaw Crown (a multinational firm with offices in Dhaka and a well-regarded senior environmental staff) to carry out third-party environmental and social monitoring.

2213 As mentioned above, Mr Glaholt arrived on site 22 January 2005.1314 He started by working with Dr Feroz Kabir, Dr Humayun Kabir and Dr Kazi Noor Newaz of Crown Agents, two of whom had been identified as part of the team having prepared the EIA,

... in conducting a detailed assessment of the blowout site and surrounding areas, and in scoping out the follow-up monitoring plan. Dr. Feroz, Dr. Kabir1315 and Dr. Kazi are well-respected local environmental scientists, well-known to both government and academic circles in Bangladesh.1316

2214 The results of this initial assessment were set out in the Environmental Site Inspection Report, dated 26 January 2005.1317 In addition to the information about the first blowout, discussed above in Section 9.1.2, this initial Report, in the words of Mr Glaholt, “outlines the environmental actions taken up to the date of the report as well as the post-impact environmental audit and monitoring plan to ensure a comprehensive environmental response".1318 The Report also states: “A post-impact environmental audit and monitoring programme has commenced in collaboration with [Crown Agents]".1319

2215 The Government, too, initiated environmental monitoring: the DoE set up a Sub-Committee for Observation and Monitoring of Environmental Status after the Blowout at the BAPEX-NIKO Tengratila Gas Field, Dowarabazar, Sunamganj".1320 Further to a memo of the Department of 30 January 2005,


1313 WS Adolph I, paragraph 116. ↩

1314 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 6 and 12. ↩

1315 This seems to be a typo; the preceding part of the quoted paragraph shows that he meant Dr Feroz Kabir. ↩

1316 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 13. ↩

1317 Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25. ↩

1318 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 14, referring to the Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25. ↩

1319 Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25, page 3, item B 8. ↩

1320 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221. ↩

[Page 624]

a four member sub-committee was formed, chaired by Mr Mohammad Reazudding, Director (Technical) of the DoE as Convener. Its tasks were:

To review the progress of compliance of the terms and conditions as laid down in the environmental clearance issued in favor of the NIKO Resources (Bangladesh) Ltd. for implementation of the said gas development project.

To observe/verify the ongoing activities/performance of the NIKO management after the blowout.

To gather/acquire samples of various environmental parameters on the spot and to assess and analyze.

2216 The Committee reviewed the relevant environmental reports, terms and conditions of the Environmental Clearance and an unidentified report, presumably the First Environmental Losses Report. The Committee visited the site on 11 February 2005. In addition to the Committee members and the convener, Mr Glaholt and “NIKO personnel Mr Raushan and Mr Lemon and EIA team member, Dr Feroz Kabir” also attended.

2217 The Committee issued on 19 February 2005 a report (the DoE Observation and Monitoring Report1321). It identified its tasks, which included to review of Niko's compliance with the Environmental Clearance Certificate and “to observe/verify the ongoing activities/performance of the NIKO management after the blowout". It recorded the Committee's observations about losses and damage. The relevant observations will be considered below in the context of the claimed losses to which they relate. In addition, the Report contains directions for surveys, which were dealt with by the Local Losses Committee, and directions for further monitoring by the Niko monitoring team.

2218 The 2005 monitoring directions related to the:


1321 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221; the date of the report is indicated in the First Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-29, page 1. ↩

[Page 625]

[Page 626]

2219 The Report noted that Niko had developed a monitoring programme and instructed Niko to inform the DoE about the planned rehabilitation of the 42 affected households “(in the long term) to get back them to the normal life”, take clear risk demarcation measures and take rapid action with respect to the relief well operations. More generally, the Report instructs the following “NIKO monitoring activities":

ΝΙΚΟ Resources has developed various format/table for assessing/monitoring various parameters. The committee suggests incorporating more issues of environment into their monitoring system. The items those could be included are: aquifer and soil quality, water quality in the contaminated ponds, health hazards and traumatic situations, air quality and whichever environmental issue arises due to the situation day by day.

Acquisition of the data and sample should follow standard procedure and the frequency of the monitoring should also be increased until the complete killing of the well is done.

The committee asked Mr. Randal of NIKO Environmental Team on the progress of acquisition of appropriate satellite image before and after the incident. He informed that the IKONOS data has been ordered in this connection.

The committee stresses that the satellite data after the blowout should be of more than one date, as the scenario is changing very rapidly.1322

2220 In conclusion, the Report notes that “NIKO has so far undertaken some measures in the field to cope with the situation” and recommends “further enhancement of the measures and activities towards mitigating the sufferings of the people and lessen the risks”. It stresses the need of data for the assessment of the losses:

For the purpose of assessing detail environmental damage, a very good data and information management system should be in place. The committee attaches importance to develop and follow a clear format on monitoring various environmental parameters and reporting the day to day status of the situation thereof.

2221 And the Report closes by giving directions about the timing of Niko's monitoring:


1322 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221, pages 7 and 8. ↩

[Page 627]

NIKO should provide its monitoring report including the overall compliance status in a clear format for every 15 days. It is requested that NIKO shall submit its first report to DOE by no later than the end of this month.

NIKO should inform DOE, in a weekly basis, of the progress of monitoring of different environmental parameters and remedial measures thereof as well as the progress of installation of the relief well.

2222 Further to these directions, the first Crown Agents/Tera Biweekly Report was produced at “the end of this month”, dated 28 February 2005. The Report refers to the instructions in the DoE Observation and Monitoring Report and states that the “sections which follow provides the first progress report with respect to [these instructions]”. Mr Glaholt explained that this First Monitoring Report “required a substantial amount of work, as it included drawing together the [daily environmental reports] and analyzing and presenting all significant findings and observations”.1323 The Report described the action taken:

Crown Agents and Tera Consultants started a comprehensive environmental damage inventory over ½ and 1 km area and surveying over 5 km area. The inventory and survey include water (sources and quality), soil (type, location and quality), vegetation and agriculture (type, quantity and material loss), aquaculture (fish loss), homestead (house damage and lost/theft of personal belongings), health issues (physical and mental health), animal husbandry (loss/stolen cattle, goat and sheep), poultry (loss/stolen chicken and duck); and business loss inventory (damage to shops, loss/stolen/damage of goods, shop closure and rent loss). In the following subsections, the detail break down of each item is shown. Data collection over 2 and 1 km area is almost completed, and currently being tabulated in tables and spreadsheet. The team went out to continue field survey between 1 and 5 km area.1324

2223 The Report continues by reporting on the monitoring performed and its results in the sectors listed in the quoted passage; it then describes the Environmental Monitoring Programme, summarises the Environmental and Social Actions to Date and describes the maps that were attached to the Report, showing

  1. Location map of the Chattak Gas Field Development Project;


1323 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 22. ↩

1324 First Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-29, Section 2. ↩

[Page 628]

  1. Tube Well Flow Monitoring Programme;

  2. Tube & Kua Well Water Quality Monitoring Programme;

  3. Pond Monitoring Programme;

  4. Crack Monitoring Programme;

  5. Zone of Burned and Heat Damaged Trees.

2224 The second -Crown Agents/Tera Biweekly Report, dated 9 April 2005,1325 develops the information in the first report and explains:

The Joint Ventures independent environmental team are conducting a stratified environmental impact covering an area from the blow-out out to a 5 km radius from the site. Based on an initial site reconnaissance and reports from the field, the site the survey effort has been stratified into three survey and sampling zones: a) blowout crater to 0.5 km radius; b) 0.5 km radius to l km radius; e) 1 km radius to 5 km radius.

The impact inventory, monitoring and management programs are focused on water (well water, surface water, aquifers), soils, air quality, vegetation, wildlife, agriculture, aquaculture, structures (household, community infrastructure), public health and safety, employment and business. Included in the Joint Ventures programs and associated reporting are specific actions regarding relocation and rehabilitation of most affected families and individuals as well as measures being taken to kill the blow-out.

In the following subsections, the detail break down of each item raised by DoE is discussed. Initial post-blowout impact inventory data collection has been completed within 0.5 km and is progressing between 0.5 km and 5 km radius. Monitoring programs are ongoing.

2225 The Report sets out over 30 pages the actions and findings, supported by tables, graphs and photos in the following sections:


1325 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79. ↩

[Page 629]

2226 The section on Community Impact Inventory and Assessment includes a variety of aspects under the following headings:

2227 Appendix A to the Report provides an Inventory of 55 Relocated Families to Safer Area”, recording for each family

[Page 630]

current production damage in percent] and Socio-Economic Infrastructure Damage].

2228 The information in this inventory resembles in part the subsequent Local Losses Report, dated 8 June 2005, which assessed the losses of 165 families, 118 businessmen, and 4 firms.1326

2229 The third Crown Agents/Tera Biweekly Report, dated 3 May 2005,1327 followed that format with some modifications. So did the subsequent reports, produced in the Arbitration.

2230 In addition to the subject matters listed above, the Monitoring Reports also report on the progress of the work concerning the relief well and the restoration to pre-blowout out situations concerning various issues, in particular displaced families and businesses.

2231 According to Mr Glaholt, these reports originally were on a bi-weekly basis and after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well on a monthly basis. He stated that there were in total 46 Monitoring Reports, the last of which was submitted on 31 December 2008.1328

2232 Concerning the team that was performing the monitoring work, Mr Glaholt described it as “a dedicated team of third party, highly regarded national environmental consultants from Crown and international safety specialists".1329 He explained that “two or three employees of Crown Agents were living on site and monitored the blowout and nearby community area every day. All were university educated in the environmental or related fields”. He also described the data collection:

Environmental data was collected on a daily basis. The data was compiled into “Daily Environmental Reports” (“DERs”). In addition to conducting our own analysis, we also sent samples of water and soil to a lab at the University of Sylhet, a private lab in Dhaka (Exonics Technology Centre) and the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) in Dhaka for testing. Crown and I also observed and assessed any disruption to local community life and commerce on a daily basis.1330


1326 See above Section 9.2.1.4. ↩

1327 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35. ↩

1328 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 20. A list of these reports can be found in BMD, FN 535 (counting 45 reports), FN 595 (for reports from July 2006 until September 2008) and in the Annex to BBL I under the heading Documents. ↩

1329 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 15. ↩

1330 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 17 and 18. ↩

[Page 631]

2233 Mr Glaholt continued by explaining that the results of the DER were reviewed by him daily and incorporated into “larger and more comprehensive monitoring reports.1331 More generally, Mr Glaholt explained:

In terms of the scope of our monitoring program, Crown and I kept an open mind and, to the extent new issues came to our attention that had not been specifically captured in the initial scope, we adapted our approach to address these new issues. At no time did we suppress findings nor were we ever under pressure from Niko management to report anything other than objective observations.1332

2234 Mr Glaholt described the work of Crown Agents and Tera as a comprehensive environmental monitoring program”1333 and opined that the Monitoring Reports “provide a comprehensive picture of the nature and extent of the environmental and social impact of the two blowouts”.1334

2235 Following the completion of the monitoring by the Crown Agents/Tera group, Monthly Monitoring Reports were presented by Niko. Some of these Reports have been produced in the Arbitration, the first of them being dated October 2008.1335 At the latest from 2010, Niko presented the Reports quarterly; those in 2014 are entitled “Environmental and Social Monitoring Reports".

2236 These Reports follow largely the model of the Crown Agents/Tera Monitoring Reports. The Reports produced in the Arbitration placed particular emphasis on Gas Seeping Data.

2237 The Environmental and Social Monitoring Reports have a different structure, reporting on the West Chattak Gas Field Development, the East Chattak Access Road, 16” Pipeline Corridor and the Jalalabad Slug Catcher, all section containing environmental monitoring information. They also contain reports on “grievances” and occasional information on visits and reports from others, for instance:


1331 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 19 ↩

1332 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 23. ↩

1333 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 8. ↩

1334 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 20. ↩

1335 Niko Monthly Monitoring Report, October 2008, Exhibit C-92. It has not been explained why a Niko monitoring report was produced in 2008 while Mr Glaholt asserted that the Crown Agents/Tera reports were produced until the end of 2008. ↩

[Page 632]

supervisor. They were joined on 20 October 2008 by Mr Abdullah Al Mamun from BAPEX, who saw the bubbles and agreed “that there is no danger to the villagers”.1336


1336 Niko Monthly Monitoring Report, October 2008, Exhibit C-92, page 16. ↩

1337 Exhibit R-119, page 8. ↩

1338 Niko Monitoring Report October - December 2014, Exhibit R-143, pages (i) and 4. ↩

1339 Niko Monitoring Report October – December 2014, Exhibit R-143, page 11, Section 3.5, “Third Party Inspections". ↩

[Page 633]

Government needs to drill new well immediately and produce the gas to the pipeline so that the pressure will be reduced.1340

2238 In May 2005, Crown Agents presented an Environmental Management and Mitigation Plan for the Relief Well and the Relocation of Production Wells (Well #3, well #4 and well #5) Site.1342 This Plan provides basic information about the project, sets a Post-Blowout Environmental Baseline, provides information about the Relief Well Drilling and the Relocation of the Production Wells and reports on Public Consultations that Niko had organised.

2239 This Plan also contains a Post-Blowout Environmental Baseline. It referred to the EIA and the “base line environmental information” contained in it, stating that following the Chattak 2 blowout “the baseline environmental conditions changed". The report explained: “The Joint Venture engaged Crown Agents and TERA Environmental Consultants to study the current situation and the change of the environmental conditions”. This was followed by a description of the environmental conditions as they were found by the initial results of the post blowout environmental surveys. These results were presented in sections on Water, Soil, Air and socio-economics, including health.


1340 Niko Monitoring Report October - December 2014, Exhibit R-143, pages (i), (ii), 12, 13, 22 and 23. ↩

1341 Niko Monitoring Report October - December 2014, Exhibit R-143, pages (ii), 23, 24, 30-33. ↩

1342 Environmental Management and Mitigation Plan for Relief Well (Well #2A), dated 23 May 2005, Exhibit R-78. ↩

[Page 634]

2240 The Environmental Management and Mitigation Plan also presented details about the Environmental Management Team:1343

Table 2. Environmental Management Team

Professional Area of specialization
Feroz Kabir, Ph.D. Team Leader (EIA, Environmental Management Specialist and Chemical Engineer)
Kazi Noor Newaz, Ph.D. Ecologist, EIA & Environmental Specialist
Humayun Kabir Agriculture and livestock specialist
Md. Salim, Ph.D. Mechanical engineer
Rafiqul Islam GIS, GPS and Image Specialist
Delwar Hossain Socio-Economist
Md. Ripon Environmental Survey Specialist
Saiful Islam Chemist
Ruhul Amin Chemist
Md. Abdhun Noor Geologist

2241 The Respondents also produced a Supplemental Report of the Review Committee on Field Trip on 2nd July 2015 to observe the Latest Status of Gas Seepage, Health Hazard, Safety Issue, Environmental and Other Impacts caused by two Wells Blowouts in 20051344 The Committee was constituted by Petrobangla and composed of representatives from Petrobangla, BAPEX and SGFL.

2242 The Supplemental Report refers to a visit by “a team comprising Officials Bapex and SGFL to the “blowout area” in November 2014, presumably the team mentioned above in the quoted passage from the Monitoring Report for November and December 2014, which reported from the site with video clips and photographs. The Respondents introduced two videos into the Arbitration, the origins are not entirely clear, however the Tribunal presumes these were from the Supplemental Report, identified as “Gas seepage Video 16 June 2015”.1345 The videos show unidentified water locations bubbling and in some images what seems to be burning gas and show the date of 16 June 20015.

2243 The Supplemental Report adds that “the present committee also visited the blowout area on 2nd July 2015” and also refers to a Field Visit in November


1343 Environmental Management and Mitigation Plan for Relief Well (Well #2A), dated 23 May 2005, Exhibit R-78, page 8. ↩

1344 Supplemental Report of the Review Committee on Field Trip on 2nd July 2015, Exhibit R-14; see also above Section 7.6.6.1. ↩

1345 Exhibits R-14A and R-14B. ↩

[Page 635]

2014. The central part of the report concerns the visit on 2 July 2015 and deals primarily with Gas Seepage and Health and Safety.

9.2.2.3 The Respondents' 2016 criticism of Niko's monitoring and assessment and their related requests

2244 In their BMD, dated 25 March 2016, the Respondents criticised both Niko's pre-blowout EIA and the post-blowout monitoring. They produced a report by BBL I, asserting that these documents failed to meet applicable standards.

2245 Based on this assertion, the Respondents requested that the Tribunal order Niko to pay for additional monitoring in advance of a decision on Niko's liability (the advance payment claim) so that BAPEX and its experts could assess fully the environmental damage and that the Tribunal suspend the procedure until that additional monitoring would be completed.

2246 The advance payment claim was for the future costs for the work of experts to perform “a more robust assessment of the environmental and health damages in Tengratila, as well as a mitigation programme recommended by BAPEX's gas emission expert”. The total claim for the expenses of monitoring, surveying and abatement amounted to sums between USD 8'461'463 and USD 8'642'493.1346 Further to a question from the Tribunal, the Respondents explained that the claim was “for direct loss caused by the blowout, not a claim for a breach of Niko's monitoring obligations”.1347

2247 The Respondents also claimed a suspension of the proceedings, to hold them “open until such time as a complete survey and monitoring of the Tengratila area can be conducted and BAPEX can provide the fullest possible accounting of environmental and health related Losses”.1348

2248 The Claimant denied that it had failed its obligations concerning the EIA and the monitoring; and it objected to both the request for an advance payment and the suspension of the proceedings, arguing that BAPEX pleads for “speculative funding to develop a hypothetical claim for damages for which no evidence exists”. It added: “It is absurd to suggest, as BAPEX does, that a party is entitled to postulate that damages may have occurred as a result of a wrong, and demand that the other side cover the costs of trying to prove it, simply by framing such costs as a ‘partial' award of damages, with a full award to follow once it gets around to proving its case”.1349


1346 BMD, section VII(B) and Amendment, paragraphs 79 and 80. ↩

1347 HT 2020 Day 1, pages 78 and 79. ↩

1348 BMD, paragraph 99(c) ↩

1349 CMD, paragraph 125 and 127. ↩

[Page 636]

2249 The Claimant also argued that the claim for costs of the monitoring programme proposed by the Respondents' experts was “not a compensable type of loss or damage” and that this claim is “barred by estoppel, waiver and/or acquiescence”.1350

2250 The Tribunal heard the Parties at the November 2020 Hearing and decided both claims in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision. Concerning the claim for advance payment, the Tribunal did not exclude that “under certain circumstances, the party liable for another party's losses may have to participate in establishing and assessing the losses which it must repair; that may include an obligation of the liable party to advance some or all costs for establishing the losses”. The Tribunal examined the circumstances presented by the Respondents to justify the requested advance payments. In conclusion, the Tribunal saw “no justification to order [Niko] to pay, in advance of any monitoring and surveying costs engaged by the Respondents or the Government, the amounts requested by the Respondents”. It denied the claim for advance payments.1351

2251 The Tribunal considered again the reasons for the decision on the claims for advance payment and for suspension1352 and herein confirms the decision.

2252 In these circumstances, the Tribunal need not revert to the controversy about the compliance of Niko's monitoring and assessment, except for (i) an assertion made by BAPEX concerning restrictions allegedly imposed by the Tribunal and (ii) the adequacy of Niko's monitoring reports.

9.2.2.4 The alleged denial of further monitoring and surveying work by the Respondents

2253 When explaining in its August 2021 Submission on Environmental Claims that it decided not to base its damages on the Third Environmental Losses Report but on the Second, BAPEX explained that it did so “in order to avoid additional causation issues as between losses occasioned by the first and second blowouts”. BAPEX justified this decision by stating that the “Respondents are not in a position to address these causation issues without further monitoring and surveying work"; and BAPEX asserts in 2021 that such further work “was denied by the Tribunal”.1353 This is not correct: the Tribunal examined in detail the request of BAPEX relating to the further monitoring and surveying and decided it in the Decision on Recoverable


1350 CMD, sections IV(A) and (B). ↩

1351 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraphs 645 and 651. ↩

1352 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, section 10.6. ↩

1353 ВМЕС, paragraph 7. ↩

[Page 637]

Loss.1354 In that Decision, the Tribunal did not deny further work by the Respondents but the request by the Respondents, 15 years after the event, that Niko be ordered to fund further monitoring and surveying work which BAPEX was planning and to suspend the Arbitration proceedings until the completion of this future monitoring and surveying work.

2254 Following that Decision, the Respondents agreed to base the claim for environmental losses not on the Second but on the Third Environmental Losses Report:

2255 In support of the denial assertion it made in 2021, BAPEX refers to paragraphs 675 and 676 of the Heads of Recoverable Losses Decision.1355 These paragraphs have the following text (emphasis in the original):

Following the notification of the present decision, the Tribunal will consult the Parties to determine the procedure leading up to the hearing scheduled for August 2021. During the course of this procedure any further argument and evidence must be presented so that any remaining evidentiary issues may be addressed during the August 2021 Hearing and thereafter the Tribunal may render its final award on the Compensation Declaration, including the environmental claims of the Government pursued through BAPEX as its assignee.

The Respondents' request to suspend the procedure on the environmental claims is denied.

2256 The Tribunal denied the requested suspension of the Arbitration procedure; it did not deny that the Respondents address the causation issues as between the first and the second blowout. This is clear when considering the parts of the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision that immediately precede the passage on which BAPEX relies:

The Tribunal must bear in mind that the proceedings dealing with the Compensation Declaration concern the claims made in the Money Suit and that these claims are based on the assessment in the Report of the Environmental Losses Committee, mandated to “estimate the long-term potential losses”. The Respondents have not put into question this assessment but, in March 2016, stated that it had to be “supplemented due to continuing harm occurring over the past decade”.

Until today, the Respondents have not presented argument and evidence to support the 2005 assessment of the committee on which the Money


1354 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, section 10.6. ↩

1355 ВМЕС, paragraph 7, FN 16. ↩

[Page 638]

Suit is based; they have not presented the announced supplement to that assessment; they have not presented a replacement of the 2005 assessment but announced that their assessment of the environmental losses will be submitted only in an uncertain future. The submissions of 15 April 2021 have not brought any substantial change, as no further information about “the Study” is provided and its completion time remains in an uncertain future.

The Tribunal does not accept that the Respondents continue holding up the progress of these proceedings by a programme for monitoring and surveying presented in 2016 and on which no progress has been made since then. If the Respondents wish to supplement the environmental claims, develop, or modify them, they must do so now.1356

2257 Following the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision of 18 May 2021, the Tribunal discussed with the Parties the next steps in the procedure. It held a Case Management Conference with the Parties on 6 June 2021 during which also the next steps of the proceedings on the Environmental Claims were discussed. The Respondents did not state that the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision prevented them from addressing the causation issues and had to limit their claims to the Second Environmental Losses Report. To the contrary, the Respondents expressly confirmed that they intended to proceed on the basis of the Third Environmental Losses Report. The minutes from this Case Management Conference were sent to the parties in draft form. On 24 June 2021, the Respondents provided additions to the draft circulated by the Tribunal, but did not comment on the section dealing with the environmental claims. The final minutes of this Case Management Conference record the following:

The Respondents then confirmed that the claims to be decided by the Tribunal in the arbitration are those that had been made in the Money Suit, based on the report of the Third Environmental Losses Committee, dated 15 September 2005 and any necessary update.1357

2258 The programme following the Heads of Recoverable Losses Decision was adjusted: the Hearing, originally scheduled for August 2021 was deferred to November 2021. The Respondents had time until 20 August 2021 to produce their Submission on the Environmental Claims. BAPEX did not complain at


1356 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraphs 672 – 674; a footnote to the first of these paragraphs clarifies that the quoted report is the Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R- 5(bis), Section 1. ↩

1357 Summary Minutes of the 8 June 2021 CMC, extracts quoted above in Section 4.9.3. ↩

[Page 639]

the 8 June 2021 Case Management Conference that it was unable to update the Environmental Claims on the basis of the Third Environmental Losses Report and had to limit itself to claims based on the Second Environmental Losses Report.

2259 As a review of the record shows, the statement about the denial by the Tribunal, allegedly forcing BAPEX to base its Environmental Claims on the Second Environmental Losses Report, is incorrect and in contradiction with BAPEX's own position expressed at the Case Management Conference following the Heads of Recoverable Losses Decision.

9.2.2.5 The adequacy of Niko's monitoring reports

2260 BAPEX relies on explanations by BBL I and criticises the EIA, in particular with respect to the baseline: “the baseline information included in the EIA [...] is not comprehensive or adequate and fails to meet established standards".1358 BAPEX mentions specifically information about air and water quality as insufficient and asserts that “Niko failed to include in the baseline potential pollutants of concern”, mentioning specifically arsenic in drinking water as a well-established hazard in the region in general.1359

2261 Quoting Dr Borthwick, BAPEX asserts that the baseline information in the ΕΙΑ "fails to meet established standards".1360

2262 With respect to the post-blowout monitoring, BBL Experts I describes in detail the “features of an appropriate environmental monitoring and surveillance programme following the gas well blowouts” and opines that “Niko's monitoring programme was deficient”.1361 BAPEX relies (i) on the requirements under Bangladesh environmental law, in particular the 1995 Environment Conservation Act and its implementing regulations, the Environment Conservation Rules of 1997;1362 (ii) on provisions in the JVA referring to standards of the international petroleum industry; it identifies the standards established by the E&P and UNEP, of which it says that Dr Borthwick was the principal author, as “a clear example of such standards"1363 and (iii) international guidelines for oil and gas development projects, in particular Guidelines by the World Bank of 1991 and 1998.1364


1358 BMD, paragraph 273, quoting from BBL I, paragraph 69. ↩

1359 BMD, paragraphs 275 – 281. ↩

1360 BMD, paragraph 273. ↩

1361 BBL I, Sections 6.2 and 6.3. ↩

1362 BMD, paragraphs 253 - 256. ↩

1363 BMD, paragraphs 257 – 259. ↩

1364 BMD, paragraphs 260 – 261. ↩

[Page 640]

2263 BAPEX relies on “what industry standards and international guidelines would require [to] be monitored following a disaster such as the blowouts in Tengratila". On that basis, BAPEX describes the alleged deficiencies of the monitoring organised by Niko and the difficulties resulting from these deficiencies:

Niko's environmental monitoring program, as reflected in various reports submitted by Niko to DOE between 2005 and 2015—many of which are on the record in this arbitration—was inadequate to properly inform the Government and BAPEX of the nature and extent of the environmental and human health damages caused by the blowouts. It also has created a situation in which it is impossible for BAPEX's environmental damages experts to adequately assess these damages. Moreover, the lack of information in and the misdirected focus of the monitoring reports impede the Government's ability to take steps to address those harms.1365

2264 The aspects which a “proper programme” would have “specifically considered" are summarised by BAPEX which lists seven such aspects. The first of these is described as follows:

“The sampling and analysis of the gases emitted from the main well throughout all of the affected area – potentially up to 5 kilometres” for hydrocarbons, oxides and other gases because such gases are known to be associated with petroleum gases and include known human carcinogens, asphyxiants, respiratory irritants, and other toxic effects.

2265 BAPEX asserts that a similar approach should have been taken by Niko with respect to the “sand and subsurface material emitted from the well”, impacts of health, drinking water, “a range of economic activities”, ecologically sensitive areas and “background control samples”.1366 According to BAPEX Niko failed to do so in part:

Niko's monitoring program measured up these recommendations in certain respects, but was deficient in other significant areas. There are three deficiencies that are of most concern to BAPEX's environmental damage experts, both from the point of view of what they would have expected a reasonable operator to do and of documenting harms caused by the blowout. They are: (1) the scope and content of the gas emissions


1365 BMD, paragraph 294. ↩

1366 BMD, paragraph 296 ↩

[Page 641]

monitoring; (2) the approach to the assessment of drinking water quality; and (3) the failure to institute proper health monitoring.1367

2266 BAPEX recognises that Niko monitored emissions for the “immediate explosive risk” but “failed to monitor the composition of the gas over the past eleven years"; it limited the emissions it did monitor only to a 500m radius and it stopped monitoring gas emissions in Tengratila on a regular basis in April 2006.1368 In particular, according to BAPEX, Niko's monitoring

... did not look for hydrocarbons, oxides, or other toxic substances that BAPEX's environmental damage experts indicate should have been measured in accordance with industry standards. [...] This is a flagrant violation of industry standards which “clearly state that the monitoring parameters selected should reflect the pollutants of concern” for the particular type of project and event in question.1369

2267 In this context, BAPEX also relies on the First Report of the DoE, which expressed concern about “the pollution load” due to the “ongoing release of gaseous substances”, which “specifically referred to the presence of sulfur oxides, carbon oxides and suspended particular matter and directed Niko to monitor the air quality in Tengratila”.1370

2268 Similar statements are made by BAPEX with respect to “Niko's approach to the assessment of drinking water” and Niko's alleged failure “to institute proper health monitoring”.1371

2269 The Claimant asserts that the post-blowout environmental monitoring programme implemented by Grant Kelly and Randal Glaholt “was consistent with appropriate industry practice at the time. This is supported by the fact that neither BAPEX nor the Bangladesh Department of Environment suggested otherwise, at least until BAPEX's Memorial on Damages over a decade after the event”. The Claimant also pointed out the responsibility of BAPEX as joint venture partner:

In the present case, BAPEX and the DoE had full visibility of the scope and content of Niko's Environmental Monitoring Program, not least via the 46 Monitoring Reports submitted to the DoE, and copied to BAPEX.


1367 BMD, paragraph 297. ↩
1368 BMD, paragraphs 298, 299, 301 and 302. ↩
1369 BMD, paragraph 298, referring specifically to BBL I, paragraph 126. ↩
1370 BMD, paragraph 299, referring specifically to DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221, which stated that it "is very likely that air pollutants in the form of SOx, CO, CO2, CH4, SPM etc. are being added everyday to the atmosphere due to burning of blowout gases and various other substances". ↩
1371 BMD, section VII(B)(3). ↩

[Page 642]

BAPEX also had joint responsibility for the management of the Joint Venture, and had the ability to table issues via the Joint Management Committee, or indeed by correspondence at any point in time. As noted above, it raised no concerns with the Environmental Monitoring Program at the time.1372

2270 With respect to the EIA, the Claimant relies on Mr Glaholt's witness statement according to which the DoE approved the EIA, granted the Environmental Clearance and renewed it every year until 2016. Concerning the monitoring reports, the Claimant pointed out that they were issued to the DoE. “BAPEX and the DoE raised no complaints about the scope or execution of the monitoring throughout”.1373

2271 In his First Witness Statement Mr Glaholt described in detail the monitoring programme he (as Tera Consultants) had developed and implemented together with Crown Agents. In response to BBL ExpertsI, Mr Glaholt addressed in his Second Witness Statement the considerations relevant for the design of a monitoring programme, the matters that such a programme must cover and how he and Crown Agents proceeded when they began “implementing and overseeing a comprehensive environmental monitoring program":

Integral to this was an initial, detailed assessment of the blowout site and surrounding areas, along with ongoing monitoring for potential new issues. I carried out this work in collaboration with Crown. This involved understanding the nature of any contaminants potentially present along with environmental, health and safety risk factors, community and government concerns, response options, and resource requirements.

It was important to assess these aspects at the outset because there is no “one size-fits-all” solution in environmental monitoring. One could speculate at length on anything that could hypothetically be possible. It is the actual nature of the blowout, contaminants present, and other matters that I assessed over the following years that are relevant for determining real potential impacts and appropriate responses.1374

2272 Concerning the aspects that had to be covered by the monitoring programme, he emphasised the variations in the types of blowouts and explained that in the present case the


1372 CMD, paragraph 154. ↩
1373 CMD, paragraphs 140 – 141. ↩
1374 WS Glaholt II, paragraphs 8 and 9. ↩

[Page 643]

... gas produced by the Chattak 2 well blowout was a pure, dry and sweet natural gas mixture – it contained no salt water, liquid hydrocarbons, or hydro sulfide ...1375

2273 He also described the effect of the “sand and soil [...] thrown up into the air”, “any other materials involved in the blowout” and the drilling mud and concluded:

Our assessment on site at the time of the blowout was that virtually all drilling material, save a fraction of the water-based mud system, remained on site and that any other hazardous substances were incinerated on site.

2274 The Tribunal considers that, as explained above in Section 9.2.2.1, the Niko- BAPEX Joint Venture had submitted to the DoE the proposed ToR for the EIΑ. The DoE reviewed the ToR and identified several subject matters that it wished to see added or developed. These included “Identification and Analysis of Potential Impacts”, with directions about what the “Analysis” had to include and mentioned specifically impact on air and water,1376 aspects with respect to which BAPEX finds the EIA deficient. The EIA contains, over some 15 pages in sections 4 and 5 and in the annexes, information about the baseline, and a section in which the subjects prescribed in the DoE letter is discussed in some 45 pages, subdivided in the subjections about the different stages of the project, each of which addressing specifically impact on air and on water. One of these subsections deals with “Impact of Non-Routine Discharges and Fire (Accidents/Disaster) Impact”.1377

2275 The DoE approved the EIA and issued the Environmental Clearance for one year. It renewed this Environmental Clearance even after the two blowouts had occurred and, as explained above in Section 9.2.2.1, renewed the clearance until 2016.

2276 The Tribunal is of the view that the DoE is and was at the time well placed to determine by reference to the relevant standards the requirements of an EIA in Bangladesh. It notes that both BAPEX and the DoE were familiar with the situation of the Chattak field at the time, since the site had been developed previously. BAPEX has not provided an explanation why the points raised by its experts in 2016 were no issue in 2004, when it submitted the EIA jointly with Niko, and the DoE granted the Environmental Clearance in 2004 and renewed it thereafter.


1375 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 11; for the full text see above Section 9.1.2.1. ↩
1376 EIA Report, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, pdf page 152. ↩
1377 EIA Report, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, subsection 7.3.5, see also below Section 9.4.11. ↩

[Page 644]

2277 The Tribunal notes that the DoE reviewed the ToR and gave specific directions for the content of the EIA; it takes this as an indication that the DoE did not approve submissions by the BAPEX-Niko JV lightly and without examination. The conclusion that might have to be drawn in these circumstances is that the views of the DoE in 2014 about the requirements for the EIA of this specific project in Bangladesh were different from those expressed by Dr Borthwick, Mr Betton and Professor Leinster CBE in 2016.

2278 In the circumstances, the Tribunal is unable to accept that the EIA fails to meet the applicable standards. This does not prevent the Tribunal from reviewing the suitability of the baseline in the EIA where this is required for the determination of a specific claim by BAPEX.

2279 Concerning the post-blowout monitoring, the Tribunal has recorded above in Section 9.2.2.2 that, in the Report of 26 January 2005,1378 Niko had informed the DoE about planned monitoring programme. The DoE had reviewed this information and, in the DoE Observation and Monitoring Report,1379 gave instructions for the scope of this programme.

2280 The Tribunal is of the view that the monitoring by Crown Agents/Tera and by Niko must be assessed by reference to these instructions. The Tribunal notes that no objections were raised at the time by BAPEX and the DoE to the manner in which the applicable regulations and the specific instructions of the DoE were implemented by Niko and its consultants and specifically in the reports that Niko submitted to the DoE.

2281 The Tribunal considered the explanation by Mr Glaholt who emphasised that "it is the actual nature of the blowout” in particular the composition of the gas and specific contaminant that must be considered when designing the scope of the environmental monitoring. In the present case, the monitoring programme designed by Niko's consultants in response to the DoE's instructions met with no objection by the DoE and was applied without such objections. This must be taken as an indication that, in the view of the DoE, the programme was compliant with the relevant regulations, despite the points raised in 2016 by the Respondents' experts engaged by the Respondents.

2282 In that context, the Tribunal noted the First Environmental Losses Report referred specifically to the blowout that had occurred seven years earlier, in 1997 at Moulavi Bazar on the site operated by Occidental Petroleum some 50 km away from the Chattak site; it stated that the blowout at Chattak 2 was


1378 Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25. ↩
1379 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221. ↩

[Page 645]

“only the reoccurrence” of that at Moulavi Bazar.1380 The Moulavi Bazar was discussed by the Parties and their drilling experts and at hearings and the Tribunal had enquired about the manner in which the liability for the Moulavi Bazar blowout was dealt with. During the February 2016 Hearing the Respondents' counsel stated that “the Moulavi Bazar blowout would have been a major event in Bangladesh and generally a very significant event in the oil and gas industry in Bangladesh”. Niko's then COO agreed.1381

2283 In these circumstances, the Moulavi Bazar incident is of interest not only for the drilling of the well and the causes of the blowout, but also for the manner in which the risks caused by the blowout are addressed. The monitoring programme adopted by OPC and presumably approved by the DoE would thus appear as an important reference for the relevant rules and practices in Bangladesh and in the international petroleum industry as applicable there. Neither BAPEX nor its environmental experts referred to monitoring after the Moulavi Bazar blowout. In particular, they have not identified any difference between the post-blowout monitoring in the two incidents.

2284 When examining BAPEX's claims the Tribunal will consider the complaints about the monitoring programmes insofar as they are relevant for the specific claim. At this stage, the Tribunal merely comments what appears to be the most serious complaint by BAPEX and its experts, the risks caused by the gas emitted by the blowout. As pointed out above, BAPEX asserts that Niko and its consultants,“failed to monitor the composition of the gas over the past eleven years”, that Niko limited the emissions monitoring only to a 500m radius and it stopped monitoring gas emissions in Tengratila on a regular basis in April 2006; and that Niko committed a “flagrant violation of industry standards" by failing to "look for hydrocarbons, oxides, or other toxic substances"; and it mentioned the passage in the DoE Observation and Monitoring Report which it transcribed as relating to the likely presence of “sulfur oxides, carbon oxides and suspended particular matter”.

2285 The Tribunal recorded above in Section 9.1.2.1 that the gas from the Chattak 2 blowout was “a pure, dry and sweet natural gas mixture – it contained no salt water, liquid hydrocarbons, or hydrogen sulfide". This statement by Mr Glaholt in his Second Witness Statement is supported there by references and has not been contested. Mr Glaholt described the gas being “within North American specifications for commercial use indoors and outdoors for heating


1380 Exhibit Annex R-1, see also above Sections 9.1.2.3 and 9.2.1.1. ↩
1381 For details about the discussion see Decision on Liability, Section 8.2.1. ↩

[Page 646]

and cooking”;1382 and it was indeed used for cooking. The objections against this use were on grounds of safety not due to the quality of the gas.

2286 In any event, Niko's consultants did not limit the monitoring of gas emissions to the immediate explosive risk, as BAPEX alleged.1383 BAPEX's experts state the contrary: “It appears that air quality in six locations within the Niko Compound were measured for LEL level, carbon monoxide, oxygen and hydrogen sulphide”.1384 This statement refers to the Second Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005, which referred to the DoE's instructions concerning air quality monitoring, stated that these parameters were monitored and that only LEL alarm thresholds were “exceeded from time to time in some locations".1385

2287 The Monitoring Reports continued to include information about air quality monitoring. The Fifth Monitoring Report, for instance, explained the approach adopted and showed the locations of the monitoring and the result, confirming that contained the following passage:

DoE in its first post-blowout report requested the Joint Venture to study the effect of gas release and burning on the air quality. The Joint Venture's environmental team conducts daily air quality monitoring at six locations within 200m of the blowout. The locations are shown on high- resolution satellite image in Figure 11. The environmental team monitors four primary air quality indicators: %LEL; CO; O2 and H2S. Monitors being used are set to the following pre-set thresholds: LEL Low 10%, LEL High 20%, СО 35 ppm, O2 Low 19.5%, High 23.5%

The team selected these 6 locations for routine air quality measurement starting from March 16, 2005 and is being monitoring everyday. To date alarm thresholds have never been reached for carbon monoxide, or oxygen. LEL thresholds have been exceeded from time to time in some locations and are used as a basis for the ongoing safety program including relocations as mentioned in the 3rd and 4th reports. The change of LEL over time is shown in Figure 12. The other parameters such as CO and H2S were not detected in the area. The oxygen level was unchanged to normal level of 20.9%. Recent monitoring results (2nd week of April, 2005) showed that detectable LEL readings are absent in four locations (points 1, 2, 3 and 6) mostly located at east, west and south of the


1382 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 11 with reference to Niko's letter to BAPEX, dated 14 December 2004 Exhibit C-15; Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23; Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25. ↩
1383 BMD, paragraph 298. ↩
1384 BBL I, paragraph 125. ↩
1385 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, Section 6. ↩

[Page 647]

blowout crater. In the north, at points 4 and 5 LEL readings have been detected.1386

2288 Similar information was included in subsequent Reports. There is no indication that the DoE complained about the scope of these Reports and considered it not compliant with its instructions and the applicable regulations. Concerning the locations of the monitoring, the DoE did not object that they were in the BAPEX-Niko compound, since further away from the compound it was still the same gas escaping from a single opening in the Regional Seal. When complaining that Niko “failed to monitor the composition of the gas" beyond a radius of 500m, BAPEX and its experts do not explain why the composition of the gas from the same source would change beyond this radius.

2289 The Tribunal concludes that the objections raised by the BAPEX and its experts in 2016 do not justify that the Monitoring Reports be disregarded. It finds these Reports a valuable source for its assessment of the environmental damage. When examining specific claims, the Tribunal will nevertheless consider again the criticism raised by BAPEX and its experts, to the extent they are relevant for these claims.

9.2.3 Expert and technical reports and studies

2290 With its Reply, dated 29 May 2014, the Claimant produced an opinion by Mr Robert D. KEMP (Kemp), dealing with the claim for Atmospheric Pollution, the gas quality and impact of the gas on the air quality.1387

2291 As explained above in Section 4.2.2, in the absence of a defence on the substance of the Claimant's claim, the Tribunals appointed its own experts. One of the experts so appointed was Mr Ian WALLIS, Director, Safety, Risk and Reliability at Theon Ltd, Aberdeen. Having received the Parties' comments on the proposed terms of reference of the experts, the Tribunals defined those of Mr Wallis as follows:


1386 Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-46, Section 6. ↩
1387 Expert Report of Robert Kemp (Kemp). ↩

[Page 648]

2292 Mr Wallis produced his report, dated 8 June 2015 (Wallis) and the Parties were given until 15 July 2015 to file observations on this and the other expert reports.

2293 The Claimant also produced a report by Dr William J. GANUS, consulting hydrologist, Oklahoma, USA, dated 7 June 2005 and entitled Evaluation of Hydrogeologic Conditions at the Niko-BAPEX Chattak Well #2 Blowout Site, Bangladesh (Ganus).1388

2294 The Respondents' newly appointed counsel announced that they wished to produced observations to the reports of the Tribunal's experts; with the agreement of the Tribunal, they produced on 31 August 2015 comments on these reports and observations of new experts. These submissions included a report by Dr Ian BORTHWICK, Environmental and HSE Specialist, UK. Dr Borthwick criticised both the approach and the conclusions of Mr Wallis. He examined the reports about the damage caused by the blowouts and concluded that in the Second Environmental Losses Report “there is no sound basis for the damage calculations”. He described the post-event monitoring programme as “deficient and misdirected with regard to assessing any impact from key pollutants of a massive hydrocarbon release.1389

2295 With its Memorial on Damages, dated 25 March 2016, BAPEX submitted several expert reports. Among these reports the following related to the environmental damages:

4. Prior to the work that we have carried out, the various experts involved focused their efforts on the acute effects of the blowouts, not on the potentially developing and chronic impacts. In addition, the work on gas releases focused on greenhouse gas emissions and the contribution to


1388 Produced as Exhibit C-38, see also CREC, paragraph 76. ↩
1389 Borthwick, paragraphs 4.17 and 4.32. ↩

[Page 649]

climate warming and not health impacts. Dr. Borthwick commented on the “Carbon Dioxide Approach” in his report dated 31 August 2015. Не also observed that such impacts are rarely the most significant in an oil and gas industry incident involving the uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons, and that previous expert reports made no apparent effort to examine the impact of toxic organic pollutants in the air or on surface water, ground water and soils, as gas and liquids percolate to the surface.

5. This report aims to address this shortfall and provides an insight on potential health and environmental impacts as observed in Tengratila during a site visit from 3 to 9 February 2016.1390

2296 The Respondents' expert report concludes that the monitoring of the blowouts and their consequences was adequate; further monitoring and assessment is necessary in the fields of Health, Environment, Agriculture and Fisheries.1391

My instructions asked me to provide opinion on the source, extent and rate of gas emissions from the ground in the area surrounding Chattak 2/2A. I was also asked to comment on the risk posed by the gas emissions with respect to asphyxiation and explosions/fires.1392

2297 He reported that he spent a six-day visit in February 2016 in the area surrounding the Chattak site, where he “also conducted a walkover survey of the site and the surrounding area. The scope of the investigation and walkover was limited by the amount of time that [he] was able to spend on the site”.1393

2298 Mr Wilson concluded that further investigation and monitoring was required; but because of the current level of risk, there was an “immediate requirement to install gas monitoring systems in buildings”.1394

2299 Mr Wilson recommended that for the long-term remediation, a Soil Vacuum Extraction (SVE) system should be installed. Mr Wilson estimated costs of


1390 BBL I, paragraphs 4 and 5. ↩
1391 BBL I, Section 10. ↩
1392 Wilson I, paragraph 1.3.2. ↩
1393 Wilson I, Executive Summary, paragraph 2. ↩
1394 Wilson I, paragraphs 7.3 – 7.9. ↩

[Page 650]

installing the system in the United Kingdom at “approximately £3,275,000 Pounds Sterling. This estimate could vary by +/- 30% depending on the results of further investigation of the ground and gas conditions and the detailed design of the system”. In addition, the operation had to be monitored for 20 years of operation at costs in the order of £1.6 million.1395 A modified version of this proposal is the basis for BAPEX's claim considered below in Section 9.5.6.

2300 On 3 September 2020, Mr Wilson presented a supplemental expert report (Wilson II) responding to the following instructions:

1. Are the gas emissions from the ground noted in your first report attributable to the Chattak 2 well blowout? and

2. Was gas seepage into the area surrounding the gas field noted in your first report a direct consequence of the first blow out.1396

2301 With its 2021 Submission on the Environmental Claims (BMEC), BAPEX produced the following additional expert reports:

This Second Expert Report updates and supplements the compensation estimates provided by the Committee in 2005. It also addresses various losses and damage that relate to the first blowout which were not addressed by the Committee at the time, utilizing amongst other sources information gained during the site visit in February 2016. In addition, it summarizes the deficiencies in Niko's activities prior to the first blowout, and the knock-on effect those deficiencies had on their post-blowout activities.1397

2302 The BBL Experts II report addressed and quantified specifically the losses caused by atmospheric pollution and health; it confirmed the amounts claimed for losses of trees and forest resources, water, soil and ecosystem resources, loss to education and lifestyle and the costs of Mr Wilson's proposal.


1395 Wilson I, paragraph 6.5.1. ↩
1396 Wilson III, paragraph 1.3.2. ↩
1397 BBL II, paragraph 6. ↩

[Page 651]

... to provide an opinion with respect to the current need for a soil vapour extraction remediation system and to update the cost estimate for providing such a system.1398

2303 Mr Wilson opined that the SVE was still necessary and specified the costs of that system at £ 4'171٬603.1399

... to calculate the US dollar value of environmental damages as of June 30, 2021 based on the Betton et al. Expert Report. Betton et al. provide estimates for eight categories of environmental losses, incurred in 2005 and subsequent years. Where appropriate, I was asked to make adjustments for inflation and to apply pre-award interest at the same 6- month LIBOR plus 2% premium rate I used for the gas loss damages, calculated without compounding.1400

2304 The Parties also produced technical reports relevant for environmental issues concerning specifically to the Chattak blowouts, viz.:


1398 Wilson III, paragraph 1.3.2. ↩
1399 Wilson III, Table 4.1 at paragraph 4.3.2. ↩
1400 Brattle III, paragraph 19. ↩

[Page 652]

indicate the dissertation is based on a questionnaire, interviews and “focused group discussions and community workshop” of an unknown number of the local population.1401

9.3 The identified environmental losses and the claims remaining to be decided

2305 In the BMD, the Respondents claimed for compensation “including all losses resulting from the two blowouts”.1403 BAPEX modified these requests subsequently. In the latest version of the claim for environmental losses, BAPEX seeks compensation for atmospheric pollution and a specified amount “representing all other environmental losses”.1404 As some losses have been compensated by Niko, and the claims for others have been withdrawn or decided already, the Tribunal first presents the environmental losses that have been identified and their status and then indicates the claims that remain to be decided.

9.3.1 Losses compensated by Niko and other Niko measures of compensation and restoration

2306 The Claimant asserts that “all direct losses from the first blowout were fully compensated by Niko”.1405 The assertion is repeated in the context of the specific claims for environmental losses as presented in BAPEX's submission, the BMEC, and shall be considered below in the sections dealing with each of these claims.

2307 The Claimant had presented its position in this respect already in Niko's Reply concerning the Compensation Declaration (C-CD.2), in the section dealing with Niko's Compensation to Members of the Local Community and the First Witness Statements of Mr Adolph and Mr Glaholt. The Tribunal has described above in Section 9.2.1.4 the assessments by the Local Losses Committee in


1401 Ahmed, Exhibit R-123. ↩
1402 EVI Report, Exhibit C-285; see also WS Glaholt II, paragraphs 18 – 21. ↩
1403 BMD, amended conclusions, paragraph 400(f). ↩
1404 BMEC, paragraph 46(a) and (b). ↩
1405 CREC, paragraph 44. ↩

[Page 653]

several reports, which the Claimant describes “meticulous and supported by reference to actual claims".1406

2308 The first of these reports is the result of detailed field inspection where the “authorised officers went to the affected houses in the field and prepared the report of losses. 165 families, 118 businessmen and 4 firms were enlisted as affected in the report. The amount of every affected individual (family) has been estimated separately”,1407 setting out in Annexure A for each of the 165 families the assessed damage, with a total of BDT 10’149’776, in Annexure B the damage assessed for each of the 118 “merchants/shop owners, with a total of BDT 608’600 and in Annexure C for each of the 4 institutions (schools, mosque and Shurma Club) the damage assessed with a total of BDT 568’624. The grand total of the damage assessed for all three categories is BDT 11'327'000.

2309 The subsequent assessment1408 is not accompanied by tables with detailed assessment. The next assessment following the first report is summarised in a letter from the Deputy Commissioner, dated 31August 2005. It covered three families for which the assessment could not be completed for the first report, fixing an amount of BDT 737’520, and BDT 344'000 for the losses of 32 families caused by the second blowout.1409

2310 A further assessment is communicated to Niko on 4 January 2006, in the total of BDT 3’258'000, consisting of an additional payment of BDT 5'000 for each of the 625 families at the occasion of Eid Ul-Azha and BDT 133'000 for the owner of a house that was burnt by the second blowout.1410

2311 The Local Losses Report records the initial payments:

To reduce the immediate losses and problems of the people, NIKO Authority assured that the people surrounding the gas field will be provided with financial help. On 01/17/05, The Deputy Commissioner, with assistance of the Upazila Nirbahi Officer, other Upazila Officers, and the UP Chairman concerned and in presence of the honorable Member of Parliament, distributed a total of BDT 3,080,000/- amongst the 616 families at the rate of BDT 5,000/- for each family which was paid by ΝΙΚΟ.


1406 CREC, paragraph 42. ↩
1407 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 1. ↩
1408 See CREC, paragraph 42 for these subsequent reports. ↩
1409 Exhibit C-50. ↩
1410 Exhibit C-63. ↩

[Page 654]

2312 Mr Adolph added up these payments and testified that in total, “Niko paid the sum of Tk 19’451’520, approximately USD 300’262 through the Deputy Commissioner, in respect of all losses and claims assessed by the Local Loss Committee”, as confirmed by the letter of 8 February 2006 from the office of the Deputy Commissioner.1411

2313 To put the amounts of these and other payments discussed in this Section in relation to the revenue of the local population, the Third Environmental Losses Report stated, as the Claimant emphasised:1412

At present, per capita monthly income is approx. BDT 2500.1413

2314 In addition, Niko made direct payments to the persons affected by the blowouts, as recorded in the Local Losses Report:

The NIKO authority advised 57 seriously affected families, who were nearby the risky area and also affected by the fire in Tengratila, to stay in a remote area leaving their households. These 57 families were provided monthly allowances for 2 (two) months at the rate of BDT 6,000/- from February 2005. Since the problems of these families have already increased, they are being paid BDT 10,000/- per family since last April 2005. NIKO hopes, once the risk of danger is removed after the drilling of a new well, that these families will return to their households. Otherwise, the matter related to compensation and rehabilitation of said families will have to be determined separately.

In response to the claims of the local people about the damage to educational institutions, the mosque, madrasah, etc. within some villages nearer to Tengratila gas field including the village Tengratila, the NIKO Authority, under the mediation of local members of parliament, committed to pay BDT 30,000/- (thirty thousand) to each of the three educational institutions of the area concerned and BDT 10,000/- to each of 57 schools and social institutions. The NIKO representative assures that this money will be paid very soon. Due to said reason, these enterprises were not included in the list of compensation while it was prepared.1414

2315 Mr Adolph also describes the cases of direct payments, viz. “payments by Niko made directly to villagers and local businesses, or made for local


1411 WS Adolph I, paragraph 167; in the quoted passage the amount is shown in Lak and written as 1'94'51'520. ↩
1412 C-CD.2, paragraph 184 and FN 237. ↩
1413 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 16. ↩
1414 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. ↩

[Page 655]

infrastructure projects undertaken by Niko”.1415 Relying on information from the Controller for Niko Canada, Mr Adolph stated that

...Niko paid a total amount of Tk 19,484,653 or USD 290,687 directly to local villagers as compensation for the blowouts. This is a considerable amount of money compared to the average income in Bangladesh.1416

2316 One case of such direct payments concerned the “relocated families”, which the Local Losses Report confirmed in the passage just quoted. Mr Adolph explained:

In the immediate aftermath of the first blowout, Niko, with the assistance of local police, undertook an immediate evacuation of any villagers in the surrounding area that it considered might be exposed to a health and safety risk. Niko identified 57 families in the risk zone. Niko made cash payments to them to cover the costs of staying at local hotels and to pay for food and living expenses for the full period that they were out of their homes.1417

2317 When commenting on the draft of the Second Environmental Losses Report in the letter of 13 April 2005, as quoted above in Section 9.2.1.2, Niko referred to the ongoing efforts of assessing directly with the concerned population the losses suffered by them:

Conversely, we do feel costs for many direct community damages (eg. damaged houses, crop loss in current crop year, burned trees, lost business, and health) could be dealt with and awarded to affected community members soon after the Deputy Commissioners SubCommittee has completed its work.

As you are well aware, Niko has been paying 6,000 Taka/month to all relocated families since the blowout. Niko, as a responsible corporate citizen in Bangladesh, is committed to compensating those directly, immediately and adversely affected by the accident; paying for temporary relocations of families; repairing reasonable damages; and or providing replacement services. At the same time it is important to Niko


1415 WS Adolph I, paragraph 155. ↩
1416 WS Adolph I, paragraph 159, emphasis added. ↩
1417 WS Adolph I, paragraph 156. ↩

[Page 656]

and our industry that any assignment or award of costs be based on coherent and fair application of existing government policy.1418

2318 Concerning the payments to the relocated families the 20th Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2006, summarised:

In August 5, 2005, the Joint Venture in collaboration with its safety specialists, Safety Boss, had relocated a total of 100 families to safer locations based on LEL readings. Locations of these relocated households are graphically presented in Figure 20. No additional relocations were required between August 5 and the present time. The Joint Venture has been paying monthly compensation of TK 10,000 per family per month over the temporary relocation period. With completion of the relief well program and continued reduction in risk a total of 23 families were allowed to move back to their residences in November, 2005. Gas levels in households and shops were monitored at 5 day intervals. By the beginning of April all houses and shops were gas free. Villagers have reoccupied their original homes and shops or in some cases chosen to build new sites with compensation they have received.

2319 The Tribunal has not seen in the record of this Arbitration a quantification specifically of the payments to relocated families. It notes that the number of affected families increased until early August 2005 and started decreasing when the relief well Chattak 2B was completed until all families had returned by April 2006. At the rate of BDT 10'000 per family the total can be expected to have been in the range of BDT 10 million and included in the amount of BDT 19'484'653 of compensation mentioned by Mr Adolph and quoted above.

2320 The Claimant explained about these payments directly to people in the villages:

Niko made substantial ex-gratia payments to local families, businesses, religious centers, schools and other organizations as part of its commitment to fully remediating the potential consequences of the blowouts.1419

2321 In addition to these payments, directly to the affected persons or through the Deputy Commissioner, as assessed by the Local Losses Committee, Niko states that it provided other benefits to the local population. Some of these


1418 Niko letter of 13 April 2005, Exhibit C-32, and mentioned in Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), Section 9.2.2. ↩
1419 C-CD.2, paragraph 154, relying on WS Adolph I, paragraph 154. ↩

[Page 657]

will be discussed in further detail below in the context of the claim to which they relate:

2322 It arranged and funded medical check-ups for villagers;1420 in addition to the construction of a temporary school and repairs to the existing school, mentioned already, it made further contributions in support of the schools and their activities.1421

2323 Mr Glaholt testified about the improvements that Niko made to the drinking water supply:

Niko drilled tube wells and installed electric pumps to improve the community's access to clean water. It is worth noting that, prior to the blowout, the community did not have properly drilled water wells.

In addition, in the first half of 2006, Niko installed seven gravity feed water tanks, each with total capacity of 4000 liters, for community use. The tanks were connected to electric pumps which drew water from deep tube wells dug by Niko. This new system supplied water to more than 110 local households. This project provided a significant benefit to the community, and improved the water supply to many homes which otherwise had none.1422 (Exhibit C-68, Letter from Niko to Department of Environment, attaching Crown Agents and Tera Consultants, Nineteenth Environmental Monitoring Report, at 40 (30 May 2006); (Exhibit C-69, Letter from Niko to Department of Environment, attaching Crown Agents and Tera Consultants, Twentieth Environmental Monitoring Report, at 37 (23 July 2006)).

2324 The Claimant quantified the value of this contribution, which the Third Environmental Losses Report had instructed, at over USD 375٬000; the water supply system actually installed is said to have had a cost to Niko of USD 60'240:

In addition, the report asked Niko to drill a deep tube well to bring clean water to the affected villages, estimating that the total cost would be Tk 2,02,00,000 (approximately USD 315,280). Niko later installed tube wells and electric pumps to address these concerns, at a cost of USD 60,240.1423


1420 WS Adolph, paragraph 158. ↩
1421 See below Section 9.5.7. ↩
1422 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 87 and 88, referring to 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C- 69, page 37. ↩
1423 C-CD.2, paragraph 183, relying on Third Environmental Losses Report; WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 87-88; WS Adolph I, paragraph 160. ↩

[Page 658]

2325 The Claimant also stated that “Niko sponsored a program for replanting trees”.1424 Mr Glaholt also reports on contributions through a tree planting and maintenance project:

In addition to the compensation paid to the community through the Deputy Commissioner, Niko implemented a tree planting and maintenance program. Niko obtained and planted the seedlings, and assumed the responsibility for the care and management of growing the seedlings.1425

2326 In support Mr Glaholt refers to the Third Environmental Monitoring Report which contains the following passage:

The Joint Venture feels that the environmental services of the trees is important and therefore came up with a draft program of burned and damaged tree replacement which it feels will practically and reasonably restore lost environmental services associated with damaged vegetation. According to the program the joint venture will replant 4 good quality seedling for each burned tree and 2 same quality seedling for each heat damaged tree with the assumed responsibility of procurement, plantation and tree husbandry. The cost involvement for procuring seedling alone will be four hundred sixty thousand Taka. (Table 3) for replacing the burned trees.

Table 3. Procurement of seedlings

Number of
Damage Trees
Number of
Replanting Seedling
Cost of
Seedling (TK)
Burned trees 306 1,224 1,22,400
Partial burned trees 1,702 3,404 3,40,400
Total 2,008 4,628 4,62,800

Tree plantation program will also help building the habitat (birds, insects, reptiles and animals live on and under the trees in wooded areas). Due to this blowout part of the Tangratila habitat was disturbed (also see section 8). The Joint Ventures re-plantation program will restore the habitat. The Joint Venture is further more emphasizing the habitat restoration thus they are committed to plant a matching number of seedlings within its own compound (Table 3) and along their road. Under this habitat restoration program they intend to plant a total of 9,256 trees.


1424 C-CD.2, paragraph 147, referring to WS Glaholt I, paragraph 60. ↩
1425 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 60. ↩

[Page 659]

In addition to that the Joint Venture will bear the planting and husbandry costs.1426

2327 With respect to compensation for losses to businesses, Mr Glaholt wrote:

In the days immediately following the first blowout, life in the nearby communities was disrupted, with many small businesses having to close temporarily. However, the effect on local businesses was carefully monitored, and a detailed business and employment inventory was performed covering the 500 meter area surrounding the first blowout site.

[...]

Some of the businesses that received compensation [further to the assessment in the Local Losses Report] relocated their shops and resumed business, yet still claimed compensation for the entire period. So far as I am aware, Niko did not dispute those claims.

[...]

The disruption recorded following the second blowout was largely attributable to additional gas flow from cracks in the ground in the market area. Niko monitored this carefully and paid compensation claims directly to any businesses that were affected. [...]

After the success of the 2B relief well, the gas seeps around the market place diminished and ultimately ceased. As a result, the evacuated and relocated shops began to re-open and, by the end of March 2006, all shop owners had been able to return to their original location.1427


1426 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, Section 9.7. ↩
1427 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 43 – 48, with references to Monitoring Reports. ↩

[Page 660]

2328 The 20th Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2006, describes this development and records that the shop owners“congratulated NIKO management for restoration of Tengratila Bazar and re-establishment of some damaged shops. It reproduces the following photo showing these congratulations:1428

[Image containing text]

CONGRATULATION TO NIKO-FROM TENGRATILA MARKET SHOP OWNERS. WE ARE PLEASED AND GRATE FUL TO NIKO FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE AND CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT OF TENGRATILA WE WISH ALL S[illegible]SS OF NIKO.

মোঃ কালা মিয়া সওদাগর। সাং- টেংরা বাজার পোদ [illegible]

29 3 2006

Plate 12. Newly reopened and refurbished Tengratila Bazaar.

2329 The Claimant also states that the blowout and more specifically the follow-up work also had some “Ancillary Benefits to Local Economy”, mentioning as examples

... a large number of jobs were created by the substantial construction related activities that followed the blowouts, including the construction of relief well drilling pads, substantial road improvements and pipeline and processing facilities. Further jobs were created by Niko's post-blowout activities, including site maintenance workers, security guards, cleaners and gardeners. This increase in local employment had spin-off effects on other local businesses as it generated additional cash that could be used by villagers to buy local goods and services.

Furthermore, a number of infrastructure projects undertaken by Niko provided an additional boost to local businesses. For example, Niko funded the rehabilitation of a 3.5 kilometer stretch of road, including the construction of two new bridges between Dowarabazar and West Chattak. [...]1429


1428 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 35. ↩
1429 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 50 – 53. ↩

[Page 661]

2330 The Claimant states that, beyond the reparation of damage caused by the blowouts and compensation for losses, Niko made other contributions as part of its relations with the local community.

Niko also sponsored discrete projects as part of community relations, including work to improve the area surrounding Tengratila market. In particular, Niko provided funding and construction support for a new set of toilets and septic system to improve hygiene conditions at the market. Niko also built a one and a half meter-wide brick pad around the perimeter of the market to improve pedestrian access.

Overall, despite the unfortunate disruption caused in the aftermath of the blowout, the company's presence, even with the blowout, significantly boosted, not harmed, the local economy on balance.1430

2331 Mr Glaholt confirmed:

Crown and I were also asked not only to observe and record any potential impacts of the blowouts, but also to recommend and ultimately implement steps to remediate them. On occasion, we were made aware of problems facing the community of Tengratila that were not attributable to the blowouts, and we would work with Niko to lend help, support and sometimes finance to address the issues. Specific examples of this include the provision of alternate access, provision of medical supplies and services, and the implementation of a water well project as described in paragraphs 87-88 below.1431

2332 The Respondents have referred to the losses recorded in the Local Losses Report, describing them as the “immediate local losses determined in the Committee report”; they recognised expressly that payment by Niko was undisputed:

BAPEX does not dispute that Niko paid out compensation for the immediate local losses determined in the Committee report. However, the Committee report did not address – and Niko did not pay- any losses related to long-term effects of the blowouts on the land and environment of the affected areas.1432


1430 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 50 – 53. ↩
1431 Glaholt I, paragraph 24; the reference to other passages in the WS lead to the water supply project, described above. ↩
1432 BMD, paragraph 328. ↩

[Page 662]

2333 Other payments by Niko, as they were reported in the Claimant's submissions, witness statements and Monitoring Reports mentioned above, also remained uncontested.

2334 The 2016 reservation concerning long-term effects, as it was made in BAPEX's statement just quoted, has indeed been recorded in the Local Losses Report:

The measures related to losses for the long-term effect on the land and environment of the area concerned caused by the fire is not covered under this committee. The permanent adverse effect on the agricultural land, gardens, fishery, and trees of the affected area observed by the committee would cause a larger type of danger to the locality. In that case, it would be required to estimate losses separately.1433

2335 The Tribunal concludes that the claims of the local population and businesses and by institutions (schools, mosque etc.) for immediate direct losses have been assessed and paid by Niko. This assessment expressly excluded long-term effects.

2336 Niko also made an initial payment for distribution by local authorities to 616 families in January 2005 unrelated to specifically identified damage and directly to up to 100 families near the blowout and temporarily evacuated from their homes.

2337 In addition, Niko made other payments and performed work relevant to the blowout and the reparation of the damage.

2338 The Tribunal will consider these payments and work when examining the claims for losses which BAPEX presented in its 2021 Submission on Environmental Claims (BMEC). It will have to examine whether and to what extent these claimed losses have already been compensated or remediated by Niko.

2339 Mr Ahmed, who conducted an enquiry with the local population in 2009 reported that the majority of the population in Tengratila thought the compensation from Niko was not enough but they wanted Niko to resume work:

Most of the people (94%) wanted the NIKO Company to operate again (Table 29, Figure 28). They thought that, if NIKO would operate again many unemployed persons would have got jobs. Development of the area


1433 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 1. ↩

[Page 663]

would have accelerated. But they thought Govt. should oversight and supervise as well as formulate useful policies.1434

9.3.2 Claims no longer pursued by BAPEX (Losses of Agriculture and Fisheries)

2340 The Second Environmental Losses Report included an item for “Loss of Agriculture and Fisheries”. It described damage caused by “dust residues on their land and contaminated water etc. spread over agricultural and in the 2 kilometers surrounding their nearby area”. It stated that these losses and those related to fisheries production had been estimated by the Deputy Commissioner. It concluded:

After submission of the losses related to Agriculture and Fisheries by the Committee of the Deputy Commissioner, it will be possible to include the losses in this regards.1435

2341 This explains that in the table presenting the loss assessment in the Second Environmental Losses Report no amount is shown under the heading of “Losses of agriculture and fisheries”; instead, the table shows the remark: “The Committee formed by the Deputy Commissioner concerned will estimate the losses, which are to be included in this account”.

2342 The Third Environmental Losses Report contains two heads of losses for “Agricultural Sector” and “Fishery Sector”.

2343 Under the heading of Agricultural Sector, the explanations of the Second Environmental Losses Report are reproduced with some variations and reference is made to the Local Losses Committee. The section completes as follows:

In accordance with the report of the District Administration, a loss of BDT 4,319,316.00 has been estimated in this sector. It is known that the District Administration has already realized this amount from NIKO and distributed it among those concerned.

2344 The amount of BDT 4'319'316 is entered in the table showing the “Total amount of environmental losses”.

2345 In the section on the Fishery Sector, the estimate of the Local Losses Committee is mentioned but an additional loss is added:


1434 Ahmed, Exhibit R-123, page 54. ↩
1435 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 4, item 3. ↩

[Page 664]

After the first blowout, the Committee of the Deputy Commissioner has estimated the losses related to fishery production (Appendix C). However, although the losses from the fishery sector were greater because of the second accident, due to the rainy season, it was not possible to estimate the losses in fishery sector. But, the Committee agreed and decided to consider the losses of 24 small and large ponds located in the said area and to restore the environment fit for fish husbandry. In this regard, BDT 2 (two) hundred thousand has been estimated to maintain the cost of purification of water, re-digging and increasing fertility, and thus BDT 4,800,000 has been estimated as costs required for 24 ponds. This estimation is in addition to the losses calculated by District Administration as losses in the fishery sector. Moreover, the losses in the fishery sector of two persons who were dropped from the list of compensation prepared by the District Administration, BDT 707,520 has, thereafter, been estimated by the District Administration against the same.

2346 The section presented the following conclusion:

A loss of BDT 7,557,477.00 has been estimated in the sector. As per report of the District Administration, BDT 2,049,957.00 out of that amount has been realized as compensation in this sector and distributed among those concerned. If the other outstanding BDT 4,800,000.00 and BDT 707,520.00 is realized, it can be distributed among those concerned through District Administration.

2347 In the table showing the “Total amount of environmental losses” the amount of BDT 2’757’477 is entered as “Losses in fishery sector”; an additional amount of BDT 4.8 million is added as “Natural environment restoration cost in pond". The work is described as “Re-digging and ecosystem development cost to restore each of the 24 ponds” with BDT 200'000 as costs per pond. The total of the loss for fisheries thus is listed as BDT 7'557٬477.

2348 In the Money Suit, losses are claimed for both agriculture, in the amount of BDT 4'319'316, and for fisheries, in the amount of BDT 7557٬477. In the presentation of the claim, as produced in the Arbitration, no credit is given for payments already made by Niko.

2349 In the Arbitration, BAPEX recognises that “Niko paid amounts originally identified” and quotes from BBL Experts I where it had been stated that “more investigation would have been required to determine the full extent of damage to agriculture and fisheries”. BAPEX continues:“As such, Respondent's experts 'are not able to provide any further assessment of of agriculture and fisheries losses”. BAPEX concludes:

[Page 665]

In the absence of opportunity for further investigation into the full extent of damages caused by the first blowout, Respondents do not claim additional losses to agriculture and fisheries.1436

2350 The Claimant takes note of this statement and concludes:

In line with the evidence from Niko's witnesses and the Local Loss Committee, any damages in these areas have been fully compensated as a result of the payments made by Niko shortly after the blowout.1437

2351 The Tribunal concludes that the losses caused by the blowouts in the sector of agriculture and fisheries have been fully compensated and no further claims are made concerning these losses.

9.3.3 The Tribunal's Decisions on Claims for Environmental Losses

2352 In its Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss (the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision), the Tribunal examined in some detail the claims for the Environmental Losses and the context in which they are presented. The Tribunal determined the following matters:

BAPEX is entitled to claim on behalf of the Government for the loss and damage caused by the first blowout to the environment and the local population (Environmental Losses) to the extent Niko has not already compensated such loss and damage, subject to the following determinations:

  1. any loss that the first blowout may have caused by increasing the level of arsenic in the Tengratila drinking water is not recoverable;
  2. compensation for any Environmental Losses attributed to continuing seepages of gas from the Reservoir must take into account the decision concerning Niko's liability for loss of gas according to paragraphs 773 (b) to (d) above;
  3. any costs of Mr Wilson's project to avoid or reduce the explosion risk caused by the use of the gas collected from seepages for cooking purposes are not recoverable;

1436 BMEC, paragraph 19, with references to BBL I, paragraph 14 ↩
1437 CREC, paragraph 68. ↩

[Page 666]

  1. the decision on the claim for the costs of Mr Wilson's project for the soil vacuum extraction is reserved; and
  2. the decision on other issues concerning the recoverability of Environmental Losses claimed by BAPEX on behalf of the Government is reserved.

2353 The Tribunal has considered these findings again and confirms them for the reasons set out in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision.

9.3.4 The claims remaining to be decided

2354 As noted above, following the Tribunal's decision on the Respondents' request to suspend the proceedings and on the claim for advance payment by Niko on account of BAPEX's monitoring, surveying and abatement programme,1438 the Respondents expressed an intention to provide further expert reports once their experts could travel again to Bangladesh. At the Case Management Conference of 8 June 2021, the Tribunal confirmed its ruling in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision. The Summary Minutes of that Case Management Conference continued by recording:

The Respondents then confirmed that the claims to be decided by the Tribunal in the arbitrations are those that had been made in the Money Suit, based on the report of the Third Environmental Losses Committee, dated 15 September 2005 and any necessary update.

The Tribunal and the Parties then discussed the procedure how to address the environmental claims on the basis of the existing record. The Parties and the Tribunal identified the table in that report, reproduced at paragraph 460 of the Decision on the Heads of Recoverable Loss, as a starting point for presenting the Parties' positions on the Environmental Claims. In this procedure, the Parties specify, by reference to each of the eleven types of losses in the table, their position on (i) the justification of the claim for this loss; (ii) the specific amount claimed/admitted (including credit for any payment made already by Niko); and (iii) the evidence on record in this arbitration, relied upon for that claim. The Tribunal may then decide the Environmental Claims on the basis of the table so completed and the evidence relied upon without any further submissions and without a hearing on these issues.

[...time frame for the submissions]


1438 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, Section 10.6 and paragraphs 777 and 778. ↩

[Page 667]

No other procedure was proposed for addressing the Environmental Claims within the framework.1439

2355 Further to the procedure provided at this Case Management Conference and subsequent exchanges with the Parties, the Tribunal confirmed the procedure on 30 July 2021 in PO No 27:

By 20 August 2021 the Respondents will make their submission on the Environmental Claims as specified in paragraph 16 of the Summary Minutes of the 8 June 2021 СМС. By 1 October 2021 the Claimant will respond to the Respondents' submission. The Tribunals will make their decision on the Environmental Claims on the basis of these submissions and any evidence on the record without any further submissions or hearing.1440

2356 In the submission which BAPEX then made on 20 August 2021 (BMEC), it decided to limit the claims to those for (i) atmospheric pollution, (ii) damage to vegetation (forest resources), (iii) losses to Water, Soil and Ecosystem Resources, (iv) losses to Human Health, (v) the cost of Mr Wilson's proposal and (vi) losses to Education and Lifestyle, all by reference to the quantification in the Second Environmental Losses Report.

9.4 Atmospheric Pollution

2357 This claim was based on the Second and Third Environmental Losses Report and then presented in the Money Suit. After the Tribunal's decisions on Liability and on the Heads of Recoverable Loss, BAPEX reduced the claim and the Parties presented a new exchange of submissions in 2021. Final comments were provided by the Parties in April 2025 in response to the Tribunal's invitation concerning carbon sequestration.

9.4.1 The Parties' positions

2358 BAPEX now seeks compensation for losses due to atmospheric pollution in four alternative periods:

Case 1: air pollution caused by gas losses of estimated 21.05 Bcf incurred between 7 January and 24 June 2005 (Period 1), quantified at USD 123٬379’376 or BDT 7'925'341'681;


1439 Summary Minutes of the Case Management Conference held on 8 June 2021, paragraphs 15, 16 and 18. ↩
1440 PO No 27, paragraph 4. ↩

[Page 668]

Case 2: air pollution caused by gas losses of estimated 13.28 Bcf between 25 June and 9 October 2005 (Period 2), quantified at USD 201'216'815 or BDT 12'925'272'206;

Case 3: air pollution caused by the loss of all gas in Sands 1 and 2, estimated 74.94 Bcf, quantified at USD 438'819'099 or BDT 28’214’969'385;

Case 4: air pollution caused by the loss of all gas in Sands 1 and 2, except gas that could have been recovered had BAPEX authorised Niko to develop the field in November 2005 and if the Chattak 2B relief well operations had reduced but not stopped the escape of gas from the Reservoir, estimated at 65.19 Bcf, quantified at USD 386'381'204 or BDT 24'544'086’659.1441

2359 In the Money Suit, the claim for atmospheric pollution was quantified at BDT 278'019’864, in the same amount as in the Third Environmental Losses Report; in the Second Report it was quantified at BDT 38’185’714.20.

2360 In the First Environmental Losses Report, the loss related to “Air Pollution” is described as related to the dust caused by the ejected debris over a large area.1442 The loss related to emission of Greenhouse Gases is first raised in the Second Environmental Losses Report where it is explained that the Committee had

... estimated the losses caused by emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere and impact of the same on the climate due to the burning of blowout gas. The quantity of gas has been estimated and accordingly the emanation of the CO2 into the air due to burning of each ton of methane has been calculated. But, if it is possible to know the amount of gas burned and defined by the committee concerned, then the amount of CO2 released can be estimated again.1443

2361 The report assumed that “739776.79 tons of CO2 have been released due to burning of 1.5 billion cubic [feet] methane gas” and quantified this quantity of CO2 at an unexplained rate of BDT 960 per ton, producing a loss of BDT 38′185’714.20 as “pollution caused by release of CO2 (created due to burning gas)”. It also considered the “Release of CO2 due to burning of trees”,


1441 BMEC, paragraph 46(a) and paragraphs 12 – 14. ↩
1442 First Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-1, page 6; see above Section 9.2.1. ↩
1443 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 2, item (1). ↩

[Page 669]

quantified at BDT 314'880, assuming “128 tons for 4 hectares, 32 tons in every hectare”.1444

2362 The Third Environmental Losses Report considered the “2 consecutive explosions" and the effect of both CO2 and methane emissions“through burning due to fire and blowout seepage”.

A huge amount of natural gas has been emanated into the air as carbon dioxide and direct methane through burning due to fire and blowout seepage due to two explosions in Tengratila Gas Field. As per description given in paragraph 3.1, total 2.80 billion cft of gas is burnt in 2 consecutive explosions.

2363 The Report treats the 2.8 Bcf as “Burning of Gas in the air (direct combustion)” and adds 0.198 bcf as “Venting of Gas (Seepage)”. It considers not only the CO2 but also the methane and applies a “global warming factor = 21 (100 years longevity)”. It applies a cost of USD 15 per tonne, corresponding to BDT 990 at the rate of 66 BDT/USD, and explains this rate by reference to a shadow price considering “valuation of carbon sequestration” referring to a website of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The resulting total is USD 4'212'422 corresponding to BDT 278’019’864, the amount claimed in the Money Suit. The basis for this explanation is presented as follows:

As a signatory of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Agreement, Bangladesh is internationally liable to mitigate the greenhouse gases. Having this background, the Committee has estimated the amount in US Dollars and Taka and they have done sequestration because of seepage of 280,828 tons of CO2 into the air.

In this sector, the Committee estimated BDT 278’019’864.00 as losses. Plantation work can be taken to offset emitted CO2 using money to be collected as compensation.

The Shadow Price of USD 10 -20 is calculated internationally to control the atmospheric changes due to CO2 per ton. In this case, the Committee has fixed USD 15 as average value of USD 10-20 per ton being considered “Consideration in valuation of carbon sequestration” as given on the website (http://www.fao.org/document/showcdr.asp?url-file) of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.1445


1444 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), Table at page 2. ↩
1445 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), pages 6 and 7, emphasis in the original. ↩

[Page 670]

2364 The Report notes that the completion of the second relief well is expected for "October 2005”. The committee therefore felt confident that it had been able to quantify the full amount of atmospheric pollution. It wrote:

Since in the current calculation the amount of total seepage of gas from the two explosions has been defined, the current committee thinks the current calculation of atmospheric effects can be calculated as total losses accountable in this sector due to the first and second explosions (if blowout seepage does not increase abnormally and no third explosion occurs, or no new estimation of gas damage is found).

2365 At the end of the section on atmospheric pollution, the Third Environmental Losses Report also considers CO2 released by the burning of trees and loss of carbon sequestration. Mr Kemp responded that such burning “is considered carbon neutral as long as the plant matter that is burned is regrown because when plants grow they convert atmospheric carbon dioxide into plant fibre”.1446 That case is discussed separately below in Section 9.4.12.

2366 No further assessments of the atmospheric pollution by a Government committee have been reported after the Chattak 2B relief well operation had been completed.

2367 In the Money Suit, the Government and Petrobangla presented the loss for atmospheric pollution on the basis of the “[d]etailed descriptions of the losses [...] given in the [Third Environmental Losses Report] of 15.09.2005, which shall be treated as part of the plaint”1447 and claimed for this loss in the amount of BDT 278'019’864, as assessed in the Third Environmental Loss Report.

2368 In the Arbitration and following the Tribunal's directions in the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss, BAPEX has revised the claim for losses caused by atmospheric pollution and now seeks the amounts for the four alternative cases quoted above. The claim now made differs from the Third Environmental Loss Report and the Money Suit primarily with respect to the quantities of lost gas and a different factor of converting methane into CO2 equivalent. The cost claimed per tonne is BDT 960, as used in the Second Environmental Losses Committee, adopted by the experts in a footnote with the explanation "as originally applied by the Committee”.1448

2369 The quantities of gas losses now are based on the estimates by Ryder Scott, as discussed above in the context of the Lost Gas claim. Concerning the


1446 Kemp, paragraph 9. ↩
1447 Money Suit Complaint, Exhibit C-6, paragraph 53. ↩
1448 BBL II, FN 13 at page 4. ↩

[Page 671]

extension of the claim to “methane CH4 in the form of natural gas escaping into the air from the reservoir”, BAPEX wrote:

It is now well accepted by climate scientists that CH4 is a far more potent greenhouse gas than CO2. Respondents' environmental damages experts have calculated the losses due to the release of CH4 by converting it into the amount of CO2 that would have the equivalent effect on the warming of the climate (the “CO2 equivalent”). The experts used a conservative 25x factor to convert CH4 to CO2 equivalent based on a United Nations Climate Science report, though other reports indicate that CH4 has as much as 84 times the warming effect of CO2. The experts first converted the volumes of gas calculated by Ryder Scott, to the weight of the CH4 in tonnes. They then converted that weight to its CO2 equivalent. Once the CO2 equivalent weight of the CH2 was determined, the experts multiplied it by the same unit cost per tonne of released CO2.

2370 On that basis, BAPEX and its experts arrived at the quantities of CO2 equivalent now claimed. The United Nations report on which BAPEX's experts relied was the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Working Group 1 (WG1), Chapter 2, Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing, available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar4/syr/ (2007), Table 2.14, p. 212.1449

2371 BAPEX relied on the Second Expert Report of Betton/Borthwick/Leinster (BBL II) who updated the Second Environmental Losses Report and presented the four alternative cases which BAPEX presents as the claim for atmospheric pollution. They explain the use of the factor 25 “to convert methane to its CO2 equivalent base".1450

2372 In its response to the Tribunal's invitation, BAPEX insisted in its April 2025 submission on the conversion of methane emissions into CO2 equivalent and on the valuation of the emissions at 960 BDT/tonne, as in the Second Environmental Losses Report. Concerning the GHG sequestration, BAPEX refers to the World Bank report showing the potential GHG reduction to be achieved through afforestation and reforestation measures.

2373 BAPEX points out that that report

... highlights the Government of Bangladesh's nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement, which include increasing tree cover from 22.37 per cent in 2014 to 24 per cent by 2025, as well as the


1449 AR4, Exhibit R-471. ↩
1450 BBL II, Section 2.2 ↩

[Page 672]

eventual reforestation of 450'000 hectares of degraded forest land. The report notes that, if these measures are fully implemented, the forestry sector in Bangladesh could transition from being a net emitter of GHGs to a net carbon sink.

2374 BAPEX asserts that “reforestation and afforestation efforts that Bangladesh has undertaken to mitigate climate change are not an appropriate measure of the cost of the pollution caused by the blowouts”; the arguments in this respect are considered below in Section 9.4.11.

2375 The Claimant had argued that the alleged environmental damages were consequential or indirect and had no legal basis.1451 In the CREC, the Claimant referred to the reports of Mr Kemp and Mr Wallis who had pointed out that Bangladesh has no obligation with respect to GHG reduction commitments under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

2376 Mr Kemp examined the Second and the Third Environmental Losses Reports and, in the passage on which the Claimant relied, concluded:

... it is critical to note that Bangladesh is listed as a Non-Annex I party to the UN Conventions on Climate Change. Parties listed in Annex 1 to the Convention are generally described as developed countries that have made specific GHG emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. These Annex 1 party reduction commitments are listed on the UNFCC website. As Bangladesh is a Non-Annex 1 party, it has not committed to any greenhouse gas emission reductions under the Convention. Therefore Bangladesh has no obligation to obtain GHG credits to offset emission occurring as a result of the blowout.

Therefore the carbon emission estimates reviewed in items 7-11 above are irrelevant as Bangladesh has no mandatory requirement to reduce carbon emissions.1452

2377 Mr Wallis confirmed:

It should be noted that Bangladesh is listed as a Non-Annex I party to the UN Conventions on Climate Change, and as such has no mandatory requirement to obtain carbon credits to offset the effect of these emissions.


1451 CMD, Sections II(F) and IV. ↩
1452 Kemp, paragraphs 12 and 13; the Convention is produced as Exhibit C-78 and contains a table of quantified economy-wide emission targets for 2020: https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/copenhagen-climate-change-conference- december-2009/statements-and-resources/appendix-i-quantified-economy-wide-emissions-targets- for-2020. ↩

[Page 673]

and

Because Bangladesh has no mandatory requirement to reduce carbon emissions, there is no loss in relation to carbon emissions.1453

2378 The Claimant insists that the status of Bangladesh under the UNFCCC has not changed and there is not “any argument from the Respondent of some other legal obligation with respect to greenhouse gas. That is because these obligations did not and to the present day still do not exist”. It continues by contesting the method of quantification of the claim, based on “what the cost of purchasing greenhouse gas offset credits would be”:

If Bangladesh had a regulatory regime that required the purchase of greenhouse gas offset credits, and Niko had failed to comply, this claim might have merit. As no such regime exists, this claim has no merit.

BAPEX is, in reality, seeking a windfall, not compensation for an actual loss.1454

2379 In the CREC, the Claimant again relies on Section 73 of the Contract Act and Article 27.2 of the JVA, asserting that the claim “(if real) would be a perfect example of 'consequential' loss and damage caused by pollution”, expressly excluded by Article 27.2 of the JVA. Finally, the Claimant contests the quantification as inflated, both with respect to the quantity of lost gas and the valuation emissions.1455

2380 In the April 2025 submission, the Claimant states that the materials to which the Tribunal's question referred “have no relevance to the Tribunal's determination of any matters within these proceedings, including any alleged atmospheric pollution quantum”. It contests that it “has had no occasion to explore the veracity of Exhibit R-207 or the October 2022 Report”. It repeats its position according to which its experts found that no loss attributable to atmospheric pollution had occurred and that the loss for atmospheric pollution was indirect and excluded by the JVA and the Bangladesh Contract Act.

2381 The Claimant's experts addressed the claim for the loss of carbon sequestration caused by the burning of trees (to be discussed separately below) but did not discuss the quantification of the main claim in the Third Environmental Losses Report by reference to sequestration and the proposed "plantation work”.


1453 Wallis, paragraphs 5.8 and 6.2(a). ↩
1454 CREC, paragraph 49. ↩
1455 CREC, paragraphs 50 – 55 ↩

[Page 674]

9.4.2 The scope of the claim for atmospheric pollution

2382 This head of claim concerns the GHG emissions into the atmosphere following the first blowout; other types of damage, including damage to the health of the population exposed to these emissions, form part of other claims which will be considered separately below.

2383 Important elements of the claim for Atmospheric Pollution are contained in the Third Environmental Losses Report. When BAPEX explained in the BMEС that the Respondents have not based “their damages” on the Third Report they did not state that they withdrew this report and their prior references to it. While the damages calculation of BAPEX is no longer based on that report, the substance of this report and the argument of the Parties and their experts relating to it remain part of the case.

2384 BAPEX describes the environmental loss for which it claims under this head by a quotation from the Second Environmental Losses Report as “losses caused by emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere and impact of the same on the climate due to the burning of blowout gas”.1456 Following the Environmental Losses Report, BAPEX includes in the claim methane emissions converted into CO2 equivalent. It does not explain what the losses by the emission of CO2 and methane were; and it does not explain how the emissions impacted the climate.

2385 BAPEX explained that it calculated the claim amount by applying a “unit cost per tonne of CO2 or methane”.1457 The Third Environmental Loss Report refers to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or the Convention) and states that “Bangladesh is internationally liable to mitigate the greenhouse gases”.1458

2386 In response, the Claimant and its experts point out that Bangladesh is not an Annex I Party to the Convention. Emissions of greenhouse gases therefore do not create any financial or other liability for Bangladesh under the Convention on which BAPEX relies. Indeed, BAPEX does not allege that the Government or any other entity in Bangladesh, including Petrobangla and BAPEX itself, have made any payments for atmospheric pollution, in the amounts claimed or any other amount; nor do they allege that Bangladesh has incurred any other liability in relation to the blowouts for which it seeks relief or indemnity from Niko.


1456 BMEC, paragraph 9, referring to Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis); see the above quotation from the Second Environmental Loss Report. ↩
1457 ВМЕС, paragraph 13. ↩
1458 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 6. ↩

[Page 675]

2387 The Tribunal concludes that, insofar the Claimant's objection appears as correct: to the extent that BAPEX's claim is based on a purported obligation to indemnify Bangladesh in respect of financial liabilities directly incurred from atmospheric pollution caused by the Chattak 2 blowout, it would have to be denied under the principles of Bangladesh law and the JVA, as examined in the Decision on Liability.

2388 BAPEX's claim is, however, broader than for direct financial loss. As BAPEX stated by quoting the Second Environmental Losses Report, it is for “impact [...] on the climate” caused by emissions of CO2 and methane. The Third Environmental Losses Report refers to “Plantation Work [that] can be taken to offset emitted CO2” and refers for quantification to “Considerations in valuation of carbon sequestration”. The Tribunal understands that this amounts to a claim for climate damage, the sequestration or remediation costs of which Niko may be obliged to pay. The Tribunal understands that, in the context in which the expression is used, mitigating greenhouse gases must be understood as reversing the emissions and restoration. The reference to plantation and sequestration suggests that this reversal is done by carbon sequestration by reforestation.

2389 The Third Environmental Losses Report presents the claim also by referring to the UNFCCC as creating international liability of Bangladesh “to mitigate the greenhouse gases”. It thus places the claim in the context of international action concerning climate change and the role of Bangladesh in this context.

2390 The Tribunal recognises that the explanations by BAPEX and its experts in the Arbitration, even when complemented by the explanations in the Environmental Losses Reports are far from providing the detail and precision one expects for claims in an ICSID arbitration for many millions of US Dollars. It must consider, however, that in such an arbitration issues may arise which go beyond the particularities of the specific case before it and that the Tribunal has a responsibility to consider important issues for the society in which all participants to the case operate. GHG emissions and developments of climate change certainly are such an overriding issue.

2391 The Tribunal therefore has taken it upon itself to examine the fundamentals of climate change as it may relate to the GHG emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout. Before addressing the specifics of the claim for these emissions, the Tribunal presents its understanding of the scientific context for assessing claims for such emissions. As Niko's liability for the first blowout at Chattak 2 has been established already, the issues that the Tribunal must consider here relate essentially, insofar as the claim for climate damage is concerned, to the causal chain from the GHG emissions in the Chattak field and any

[Page 676]

damage they may cause and, considering the claim for restoration, the scope and method for sequestration.

2392 The matter of climate change is of extreme complexity and has given rise to a vast amount of research, studies and scientific debate. The Tribunal is aware of the limitations of its own efforts in this respect, the results of which are presented for the narrow area of the case before it. In this context, the Tribunal also is fully aware of its responsibility in ICSID proceedings for assuring due process. This implies that a party defending against a claim must have been informed about the claim and its context and that, if and to the extent to which the Tribunal awards the claim, the defending party had the information to defend against it. Although, in its final form, the claim for Atmospheric Pollution was framed by BAPEX differently, the evolution of the claim since the Environmental Losses Committees in 2005 clearly emphasised the damage as part of climate change and its international context and different forms for reparation of this damage.

2393 With these considerations in mind, the Tribunal has examined the claim of BAPEX on behalf of the Government for loss caused by the GHG emissions attributed to the first blowout at the Chattak 2 well in January 2005.

9.4.3 The UNFCCC, the IPCC and the international framework concerning GHG emissions and climate change

2394 The Third Environmental Losses Report, dated 15 September 2005, relied on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or the Convention), adopted on 9 May 1992, that entered into force on 21 March 1994; Bangladesh signed the Convention on 9 June 1992 and ratified it on 15 April 1994. The Third Environmental Losses Report stated that “[a]s a signatory of the [UNFCCC], Bangladesh is internationally liable to mitigate the greenhouse gases”.1459 By the time of the 2005 blowouts, obligations resulting from the UNFCCC had been “operationalised” by the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, adopted on 10 December 1997, which entered into force on 16 February 2005.

2395 The Third Environmental Losses Report relies on the UNFCCC and, in its Reply to the present claim, Niko discusses the position of Bangladesh under


1459 Third Environmental Losses Report Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 6. The Report uses the term "Agreement" instead of "Convention”, but the Tribunal has no doubt that it is the UNFCCC that is meant. ↩

[Page 677]

that Convention, including the question “what the cost of purchasing greenhouse gas offset credits would be”.1460

2396 The UNFCCC starts its preamble with the acknowledgement by the Parties “that change in the Earth's climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind". This and other considerations recorded in the preamble lead to the definition of the Convention's objective in Article 2:

The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable ecoпотіс development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

2397 The Convention continues by defining guiding principles (Article 3) and specific Commitments on the basis of "common but differential responsibilities” of the Parties (Article 4). The Convention settles some other matters, creates subsidiary bodies and establishes the Conference of the Parties (COP), which first met in Berlin in 1995 and continues to meet every year. At COP 3, the Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC on 11 December 1997, which entered into force on 16 February 2005, and at COP 21, the Paris Agreement on 12 December 2015, which entered into force on 4 November 2016.

2398 The Convention refers to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to “respond to the need for objective scientific and technical advice”.1461 The IPCC had been created in 1988. Its First Assessment Report (FAR), completed in 1990 and updated in 1992, prepared the UNFCCC. The IPCC is described as the “United Nations body for assessing the science related to climate change”. It prepares “comprehensive Assessment Reports about the state of scientific, technical and socio-economic knowledge on climate change, its impact and future risks, and options for reducing the rate at which climate change is taking place”. The latest of these Assessment Reports (AR) was the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), issued in 2023 and consisting of three Working Group (WG) contributions and a Synthesis Report. In addition to the AR, the IPCC produces other reports, in particular special reports and


1460 CREC, paragraphs 47 – 55. ↩
1461 UNFCCC, Article 21(2). ↩

[Page 678]

methodology reports and carries out other activities such as workshops on various topics to support its work programme.

2399 Its reports are based on a broad consultation process with the scientific community and governments. “Through its assessments, the IPCC determines the state of knowledge on climate change. It identifies where there is agreement in the scientific community on topics related to climate change and where further research is needed”. The Assessment Reports are a “key input into the international negotiations to tackle climate change”.1462

2400 BAPEX relies on one of the IPCC Assessment Reports and produces it as Exhibit R-471. The Tribunal, too, refers to the IPCC reports as the principal source of information about scientific issues related the claim for Atmospheric Pollution.

2401 Against this background the Tribunal has examined what loss and damage could be caused to BAPEX and, more generally, to Bangladesh by the release of carbon dioxide and methane to the atmosphere from the first Chattak blowout on 7 January 2005. The Tribunal starts by presenting its understanding of the relevant processes in climate change as presented essentially in the IPCC reports.

9.4.4 Greenhouse Gases, their warming effect and the complexity of the climate system

2402 While there are substantial differences in the Parties' assessment of the quantity of gas that escaped from the Reservoir, differences that have been addressed and decided above in Section 7, it is undisputed that the first blowout, like the second, did cause the emission of GHG and that some of these emissions took the form of CO2 produced by the burning gas and some escaped as methane (CH4) without burning.

2403 The latest IPCC Assessment report defines Greenhouse Gases as follows:1463

Gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of radiation emitted by the Earth's surface, by the atmosphere itself, and by clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect. Water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and ozone (O3) are the primary GHGs in the Earth's atmosphere. Нитап- made GHGs include sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons


1462 IPCC Website: https://www.ipcc.ch/, accessed on 29 October 2024. ↩
1463 IPCC AR6, WG1, Synthesis Report 2023, Annex I Glossary at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC AR6 SYR AnnexesIndex.pdf. ↩

[Page 679]

(HFCs), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs); several of these are also 03-depleting (and are regulated under the Montreal Protocol).

2404 CO2 and methane, as Greenhouse Gases, are normal constituents of the atmosphere, where they are present in low concentrations and, at ordinary concentration, are considered harmless.1464 The role of GHG has been described in a chapter on The Historical Overview of Climate Change Science as part of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report of 2007:

The two most abundant gases in the atmosphere, nitrogen (comprising 78% of the dry atmosphere) and oxygen (comprising 21%), exert almost no greenhouse effect. Instead, the greenhouse effect comes from molecules that are more complex and much less common. Water vapour is the most important greenhouse gas, and carbon dioxide (CO2) is the second-most important one. Methane, nitrous oxide, ozone and several other gases present in the atmosphere in small amounts also contribute to the greenhouse effect.1465

2405 The process producing the greenhouse effect is driven by the energy from the Sun, of which part is absorbed by the Earth's surface and, to a lesser extent, by the atmosphere, and part reflected to space. The First IPCC Assessment Report, that served as the basis for the UNFCCC, presented the process as follows:1466

Scientific Assessment of Climate Change

[Image of the greenhouse effect diagram]

SUN

some solar radiation is reflected by the earth and the atmosphere

solar radiation passes through the clear atmosphere

ATMOSPHERE

some of the infra-red radiation is absorbed and re-emitted by the greenhouse gases. The effect of this is to warm the surface and the lower atmosphere

most solar radiation is absorbed by the earth's surface and warms it

EARTH

infra-red radiation is emitted from the earth's surface

Figure 3 A simplified diagram illustrating the greenhouse effect


1464 For CO2 see IPCC, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (2005), Annex 1, page 390; however, at page 385: "high concentrations can be dangerous". For methane see below Section 9.4.6. ↩
1465 AR4, Exhibit R-471, Chapter 1 at page 115. ↩
1466 Policymaker Summary of Working Group I (Scientific Assessment of Climate Change), page 66. ↩

[Page 680]

2406 In a simpler form it has been represented in the following drawing:1467

[Image of the greenhouse effect diagram]

The Greenhouse Effect

Some sunlight that hits Earth is reflected back into space, while the rest becomes heat

Greenhouse gases absorb and redirect heat radiated by Earth, insulating it from heat loss to space

2407 In this process, GHGs play an essential role for preserving the Earth's temperature and climate. The IPCC 1990 and 1992 Assessment Reports stated: “Naturally occurring greenhouse gases keep the Earth warm enough to be habitable”.1468 The IPCC's chapter with the Historical Overview of 2007 summarised this role as follows:

Without the natural greenhouse effect, the average temperature at Earth's surface would be below the freezing point of water. Thus, Earth's natural greenhouse effect makes life as we know it possible.1469

2408 That chapter also described the carbon cycle, another important role of specifically CO2 in the atmosphere, explaining that carbon dioxide

... plays a vital role in the Earth's environment as a necessary ingredient in the life cycle of plants and animals. During photosynthesis plants assimilate CO2 and release oxygen. Anthropogenic activities which cause the emission of CO2 include the combustion of fossil fuels and other carbon containing materials, the fermentation of organic


1467 Wikipedia: Greenhouse effect: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenhouse_effect, accessed 29 October 2024. ↩
1468 FAR, page 66 (WGI Policy Maker Summary, Section 2.3.1). ↩
1469 AR4, Exhibit R-471, Chapter 1 at page 115. ↩

[Page 681]

compounds such as sugar and the breathing of humans. Natural sources of CO2, including volcanic activity, dominate the Earth's carbon cycle.1470

2409 The Tribunal concludes that CO2 and methane in themselves are not harmful to the atmosphere. It is the increase in their emissions as it occurred in the course of industrialisation that disturbed the natural carbon cycle, and this increase is due to human activities. The First IPCC Report 1990 explained the process:1471

Emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide. These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface.

2410 The increase in emissions has been represented in the Climate Change 2007 Report, on which BAPEX relies in a different context, in the following graph:1472

Concentrations of Greenhouse Gases from 0 to 2005

CO₂ (ppm), N₂O (ppb)

400

350

300

250

Carbon Dioxide (CO₂)

Methane (CH₄)

Nitrous Oxide (N₂O)

2000

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

CH₄ (ppb)

0 500 1000 1500 2000

Year

FAQ 2.1, Figure 1. Atmospheric concentrations of important long-lived green- house gases over the last 2,000 years. Increases since about 1750 are attributed to human activities in the industrial era. Concentration units are parts per million (ppm) or parts per billion (ppb), indicating the number of molecules of the greenhouse gas per million or billion air molecules, respectively, in an atmospheric sample. (Data combined and simplified from Chapters 6 and 2 of this report.)


1470 IPCC, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (2005), Annex 1, page 385. ↩
1471 FAR, Executive Summary at page XI. ↩
1472 AR4, Exhibit R-471, referred to in BMEC, FN 26, Figure 1 at page 135. ↩

[Page 682]

2411 Carbon dioxide has a very long lifetime in the atmosphere, some of it for several centuries, the remainder for thousands of years. One study, based on a broad review of the available research summarises the findings as follows:

Nowhere in these model results or in the published literature is there any reason to conclude that the effects of CO2 release will be substantially confined to just a few centuries. In contrast, generally accepted modern understanding of the global carbon cycle indicates that climate effects of CO2 releases to the atmosphere will persist for tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of years into the future.1473

2412 Methane's atmospheric lifetime is now assessed be around 10 years, and then decomposed into CO2 and water vapor; soil lifetime of methane is assessed as longer than a century.1474

2413 The increase in Greenhouse Gases produced rising temperatures on the Earth's surface. IPCC reports have regularly reported on scientific assessments of these temperature increases.

2414 In the First Assessment Report in 1990, the IPCC wrote that, in its judgement,

[g]lobal mean surface temperature has increased by 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last 100 years, with the five global average warmest years being in the 1980s.

2415 In the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, dated 2018, the IPCC considered it likely that by 2017 global warming had reached approximately 1°C:

Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C (likely) between 0.8°C and 1.2°C) above pre-industrial levels in 2017, increasing at 0.2°C (likely between 0.1°C and 0.3°C) per decade (high confidence).1475


1473 Archer et al, Atmospheric Lifetime of Fossil Fuel Carbon Dioxide, The Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences, 2009, pages 117 and 131. ↩
1474 AR6, Section 6.3.1 and Table 6.2 at pages 835 – 836. ↩
1475 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, page 31 at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf. ↩

[Page 683]

2416 The Climate Change 2023 Synthesis Report, the latest of the IPCC reports, represented the following graphic:

c) Changes in global surface temperature

Global surface temperature has increased by 1.1°C by 2011-2020 compared to 1850-1900
°C 2.0
1.5
1.0 1.0
0.5 Observed
0.0 0.2
-0.5 warmest multi-century period in more than 100,000 years
-1.0
1850 1900 1950 2000 2020

Key

°C 0 0.5 1 1.5

2417 AR6 of 2023 explained that during the period 2011 to 2020 global surface temperatures reached 1.1°C above the 1850-1900 level and stated that “Global surface temperature has increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years (high confidence)”.

2418 During the period from 2010 to 2019 the increase of the surface temperature is estimated at between 0.8°C and 1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.07°C.1476


1476 AR6, Synthesis Report, page 42 at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf. ↩

[Page 684]

2419 The report of Working Group I that was part of the preparation of the AR6 Synthesis Report represented the development of the global surface temperature during the last 2000 years as follows:

(a) Change in global surface temperature (decadal average) as reconstructed (1–2000) and observed (1850–2020)

°C
2.0
1.5 Warming is unprecedented in more than 2000 years
1.0 Warmest multi-century period in more than 100,000 years
1.0 observed
0.5
0.2
0.0 reconstructed
-0.5
-1
1 500 1000 1500 1850 2020

2420 The Working Group presented further detail about the progressive rise in temperature: “Each of the last four decades has been successively warmer than any decade that preceded it since 1850”. For the period from 2003 to 2012 it estimated the increase in temperature increase by 0.19°C (between 0.16 and 0.22°C).1477

2421 This suggests that by 2005, the estimated average surface temperature increase was below 1°C.

2422 These numbers about the increase in temperature are estimated averages: the estimated increase over land is higher than over the ocean; and the average takes into account that, in addition to “well-mixed GHG emissions”, other factors act in the opposite direction and produce a cooling effect; these include aerosols as well as solar and volcanic drivers.1478

2423 Other factors that cause differences in the warming effect relate to the surface from which the solar radiation is reflected and the composition of the atmosphere in different regions of the Earth.


1477 AR6, Summary for Policy Makers, page 6, at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_FullReport.pdf. ↩
1478 AR6, Synthesis Report, page 43, at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_FullVolume.pdf. ↩

[Page 685]

2424 Concerning the surface, AR4, WG II Report points out that the reflection factor ("albedo”) of “agricultural land can be very different from that of a natural landscape, especially if the latter is forest”. The different effect of the surface reflection “is particularly accentuated when snow is present”.1479

2425 The effect of the regional differences in the composition of the air has been described in AR4:

In the humid equatorial regions, where there is so much water vapour in the air that the greenhouse effect is very large, adding a small additional amount of CO2 or water vapour has only a small direct impact on downward infrared radiation. However, in the cold, dry polar regions, the effect of a small increase in CO2 or water vapour is much greater. The same is true for the cold, dry upper atmosphere where a small increase in water vapour has a greater influence on the greenhouse effect than the same change in water vapour would have near the surface.1480


1479 See e.g. AR4, Exhibit R-471, Section 2.5.1 at page 180. ↩
1480 AR4, Exhibit R-471, Chapter 1 at pages 115 – 116. ↩

[Page 686]

2426 The 2023 AR6 Synthesis Report presented the regional differences in temperature changes in the following two images:1481

Emergence of changes in surface temperature
Annual mean temperature change and the change relative to year-to-year variations

(a) Change in temperature at a global warming level of 1°C

Missing data Zonal mean
-2.4 -2.1 -1.8 -1.5 -2.1 -0.9 -0.6 -0.3 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 °C 90°N 60°N 30°N 0 30°S 60°S 90°S 0.5 1 2 3 4 5 Observation (Berkeley Earth) Other observation datasets CMIP6 multi-model mean (45) 5-95% model range

(b) Change in temperature at a global warming level of 1°C relative to the size of year-to-year variations

Missing data Zonal mean
-4 -3.5 -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Signal to noise ratio 90°N 60°N 30°N 0 30°S 60°S 90°S 0.5 1 2 3 4 5

Figure TS.3 | Emergence of changes in temperature over the historical period. The intent of this figure is to show how observed changes in temperature have emerged and that the emergence pattern agrees with model simulations. The observed change in temperature at a global warming level of 1°C (a), and the signal-to-noise ratio (the change in temperature at a global warming level of 1°C, divided by the size of year-to-year variations, (b)) using data from Berkeley Earth. The right panels show the zonal means of the maps and include data from different observational datasets (red) and the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6) simulations (black, including the 5–95% range) processed in the same way as the observations. (1.4.2, 10.4.3)

2427 The first image shows that, at a global warming level of 1°C, the temperature increase is higher in the Northern Hemisphere than in the tropics. This had been stated already in the 2018 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C: The largest increase in mean temperature is found in the high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere.1482 As explained above, the physical properties of the land surface play a role in this respect1483 and the humidity in the air.1484

2428 These differences demonstrate some aspects of the complexity of the climate system; but GHGs are only a part of this system and interact with other components and processes. The system and the complex interactions were


1481 AR6, Summary for Policy Makers, page 51. ↩
1482 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, page 187. ↩
1483 See e.g. AR4, Exhibit R-471, Section 2.5.1 at page 180. ↩
1484 AR4, Exhibit R-471, Chapter 1 at page 115. ↩

[Page 687]

presented in the TAR of 2001. The report of the AR3 Working Group I presented the Scientific Basis and described the climate system1485 as

... an interactive system consisting of five major components: the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the land surface and the biosphere, forced or influenced by various external forcing mechanisms, the most important of which is the Sun.

2429 The report presented the system and the five major components in the following drawing, pointing out that “the direct effect of human activities on the climate system is considered an external forcing":1486

Changes in Solar Inputs Changes in the Atmosphere: Composition, Circulation Changes in the Hydrological Cycle

Atmosphere

N₂, O₂, Ar, H₂O, CO₂, CH₄, N₂O, O₃, etc. Aerosols

Volcanic Activity

Clouds

Atmosphere-Ice Interaction Precipitation Evaporation Terrestrial Radiation Atmosphere-Biosphere Interaction
Heat Exchange Wind Stress Human Influences Glacier Ice Sheet
Sea Ice Biosphere Land- Atmosphere Interaction
Hydrosphere: Ocean Soil-Biosphere Interaction
Ice-Ocean Coupling Hydrosphere: Rivers & Lakes Cryosphere: Sea Ice, Ice Sheets, Glaciers Land Surface

Changes in the Ocean: Circulation, Sea Level, Biogeochemistry

Changes in/on the Land Surface: Orography, Land Use, Vegetation, Ecosystems

Figure 1.1: Schematic view of the components of the global climate system (bold), their processes and interactions (thin arrows) and some aspects that may change (bold arrows).

2430 The report continued by describing the atmosphere as “the most unstable and rapidly changing part of the system”, and explains the role of Greenhouse Gases, which form only a very small part of the atmosphere, but have a vital function for the temperature on Earth, as explained above. The Report emphasises the complexity of the interactions among the components:


1489 AR3 (TAR), page 87, at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/WGI_TAR_full_report.pdf. ↩
1486 AR3 (TAR), page 88. ↩

[Page 688]

Many physical, chemical and biological interaction processes occur among the various components of the climate system on a wide range of space and time scales, making the system extremely complex. Although the components of the climate system are very different in their composition, physical and chemical properties, structure and behaviour, they are all linked by fluxes of mass, heat and momentum: all subsystems are open and interrelated.

As an example, the atmosphere and the oceans are strongly coupled and exchange, among others, water vapour and heat through evaporation. This is part of the hydrological cycle and leads to condensation, cloud formation, precipitation and runoff, and supplies energy to weather systems. On the other hand, precipitation has an influence on salinity, its distribution and the thermohaline circulation. Atmosphere and oceans also exchange, among other gases, carbon dioxide, maintaining a balance by dissolving it in cold polar water which sinks into the deep ocean and by outgassing in relatively warm upwelling water near the equator.1487

2431 This complexity makes it very difficult to measure many of the specific processes. The measurement of GHG emissions and their effect is a good example of these difficulties, in particular because of the very different periods during which these gases, once released into the atmosphere, remain there. The issue is relevant for one of the controversies concerning this claim: the quantification of the total GHG emissions caused by the Chattak 2 blowout, given the different characteristics of carbon dioxide and methane. The IPCC laboured with the metrics throughout its work.1488 In its last AR in 2023, the IPCC made the following comment about GHG emission metrics:1489

GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different greenhouse gases in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO2- equivalents (CO2-eq) using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6. The AR6 WGI and WGIII reports contain updated emission metric values, evaluations of different metrics with regard to mitigation objectives, and assess new approaches to aggregating gases. The choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations


1487 AR3 (TAR), page 89(j). ↩
1488 For some discussion about the metrics for assessing emissions, see AR4, Exhibit R-471, Section 2.10.4 at page 215. ↩
1489 AR6, Synthesis Report, FN 69 at page 44. ↩

[Page 689]

and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future GHG emissions.

9.4.5 The role of human activities in the increase of the Earth's temperature

2432 As explained above, natural events, in particular solar radiation and volcanic eruptions, have in the past played a critical role in producing changes in the temperature on Earth, both positive and negative; they played an important role in the fluctuations shown in the graphs above. There is no reason to assume that, during the period of emissions caused by human activity, such changes would not continue to occur. The increase of anthropogenic GHG emissions since the start of industrialisation and the dramatic acceleration of this increase during the last century suggest that the anthropogenic emissions at least contributed to the temperature increase. The question that was considered in the work of the IPCC and the broad research on which its work relied was how much of the temperature increase is due to one and to the other cause. The answer to this question evolved over time. As anthropogenic GHG emissions further increased and research about its effects progressed, the predominant role of the human factor in climate change became clear.

2433 In its report preparing the conference that produced the UNFCCC, the IPCC wrote in 1990:

The human-caused emissions of carbon dioxide are much smaller than the natural exchange rates of carbon dioxide between the atmosphere and the oceans, and between the atmosphere and the terrestrial system. The natural exchange rates were, however, in close balance before human-induced emissions began; the steady anthropogenic emissions into the atmosphere represent a significant disturbance of the natural carbon cycle.1490

2434 The First IPCC Report in 1990 (FAR) faced uncertainty about the relative importance of natural and anthropogenic causes. It observed the global mean surface air temperature had increased by 0.3°C to 0.6°C over the last 100 years, the five global average warmest years were in the 1980s and the global sea-level had increased by 10 to 20cm. It considered “natural climate sensitivity" and concluded that this increase could be “largely due to this natural variability":


1490 FAR, Sections 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 at page 52 at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/ipcc_90_92_assessments_far_full_report.pdf. ↩

[Page 690]

The size of the warming over the last century is broadly consistent with the prediction by climate models, but is also of the same magnitude as natural climate variability. If the sole cause of the observed warming were the human-made greenhouse effect, then the implied climate sensitivity would be near the lower end of the range inferred from models. Thus the observed increase could be largely due to this natural variability: alternatively this variability and other human factors could have offset a still larger human induced greenhouse warming. The unequivocal detection of the enhanced greenhouse effect from observations is not likely for a decade or more.1491

2435 These observations were confirmed in the 1992 Supplement which was before the COP that adopted the UNFCCC.

2436 The UNFCCC noted and expressed concern about the increase of GHG in the atmosphere due to “human activities”. It expressed concern that the resulting greenhouse effect will lead “on average” to additional warming. It did not say that the anthropogenic contribution was the only reason for the additional warming but added:

... that human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.1492

2437 Like the FAR and its 1992 Supplement, the UNFCCC underlined the uncertainties in the preamble of the Convention by noting:

... that there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change, particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns thereof.

2438 With further research, the predominant role of human activity for global warming became more clearly apparent. Research relied to a large extent on “Radiative Forcing (RF)” which “is used to assess and compare the anthropogenic and natural drivers of climate change”. The concept of


1491 FAR, Sections 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 at page 53. ↩
1492 UNFCCC, Preamble. ↩

[Page 691]

Radiative Forcing and its use in climatic research was described in AR4, 2007.1493

2439 In 1995, the Second IPCC Assessment Report (AR2 or SAR) concluded: “The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate". It also noted that the anthropogenic signal was still emerging from the background of natural climate variability. AR3 (TAR) of 2001, the last AR before the Chattak blowouts, noted these passages from AR2. Relying on “progress in reducing uncertainty” it concluded:

There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.1494

2440 The temperature changes and the different attributions – natural, human and combined – as they were understood in 2001, were represented in the following graphs:1495

Simulated annual global mean surface temperatures

(a) Natural

Temperature anomalies (°C)

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0

1850 1900 1950 2000

Year

(b) Anthropogenic

Temperature anomalies (°C)

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0

1850 1900 1950 2000

Year

(c) All forcings

Temperature anomalies (°C)

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0

1850 1900 1950 2000

Year

Figure 4: Simulating the Earth's temperature variations, and comparing the results to measured changes, can provide insight into the underlying causes of the major changes. A climate model can be used to simulate the temperature changes that occur both from natural and anthropogenic causes. The simulations represented by the band in (a) were done with only natural forcings: solar variation and volcanic activity. Those encompassed by the band in (b) were done with anthropogenic forcings: greenhouse gases and an estimate of sulphate aerosols, and those encompassed by the band in (c) were done with both natural and anthropogenic forcings included. From (b), it can be seen that inclusion of anthropogenic forcings provides a plausible explanation for a substantial part of the observed temperature changes over the past century, but the best match with observations is obtained in (c) when both natural and anthropogenic factors are included. These results show that the forcings included are sufficient to explain the observed changes, but do not exclude the possibility that other forcings may also have contributed. The bands of model results presented here are for four runs from the same model. Similar results to those in (b) are obtained with other models with anthropogenic forcing. [Based upon Chapter 12, Figure 12.7]


1493 AR4, Exhibit R-471; see in particular FN 1 at page 131, and page 133, Section 2.2 and other passages at pages 195, 199 et passim. For the concept and definition of radiative forcing (RF), see the Glossary in the IPCC ARs, in particular AR6 and AR4. ↩
1494 AR3, Summary for Policymakers, page 158. ↩
1495 AR3, Summary for Policymakers, Figure 4 at page 159. ↩

[Page 692]

2441 Six years later and after the Chattak blowouts, research had further progressed and provided evidence for a predominance of human causes for the temperature increase. In the Arbitration, BAPEX produced the IPCC report of WG I, “The Physical Science Basis of AR4, Climate Change 2007”, which referred to climate model studies since AR3 and stated that they gave “medium confidence that the equilibrium global mean temperature response to a given RF is approximately the same (to within 25%) for most drivers of climate change”. It continued by reporting progress in assessing the relative importance of human influence on climate change and concluded that this influence far outweighed natural influences:

For the first time, the combined RF for all anthropogenic agents is derived. Estimates are also made for the first time of the separate RF components associated with the emissions of each agent.

The combined anthropogenic RF is estimated to be +1.6 [–1.0, +0.8]2 W m-2, indicating that, since 1750, it is extremely likely that humans have exerted a substantial warming influence on climate. This RF estimate is likely to be at least five times greater than that due to solar irradiance changes. For the period 1950 to 2005, it is exceptionally unlikely that the combined natural RF (solar irradiance plus volcanic aerosol) has had a warming influence comparable to that of the combined anthropogenic RF.1496

2442 As research progressed and the average temperature increased with every decade, the next IPCC AR, issued as AR5 in 2014, recorded the conclusions from further evidence. The Synthesis Report of AR5, Climate Change 2014, recorded the following:

The evidence for human influence on the climate system has grown since IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by anthropogenic increase in GHG concertation and other anthropogenic forcings together. The best evidence of the human-induced contribution to warming is similar to the observed warming over this period.

2443 The report identifies some of the effects of the anthropogenic influences and then presents a graph showing the positive and negative anthropogenic


1496 AR4, Exhibit R-471, page 131 and section 2.8 about the Utility of Radiative Forcing, at pages 195 - 199. In a footnote the report explains the term "extremely likely", expressing a 95% confidence level or higher. ↩

[Page 693]

forcings (green and yellow); the net result (orange) is very close to the observed warming (black):1497

Contributions to observed surface temperature change over the period 1951–2010

OBSERVED WARMING
Greenhouse gases
Other anthropogenic forcings
Combined anthropogenic forcings
Natural forcings
Natural internal variability
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
(°C)

Figure SPM.3 | Assessed likely ranges (whiskers) and their mid-points (bars) for warming trends over the 1951–2010 period from well-mixed greenhouse gases, other anthropogenic forcings (including the cooling effect of aerosols and the effect of land use change), combined anthropogenic forcings, natural forcings and natural internal climate variability (which is the element of climate variability that arises spontaneously within the climate system even in the absence of forcings). The observed surface temperature change is shown in black, with the 5 to 95% uncertainty range due to observational uncertainty. The attributed warming ranges (colours) are based on observations combined with climate model simulations, in order to estimate the contribution of an individual external forcing to the observed warming. The contribution from the combined anthropogenic forcings can be estimated with less uncertainty than the contributions from greenhouse gases and from other anthropogenic forcings separately. This is because these two contributions partially compen- sate, resulting in a combined signal that is better constrained by observations. [Figure 1.9]

2444 Elsewhere in the same report, anthropogenic GHG emissions were described as the “dominant cause” of global warming:

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre- industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.1498

2445 The latest IPCC AR6 WGI, 2021 Report went a step further. To demonstrate that the global warming since the middle of the last century was anthropogenic, it presented a comparison of the rise in temperature, as it was


1497 AR5, Synthesis Report, page 6 at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf. ↩
1498 AR5, Synthesis Report, pages 4 – 5. ↩

[Page 694]

actually observed, compared to a simulation of the developments as it would have developed without anthropogenic interference, by natural actors alone:1499

(b) Change in global surface temperature (annual average) as observed and simulated using human & natural and only natural factors (both 1850–2020)

°C
2.0
1.5
1.0 observed
0.5 simulated human & natural
0.0 simulated natural only (solar & volcanic)
-0.5
1850 1900 1950 2000 2020

1499 AR6, page 6. ↩

[Page 695]

2446 Among the sources for anthropogenic GHG emissions, CO2 from fossil fuels and industry are by far the most important. These sources have been represented in the following graph:

a)

Increased emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)

Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions resulting from human activities continue to increase

GHG Emissions (GtCO₂-eq/yr)

60

45

30

15

0

1850 1900 1950 2000 2019

Non-CO₂ emissions

CO₂ from Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)

-CO₂ from fossil fuels and industry

2447 The temperature increase is determined not only by the GHG as positive drivers but also by other drivers with a cooling effect. Aerosols, which are also primarily anthropogenic, are the most important cooling factors. AR6, Synthesis Report explains that

... other human drivers (principally aerosols) contributed a cooling of 0.0°C to 0.8°C, natural (solar and volcanic) drivers changed global surface temperature by −0.1°C to +0.1°C, and internal variability changed it by −0.2°C to +0.2°C.1500


1500 AR6, Synthesis Report, page 5. ↩

[Page 696]

2448 The interplay of these factors is presented in the following table:1501

d) Humans are responsible

Observed warming is driven by emissions from human activities with GHG warming partly masked by aerosol cooling 2010–2019 (change from 1850–1900)

Observed warming

Total human influence

Well-mixed GHG

Other human drivers*

Solar and volcanic drivers

Internal variability

2.0 °C

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0

*Other human drivers are predominantly cooling aerosols, but also warming aerosols, land-use change (land-use reflectance) and ozone.

2449 The Tribunal concludes that in 2005, at the time of the Chattak blowouts, some uncertainty may still have prevailed about the contribution of human activities to the rising temperatures. Since then, such uncertainty has been much reduced. For the purpose of its analysis in the present case, the Tribunal accepts that the rising temperatures since the start of last century are caused by human activities with fossil fuels and industry being the main factors.

9.4.6 Impact of the increasing temperatures and climate change

2450 The UNFCCC in 1992 expressed concern about the increasing concentration of GHG in the atmosphere, the resulting warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere and the possibility that these developments


1501 AR6, Synthesis Report, page 43. ↩

[Page 697]

... may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.

2451 However, the Parties to the UNFCCC were aware that

... there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change, particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns thereof.1502

2452 The cautious expression of the impact of climate change and the warning about the uncertainties resulted from the limited knowledge then available as it appeared from the reports of the IPCC. The IPCC AR 1 of 1990 and the Supplement of 1992 noted “the retreat of most mountain glaciers of the world since the end of the nineteenth century and the fact that global sea level has risen over the same period by an average of 1 to 2 mm per year”. It concluded that "[t]his apparent connection between observed sea-level rise and global warming provides grounds for believing that future warming will lead to an acceleration of in sea-level rise”.1503 The Supplement reported that some international organisations were “implementing programmes to help identify ecological and socio-economic consequences of climate change.” The reports emphasised the need for increasing the available information and data to support impact studies and announced that WG II was “preparing guidelines to assess the socio-economic and environmental impacts of potential climate change".1504

2453 As research progressed and the global average temperature increased, more information was obtained about the impact of the rising temperatures, changes in the Earth's climate and human and natural systems. In 2001, the AR 3 Synthesis Report, the last IPCC Assessment Report before the Chattak blowouts, stated:

There are preliminary indications that some human systems have been affected by recent increases in floods and droughts. The rising socio- economic costs related to weather damage and to regional variations in climate suggest increasing vulnerability to climate change. [...]

Extreme events are currently a major source of climate-related impacts. For example, heavy losses of human life, property damage, and other environmental damages were recorded during the El Niño event of the years 1997 – 1998. The impacts of climatic extremes and variability are a major concern. [...] Because [social and economic] systems are also


1502 UNFCCC, Preamble. ↩
1503 FAR, page 80. ↩
1504 FAR, 1992 Supplement, page 28. ↩

[Page 698]

affected by changes in socio-economic factors such as demographic shifts and land-use changes, quantifying the relative impacts of climate change (either anthropogenic or natural) and of socio-economic factors is difficult ...1505

2454 The 2001 Synthesis Report also refers to regional differences in the impact of climate change and other differences. It points out, for instance, that the projected climate change will have beneficial and adverse environmental and socio-economic effects, but the larger the changes and rate of change in climate, the more the adverse effects predominate. With respect to the rising sea level, the Synthesis Report, relying on the work of WG I, describes the complex processes that produce this effect with the following image:1506

What causes the sea level to change ?

Terrestrial water storage, extraction of groundwater, building of reservoirs, changes in runoff, and seepage into aquifers Surface and deep ocean circulation changes, storm surges Exchange of the water stored on land by glaciers and ice sheets with ocean water
Subsidence in river delta region, land movements, and tectonic displacements As the ocean warms, the water expands

WGI TAR Box TS-2

Figure 3-4: The level of the sea at the shoreline is determined by many factors in the global environment that operate on a great range of time scales, from hours (tidal) to millions of years (ocean basin changes due to tectonics and sedimentation). On the time scale of decades to centuries, some of the largest influences on the average levels of the sea are linked to climate and climate change processes.

2455 IPCC AR4 of 2007 includes observations about the impact of rising temperatures. While the Synthesis Report refers to evidence showing “that many natural systems are being affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature increases”, the sources of this evidence are unevenly distributed. The sources show predominately impact in the Norther Hemisphere and “widespread melting of snow and ice and rising average sear


1505 AR3, Synthesis Report, page 55, paragraphs 2.25 and 2.26. ↩
1506 AR3, Synthesis Report, page 67. ↩

[Page 699]

level".1507 In the section on “Robust Findings, Key Uncertainties”, the Synthesis Report presents as robust finding that:

Anthropogenic warming over the last three decades has likely had discernible influence at the global scale on observed changes in many physical and biological systems.

2456 The Report pointed out, however, that climatic data coverage remains limited in some regions “with marked scarcity in developing countries” and emphasised the difficulties in determining causation. The Report explained:1508

Analysing and monitoring changes in extreme events, including drought, tropical cyclones, extreme temperatures and the frequency and intensity of precipitation, is more difficult than for climatic averages as longer data time-series of higher spatial and temporal resolutions are required.

Effects of climate changes on human and some natural systems are difficult to detect due to adaptation and non-climatic drivers.

Difficulties remain in reliably simulating and attributing observed temperature changes to natural or human causes at smaller than continental scales. At these smaller scales, factors such as landuse change and pollution also complicate the detection of anthropogenic warming influence on physical and biological systems.

2457 The IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report of 2014 provided the scientific input for the COP21 in Paris. It reported on increased evidence since AR4 and stated:

In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate change, irrespective of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems to changing climate.

Evidence of observed climate change impacts is strongest and most comprehensive for natural systems. Some impacts on human systems have also been attributed to climate change, with a major or minor contribution of climate change distinguishable from other influences (Figure 1.11). Impacts on human systems are often geographically heterogeneous because they depend not only on changes in climate


1507 AR4, Synthesis Report 2007, page 2. ↩
1508 AR4, Synthesis Report, page 72, references to other parts of the Report omitted; more detailed discussions of these findings are in the AR4 report of WG II, especially in the sections on "Current knowledge about observed impacts of climate change on the natural and human environment". ↩

[Page 700]

variables but also on social and economic factors. Hence, the changes are more easily observed at local levels, while attribution can remain difficult.1509

2458 Figure 1.11 to which reference is made in this passage is a world map showing for different regions “observed impacts attributed to climate change for Physical systems, biological systems, human and managed systems” with different degrees of confidence. It shows the great regional variety of impacts; the explanatory note states that, based on the available scientific literature since AR4, “there are substantially more impacts in recent decades now attributable to climate change”; and it points out that, despite the growing knowledge base, “publications are still limited for many regions, systems and processes”. The chapter on Observed Changes and their Causes lists a variety of changes and emphasises “Extreme Events”:1510

Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950. Some of these changes have been linked to human influences, including a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an increase in warm temperature extremes, an increase in extreme high sea levels and an increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions.

2459 Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement at the COP21 in Paris on 12 December 2015, the IPCC presented the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, which presented climate models with different levels of global warming, considering also differences in regional climate characteristics.

2460 One of the aspects of this report consisted in a presentation of the impacts and risks of the rising temperature for various systems. This included detailed descriptions and analysis of the changes that had occurred and those that were expected to occur with further rising temperatures.

2461 The Report showed that these impacts and risks varied considerably from one system to another. Some of these explanations were summarised in the following table under the heading: “How the level of global warming affects impacts and/or risks associated with the Reasons for Concern (RFCs) and selected natural, managed and human systems.”


1509 AR5, Synthesis Report, page 49. ↩
1510 AR5, Synthesis Report, page 53. ↩

[Page 701]

2462 Under this title, the report presents a table showing five Reasons For Concern (RFCs) illustrating the impacts and risks of different levels of global warming for people, economies and ecosystems across sectors and regions.1511

Impacts and risks for selected natural, managed and human systems

Global mean surface temperature change relative to pre-industrial levels (°C) 2.0 1.5 1.0 0
H M VH VH Warm-water corals
H H H Mangroves
H M H Small-scale low-latitude fisheries
H H H Arctic region
M M H Terrestrial ecosystems
H H H Coastal flooding
M M M Fluvial flooding
M M H Crop yields
M M H Tourism
H H M Heat-related morbidity and mortality
2006-2015

Confidence level for transition: L=Low, M=Medium, H=High and VH=Very high

2463 The colours indicated varying degrees of risk ranging from purple (“very high risks of severe impacts/risks") to white (no detectable risks attributable to climate change). Red indicates “severe and widespread impacts/risks”. Yellow indicates that “impacts/risks are detectable and attributable to climate change with at least medium confidence”. The graph also indicates that the “global mean surface temperature” does not have the same impact on all systems: the impact of a given degree of warming differs considerably depending on the nature of the system affected.

2464 The grey bar across the above graph shows the development during the period from 2006 to 2015.1512 The position of that bar suggests that, for practically all systems shown on that table, the impact of the temperature increase by 2006 had at least the yellow range, i.e. had reached the level at which "impacts/risks are detectable and attributable to climate change with at least medium confidence”; some systems had already reached the level of “severe and widespread impacts/risks”. The IPCC reports show that by that time already the carbon budget was such that further GHG emissions in the years to come caused serious risk.

2465 Subsequent COP and IPCC reports recorded further increase in global warming and the impact of these increases. The First Global Stocktaking by COP28, held in Dubai in November/December 2023, noted “with alarm and serious concern” findings of the IPCC AR6, including the findings:


1511 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, Summary for Policy Makers, page 11. ↩
1512 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, Summary for Policy Makers, page 11. ↩

[Page 702]

  1. That human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming of about 1.1 °C;
  2. That human-caused climate change impacts are already being felt in every region across the globe, with those who have contributed the least to climate change being most vulnerable to the impacts, and, together with losses and damages, will increase with every increment of warming; ...1513

2466 AR 6 in 2023 described the impact of anthropogenic emissions in dramatic terms:1514

Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase over 2010– 2019, with unequal historical and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within countries, and between individuals (high confidence). Human- caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. This has led to widespread adverse impacts on food and water security, human health and on economies and society and related losses and damages to nature and people (high confidence). ...

2467 A similar description is contained in the Synthesis Report of AR6, which concludes that

Climate change has caused substantial damages, and increasingly irreversible losses, in terrestrial, freshwater, cryospheric and coastal and open ocean ecosystems (high confidence). The extent and magnitude of climate change impacts are larger than estimated in previous assessments (high confidence).1515


1513 COP28 First Global Stocktake, FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/16/Add.1, paragraph 15. ↩
1514 AR6 Synthesis Report, Section 2 at paragraph 2.1. ↩
1515 AR6, Synthesis Report, page 46. ↩

[Page 703]

2468 That report contains the table showing the latest understanding of observed impacts and related losses and damages, differentiating between types of impact and the importance of this impact in different regions of the Earth.1516

C) Observed impacts and related losses and damages of climate change Global Africa Asia Australasia Central & South America Europe North America Small islands Dimension of Risk → Impact
HUMAN SYSTEMS Water availability and food production Physical water availability [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Key

Increased climate impacts

HUMAN SYSTEMS

Adverse impacts

Adverse and positive impacts

ECOSYSTEMS

Climate-driven changes observed, no assessment of impact direction

Confidence in attribution to climate change

*** High or very high

** Medium

* Low

° Evidence limited, insufficient

/ Not assessed

Agriculture/crop production [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
Animal and livestock health and productivity [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
Fisheries yields and aquaculture production [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
Health and wellbeing Infectious diseases *** *** *** ** *** ** *** ***
Heat, malnutrition and harm from wildfire *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Mental health ** * ** ** ** ** ** **
Displacement ** *** *** * ** * ** ***
Cities, settlements and infrastructure Inland flooding and associated damages ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
Flood/storm induced damages in coastal areas *** *** *** ** ** ** ** ***
Damages to infrastructure *** *** *** ** ** ** ** ***
Damages to key economic sectors ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ***
ECOSYSTEMS Changes in ecosystem structure Terrestrial *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Freshwater *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Ocean *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Species range shifts Terrestrial *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Freshwater *** ** ** ** *** *** *** **
Ocean *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Changes in seasonal timing (phenology) Terrestrial *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Freshwater *** ** ** ** *** *** *** **
Ocean *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***

2469 Specifically, about Bangladesh the AR6 WG II Report in 2022 stated the following:

Bangladesh with 163 million people, an example, is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate risks and natural hazards, and faces severe floods, cyclones, droughts, heatwaves and storm surges on a regular basis (Dastagir, 2015; Hossain et al., 2018; Roy and Haider, 2019).1517

2470 The Tribunal concludes that by 2005 the increase of GHG in the atmosphere from human activity was causing anthropogenic impacts and risks to the climate on Earth. Any additional GHG emission increased the accumulation of these gases in the atmosphere and thus aggravated these impacts and risks. The CO2 and equivalent emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout, together with other emissions worldwide, added to the GHG already accumulated in the atmosphere and thereby contributed to further warming of the Earth's


1516 AR6, Synthesis Report, Figure 2.3 at page 49. ↩
1517 AR6, WGII, page 1467 at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FullReport.pdf. ↩

[Page 704]

surface and atmosphere and aggravated the impacts and risks observed, as just described. The Tribunal concludes that the increase of GHG in the atmosphere caused by CO2 and equivalent emissions from Chattak 2 is a damage to the atmosphere.

2471 The increase of GHG caused by the Chattak 2 blowout affects the atmosphere globally. Consequently, the resulting impacts and risks also occur at the global level. The increase in temperature and its climatic consequences caused by GHG emissions are part of a complex process, driven by many different factors and leading to widely different effects. The process itself, however, is put in motion directly by the emission. The damage to the atmosphere, in the opinion of the Tribunal, is a direct damage for which Niko is responsible.

2472 When considering the consequences which the Tribunal is invited to attribute to this damage to the atmosphere for which Niko is responsible, the Tribunal must take account of the international action initiated through the UNFCCC on which the Third Environmental Losses Report expressly based the claim.

9.4.7 International action to deal with anthropogenic GHG emissions

2473 On the basis of the above explanations the Tribunal concluded that climate change, as it is understood today, is the result of a complex process, the understanding of which evolved over time. The Tribunal observes that international action evolved as a function of the improving understanding of the process and the increasing understanding of the seriousness of its impacts. The Tribunal highlights here some aspects of the international action which appear to it as relevant to the specific issue it must address when dealing with the claim for Atmospheric Pollution.

2474 The UNFCCC of 1992, acknowledging the need for “an effective and appropriate international response" to the “global nature of climate change"1518 defined the “stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere” as its objective. Its Article 2 did so in the following terms:

Article 2: Objective

The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a


1518 UNFCCC, Preamble. ↩

[Page 705]

level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

2475 In order to achieve this objective, the Convention defines in its Article 4 the Commitments which the Parties take. Taking into account the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of all Parties to the Convention, Article 4 distinguishes between commitments made by all Parties and those made only by "developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex 1”. The Parties in the latter group make specific commitments to limit GHG emissions. They shall

... adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.

2476 The commitments of all Parties are expressed in less specific and constraining manner: they include

... measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol ...

2477 While the commitments of all Parties and those of the Annex I Parties include various other measures, such as recording GHG and its effects, major emphasis is placed on cooperation and communication between Parties and adaptation to the impacts of climate change.

2478 Recalling the provisions of the UNFCCC and in “pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in its Article 2”, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 further defined in Articles 2 and 3 the specific commitments that each of the Annex I Parties take “in achieving its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments”. It lists policies and measures that these Parties must take to reduce GHG emissions and sequester carbon dioxide.

2479 The Protocol lists in Annex A the Greenhouse Gases covered, including carbon dioxide and methane and the Sector and source categories; Annex B to the Protocol states for each Annex I Party, in percentage of the base year or period, the quantified emission limitation of its reduction commitment; most of these commitments were for 92%, some of them were higher, the highest 110%.

[Page 706]

2480 The Protocol provides for the reduction commitments to be implemented progressively through commitment periods, the first running from 2008 to 2012. Article 3 regulates details for the implementation of these reductions. Paragraph 1 specifies the reduction commitment:

The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.

2481 The Protocol also provided “Flexible Mechanisms” by which a Party, individually or jointly with others, could meet its commitments by emission reductions by other Parties, especially non-Annex I Parties. These mechanisms formed one of the bases for emission trading systems.

2482 In preparation of COP 21 in Paris, all Parties to the UNFCCC were invited to communicate Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC), the results of which were presented to the COP in a Synthesis Report.1519 At that conference the Paris Agreement of 20151520 was adopted, which recognised “the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat if climate change on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge”.

2483 The Paris Agreement has a long-term temperature goal, set out in Article 2 (1) (a), defined as follows:

Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risk and impacts of climate change.

2484 To implement this objective, Article 3 requires “all Parties [...] to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts [...] with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2”. These efforts are to be reported in successive Nationally Determined Contributions to the global response to climate change [NDC], which are submitted every five years, each of which


1519 COP21, Synthesis Report, at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf. ↩
1520 Paris Agreement at: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7- d&chapter=27&clang=_en. ↩

[Page 707]

... will represent a progression beyond the Party's then current [NDC] and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.1521

2485 The Agreement also states that the Parties “should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1(d), of the Convention, including forests" and supports the pursuit of “voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their [NDC]". Article 6(2) and (3) creates the basis for Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes [ITMO], linking the carbon emission trading systems of different countries and provides that such transfers “to achieve [NDC] under this Agreement shall be voluntary and authorized by participating Parties”.

2486 Adhesion to the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and commitments by Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have given rise to controversy; compliance with NDC by Parties to the Paris Agreement differed.1522 The Tribunal is aware of these controversies and differences. For the purpose of the present Award, however, the concrete steps taken to reduce GHG emissions appear relevant. In this respect, the Paris Agreement has spurred the formulation of NDCs for 2030 and mid-century strategies around the world. In AR6, the IPCC WG III report of 2022 discussed in detail the evolving policy mixes or policy packages, including regulatory, market-based and other approaches adopted by Governments to reduce GHG emissions and meet NDC commitments.1523

2487 Carbon pricing is an important element in these policies:

Many economists believe that the best way to address climate change is to put a price on emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs). [...] Two major approaches are now in use for putting a price on carbon: a carbon tax (sometimes called a fee or levy) and a cap- and-trade system. A carbon tax charges a fee for every tonne of carbon dioxide that is emitted [...]

A cap-and-trade system puts a cap on greenhouse gas emissions and issues emissions permits, often referred to as allowances or certificates.


1521 Paris Agreement, Article 4(3). ↩
1522 The "implementation gap", for instance is considered in some detail in AR6, WGIII, Chapter 4, at page 411, at: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf,. ↩
1523 See in particular AR6 WGIII, Chapter 4 at page 628: “The energy policy landscape continues to evolve". ↩

[Page 708]

Typically, one certificate allows the owner to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide. Emitters operating under a cap can trade these certificates so that the market finds the lowest-cost emissions reductions available.

With cap and trade, the level of emissions is known. What is less certain is the market price of the certificates.1524

2488 Pricing of emissions of CO2 and of other GHG, expressed in terms of the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of CO2, was explained in the IPCC AR6, WG II, describing the macroeconomic policies:1525

Pricing of GHGs, including carbon, is a crucial tool in any cost-effective climate change mitigation strategy, as it provides a mechanism for linking climate action to economic development (IMF/OECD, 2021). By 2019, 57 nations around the world had implemented or scheduled implementation of carbon pricing. These initiatives cover 11 gigatons of carbon dioxide or about 20% of GHG emissions. Carbon prices in existing initiatives range between USD 1 and USD 127 per ton of carbon dioxide, while 51% of the emissions that are covered are priced more than USD 10 per ton of carbon dioxide.

2489 The IPCC reports define Carbon price as follows:

The price for avoided or released carbon dioxide (CO2) or CO2- equivalent emissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax, or the price of emission permits. In many models that are used to assess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon prices are used as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation policies.1526

2490 In addition, other criteria may be applied in the determination of carbon prices, including environmental and fiscal policy:

At the national level, it is also essential to create public fiscal space for actions promoting the SDG agenda and thereby broadening the scope of mitigation (medium evidence, medium agreement). To do so, pricing carbon – either through tax payments based on the level of emissions or cap-and-trade systems that limit total allowable emissions – is an efficient means of discouraging carbon emissions throughout an economy (both in consumption and production) while simultaneously encouraging


1524 Steven Nadel, Cassandra Kubes, State and Provincial Efforts to Put a Price on Greenhouse Gas Emissions, with Implications for Energy Efficiency, January 2019, ACEEE White Paper, page 1, at: https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/carbon-pricing-010719.pdf. ↩
1525 AR6 WGII, Box 18.7 at page 2719. ↩
1526 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, Glossary, page 544; identical or similar definitions are contained in other IPCC reports. ↩

[Page 709]

a switch to non-carbon energy sources and generating revenues for prioritised actions.1527

2491 Carbon price can also refer to the “marginal abatement cost of carbon [...], determined by the mitigation target under consideration: it describes the cost of reducing the last unit of emissions to reach the target at a given point in time".1528

2492 Mr Kemp referred to a report produced by the Claimant, dated January 2014 and reporting on the development of the global carbon markets. Relying on different sources, the report states that

the EU Emission Trading System dominates world carbon markets with 88% of volume and 94% of value. There are other carbon markets, in North America and China, for example. And China's markets are potentially huge. Five of seven planned carbon markets were launched in China in 2013, in Guangdong, Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Tianjin.

2493 The report points out that Flexible Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol collapsed and emphasises the large fluctuations both in the volume of trade on these markets and the prices applied. It also points to the relation of the market prices with the policy of governments concerning their emission targets:

The main explanation for the falling prices in carbon markets around the world is the very modest emission reduction targets adopted for the period up to 2020. Without ambitious climate targets there is no need for deep emission reductions and carbon prices will remain at low levels. However, if the goal to limit global warming to two degrees shall be met, more dramatic cuts are needed over the next decades. The international negotiations towards a new climate agreement scheduled to be adopted in Paris in 2015 will be a litmus test on the political willingness among large emitters to make the required emission reductions.

2494 Apart from these actions concerning GHG reductions, carbon pricing and other related matters, the UNFCCC process also addressed international and domestic action to be taken in response to the impact of climate change, discussed in Section 9.4.6 above. It did so by working on adaptation measures which are considered as a priority issue. It also considered this impact in the context of Loss and Damage.


1527 AR6, WGIII, page 463. ↩
1528 AR6, WGIII, page 359. ↩

[Page 710]

2495 The concept of Loss and Damage (L&D) might appear as being directly relevant to the claim for Atmospheric Pollution, as presented in the present case. It turns out, however, to have taken a more complex and diffused connotation than that in a legal context.

2496 Early on in the climate change discussion, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) insisted that the consequences of climate change, especially the rising sea level be addressed. It made proposals during the negotiations for the UNFCCC and pursued the issue further. The issue was mentioned in the 2007 Bali Action Plan and subsequent work; as part of the Doha Climate Gateway in 2012 the Parties decided to establish institutional arrangements to address Loss and Damage.

2497 These arrangements were formalised at the 19th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP19), when the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM) was created.1529 Bangladesh played an important role by initiating the Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative;1530 at the COP11 in 2005, Bangladesh, on behalf of the LDC Group, called for the compensation for damage caused climate change,1531 “but the issue failed to gain any traction".1532

2498 The objective of the WIM is

... to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.1533

2499 The term Loss and Damage, in two versions, is defined by the IPCC as follows:

Loss and Damage, and losses and damages


1529 Reinhard Mechler et al., Loss and Damage from Climate Change, Concepts, Methods and Policy Options, Springer 2019, pages 7 – 9. ↩
1530 International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD) et al., Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative, at: https://website.icccad.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Loss- and-Damage-in-Vulnerable-Countries-Initaitive_Brochure.pdf. ↩
1531 IISD Earth Negotiation Bulletin, Summary Report on UNFCCC COP 11, at: https://enb.iisd.org/events/unfccc-cop-11/summary-report-28-november-10-december-2005. Also in Elisa Calliari et al., The Politics of (and behind) the UNFCCC's Loss and Damage Mechanism, in Mechler et al., op.cit. pages 155, 161. ↩
1532 Lisa Vanhala, Cecilie Hestbaek, Framing Climate Change Loss and Damage in UNFCCC Negotiations, in 16(4) Global Environmental Politics, pages 111 – 129, at: https://direct.mit.edu/glep/article/16/4/111/14859/Framing-Climate-Change-Loss-and-Damage- in-UNFCCC. ↩
1533 Presentation of the WIM, at: https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and- resilience/workstreams/loss-and-damage/warsaw-international-mechanism. ↩

[Page 711]

Research has taken Loss and Damage (capitalised letters) to refer to political debate under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) following the establishment of the Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage in 2013, which is to ‘address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change'.

Lowercase letters (losses and damages) have been taken to refer broadly to harm from (observed) impacts and (projected) risks and can be economic or non-economic.1534

2500 Article 8 of the Paris Agreement provided a permanent legal basis for the WIM and records that

Parties recognise the importance of averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.

2501 The recognition by the Parties to the Paris Agreement of the importance of “addressing loss and damage” had limits: it did not extend to recognising liability and requiring compensation. Paragraph 51 of the Decision adopting the Paris Agreement stated that the Conference of the Parties

Agrees that Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.1535

2502 Discussions thereafter were focused on the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund. Some progress in this respect was made at COP29 in Baku in November 2024. At that conference, “a decision was made to ensure the full operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund” for which financial support of over USD 730 million were pledged.1536

2503 The Tribunal is not aware of any agreement in the UNFCCC process establishing liability for past GHG emissions or the calculation of compensation for loss and damage caused by such emissions.

2504 Concerning liability and compensation, the AR6 WG III Report points out:


1534 AR6, Synthesis Report, Glossary ↩
1535 Decision 1/CP.21t, at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2. ↩
1536 News from the Conference, dated 24 November 2024, at: https://cop29.az/en/media-hub/news/- 1732385682. ↩

[Page 712]

Liability and compensation, implying legally defined reimbursement of losses and damages attributable to climate change, remain contentious in L&D dialogue (high confidence).

2505 The WG III report refers to “academic and grey literature” about the subject, to “responsibility principles, such as historical responsibility based on the polluter pays principle, beneficiary pays and ability to pay” and to “scholarship which has studied compensatory, distributive and procedural equity considerations for burden sharing”. It continues by stating:

Litigation and liability are linked, and a growing research body has examined the role of litigation and international law for the L&D context finding that litigation risks for governments and business may increase as the science, particularly on attribution, matures further.1537

2506 In an analysis of the decisions on L&D at COP19 and the road to the adoption of the WIM, the “ambiguity of the idea of loss and damage” was underlined and “the way in which that ambiguity was constructed":

From 2008 onward, an overarching and ambiguous “loss and damage” frame began to replace two more specific historical framings—a “liability and compensation” frame and a “risk management and insurance” frame—in the discussions. The rhetoric of the older framings tended to stoke conflicts over culpability for greenhouse gas emissions and the appropriate realm in which climate-related harm should be addressed. The overarching master frame that replaced these two framings obscured these divisions, which allowed for a consensus to emerge in 2013. “Loss and damage” was an amorphous concept to which policy actors attached different meanings.1538

2507 The Tribunal concludes from the information set out above that international action is focused on future GHG emissions, the limitation of their increase and their reduction. Not all Governments have made binding commitments in this respect. Moreover, the commitments made do not exclude the continuation of such emissions but provide for their gradual reduction. It follows that a large part of GHG emissions continues to be unaffected by international commitments.

2508 The measures taken by Governments to implement domestically the GHG reduction to which they are committed vary considerably. One of such measures is the pricing of GHG emissions by carbon taxes or levies. Despite


1537 AR6, WGIII, page 2565. ↩
1538 Vanhala and Hestbaek, Abstract. ↩

[Page 713]

their importance in climate policy, such measures were said to cover only some 20% of all GHG emissions. Even in countries that regulate GHG emissions, only a fraction of GHG emissions is covered by such payments and not all those who produce GHG emissions pay for them. The Claimant pointed out that Bangladesh has no “regulatory regime that required the purchase of greenhouse gas offset credits”.1539

2509 The criteria that determine the level of carbon prices are diverse; they relate to government policies, market criteria and reduction costs and lead to great differences in pricing. The Tribunal is not aware of carbon prices being determined by the damage caused by climate change. The Tribunal is therefore not persuaded that carbon prices, as they were considered in this Section, are an appropriate metric for quantifying the damage caused by a specific GHG emission.

9.4.8 Climate change litigation

2510 The IPCC reports and other publications state that large numbers of court cases are brought in the United States and other jurisdictions in relation to climate change. AR6 WG III Report in 2022 for instance states that

[a]s of 31 May 2021, 1841 cases of climate change litigation from around the world had been identified. Of these, 1387 were filed before courts in the United States, while the remaining 454 were filed in 39 other countries and 13 international or regional courts and tribunals (including the courts of the European Union).1540

2511 The UNEP/Sabin Center's Global Climate Litigation Reports had recorded that in 2017 there were 884 cases brought in 24 countries and in their 2020 update that as of “1 July 2020 the number of cases has nearly doubled with at least 1,550 climate change cases filed in 38 countries. In the 2023 update, the report stated:

As at 31 December 2022, the Sabin Center's Climate Change Litigation databases included 2,180 cases filed in 65 jurisdictions and international or regional courts, tribunals, quasi-judicial bodies, or other adjudicatory bodies, including special procedures of the United Nations


1539 CREC, paragraph 49. ↩
1540 AR6 WGIII, page 1376. ↩

[Page 714]

and arbitration tribunals. This number includes 1,522 cases in the United States of America and 658 cases in all other jurisdictions combined.1541

2512 The Sabin Center's Climate Change database is regularly updated; since the 2023 Status Report, the number of cases in the USA and in other jurisdictions has further increased.1542

2513 In their argument about the claim for Atmospheric Pollution, the Parties have not relied on or referred to any cases dealing with climate change and compensation for loss and damage caused by it. To the extent the information about these cases is in the public domain and relevant for the decision on the claim for Atmospheric Pollution, the Tribunal has nevertheless considered some of the climate litigation cases. It does so for comparative reasons, being aware that the law applicable to Niko's liability in this case is the law of Bangladesh.

2514 The IPCC AR6 WG III Report provides some detail about the nature of the climate change litigation cases:

The majority of climate change litigation cases are brought against governments, by civic and non-governmental organisations and corporations [...] Many, although not all of these cases, seek to ensure that governmental action on climate change is more ambitious, and better aligned with the need to avert or respond to climate impacts identified and predicted by the scientific community.

2515 The report also mentions climate change litigation against corporations by regional or local governments and non-governmental organisations, including claims for climate change-related damage, seeking compensation from major carbon polluters.1543

2516 The UNEP/Sabin Center's Report defines “climate change litigation” to include

cases that raise material issues of law or fact relating to climate change mitigation, adaptation or the science of climate change [...and] brought before a range of administrative, judicial and other adjudicatory bodies.


1541 UNEP and Columbia Law School, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Global Climate Change Litigation, 2023 Status Review, page XIV, at: https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-climate- litigation-report-2023-status-review. ↩
1542 https://www.climatecasechart.com/about. ↩
1543 AR6 WG III, page 1376. ↩

[Page 715]

2517 They are focused on a variety of issues, similar to those listed in the above text from AR6 WG III and include “corporate liability and responsibility”. The report also points out:

One of the most visible categories of climate cases includes actions asserting that insufficient climate mitigation or adaptation violates plaintiffs' rights, including the rights to life, health, food, water, liberty, family life, a healthy environment, a safe climate and more.1544

2518 This may concern governments' compliance with and implementation of their national mitigation commitments or net zero strategies. It may also concern claims against corporations ordering them to reduce GHG emissions or otherwise adopt more climate friendly conduct.

2519 These descriptions show that most of the climate litigation cases concern issues different from those which the Tribunal must decide. This includes many of the cases that received high public attention, like those against governments, seeking to influence their climate change action. This also applies to cases against corporations concerning future action, in particular cases seeking orders for reduction of GHG emissions.

2520 The issues of concern for the Tribunal are those that relate to the remedies in situations where liability for emissions that have occurred already is established. In view of the complex relationship between GHG emissions and loss and damage caused by climate change, questions of causation are particularly relevant.

2521 Cases against companies producing gas and other fossil fuel are particularly relevant in the context of the present Arbitration. The quoted passage of the AR6 WG III Report refers to an article that examined such cases in the United States:

In the early 2000s, a small clutch of lawsuits against oil, gas and electric companies was tested in North American courts. Victims claimed that the actions of such companies exacerbated damages they suffered as a result of extreme weather events. The cases were high profile because of the novelty of their subject matter, yet all were unsuccessful. Claimants found it exceedingly difficult to surmount procedural and substantive thresholds.1545


1544 UNEP/Sabin 2023 Report, page 26. ↩
1545 Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer and Veerle Heyvaert, If at First You Don't Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2018), page 3. ↩

[Page 716]

2522 The authors of this article point to the difficulty of proving causation in climate change cases where it “can be factually and conceptually difficult, if not impossible” to prove that the respondent caused the climate related harm suffered by the claimant. As illustration they refer to the case in the USA referred to as Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.1546 They explain:

The district court held that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate either a 'substantial likelihood' that ExxonMobil's activities had caused the plaintiffs' injuries or that the ‘seed' of their injuries was 'fairly traceable' to the defendant's GHG emissions. Specifically, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish causation because there was ‘no realistic possibility of tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to any particular emissions by any specific person, entity, [or] group at any particular point in time'. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court [... and held] that federal legislation pre- empted the plaintiffs' federal common law claims, explaining that any solution for the alleged effects of global warming ‘must rest in the hands of the legislative and executive branches of our government, not the federal common law'. Similarly, the district court in the Comer case ruled that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate proximate causation.1547

2523 More generally, the authors explained the difficulties faced by claimants in these earlier cases by the complexity of the causative chain in climate change matters.

In the first wave of strategic private climate litigation commonly corporate defendants argued that their contribution to GHG emissions is insignificant in relation to historical or global emissions, and therefore cannot be said to directly cause climate change harms or have a significant environmental impact. The temporal and geographical scope of anthropogenic climate change spans decades and continents. The diffuse and transboundary character of GHG emissions renders it difficult to attribute liability for climate change to particular actors.

Courts were therefore reluctant to make definitive findings of fact about climate change causation, and tended to regard climate change as a consequence of collective policies rather than individual choices. For that


1546 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 2012 WL4215921 (9th Cir 2012; see also on the Sabin Website at: https://climatecasechart.com/case/native-village-of-kivalina-v- exxonmobil-corp/). ↩
1547 Ganguly et al., page 9. ↩

[Page 717]

reason, climate change challenges were treated as political questions that were generally unsuitable for judicial review or adjudication.1548

2524 The progress in climate change research that has been highlighted above also has brought development in the argument supporting claims for damages caused by large scale emitters of GHG. GANGULY et al. explain:

The discouraging precedents, however, evidently have not dampened enthusiasm for the cause. Indeed, a second wave of strategic private climate litigation can now be observed. The current strategic cases against private defendants typically allege climate change-related damage and seek compensation from major carbon producers.1549

2525 They opine that one of the motivations that underpin these cases is

...the argument that corporations are the 'right' parties to bear responsibility for climate change. Arguably, enterprises in energy, transport, agriculture and other manufacturing sectors such as cement bear a collective and therefore legal responsibility for climate change through their carbon-emitting activities.1550

2526 A recent study, based on the information in the Climate Change Litigation Database of the Sabin Center of Climate Change Law, analysed 86 lawsuits "filed against the world's largest fossil fuel producing companies” and noted that the "most frequent ground for bringing a case against fossil fuel companies, accounting for 38 percent of cases, relates to their responsibility for damages caused by the impacts of climate change such as extreme weather". The study opined that the problems of causation and attribution have been reduced if not overcome and noted an increase of cases seeking compensation for climate impacts:

Climate science can now directly attribute individual extreme weather events to climate change. Over the last 20 years, the data has become significantly more precise, with over 500 studies attributing extreme weather events to the results of increased greenhouse gas emissions from the burning of fossil fuels. There is also robust information on the historic emissions from fossil fuel companies, through which it is possible to calculate a company's contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, it is possible to credibly quantify an individual fossil fuel


1548 Ganguly et al., page 12. ↩
1549 Ganguly et al., page 3. ↩
1550 Ganguly et al., pages 4 – 5. ↩

[Page 718]

company's contribution to a specific extreme weather event, and any damages that result from it.1551

2527 The report notes, however: “So far, no oil and gas company has had to pay liability for damages associated with climate change”.

2528 Similar developments were reported by the UNEP/Sabin 2023 Report, stating that "nearly two dozen states and cities in the United States of America have sued large fossil fuel companies seeking compensation for damages related to climate change”. The cases were still pending at the time of the report and remained essentially concerned with jurisdictional issues.1552

2529 A group of scholars examined cases in which causal claims were made about the effect of a defendant's GHG emissions on the claimant. In these cases the claimants have sought, inter alia, compensation for climate-related losses and to compel governments to reduce their GHG emissions. So far, most of these claims have been unsuccessful. They explain:

Our analysis of 73 cases from 14 jurisdictions finds that, in contrast to previous interpretations, limitations in the scientific evidence provided to past lawsuits may have hindered the making of findings of causation.

This conclusion is based on the finding that such evidence lags significantly behind the state-of-the-art in climate science. To maximise the chances of establishing causation in the courts, plaintiffs should ensure that (1) cases filed concern impacts that are demonstrably attributable to climate change, and (2) that evidence submitted to the courts clearly substantiates the alleged relationship between defendants' emissions and plaintiffs' losses. Across jurisdictions, courts have found insufficient links between defendants'emissions and plaintiffs' injuries. In some cases courts have explicitly, and incorrectly, stated the infeasibility of scientifically attributing climate impacts to individual emitters.1553

2530 In 2022, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines published its Report on the National Inquiry on Climate Change, the outcome of its seven-year investigation into the responsibility of 47 fossil fuel-producing companies (referred to as “Carbon Majors”) for climate change. The


1551 Oil Change International and Zero Carbon Analytics, Big Oil in Court - The latest trends in climate litigation against fossil fuel companies, dated 14 September 2024, at: https://zerocarbon- analytics.org/energy/latest-trends-in-climate-litigation-against-fossil-fuel-companies/, references omitted. ↩
1552 UNEP/Sabin 2023, page 53. ↩
1553 UNEP/Sabin 2023, page 53. ↩

[Page 719]

investigation was initiated by a petition by Greenpeace Southeast Asia and other environmental organizations and individual Filipino citizens In re Greenpeace Southeast Asia and Others, who requested the Commission to investigate “the human rights implications of climate change and ocean acidification and the resulting rights violations in the Philippines,” naming the Carbon Majors as respondents. The Commission conducted a fact-finding mission that included hearings in Manila, London, and New York.

2531 The Commission found that the emissions by Carbon Majors caused climate change and loss and damage and that the Carbon Majors had early awareness, notice or knowledge of their products' adverse impacts on the environment and climate system and engaged in wilful obfuscation and obstruction to prevent meaningful climate action. The Commission concluded that the Carbon Majors have a corporate responsibility to undertake human rights due diligence and provide remediation. It did not attempt to determine liability and quantum of damage specifically of any of the companies but noetd about their combined responsibility as follows:

2532 The Commission concluded with recommendations to the Government, the courts and many others. Recommendations were also addressed to the Carbon Majors, including one by which the Commission

... encourages the carbon majors to contribute to a Green Climate Fund or other similar funds not only in the jurisdictions they operate in and in geographical areas that bear the brunt of the impact of climate change. They can choose to finance mitigation and adaptation measures and project in said areas to alleviate the plight of those impacted by climate- change harms.1554

2533 The causation issue has been addressed in a systematic manner the case of Saúl Ananías Luciano Lliuya v RWE AG in which the evidentiary requirements were clearly defined by the Higher Regional Court, the Court of Appeal (OLG) of Hamm in Germany.1555 The case was brought by the Mr Lliuya in November 2015 before the District Court Essen, Germany. The Claimant argued that RWE, Germany's largest electricity producer, knowingly contributed to climate change by emitting substantial volumes of GHG and thereby contributed to the melting of mountain glaciers near his town of Huaraz. The melting gave rise to an acute threat: Palcacocha, a glacial lake located above Huaraz, experienced substantial volumetric increase since


1554 Report of the Commission, pages 131 – 132, at: http://chr2bucket.storage.googleapis.com/wp- content/uploads/2022/12/08152514/CHRP_National-Inquiry-on-Climate-Change-Report.pdf. ↩
1555 Details and documents at the Sabin Center's website, at: https://www.climatecasechart.com/document/luciano-lliuya-v-rwe-ag_dd33. ↩

[Page 720]

1975, which has dramatically accelerated from 2003 onwards. He sought reimbursement of a portion of the costs of setting up flood protections. The share calculated amounts to 0.47% of the total cost - the same percentage as RWE's estimated contribution to global industrial greenhouse gas emissions since the beginning of industrialization, from 1751 onwards. The amount in dispute was EUR 17'000 and not 33 cents, as RWE seems to have argued.1556

2534 The District Court dismissed the claim, inter alia because no “linear causal chain" could be discerned amid the complex components of the causal relationship between particular greenhouse gas emissions and particular climate change impacts.

2535 Mr Lliuya appealed to the Higher Regional Court (OLG) of Hamm which decided that the claim was admissible and conclusive (“schlüssig”). The court relied on the principle that “even a party who acts lawfully must be liable for property damage caused by him”. The claim was not based on a failure to prevent a natural event but on actions of RWE and the operation of the power stations that contributed to the flood risk. The court explained these considerations at a hearing and in a subsequent order for taking evidence (“Hinweis- und Beweisbeschluss”) of 30 November 2017. By this order the court decided that evidence by expert opinions had to be taken and defined the substance matters. This definition of the substance matters identified by the court are significant for the causal chain to establish that GHG emissions caused a specific damage:

  1. A flood and/or mudslide resulting from the significant expansion and increase in the volume of water in Lake Palacocha poses a serious threat to the plaintiff's property, which is situated below the glacial lake in the city of Huaraz in the Ancash region of Peru.

    1. The CO2 emissions released by the defendant's power plants rise into the atmosphere and, in accordance with physical laws, lead to a higher concentration of greenhouse gases in the Earth's atmosphere.
    2. The increased concentration of greenhouse gas molecules reduces the global thermal reflection and increases global temperature.

1556 These amounts are indicated in the evidentiary order of the OLG Hamm. ↩

[Page 721]

c) The resulting increase in average temperatures also on the local level accelerates the melting of the Palcaraju Glacier; as the glacier loses mass and recedes, the volume of water in Lake Palcacocha rises to a level that can no longer be contained by the natural moraine.

d) The defendant's share in the contributory causation, as shown in the causal chain outlined in a) through c), is measurable and calculable, and accounts for 0.47% of the total. If, on further assessment of the defendant's share in the contributory causation, a different percentage is identified, the expert will quantify the correct proportion.1557

2536 After a long delay, especially due to the coronavirus pandemic, a site visit took place in the Andean city of Huaraz in May 2022. Judges of the OLG Hamm, court-appointed experts and lawyers for both parties travelled to Peru to examine whether the plaintiff's house is threatened by a possible flood wave from the glacier lake Palcacocha above the city.

2537 Eventually, the OLG Hamm dismissed the claim on 28 May 2025 without possibility of appeal. While the principle of RWE's liability was not in question, the court found on the evidence that the claimant could not establish a real and imminent risk of damage to his property. Based on expert opinions commissioned by the court, the OLG Hamm concluded that the risk of a catastrophic glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) threatening the plaintiff's property within the next 30 years was just one percent. The court held:

Such a small percentage rules out any serious concern of an imminent violation of rights. The property damage feared by the plaintiff does not, in factual terms, appear tangible; on the contrary, it must be considered highly unlikely. (p. 112)1558

2538 Inspired by the Lliuya v. RWE case,1559 a case based on a similar line of argument was brought in 2023 in Switzerland before the Cantonal Court of


1557 Original and English translation (partly corrected by the Tribunal) on the Sabin Center's website. ↩
1558 Maxim Bönnemann and Maria Antonia Tigre, What Lliuya v. RWE Means for Climate Change Loss and Damage Claims, Sabin Centre blog, published 19 June 2025, at: https://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2025/06/19/what-lliuya-v-rwe-means-for-climate-change-loss-and-damage-claims/. ↩
1559 The relationship is reported in Laura Andrea Duarte Reyes and Nina Burri, Transnational corporate liability in the era of loss and damages: the case of Asmania et al. v Holcim, in Stefano Zirulia, Lidia Sandrini And Cesare Pitea (eds.), What future for environmental and climate litigation? Exploring the added value of a multidisciplinary approach from international, private and criminal law perspectives (2024: Milano University Press), page 100, at: https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Publikationen/Duartes_Burri_Transnational_corporate_liability_in_t he_era_of_loss_and_damage_2024.pdf. ↩

[Page 722]

Zug (Kantonsgericht Zug) – Asmania et al. v. Holcim. The claimants, inhabitants of the Indonesian island of Pari, hold the Swiss cement company responsible for the rising sea level threatening their island. They argue that, by the CO2 emissions in the course of cement production, Holcim contributed to the global warming which caused the rising sea level. They claim for both reduction of emissions and compensation, specifically for

2539 Relying on Swiss case law, the claimants argue that it is not necessary for establishing causation that the acts of the respondent be the sole cause of the damage; contribution to the damage is sufficient. They assert that Holcim is responsible for 0.42% of all industrial CO2 emissions and limit their claim for contribution to the cost of adaptation measures to this percentage.1560 The assessment is based on a publication by Heede who concluded:

Since cement emissions are relatively small compared to fossil fuel emissions, Holcim's portion of cumulative emissions since 1950 is 0.48% of global fossil fuel & cement emissions (or 0.42% of global fossil fuel and cement emissions from 1751 to 2021).1561

2540 The claimants obtained a first result when the court granted free legal aid to the claimants, accepting that the case did not seem to lack any chance of success.1562 A hearing in the court of Zug was held on 3 September 2025. The case is still pending.1563

2541 The Tribunal concludes that in the case of large GHG emissions over many years it may be possible to trace a specific climate damage or risk of damage to a specific source of emission. In the case of a single emission of quantities as those which the Tribunal determined in the present case, the damage to Bangladesh, if it could be traced at all, would be insignificant.


1560 Duarte Reyes and Burri, pages 118 and 120. ↩
1561 Richard Heede, Carbon History of Holcim Ltd: Carbon Dioxide Emissions 1950 – 1921, Carbon Accountability Institute, 7 July 2022 at: https://callforclimatejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/Heede-Report.pdf. ↩
1562 UNEP/Sabin 2023 Database, at: https://www.climatecasechart.com/document/asmania-et-al-vs-holcim_f2ce. ↩
1563 https://www.climateinthecourts.com/indonesian-islanders-take-their-fight-for-climate-justice-to-swiss-court/. ↩

[Page 723]

2542 A different approach was adopted in a series of cases in Indonesia which ordered restoration: the UNEP/Sabin 2023 report explain that a “significant proportion of pre-2020 cases from Asia were challenges brought by the Government of Indonesia against palm oil, mining and logging companies for the destruction of peatland ecosystems”. The report mentions six cases filed between 2012 to 2019 in which the Indonesian Government sued palm oil producers for GHG emissions and loss of carbon sinks from peatland destruction, as well as the actual cost to restore the ecosystem to its original state:

2543 The cases are also reported and further discussed in an article about Climate Change in Indonesia1565 reports a number of cases where the Government, acting through the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, claimed against companies for illegal logging activities and peatland fires on various counts, including the release of GHG. In one of these cases the government claimed against two mining companies conducting illegal activities outside their permitted area, including clearing of protected forests for road access to the mining location. For this latter claim the government calculated that clearance released 359 tons of Carbon (tC) per hectare and applied 90'000 Indonesian rupiahs (IDR) per ton for the restoration, awarding IDR 6.7 billion for the restoration of 74’672 tC released by the destruction of the forest's 208 hectares. The case went through several stages and ended before the Supreme


1564 UNEP/Sabin 2023, page 23. ↩
1565 Andri G. Wibisana, and Conrado M. Cornelius, Climate Change Litigation in Indonesia, in Lin and Kysar (eds.), Climate Change Litigation in the Asia Pacific (2020: Cambridge University Press), pages 234 – 260. ↩

[Page 724]

Court which granted the claim in a total of 32.3 billion IDR, including the 6.7 billion for the restoration costs of the carbon release.1566

2544 A similar approach was applied in several other cases. In one of them WIBISANA and CORNELIUS describe the calculation of the claim for GHG, as awarded eventually by the Indonesian Supreme Court:

In calculating its claim for compensation, the government specified two heads of damage related to GHG emission. First, the government argued that the fires released 13,500 tC into the atmosphere. The reduction of the carbon release cost IDR 90,000 per ton. Hence, the total reduction cost for 13,500 tC was IDR 1.2 billion. Second, the government stated that the fires also reduced the ability of the peatland to absorb CO2. Such a loss of GHG absorption capacity was similar to the emissions of 4,725 tCO2 (ton of CO2). A restoration was required to rectify this loss, which cost IDR 425.3 million (i.e. IDR 90,000 per ton × 4,725 tons).1567

2545 WIBISANA and CORNELIUS report that in several of these cases the Government quantified the restoration costs and the carbon absorption capacity at IDR 90'000 per ton of GHG. They explain that this amount “is obtained by referring to the Regulation of Minister of the Environment Number 13 of 2011 concerning Damages as a Result of Environmental Damage and Degradation”.1568 At the average rate of USD 0.0001142 for the IDR in 2011, this amount corresponds to USD 10’278.1569 The authors point out that in the cases reported “the way the damages were estimated is apparently similar to the estimation of restoration costs” and that the amount of restoration costs was estimated “by referring to the price of ‘carbon credit' [...] the price of carbon credit was considered to reflect the cost required to restore a ton of carbon".1570

2546 The authors emphasise the specificity of the approach taken in the Indonesian courts by focusing on restoration rather than claiming damages for the climate change:

The Indonesian approach is unique because it offers a solution for tort-based climate lawsuits, by focusing on the cost of emission reduction rather than on climate change damage. The focus allows the plaintiff to

1566 Minister of Environment v. PT Selatnasik Indokwarsa and PT Simpang Pesak Indokwarsa, Decision Number 109 PK/Pdt/2014, (Supreme Court Review, 2014) 36-9, further references at Wibisana and Cornelius, pages 240 – 242. ↩
1567 Wibisana and Cornelius, page 244. ↩
1568 Wibisana and Cornelius, FN 72, at page 248. ↩
1569 https://www.exchange-rates.org/exchange-rate-history/idr-usd-2011. ↩
1570 Wibisana and Cornelius, page 252. ↩

[Page 725]

avoid a very difficult, if not impossible, task of proving causation between the defendant's conduct and a particular climate-related damage suffered by the plaintiff.1571

2547 The authors point out, however, that “no real restoration has been conducted by the government, although they have won almost all cases related to illegal logging and peatland fires, in which they asked for compensation based on restoration costs."

2548 They point to the experience in other countries in the context of natural resources damages where restoration is ordered. They mention some cases from the USA, including Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. The SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F 2d 652 (1st Cir, 1980), in which the court ruled that the claimed restoration costs should be based on a concrete restoration that was already taken or will be taken.

2549 In the opinion of WIBISANA and CORNELIUS the lack of actual restoration emerged because the Indonesian courts

... did not require the government to indicate that the restoration costs are calculated according to restoration measures already taken or to be taken by the government. The solution is simply for the court to require the government to submit a restoration plan. This restoration plan is important not only to convince the court that the claimed costs are not arbitrarily estimated, but more importantly to ensure that the restoration will be undertaken.1572

2550 The article concludes by a discussion of the question of fairness of holding certain emitters liable and others not and states that by adopting the approach they did, “the Indonesian courts have absolved the plaintiffs from the seemingly impossible task of proving the causal relationship between the defendant's GHG emissions and the plaintiff's losses due to climate change”.

2551 In a 2024 publication LIN and PEEL, refer to two of the Indonesian cases and confirm that the “enforcement of the verdicts has been poor [...] because of delays in enforcing the verdicts ...”. They conclude on the Indonesian cases:

To the best of our knowledge, environmental regulatory agencies elsewhere in the Global South have not sought to use tort law to compel polluters to pay compensation and restoration costs for causing climate change through illegal activities such as deforestation. While these Indonesian cases are a mere handful, they highlight an interesting

1571 Wibisana and Cornelius, page 249. ↩
1572 Wibisana and Cornelius, pages 252 – 254. ↩

[Page 726]

avenue for the emergence of climate change litigation through actors responsible for enforcing environmental and natural resources laws.1573

2552 The approach of restoration instead of damages is not quite as exceptional, as these authors seem to believe. A United States case concerning methane emissions from a gas storage facility provides an example both for restoration as a solution and for the necessary precautions ensuring that the restoration is actually implemented.

2553 The case of People v. Southern California Gas Company, concerned the release of large quantities of methane from a well of an underground gas storage facility of the Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas).1574 The Aliso Canyon Underground Natural Storage Facility is one of the largest gas storage fields in the United States. The leak was discovered on 23 October 2015. Some 8'000 households and two schools were temporarily relocated, and various protective and restorative activities were performed. When by 6 January 2016 the leak had not been closed, the Governor of California declared the state of emergency and directed various measures, including directions to the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to develop a programme for full mitigation of the methane emissions (the Proclamation)1575. The instructions for a mitigation programme followed a mitigation commitment that SoCalGas had assumed voluntarily on 18 December 2015 in a letter to the Governor.1576 The flow of gas was eventually stopped on 11 February 2016.

2554 The incident led to a number of lawsuits, among which an action by the California Attorney General, acting in an independent capacity and on behalf of the people of the State of California together with the CARB. The action was filed on 8 August 2016 and followed by a first complaint dated 7 December 2015 and by a second amended complaint on 8 January 2016. The complaint


1573 Lin and Peel, Litigating Climate Change in the Global South (2004: Oxford University Press), pages 168 and 169. ↩
1574 People v. Southern California Gas Co., JCCP No. 4861 California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, Case Nos. BC602973 and BC628120, at: https://www.climatecasechart.com/collections/people-v-southern-california-gas-co--e0ae12. ↩
1575 Governor of California's Proclamation of a State of Emergency, dated 6 January 2016, at: https://archive.gov.ca.gov/archive/gov39/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/1.6.16_Aliso_Canyon_Emergency.pdf. ↩
1576 Aliso Canyon Methane Leak Climate Impacts Mitigation Program, page 21, at: https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/arb_aliso_canyon_methane_leak_climate_impacts_mitigation_program.pdf. ↩

[Page 727]

relied on different legal grounds and referred to methane as GHG. The relief sought included “full mitigation of the GHG impact of the Incident”.1577

2555 In September 2016 the State of California enacted Bill No 888 (SB 888) which requires inter alia mitigation the emissions of an amount at least equivalent to the impact on the climate from the GHG emitted by the Incident and required the CARB to determine the quantity of emitted GHG.

2556 Eventually, the case was settled by an agreement that included funding by SoCalGas of GHG reduction of a quantity at least equal to the GHG emitted by the Incident which CARB had assessed at 109'000 tons of methane:

CARB and SoCalGas have agreed that SoCalGas will fund a Mitigation Account that will reduce methane emissions in the dairy sector in an amount that will fully offset the impact on the climate from the Incident, meet the threshold of SB 888 for SoCalGas to pay an amount at least equal to the amount necessary to reduce the impact on the climate from GHGs, be consistent with the CARB Mitigation Program, catalyse additional emission reductions and generate significant environmental co-benefits.1578

2557 Further to the instructions in the Governor's Proclamation, the CARB prepared an “Aliso Canyon Methane Leak Climate Impacts Mitigation Program, dated 31 March 2016”,1579 which presented the basis for the mitigation programme eventually agreed. The programme document explained:

In addition to the leak's many effects on local residents, the emissions from Aliso Canyon will contribute to global warming and its detrimental consequences for the environment, problems that the State has recognized and rallied to address.

2558 The programme document pointed to the Act by which California targeted a return to 1990 GHG emissions level and efforts to achieve this objective; it observed that the “methane emissions from the Aliso Canyon leak, equivalent to millions of tons of carbon dioxide, set the opposite example, exacerbating rather than alleviating climate change”. In response, the proposed programme was focused on the reduction of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCP). It reported that CARB had considered different mechanisms for reducing


1577 For an account see the Consent Decree: Southern California Gas Leak Cases, Judicial Counsel Coordination Proceeding No 4861, proposed consent decree (August 2018), Section 6, at: https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/environment/aliso-consent-cecree.pdf. ↩
1578 Quoted from the Consent Decree, page 12. ↩
1579 Aliso Canyon Methane Leak Climate Impacts Mitigation Program. ↩

[Page 728]

emissions of methane and other greenhouse gases and concluded that, for the specific circumstances of the Aliso Canyon Mitigation Programme a focus on reducing methane emissions from the agriculture (including dairy) and waste (landfill and wastewater) sectors was most suitable.

2559 The draft of the programme had been submitted to public consultation and received a large number of comments. The document concluded from these comments “that the people of this State and their public officials refuse to allow the Aliso Canyon leak to compromise the State's campaign to address climate change”. It discussed the comments and proposals received and confirmed that CARB's programme “will complement the actions of [other entities] through mitigation of the leak's climate impacts”. The document pointed out that “it is estimated that SLCPs are responsible for approximately 40 percent of current net climate forcing, a fact that highlights the need for prompt action to address these pollutants”.

2560 Concerning the determination of the quantity of emissions that required the "full mitigation”, the document addressed the metrics issue discussed above. insofar as the programme targeted primarily methane reductions, a ton- for-ton comparisons between leaked emissions and emission reductions from mitigation projects could apply. With respect to other GHG targeted in the mitigation projects, the document considered the different Global Warming Potential (GWP) of different GHG to reflect that “methane is a far more potent climate pollutant than carbon dioxide, and less potent than fluorinated gases or black carbon”. It discusses the evolution in the assessment of GWP of different GHG. It points out that ICPP AR5 assigns to methane a 20- year GWP of 84 and a 100-year GWP of 28. In other words, one ton of methane has the global warming potential of 84 tonnes of carbon dioxide over a 20-year time frame, and the potential of 28 tonnes of carbon dioxide over a 100-year span. The CARB expresses a preference for the 20-year time horizon and quotes an earlier CARB text stating that this “better captures the importance of the [short-lived climate pollutants] and gives a better perspective on the speed at which [short-lived climate pollutant] emission controls will impact the atmosphere relative to CO2 emission controls.” On this basis the then anticipated “approximately 100,000 tons of methane emitted in the Aliso Canyon leak amount to about 8,000,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (8 MMTCO2eq)”. It pointed out, however, that “Multiple comments favored a 100-year GWP”, pointing out that the 100-year GWP metric was more commonly used in other contexts.

2561 CARB also considered the reliance on carbon credits and pointed out that, in the context of a mitigation project, such use was inappropriate:

[Page 729]

does not involve the purchase and surrender of compliance instruments (allowances and offset credits) associated with the State's Cap-and-Trade Program for greenhouse gas emissions. Use of these instruments for mitigation would be inappropriate for several reasons. Among them, the Cap-and-Trade Program, with its carefully calibrated annual emission caps, is not designed to capture fugitive emissions from sources such as Aliso Canyon. [...] The contrary views expressed by SoCalGas in its comment regarding this element of the mitigation program reflect both a misunderstanding of the Cap-and-Trade Program and a misapprehension of what full mitigation entails.

2562 The document continues by discussing issues and criteria concerning the choice of the mitigation projects and concludes by highlighting the paradigmatic effect of the project which might provide guidance for similar future catastrophes:

This mitigation program provides a framework for fully mitigating the climate-change consequences of the Aliso Canyon methane leak.

Beyond that, the program itself, the process of its development, and the future process of its implementation have provided and will provide a forum for conversations about how to repair the damage caused by the Aliso Canyon leak, and perhaps will also provide a guide on how to mitigate the global-warming consequences of any similar future catastrophes. CARB looks forward to further engagement with stakeholders in these discussions.

2563 The Tribunal's review of these cases leads it to the conclusion that courts have been unable to trace causal links from a specific instance of GHG emissions to a specific loss or damage. The chances of establishing such a link may be greater if, as in Lliuya, the chain starts not with a specific event but with cumulative emission over a long period, adding up to an identifiable share of the total emissions during that period; but Lliuya showed that, even in such cases, the link between the emissions and the damage or risk of damage is difficult and, if it can be established, the contribution of the emitter to the overall GHG emissions that caused the victims damage remains small even for those who have emitted large quantities of GHG over many years. In any event, BAPEX's arguments do not appear to be predicated on a specific incidence of climate change-related damage attributed specifically or solely to the GHG emissions stemming from the Chattak blowout.

2564 Rather than seeking compensation for losses that may be difficult to causally link to a specific instance of GHG emissions, it appears more justified to

[Page 730]

consider restoring the pre-emission situation by “mitigation” or carbon sequestration.

9.4.9 The quantity of GHG emissions for which Niko is liable

2565 The Tribunal has determined that Niko is responsible for 8.542 Bcf lost gas. The bulk of this quantity escaped from the Reservoir prior to the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation in October 2005. For the purposes of the claim for atmospheric pollution, the Tribunal therefore assumes that the GHG emissions for which Niko is liable occurred in 2005.

2566 The metric for these emissions is metric tonnes of CO2 and CO2 equivalent. The process of deriving this number of tonnes is not disputed between the Parties, but the values to be applied in the course of the process are contested.

2567 In a first step of the process, the cubic feet must be transferred into a decimal metric. BBL II used Kyle's converter at https://www.kylesconverter.com/volume/cubic-feet-to-cubic-meters,1580 a tool that was not contested. Applied to 8.542 Bcf, the tool produced the equivalent of 241’880'000 m³. Translated into kg by the factor 0.554, as used without objection in BBL II,1581 produces 134'001’520 kg or 134’001.5 tonnes.

2568 The emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout consisted of methane but some of this methane ignited, producing CO2. It is undisputed that methane has a substantially higher Global Warming Potential (GWP), but the experts disagree about the factor that has to be applied to reflect this difference.

2569 BBL II rely on a factor of 25; BAPEX itself refers also to a value of 84.1582 Mr Kemp objects and asserts that the correct factor is 21.1583 The value used by Mr Kemp is also that used in the Third Environmental Losses Report, which specifies “global warming factor = 21 (100-year longevity).1584

2570 IPCC AR2 on which the Kyoto Protocol relied provided the following explanation:

The Global Warming Potential is an attempt to provide a simple measure of the relative radiative effects of the emissions of various greenhouse gases. The index is defined as the cumulative radiative forcing between the present and some chosen time horizon caused by a unit mass of gas

1580 BBL II, FN 11 at page 4. ↩
1581 BBL II, FN 24 at page 10. ↩
1582 BMEC, paragraph 13. ↩
1583 Kemp, paragraph 8. ↩
1584 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 6. ↩

[Page 731]

emitted now, expressed relative to that for some reference gas (here CO is used). The future global warming commitment of a greenhouse gas over a chosen time horizon can be estimated by multiplying the appropriate GWP by the amount of gas emitted. For example, GWPs could be used to compare the effects of reductions in CO 2 emissions relative to reductions in methane emissions, for a specified time horizon.1585

2571 The report provides for three different “time horizons” with different values for 20 years, for 100 years and for 500 years. For CO2, which is the reference gas, the values are 1. For methane, the values are 56, 21 and 6.5 years.1586

2572 The Kyoto Protocol referred to AR2 in an Addendum that recorded a decision of the Parties at the COP, Reports the following passage by which the Conference of the Parties reaffirmed:

... that global warming potentials used by Parties should be those provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its Second Assessment Report (“1995 IPCC GWP values”) based on the effects of the greenhouse gases over a 100-year time horizon, taking into account the inherent and complicated uncertainties involved in global warming potential estimates. In addition, for information purposes only, Parties may also use another time horizon, as provided in the Second Assessment Report.1587

2573 The Second Assessment Report, in Table 4 provides for the methane GWP value of 21 over a 100-year time horizon, as they were used by the Third Environmental Losses Report and by Mr Kemp.

2574 The Tribunal noted that the conversion of methane into CO2 equivalents is a complex process with “inherent and complicated uncertainties” mentioned in the relevant decision attached to the Kyoto Protocol. The IPCC revised its explanations about the comparison of different GHG in AR4 and in subsequent IPCC reports; in addition to the GWP, the IPCC introduced other metrics, in particular Global Temperature-change Potential (GTP).

2575 BBL II provide as source for their use of the value 25 a website that refers to a different IPCC Report, stating that in 2007 the GWP values were changed in


1585 SAR, WGI, page 21, at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_sar_wg_I_full_report.pdf. ↩
1586 SAR, WGI, Table 4 at page 22. ↩
1587 Kyoto Protocol, Addendum Decision 2/CP.3, paragraph 3. ↩

[Page 732]

AR4.1588 The value of 84, to which BAPEX referred is that for the 20 years' time horizon and not for the 100 years as provided by the Kyoto Protocol.

2576 Given the complexity of the conversion process and varying factors at which the IPCC arrived, the Tribunal decided to adopt the value which the Kyoto Protocol prescribed for the emission limitation commitments (21 in the 100 years' time frame) and which was used both in the Third Environmental Losses Report and by Mr Kemp.

2577 The Tribunal therefore applies the conversion rate of 21.

2578 The Parties and their experts have not identified the part of the escaping methane that ignited and was converted into carbon dioxide. In its comments of 28 April 2025, BAPEX stated that the “significant emissions [were] predominantly methane”.1589 The Tribunal considered that, during the initial period of the Chattak 2 blowout, all of the escaping gas burnt and that thereafter some of the escaping gas continued to burn. It therefore estimates the gas that ignited as CO2 as 30% of the total gas emission.

2579 Consequently, the Tribunal applied the conversion rate of 21 to 70% of the 134'001.5 tonnes. The total of CO2 and CO2 equivalent is therefore calculated as follows: 93’802 x 21 = 1'969'822 for the methane, plus the remaining 30% (40'200) for the CO2, producing a total of 2’010’022 tonnes.

9.4.10 The impact of the atmospheric pollution from the Chattak 2 blowout on Bangladesh

2580 When BAPEX seeks an order for the payment of damages “with respect to losses due to atmospheric pollution”1590 it refers to the Second Environmental Losses Report and states that the claim is for “losses caused by emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere and impact of the same on the climate due to the burning of blowout gas”; it also includes in the claim the methane that continued to escape after the burning of the gas was extinguished.1591 The Tribunal found that the GHG emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout did indeed cause damage to the atmosphere. The question that remains unanswered is: what is the damage caused to Bangladesh by this damage to the atmosphere and the resulting impact on climate change?


1588 https://climatechangeconnection.org/emissions/co2-equivalents/, link provided in BBL II, FN 12 at page 4, also Exhibit R-464. ↩
1589 BAPEX's 28 April 2025 comments, page 2. ↩
1590 BMEC, paragraph 46(a). ↩
1591 ВМЕС, paragraphs 9 and 13. ↩

[Page 733]

2581 Bangladesh is vulnerable to weather events and in the past has suffered damage from natural catastrophes, irrespective of the recent climate change. Scientific literature and the IPCC reports have indicated that anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased the risk of such harm, in particular from rising sea level and aggravated weather conditions caused by climate change; and that by now some of such harm has materialised already. Neither BAPEX and its experts nor the Environmental Losses Reports have identified any specific climate change-related harm that Bangladesh has suffered as the result of the Chattak 2 GHG emissions in 2005. Indeed, after a careful review of the record in this Arbitration, the Tribunal notes that BAPEX has not identified any relationship between the claim for atmospheric pollution in this Arbitration and any loss or damage caused to Bangladesh by the Chattak 2 blowout.

2582 In this Arbitration, BAPEX produced a “Bangladesh Country Environmental Analysis" by the World Bank Office in Dhaka and on which it relied in a different context.1592 This study is dated September 2006, i.e. less than a year after the completion of the Chattak 2B relief well. The analysis highlighted the vulnerability of Bangladesh and the likelihood that climate change would increase the risks of disasters. It does so in terms which present future aggravation of Bangladesh's vulnerability and not as climate change-related harm that had by that point arisen already.

2583 Under the heading of “Vulnerability to Climate Change”, the 2006 World Bank Report stated:

Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to the projected impacts of climate change, as these are likely to increase the already high risks of disasters, and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities. Global warming will cause changes such as higher temperatures, sea level rise and changing rainfall patterns, as well as more abrupt effects, such as an increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme events such as floods, storm surges and cyclones.1593

2584 The passage continued by describing in further detail some of these risks and predictions for the year 2030. It concludes by stating:

While climate change does not form a focus of this report, the scale of Bangladesh's vulnerability to climate change demand that assessment of the associated risks and planning for adaptation remain a priority for

1592 Bangladesh Country Environmental Analysis, Bangladesh Development Series Paper No: 12, The World Bank Office, Dhaka, September 2006 (2006 Word Bank Report), Exhibit R-207, relied on at BMD, paragraph 105 (erroneously identified as R-208), in the context of "Bangladesh's capacity issues”. ↩
1593 2006 World Bank Report, Exhibit R-207, page 3, paragraph 9. ↩

[Page 734]

further work, building on the recently completed National Adaptation Programme of Action.1594

2585 The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), to which the 2006 World Bank report referred in the above quotation, was issued in November 2005 by the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF).1595 Such NAPA programmes are prepared as implementation of Article 4.9 of the UNFCCC1596 and the Bangladesh NAPA refers to this Convention. The Foreword to Bangladesh's Programme recalls that the Government “has recognised climate change as an important issue and attempts are being made to incorporate potential response measures for reducing impacts of climate change into the overall development planning process”. The Foreword describes the broad scope of the preparatory work, drawing on representatives from government at several levels, the scientific community and other stakeholders. It describes the environmental context and key environmental stresses, including disasters; and it addresses adaptive actions including fifteen related projects.

2586 When the NAPA was issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forest in November 2005, the Ministry had received in April and September 2005 the reports of the Environmental Losses Committees which it had formed and which reported that a “huge quantity of gases have been emanated into the air” and recommended “plantation work [...] to offset emitted CO2”. The 2005 NAPA was followed by an updated version of the NAPA, which the MoEF issued in June 2009,1597 and by INDC and NDC reports.1598

2587 The Tribunal has been unable to find anywhere in the record of the Arbitration or in publicly available reports any mentioning by the MoEF or Bangladesh of losses related to atmospheric pollution from the Chattak blowouts, as they are claimed in this Arbitration.


1594 2006 World Bank Report, Exhibit R-207, page 3, paragraph 9. ↩
1595 ΝΑΡΑ 2006, at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/ban01.pdf. ↩
1596 See UNFCCC Note in NAPA 2006. ↩
1597 https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/ban01.pdf. ↩
1598 E.g. INDC 2015, at: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Bangladesh/1/INDC_2 015_of_Bangladesh.pdf; ↩
Roadmap and Action Plan for Implementing Bangladesh NDC, 2018, at: https://moef.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/moef.portal.gov.bd/page/ac0ce881_4b1d_4844_a 426_1b6ee36d2453/NDC%20Roadmap%20and%20Sectoral%20Action%20%20Plan.pdf;
NDC 2021 Updates, at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/NDC_submission_20210826revised.pdf.
For a list see the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) at: https://www.undp.org/bangladesh/projects/national-adaptation-plan-nap.

[Page 735]

2588 The Tribunal concludes that no specific instance of climate change-related harm directly caused by, or specifically causally linked to, the Chattak blowout has been identified or alleged.

2589 This conclusion is confirmed when one considers the quantification of the claim as presented by BAPEX:

2590 The Tribunal noted that BAPEX quantifies the claim for atmospheric pollution by applying to the quantified GHG emissions a “unit cost per tonne of CO2” or methane, converted to CO2 equivalent.1599

2591 The unit cost used is BDT 960 and converted to USD 14.95/tonne.1600 BAPEX describes the this unit cost as “Reasonable and Conservative” and compares the unit cost used is BDT 960 and converted to USD 14.95/tonne.1601 BAPEX describes the this unit cost as “Reasonable and Conservative” and compares “the metric that can serve to assess the unit cost of $14.95 used by the 2005 Committee and BAPEX's environmental damages experts” to carbon sequestration costs, the calculation of which is “complex and depends on a range of factors ...”. For the unit costs of BDT 960 and USD 14.95, neither BAPEX nor the Second Environmental Loss Committee provide any calculation or source. BAPEX relies for this quantification on its experts. These experts, Clifford Ian BETTON, Dr Ian BORTHWICK and Dr Paul LEINSTER CBE, do not provide any calculation but state in their opinion in a footnote, as mentioned above: “We utilised a cost of TK960 per tonne, as originally applied by the Committee”.1602 That amount is shown with no further explanation as “Unit Price” in the table in which the Second Environmental Losses Report quantifies the “Losses due to Air Pollution”.

2592 No explanations are provided in any of these documents by BAPEX, its experts and the report on which they rely as the basis of this “unit price”.

2593 The Claimant and its expert Mr Kemp state that a report by the FAO1603 was referenced in the Second Environmental Losses report but that it had not been produced in the Arbitration. A FAO report had indeed been mentioned but not in the Second Environmental Losses Report, on which BAPEX relies in its final submission on the Environmental Claims, but in the Third Report; and this Third Report does not mention a “unit price” of BDT 960.


1599 ΝΑΡ. ↩
1600 ΝΑΡ. ↩
1601 BMEC, paragraph 13; BBL II, paragraph 10 and FN 13; BAPEX's 28 April 2025 comments, title at page 5. ↩
1602 BBL II, FN 13. ↩
1603 Kemp, paragraph 11. ↩

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2594 The Claimant argues that the “BDT 960/tonne figure is accordingly unsupported and should be given no weight by the Tribunal”.1604

2595 The Tribunal notes, however, that the Third Report refers to a “Shadow Price of USD 10-20” and asserts that this price

... is calculated internationally to control the atmosphere changes due to CO2 per ton. In this case, the Committee has fixed USD 15 as average value of USD 10-20 per ton being considered “Consideration in valuation of carbon sequestration” as given on the website (http:www.fao.org/document/show-cdr.asp?url-file) of Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.1605

2596 The Third Report indicated that BDT 66 to the USD were used when calculating the BDT value of the claim. The value of USD 15, used in that report, therefore corresponds to BDT 990/tonne. The Tribunal finds this value sufficiently close to that of BDT 960/tonne, as used in the Second Report, and concludes that both reports refer in essence to the same value.

2597 The Tribunal therefore turns to the calculation explained in the Third Environmental Losses Report as the origin of the unit price of cost.

2598 The FAO Report, which the Third Environmental Losses Report indicated as the source for the “Shadow Price of USD 10-20”, had not been included with the Third Environmental Losses Report. Although this had been pointed out in Kemp, dated 29 May 2014,1606 and again by the Claimant in CREC, BAPEX did not produce the FAO Report.

2599 The Third Environmental Losses Report contained the link to a website as reference for the FAO report. The Tribunal tried reaching the document through this link. It reached the website of the FAO, but received the message “page not found”. The information in the quoted passage from the Third Report nevertheless made it possible to identify a source: a search for “FAO Consideration in valuation of carbon sequestration” leads to a FAO report on "Forest Valuation for Decision Making – Lessons of Experience and Proposals for improvement”, dated February 1997, at https://www.fao.org/4/w3641e/w3641e00.htm. An annex to this report contains "Box A1.4. – Considerations in valuation of carbon sequestration”. The document discusses in detail questions concerning the valuation of forests, including different valuation methodologies, pointing out inter alia: “there are no absolute values and whatever is presented depends on context


1604 CREC, paragraph 55. ↩
1605 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 7. ↩
1606 Kemp, paragraph 11. ↩

[Page 737]

and necessarily reflects one or several interest group perspectives or a compromise among many”.1607 Annex 1 of the report deals with “Values, Benefits and Costs to Consider in Forest Valuation". Annex 1.6 is entitled "Carbon sequestration values (indirect use value)”.1608 That annex discusses different approaches to valuation and points out that these “different approaches usually arrive at different figures: even similar methods can supply different values”.

2600 Box A1.4 in this Annex 1.6 contains considerations in valuation of carbon sequestration. It states that “forests are able to store 20-100 times more carbon per unit area than croplands” but also points out uncertainties and aspects that are not fully known. This box contains the passage on which the Third Environmental Losses Report relied:

Estimated values have ranged from $5 to $125/tonne carbon, but recently a “shadow price” of $10-20 per tonne of carbon emissions has been generally accepted as a reasonable estimate of potential damage from climate change.

2601 The text in the box is accompanied by the following warning with respect to the fixation of carbon valuation: “Remember that some analysts have given very high values to [carbon valuation] even exceeding those of timber. Be moderate."1609

2602 The Tribunal notes that the FAO Report and specifically the passage on which the Third Environmental Losses Report relies is of a general nature, and is accompanied by the above disclaimer. Given the great variety of approaches and differences in results, determination of a value relevant for a specific situation as that in Bangladesh requires some further analysis.

2603 Neither the Third Environmental Losses Report nor BAPEX and its experts have tried to make such an analysis. For this reason alone, the value of USD 15 per tonne of CO2 and equivalent, cannot be accepted as properly supported for the claim.

2604 In any event, the reliance on the valuation in the FAO Report is irrelevant for the quantification of a claim for damages from climate change: the FAO Report concerns the valuation of carbon sequestration by forests. There is no indication in the FAO Report about the relation to any climate change-related


1607 Forest Valuation, FAO, February 1997, Foreword, page 1. ↩
1608 Forest Valuation, FAO, February 1997, Annex A1.6, page 3/9. ↩
1609 Forest Valuation, FAO, February 1997, Annex A1.6, page 5/9. ↩

[Page 738]

harm in Bangladesh and even less to the damage caused by the Chattak 2 blowout.

2605 BAPEX has not explained on what grounds the Tribunal should or may rely for quantifying a loss caused by GHG emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout.

2606 While BAPEX failed to explain the grounds for its choice of the “unit costs” (or price), the Tribunal noted that, when discussing the valuation of the loss in the Environmental Losses Reports, Kemp and the Claimant refer more generally to values on the carbon market. Mr Kemp wrote:

The value used by the 2nd committee for GHG emissions ($15/tonne) is a commonly quoted value, but the actual value of GHG credits is highly variable and tends to be much less than that. The January 9, 2014 report from Redd-Monitoring suggests certain GHG credits may be as low as €0.35 (

2607 In a footnote to this passage Kemp states the following:

Redd-monitor.org, Global Carbon Markets Have Shrunk in Value by 60% Since 2011, available at http://www.redd-monitor.org/2014/01/09/global-carbon-markets-have-shrunk-in-value-by- 60-since-2011/#more-14724 (9 January 2014).1610

2608 The Tribunal has discussed above in Section 9.4.7, the system of carbon credits. The function of this system is to create a market for GHG emission reductions, primarily in relation to national regimes for such reductions, mainly in response to commitments made under the UNFCCC by Annex I countries. The Claimant pointed out:

If Bangladesh had a regulatory regime that required the purchase of greenhouse gas offset credits, and Niko had failed to comply, this claim might have merit. As no such regime exists, this claim has no merit.

BAPEX is, in reality, seeking a windfall, not compensation for an actual loss.1611

2609 There is no indication in the record or otherwise that Bangladesh has established such a regulatory system and that the claimed amount is pursuant to such a system.


1610 Kemp, paragraph 11 and FN 2, referring to Exhibit C-77, relied upon in CREC, paragraph 54; the value of USD 15/tonC appears in the Third Environmental Losses Report, not in the Second Report, as stated by Mr Kemp. ↩
1611 CREC, paragraph 49. ↩

[Page 739]

2610 In any event, reliance on carbon pricing for assessing the loss caused to Bangladesh by the Chattak blowout is unsuitable: As Mr Kemp explained, the prices are market driven. These prices may have some relation to costs for carbon sequestration but they do not seek to quantify losses caused by climate change. The great variability of these prices, apparently not driven by climate change losses in specific cases, confirms that they do not serve to quantify such losses. Consequently, carbon prices are not a suitable instrument for the quantification of climate change losses suffered in Bangladesh. As the court in the SoCalGas case stated in the above quotation, stated in relation to a carbon credit programme in California and the proposed application to the valuation of accidental emissions from a gas storage facility: "the Cap-and-Trade Program, with its carefully calibrated annual emissions caps, is nor designated to capture fugitive emissions from sources such as Aliso Canyon".

2611 The Tribunal sees no basis for relying on prices quoted in such programmes for quantifying a claim for losses suffered by BAPEX or the Government by the Chattak 2 blowout, assuming BAPEX had shown that climate change losses, attributable to that blowout, had occurred.

2612 The Tribunal concludes that the Respondents have failed to evince a direct causal link between the specific GHG emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout and direct harm to BAPEX, the Government or Bangladesh in general, whether in the form of a financial obligation to purchase emission offsets or an instance of climate change-related harm directly causally linked to the Chattak 2 blowout GHG emissions. The Tribunal has explained above the complexity of the process by which GHG emissions lead to global warming and climate change and, through this change, lead to rising sea levels and aggravated weather events; and it has shown the difficulties faced by claimants in climate change court action to demonstrate damage caused by such emissions for which the respondents are responsible. The failure of BAPEX to identify any such damage in the present case may be seen as confirmation of these difficulties.

2613 The Tribunal concludes that BAPEX has failed to demonstrate the existence of a causal link from the damage to the atmosphere to a specific damage suffered by BAPEX or Bangladesh. Consequently, the claim for atmospheric pollution, to the extent it is characterized as a claim for direct compensation in respect of climate change-related harm suffered as a result of GHG emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout must be rejected.

2614 In any event, had this claim not been dismissed, the Tribunal would have had to examine whether and to what extent that claim was excluded as indirect or

[Page 740]

consequential under the law of Bangladesh and the JVA, as the Claimant had argued.

9.4.11 Niko's obligation to repair the damage to the atmosphere

2615 The conclusion in the previous Section does not change the Tribunal's earlier finding that the Chattak 2 blowout for which Niko is liable caused damage to the atmosphere. This damage was caused by the GHG emissions from the blowout. Does Niko's liability for the blowout include an obligation to repair this damage by removing the GHGs from the atmosphere and is BAPEX in its own right or as assignee of the Government entitled to require such removal?

2616 The Third Environmental Losses Report places the issue in the context of commitments of Bangladesh under the UNFCCC system: “As a signatory of the [UNFCCC] Bangladesh is internationally liable to mitigate the greenhouse gases”. The Claimant and its experts, as stated above in Section 9.4.1, object that in the UNFCCC Bangladesh was not listed as an Annex I Party and therefore had “no mandatory requirement to reduce carbon emissions” and that there were no legal obligations with respect to GHG.

2617 Insofar as specific reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, which operationalised the UNFCCC obligations, are concerned, the Claimant's position is correct: Bangladesh did not assume specific GHG limitation and reduction commitments under these instruments.

2618 However, Bangladesh is a Party to the UNFCCC. Bangladesh has thereby subscribed to the Objective set out in Article 2 of this Convention “to achieve [...] stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. The principles of Article 3 of the UNFCCC apply to all Parties, including Bangladesh, and provide that the Parties to the Convention “should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects”.

2619 While the specific commitments for developed country Parties, listed in Annex I, set out in Article 4(2) of the UNFCCC do not apply to it, Bangladesh is bound by the commitments under Article 4(1) that apply to “All Parties”. This provision requires inter alia that all Parties shall:

(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change;

[Page 741]

[...] (d) Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems.

2620 It follows that under the UNFCCC Bangladesh does have concrete obligations concerning the limitation of GHG emissions and the promotion of GHG sequestration. During the years following the acceptance of these commitments under the UNFCCC, Bangladesh has emphasised the importance of the commitments it did take and its intention to work on their implementation. In its report on the NAPA quoted above, the Government recalled in November 2005, the year of the two Chattak blowouts:

The Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh has recognised climate change as an important issue and attempts are being made to incorporate potential response measures for reducing impacts of climate change into overall development planning process.1612

2621 Bangladesh has confirmed this position and strengthened in subsequent communications:

2622 In the 2015 INDC under the UNFCCC, Bangladesh declared:

With respect to Bangladesh's contribution to global efforts to counter climate change, this INDC sets out a number of mitigation actions that will help limit the country's GHG emissions. These mitigation actions will play a key role in realising the move to a low-carbon, climate- resilient economy and to becoming a middle-income country by 2021 whilst ensuring that it will not cross the average per capita emissions of the developing world. The INDC includes both unconditional and conditional emissions reduction goals for the power, transport, and industry sectors, alongside further mitigation actions in other sectors, which Bangladesh intends to carry out.1613

2623 In 2018 the Minister of Environment declared in his Message introducing the Roadmap and Action Plan for Implementing Bangladesh NDC:

Bangladesh is one of the leading developing countries to demonstrate her intension to address adverse impacts of climate change by keeping no

1612 NAPA, Foreword. ↩
1613 INDC 2015, page 2. ↩

[Page 742]

stone untouched in this field. We have focused much on adaptation to protect our people and resources from the adverse impacts of climate change. However, the country has also expressed her intention through the NDC to address GHG emissions keeping our limitations in mind.

Despite being a minimal emitter, such expression is made to align our efforts with others under the Paris Agreement for securing this globe from the predicted dreadful impacts of global warming. Our future actions to reduce GHG emission have been elaborated in this Roadmap and Action Plans. These documents have also taken into accord our National Adaption Plan to address the impact of climate change. Thus, a close link between our adaptation and mitigation plans has been established through the NDC Roadmap and Sectoral Action Plans.1614

2624 Referring to the quoted 2015 INDC and the 2018 Roadmap, Bangladesh confirmed in the NDC 2021 its unconditional and the conditional commitments for GHG reductions:

Bangladesh submitted its INDC to UNFCCC on 25 September 2015, for three sectors (Power, Industry and Transport). Subsequently, Bangladesh prepared the NDC Implementation Roadmap and Action Plan in 2018. Bangladesh's INDC proposed for 12 million tons (5%) unconditional reduction in GHG emission from Business as Usual (BAU) scenario by 2030 and a further 24 million tons (10%) conditional reduction in GHG emission with support from the international community taking the base year 2011.

2625 The updated NDCs 2021 further developed the unconditional and the conditional contributions and presented GHG emission reduction scenarios. For both conditional and unconditional contributions, the report included long lists of actions by 2030.

2626 The Tribunal concludes from these explanations that, since its adhesion to the UNFCCC in 1994, Bangladesh is committed to supporting actions for mitigating GHG emissions. Restoring the damage caused by the emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout is therefore an action in line with Bangladesh's international commitments which entitles BAPEX to include the related costs in the claim against Niko.

2627 Niko's obligation to retore the environment finds an expression in the JVA and related commitments:


1614 https://moef.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/moef.portal.gov.bd/page/ac0ce881_4b1d_484 4_a426_1b6ee36d2453/NDC%20Roadmap%20and%20Sectoral%20Action%20%20Plan.pdf. ↩

[Page 743]

2628 Article 27.3 (c) of the JVA contains a general restoration obligation of Niko upon completion of its operations to restore the baseline:

After completion of approved Petroleum Operations the OPERATOR shall level, restore or reclaim the affected lands to generally accepted standards of the international Petroleum Industry.

2629 The obligation is developed and expanded in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) which was submitted by Niko to the Department of Environment (DoE), dated June 2004, and on which the Respondents relied in the BMD concerning the section on “Impact of Non Routine Discharges and Fire (Accidents/Disaster) Impact.1615 The JVA requires that such an EIA be prepared and provides that the Operator, i.e. Niko, “shall take necessary measures in line with the EIA recommendations and incorporate those measures in the Work Programme”1616. While formally the EIA is submitted by the “NIKO-BAPEX Joint Venture”, the Tribunal concludes that the “recommendations” and assurances in the EIA are commitments by Niko as the Operator.

2630 The EIA deals with a broad range of subjects, including blowouts. Section 7.3.5, entitled "Impact on Non Routine Discharges and Fire (Accidents/Disasters) Impact”, on which the Respondents rely, deals with accidents occurring “in the following form: spill, blowout and fire”. In the introduction to section 7.3.5, the EIA states that “Well blowouts are rare, but can be quite serious” and describes the “elevated risk of fire and/or explosion” and the “release of combusted and non-combusted gases”.

2631 In section “7.3.4 Impacts during Drilling, Production and Processing" express mention is made of the “the production of greenhouse gases and damage to the ozone layer” about earlier operations in the Chattak field and the flaring practiced in these earlier operations. The JV announces that, contrary to earlier operations in the Chattak field, “this time [...] gas burning will be reduced significantly during the proposed NIKO-BAPEX Joint Venture operation”. Niko as the Operator thus committed to a “significant” reduction of GHG emissions by gas burning.

2632 Section 7.3.5 of the EIA about accidents and disasters then describes possible impacts in several subsections, starting with “Impact on Land” which closes with a paragraph about “Residual Impact”, stating that the JV will follow appropriate guidelines and that accidents are unlikely; it continues as follows:


1615 BMD, paragraph 331 and FN 669. ↩
1616 JVA, Article 27.3(a). ↩

[Page 744]

However, if any accident occurs then NIKO-BAPEX Joint Venture will clean up all the wastes and restore the land to its baseline conditions. NIKO-BAPEX Joint Venture will also pay appropriate compensation to the legitimate owners and affected people and/or their families following standard procedure of the Government of Bangladesh and Canada.1617

2633 The general clean up and restoration obligation is not expressly mentioned in the subsequent subsections, including that on the Impact on Air, which provide that the JV will “also” pay compensation. The passage on blowouts describes the release of methane and, if this gas ignites, of CO2 and assumes that the "plume will be high enough and dispersed sufficiently to reduce the residual threat to human life”. No mention is made of the warming effect of the GHG.

2634 These obligations concerning the restoration of the site and the environment are general obligations of Niko as the Operator. They express the concern about restoration to the baseline. In cases where the baseline is disrupted by acts causing liability of the Operator, the baseline must be restored, whether the specific action is prescribed in the ordinary restoration activity or not. The fact that damage to the atmosphere is not expressly mentioned among the ordinary restoration obligations of the Operator is no justification for excluding such damage from the restoration of the baseline.

2635 The Tribunal concludes that, to the extent that it is necessary and possible, the baseline situation must be restored also in case of an accident such as the Chattak 2 blowout. Where damage is caused to the atmosphere by GHG emissions, return to baseline conditions includes removal of these gases from the atmosphere.

2636 When concluding, on grounds of Bangladesh's policy in the UNFCCC context and on grounds of Niko's JVA commitments, that GHG emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout must be removed from the atmosphere, the Tribunal is aware that Bangladesh, like practically all States party to the UNFCCC, continues to emit GHG; it has not been alleged in the Arbitration that anyone in Bangladesh must pay for any GHG emissions. Moreover, if no blowout had occurred and the gas that escaped from the Chattak Reservoir had been delivered to Petrobangla (as assumed in the calculation of the claim for lost gas accepted by the Tribunal), it would have been burnt in power stations and would have caused CO2 emissions without any charge for such emissions. In other words, requiring restoration in case of GHG emissions


1617 EIA, Exhibit C-13 and R-72, page 75, emphasis added. ↩

[Page 745]

from the Chattak 2 blowout, these emissions would be treated differently from other emissions, in particular emissions from power stations.

2637 The Tribunal sees such different treatment justified for several reasons: first of all, the emissions were caused by the blowout for which Niko is liable.

2638 Moreover, the joint objective of all Parties to the UNFCCC is the reduction of GHG emissions, to the extent possible. The Convention accepts that the transition takes time and the efforts that the transition requires are differentiated between developed countries (in Annex I) and others; the continued use of fossil fuels, e.g. for energy production thus is accepted. This does not require or justify the waste of such fuels, as it occurs in a blowout. Reducing and cessation of flaring, for instance, is one of the first steps for reducing GHG emissions, as confirmed by the EIA submitted by Niko before commencing operations in the Chattak field.

2639 Concerning the JVA obligations, the objective is to produce natural gas for the use in power stations; wasting gas in a blowout is not such an objective and the resulting emissions are not an accepted action that exempts the Operator from the obligation to restore the base line status.

2640 The Tribunal therefore confirms its conclusion that Niko is obligated to remove from the atmosphere the GHG emitted by the Chattak 2 blowout and the Government is entitled to require such removal in the form of the sequestration of carbon emitted by the Chattak 2 blowout without having to show that any climate change harm in Bangladesh was caused by the Chattak 2 blowout. That means that the emission of 2'010'022 tonnes of CO2 and equivalent must be reversed by the removal of this quantity from the atmosphere. Consequently, the Tribunal examines how this sequestration must be ordered.

2641 The Third Environmental Losses Report referred to “Plantation work [that] can be taken to offset emitted CO2 using this money to be collected as compensation”. The Tribunal understands that the “plantation work” to which the Report referred consists in carbon sequestration by afforestation/reforestation as it is mentioned for instance in the FAO report to which the Third Committee referred.

2642 When the Third Environmental Losses Committee assessed the damage of Atmospheric Pollution it did not assess the compensation that Niko had to pay by reference the costs of Plantation work in Bangladesh. Instead it referred the FAO Report concerning “Considerations in valuation of carbon sequestration”.1618 The amount derived by the Third Environmental Losses


1618 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 7. ↩

[Page 746]

Committee from this publication, as explained, not only is unrelated to any damage suffered by BAPEX or the Government; importantly in the present context, there is no indication that it is in any way related to costs of “plantation work” in Bangladesh. Similarly, the unit costs used by BAPEX and its experts is an unexplained rate; no relation to plantation costs in Bangladesh are indicated. BAPEX's submission of 28 April 2025 seems to indicate that the unit cost used in its claim are substantially above the costs for plantation work in Bangladesh.1619

2643 The Tribunal therefore has examined the availability of other information about the costs of carbon sequestration by plantation in Bangladesh.

2644 The World Bank Report of 2006, which BAPEX produced as Exhibit R-207, points specifically to emission reductions and carbon sequestration in the context of carbon trading. In this context, it points to the possibility of “technical assistance from the World Bank as necessary”.1620

2645 In a subsequent report, Country Climate and Development Report, Bangladesh, dated October 2022, the World Bank Group develops these possibilities of carbon sequestration in a concrete manner. It referred to Bangladesh's NDCs 2021, mentioned above and in one section addressed specifically Carbon Sinks. It explained:

Additional reductions can be achieved through afforestation and reforestation (Table 6). Emissions from forest lands (due to degradation) stand at 1.17 MtCO2e per annum, while sequestration is

0.81 MCO2e per annum, resulting in total positive emissions of 0.37 MtCO2e per annum. The GoB has committed to increase tree cover from

22.37 percent (2014) to 24 percent by 2025, a relatively low target, while the NDCs aim to reforest 450,000 ha of degraded forest land. If implemented, this will flip the forestry sector from emitter to sink, with 5 million tons of additional carbon sequestration.

2646 The report continues by discussing some of the projects and concludes by insisting on the importance of these projects, considering afforestation as a high priority:


1619 BAPEX's 28 April 2025 comments, page 8, states that using the afforestation/reforestation costs in Bangladesh as assessed by the World Bank instead of the unexplained unit costs applied by BAPEX's experts "would give Niko a windfall". ↩
1620 2006 World Bank Report, Exhibit R-207, page 65, paragraph 194. ↩

[Page 747]

This afforested land will potentially sequestrate 230 MtCO2e by 2025. Speeding up the process of afforestation across these forested zones— and increasing the overall target—should therefore be a high priority.

2647 The explanations are followed by Table 6, to which the quoted text referred, and which provides concrete information about the investment costs in USD and the quantity of carbon sequestration produced by such investment.1621

Table 6: Indicative Costs and Carbon Sequestration Benefits of Afforestation/Reforestation Options

Afforestation/Reforestation Area (hectare) Investment Cost (US$ million) Carbon Sequestration Volume in 25 Years (million tons)
Mangroves in newly accreted coastal island 40,000 25 30
Coastal Green Belt 126,000 190 80
Hill Forest in Chattogram 250,000 300 120

Sources: Bangladesh Forest Department and Sustainable Forest and Livelihood Project.

2648 These cost estimates in the report by the World Bank Group are identified as indicative costs provided by the Bangladesh Forest Department, which, in the Tribunal's opinion, is best placed to provide such estimates for afforestation and reforestation projects in Bangladesh.

2649 The Tribunal referred the Parties to this 2022 World Bank report. It addressed their attention specifically to this Table 6, giving them an opportunity to comment on its relevance, if any, to the quantum of the claim for atmospheric pollution in the present proceedings.

2650 As mentioned above, the Claimant did not consider that the 2022 World Bank report and the table had any relevance to the issue of atmospheric pollution. It did not contest the numbers in Table 6.

2651 BAPEX points out in its April 2025 submission that the 2022 World Bank report

... highlights the Government of Bangladesh's nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement, which include increasing tree cover from 22.37 per cent in 2014 to 24 per cent by 2025, as well as the eventual reforestation of 450'000 hectares of degraded forest land. The report notes that, if these measures are fully implemented, the forestry sector in Bangladesh could transition from being a net emitter of GHGs to a net carbon sink.

1621 World Bank 2022 Report, Section 4.4 at pages 49 – 50, at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/6d66e133-e49d-5ad9-b056-7b1a6c6206ed/content. ↩

[Page 748]

2652 While recognising that “reforestation/afforestation has significant carbon removal benefits”, BAPEX considers reforestation as “among the slowest natural methods for carbon sequestration” and points out that the land available for GHG removal is limited; it does, however, not provide information about the actual progress of the Government's afforestation programme. In particular, it does not state that the capacity for GHG removal has been fully absorbed and that funding “plantation work” through compensation payments by Niko, as the Third Environmental Losses Report had recommended, would be no longer possible.

2653 BAPEX asserts that “reforestation and afforestation efforts that Bangladesh has undertaken to mitigate climate change are not an appropriate measure of the cost of the pollution caused by the blowouts"; it describes some other solutions to “mitigate the damage caused by the blowout”, which seem substantially more expensive than carbon sequestration envisaged by the World Bank report. BAPEX does not indicate that any of these other solutions are available in Bangladesh.

2654 Referring to the numbers in Table 6 of the 2022 World Bank report, BAPEX writes that the “cost figures for afforestation and reforestation [...] are a part of Bangladesh's nationally determined contributions to reduce Bangladesh's carbon emissions from the regular economic and social activity”. It does not contest that the cost figures in the identified table do not correctly reflect the costs for “Plantation work” in Bangladesh.

2655 It states that the cost figures in the 2022 World Bank report were intended to guide national climate policy and investment in nature-based solutions for Bangladesh's future emission reduction goals. BAPEX contests that the indicated costs “purport to serve as a metric for compensating the environmental harm caused by catastrophic industrial events and are not an appropriate metric for this purpose”.

2656 The Tribunal concludes that there are concrete projects in Bangladesh to remove CO2 from the atmosphere and that the cost figures for afforestation and reforestation in Table 6 of the 2022 World Bank report are a part of Bangladesh's nationally determined contributions to reduce Bangladesh's carbon emissions. BAPEX does not allege that planned quantities envisaged by these projects have been absorbed and that additional funding by financial contributions from the payment by Niko, could no longer be used, as recommended by the Third Environmental Losses Committee. The Tribunal also noted that BAPEX recognises the significant carbon removal benefit of reforestation/afforestation projects.

2657 The Tribunal is comforted in its opinion that the data in Table 6 of the 2022 World Bank report are a suitable metric for assessing the costs of removing

[Page 749]

from the atmosphere the CO2 and equivalent emissions for which Niko is liable. Quantifying these costs, the Tribunal notes that the costs per million tonnes of carbon sequestration in these projects is estimated as ranging from USD 0.833 million to USD 2.5 million. As these are only estimates and allowance must be made for cost overruns in such projects, the Tribunal relies on the higher of these costs per project. Applying the estimated project costs of USD 2.5 per tonne to the 2’010’022 tonnes of CO2 and equivalent GHG emissions, the Tribunal concludes that the costs for removing the GHG emissions from the Chattak 2 blowout by carbon sequestration through “plantation” are in the order of USD 5'025'055.

2658 In view of the formal statements made by the Government of Bangladesh in the context of its reporting as Party to the UNFCCC, expressing its intentions to limit and indeed reduce GHG emissions, the Tribunal has no doubt that, provided the necessary funding is available, the suggested sequestration by "plantation” will be implemented.

2659 However, the Tribunal has seen no indication that Bangladesh has incurred any costs in relation to the Chattak 2 carbon sequestration; it therefore has to take account of the Claimant's concern according to which “BAPEX is, in reality, seeking a windfall, not compensation for an actual loss”.1622 Moreover, considering the criticism that had been raised against the Indonesian court decisions, as quoted above in Section 9.4.8, the Tribunal wishes to avoid that the intended carbon sequestration remains without effect. The Tribunal therefore qualifies the payment order by directions that the amount identified be used for the carbon sequestration of the Chattak 2 GHG emissions for which Niko has been found liable. The payment order therefore is qualified.

2660 The Tribunal therefore orders that Niko must pay to BAPEX USD 5'025'055, provided BAPEX has prior to such payment identified the carbon sequestration project to which the funds will be applied and specified details about the project, including location, methods and budget. Niko must be given an opportunity to comment on the project and to suggest alterations to improve its effectiveness.

2661 The Tribunal has taken note of the offer of technical assistance by the World Bank Group, as expressed in the 2006 report produced as Exhibit R-207. From the World Bank Group report of 2022, the Tribunal concludes that the World Bank Group is prepared to provide the technical assistance for implementing a carbon sequestration programme of the Government of


1622 CREC, paragraph 49. ↩

[Page 750]

Bangladesh, along the lines described in that report, provided the necessary funding is made available.

2662 The Tribunal concludes that the World Bank Group as author of the 2022 Report is available to provide assistance and advice in case of any difference between BAPEX and Niko about the carbon sequestration project identified by BAPEX for funding by Niko.

9.4.12 Atmospheric Pollution owing to the burning trees

2663 BAPEX claims BDT 314'880 based on the Second Environmental Losses Committee's “original estimate of atmospheric pollution owing to the burning of trees”. It declares that this amount is equivalent to USD 4'902.1623

2664 The Second Report included in the category of Losses to Air Pollution a claim “(b) Release of CO2 due to burning of trees” at the amount now claimed by BAPEX. It explained “128 tons for 4 hectares, 32 tons in every hectare” and applied the unit price of BDT 960, as applied to the principal claim for atmospheric pollution. In the context of the claim for loss of forest resources, the Second Environmental Losses Report states that the “areas which have been affected due to burning of forest resources would take about 20 years to restore to verdant production”.1624

2665 The Third Environmental Losses Report updated the assessment of the Second Environmental Losses Committee by stating that “in field inspection" the Committee observed that an additional hectare of forest burnt due to the second blowout. Therefore, it expanded the reference area from 4 to 5 hectare. It also increased the sequestration potential from 32 to 82 tons CO2 per hectare, explaining that “in a tropical vegetation area, 1 hectare space can hold 82-100 tons of carbon dioxide”. It quantified the sequestration at USD 15 per ton, the rate which it had derived from the “shadow price” in an FAO publication.1625

2666 On this basis the “CO2 emitted by burning trees” is quantified by the Third Environmental Losses Committee at BDT 405’900, calculated as follows: “82 tons per hectare, 410 tons in 5 hectares, and 15 USD per ton”.1626

2667 BAPEX's experts reproduce the assessment of the Second Environmental Losses Committee without comment of their own.1627


1623 BMEC, paragraph 15, relying for the USD equivalent on Brattle III, paragraph 28. ↩
1624 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 3, Section 2. ↩
1625 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 7. ↩
1626 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 17. ↩
1627 BBL I, paragraph 11. ↩

[Page 751]

2668 The Claimant responds to the claim for “costs due to loss of sequestration facility for CO2” in the context of the claim for loss of trees and forest resources.1628 It repeats its argument that “there is no legal obligation on Bangladesh to offset carbon dioxide emissions” and that therefore “there can be no loss for any loss of sequestration”; but it adds:

In the alternative, even if there were a legal obligation, as clearly indicated in the EVI Report, any immediate impacts from the first blowout to vegetation were largely remediated by 2010, and fully remediated by 2019-2020. BAPEX's claims, which indicate lingering issues for up to 20 years, are exaggerated and unsupported.1629

2669 Concerning the Claimant's argument about remediation Mr Kemp confirmed that regrowth of biomass sequesters carbon dioxide:

The burning of biomass is considered carbon neutral as long as the plant matter that is burned is regrown because when plants grow they convert atmospheric carbon dioxide into plant fibre. For example, there are power plants fired on wood that generate carbon neutral electricity in this manner. Assuming all the plant matter (trees and so forth) that was burned is replaced, this amount should not be included as a permanent carbon emission.1630

2670 The Tribunal considers that it is uncontested that the growth of trees sequesters carbon dioxide. This has been discussed above; it was reflected in the Third Environmental Losses Report and that FAO report on which it relies. The statement of Mr Kemp remained uncontested.

2671 The Tribunal will discuss below in Section 9.5.1, in the context of BAPEX's claim for the costs the replantation of trees, the evidence about Niko's plantation of trees and the Claimant's argument of remediation beyond the original state. As seen below, the Tribunal concludes that based on the evidence produced in this Arbitration, the trees that were burnt or damaged have been restored to the level they had before the first Chattak blowouts.

2672 The Tribunal concludes that the trees planted by Niko have sequestered a quantity of CO2 at least equal to that emitted by the burning trees. Therefore, the Tribunal concludes that the effect of the GHG emissions has been reverted. The claim for atmospheric pollution due to the burning trees is dismissed.


1628 See below Section 9.5.1. ↩
1629 CREC, paragraph 66. ↩
1630 Kemp, paragraph 9. ↩

[Page 752]

9.5 Other Claims for Environmental Losses

9.5.1 Damage to vegetation (trees and forest resources)

2673 BAPEX seeks BDT 23'349'484.40 which it declares as equivalent to USD 363'498 as compensation for damage to vegetation estimated in the Second Environmental Losses Report. While entitled “damage to vegetation”, the claim essentially concerns damage to and loss of trees. The relation of this claim to that examined in Section 9.4.12 is one of the issues to be examined below.

2674 The Claimant denies this claim in its entirety.

9.5.1.1 The Parties' Positions

2675 BAPEX explains that the Second Environmental Losses Report “estimated losses related to production of trees and forest resources, the cost of replanting such trees, and losses attributable to the loss of the role of such trees in sequestering CO2 and preventing it from entering in the atmosphere.1631

2676 The Second Environmental Losses Report, dated 13 April 2005, described under the heading “Loss of vegetation, i.e. forest resources” losses caused to “rural trees, i.e. forest resources”. It explained that these losses were surveyed by the Forestry Division of Sylhet which

... estimated the current market value of the different types of trees, their wood prices, their firewood value, and if necessary, an account of fruit production and re-planting of forest resources of the affected families in the neighbouring villages. The areas which have been affected due to burning of forest resources would take about 20 years to restore to verdant production. Considering the environmental background, the Committee has included the carbon sequestration losses under ecological services of the forest resources. However, the atmospheric cooling and humidification factors comprised in the ecological services of trees were not included due to lack of information and data.1632

1631 BMEC, paragraph 16. ↩
1632 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), item 2. ↩

[Page 753]

2677 The Second Report quantified the losses under the heading of “Losses of trees and forest resources” in four items which add up to the total now claimed by BAPEX. These items show the following amounts in BDT:1633

(a) Losses related to production of trees and forest resources: 14'653'224.40

(b) Re-plantation cost: 8'176'900.00

(c) Cost due to loss of sequestration facility of CO2: 512'000.00

(d) Cost due to loss of sequestration facility of CO2 in agriculture: 7'360.00

Total claim: 23'349'484.40

2678 The Third Environmental Losses Report, dated 15 September 2005, noted that the Forest Division had

... estimated the cost of different types of burnt vegetation of the concerned affected people of the village, and in applicable cases, they have estimated the value of wood, energy and production of fruit, and replantation of cost of trees. During survey, the villagers stated that in their opinion it would require 20 to 30 years to grow a pant from its planted state to reach the current size, which the committee has taken into consideration.

2679 The Third Environmental Losses Committee considered impacts that the previous committee had not considered, in particular the impact on vegetation “increased after the second explosion”. It obtained a survey and estimate by the Sylhet Forest Division and accepted it as reasonable; and it considered CO2 sequestration facilities of the forest. It concluded:

In this sector, the amount of losses has been estimated at BDT 33,898,311.00. Out of this, BDT 33,073,311.00 can be distributed among the villagers through District Administration against losses due to impact on trees, forestry resources, and vegetation. Other than that, the

1633 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), Table at the penultimate page. ↩

[Page 754]

remaining BDT 825,000 received for compensation of CO2 sequestration can be spent on forestation.1634

2680 The amount of BDT 33'898’311, as valued by in Third Environmental Loss Report is that claimed in the Money Suit.1635

2681 In the Arbitration, BAPEX claims only the amount of the assessment in the Second Environmental Losses Report, explaining that it did so“[b]ecause the Committee did not choose to reserve its estimate related to vegetation to the availability of further information”.1636 BAPEX refers to the BBL Experts II report which reproduces the amounts quantified in the Second Environmental Losses Committee without any comment on the substance.1637

2682 The Claimant states that the impacts to vegetation from the first blowout were “closely monitored by Mr Glaholt and Crown Agents”, who recorded “burning to 306 trees within a 200 metre radius of the blowout” and “Heat affected vegetation over an area of approximately 2.5 hectares”.

2683 It relies on the assessment in the Local Losses Report, stating that it had paid the amounts assessed in this Report in full.1638

To the extent there were any amounts owing by Niko for a loss of trees or for replantation cost after the first blowout, Niko paid these amounts in full through the Local Loss Committee. The Local Loss Committee's assessment on 8 June 2005 specifically detailed compensation to 84 families for damage to trees. This calculated the exact loss for trees due to the first blowout at BDT 3’281’515 which Niko paid, ending the claim.1639

2684 It also refers to a letter, dated 8 February 2006 in which the Deputy Commissioner of Sunamganj confirms receipt of the compensation paid by Niko that was “distributed among the affected families ...”.1640

2685 The Claimant also states that “Niko implemented a tree planting and maintenance program” and concludes that “all damage was completely – and objectively – remediated by 2010”. It develops the point by references to the EVI report and asserts that during this time the tree cover increased:


1634 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 9, Section 3.5. ↩
1635 Money Suit Complaint, Exhibit C-6, page 55. ↩
1636 BMEC, paragraph 17. ↩
1637 BBL II, pages 7 and 8. ↩
1638 C-CD.2, paragraph 187. ↩
1639 CREC, paragraph 65. ↩
1640 Exhibit C-64. ↩

[Page 755]

The EVI Report notes that tree cover within 2km of the blowout generally increased from 2004 (before the blow out) to 2019. Specifically, this tree cover increased by 6% between 2005 and 2020.1641

2686 Concerning the third and fourth item of BAPEX's damage to vegetation (forest resources) claim, i.e. the costs due to loss of sequestration facility of CO2, the Claimant repeats the argument that it had made with respect to the atmospheric pollution: Because there is no legal obligation on Bangladesh to offset carbon dioxide emissions, there can be no loss for any loss of sequestration facility”.

2687 More generally, the Claimant asserts that “any immediate impacts from the first blowout to vegetation were largely remediated by 2010; and claims for “losses related to production of trees and forest resources” and for the loss of sequestration facilities would be unrecoverable as indirect or consequential losses and “any losses from trees resulting from exposure to gas necessarily is excluded as consequential loss by Article 27.2 of the GVA”.1642

9.5.1.2 The damage to trees and forest resources

2688 The First Environmental Losses Report, following a visit by the Committee of the site on 10 January 2005, clarifies that the trees affected were not government forests but those of personal and communal trees of a great variety of fruit and other trees:

In interrogation of the people at the time of inspection of area, and in checking of the records do the Forest Division, it is found that there is no government forest within several kilometers surrounding the place of incident. However, the neighboring villages are rich with personal and communal forests. It seems that this blowout caused incredible damage in said village. Huge damage occurred in the rain tree, mango, jackfruit, kazi guava, olive, coconut, betel-nut, bamboo cluster, pineapple, and vegetable gardens. Due to the fire incident, the leaves of nearby trees were burned and have turned brown. There is a possibility that gardens located in remote places will be affected over time. There is the possibility of a negative effect on the rural economy and environment due to this gas disaster.1643

2689 The DoE Subcommittee for Observation and Monitoring, that had visited the site on 11 February 2005, observed in its report of 19 February 2005:


1641 CREC, paragraphs 57 – 64. ↩
1642 CREC, paragraphs 66 and 67. ↩
1643 First Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-1, Appendix 1. ↩

[Page 756]

To the north and eastern side of the main rig-pond and waste-pond there are the trees burnt-out by the break-out of fire. The burnt-out plantation area can be estimated as more or less 300x300 m²,

The main species of plants burnt-out in the upper storey was bamboo, betelnut, jack fruit, albizia (Koroi), mango, coconut, guava and olive trees. In the middle and lower storey there was pine-apple and various other herbs and shrubs which were either burnt-out or damaged by the fire.

2690 The report continued by requiring a detailed survey of “the number of plant resources including the coverage by various species of plants for assessing the damage occurred to the vegetation of the surrounding.”1644

2691 Further to these instructions, the First Monitoring Report noted an ongoing inventory and the Second Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005,1645 produced results from high-resolution satellite imagery, stating that on this investigation, “it is estimated that heat damage to trees in the Tengratila area is restricted to an approximate 200m radius offset slightly from the centre of the blow-out":1646

[Image of a satellite map with circles indicating damage areas]

Figure 8. Satellite image showing approximate zone of damaged trees (red line) and soil fallout (grav line) following the blowout.


1644 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221, page 4. ↩
1645 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79. ↩
1646 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, page 17. The image above was copied from an identical version in the Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, page 13, produced in the Arbitration with a better reproduction quality. ↩

[Page 757]

2692 The Second Monitoring Report explained:

Most heat damage was concentrated on trees within the Joint Venture compound and along the north margin of the primary containment pond and some elevated ground to the immediate east and southeast of the crater. A detailed inventory of heat damaged trees for the 55 temporarily relocated families most affected by the blow-out is shown in column 26 of Appendix-A.1647 Since the initial blow-out it is apparent that while a number of trees have been killed some heat damaged trees which initially suffered defoliation have begun to regenerate leaves.1648

2693 The Third Monitoring Report, dated 3 May 2005, refers to the satellite imagery reported in the First and Second Monitoring Reports, and confirms the area of the damage to trees. It adds:

The recent frequent rain is helping re-leafing some of the trees in the burned out area. A detailed inventory of heat damaged trees has been completed and available upon DoE's request.1649

2694 Concerning this inventory, the Third Monitoring Report states:

The Joint Ventures' environmental team has completed revisiting the area for specific details of the damaged trees and has finalized the tree inventory. The inventory includes all burned and partial heat damaged along with unburned trees. A total of 306 trees were documented as “burned” of which 78 (25.5%) were within the Joint Venture's Property. An additional 1702 trees were identified as “partially burned”, of these 200 (11.8) were also within the Joint Venture's property. “The heat affected vegetation area is of approximately 2.5 hector. The DC committee is sharing the inventory in their assessment on loss of timber, firewood, fruit and medicine values. The DoE committee is assessing the loss of environmental services.1650

2695 The Local Losses Report,1651 dated 8 June 2005, included “Affected fruit garden and trees” as one of the sectors covered. The reported losses show that most of the 165 families suffered loss of trees. This Report recorded for each


1647 The reference is to the appendix to the Monitoring Report, which shows for the families of Jamal Udin and Abdul Malek losses of trees similar to those recorded in the Local Losses Report. ↩
1648 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, section 4. For the inventory see above, Section 9.2.2. ↩
1649 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, Section 4.1. ↩
1650 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, Section 9.7. ↩
1651 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis). ↩

[Page 758]

family the number of trees and their species, the extent of damage and the monetary value of the loss.1652

2696 The Fifth Monitoring Report, dated 27 June 2005,1653 refers to a “2nd and 3rd high-resolution imagery and pictures [...] illustrating where the more conspicuous heat damaged trees in the Tengratila area were”; it refers to [g]round truthing and conventional photography”, confirming the observations about the location of “conspicuous heat damage". It adds observations specific to abnormalities in jackfruit trees:

On May 21, 2005 the Joint Venture's Environmental team observed some abnormalities in Jack Fruit trees at the north side of the crater. Apparently it seems that some jackfruit trees are dying or very unhealthy which could be linked to gas bubbling and possible alterations to the water table for a prolonged period of time as shown in Plate 4.1654

2697 The Sixth Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2005, states that the survey of impacts to vegetation was completed and the results were “progressively reported in previous progress reports”. It refers to the “detailed inventory” by the Local Losses Report and Niko's compensation. With respect to the second blowout that had occurred on 24 June 2005:

The recent blowout of relief well (Chhatak Well #2A) generated intense heat within about 200m of the blowout, however, the zone of heat damaged vegetation did not extend past that already being affected by the original blowout with the exception of a grassy, recently reclaimed area on Joint Venture property along the south margin of the Chhatak 2A well.

2698 Under the heading of “Heat Damaged Trees”, the Report continues:

As mentioned above the inventory of heat damage trees following the blowout of Chhatak_Well #2 was previously completed and reported. Monsoon rain has stimulated growth in some heat damaged trees. The relief well blowout at Chhatak 2A had minimal heat effects on nearby tree cover (Plate 2). Since there were no trees in the east, west and south of the well location the extent of tree damage was minimal. The Joint Venture's environmental team continues to monitor and document significant changes in the vegetation.

1652 For details see below Section 9.5.1.3. ↩
1653 Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-46. The letter communicating this Report to the DoE is dated 9 July 2005. ↩
1654 Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-46, Section 4.1. ↩

[Page 759]

2699 The 20th Monitoring Report, transmitted by Niko to the DoE on 23 July 2006, summarises past reports concerning Heat Damaged Trees:

The Chattak 2 blowout resulted in heat damage to in excess of about 200 trees, many of which were on NIKO property and immediately adjacent land to the east and north. Based on spatial analysis of satellite imagery for the site it is estimated that trees in the village area within an area of approximately 2.11 ha (21,054m2) have suffered more direct and chronic effects while trees in adjacent areas have been either unaffected and or appear fully recovered. A complete inventory of trees conspicuously damaged during the initial phase of the blowout was completed and included in the original damage inventory. Tree damage by heat was further inventoried by government specialists and used as the basis for its estimate of compensation owing to villagers and which was subsequently paid by NIKO. The intense heat from the 2nd blowout has damaged some trees in the northwest of the blowout, however the damage is far less than the previous blowout in January 2005. Heat affected trees within a 0.69 ha (6900 m2) area within the village area (excluding areas within Niko's compound).1655

2700 In the Arbitration, Mr Glaholt testified in his First Witness Statement, dated 29 May 2014, that the “effect of the blowouts on local vegetation was extensively monitored and carefully documented by myself and Crown in the Monitoring Reports”. He concluded about the damage:

We found that the heat affected vegetation area was approximately 2.5 hectares. This stands in contrast to the area of burned vegetation estimated by the Government's environmental committees that almost doubled our finding.1656

2701 Mr Farid Uddin Ahmed testified in his Witness Statement, dated 5 March 2016 (WS Ahmed):

The fruit trees in my home garden lost their leaves a few days after the first blowout. Some of them died and we had to replant some trees.1657

2702 The Tribunal concludes on the evidence before it that the damage to trees was caused by the first blowout; for the purpose of the present damage to vegetation claim it considers the damage by the second blowout as negligible. As the First Environmental Losses Report noted, the trees affected were not


1655 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, Section 9.8. ↩
1656 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 54 and 56. ↩
1657 WS Ahmed, paragraph 13. ↩

[Page 760]

government forests but those of personal and communal trees. The damage to these “personal and communal trees” was assessed by surveys of the Environmental Losses Committees, examining specifically the trees affected, and by the environmental consultants Crown Agents/Tera (Mr Glaholt), considering the area around the blowout.

9.5.1.3 Compensation by Niko of the Losses of Production of Trees and Forest Resources

2703 The first item of BAPEX's claim for damage to vegetation is identified as the losses related to production of trees and forest resources. BAPEX relies on the Second Environmental Losses Report, which in turn is based on a “survey of the Forest Division of Sylhet”. This Forest Division “estimated the current market value of different types of trees, their wood prices, their firewood value, and if necessary, an account of fruit production and re-planting of forest resources".

2704 The resources to which this estimate of the Sylhet Forest Division applied were not government forests but “personal and social forests”, as described by the First Environmental Losses Report:

In checking of the records of the Forest Division, it is found that there is no government forest within several kilometers surrounding the place of incident. But, the neighboring villages are enriched with personal and social forests.1658

2705 Neither BAPEX and its experts nor the Second Environmental Losses Report explain how the Sylhet Forest Division proceeded in estimating the losses of these “personal and social forest”. The Second Report merely states that the amount is an estimated “current market value”.

2706 This estimate was followed by a different assessment of the loss by another governmental organisation: as explained above in Section 9.2.1.4, the Local Losses Report, dated 8 June 2005, was produced by a committee formed further to directions from the Energy and Mineral Resources Division, and convened by Md. Jafar Siddique, the Deputy Commissioner Sunamganj. In preparing the Report, the “authorised officers went to the affected houses in the field and prepared the report of losses”, recording for each one of the affected families the number of trees and the related damage.

2707 The amount which BAPEX claims pursuant to the Second Environmental Losses Report for damage to vegetation is substantially above that of the subsequent assessment of not only the lost and damaged trees but the Local


1658 First Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-1. ↩

[Page 761]

Losses Report for all local losses. BAPEX does not explain the differences between the two valuations and disregards the subsequent far more detailed assessment by the Local Losses Committee. The Tribunal has therefore examined whether the loss quantified in the Second Environmental Losses Report includes any damage which was not included in the Local Losses Report.

2708 The Local Losses Report provides detailed information about the loss elements that it took into account. As demonstration, the Tribunal takes as a first example item 1 of the “List of the Victimised Families”,1659 which records the loss of the family of Mr Jamal Uddin and identifies their damage. The part concerning the loss of trees, provides the following information:

Jamal Uddin, Father – Late Tofazzol Hossain Village Tengratila.

2709 The factual description of the damage is grouped by types of trees, starting with jackfruit trees:

8 jackfruit trees (big) have been partially burnt by heat. As a result production has decreased by 50% (8 x 25 Jackfruit x 50/=) x 50%,

2710 This damage is assessed at BDT 5'000 with the following calculation:

Each of the Jackfruit trees produces 25 jackfruits. Each jackfruit costs Tk. 50/= Has been considered only for sale in the market”; the loss is valued at 5'000.

2711 This is followed by the description of the damage of areca trees:

20 areca trees (big) have been totally burnt in their tops (20 Pieces x 400/= timber value) + (20 x 400/= x 0.50,

2712 The value of these trees is assessed at BDR 12'000, with the following explanation:

Each of the areca trees values Tk. 400. Produces 400 nuts x 0.50/=.

2713 The same exercise is performed for “2 lichi trees (medium) decreased by 50%”, “2 coconut trees (partly burned), production decreased by 50%”, 2 guava trees, reduced by 50% and “2 bamboo thickets have been burnt totally (2 x 20 pieces of bamboo x @ 60/"


1659 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), Table with the evaluation of damage in the Upazila area: Doarabazar District-Sunamganj. ↩

[Page 762]

2714 The same type of information is provided for the estimates of the damage suffered by Mr Md. Abdul Malek, in Tengratila, recorded in item 2 on the list; the section on damage to trees starts with jackfruit trees:

30 jackfruit trees (big), have been totally burnt. Price of wood + fire wood (30 x 15 cft x 600/=) + 05 mounds of fire wood x@40/ = x 30 + (2,70,00/= + 30,000/= 3,00,000/=

2715 The damage is assessed at BDT 300'000 with the following explanation:

Each of the big jackfruit trees timber value 15cft x @ 600/=, Firewood 20 mounds @40/=

2716 Md. Abdul Malek also suffered damage by the loss of “various types of timber trees (medium)”, “3 year old timber tree plant 52 pieces”, “2 coconut trees”, “20 areca trees” and “1 palm tree (big)”, each assessed in the same manner.

2717 This type of assessment is made for many other families which had damage to or destruction of their trees.

2718 The Second Environmental Losses Report estimated “the current market value of different types of trees, their wood prices, their firewood value, and if necessary, an account of fruit production and re-planting of forest resources”. The Local Losses Report assesses these losses specifically in communication with the directly affected families.

2719 The Tribunal concludes that the damage to trees in the categories listed in the Second Environmental Losses Report, dated 13 April 2005, have been subject to a meticulous and detailed contemporaneous assessment by the Local Losses Committee and recorded in its Report of 8 June 2005. BAPEX and its experts have not identified any item of damage listed in the Second Environmental Losses Report that subsequently has not been assessed specifically in the Local Losses Report, including subsequent updates, referred to above. In the absence of any argument that items of loss were excluded or overlooked in the Local Losses Report, the Tribunal concludes that the losses related to production of trees and forest resources have been as assessed conclusively by the Local Losses Committee. The losses so assessed and subsequent updates have been paid by Niko. This item of the claim must be dismissed.

9.5.1.4 The re-plantation costs

2720 The second item of BAPEX's damage to vegetation claim, described as "Re-plantation cost”, is based on an “estimation of the Forestry Division". There is no explanation about the manner in which the Forestry Division proceeded in preparing this estimate, nor are there any indications about the

[Page 763]

programme for such re-plantation; and there is no explanation who was planned to implement the re-plantation; and there is no allegation that the Forestry Division or any other organisation, for which BAPEX is entitled to act, carried out such a programme or paid for it.

2721 The only evidence or assertion about re-plantation of burnt or damaged trees concerns the tree planting programme, which Niko ordered, apparently acting on behalf of the Niko-BAPEX Joint Venture. The programme is described as providing for planting more than double the number seedlings than burnt or partially burnt trees, as quoted above.

2722 The Third Monitoring Report described this programme, indicating the number of seedlings and quantifying the costs at BDT 462’800:

The Joint Venture feels that the environmental services of the trees is important and therefore came up with a draft program of burned and damaged tree replacement which it feels will practically and reasonably restore lost environmental services associated with damaged vegetation. According to the program the joint venture will replant 4 good quality seedling for each burned tree and 2 same quality seedling for each heat damaged with the assumed responsibility of procurement, plantation and tree husbandry. The cost involvement for procuring seedling alone will be four hundred sixty thousand Taka. (Table 3) for replacing the burned trees.

Table 3. Procurement of seedlings

Number of
Damage Trees
Number of
Replanting Seedling
Cost of
Seedling (TK)
Burned trees 306 1,224 1,22,400
Partial burned trees 1,702 3,404 3,40,400
Total 2,008 4,628 4,62,800

The Joint Venture is further more emphasizing the habitat restoration thus they are committed to plant a matching number of seedlings within its own compound (Table 3) and along their road. Under this habitat restoration program they intend to plant a total of 9,256 trees. In addition to that the Joint Venture will bear the planting and husbandry costs.1660


1660 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, page 20. ↩

[Page 764]

2723 It has not been contested that this programme was indeed implemented. Mr Glaholt testified about this programme:

Niko implemented a tree planting and maintenance program. Niko obtained and planted the seedlings, and assumed the responsibility for the care and management of growing the seedlings.1661

2724 The Tribunal concludes that the “re-plantation” programme, quantified in the Second Environmental Losses Report, has been implemented by Niko at its own expense. The Tribunal sees no basis on which BAPEX could claim for the cost of this re-plantation.

9.5.1.5 Has Niko's plantation programme successfully
restored the trees and forest resources?

2725 Concerning the recovery of damaged trees and plantation of new trees Mr Glaholt stated that, in addition to the re-planting of trees discussed in the prior section, the rainy season contributed to the rapid recovery of the damaged trees:

In the aftermath of the first blowout, the frequent rain during monsoon season helped many of the trees re-leaf as recorded in the third Monitoring Report. This regeneration was in addition to a restoration program sponsored by Niko which entailed the replanting of good quality seedlings to make up for each burned tree or partially burned tree. (Exhibit C-35, Crown Agents and Tera Consultants, Third Environmental Monitoring Report, at 12, 20 (3 May 2005)).1662

2726 Similarly, the Sixth Monitoring Report recorded: “Monsoon rain has stimulated growth in some heat damaged trees.”1663

2727 To demonstrate that the re-plantation and the natural recovery produced a full restoration, the Claimant relies also on the EVI Report, dated 25 August 2020.1664 This report identifies Land Use Land Cover (LULC), distinguishing between February and the November data, reflecting the dry and the Monsoon period, and emphasised the increasing use of “infrastructure”.

2728 The Report observed that, within a range of 2km from the blowout, the “tree cover” increased by approximately 41% (73ha) from 2004 to 2005 and that trend continued thereafter. The area covered by “infrastructure also increased


1661 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 60. ↩
1662 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 63. ↩
1663 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 17. ↩
1664 EVI Report, Exhibit C-285, see above Section 9.2.3. ↩

[Page 765]

dramatically over the period” from approximately 9 ha in February 2004 to 28 ha by 2020. Land area classified as “agriculture” (encompassing crop, fallow, pasture) exhibited a reverse trend, declining between 2004 and 2005 by 7.3% and continuing this decline until 2010 with a slight increase thereafter.

2729 Concerning the range of 250m from the blowout, the Report presents the changes graphically for the February and the November data the LULC:

LULC Change within 250m (February)

2004 2005 2010 2020
Agriculture 14.04 12.33 10.8 10.28
Tree cover 5.76 8.01 8.28 5.9
Waterbody 1.53 0.54 1.8 0.79
Infrastructure 0.81 1.26 1.26 3.28
Sandy Area 0 0 0 0

Figure 8 Time series variation in land cover within the 250m radius
study area, in1 February from 2004-2020

LULC Change within 250m (November)

2004 2005 2019 2019
Agriculture 9.36 5.13 9.45 10.22
Tree cover 8.01 7.92 7.65 5.41
Waterbody 3.6 7.83 3.6 1.61
Infrastructure 1.17 1.26 1.44 3.01
Sandy Area 0 0 0 0

Figure 9. Time series variation in land cover within the 250m radius
study area, in November from 2004-2020

2730 The Report points out that, within the 250m range, the Niko site occupied some 4 ha (20.4%) and that surface was increased by an additional 1.6 ha to 5.6 ha (29% of 250 radius area). “This expansion involved the conversion of what were classified as agricultural lands”. Figure 8 (February) was commented by pointing out the “decreasing trend in agricultural land, and a possible increase of relatively stable tree cover through 2010 followed by a return to pre-blowout baseline levels by 2020. The area given to infrastructure more than doubled between 2010 and 2020".

2731 The EVI Report concluded:

Overall, the various indices examined suggest impacts to vegetation associated with proximity to the blowout were most apparent within 250m in the year immediately following the blowout and appear to have recovered or partially recovered by 2010 and to be indiscernible by 2020.1665


1665 EVI Report, Exhibit C-285, page 44. ↩

[Page 766]

2732 In Mr Glaholt's reading, the EVI Report

concludes that there was an impact from the blowout within 250m of the well site, and to a lesser extent, some impact out to 500m from the well site. These impacts were either partially or fully returned to the 2004 baseline conditions by 2010, and fully recovered by 2019-2020.

The EVI Report also finds some evidence that by 2019-2020 vegetation health conditions had improved beyond what they were in 2004, before the blowout. There are many reasons for why this could have occurred. Regardless of the reason it does not suggest any lingering impact to vegetation (agriculture and tree cover) or water as a result of the blowout. The EVI Report also notes an approximately 200% increase in infrastructure within 2km of the well site from 2004 through 2020. This means that there are more buildings and development, including associated infrastructure, in 2019-2020 than there were in 2004.

2733 BAPEX produced evidence that places doubt about the full recovery as described by Mr Glaholt:

2734 Mr Farid Uddin Ahmed testified that by the time of his Witness Statement, dated 5 March 2016, the production of his own fruit trees had “nearly recovered”, but that that of many others had not:

The growth of the trees that survived was stunned. They did not produce much fruit and the fruit that was produced looked distorted. In fact, a Niko representative advised us to not eat this produce because they said it might be contaminated by the sand that fell over the village. My harvests have gradually improved over the years, for the first two or three years, I was able to harvest very little. Today, my own production has nearly recovered to pre-blowout levels. However, this is not true for many.1666

2735 In the BBL Experts I report there were comments on the damage to trees and the recovery. The experts refer to their site visit in February 2016:

During the site visit a number of dead trees were seen along with dead saplings. Without a full survey it is difficult to judge the percentage of trees lost.1667


1666 WS Ahmed, paragraph 13. ↩
1667 BBL I, paragraph 163. ↩

[Page 767]

2736 The experts nevertheless conclude:

The restitution of trees in many of the areas within the village of Tengratila has not been effective to date.1668

and

However, the effect on trees and vegetables is still evident. A number of trees have been lost since the blowout and re-planted trees have not survived in a number of cases. It was reported that the growth rates of trees post blowout is reduced and that the quantity of fruit produced is lower than pre blowout levels.1669

and

The restitution of trees in many of the areas within the village of Tengratila has not been effective to date.1670

2737 Apart from their visual observation in 2016, the BBL Experts rely on a “study [that] indicated up to one third of trees have been lost in the area”. That study is the master dissertation of Mr Ziauddin Ahmed.1671

2738 Mr Ahmed discusses in section 4.1.4.1 of his 2012 dissertation with "Condition of Trees: Number of Trees Declined Immensely”. Without any reference to the Local Losses Report, the monitoring reports or other documentary evidence, Mr Ahmed relied on what he was told in “community discussion and in interviews”. He states:

Tengra Tila area was once full of trees and bushes. Still there are many trees and wildlife. But number of trees has been declined to one-third of the number previous.

2739 The “huge deforestation” that took place because"[m]ost of the trees were burnt by the flame of the gas”, because "[m]ost of the trees died during the last few years after the blowout” and, in the opinion of most of the respondents in his interviews “thought that the trees were dying due to the source of underground and surface water”. He pointed out that there “were other reasons also, those were cutting of trees and natural dying of trees”.1672


1668 BBL I, Section 1.3.2.3, page 7. ↩
1669 BBL I, paragraph162. ↩
1670 BBL I, paragraph 243. ↩
1671 Ahmed, Exhibit R-123; see above Section 9.2.3, quoted by BBL I, paragraph 163. ↩
1672 Ahmed, Exhibit R-123, page 42. ↩

[Page 768]

2740 The Claimant points out that the visit of BBL Experts was only in 2016 and states that “the extent they observed a dead tree or sampling, their observations followed innumerable intervening and supervening events”; the Claimant goes on to describe such events.1673

2741 Mr Glaholt commented in his second witness statement the statements of the BBL Experts:

At paragraphs 161 through 164 and 216, the Betton Report focuses on impacts to agriculture, noting that the effect of the blowout on trees and vegetables is still evident. This does not align with what I saw, and what Crown and I reported in the Monitoring Reports in the years after the blowout. The EVI Report also shows that to the extent there were any lingering, discernible impacts from the blowout on trees and vegetation in 2010, these are now resolved.

2742 The Tribunal notes that it is uncontested that Niko implemented a large-scale re-plantation programme that was intended to replace and surpass the pre-blowout number of trees. There are indications that the restoration succeeded: the EVI Report points in this direction and Mr Farid Uddin Ahmed's fruit trees had recovered by 2016. He provided no information who were those for whom this was not the case and why the trees did not recover by 2016. As Mr Ziauddin Ahmed noted, there were different causes why trees died and had not recovered by 2012.

2743 In these circumstances the Tribunal does not accept that the damaged trees, that the BBL Experts saw during their visit to the site in 2016, are evidence that the re-plantation programme was not successfully completed and that further re-plantation is justified as restoration measure following the first blowout in 2005. The Tribunal concludes based on the evidence before it that the forest resources and trees have been restored.

9.5.1.6 The claims for the “loss of sequestration facility of
CO2"

2744 BAPEX presents two items concerning “Cost due to loss of sequestration facility of CO2”, one is qualified by a reference to “agriculture”, the other is unqualified.

2745 The Claimant relies on the argument that it presented also against the claim for atmospheric pollution: in the absence of a legal obligation to offset carbon


1673 CREC, paragraph 63 with reference to paragraphs 23 and 45. ↩

[Page 769]

dioxide emissions under the UNFCCC, “there can be no loss for any loss of carbon sequestration facility”.1674

2746 The Tribunal has considered above in Section 9.4.12BAPEX's claim for lost carbon sequestration due to burning trees. To the extent to which this loss is claimed here again, it must be dismissed as double claiming.

2747 The Tribunal noted, however, that the Second Environmental Losses Committee referred to another type of loss which it described as the loss of “ecological service of trees”. It did so in the following passage in the Second Environmental Losses Report, as quoted above:

Considering the environmental background, the Committee has included the carbon sequestration losses under ecological services of the forest resources. However, the atmospheric cooling and humidification factors comprised in the ecological services of trees were not included due to lack of information and data.1675

2748 The Tribunal understands this passage to mean that the Committee considers that “the atmospheric cooling and humidification factors” are part of the “ecological services of trees” and the loss of some trees and damage to others is a loss of these ecological services; but for lack of information and data the Committee was unable to quantify it and therefore did not include it in the claim.

2749 The tree cover was restored over time and the ecological loss was reduced as this restoration advanced. While the trees were growing to reach the size and shape of the burnt trees they were replacing, the local population was deprived of these benefits.

2750 The Tribunal sees this temporary loss of the “ecological services” of the forest resources and trees as part of the damage to the “forest resources”. There is no indication that this temporary loss of the “ecological services” of the forest resources and trees has been included in the assessment of the Local Loss Report; the Tribunal concludes therefore that the loss of these general benefits is not covered by the corresponding payments made by Niko.

2751 The Tribunal understands that this temporary loss, while included in the overall loss for which BAPEX claims, has not been quantified specifically in the Second Environmental Losses Report, nor has it been quantified by BAPEX and its experts as a specific head of damage. The Tribunal therefore


1674 CREC, paragraph 66. ↩
1675 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), item 2. ↩

[Page 770]

considers this loss as part of the general adverse effects of the blowout and addresses this aspect of the environmental damage below in Section 9.5.8.

2752 In summary on the claim for damage to vegetation (trees and forest resources), the Tribunal concludes that (a) the claim item for losses related to production of trees and forest resources has been assessed in the Local Losses Report and subsequent updates; any loss has been compensated by Niko; (b) the claim item for re-plantation costs is dismissed because there is no loss for which BAPEX can claim since Niko itself has carried out the re-plantation; (c) the claim items for loss of sequestration facility of CO2, is dismissed for double counting; the claim for the temporary loss of “ecological services" of the forest resources and trees, noted but not quantified by the Second Environmental Losses Committee, is reserved for consideration below in Section 9.5.8.

9.5.2 Loss of water resources

2753 BAPEX seeks BDT 65.1 million as compensation for losses to water resources. The loss had been presented as a separate item in the Second Environmental Losses Report. In the BMЕС, ВАРЕX combined this item of the claim with two other items of losses (loss of soil resources and loss of “environmental system") to a total claim of BDT 92.6 million, stated to be equivalent to USD 1’441٬569. Given the difference in the types of alleged losses and the method of quantification, the Tribunal treats the three parts of this claim separately.

2754 For the three types of losses, BAPEX relies on the Second Environmental Losses Report, on the BBL Experts Report II, which had combined the three groups of losses and on Brattle III, for the USD equivalent. In the BMD, BAPEX had complained about Niko's “approach to the assessment of the drinking water quality”.1676 It produced the ESG Report1677 and, relying on the conclusions reached by the BBL Experts Report I,1678 concluded that the result of water sample analysis of this report “show high levels of arsenic in water, which exceed the Bangladesh drinking water standard”.1679

2755 The Second Environmental Losses Report describes the damage to water resources, mentioning damage to the aquifer and the wells, with consequences for the drinking water, agriculture and fishponds:

Considering the neighboring area, the losses of water resources are long-term. The blowout explosion in Tengratila Gas Field spread out over a


1676 BMD, paragraphs 303- 306. ↩
1677 See above Section 9.2.3. ↩
1678 BBL I, paragraph 184. ↩
1679 BMD, paragraph 341. ↩

[Page 771]

wide range north and south of the area. It seems blowout bubbles, seepage, and debris were blown out widely over the surrounding area, affecting the underwater aquifer including the underground fishery pond and water of the agricultural field. All the wells and tube-wells used as drinkable water sources became unfit for use. The contaminated water caused by the blowout has made all the surrounding ponds unsuitable for fishing. Moreover, the contaminated water and dredged soil brought to make the Relief Well pad and water mixed with mud have been affecting the production of about 400 hectares of agricultural land. But, if it is possible to completely stop the blowout by installation of a Relief Well, the accurate losses of water resources can be finalized. As a result of the current situation, the source of drinkable water of the area has been lost, and the potential adverse reaction of the blowout has been spread over a wide area of the aquifer, and the water of the fishery pond has been contaminated, thus these places have become unsuitable for cultivation ...1680

2756 Concerning the quantification of the water resources loss, the Report states: “the current losses have been estimated calculating the rehabilitation and replacement costs”.

2757 These estimated “rehabilitation and replacement costs” were identified in four categories:

  1. Sources of drinkable water [20 million BDT] costs estimated to supply and install two deep tube wells for 600 families.
  2. Aquifer [40 million BDT] Purification cost estimated.
  3. Fishery Pond [5 million BDT] Purification estimated.
  4. Damage to agricultural production [10 million BDT] Purification costs estimated.

2758 The Third Environmental Losses Report presented similar findings:

All the members of the committee have agreed that, due to the consecutive accidents, surface and underground drinking water has been seriously affected. In the Tengratila region, the only source of pure drinking water is underground water. People of this locality collect the water through a tube-well. At present, water from the tube-well is completely undrinkable.


1680 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis) paragraph 4. ↩

[Page 772]

It is also not possible to use this gas-mixed tube-well water for the purpose of cooking and bathing.

[...]

After the gas well accident, the water of all the water sources has been tested in a laboratory, and it was found that the quantity of arsenic has increased in the water of all the tube-wells. As a result, villagers are not using this water in any work.

Moreover, since gas and oily elements have been mixed with the underground water, it is assumed to have become polluted. There is a severe possibility of changing the underground water flow line due to the blowout flow of sand and water, which would be revealed slowly, and this will cause a long term irreparable impact and harm, the committee assumed.

2759 The remedial solution proposed in the Third Environmental Losses Report was no longer the “two deep tube wells for 600 families” and “Purification”, as proposed in the Second Report. The Third Environmental Losses Report proposed the installation of a well some 5 km away from the blowout wells and a pipeline to bring the water to Tengratila:

to install a deep tube-well in a remote area away from the site of the accident to arrange the permanent facility for pure drinking water for the people of this area, and upon bringing the water through the pipeline, it will be distributed among the people. Besides, it is proposed to make the water enter underground by means of recharging, so that the natural balance underground can be reset.

2760 The components for this “reconstruction of water supply system” were an observation tube well, a production tube well, supply lines, a pump house, an electric connection and pump installation and an “Iron removing plant (having capacity of 100,00 liters)” at a cost of BDT 20.2 million. In addition, a system for "rehabilitation of affected water carrying aquifer” was provided, including 5 years operation and maintenance costs for a total of BDT 49.5 million.

A loss of BDT 69,700,000 has been estimated in the sector. The committee has recommended arranging the supply of pure water urgently in the affected area through the Department of Public Health Engineering at a cost of BDT 20,200,000 out of the said money. The other

[Page 773]

BDT 49,500,000 is realizable against losses of damaging the aquifer.1681

2761 This amount of BDT 69'700'000 then was claimed in the Money Suit under the heading “Damage to water resources”.1682

2762 The Claimant objects that the assertions about water sources having become unfit for use and about the alleged impact on underground aquifer in the Second Environmental Losses Report were unsupported:

There is no mention of any measurements, results of investigations, or specifics on what contaminants were allegedly present, why these water resources were impacted or why they were there was a loss.1683

2763 The Claimant also refers to the monitoring and reporting prepared by Niko's team of environmental consultants and the tests carried out by the University of Sylhet; it objects that BAPEX and its experts failed to take account of them.1684

2764 The Claimant also referred to what it described as the “extensive program drilling tube wells and installing electric pumps to improve community access to clean water”; and it mentioned 45 new tube wells in the Tengratila area and “seven gravity feed water tanks, each with a capacity of 4000 litres, for community use in the first half of 2006”.1685

2765 The Claimant produced witness statements by Mr Glaholt and Mr Adolph together with monitoring reports, correspondence and expert reports, including in particular Dr Ganus's report of 7 June 2005 that considered the hydrogeologic conditions and the effect of the first blowout on the water resources and the wells.1686 Relying on this report, the Claimant concludes “that there were no significant adverse impact to the aquifer from the blowout".1687

2766 When examining this claim, the Tribunal considered in the Second Environmental Losses Report the statements about “contamination”: in particular the Report asserted that the water had become “unfit for use” and


1681 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), Section 3.8 at pages 11 and 12. ↩
1682 Money Suit Complaint, Exhibit C-6, page 55. ↩
1683 CREC, paragraph 71. ↩
1684 C-CD.2, paragraph 182. ↩
1685 CREC, paragraph 74. ↩
1686 Evaluation of Hydrogeologic Conditions at the Niko-BAPEX Chattak Well #2 Blowout Site, Exhibit C-38; see above Section 9.2.3. ↩
1687 CREC, paragraph 76. ↩

[Page 774]

explained: “All the wells and tube-wells used as drinkable water sources became unfit for use”, “unsuitable for fishing” and “unsuitable for cultivation”.

2767 Concerning the losses related to "agricultural land” and "fishery production”, the Second Environmental Losses Report states that they were investigated by “the Committee formed by the local Deputy Commissioner".1688 Some two months after this Report, the Deputy Commissioner Sunamganj issued on 8 June 2005 the Local Losses Report which does indeed include an assessment of losses related to agriculture and fishery.1689 Relying on this Local Losses Report and witness statements, the Claimant asserts that “any damages in these areas have been fully compensated as a result of the payments made by Niko shortly after the blowout".1690 As pointed out above in Section 9.3.2, BBL Experts in their First Report stated in 2016 that “more investigation would have been required to determine the full extent of damage to agriculture and fisheries”.1691 No such investigations seem to have been carried out and in 2021 BAPEX wrote: “In the absence of opportunity for further investigation into the full extent of damages caused by the first blowout, Respondents do not claim additional losses to agriculture and fisheries”.1692 No reservation was made by BAPEX with respect to losses to agriculture and fisheries caused by water allegedly rendered unfit.

2768 The Tribunal concludes that BAPEX does not claim that water was rendered unfit for agriculture and fisheries. The remaining claim concerns alleged losses related to drinking water.

2769 With respect to drinking water, BAPEX had focused on arsenic in the water. In the BMD, the title about “Damage to water resources” was qualified by the words: “high levels of arsenic in drinking water”. BAPEX asserted that “the blowouts are likely to be a major, if not the primary, cause of the high level of arsenic poisoning present in people living in Tengratila”.1693 The assertion relies on a statement in the BBL Experts I report:

Arsenic levels that exceeded the Bangladesh drinking water standard of 0.05mg/litre were found in 3 of the 4 tube wells that were sampled (0.11, 0.174 and 0.235mg/litre). Even though the shallower wells were found not to be contaminated, these results indicate that a significant number of wells in Tengratila are likely to have elevated levels of arsenic. This is


1688 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 4, paragraph 3. ↩
1689 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis). ↩
1690 CREC, paragraph 68. ↩
1691 BBL I, paragraph 14. ↩
1692 BMEC, paragraph 19. ↩
1693 BMD, title of section VII(C)(4)(b), and paragraph 341. ↩

[Page 775]

likely to be a major, if not the sole primary, cause of the high level of arsenic poisoning present in people living in Tengratila.1694

2770 In response, the Claimant pointed out that arsenic is a widespread problem in Bangladesh and that this had been pointed out already in the EIA:

Safe drinking water is not available to many of the households in the area. Arsenic contamination in ground water has been identified in 10% of tube wells in the study area. These residents depend on tube wells, pond and/or rivers as their source of drinking water.1695

2771 Mr Glaholt provided some background information to the occurrence of arsenic in Bangladesh:

Arsenic is present throughout Bangladesh as a result of rocks rich in arsenic being eroded from the Himalayas and deposited throughout the country (Exhibit C-294, Nepotism and Neglect (April 2016)). These sediments release arsenic into the groundwater. River water is also known to deposit arsenic contamination that seeps into the aquifers and groundwater (Exhibit C-293, Kolkata's arsenic levels to rise after recent Nepal earthquake (14 May 2015)). In the monsoon season, large areas of land around Tengratila are connected by those seasonal water flows. This constant pattern will have an on arsenic levels along with the environment, agriculture, fisheries and other aspects of daily life.1696

2772 As pointed out in some of the Monitoring Reports, some of the wells had been labelled "good", further to a survey that had been conducted in 1999 “by British Geological Survey (BGS), Mott MacDonald Ltd. UK” for the Department of Public Health and Engineering (DPHE).1697

2773 The Second Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005, explained that the environmental inventory had identified a total of the 173 wells between 0.5 and 1.0 km radius from the blowout and that samples from all of them were tested for arsenic content between 7 and 29 March 2005. In 16% of these wells (28 wells) arsenic was detected. The arsenic level in 14 of these wells exceeded the Bangladesh standard. The report pointed out that all of these wells “had been marked as contaminated by Department of Public Health and


1694 BBL I, paragraph 184. The assertion that 3 out of 4 sampled tube wells had arsenic levels above the Bangladesh drinking water standard is based on the ESG Report (see above Section 9.2.3); see BMD, paragraph 341, and BBL I, paragraph 182. ↩
1695 EIA Report, Exhibit R-72 and C-13, section 5.3.1, page 45. ↩
1696 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 30. ↩
1697 E.g. 12th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-62, and 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, Section 3.1.1. ↩

[Page 776]

Engineering (DPHE) prior to the blowout”.1698 Mr Glaholt explained that the tests were performed by the Sylhet University and included tests for arsenic. He asserted “whenever test results indicated the presence of threatening levels of arsenic in a drinking well, we oversaw the closure of the well”.1699

2774 Neither BAPEX nor its experts mention the prior survey of the DPHE and the wells marked as contaminated; nor do they discuss the comment in the Second Monitoring Report about the pre-blowout contamination of some of the wells. The Third Environmental Losses Report, issued 15 September 2005, also makes no reference to them and does not refer to the 173 wells tested by the Niko consultants but refers to “10 existing water sources” and states that “[a]rsenic was found in 3 water sources”. It asserts that after “the gas well accident, the water of sources has been tested in a laboratory, and it was found that the quantity of arsenic has increased in the water of all the tube-wells”.1700 The report does not state which of the wells were tested and how it was determined that arsenic in the water had increased.

2775 The BBL EXPERTs in their first report asserted that “the effects of the blowouts are the only observable reasonable cause for increased levels of arsenic".1701

2776 In the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision1702 the Tribunal noted that the gas from the blowouts did not contain arsenic and examined the explanations by BAPEX's experts about how the blowout could cause an increase of arsenic in the water of some wells. The Tribunal noted that the experts presented different theories about the processes by which arsenic in the ground could be dissolved and enter the water. The processes were complex and rested on a number of assumptions. According to the experts the “arsenic containing minerals" must “react under different conditions to form water soluble compounds"; bacteria, oxidation or liquids containing 15% acids were given as possible explanations for these processes.

2777 The Tribunal concluded, even if it were assumed that the blowouts caused an increase in arsenic content of the water, it was unable to consider any of the different processes described by the experts as a natural result of Niko's fault as Operator when it decided the casing depth and performed the wiper trip in the course of which the first blowout occurred. It concluded that the loss and damage that may have been caused by the first blowout was remote and


1698 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, Section 3.1.2, page 4. ↩
1699 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 83. ↩
1700 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 11. ↩
1701 BBL I, paragraph 211. ↩
1702 See above Section 4.6. ↩

[Page 777]

indirect and as a consequential loss was excluded by the Contract Act and the JVA.1703

2778 The Tribunal concludes that it has not been established that the first blowout caused an increase of arsenic in the water of some wells. It confirms its conclusion that, in any event, if such a causation had been established, Niko's liability would be excluded under the law of Bangladesh and the JVA.

2779 The Tribunal now turns to examining the evidence for any other loss or damage to the water resources attributable to the first blowout.

2780 The Tribunal notes that the quality of the water, for drinking and other purposes, was a concern from the beginning of the post-blowout period, both on the side of the DoE and other Bangladesh authorities and on the side of Niko and its monitoring consultants:

2781 The first information about monitoring seems to have been the Environmental Audit and Monitoring Programme of Niko's consultant Mr Glaholt, dated 26 January 2005. This programme included sampling and monitoring water wells and flow, including “expedited”“detailed chemical analysis”.1704

2782 The DoE Observations and Monitoring Report of 19 February 2005 by a DoE subcommittee noted the assessing and monitoring parameters and “suggests incorporating more issues of environment into their monitoring system". With respect to water issues, the DoE Observations and Monitoring Report found “underground water coming forcibly up” and “tube-wells where water is coming up”; and it stated:

There were a number of drinking water holes, an indigenous technique of abstracting ground water. The level of water in these holes has either been increased or some cases been dried. Thus the sources for drinking water for the families have become unsuitable for drinking.


1703 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, Section 10.4.3, in particular paragraphs 561 – 566. ↩
1704 Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25. ↩

[Page 778]

2783 This "indigenous technique” of “drinking water holes” is also described as “kua wells”. In one of the Monitoring Reports kua wells are described as “shallow hand dug wells”;1705 several reports show the following photograph of a kua well:1706

[Image Omitted]

Plate 1. Kua well in Tengratila, January 24, 2006.

2784 The Subcommittee instructed monitoring of the “quality of the upwelling water of sprinklers and the tube wells” and:

Alternative arrangements of drinking water should [be] immediately planned for the villagers as the sources of drinking water have already diminished by the blowout situation.

2785 With respect to the groundwater aquifer the report notes that the “blowout so far aggravated a huge area which might have affected the groundwater aquifer”. It instructed that Niko “monitor the disturbance of the groundwater aquifer to ensure the status of the aquifer after the blowout” in “3-5 square km area surrounding the main blowout”.


1705 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 12. ↩
1706 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, 19th Environmental Monitoring Report, May 2006 (19th Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit C-68, page 15; see also Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, 18th Environmental Monitoring Report, 10 April 2006 (18th Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit R-80, page 15. ↩

[Page 779]

2786 Further to these instructions, the First Monitoring Report, dated 28 February 2005, reported that Crown Agents were “surveying the area to locate all the Tube wells, Kua wells and ponds” and that they were “sampling water from all wells, ponds, primary and secondary containment ponds and crater”. It listed the number of wells and the types of tests. It also reported that the Niko consultants established a “Water Monitoring Program” and reported preliminary findings of a primary assessment.

2787 The Second Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005,1707 contained further details in the section on “Water Monitoring”. In the “current inventory of water resource features within 1 km radius of the blowout” it listed the following:

2788 Referring to the instructions to “monitor the quality of upwelling water of flowing tube wells (‘sprinklers') and regular tube wells, the Second Monitoring Report provides results concerning water chemistry of drinking water wells and other water resources, distinguishing for wells in a 500m radius from the blowout, 500 – 1000 radius and in a 1 – 5km radius. It also reports on the Tengratila Aquifer, including the “artesian flow” caused by the seeping gas and the water levels in the kua wells. It continues by reporting on the water in ponds, the blowout crater and on blowout points, bubbles and seepages.

2789 The subsequent Monitoring Reports contain similar reports dealing with the progress of the monitoring and testing and providing data from the testing.

2790 Some of the later Reports summarise the prior monitoring action. The Tribunal refers to the explanations in the 20th Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2006.1708 This Report summarises the water monitoring programme, including the following elements:


1707 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79. ↩
1708 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69. ↩

[Page 780]

The inventory of water resources has documented all water wells within 500 meters (29 Tube wells and 51 Kua wells); between 500m & 1000m (33 Tube wells and 58 Kua wells) and between 1km & 5km (5 Tube wells and 5 Kua wells) of the blowout as well as all surface water features. The inventory of kua wells and tube wells was limited to within 1000m of the blowout.

2791 The Report continues by presenting in detail the results of this monitoring about the water chemistry with the following conclusion:

There is no basis to conclude that contamination of wells has occurred as a result of release of drilling fluids, in part on their very high pH and low permeability.1710

2792 With respect to the Tengratila Aquifer, the Report explained the reasons for the elevated water levels and the bubbles:

Following the first blowout it became apparent that the uncontrolled release of gas had pressurized the shallow groundwater aquifer above the regional seal which originally confined the gas to deeper zones not connected to the aquifer. The result of this was that water was forced to the surface, in many instances resulting in formation of small springs or “landflows”, elevated water levels in kua wells (shallow hand dug wells) and production of water from several tube wells which previously required hand pumping.

2793 Further to the concern about aquifer disturbance expressed in DoE Observations and Monitoring Report of 19 February 2005 mentioned above, the 20th Monitoring Report continues by explaining that “monitored change


1709 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 5. ↩
1710 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 12. ↩

[Page 781]

in the local aquifer by monitoring artesian flow, gas production and water chemistry in a group of tube wells and kua wells as well as monitored change in the occurrence of blowout-induced springs and ground fissures". It provides an “update of recent data on tube well flow, kua well level, boils and seepages" and concludes:

Expert review of subsurface geological conditions thus far suggests that long-term structural change to the aquifer is unlikely. No evidence of aquifer contamination by drilling fluids has been detected. Test on gas from the reservoir indicate it is 97% methane and had no detectable hydrocarbon liquids.1711

2794 The artisanal flow caused by the blowout had ceased by the time of the 20th Monitoring Report:

...water flow rates of most of the wells remained relatively static after the second blowout with a few exceptions. Flow rates began to rapidly decline in most wells shortly after the “well kill” procedures were commenced on October 4, 2005. Artesian flow had stopped in all wells by January 4, 2006. However, on January 17, 2006, tube well no.5 exhibited artesian flow again for a three day period before stopping. Since January 20, 2006, artesian flow of all monitoring tube wells has ceased and remained so to the present (May 31, 2006).1712

2795 The report also referred to the monitoring of “gas presence in tube wells for safety reasons”. It noted a “conspicuous decline in measured gas levels” after the well kill operation in October 2005, and reported higher LEL levels for three out of 20 wells with “detectable gas".

2796 Concerning the kua well water level, the report noted that “rainfall appears to have a significant effect on local shallow water levels in the area” and referred to a “potential more direct influence between blowout gas and groundwater levels in this area which has now been eliminated or significantly reduced”. On the gas level bubbling in the kua wells the report stated that such bubbling occurred at low levels before the blowout, increased when the blowout occurred and almost disappeared after the well kill operation:

Prior to the first blowout shallow gas was observed bubbling sporadically and at relatively low level to surface in and around the Tengratila area. Gas was also encountered prior to the blowout while drilling shallow water wells for the water well drilling program in 2004. Subsequent to


1711 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 12 – 13. ↩
1712 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 13. ↩

[Page 782]

the blowouts natural gas was introduced much more substantively into the upper soil strata and associated aquifer and in some cases could be seen bubbling up in Kua wells. The environmental team has monitored gas presence in Kua wells both for safety reasons and also to provide a further indication of changes following the well kill procedure. [...] There was a conspicuous decline in measured gas levels at Kua wells following the October 4 well kill procedure was implemented. At present, detectable gas is only reported at one monitored kua well (K-5).

2797 The Report also noted that seepages and boils caused by the blowouts had ended after the completion of the relief well:

The Joint Venture's environmental team has monitored the number and activity of seepages (places where gas pressure has forced water out of cracks in the ground) and boils (places where gas bubbled up in ponds and seasonally flooded areas). Following the 2nd blowout there was an increase in the number and intensity of some of these features along the main north south trend of the fault line underlying Chattak 2. After completion of relief well killing process there was a continued gradual decrease in the number and activity of the seepages and boils. This trend appears clearly linked to the well kill. At present there are no conspicuous seepages or boils.1713

2798 In his report of 7 June 2005,1714 before the second blowout, Dr Ganus noted that "[n]umerous measurements of gas emissions, water quality, and water flows and levels in wells have been made since the blowout” and concluded from these measurement and the reports then available that there was no evidence that the water chemistry and the structure of the deep aquifer were affected by the blowout. The Claimant quoted the following passages from Dr Ganus:

The extensive data collection since the blowout demonstrates a good faith effort to develop sound technical information to assess impacts regarding potential hydrogeological impacts rather than relying on simple observations and speculation;

There is no evidence that the water chemistry in the tube wells has been impacted. Natural gas passing through the aquifer would not be reactive with water;


1713 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, Sections 3.2.1 – 3.2.4 and 3.3 at pages 13 – 18. ↩
1714 Evaluation of Hydrogeologic Conditions at the Niko-BAPEX Chattak Well #2 Blowout Site, Exhibit C-38. ↩

[Page 783]

Likewise there is no evidence the structure of this deep aquifer has in any way been affected beyond the crater site”; and

[T]here is no evidence that the chemistry of the shallow groundwater or pond waters has been altered in any measurable way.1715

2799 The Second Environmental Losses Report does not mention the First and Second Monitoring Reports, dated 28 February and 9 April 2005; and BAPEX does not consider in the BMEC these or any other Monitoring Reports nor the Ganus Report. The Tribunal has not seen any record of objections or criticism by BAPEX, the Department of Environment or any other authority in Bangladesh about these contemporaneous Reports, and any subsequent Monitoring Reports and their findings. The first BBL Experts Report criticised Niko's monitoring work and suggested in 2016 that further monitoring be performed; but it did not discuss in any detail the findings concerning the water quality in the Monitoring Reports.

2800 The Tribunal concludes that BAPEX has failed to show that the “rehabilitation and replacement” work, presented in the Second Environmental Losses Report and for which BAPEX claims the costs, was necessary to remedy effects of the first blowout. Indeed, when the Third Environmental Losses Report considered the situation after the second blowout, it no longer provided for the remedial work proposed in the Second Environmental Losses Report but based the assessment on a different project.

2801 In any event, in the Tribunal's view, there is no evidence or allegation that the work proposed in the Second Environmental Losses Report or in the Third Environmental Losses Report was in fact implemented. It follows that BAPEX or the Government have not incurred the loss for which the Government claimed in the Money Suit and BAPEX now claims in the Arbitration.

2802 This being said, the Tribunal considers that the evidence shows that the first blowout had some impact on the water reserves in Tengratila through the material ejected by the blowout and through the gas. Its “sweet” nature makes it unlikely that the gas contaminated the water. The Claimant relies on the Monitoring Reports, the report of Dr Ganus and the testing for the presence of contaminants carried out by the University of Sylhet; it points out that “the sole (albeit unnamed and undetailed) contaminant of concern was arsenic",1716 an issue that has been addressed above.

2803 Reference was made to the gas rising from the opening in the Regional Seal causing disruption of the aquifer. There is no evidence that this impact was


1715 CREC, paragraph 76, quoting from Ganus, pages 1 – 3. ↩
1716 CREC, paragraph 72. ↩

[Page 784]

of a lasting effect: A possible exception may be effects on the aquifer by gas that may continue to be flowing from the reservoir due to a possibly incomplete sealing of the blowout well by the 2B relief operation; for the reason explained above, if such disruption continues to be caused by such flow, Niko is not liable for it.

2804 It follows that for a limited period, the water supply to the population of Tengratila was affected by the first blowout. Some of this effect may have been welcomed: Mr Glaholt explained that the first blowout increased the rate of flow in local water wells which meant that “water could be retrieved from the wells that would have previously required pumping” – until the pressure from the gas subsided as a result of the relief operation. On balance, however, the Tribunal is of the view that, during this limited period, the effects of the first blowout caused inconvenience and disruption to water supply of the local population.

2805 Against this background, the Tribunal considered the improvements which, according to the Claimant's assertions, Niko made to the drinking water supply by an “extensive program [...] to improve community access to clean water".1717 Details of this programme have been reported by Mr Glaholt1718 and the Monitoring Reports.

2806 Niko relies specifically on the section on “Community Water Supplies” in the 19th Monitoring Report for May 2006, which reports on a “public consultation Focal Group Discussion (FGD) on present drinking water scarcity” and reports on Niko's action to improve the drinking water supply in Tengratila:

As of March 27, 2006 Niko had arranged for drilling of a total of 42 new tube wells in the Tengratila area. These wells are pre-tested for presence of arsenic and chlorine shocked prior to bringing on stream. Wells which have excessive arsenic are sealed and abandoned. Niko is also in the process of setting up a village run, tank-based water storage and distribution system as a pilot project (plates 19 and 20). This system is tied into a series of deep 3” wells and uses a community run electric motor to supply water to the storage tanks. As of March 15, 2006 four, 4000 litre gravity feed storage tank systems with distribution lines had been installed. In excess of 110 households are provided water by this system. Two more 4000 litre supply systems of this kind are being installed.1719


1717 CREC, paragraph 74. ↩
1718 WS Glaholt, paragraphs 86 – 88. ↩
1719 19th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-68, Section 9.4, page 40. ↩

[Page 785]

2807 The 13th Monitoring Report provides a photograph of the FDG in October 20051720 and the 20th Monitoring Report a photograph of the “newly installed deep tube well system”:1721

[Image Omitted]

Plate 17. FGD participants discussing concerns regarding drinking water scarcity with
Niko environmental team at Tengratila Bazar October 30, 2005


1720 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, 13th Environmental Monitoring Report, 9 January 2006 (13th Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit R-118, page 42. ↩
1721 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 38. ↩

[Page 786]

[Image Omitted]

Plate 15. Tengratila villager using tap water from newly installed deep tube well system, May, 2006.

2808 Mr Glaholt pointed out that “prior to the blowout, the community did not have properly drilled water wells”. He stated that eventually the water storage and distribution system had seven tanks. He described the system in terms similar to those quoted above from the 19th Monitoring Report:

In addition, in the first half of 2006, Niko installed seven gravity feed water tanks, each with total capacity of 4000 liters, for community use. The tanks were connected to electric pumps which drew water from deep tube wells dug by Niko. This new system supplied water to more than 110 local households. This project provided a significant benefit to the community, and improved the water supply to many homes which otherwise had none.1722

2809 These installations and the improvement brought by them to the Tengratila population regarding the water supply, have not been contested by BAPEX and its experts; in fact, they were not mentioned. The Tribunal has no reason to doubt their effectiveness.

2810 The Tribunal concludes that Niko made substantial improvements to the access of the local population to clean drinking water. It is of the view on the basis of the information provided in this Arbitration that these improvements are valuable and compensate for the inconvenience and disruption to the


1722 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 87 and 88. ↩

[Page 787]

water supply caused by the first blowout during a limited period. No further compensation is to be ordered by the Tribunal.

9.5.3 Loss of soil resources

2811 BAPEX seeks BDT 12.5 million as compensation for losses of soil resources as part of the combined claim, corresponding at the exchange rate applied by BAPEX to some USD 194’595.1723 As explained, the three combined claims are considered separately in Sections 9.5.2, 9.5.3 and 9.5.4). BAPEX relies on the Second Environmental Losses Report. BBL Experts II on which BAPEX also relies refers to that report without adding any further explanations.1724

2812 The First Environmental Losses Report describes the loss to “Agricultural Crops" as follows:

A 2-3 inch layer of sand has been deposited on the nearby agricultural land. Because of sand blasting during the fire incident, the sand spread out to surrounding places. It seems that the quantity of sand is more on the northern side of the well (photo-3). As a result, organic matter and micro-fauna has been damaged. At present, there is the possibility of a reduction of current agricultural crops (mainly rice) and coming agricultural crops.1725

2813 Like the two other components of this combined claim, this claim is described in one of the three paragraphs in the Second Environmental Losses Report, which contains in paragraph (5) the description of the “Impact on Soil Resources":

It is apparent to the Committee that the fertile agricultural land of the area has been contaminated by the dust and contaminated water caused by the blowout explosion. The Local Deputy Commissioner and Police Superintendent reported to the Committee that the dust created immediately after the blowout explosion had settled on the city of Sunamganj. Considering the overall background, losses of soil resources have been considered by dividing them into three types of impact zone. The deadly affected area spreads up to 2 km from the main Crater, the semi-affected area spreads from 2 km up to 8 km from the main Crater, and the less affected area spreads from 8 km up to 15 km from the main


1723 BAPEX stated that the claim for BDT 92.6 million corresponded to USD 1'441'569, a rate of BDT 64.236 to the USD. ↩
1724 BMEC paragraphs 20 and 21; BBL II, paragraph 28 and the table of "Losses Identified" following that paragraph. ↩
1725 First Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-1, page 6, item (3); the photo mentioned in the quoted text was not attached to this exhibit. ↩

[Page 788]

Crater. The committee thinks it will take three years for the deadly affected area, and 2 years for the semi-affected area and 1 year for the more or less affected area to return their original conditions. The losses to the agricultural production have been estimated on the basis of the agricultural land of the area.1726

2814 The claim for loss of soil resources is quantified by reference to “Losses of production of crops” for each of the three categories: for the Deadly Affected Area and for the Semi-affected Area, assumed to recover in three and two years, respectively, the loss of production is assessed each at BDT 5 million, and for the Less Affected area at BDT 2.5 million; the total adds up to the BDT 12.5 million claimed under this head.1727

2815 The Third Environmental Losses Report mentions effects of “gas and sand blasting due to fire in the gas well”. It states: “Adjacent Tengratila Bazar, households, fruit, and vegetation on the hill are affected by fire. Underground sand, mud, including gas, has spread out surrounding 2-3 km of the main crater". The Report adopts the three categories from the Second Environmental Losses Report: Deadly Affected, Semi-Affected and Less Affected areas; and it adds a fourth category: “very affected area”. This latter category is described as follows:

The very affected area is spread up to 2 km surrounding the main crater of the explosion. Emission gas has been seen in several parts of this area. Since this area is of the vale and lower part of the vale, it is risky to cultivate there currently. Earlier condition of the soil can be taking at least 3 years. Estimated costing for the required fertilizers to restore the fertility of the soil has been considered during calculation of damages.

2816 The “severely affected” area presumably corresponds to the “deadly affected” area in the Second Environmental Losses Report. It is described as consisting of about “50 hectares land of hill, vale, alluvium land and lower areas surrounding the main crater of explosion”. The damage is identified as “emissions of gas from a wide range in this area” which would require 10 years to restore the area to its earlier condition. The “Semi-affected area is spread from 2 km to 4 km of the main crater of explosion. It will require 2 years to restore this area to its earlier condition”; for the less affected area it will take one year.


1726 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 4. ↩
1727 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), Table at page 6, item 5. ↩

[Page 789]

2817 In support of the alleged deteriorated soil conditions the Third Environmental Losses Report presents the following table, said to show the results of chemical analyses of the soil before and after the blowouts:1728

Appendix Table - Gha 2: The average result of chemical analysis of the soil sample
collected from the area affected by the explosion in Tengratila
Gas field.

Elements Previous Condition (2002) Current Condition (2005)
Organic Materials Medium Low
Calcium Low Very Low
Magnesium High Very Low
Nitrogen Low Very Low
Phosphorus Low Very Low
Sulfur Medium Low
Zinc Adequate Low

Ref: Soil Resource Research Institute, 2005.

2818 The findings of the Report are, however, qualified by the explanation about the limitations in the collection of evidence from the soil:

The entire area other than the hillock part is currently underwater due to the rainy season, so a total specimen of losses could not be obtained. in this case, a specimen of soil was collected from the affected area, and after an analysis of chemical composition of the said soil, it was found [follows a summary of the results in the above table].

2819 The losses are quantified in the Report at a total of BDT 17’043’105, consisting of BDT 2 million for the Deadly Affected Area, BDT 7 million for the Very Affected Area, BDT 5 million for the Semi-Affected Area1729 and BDT 3’043'105 for the Less Affected Area. The basis for the quantification is stated to be "losses in crop production” for the duration identified for each of the areas but also as the “value of the necessary fertiliser”. The deterioration of the soil conditions is shown by the table reproduced above, comparing soil conditions in 2002 and in 2005.


1728 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis); the appendix elsewhere in the report is identified as D2. ↩
1729 This is the amount shown in the table at section 3.9 of the Report; in the table at page 19, BDT 50 million are shown; this seems to be a typo since the total of BDT 17'043'105 in section 3.9 is the amount quantified also in the table with the supporting calculation of the fertiliser costs and is the amount that is claimed in the Money Suit for this head of damage. ↩

[Page 790]

2820 Another table in the Appendix shows the cost of fertiliser, allegedly required to restore the soil to its pre-blowout condition:1730

Appendix Table – Gha 1: To restore Soil fertility, the required amount of fertilizer and the
price.

Required Fertilizer Total Amount (Ton) Price(BDT)
Organic Fertilizer (Cow dung) 12,000 1,21,00,000.00
Dolomite 2,400 9,65,000.00
Urea 136 23,55,150.00
TSP 73 9,75,380.00
Gypsum 60 1,79,953.00
Zinc Sulphate 9 3,77,622.00
Total 1,70,43,105.00

Ref: Soil Resource Research Institute, 2005.

2821 The BBL Experts Report I mentions some analyses that the authors had organised and for which the ESG Report presented the results. In Section 7.3.2, entitled “Soil and Sediment Analyses”, BBL Experts present the conclusion of the samples that they had taken. The report explains that arsenic “is a naturally occurring constituent of many soils and the limit values are set nationally based on local circumstances. Uptake of arsenic by plants is low and unless levels are exceptionally high, these are not a cause for concern." The BBL Experts report that the analysis of the samples they had taken showed results that exceeded a Canadian standard but were below that of the UK recommended standard for arsenic levels in agricultural soil; they do not report on the standards relevant for Bangladesh. The BBL Experts Report I also mentions that “1 of the 10 samples equalled the guideline standard of 64 mg/kg for chromium.1731 No other chemical soil component is mentioned in this context.

2822 In the section on “Impacts on Agriculture”, BBL Experts Report I explains that it was “understood from the local farmers that crops and rice production suffered from adverse effects for several years after the blowouts”; while the “impacts on rice production have largely been resolved over time [...] the production rates of other vegetables and fruit trees are still adversely affected". The report attributes this situation to methane in the soil. They explained:


1730 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), Appendix. ↩
1731 BBL I, paragraph 197. ↩

[Page 791]

The likely cause of the impacts on crops and vegetation is the reduction in oxygen levels in the soil due to the high methane emissions, which continue today. The gas flux sampling that was carried out gave readings of 100% methane in some instances169 and the aeration of soil to provide oxygen to the roots of plants is a pre-requisite for healthy growth; the number of species that can grow in anoxic conditions is generally restricted to marsh and water habitats, e.g., rice. Until the gas is controlled and the soil is able to return to a normal state in terms of aeration, agriculture will continue to be affected adversely.1732

2823 The support presented by the BBL Experts I Report for the 100% methane reading is a statement in Mr Wilson's first report: “Gas has been measured in the ground at 100% in several locations below the village”.1733

2824 In the BMD, BAPEX reproduces the above quoted paragraph of the BBL Experts I Report in the section on Impact on Agriculture. Neither the Second nor the Third Environmental Losses Report include methane in the soil as a basis for the losses assessed in these reports; and BAPEX does not rely on methane in the soil and the allegedly resulting effect on growth as a damage caused by the blowout. Methane in the soil does not form part of the claim it is now made.

2825 The Claimant asserts that “there is no ongoing damage, and any impact immediately after the blowout was fully compensated by Niko”. It refers to Mr Glaholt's testimony concerning test results and the effect of the monsoon rain, concluding that the “seasonal flooding had washed away the negative components and soil levels returned to pre-blowout quality”.

2826 Concerning the Second Environmental Losses Report and its estimate of the losses of soil resources, the Claimant points out the contradiction with the observations of Mr Glaholt and the Crown Agents' Monitoring Reports.1734 The Claimant also points out that the Local Losses Report records “concerns with soil" by 17 families who claimed for a total of BDT 538٬729 and that Niko paid that amount.

2827 The Claimant states that the Respondents provided no evidence of any lingering soil issues directly caused by the first blowout. It asserts that the BBL Experts “misstate the situation and fail to take into account intervening human activity and other Intervening Events since the blowout”. The evidence


1732 BBL I, Section 8.3, paragraphs 216 and 217. ↩
1733 Wilson I, paragraph 6.3.1(a). ↩
1734 CREC, paragraph 83. ↩

[Page 792]

indicates, according to the Claimant, “that any soil issues caused by the first blowout were remediated and fully compensated by Niko”. In any event, the alleged loss of agricultural production would be a form of “consequential loss and damage resulting from pollution”; any liability for it would thus be excluded by Article 27.2 of the JVA.1735

2828 Mr Glaholt referred in his First Witness Statement to the monitoring programme and testing of soil chemistry; he concluded that “there was minimal permanent damage to soil resources”. Initial testing had shown that soil chemistry “was within relevant guidelines” and added:

Further testing of the period following the first blowout indicated that there was some increase in conductivity, pH, organic matter, potassium and sulfur content and some possible decrease in copper. Potassium and sulfur are both essential plant nutrients. However, the rain quickly washed out some of the inert components of the soil, as well as some potassium, and returned the soil quality to levels akin to pre-blowout quality. In 2006 it was noted during a field inspection, that rice crops in areas closest to the blowout appeared as productive as those further afield.1736

2829 With respect to the effect of the blowout on trees and vegetation on which the BBL Experts opined, Mr Glaholt refers to his own observations, the monitoring reports and the EVI Report.1737

2830 Concerning the passage about reduced agricultural productivity caused by methane in the soil, as quoted above, Mr Glaholt commented in the section of his First Witness Statement dealing with “Agriculture”:

High methane in the soil likely existed in some areas before the blowout, and in other areas it would be impossible to determine with any reasonable certainty where this is still a result of the blowout, and therefore causing the alleged issues, or a result of seismic activity, or both (and if so in what proportion).1738

2831 The Monitoring Reports on which the Claimant and Mr Glaholt rely do indeed report repeatedly on soil condition and related issues relevant for the present claim related to soil resources.


1735 CREC, paragraphs 80 – 87. ↩
1736 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 91. ↩
1737 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 47. ↩
1738 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 48. ↩

[Page 793]

2832 The Tribunal understood from the presentation of this claim in BMEC and the relevant passage in the Second Environmental Losses Report on which BAPEX relies that the claim is based on two possible damaging events: (i) the risk of soil pollution by contaminating components of the ejected material and (ii) deposits of the sand and other material ejected by the blowout.

2833 Concerning the passage in the BBL Experts Report I about reduced agricultural productivity caused by methane in the soil, the Tribunal notes that it relates to the claim for agricultural losses for which the Respondents no longer claim.1739 In any event, the Tribunal is of the view that ongoing agricultural losses have not been established; had they been established, the causal link of such losses with the first blowout is contested and, if there were such a link, Niko is not liable for any ongoing gas escaping from the Reservoir that would have been avoided if BAPEX had not failed to authorise Niko to drill a production well.1740

2834 Concerning the risk of soil pollution by contaminating material, the DoE Observation and Monitoring Report of 19 February 2005 expressed special concern about pollutants in the drilling mud. Under the heading “Soil Pollution" it stated:

It can be assumed that the soil of the adjacent area including surface as well as ground water system is affected by drilling mud-borne pollutants, especially heavy metals and metalloids like arsenic. It has been reported by the villagers that sum muddy substances at the beginning of the blowout has been escaped/flowed with water toward western direction to the low-lying paddy field.

2835 The DoE Observation and Monitoring Report instructed Niko:

To verify soil condition, samples of both the contaminated area are required to be tested.1741

2836 The First Monitoring Report, dated 28 February 2005 states that the fallout “accumulated on top of buildings immediately beside the blow-out crater and on a cucumber patch approximately 300m northwest from the crater”. It describes the sampling and testing that was being performed with respect to "Soil":


1739 See above Section 9.3.2. ↩
1740 See above Section 7.6.6. ↩
1741 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221, page 6, Section 2.12. ↩

[Page 794]

2837 Preliminary Findings are reported with respect to “Soil fallout material blown from the sub-surface and accumulated on top of buildings immediately beside the blow-out crater and on a cucumber patch approximately 300m northwest from the crater".1742

2838 More details are provided in the Second Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005. In section 4.2, the Report indicated the area over which the “Soil fallout” was spread1743 and referred to section 6 where the ongoing monitoring and its results was described. With respect “the blowout soil chemistry” this section of the Report added:

Laboratory results indicate that these soils were relatively benign, with neutral pH (note most soils in the area tend to be naturally acidic) and contain elevated levels of potassium (see also Section 5).

2839 Referring to observations concerning deposits on a cucumber patch, the Report continues:

Cucumber plants which have been exposed to this soil appear to be overall healthy but somewhat delayed in crop development. It is likely that elevated potassium will have temporarily increased plant productivity in areas subject to more substantial soil fallout.1744


1742 First Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-29, Section 2.2; referred to in WS Glaholt I, paragraph 90. ↩
1743 See below in this Section. ↩
1744 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, page 18, section 5. ↩

[Page 795]

2840 Addressing specifically the instructions in the DoE Observation and Monitoring Report concerning the area adjacent to the blowout and the low lying paddy field, section 5 of the Report explained that “two pure samples of material deposited by the well” were taken, “a sample from the rig shack adjacent to the crater; and from an approximately 10cm deposit on a cucumber patch approximately 200m northwest”. Photographs of the test locations were shown, and the results were presented in the following table:1745

Table 5. Chemical profile of soil fallout (blowout sand and mud deposit) on the ground

Sample location PH EC
(mS/cm)
Fe As K Al Lead Cl Phe-
nol
THE SAR
Canadian Standard* na Na 12 Na na 70 na 3.8 3780 5
Rig Shack Roof 7.53 0.24 na 8 <6 na 5.1 19.8 Na <10 0.57
Cucumber Patch 7.78 0.22 na 5 7 na 5.9 31.4 Na 36 0.71

2841 The Report also provided results of an “intensive sampling program” conducted at two different rice paddies:

(i) a rice paddy subject to intensive soil fallout immediately west southwest of the blowout; and

(ii) an unaffected control rice paddy located an equivalent distance east northeast of the blowout.

2842 The Report showed the locations of the point-locations from which they had been taken: 16 from the affected west paddy and 8 from the control paddy, two samples each, one from the top 15cm and the other from the lower 15 cm. the results of the laboratory analysis of these 50 samples are presented in a table for the following soil chemistry and physical parameters:

Analytical Result

Soil
Sample
No.
EC
(ds/m)
Reaction
(pH)
OM
%
K Ca Mg N
(total)
P S B Cu Fe Mn Zn
Meq/100g soil micro gm/g soil

2843 The Report concludes:

Preliminary analysis of soil chemistry indicates that areas associated with more intense soil fallout currently exhibit some increase in conductivity, pH, organic matter, potassium and sulphur and possibly


1745 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, pages 18 and 19. ↩

[Page 796]

some decrease in copper. Overall, the soil condition does not appear to be significantly compromised, however, some further study is required.

2844 In another table comparative values from the Sunamganj district from the years 1999 and 1996 and critical levels are presented. The Report concludes that

... soil chemistry is within the guidelines [...] except for the iron content which is the characteristic of the area. In the monsoon the deposits will eventually be washed out and the topsoil will again be revitalized.1746

2845 The next report, the Third Monitoring Report, dated 3 May 2005, recorded that already some of the expected wash-out had occurred; it showed graphically the extent of the reduction for potassium and for manganese and explained:

... recent rain washed out some of the inert components from the soil as well as the potassium and brining the soil quality close to the control soil quality level.1747

2846 Subsequent Monitoring Reports contained sections on the soil quality. The 20th Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2006,1748 repeats some of this information, in particular the conclusion that the samples of the blowout material were found to be benign:

Soil fallout samples collected and analysed from the previous blowout of Chattak Well #2 were found to be benign (Table 4). Samples had somewhat elevated levels of potassium, a natural soil-plant nutrient which was also a constituent of the drilling fluid.


1746 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, pages 21 and 22. ↩
1747 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, pages 14 – 16, Section 5. ↩
1748 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 28, Section 5. ↩

[Page 797]

2847 The following table was presented in support of this statement:

Table 4. Soil chemistry of soils projected from the Chattak 2 blowout, January 24, 2005

pH EC
µS/cm
As
mg/kg
K
mg/kg
SAR
mg/kg
Pb
mg/kg
CI
mg/kg
TEH
mg/kg
WHO/CCME
Guideline¹
- - 12ª - 5b 70b - 3,780b
Blowout Soil
(2 samples
20m and
200m distant
7.78
7.53
0.24
0.22
8
5
<6
7
0.51
0.71
5.1
5.9
19.8
31.4
<10
36

1. WHO, (a) = World Health Organization, CCME (b) = Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment

2848 The BBL Experts Report I identifies “the deposition of sand and other sub-surface material over a large area” as one of the “two evident areas of environmental impact”; but it considers the monitoring programme by Niko's consultants as “not adequate”.1749 In the section on “Results of Chemical Analysis", the report presents the “results of greatest significance in relation to impacts on people and the environment”. The BBL Experts had analysed samples of soil and sediments for 8 metals and for arsenic.1750 They presented the results in section “7.3.2 Soil and Sediment Analysis”, explaining that 14 of the 18 samples taken exceeded Canadian but were below the UK standards. They also found that “1 of the 10 samples equalled the guideline standards of 64 mg/kg for chromium”. The section does not mention any results other than for arsenic and chromium.

2849 The BBL Experts conclude that “the results from the water, soil and sediment samples indicate the need for further work to understand the impact that these levels may have on fish and plant growth and also on people through inhalation of disturbed material or being carried in aerosols".1751 The “Detailed Environmental and Health Survey and Monitoring” programme proposed in the 2016 BBL Experts Report I included:

Soil samples at 2 depth:

(i) 32 soil samples to be taken along 8 transects going out from the village centre and analysed for metals and pH;


1749 BBL I, Section 8.2, paragraphs 213 and 214. ↩
1750 BBL I, Appendix 4. ↩
1751 BBL I, Section 7.3.2. ↩

[Page 798]

(ii) Samples to be collected on a quarterly basis first 2 years and then possibly in years 3.1752

2850 There is no mention in the BBL Experts Report I that soil samples related to blow out material had already been tested in 2005 for pH values and metals, even though the BBL EPERTS refer in the discussion on Impacts on Agriculture to the Second Monitoring Report in which the results of the tests were reported in detail.1753 They do not explain why tests should be conducted for two or three years after 2016 if the blowout material was found to have been “benign” in the contemporaneous 20th Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2006.

2851 The Tribunal notes that the Subcommittee had instructed that the soil be tested; further to these instructions Niko's consultants conducted a test programme, described it and reported the results in the Second Monitoring Report of 8 April 2005; the Tribunal also notes that the DoE received this report; the report was produced in the Arbitration by BAPEX; the experts engaged by BAPEX had at their disposal this report and quoted from it in a different context.

2852 The Tribunal notes that the tests and the results of the analysis presented in the Second Monitoring Report, and the subsequent reports remained uncontested and were in fact not discussed by BAPEX and its experts in their submissions in this Arbitration.

2853 The Tribunal concludes that the material ejected by the first blowout was primarily from the ground around the wellbore; in addition, it contained some drilling mud and debris from drilling equipment. The test results reported in the Monitoring Reports are uncontested, including the conclusion about possible “drilling mud pollutants” deposited on the soil surrounding the blowout site. The Tribunal concludes that no evidence has been produced contradicting the conclusion of the Monitoring Reports that the material ejected by the first blowout was “benign” and, with respect to the soil pollution by contaminating material, the Claimant's position that “there is no ongoing damage”.

2854 Concerning deposits of the sand and other material ejected by the blowout, the other possibly damaging event relied on by BAPEX, it is uncontested that such deposits occurred. As explained above in Section 9.1.2.1, the first blowout manifested itself, in addition to the escaping gas,


1752 BBL I, paragraph 231. ↩
1753 BBL I, paragraph 216 and FN 168. ↩

[Page 799]

burning for some time, by the ejection of sand from the wellbore and other material.

2855 The Reports differ with respect to the thickness of these deposits and to the distance from the blowout well at which these deposits occurred. It is clear, however, that most important deposits occurred within Niko's compound; but important deposits also occurred outside this compound.

2856 The statements about the area covered by these deposits, as they are contained in the Second and the Third Environmental Losses Reports, have been quoted above. The Monitoring Reports present a more detailed account of the ejection of the “soil fallout” and its evolution.

2857 The Second Monitoring Report contains in section 4.2 the following statement:

Soil fallout from the blow-out was spread over a wide area primarily west of the well site due to prevailing westerly windflow at the time of the incident. An area of more concentrated soil fallout did occur over an area of approximately 0.15 km2 [...].

2858 A passage in section 4.2 of that report provides some information about the thickness of the deposit outside the Niko compound, stating that a cucumber patch “had approximately 10 cm accumulation of blowout soil”;1754 the deposits recorded in the Local Losses Report vary considerably and range from 1 or 2 inches to 7 feet.1755

2859 More deposits were, however, added by the second blowout. The Sixth Monitoring Report, dated 28 July 2005, recorded:

Approximately one week after the initial Chhatak 2A blowout the well projected conspicuous heavy sand deposits over an area extending approximately 200m northwest of the well site.

and

Soil and sand fallout from the recent blowout of Chhatak Well #2A (relief well) was spread over an area primarily northwest of the well site due to prevailing northwesterly wind flow at the time of the incident. The soil/sand was deposited over an area of approximately 1 km of radius predominantly in the northwest direction.1756


1754 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, page 18. ↩
1755 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis); for examples from the Local Losses Report see below in this Section. ↩
1756 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, pages 16 and 17 with references to photographs; a photograph of this fallout can be seen above in Section 9.1.2.2. ↩

[Page 800]

2860 The Tenth Monitoring Report also records that “Limbs of trees were broken by the weight of sand”.1757 Concerning the manner in which the soil deposits were dealt with, the Witness Statement of Mr Shahjahan stated that “we had no choice but to till the sand and stones into the field, since we had nowhere else to put it”.1758

2861 As explained above in the context of the risk of soil pollution, the Third Monitoring Report, dated 3 May 2005, recorded that some of the deposits from the first blowout had already been washed out. The Sixth Monitoring Report, dated 23 July 2005 and including information from the second blowout, provided some information about the effect of the monsoon rains:

Monsoon rains have recently flushed a considerable amount of soil fallout off tree cover. Vegetation in areas previously exposed to soil fallout exhibited some temporary reduction in growth rate but appeared to recover over the following two to three months.1759

2862 The 12th Monitoring Report, dated 8 December 2005, states that “most of this fallout" has been flushed by monsoon rains and presents a photograph of vegetation “previously subject to heavy sand / soil fallout from Chattak 2A blowout":1760

Monsoon rains have subsequently flushed most of this fallout debris from the area and vegetation shows signs of significant recovery (Plate 7).

[Image Omitted]

Plate 7. Aerial view of vegetation (top right of photo) off northwest
corner of Chhatak 2A well site September 17, 2005
previously subject to heavy sand/soil fallout from Chhatak
2A blowout on July 5, 2005. Chhatak 2B and 2C well site in
foreground.


1757 Tenth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-136, page 21. ↩
1758 WS Shahjahan, paragraph 10. ↩
1759 Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 18. ↩
1760 12th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-62, page 28. ↩

[Page 801]

2863 By early 2006 the flushing of the fallout by the monsoon rains seems to have been complete. The 18th Monitoring Report, dated 10 April 2006, states:

Monsoon rains have subsequently flushed fallout debris from the area and vegetation has largely recovered. appears to have recovered (Plates 10 and 11).1761

2864 While these Reports show a progressive wash out of the soil fallout, deposits in some areas caused damage that was assessed and in certain cases had to be removed.

2865 The Local Losses Report included a number of incidents of damage caused by deposits from the blowouts to agricultural land and to fishponds. In each of these cases the corresponding loss was quantified and formed part of the loss assessment for which Niko paid compensation. For instance:


1761 18th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-80, page 27; Plates 10 and 11 are photographs showing the north-west corner of the area surrounding the Chattak 2A relief well shortly after the second blowout (7 July 2005) and on 24 January 2006.

[Page 802]

2866 Similar assessments are made with respect to losses to fisheries caused by soils from the blowouts:

[Page 803]

2867 The damage assessed in the Local Losses Report covered not only the loss of production but in some cases also the costs of removing the “deposition of sand" and, in at least one case, costs for “Land development/increasing fertility of the pond”.

2868 As noted above, the Claimant states that there “were 17 families who claimed for soil concerns for a total of BDT 538٬729. Niko paid this amount.”1762

2869 Apart from the losses assessed in the Local Losses Report and in subsequent assessments discussed above, BAPEX has not identified any other specific damage from the soil fallout to the local population. All of this damage has been paid by Niko.

2870 The Monitoring Reports, in which Niko's consultants responded to the instructions of the DoE Observation and Monitoring Report provided a clearer picture of the damage to soil resources than the sweeping statements in the Second Environmental Losses Report quoted at the beginning of this Section. These Monitoring Reports remained uncontested.

2871 The Tribunal concludes that the evidence produced does not show that the material ejected by the first blowout and spread on the Niko compound, the neighbourhood and beyond caused pollution. The damage caused by this material has been recorded by the Local Losses Committee and has been paid by Niko. BAPEX has not shown evidence supporting the claim for further losses to Soil Resources, as quantified in the Second Environmental Losses Report and claimed by BАРЕХ.

2872 This being said, the Tribunal noted that the evidence and in particular the Monitoring Reports, show that the spread of material ejected from the first blowout was broad and deposits of soil fallout were not limited to the families that claimed and were compensated through the Local Losses Report and its follow-up. While it remains uncontested in this Arbitration that the soil fallout from the second blowout (and with it that from the first blowout) had been washed out by early 2006, during the months following the first blowout, the surrounding area had been covered by the fallout. That fallout had to be removed, as recorded in the Local Losses Report, or disappeared only gradually, in particular due to the monsoon rain.

2873 It follows that, until it had disappeared in early 2006, the deposits caused disruption or more serious inconveniences to the local population which, in the opinion of the Tribunal, cannot be identified specifically but has to be


1762 CREC, paragraph 84, relying on the Local Losses Report and specifying that 13 families claimed soil impacts for agricultural purposes and 4 families for fisheries.

[Page 804]

considered more broadly, which the Tribunal will address below in Section 9.5.8.

9.5.4 Loss of the environmental system

2874 BAPEX seeks BDT 15 million as compensation for “Losses of the environmental system”, consisting of BDT 10 million for “Rehabilitation costs", described as “cost over 20 years to restore the ecosystem” and BDT 5 million for “Management costs”. In the Second Environmental Losses Report, the loss was identified as a separate item; as explained above, BAPEX combined this loss as one of three claims, one claim related to the environmental system, and two claims concerning water resources and soil resources, discussed in the preceding sections, to the combined claim for a total of BDT 92.6 million, stated to be equivalent to USD 1'441'569.

2875 As it does with respect to the two other claims, BAPEX explains that in the Second Environmental Losses Report the “Committee did not choose to reserve its estimate based upon the availability of further data”. BAPEX limits the claim for loss of the environmental system to the “Committee's original estimate".1763 No other explanations or support is provided in the BMEC of BAPEX and in the BBL Experts II Report, on which BAPEX relies.

2876 The Second Environmental Losses Report states that the first blowout caused damage to the habitat or ecosystem of a number of species around 1 km of the blowout and seeks to distinguish the present claim from those for other losses. The following explanations are provided:

(6) Loss of Ecosystem: Trees, water bodies, agricultural land, and hillocks existing in the rural neighborhood system around 1 km from the main crater have been seriously affected by the blowout explosion in the Tengratila Gas Field. Habitats of birds, different species of rural animals, amphibians, soil worms, and soil-inhabiting animals and plants in the ecosystem have been damaged and, as an instant reaction, several animal species of the area were eliminated locally. Considering these circumstances, it is very important to replace and rehabilitate this type of ecosystem in this area. The Committee has calculated the financial losses considering the final determination and execution of the long-term replacement and rehabilitation of the ecosystem. All the measures to be taken to reform the overall ecosystem and all the investment and management to be arranged in relation to the same have been included as replacement expenses against losses of ecosystem. It is mentionable here that the costs mentioned in the material of serial No. 2 [damage to


1763 BMEC, paragraph 21.

[Page 805]

vegetation (trees and forest resources), above section 9.5.1] have been included for plantation. So, this cost was not included again in the sector of replacement and rehabilitation of the overall ecosystem.1764

2877 The Third Environmental Losses Report presents the loss by a text that in part is identical with that of the Second Report. Concerning the overlap with the claim for other work, the Third Environmental Losses Report mentions several other reports and states:

It is mentionable here that costs related to trees and vegetation resources, agriculture, fishery, water resources, and soil resources have been included respectively in serial nos. 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, and thus losses of these sectors are not included again in the reformation or rehabilitation sector of the ecosystem. However, estimation of losses is given below:

2878 The programme for the “reformation or rehabilitation” is presented in the Third Report in the following terms:

The impact incurred by the blowout on ecosystem consists of soil, trees, surface and underground water bodies, air, different types of birds/animals/microbes etc., to rehabilitate and restore them naturally in the 20-year environmental management framework.

2879 The duration of the programme in the Third Environmental Losses Report is 20 years, as in the Second Environmental Losses Report; but the amount of the loss is increased to BDT 20 million, BDT 1 million per year. In a final paragraph on this loss the Report clarifies that the restoration programme remains to be developed:

A loss of BDT 20,000,000.00 has been calculated in this sector. A proper program can be undertaken to restore the ecosystem in the affected area through the Department of Environment and Department of Forest, using the money realized against compensation.1765

2880 In the BMD, BAPEX also relies on the dissertation of Mr Ziauddin Ahmed in support of the assertion that “Habitats of critical animal species and plants in the ecosystem were found to have been damaged. It observes that several species had disappeared”.1766 BAPEX states that the study of Mr Ahmed "describes the impacts from the blowouts on bio-diversity and wild life”.1767 The extract of Mr Ahmed's dissertation produced by the Respondents, based


1764 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 5, emphasis in the original.
1765 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), pages 14 and 15.
1766 BMD, paragraph 329(9).
1767 Ahmed, Exhibit R-123, page 43; see above Section 9.2.3.

[Page 806]

on consultations of local population,1768 contains the following section on "Bio-Diversity and Wild Life: Threat due to the Lost Trees and Environmental Degradation":

Blowouts and environmental degradation not only caused dying of trees but also caused havoc to local wild birds and animals (Case 1, Case 2), Before the blowouts Siberian birds used to come in the nearby Konoskai Haor during the winter seasons, but after the incident the number of Siberian birds reached at almost zero. Numbers of White Eagle could be seen before the incident, but this number declined. After the blowouts rabbits, frogs, squirrels, etc. could hardly be seen. Many of the reptiles also became extinct after' the blowouts. As a result number of different poisonous insects was increasing and whole the area was looking dry and motionless.1769

2881 The Claimant objects that this claim “is almost entirely duplicative of other categories of alleged environmental loss” and adds:

With the exception of the specific living organisms and wildlife cited, this claim repeats BAPEX's claims for loss of vegetation, water, agriculture and soil – all of which are discussed above and meritless.

[...]

It is unclear how a cost to “restore the ecosystem” or claim for habitat differs from the particulars in the claims for vegetation, water, agriculture and soil. In Niko's submission, this underscores the point that there is simply no evidence at all to support an independent claim for loss of environmental system.1770

2882 The Claimant sees "wildlife" as "the sole matter within this claim that is not duplicated elsewhere”. It asserts that the claim is “speculative, unproven and directly contradicts the evidence that is before this Tribunal”. The Claimant refers in particular to the “survey of local wildlife” which, further to instructions by the DoE, Mr Glaholt and Crown Agents prepared and submitted to the DoE on 30 May 2006. That survey concluded that no significant adverse impact on local wildlife was identified. The Claimant relies on Mr Glaholt's Witness Statement who described the instructions, some of the difficulties and the conclusion and referred to the relevant Monitoring Reports.


1768 For details see above Section 9.2.3.
1769 Ahmed, Exhibit R-123, page 43, Section 4.1.4.2.
1770 CREC, paragraphs 88 – 90.

[Page 807]

2883 In any event, so the Claimant, “any impacts beyond the immediate aftermath of the first blowout are indirect or consequential.1771

2884 The Tribunal first considers the alleged loss at the basis of this claim. The Tribunal notes, as pointed out by the Claimant, that the only loss that would not be duplicative of losses claimed under other heads of claim is the loss of wildlife and other living species. The two Environmental Losses Reports provide no specific information about the loss of “wildlife” caused by the first blowout: the reports do not identify the species allegedly affected, nor do they explain how the fire and the gas escaping from the first blowout affected the wildlife. BAPEX and its experts have not added any information to the vague statements in the Environmental Loss Reports.

2885 With respect to “wildlife and other animal species” The DoE Observation and Monitoring Report of 19 February 2005, under the heading of “Burnt-out Trees” addressed the question of losses to wildlife species and instructed that a survey be conducted:1772

There is every possibility of destruction of habitat of some wild life and other animal species on the account of fire in the densely planted homestead areas.

A detail survey required to be conducted on the number of plant resources including the coverage by various species of plants for assessing the damage occurred to the vegetation of the surrounding. This survey should also include the presence of wild life such as mongoose, wild dog and among other the amphibians, the reptiles and the avian species.1773

2886 The Second Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005, announced that “a draft survey protocol for the wildlife survey” was “near completion".1774 The Third Monitoring Report, dated 3 May 2005, announced that the protocol had been completed and work on the survey had started:

The protocol was finalized and currently a team is conducting a structured interview-based survey of local people within a series of 9 Cells, each 1km × 1km, centred on the blowout. The interviews are designed to obtain spatial and temporal observations of changes in


1771 CREC, paragraphs 91 92, referring to WS Glaholt I, paragraph 93; DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221; 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69.
1772 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221; see above Section 9.2.2.
1773 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221, page 4.
1774 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, page 24, item 8.

[Page 808]

wildlife diversity, distribution and abundance and includes specific measures to obtain information on IUCN Red-listed species.1775

2887 Mr Glaholt wrote in his First Witness Statement:

Our efforts to conduct the required monitoring were undermined by a lack of information available on the local wildlife prior to the first blowout. We sought to address this gap by interviewing local people. However, the exercise proved to be difficult and somewhat unreliable due to the lack of pre-blowout information and the source of the post-blowout information. In any event, our efforts did not reveal significant adverse impact on local wildlife.1776

2888 First results were presented in the Tenth Monitoring Report, dated 3 October 2005. The Report stated that the “field survey was completed on 15 June 2005” and provided information about the survey:

Crown Agents consultants were engaged for the field survey which took place from May 30, 2005 to June 15, 2005. The objective of the survey were to collect data on wildlife presence, habitat and abundance or disappearance and other changes due to first blowout at the Tengratilla Gas Field. Focus group discussion (FGD), using photographs and questionnaire surveys were conducted to collect data on temporal and spatial patterns of occurrence of amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals. The survey sought to obtain information on the ten most common species in each class as well as on IUCN endangered species which may occur in the area. Thirty-seven FDGs were conducted which includes general villagers, fishermen, farmers, local leaders, teachers, students, male and female representing different socio-economic groups and occupations. Each group consisted of five/seven persons such that the survey obtained anecdotal observations from between about 185 – 259 people in the Tengratilla area.1777

2889 This was followed by four tables listing the species selected in the four categories, amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals.

2890 The result of the survey, as recorded in CREC and Mr Glaholt's first witness statement, was presented in the 15th Environmental Monitoring Report, dated 10 February 2006, produced by the Respondents.1778 The Claimant produced


1775 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, page 17, item 8.
1776 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 95.
1777 Tenth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-136, Section 8, pages 30 – 31.
1778 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, 15th Environmental Monitoring Report, 10 February 2006 (15th Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit R-114.

[Page 809]

a letter to the DoE, dated 30 May 2006 by which Niko transmitted the 20th Monitoring Report. The 15th Monitoring Report and some of the subsequent reports, including the 19th and the 20th Monitoring Report, contain the following tables and concluded the explanations on its section 8 “Wildlife Impact Inventory” with the statement that “there is no basis to conclude that local extirpations or persistent displacements of any endangered species have occurred".1779

2891 The introductory passages to section 8 of these later reports, are practically identical to the relevant passage in the Tenth Monitoring Report, quoted above. With respect to the species covered by the survey, the section explains that a distinction was made between “the ten most common species in each class" and the species included on the IUCN list of endangered species which may occur in the area.

2892 The final report, provided by the 18th Monitoring Report of 10 April 2006, then continues by a cautionary note:

Reported observations must be treated with some caution as migratory and seasonal climatic events also influence animal occurrence and habitat supply as do discrepancies in the period of observation pre and post blow-out. Observer bias is also problematic. For example no reports were obtained of the monitor lizard (Varanus sp.) yet this species (what was believed to be V.bengalensis) was commonly observed in close proximity to the Chattak 2B and 2C relief wells. Intriguingly, the Brahminy kite, Haliastur indus, was also very common in the area but never reported by local villagers during the interviews (Plates 14 and 15).1780

2893 The plates to which this text refers show what is described as “monitor lizard” at Chattak 2A on 3 January 2006 and as “concentration of Brahminy kite” near Chattak 2 on 22 October 2005.


1779 15th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-114, page 35; 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 33.
1780 18th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-80, page 33; the plates to which this text refers are identified as a Lizard at the Chattak 2A well and Brahminy kite observed near Chattak 2 on 12 October 2005.

[Page 810]

2894 This text is followed by four tables with the same categories of wildlife as in the Tenth Monitoring Report; the tables now mark for each species whether it was observed in pre-2004, 2004 and “post- blowout (pre-Monsoon)”. The first of these tables concerns amphibian species. It shows that the “common amphibia species” were observed before and after the blowouts, while the species on the IUCN list were not observed after the blowout:

Table 5.Common and uncommon amphibian species with occurrence records in the Tengratila area

Amphibians Commonly Reported In Tengratila Area Pre-2004 2004 Post Blow-out (Pre-monsoon)
Scientific Name Common/Local Name
1. Bufo melanostictus Kuno Bang X X
2. Rana tigrina Cola Bang X X
3. Rana hexadactyla Indian Pond Frog X X
4. Rhacophonus maculatus Common Tree Frog X X
5. Kaloula pulchra Venpu Bang X X
IUCN Listed Amphibians Reported In Tengratila Area
1. Microhyla ornata Cheena Bang X X
2 Microhyla rubra Lal Cheena Bang X X
3. Rana alticola Pana Bang X X
4. Rana taipehensis Gach Bang X X
5. Rhacophorus maximus Large Tree Frog X X

[Page 811]

2895 The tables concerning reptiles and birds also show, with two exceptions, that the common species were observed both before and after the blowouts but not those on the IUCN list.1781 In the fourth table, concerning mammals, four out of the ten species observed in 2004 and before, where not observed after the blowout:

Table 8: List of mammal species investigated in the study area with the status the species after and before blowout

Common and Uncommon Mammals Reported In The Tengratila Area Before and After the Blowout Pre-2004 2004 Post Blow-out (Pre-monsoon)
Scientific Name Common/Local Name
1. Canis aureus Jackal X X
2. Felis chaus Jungle cat X X
3. Herpectes edwardsi Baro benji X X X
4. Viverra zibetha Bagdash X X
5. Viverricula indica Khatash X X
6. Bandicota bengalensis Indian mole rat X X
7. Bandicota indica Bandicoot rat X X
8. Mus musculus House mice X X
9. Suncus nurinus Chika X X
10. Pteropus giganteus Indian flying fox X X
IUCN Listed Mammals Reported In Tengratila Area
1. Vulpes bengalensis Bengal fox X X
2. Manis crassicaudata Pangolin X
3. Panthera pardus Chita Bagh X
4. Hystrix indica Shojaru X

2896 The 18th Monitoring Report continues by listing species which “were specifically reported by local villagers within 500m of the blowout after the blowout"; and then continues:

The short time frame and season of observation post blowout also introduced their own bias. Anomalies and patterns in the anecdotal record compared with observations easily made in the field also suggest that reported villager observations cannot be totally relied on. Given the nature of the habitat altered by the blowout (well pad, rice paddy,


1781 Table 7, showing the results for observed birds shows that all 10 "common” species were observed post blowout; they are not shown as having been observed also in 2004 and pre-2004; this seems to be an omission, since the crows, sparrows and other birds observed after the blowout, like were observed before.

[Page 812]

ornamental plantings around an existing gas field facility, open village tree cover (predominantly jackfruit) with crop-based groundcover), within a high density village settlement, as well as the aerial extent of disturbance, lack of significant contamination, and confinement of industrial activity to a long established site) there is no basis to conclude that local extirpations or persistent displacements of any endangered species have occurred.1782

2897 The Tribunal notes that neither BAPEX and its experts nor the extract from the dissertation of Mr Ahmed mention the survey by the monitoring team. The statements of Mr Ahmed do not identify the basis on which they are made; presumably they are based on the consultation of the local population in 2008, the time of the dissertation, some three years after the blowouts. They do not explain how the observations relate to the blowouts: for instance, it is not obvious that the failure of migrating birds to return to places in Tengratila is due to the blowouts; similarly, the information about the decline or extinction of the species mentioned by Mr Ahmed, if it did occur, may have had other reasons.

2898 The Tribunal notes that there has been no allegation that any physical destruction of wildlife occurred. In view of the evidence provided, in particular by the survey of the monitoring team, the Tribunal finds it doubtful that the first blowout caused a significant reduction in the Tengratila wildlife. The Tribunal therefore sees no basis for awarding any compensation for destruction of wildlife itself.

2899 Concerning, it is not clear what damage to the ecosystem allegedly occurred which is not covered by the claims for the loss of vegetation and other claims considered above.

2900 The Second Environmental Losses Report recognised that the restoration of the vegetation, considered in the claim discussed above in Section 9.5.1, restores the ecosystem and may not be claimed again under this head of claim. The restoration of water and soil resources, to the extent they were damaged, also contributed to the restoration of the ecosystem. The Second Environmental Losses Report does not explain what additional work would have to be performed for the restoration of this loss.

2901 BAPEX's claim results from the passage in the Third Environmental Losses Report quoted above that “a proper program [...] to restore the ecosystem in the affected area” remained to be prepared. There is no indication that such


1782 18th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-80, page 36; 19th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-68, page 37.

[Page 813]

a programme has been executed or even prepared, nor even what additional contribution such a programme would have to provide.

2902 The Third Monitoring Report explains how the tree planting programme carried out by Niko contributes to the repair of any damage to the wildlife habitat/ecosystem:

Tree plantation program will also help building the habitat (birds, insects, reptiles and animals live on and under the trees in wooded areas). Due to this blowout part of the Tengratila habitat was disturbed (also see section 8). The Joint Ventures re-plantation program will restore the habitat.1783

2903 Assuming the ecosystem for wildlife in Tengratila other than vegetation resources and other systems considered above suffered damage and destruction by the first blowout, the Tribunal concludes that, such damage and destruction has been restored especially by Niko's work concerning tree planting programme, discussed above in Section 9.5.1.4. As BAPEX did not allege that specific additional restoration work was required, the claim must be dismissed.

9.5.5 Losses related to human health

9.5.5.1 The claim and positions of the Parties

2904 In this claim BAPEX seeks two distinct items of compensation: (i) BDT 160 million equivalent to USD 2’490’833 for the “rehabilitation of traumatised people” and (ii) BDT 125 million equivalent of USD 1’765’730 for the construction of a hospital at BDT 50 million and BDT 75 million for 15 years for operating the hospital from 2005 to 2020 at annually BDT 5 million.1784

2905 For the first part of this claim, the “rehabilitation” claim, BAPEX relies on the Second Environmental Losses Report which assessed the “Losses related to health” at BDT 160 million. The costs are presented for “rehabilitation of traumatised people”, calculated at BDT 400'000 for 400 people.1785 The damage was explained as follows:

(7) Health Effects: People in the rural surrounding 2-3 km of the Tengratila Gas Field were instantly panicked and frightened due to explosion. This has had an irreparable effect on body and mind. While


1783 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, page 20.
1784 BMEC, paragraphs 22 and 30; Brattle III, paragraph 20; Brattle Workpaper E, Exhibit R-456, Table E9.
1785 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), Table at page 6.

[Page 814]

the panic-stricken people were running to escape, many suffered broken limbs such as hands and legs, and some women suffered incidents such as miscarriages or early delivery. It has become apparent from the discussion with local people and public representatives that at least 400 members of 100 families living in the houses nearer the main Crater have been suffering from trauma. It is uncertain whether these traumatized people will be able to resume life as normal. In this domain, the losses have been calculated estimating the costs in their health sector.1786

2906 In the Third Environmental Losses Report this part of the loss claimed by BAPEX, still identified as “rehabilitation for traumatised people”, is reduced from BDT 160 million to BDT 65.04 million, even though that report included also the damage caused by the second blowout. The calculation of the number of "affected people” is increased from 400 to 1084, calculated as 197 families of 5.5 members on average. The duration of the rehabilitation, which had not been indicated in the Second Environmental Losses Report is now identified at 2 years, at the costs of BDT 2’500 per month.1787

2907 The explanations for the loss in the Third Environmental Losses Report repeat the words of the Second Environmental Losses Report about the damage caused by the first blowout and then add observations by the Third Environmental Losses Committee, including effects of the second blowout:

The current committee finds in the field level that no firm has recorded detailed statements of these factors. However, upon discussion with local people, it becomes clear that almost everyone from the affected villages has been sick mentally and physically ever since, long due to continued deadly sound pollution. Besides, a lot of dust and poisonous gas spread out due to the two consecutive blowouts and have created instant health problems for the people living within 5 km of the surrounding villages – there is no scope for doubt in this regard. As per rural sentiment, people generally do not go to physicians, and thus no actual statement on how many people are suffering from health problems can be obtained. However, the blowout has had a great impact on the health and mental well-being of the people who were displaced from the nearer area to another places,


1786 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 5.
1787 The table in the Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 19, states "2 years @ BDT 2500/per year/per person"; this must be typographical error; the indicated result is BDT 65.04 million for 1'084 people, which means that the costs are per month not per year; the explanatory text, as quoted below, also speaks of "monthly income".

[Page 815]

This panic has been raised due to the second blowout, and the health risk to almost all the nearer villagers has increased. Considering this, the committee agreed to pay compensation equivalent to two years' income for all family members of two villages (Tengratila & Ajobpur) of the said area. It is mentioned in the report of the District Administration that the number of families in the two affected villages is 197. The national average family size of Bangladesh is 5.5 members (Reference: Census, 2001). At present, per capita monthly income is approx. BDT 2500. Accordingly, total BDT (1084x2500x24) = BDT 65,040,000 is fixed as compensation. Although this amount of compensation is very little compared to the international compensation rate, the committee, by considering the socio-economical condition of Bangladesh, has made this decision (Bangladesh Economic Census 2004).

2908 The table summarising the loss assessment shows BDT 65.04 million as "Rehabilitation for traumatised people”, calculated as explained in the text, adding that this amount is an estimate of the direct loss and adds “If indirect losses are estimated, this amount will increase”.

2909 Concerning the disbursement of the money so assessed, the Report states: “The committee proposed to distribute the money to be realised among the 1084 members of the 197 families through District Administration.”

2910 In addition to this financial distribution, the Report proposes the construction and operation of a hospital, which forms the second item of this claim.

2911 In the “hospital claim”, BAPEX refers to the proposal in the Third Environmental Losses Report which was made in the following terms:

Aside from financial compensation, the Committee has recommended the setup of a hospital (including a mental health care service-providing department) for the people of that area. NIKO will operate the said hospital for at least 5 years or for the entire period of operation of the project, and then they will vest the responsibility of the hospital in the government.1788

2912 The required funds are described as (i) a "Onetime allotment" of BDT 50 million for the “Hospital setup cost” with the target “Mainly for the area of Tengratila and Ajobpur & surrounding” and (ii) BDT 25 million as “Operation


1788 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), pages 15 and 16.

[Page 816]

costs for minimum 5 (five) years” at BDT 5 million per year.1789 It is not explained whether these operational costs are those of Niko, which according to the explanations is expected to operate the hospital, or are an additional annual contribution that Niko is expected to make while operating the hospital.

2914 BAPEX explains that the loss as presented in the Second Environmental Losses Report had to be updated:

Because long-term health effects by definition would not have been observable by the Committee in 2005, “the Committee did not take due account of the potential for long term impacts”. It thus appears appropriate to supplement the Committee's estimates upon the basis of additional medical costs incurred as a result of respiratory and other maladies caused by chronic exposure to methane occasioned by the blowout.

2915 BAPEX states that the BBL Experts II Report presented an “estimate of medical costs based on figures originally included in the Second Environmental Losses Report” and added the costs for the hospital from the Third Report, expanding the claim for operation of the hospital from 5 to 15 years.

2916 The BBL Experts report on information obtained from Dr A K M Zillul Haque1790 and rely on the witness statement of Dr Abdul Gafur, a physician in the city of Sylhet who also treated patients in Sunamganj which will be considered below.

2917 The Claimant accepts that there were health effects of the blowouts on the local population, but states that these were short-term and all have been compensated by Niko. It asserts that there are no long-term effects that remain to be compensated. The Claimant relies on the Monitoring Reports and quotes from the 13th Monitoring Report, dated 9 January 2006 which BAPEX had produced in the Arbitration:

No widespread serious injuries or conspicuous health issues appear to have resulted from the blowout. [...] The Government investigation into damages as a result of the blowout also documented health related damages and costs related to health effects in its compensation estimate.


1789 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis) table at page 19.
1790 In particular at BBL I, paragraphs 165 et seq.; for further details see below Section 9.5.5.2.

[Page 817]

These costs were subsequently paid by NIKO for government distribution to the villagers.1791

2918 The Claimant asserts that the claim for “rehabilitation of traumatised people” is meritless and all potentially associated losses were fully compensated by Niko.

2919 Concerning the immediate effect of the first blowout, the Claimant accepts that

... there were a number of individuals who reported health concerns after the first blowout, specifically stress from noise, all such health concerns evidenced in the record were fully compensated by Niko.

The evidence is that immediately after the first blowout a number of people and families were evacuated in the vicinity of the Chattak 2 well. There were also a number of people who suffered stress from noise relating to the blowout. Lastly, there were a few individuals who alleged discreet health related impacts that were not a direct cause of the blowout (for example, one person burnt themselves when igniting a tube well while making tea, despite warnings not to).1792

2920 The Claimant relates its account of the immediate effect of the blowout to the passage in the Second Environmental Losses Report quoted above, where it was reported that people were “instantly panicked and frightened from the explosion" and that there were, as the Claimant describes them,“a few incidents of minor injury”.1793 It objects to BAPEX's reliance on the Second Environmental Losses Report

... because doing so ignores two important developments after this date. First, the Joint Venture's environmental team conducted a health survey of all households within 500m of blowouts to determine impacts. Second, the Local Loss Committee considered the claims of stress and health impacts to people in Tengratila and other villages to determine actual losses.


1791 CREC, paragraph 97, quoting from 13th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-118, page 40, emphasis in the quotation by the Claimant.
1792 CREC, paragraphs 94 and 95, referring to WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 99 100, 37 38 and 98; Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis); Sixth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-47, page 30.
1793 CREC, FN 162.

[Page 818]

Through the Joint Venture survey, Local Loss Committee assessments, and payments by Niko, health impacts from the first blowout were accounted for and compensated.1794

2921 The Claimant also refers to testimony by Mr Glaholt and Mr Adolph stating that “Niko took numerous steps that resulted in a significant improvement to local health”,“arranged and funded medical check-ups for villagers” and, during the months that followed the first blowout “gave the community unrestricted access to its doctor, who was on-site to meet the medical needs of the rig camp”.1795

2922 Concerning the alleged long-term impacts, the Claimant objects that there was no evidence to show such impact. It points out the “evidence that un-combusted and combusted lean natural gas (methane released by the blowout) disperses very quickly outdoors”; and

... the gas released at the site of the blowout burnt and, without human intervention to the contrary, any methane escaping into the air through gas seeps quickly dissipated.1796

2923 The Claimant contests the statements of the BBL Experts concerning health problems”,“respiratory problems” and the alleged effects of exposure to methane, which are “unknown to science”.1797 The Claimant states that “BAPEX has adduced no evidence to suggest the alleged long-term mental and emotional issues manifested, much less that they continue today”.1798

2924 In another line of argument, the Claimant refers to the construction of two new schools near the blowout site and the increase of homes and buildings in the area, which it considers “hardly consistent with the assertion that seepages have rendered the area dangerous and uninhabitable”; and it mentions that the activity of the monitoring team

... required spending time in close proximity to this gas – more time in close proximity to these areas than those living in the community. Not a single person from the monitoring team reported any adverse health impacts from their work, nor did they detect any significant adverse health impacts in the community from the gas. To the extent there were any ongoing gas emissions as a result from the first blowout, absent


1794 CREC, paragraphs 96 and 97, referring to WS Glaholt I, paragraph 99; Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35; Fourth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-115.
1795 WS Glaholt, paragraph 100 and WS Adolph 1, paragraph 158, referred to in CREC, paragraph 106.
1796 CREC, paragraphs 106 and 102.
1797 CREC, paragraphs 102, 114.
1798 CREC, paragraph 109.

[Page 819]

human intervention to capture or alter the flow path of that gas, it would harmlessly dissipate into the atmosphere.1799

2925 The Claimant also argues that no causal nexus was shown between the gas emissions from the first blowout and alleged health impacts:

There is no expert report that comments upon the existence of a direct causal nexus between gas emissions from the first blowout (or at all) and the alleged long-term health impacts from methane allegedly observed in the area. The observations of Messrs. Betton, Borthwick and Leinster in 2016 that there were "health problems" in the form of "respiratory problems" is nothing more than an observation at a snapshot in time. It is something which they explicitly note has "not been investigated in a systemic way", is "a unique situation" warranting further study, and one which the authors admit lacks supporting "comprehensive data".1800

2926 Finally, the Claimant states that the alleged impacts “would be at best 'consequential loss and damage arising from pollution”, indirect and remote, excluded both under the JVA and the Bangladesh Contract Act. The Claimant also contests the quantification of the claim and the justification of the construction and operation of a hospital.

9.5.5.2 The evidence regarding health effects

2927 The First Environmental Losses Committee visited the site shortly after the first blowout on 10 January 2005. In its report the Committee gave first indications about various losses. With respect to the population, it observed that "it was possible to secure the people and life” but added that the ejection of sand-stone, the “strong heat, deadly sound, earthquake and fire flame [...] made the villagers frightened”.1801

2928 The Second Environmental Losses Report, dated 13 April 2005, mentioned in the passage quoted above, the panic and fright of the people and the injuries that occurred when they escaped from the blowout. It became “apparent” to the Committee that at least 400 members of 100 families were “suffering from trauma”.1802 The Third Environmental Losses Report, issued after the second blowout and dated 15 September 2005, repeated the observation of the First Report about the panic and fright. It continued by the passage quoted above, in which it concluded that “upon discussion with local people, it becomes


1799 CREC, paragraphs 105 – 107.
1800 CREC, paragraph 102, underlining in the CREC quotation.
1801 First Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-1, page 6.
1802 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 5.

[Page 820]

clear that almost everyone from the affected villages has been sick mentally and physically ever since”.1803

2929 The DoE Subcommittee for Observation and Monitoring in its Report of 19 February 2005 stated that it had “interviewed some women and households to know the present status of their daily life and other problems”. It recorded information about disruptions of the villagers' life, causing a failure to appear at a qualifying exam and the dislocation of some families outside the danger zone. It continued:

At the onslaught of such a situation, a number of people are suffering from the trauma and various other physical and mental disorders, which demands a detail health and social survey to figure out the actual scenario and undertake remedial measures.

It is apparent that the blowout caused health complicacies among the neighboring people. The committee received more than one complaints regarding itching of skin on having the bath in the ponds affected by the blowout or seepage created by blowout. The committee also feels that there might be some ailments occurring due to air pollution that was serious during fire-ball of the blowout and the onward burning. It is very likely that air pollutants in the form of SOx, CO, C02, CH4, SPM etc. are being added everyday to the atmosphere--du€;o burning of blowout gases and various other substances.

2930 The Sub-Committee considered Niko's ongoing measures as “not adequate in various aspects including social and medical services” and stated:

A physician is not in place to look into the issues of physical illness, trauma or any other abnormal situation that has been triggered by the blowout incident.

An appropriate system should be in place to monitor health impacts, social impacts especially traumatic situation within 2km boundary from the main blowout. Remedial measures should also be in place which may include a medical team to be employed in this area.1804

2931 Niko's environmental consultants, Crown Agents/Tera, responded in their First Monitoring Report, dated 28 February 2005 announcing that it was conducting a health survey; that the data was being tabulated and processed. It also announced that it “conducted 8 focus group sessions with community


1803 Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), pages 25 and 26.
1804 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221, pages 5 and 6.

[Page 821]

groups within 1 km area including control group community”. It announced further detail for the next reports and added:

Preliminary Findings: some people within 1 km area reported some physical and psychological health problems.1805

2932 The Second Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005, included a section 9.3 on Health and Social Welfare, which reported on the health survey and provided some explanations on the medical situation:

The Joint Venture's environmental team has conducted a health survey of all households within 0.5 km of the blowout. The survey within 1 km is almost done and the data is being tabulated and processed.

A subset of detail survey report of the 55 relocated families is provided in the Appendix-A. Of the 55 relocated families 20% percent reponed some health problem. Preliminary results show that most of the health complains were headache, sprain ankle, panic and psychological upset. Sorne people within 1 km area reported some physical and psychological health problems as well.

The team also conducted 8 focus group sessions with community groups within 1 km area including control group community in order to better ascertain what percentage of health- related reports may be attributable to the blowout. Results of this focus group investigation will be reponed in a future progress report once completed.1806

2933 Appendix A to this Report is an “Inventory of 55 Relocated Families to Safer Area” which sets out over 75 pages “claim and assessment for 55 relocated families within 500m from the centre of West Chhatak Well site No. 2". The table provides for each of these families information about names and occupation, distance from the blowout, number of family members, homestead description and information about the damage suffered. This latter category includes a section about health and information about “doctor visit”.

2934 In this table the Tribunal found 8 cases recording some form of injury and five cases recording medical conditions that may be taken as a longer term health impact, relating to traumatic effects and respiratory problems.1807 The


1805 First Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-29, page 4.
1806 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79.
1807 Appendix A to Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79; for the cases of some form of health impact see below Sections 9.5.5.4, 9.5.5.5 and 9.5.5.6.

[Page 822]

report does not indicate how medical condition identified was caused by the blowout; in one case it seems clear that it was not so caused.

Jaundice (elder daughter), paratyphoid (elder son), visited doctor: Jamal Uddin (No 32), Deed writer, 40m from blowout point, 3 male, 6 female members of the household.

2935 The Third Monitoring Report, dated 3 May 2005, provides the following information about the health survey:

The Joint Venture's environmental team has conducted a health survey of all households within a 0.5 km of the blow-out. The survey report is included in the inventory.1808

2936 Exhibit C-35, which is the Third Monitoring Report, mentions in the table of contents an Appendix, presumably the health survey; but this appendix is not produced in the Arbitration.

2937 Reference to the health survey report is also made in the Fourth Monitoring Report, with the addition that the survey report“is included in the inventory as mentioned in the 3rd report”.1809 Subsequent Monitoring Reports also refer to the health survey and state that the “survey report is included in the 3rd and 4th Niko monitoring reports”.1810 The health survey report is, however, not produced with these Monitoring Reports.

2938 Relying on the Monitoring Reports and Mr Glahol's testimony, the Claimant asserts that “health impacts from the first blowout”, presumably including injuries”, “were accounted for and compensated”.1811 The Tenth Monitoring Report, dated 3 October 2005, and subsequent reports also mention a government investigation that documented health related damages and costs and Niko's payment:

The Government investigated into damages as result of the blowout also documented health related damages and costs related to health effects in its compensation estimate. These costs were subsequently paid by Niko for government distribution to the villagers.1812


1808 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, Section 9.3 at page 18.
1809 Fourth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-115, Section 9.3, page 19.
1810 Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-46, Section 9.3, page 22; similarly, Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, Ninth Environmental Monitoring Report, 4 September 2005, Exhibit R-86, Section 9.3, page 28.
1811 CREC paragraphs 96 and 97, referring to WS Glaholt I, paragraph 99, Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35; Fourth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-115.
1812 Tenth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-136, page 35, Section 9.3; similarly, 19th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-68, page 39, Section 9.3.

[Page 823]

2939 Some information about the blowout health damage is contained in the Tenth Monitoring Report, dated 3 October 2005, which is reproduced with slight modifications in subsequent Reports, as the following passage from the 13th Monitoring Report:

The blowouts resulted in varying degrees of social stress and disruption also had an unforeseen positive impact on the local economy and other aspects of community well being. No widespread serious injuries or conspicuous health issues appear to have resulted from the blowout. Two village women did report interference with pregnancies. One reported a pre-mature delivery while another attributed a still born child.1813

2940 These Monitoring Reports also provided information about the effects of the Chattak 2A blowout. In the 13th Monitoring Report, dated 9 January 2006, the following passage was contained:

The Chattak 2A blowout on June 24, 2005 was confined within localized areas already disturbed by the original blowout. The primary health related stress reported at this time was associated with noise from the blowout between June 24 and July 5, 2005 when the well finally bridged off.1814

2941 The Monitoring Reports also contain information about Niko's medical services, with respect to which the DoE Subcommittee in the 19 February 2005 Report had given instructions. In this context, the 13th and 19th Monitoring Reports also make observations concerning the health situation in the villages in general:

In August, the Joint Venture stationed a liaison officer in the community to compliment four environmental team representatives who have been living and working in the community on blowout related issues since shortly after the initial event. Community visits from the Joint Ventures safety and environmental specialists continue on daily basis and provide constant insight into community well being. Recent demobilization of the drilling rig at Tengratila has raised expressed concern by the community that long term community employment opportunities with Niko and Niko's community service programs may be at risk.

Niko's on-site medical doctors have continued volunteer medical services for villagers (Plate 18). They report the predominant ailments in the community are related to fungal infection and hygiene -related problems.


1813 Tenth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-136, page 35, quoted in 13th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-118, page 40, Section 9.3.
1814 13th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-118, page 40, Section 9.3.

[Page 824]

In this month of April about five hundred and fifty local patients take treatment from volunteer medical services. These specialists report no overt sign of blowout-related injury and have noted some improvement in community health as a function of general health education (eg. hygiene) and service provided. Community attitudes appear to be generally positive in regard to Niko and improvements being made locally.1815

2942 Plate 18, to which this passage referred is the following:

Plate 18. Local villagers visiting NIKO doctor at the West Chattak Facility, April 2, 2006.


1815 19th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-68, page 40, Section 9.3. Similar passages are contained in 13th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-118, and others thereafter.

[Page 825]

2943 In the 20th Monitoring Report1816 the same text is included but the above photograph is replaced by the following:

Plate 13. Local villagers visiting NIKO doctor at the West Chattak Facility, April 20, 2006.

36

2944 In the Arbitration, the Claimant and BAPEX produced statements in which witnesses reported about their recollection of health-related matters. BAPEX also produced statements of some of its experts who reported inter alia on information they received at the occasion of their visit to Tengratila in 2016.

2945 The Claimant produced in 2014 a witness statement by Mr Glaholt, dated 29 May 2014. As explained above, Mr Glaholt had been “engaged on a full-time basis to oversee the monitoring of any environmental and social impacts in the aftermath of the first blowout”.1817 In his First Witness Statement, Mr Glaholt asserted with respect to the health effects of the blowouts:

Based on the results of our monitoring, and on-site observations, we did not detect significant health effects either among our monitoring team (who spent more time in close proximity to escaping natural gas and burning natural gas than community members) or among the community at large. We must conclude that conspicuous and significant adverse health effects caused by gas release did not occur.1818


1816 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 36.
1817 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 9.
1818 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 36.

[Page 826]

2946 Mr Glaholt also commented on the exposure to gas inside buildings, insisting on his position concerning the dispersal of the gas into the air, even when it is used for cooking the houses:

Because this is essentially near commercial grade gas, it can be used for cooking. Since 2005, individuals in the community have created systems to capture and pipe this gas to various locations. This undoubtedly increases methane exposure inside and outside of homes. However, even when indoors there is still likely significant ventilation around the exits of any piping systems so that any gas would be immediately dispersed into the air, much as it would when outside.1819

2947 Mr Adolf, in his First Witness Statement, explained the payments made by Niko following the first blowout. He distinguished cash payments directly to the “57 families in the risk zone” and claims in amounts determined by the Local Loss Committee. Mr Adolph states that Niko “arranged and funded medical check-ups for villagers” but did not mention any health-related payments.1820

2948 Three of the witness statements produced by BAPEX in March 2016 deal with health effects of the first blowout:

2949 In his Witness Statement, dated 5 March 2016, Mr Farid Uddin Ahmed described his recollection of the first blowout. He explained that he was in his house approximately 250 meters northwest of Niko's compound. He “heard a loud noise and went to the hill overlooking the Niko compound”; his “neighbours did the same”. He then “saw an explosion”, the geyser of material from the well, and ran away to find his family. The stated: “we were scared” and took refuge in Lakshmipur, some 5 kilometres away.

2950 Mr Ahmed reported in his Witness Statement about some of the damage he observed. With respect to “health issues related to the blowout” experienced by his students, mentioned “hearing problems as a result of hearing the loud noises caused by the blowouts”, “serious psychological trauma” suffered by some of the younger children” and “breathing problems, burning eyes and headaches after the blowouts”. “Shortly after the blowouts” his neighbours came to him “with problems with their breathing, vision and hearing”.1821

2951 Md. Shahjahan explained in his Witness Statement, dated 6 March 2016, that from 1986 until 1992 he was the headmaster of the Tengratila Secondary School; in 2005, at the time of the blowouts, he “served as the appointed


1819 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 39.
1820 WS Adolph, paragraphs 156 – 164.
1821 WS Ahmed, paragraphs 10 and 11.

[Page 827]

President of the Sowarabazar Upazila Anti-Corruption Committee”. His house in Tengratila is “less than one kilometer northeast of Niko's compound”. He wrote about the sound of the first blowout and the shaking ground. “Many people fled from their homes. Afterwards, sand covered the village and three kilometers around”. At the second blowout “the explosion was louder” and the “gas coming out of the ground” was “worse after the second blowout”.

2952 Concerning the health effects, Md. Shahjahan referred to hearing problems resulting from the sound of the explosions and people “hurt themselves by tripping and falling" when they ran away from the Niko compound. He also reported respiratory problems and increases in arsenic poisoning.

2953 Dr Gafur, a physician, explained in his Witness Statement of 8 March 2016 that he specialised in respiratory diseases since 2010 and treated since then patients in the city of Sylhet and also Tengratila. He explained that once a week on Friday he receives patients in Sunamganj, where he has a private office. "There, patients come from Doarabazar Sub-District and adjoining places, including the village of Tengratila”.1822

2954 Dr Gafur stated that “Over the past five years, I have observed that by far the largest number of patients with respiratory problems come to me from Tengratila and the Doarabazar area”. This testimony will be further considered below in the Section 9.5.5.6 on Respiratory Problems.

2955 BBL Experts Report I conveys information about observations during their visit to Tengratila from 3 to 9 February 2016 which provided “an insight on potential health and environmental impacts”.1823 This included observations from the site visit, interviews of “groups of villagers”, meeting with “representative individuals”1824 and information from Dr A.K.M. Zillul Haque. The report describes Dr Zillul Haque as “local doctor (practicing in Doarabazar)” and as “Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer of Doarabazar".1825 The information that BBL Experts provide from Dr Zillul Haque concerns the number of people requiring immediate medical treatment and the number of people “affected by chronic arsenic poisoning"; it will be considered in the context of the relevant claims.

2956 With respect to health impact, the experts concluded that a “number of people in Tengratila are clearly suffering respiratory problems and from arsenic poisoning, both of which we believe are likely to have been caused or at a


1822 WS Gafur, paragraph 4.
1823 BBL I, paragraph 5
1824 BBL I, paragraphs 31 and 32.
1825 BBL I, paragraphs 170 and 165.

[Page 828]

minimum exacerbated, by the consequences of the blowouts”.1826 BBL Experts I Report also mentions that “a number of individuals have suffered burns, predominantly associated with lighting gas for use in cooking” and "fainting and dizziness observed in school children; other medical issues that were “highlighted by people living in Tengratila” were “psychological issues", “eye problems”, “heart problems” and “muscular weakness and tremor”.1827

2957 The BBL Experts II Report relies on the information gathered in 2016 and reported in BBL Experts I Report and does not introduce new evidence.

9.5.5.3 The features of the first blowout and their potential to cause the alleged health related damage

2958 The evidence considered in the previous Section pointed to a large number of medical conditions for which the first blowout was presented as actual or potential cause. One of the defences raised by the Claimant against BAPEX's claims for health-related damage consists in saying that the features of the Chattak 2 blowout were such that that they could not produce the health effects for which BAPEX claims. The Tribunal therefore considers first the specific features of the first blowout to determine their potential health effects.

2959 The first of these features relates to the manner in which the blowout manifested itself. The events of the first blowout have been described above in Section 9.1.2.1. They concerned the initial phase of some two days characterised by the flame of some 100m height and the geyser of soil and debris, accompanied by vibrations of the ground and loud noise. This was followed by a period of some 9 months until 9 October 2005, when the Chattak 2B relief well operation was completed. During this period seepages of gas continued over a larger area, some of which ignited with flames much smaller than that during the initial phase. The second blowout that occurred on 24 June 2005 and which manifesting itself in a manner similar to that of the first blowout, is not included in Niko's responsibility. After the completion of the relief operation on 9 October the seepages further reduced; Niko is responsible for these reduced seepages for another three years until 8 October 2008.1828

2960 The health effects that have been raised in relation to these events concern physical injury and their psychological impact, primarily during the initial period of some two days.


1826 BBL I, paragraph 1.3.2.1.
1827 BBL I, paragraphs 171 – 177.
1828 See above Section 7.6.6.3 in fine.

[Page 829]

2961 A second feature potentially relevant for the health effects concerns the gas that escaped from the Reservoir. The issue has two aspects: the composition of the gas and its dispersion once it emanated from the ground.

2962 Concerning the composition of the gas, the specialists that Niko first engaged to examine the blowout and to “kill” it, characterised the gas as “dry and sweet”. The Summary Report of Safety Boss, dated 24 January 2004, stated:

The gas flow was & is dry and sweet, likely 100% methane with no H2S.1829

2963 Mr Glaholt explained in his Second Witness Statement:

The gas produced by the Chattak 2 well blowout was a pure, dry and sweet natural gas mixture – it contained no salt water, liquid hydrocarbons, or hydrogen sulfide. Including butanes, 99% of the West Chattak gas stream is comprised of natural gas products that are within North American specifications for commercial use indoors and outdoors for heating and cooking.1830

2964 This is confirmed by the reports of Niko's consultants, the Crown Agents/Tera monitoring team. Proceeding further to instruction of the DoE,1831 these consultants presented the results of their daily monitoring of the air quality at six locations within 200m of the blowout sites. The team monitored "three primary air quality indicators: %LEL, CO and O2.” The Third Monitoring Report, dated 3 May 2005 noted:

To date alarm thresholds have never been reached for carbon monoxide or oxygen. LEL thresholds have been exceeded from time to time in some locations and are used as basis for ongoing safety program including relocations.1832

2965 This observation was confirmed in subsequent Monitoring Reports.1833 Concerning the composition of the gas, the reports recorded 97.9% methane, 1.8% ethane and 0.2% propane.1834 Other components which had been


1829 Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23, page 3.
1830 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 11 with reference to Niko's letter to BAPEX, dated 14 December 2004, Exhibit C-15; Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23; Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25.
1831 DoE Observation and Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-221, page 7.
1832 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, page 16.
1833 See e.g. 20th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-69, page 28.
1834 Eighth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-116, page 18 and subsequent reports.

[Page 830]

identified for monitoring gave no basis of concern, except for flammability; subsequent monitoring of the gas therefore focused on the LEL values.

2966 The Tribunal has examined above in Section 9.2.2.5 the criticism raised in the BBL Experts I Report against the scope and content of the gas emissions monitoring by Niko's consultants. BAPEX relied on this criticism and argued that Niko's monitoring “did not look for hydrocarbons, oxides, or other toxic substances that BAPEX's environmental damages experts indicate should have been measured in accordance with industry standards”.1835 As noted above, the Tribunal examined the evidence and concluded that it did not support this criticism: the Monitoring Reports considered in addition to the LEL levels, carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2) and Hydrogen Sulphate (H2S). The Tribunal also referred to the observation by Mr Glaholt who had emphasised that “it is the actual nature of the blowout” in particular the composition of the gas and specific contaminant that must be considered when designing the scope of environmental monitoring.

2967 In the present context, the scope of the monitoring by Niko's consultants was determined in function of the composition of the gas and was made in response to instructions from the DoE; the results were notified in the Monitoring Reports to the DoE; no objection was raised concerning the scope of the monitoring.

2968 The BBL Experts identified in section 6.2 of their first report the aspects of the gas that, in their opinion, should have been analysed.1836 They took samples of the seeping gas and had it analysed by a laboratory in the UK and produced the results.1837 For the analyses they “selected the parameters to be analysed based on the thinking outlined in Section 6.2 to obtain an overview of the current situation and to identify the potential issues that need further investigation”.1838 The gas so analysed was, according to the determination of Mr Wilson, the same as that of the Chattak 2 blowout.1839

2969 Neither BAPEX nor its experts have identified among the results of their analysis any of the components of the gas that should have been analysed by Niko's consultants and that could give rise to the health concerns expressed by the BBL Experts.


1835 BMD, paragraph 298.
1836 BBL I, Section 6.2.
1837 ESG Report, Exhibit R-129, and Appendix 4 and 5 to the BBL I Report.
1838 BBL I, paragraph 181.
1839 Wilson I, paragraph 6.2.4, also Executive Summary, paragraph 5; Mr Wilson's Report was available to the BBL Experts and is referred to in their report.

[Page 831]

2970 The Tribunal concludes that there is no basis to believe that the Chattak 2 gas was anything but the dry and sweet gas described above and that there is no evidence that this gas had any of the components which the BBL Experts identified as constituting a health risk. The Tribunal therefore sees no justification for criticising the limited scope of the air quality monitoring adopted by Niko's consultants.

2971 In addition to the composition of the gas, the Claimant insisted on the dispersion of the gas once it emanated from the ground:“any methane escaping into the air through gas seeps quickly dissipates”.1840 The Claimant relied on the circumstances invoked in support of the claim for atmospheric pollution, which is based on the emission of methane and CO2 in the atmosphere.1841 The Claimant also referred to other witness statements, in particular that of Mr Glaholt who stated:

Air quality in the area was affected by the release of un-combusted and combusted, lean natural gas in an outdoor setting that provided for good air dispersion. Air monitoring was only able to detect natural gas in the immediate vicinity of the blowout and within a few feet or less at cracks and fissures in the ground where gas was escaping within the community and facility site.1842

2972 Mr Kemp confirmed when discussing the practice of using the Gas Monitors:

If we held the monitors to within inches of cracks or fissures where was a gas seepage, we might get alarm readings, but at any higher than 2 feet the gas typically dissipated enough that it wouldn't register on the monitors.1843

2973 Mr Wilson explained the use the “hand held device to observe known emissions of methane, in places where bubbling was occurring from the ground and water":

The methane emissions did show up on the thermal or infrared images and useful information on the fate of methane emitted from the ground was obtained. The images indicated that the bubbles of methane coming out of the ground quickly dispersed once in the air. A continuous cloud of methane does not develop at ground level, but this does not mean that the emissions are necessarily safe. The emissions from a vent pipe were


1840 CREC, paragraph 102.
1841 See above Section 9.4; the Claimant refers specifically to the presentation in the Third Environmental Losses Report and comments in the expert report of Mr Willis.
1842 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 35.
1843 WS Kelly, paragraph 24.

[Page 832]

also observed and the methane from the pipe quickly dispersed down wind and within 1m of the vent could not be seen.1844

2974 Concerning dispersion inside buildings, Mr Glaholt referred to the use of the seeping gas for cooking purposed. Given what he called the “essentially near commercial grade gas”, he explained:

Since 2005, individuals in the community have created systems to capture and pipe this gas to various locations. This undoubtedly increases methane exposure inside and outside of homes. However, even when indoors there is still likely significant ventilation around the exits of any piping systems so that any gas would be immediately dispersed into the air, much as it would when outside.1845

2975 The dispersal is reflected in the practice of measuring methane concentrations inside buildings or other closed spaces. For this reason, methane concentration is measured above the location of the emission. Mr Wilson gives as example measurement “above a crack in the floor or pipe coming into a building" when determining he “maximum concentration considered acceptable within an occupied residential space in all countries in which [he has] experience of working”.1846 He is “monitoring ingress points above cracks”1847 and relies on Mr Kelly's Atmospheric Testing report that recorded “gas readings immediately above these [slabs]”.1848 Mr Kelly reported that this was the general policy established for determining whether, following the Chattak blowouts, an area was deemed to be hazardous and evacuation strongly recommended.1849

2976 On the basis of the argument and evidence before it, the Tribunal concludes that the gas from the Chattak 2 blowout was pure, dry and sweet. The components of this gas that must be considered for a possible health impact are methane and, once ignited, carbon dioxide. Methane is lighter then air, raises up and is rapidly dispersed. The Tribunal will consider this impact in the present Section below; the flammability issue and the LEL levels will be considered below in Section 9.5.6.

2977 The third aspect feature potentially relevant for the health effects concerns the material ejected during the first phase of the blowout. This material


1844 Wilson I, paragraph 4.5.1.
1845 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 39.
1846 Wilson I, paragraph 3.3.9.
1847 Wilson I, paragraph 6.3.1(f).
1848 Wilson I, paragraph 5.6.6, referring to the Atmospheric Testing in Tengratila and Tengrabazar, 24 November 2005, Exhibit C-316.
1849 Exhibit C-316, page 1.

[Page 833]

landed in thick layers on the BAPEX/Niko compound and in parts of the immediate surrounding area. The information about the further spread in form thinner layers differs. It appears, however, that some of the material settled as dust in a wider range.

2978 The material is sometimes referred to as “soil fallout”, and the question of a potential damaging effect was discussed above in Section 9.5.3.

2979 The material came from the wellbore and was ejected by the gas escaping with great force. The principal component therefore was the soil of the wellbore. In contemporary documents the material is therefore referred to as “soil”, “sand”, “dust”; the Monitoring Reports refer to “soil fallout”.1850 Together with this soil other material in or near the wellbore was ejected.

2980 In his report of 24 January 2005, Mr Miller, CEO of Safety Boss who had been called upon to opine on relief operations, described the materials as “involving formation sand, displaced surface soil and near surface soil”.1851

2981 The Environmental Site Inspection Report, which Mr Glaholt prepared shortly after his arrival on site, mentions bricks and drilling mud; and he explains the distribution of the material, mentioning in particular the “fine dust” in the more remote areas:

During the first two days of the blowout, escaping gas created a geyser of native sand/soil and some drilling mud (KCI polymer-based). Projection of material around the well bore has created a broad cone of soil approximately 2 m high around well centre which has filled with water/mud to an undetermined depth. Soil/sand debris has been most conspicuously spread over portions of an area approximately 200 m x 400 m adjacent to the well site, though some fine dust has been reported as far as 2 km away. Mineral debris blown from the well has variably blanketed adjacent ground, paddy. vegetable plots, fruit trees and native vegetation in a generally northwest direction with some accumulations exceeding 10 ст.1852

2982 In his Second Witness Statement Mr Glaholt commented in particular on the drilling mud:

It is my view (and was my observation at the time) that by far the vast majority of drilling mud involved in the blowout remained on site, as did


1850 E.g. Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, and Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, both section 4.2.
1851 Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23, page 3.
1852 Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25, page 2.

[Page 834]

any other potentially deleterious substances. To the extent any of the drilling mud was spread off of the Niko compound, it did not contain any harmful chemicals.1853

2983 When examining allegations about health damage caused by the material ejected by the first blowout, the Tribunal will therefore have to consider in particular the nature and components of the native soil and the drilling mud to determine whether they could cause the alleged damage.

2984 The Monitoring Reports, as they were discussed above in Section 9.5.3, examined the “soil fallout" at the locations where it ended up as deposits. Further to instructions of the DoE, the Second Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005, presented the results of this examination. With respect to “the blowout soil chemistry”, the Report stated:

Laboratory results indicate that these soils were relatively benign, with neutral pH (note most soils in the area tend to be naturally acidic) and contain elevated levels of potassium.1854

2985 Subsequent Monitoring Reports provided further information and “results of laboratory analysis of basic soil chemical parameters”.1855

2986 The Monitoring Reports also reported on the effect of the rain on the deposits: Already the Third Monitoring Report, dated 3 May 2005 reported that

As was expected, recent rain washed out some of the inert components from the soil as well as the potassium and brining the soil quality close to the control soil quality level.1856

2987 By early 2006 the monsoon rains had flushed the fallout debris not only of the first blowout but also that of the second blowout.

2988 BAPEX and its experts nevertheless assert that the material ejected by the two blowouts was “liable to give rise to adverse health effects, such as respiratory disease”. The assertion will be discussed below when the alleged respiratory diseases are examined.

2989 Against this background the Tribunal has examined the different types of health effects that were raised in the context of this claim.


1853 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 12, with references to Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23 and Environmental Site Inspection Report, Exhibit C-25.
1854 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, page 18, Section 4.2.
1855 E.g. Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, page 15.
1856 Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35, page 15.

[Page 835]

9.5.5.4 Physical injury

2990 The Second Environmental Losses Report, on which BAPEX's claim for losses related to human health is based, in the passage quoted above, identifies specifically incidents of physical injury:

While the panic-stricken people were running to escape, many suffered broken limbs such as hands and legs, and some women suffered incidents such as miscarriages or early delivery.

2991 The Claimant accepts that “there were a few incidents of minor injury”,1857 and it relies on a “health survey of all households within 500m of the blowout to determine impacts”. The circumstances of this health survey have been described above in Section 9.5.5.2; the appendix to the Third Monitoring Report, which is said to contain the report on this health survey, has not been produced. The Damage Inventory, produced with the Second Monitoring Report, which may contain some aspects of the survey, identified some instances which may have some relation to physical injury; they identify the damage or harm and circumstances of the person having suffered them. The Tribunal has identified the following 6 cases recording some form of injury:


1857 CREC, FN 162.

[Page 836]

2992 The context of the injuries by people “running to escape” are illustrated by an observation of Mr Miller, CEO of Safety Boss, the consultant invited by Niko to opine on relief operations, in his Report of 24 January 2005:

There are numerous residents in the Immediate area, some as close as 60m (ail distances are from well center), many within 200m, as well there have at times been several hundred spectators encroaching within the potential hazard area.1858

2993 The initial report on the blowout stated that in the early morning of 8 January 2005 at around 4 am the loud sound started, gas started flowing vigorously, the rig collapsed into the ground, the noise was increasing and at 6:55 am the gas ignited. By that time a group of local people seems to have assembled already. The report of the crew stated “we tried to leave that place by boat, but failed due to angry mob”.1859

2994 These are the contemporaneous reports identifying specific injury or similar harm and provide some information about the circumstances under which this occurred.

2995 The witness statements which BAPEX produced in 2016 address the provide further information about the incidents:

2996 Mr Farid Uddin Ahmed explained that when he heard “a loud noise and went to the hill overlooking the Niko compound. My neighbors did the same”. When the explosion and the ejection of soil and other material from the well occurred, he “ran away” like many others.1860 He also reported about harm suffered by his students; this will be considered below in Section 9.5.7.

2997 Mr Shahjahan added the information that, when running away, people “hurt themselves":

The sound of the explosions damaged people's ears. People ran away from the Niko compound, and in so doing, hurt themselves by tripping and falling.1861


1858 Safety Boss Summary Report, Exhibit C-23, page 2.
1859 Sequence of Events: Well Control Chattak 2, Exhibit C-19; WS Ahmed, paragraph 4.
1860 WS Ahmed, paragraph 4.
1861 WS Shahjahan, paragraph 7.

[Page 837]

2998 The BBL Experts report more dramatic accounts and mention the death of people and the disappearance of a 6-year old child for an entire month:

Several people reported the death of relatives whilst fleeing the area. One person is regularly seeing a psychiatrist as a result. Another individual, who was just 6 years old at the time of the blowout, ran as directed but in the dark, got lost and remained so for a month until reunited with his parents.1862

2999 The account is unusual: there are several accounts of people running away from the blowout; Mr Ahmed reported, as explained above, that he and his neighbours went to the hill overlooking the Niko compound; when the geyser of material from the wellbore erupted, they ran away; similarly Mr Miller of Safety Boss reported that people assembled near the blowout site. Neither Mr Ahmed nor anyone else reported a fatal incident in this context and none of the other reports about the people running away from the blowout mentions the death of persons. When the BBL Experts report describe what they heard about the six-year-old child running in the dark and disappearing for an entire month; they do not report how this six-year old child survived in the dark during for an entire month. The accounts reported by the BBL Experts in 2016 might serve as an example of how, with the passage of time, event reporting may become increasingly dramatic.

3000 There is no other indication about fatalities in the context of the blowouts; indeed, one of the fortunate aspects that has been highlighted by the Parties and reports is that no fatalities occurred. Nor has there been any mention anywhere else of a 6-year-old child that disappeared for a month and then appeared again.

3001 The evidence concerning the number and importance of injuries that occurred in this manner or is otherwise related to the first blowout, is scant. Apart from the cases in the Damage Inventory quoted above and occasional mention of individual incidents in the Monitoring Reports, the health survey attached to the third Monitoring Report may have provided some information; but it has not been produced in the Arbitration. The BBL Experts made some more general statement about injuries that required treatment:

In the periods immediately following the two blowouts, a number of people suffered injuries that required medical treatment. The numbers of people suffering from acute health related effects following the blowouts


1862 BBL I, paragraph 174.

[Page 838]

as detailed in the records held in Doarabazar are shown in the table below.

Table 7-1 - Individuals requiring immediate medical treatment after blowout according to notes taken at Doarabazar interview with the Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer of Doarabazar, Dr. A. K. M. Zillul Haque

Date of Blowout Number of People Treated by Local Medical Staff
1. 7 January 2005 121
2. 24 June 2005 1,426

3002 No information is provided about the “records held in Doarbazar” to which Dr Zillul Haque referred in his interview with the BBL Experts, about the manner in which the need for medical treatment was determined and about the medical conditions for which such treatment was requested. It is not clear whether the 121 people listed in this table all “suffered injuries that required treatment" for injuries caused by the first blowout or whether some of them suffered from other “acute health related effects".

3003 In this context it also must be noted that, among the persons who noted the “running to escape”, two presented direct testimony by witness statements. They did not report any “broken limbs such as hands and legs”. One of them did not mention any injury and the other simply stated that the people running away “hurt themselves by tripping and falling”.1863 The Tribunal also notes that, contrary to the detailed report on the losses to fruit, fish, buildings etc., no specific injury has been reported by the Local Losses Committee. The only specified injuries are those in the Damage Inventory quoted above; but no claim is made for their compensation.

3004 In these circumstances, it is unclear how serious the medical condition was for which 121 persons are recorded in the Doarabazar records to which the BBL Experts refer. In any event, the number shown is far below the 400 people for which BAPEX's claim for health-related damage is based. Considering these reports listing numbers of unidentified persons having suffered health impacts from the blowouts, the Tribunal notes that the Local Losses Committee recorded for each of the “Victimized Families”, identified by name, the number of trees and their species and, where applicable, the quantity of fruit, damage to buildings, losses to fishes and other damage, quantifying the claim for compensation.1864 Neither in the report of this Committee nor elsewhere in the file of this Arbitration is there any claim for physical injury of a specific person.


1863 See the witness statements of Mr Ahmed and Mr Shahjahan quoted above.
1864 For details on these reports see above Section 9.2.1.4.

[Page 839]

3005 The Tribunal also notes the Claimant's assertion quoted above, according to which “health impacts from the first blowout”, presumably including injuries”, “were accounted for and compensated”.1865 Similar statements are made in some of the Monitoring Reports.1866 These statements remained uncontested.

3006 This suggests that specific claims by individuals affected by such health impacts, if they were made, have been settled by Niko.

3007 In these circumstances, the Tribunal is not in a position to award any compensation for specific cases of injuries suffered by persons escaping from the blowout site or otherwise suffering health impacts from the first blowout.

9.5.5.5 Trauma and stress

3008 The Tribunal notes that suffering mentioned in the passage quoted at the opening of the Section on physical injury were referred to in the context of the description of panic and fright that led, in the statement of the Second Environmental Losses Report, to the “trauma” for which the rehabilitation costs are claimed. Injuries mentioned in the Second Environmental Losses Report appear as the peak or specific manifestation of the scary situation in general and the precipitated running to escape the danger. The Tribunal therefore considers now the broader context of panic and fright and the related trauma described in the Second Environmental Losses Report.

3009 The health effects that are the basis for the amount claimed pursuant to the Second Environmental Losses Report, dated 13 April 2005, on which BAPEX relies are described as follows:

... at least 400 members of 100 families living in the houses nearer the main Crater have been suffering from trauma. It is uncertain whether these traumatised people will be able to resume life as normal. In this domain, the losses have been calculated estimating the costs of their health sector.1867

3010 As discussed in the previous Section, this passage is preceded by an explanation according to which the panic and fright caused by the first blowout had “an irreparable effect on body and mind”. BAPEX claims


1865 CREC paragraphs 96 and 97, referring to WS Glaholt I, paragraph 99; Third Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-35; Fourth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-115.
1866 E.g. Tenth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-136, page 35, quoted above.
1867 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 5, paragraph 7.

[Page 840]

BDT 160 million, an amount calculated in the Second Environmental Losses Report for “rehabilitation of traumatised people".1868

3011 BAPEX also claims for BDT 125 million for the construction and operation of a hospital. The need for such a hospital was not mentioned in the Second Environmental Losses Report but only in the Third Environmental Losses Report. BAPEX explains the extension of the claim to this additional amount as follows:

Because long-term health effects by definition would not have been observable by the Committee in 2005, "the Committee did not take due account of the potential for long-term health impacts." It is thus appropriate to supplement the Committee's estimates upon the basis of additional medical costs incurred as a result of respiratory and other maladies caused by chronic exposure to methane occasioned by the blowout.1869

3012 This indicates that BAPEX claims for the hospital costs as compensation for the named “additional medical costs”. This is confirmed by the BBL Experts who confirmed that the Third Environmental Losses Report following the second blowout “considered the provision of medical facilities that was required to deal with the mental and emotional health issues resulting from the trauma of the second blowout" but added

... we believe that it is a valid estimate of costs for the medical facilities needed to deal with the long-term effects of the first blowout, caused by exposure to methane of 16+ years.1870

3013 The Tribunal concludes that BAPEX's claim for BDT 160 million is for the rehabilitation of the 400 traumatised persons and the BDT 125 million claim for the medical effects of the chronic “exposure to methane”.

3014 The Claimant accepts that some individuals reported “stress from noise”, and asserts that related “concerns” were fully compensated by Niko:

The record shows there is no current loss to human health. While there were a number of individuals who reported health concerns after the first blowout, specifically stress from noise, all such health concerns evidenced in the record were fully compensated by Niko.1871


1868 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), item 7 in the table at page 6.
1869 BMEC, paragraph 28; the quotation is from the BBL II, paragraph 16.
1870 BBL II, paragraph 21.
1871 CREC, paragraph 94.

[Page 841]

3015 In support of this assertion, the Claimant relies on Mr Glaholt's First Witness Statement:

The only identifiable health effect observed was stress associated with the noise from the blowout. Indeed, the local loss committee considered claims of stress by people in Tengratila and the villages further away. Niko paid these amounts in full.1872

3016 Concerning the long-term traumatic effects, the Claimant contests that there is any evidence for such long-term mental damage:

BAPEX has adduced no evidence to suggest the alleged long-term mental and emotional issues ever manifested, much less that they continue today.1873

3017 Some persons exposed to the first blowout may have suffered shock and distress. In some cases, the expression “trauma” was used: Mr Ahmed stated that “some of the younger children suffered serious psychological trauma. They all lived in fear of another blowout”.1874 This may well have been due to the second blowout which made the blowout appear as a repeating event; the Third Environmental Losses Report explained that the second blowout "raised” the panic and increased “the health risk to almost all the nearer villagers".

3018 The First Monitoring Report, dated 28 February 2005, provided preliminary information about “health study” in preparation and indicated that “some people within 1 km area reported some physical and psychological health problems”.1875 The “Inventory” attached to the Second Monitoring Report, dated 9 April 2005, then provided a detailed table with results of these enquiries concerning the 55 relocated families. It listed only one case for which it used the expression “traumatised”:

Children traumatised, not visited to doctor: Abdul Kahim, business farming, 40m from the blowout c, 2 male and 2 female members in the household.1876

3019 The Second Environmental Losses Report, dated 13 April 2005, did not mention the two Monitoring Reports. It based the opinion about “trauma” on “discussion with local people and public representatives”; the long-term effect


1872 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 99, referred to in CREC, paragraph 96. ↩
1873 CREC, paragraph 109. ↩
1874 WS Ahmed, paragraph 10. ↩
1875 First Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-29, page 4. ↩
1876 Second Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-79, Appendix A, items 5, 6 and 7. ↩

[Page 842]

of this trauma was based on the observation that it was «uncertain whether these traumatised people will be able to resume life as normal».

3020 None of these statements about traumatic effects rely on a medical examination that would justify assuming that persons suffered a medical condition from the blowout requiring treatment over a long term. Indeed, the basis for BAPEX's claim for the rehabilitation of a long-term traumatic condition of 400 persons is the observation in the Second Environmental Losses Report, issued some three months after the blowout occurred. BAPEX itself accepts that “long-term health effects by definition would not have been observable by the Committee in 2005”.1877 It follows that the Second Environmental Losses Report cannot serve as a basis for the “irreparable effect" of the first blowout and the cost of their “rehabilitation” over a long period of time.

3021 Five months after this Second Environmental Losses Report, when the Third Environmental Losses Report was issued on 15 September 2005, long-term health effects still had not been established: the report recognises that “no firm has recorded detailed statements of these factors” and that “no actual statement on how many people are suffering from health problems can be obtained".

3022 The BBL Experts I Report states that “some individuals were reported to be severely traumatised by the events associated with the blowouts”. It has been mentioned already above that the events referred to by the BBL Experts as having caused these individuals to be “traumatised” have no relation to the evidence in the Arbitration: “death of relative while fleeing the area”, presumably the blowout; and the disappearance of a six-year old child for one month. The BBL Experts conclude that the “extent of psychological damage and numbers or [of?] people affected are yet to be determined”.1878 In any event, the BBL Experts see the health impact of the blowouts in 2016 not in traumatic suffering of the people of Tengratila but in other health conditions:

Villagers are clearly suffering the symptoms of two major health impacts, namely arsenic poisoning and respiratory problems.1879

3023 The experts therefore focus their explanations on these two conditions and not on traumatised persons requiring treatment. This is reflected also in the description of the loss of BDT 160 million which had been described in the 2005 Second Environmental Losses Report as “Rehabilitation of traumatised people"; the 2016 BBL Experts Report still refers to the Second Environmental


1877 BMEC, paragraph 28. ↩
1878 BBL I, paragraph 174. ↩
1879 BBL I, paragraph 167. ↩

[Page 843]

Losses Report, but the “traumatised people” have been replaced by “Losses Related to Human Health”.

3024 The Tribunal is aware that the first blowout – the loud noise, the shaking ground, the high flame and the geyser of soil – was, in Mr Shahjahan's words, a “scary event”;1880 and Mr Ahmed and his wife “were scared”.1881 The Tribunal has no doubt that the first blowout created shock and stress for the population of Tengratila, especially to those who lived close to the site of the blowout or who had approached it when the blowout happened. At the same time, the Tribunal notes that neither Mr Ahmed nor Mr Shahjahan, the only eyewitnesses of the first blowout who testified in the Arbitration, state that they were “traumatised” or that they experienced symptoms of such a condition. The other evidence produced is far from demonstrating a medical condition among the residents if Tengratila of such importance that years of rehabilitation are required; and there is no indication that a programme for “rehabilitation of traumatised people” was conducted or even planned.

3025 In these circumstances, the Tribunal will consider the shock and stress caused by the first blowout in its overall assessment of the effect of the blowout; but the Tribunal is unable to award funding for a programme that has neither been performed nor planned.

9.5.5.6 Respiratory problems

3026 In the final version of its claim for losses related to human health ВАРЕХ shifted from the “rehabilitation of traumatised people” to “respiratory health issues”. While still referring to the Second Environmental Losses Report, in ВМЕХ, ВАРEX emphasises the respiratory problems and relies on the

... epidemiological evidence of “significant ongoing health issues including asthma-like symptoms requiring regular use of inhalers to alleviate symptoms and associated treatment costs for the residents of Tengratila at a rate reported to be 30 times the average in the local district.1882

3027 BAPEX continues by quoting the BBL Experts II Report which stated that “the [Environmental Losses] Committee did not take due account of the potential for long-term health impacts”.1883 BAPEX concludes that it is


1880 WS Shahjahan, paragraph 6. ↩
1881 WS Ahmed, paragraph 4. ↩
1882 BMEX, paragraph 27, quoting from BBL II, paragraph 17. ↩
1883 BMEC, paragraph 28, quoting BBL II, paragraph 16. ↩

[Page 844]

... appropriate to supplement the Committee's estimates upon the basis of additional medical costs incurred as a result of respiratory and other maladies caused by chronic exposure to methane occasioned by the blowout. Respondent's environmental damage experts have thus set forth an estimate of medical costs based on figures originally included in the Second Environmental Losses Report.1884

3028 BAPEX claims for “additional medical costs incurred as a result of respiratory and other maladies caused by chronic exposure to methane occasioned by the blowout". The amount claimed is the BBL Experts” “estimate of medical costs based on figures originally included in the Second Environmental Losses Report", i.e. BDT 160 million.

3029 BAPEX adds to this amount BDT 125 million, which the BBL Experts quantified by reference to the “Hospital set up” and “Operation” costs in the Third Environmental Losses Report. The experts recognise that that Report

considered the provision of medical facilities that was required to deal with the mental and emotional issues resulting from the trauma of the second blowout.

3030 The BBL Experts, nevertheless, use the cost so quantified for quantifying medical facilities to deal with the long-term health effects caused by methane released by the first blowout:

... we believe that it is a valid estimate of costs for the medical facilities need to deal with the long-term effects of the first blow out, cause[d] by exposure to methane over 16+ years.1885

3031 The "epidemiological evidence” on which BAPEX relies concerns reports about chronic arsenic poisoning and respiratory health issues, in particular the list of patients of Dr Zillul Haque, the witness statement of Dr Gafur and information gathered by the BBL Experts in 2016 by their own observations and in their discussions with people in Tengratila and the region.

3032 BAPEX quotes from the second report of the BBL Experts in which they present their “epidemiological evidence” by reference to their visit to Tengratila in 2016:

From our field study in 2016, we have qualitative epidemiological evidence from the district medical centers of significant ongoing respiratory health issues including asthma-like symptoms requiring


1884 BMEC, paragraph 28. ↩
1885 BBL II, paragraph 21. ↩

[Page 845]

regular use of inhalers to alleviate symptoms and of associated treatment costs for the residents of Tengratila at a rate reported to be 30 times the average in the local district.1886

3033 Concerning the causes for these “significant ongoing respiratory health issues", the BBL Experts rely in particular on a recent paper by J. Yeon et al., “Acute Respiratory Distress Due to Methane Inhalation”, in 74(3) Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases, dated 29 March 2013, produced as Exhibit R-131. The Experts state that this

... recent paper has identified an acute effect on the human respiratory system following short-term exposure to high levels of methane. The effects reported are similar to those reported by the villagers of Tengratila and the local and regional medical staff. Previous opinion on the effects of methane has concentrated on the flammability, explosive and asphyxiant nature of the gas and the toxicity has not been considered to be of any significance, resulting in an assumption that methane does not give rise to health impacts. This assumption may not be true.

3034 The BBL Experts continue by opining that the exposure of the population to the methane from the blowout may be a “situation not seen before in terms of adverse effects of methane on humans":

Tengratila provides a rare situation where a population has been exposed to elevated levels of methane for more than 10 years and unless the gas emissions are stopped, will continue for the foreseeable future. The effects seen in Tengratila are similar to those reported from exposure to high concentrations of methane and it is possible that Tengratila represents a situation not seen before in terms of adverse effects of methane on humans.

3035 The Claimant contests the observations of the BBL Experts in 2016 about the "alleged long-term health impacts from methane allegedly observed in the area", noting that in their observations

... that there were “health problems” in the form of “respiratory problems” is nothing more than an observation at a snapshot in time. It is something which they explicitly note has not been investigated in a systematic way” is “a unique situation” warranting further study and one which the authors admit lacks supporting “comparative data”.1887


1886 BBL II, paragraph 17, quoted in BMEC, paragraph 27. ↩
1887 CREC, paragraph 102, quoting from the BBL I, paragraphs 141, 145, 167, 194, 170. ↩

[Page 846]

3036 The Claimant also contests the causality between methane emissions and the alleged health effects. It contests that “methane gas exposures, let alone ones for which Niko is responsible, actually caused the long-term health impacts of which BAPEX now complains”.1888 It refers to the “evidence that un-combusted and combusted lean natural gas (methane released by the blowout) disperses very quickly outdoors”; and

... the gas released at the site of the blowout burnt and, without human intervention to the contrary, any methane escaping into the air through gas seeps quickly dissipated.1889

3037 In addition, the Claimant refers to the statement of Mr Glaholt concerning air quality:

Air quality in the area was affected by the release of un-combusted and combusted, lean natural gas in an outdoor setting that provided for good air dispersion. Air monitoring was only able to detect natural gas in the immediate vicinity of the blowout and within a few feet or less at cracks and fissures in the ground where gas was escaping within the community and facility site.

Based on the results of our monitoring, and on-site observations, we did not detect significant health effects either among our monitoring team (who spent more time in close proximity to escaping natural gas and burning natural gas than community members) or among the community at large. We must conclude that conspicuous and significant adverse health effects caused by gas release did not occur.1890

3038 Concerning the health effects of methane, Mr Glaholt stated:

I do not dispute that in the right conditions exposure to high levels of methane can have acute effects, but the referenced case study at paragraph 202 of the Betton Report (involving very intense short-term exposure in a closed room) is looking at a fundamentally different situation than what is experienced in Tengratila.1891

3039 Finally, the Claimant relies, in this context, too, on the limitation of liability under the law of Bangladesh and the JVA:“even if BAPEX had met its evidentiary burden to prove adverse medical or health issues caused by long-term exposure to blowout gas (which it plainly h[...as not), the resulting


1888 CREC, paragraph 101. ↩
1889 CREC, paragraphs 106 and 102. ↩
1890 Glaholt I, paragraphs 35 and 36. ↩
1891 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 39. ↩

[Page 847]

alleged respiratory conditions -as unfortunate as they might by – would be at best ‘consequential loss and damage arising from pollution [...] A fortiori, the costs to build, staff and operate medical facilities would certainly be excluded as indirect and remote ..."1892

3040 The Tribunal notes that, in the final presentation of the claim for health-related losses, BAPEX

3041 In other words, what BAPEX claims under this head of the health-related costs are the “additional medical costs incurred as a result of respiratory and other maladies caused by chronic exposure to methane occasioned by the blowout" in an amount that originally had been estimated for the rehabilitation of traumatised people.

3042 The Tribunal also notes that BAPEX and the BBL Experts originally attributed the respiratory problems to two factors, both originating from the blowouts: (i) the material ejected by the blowouts (occasionally referred to as “soil fallout") and (ii) the exposure “to elevated levels of methane for more than 10 years". Although BAPEX and its experts seem to have now abandoned the allegation that the respiratory problems were caused by the soil fallout, this


1892 CREC, paragraph 113. ↩
1893 BMEC, paragraphs 27 and 28. ↩
1894 BMEC, paragraph 22. ↩
1895 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 6, item 7. ↩

[Page 848]

explanation has not been withdrawn by BAPEX; the Tribunal therefore examines it.

3043 Concerning health related damage caused by the material ejected by the blowouts, BAPEX quotes in the BMD from BBL Experts Report I, asserting that the villagers of Tengratila were exposed for 10 years to the soil fallout from the first blowout. The experts wrote:

... as a result of the 2 blowouts the villagers of Tengratila were exposed to high levels of airborne-material that then settled on the ground. In the 10 years following the blowouts, they will then have been exposed to this material dust through skin contact and by inhalation as it is disturbed by movement and weather and becomes airborne and to gas emanating through the ground and water bodies.

3044 BAPEX asserted that “these chronic exposures are liable to give rise to adverse health effects, such as respiratory disease, observed by the environmental experts".1896

3045 The BBL Experts I Report explains the effect of the ejected material as follows:

As a result of the 2 blowouts, the villagers of Tengratila were exposed to high levels of airborne material that then settled on the ground. In the 10 years following the blowouts, they will then have been exposed to this material dust through skin contact and by inhalation as it is disturbed by movement and weather and becomes airborne and to gas emanating through the ground and water bodies.

These chronic exposures potentially give rise to adverse health effects. These have not been investigated in a systematic way. Villagers are clearly suffering the symptoms of two major health impacts, namely arsenic poisoning and respiratory problems.1897

3046 The Tribunal has described the ejection of soil and other material above in Section 9.1.2.1 and considered in Section 9.5.3 BAPEX's claim for damage to the soil resources due to the soil fallout. The Tribunal concluded that the soil fallout was deposited primarily on Niko's compound but affected also some families. The resulting deposits decreased with the distance from the crater, finer dust spread over a larger area.

3047 The Tribunal has noted that in the Inventory attached to the Second Monitoring Report, some cases of breathing problems and a case of “eye


1896 BMD, paragraph 352, quoting from BBL I, paragraphs 166. ↩
1897 BBL I, paragraphs 166 and 167. ↩

[Page 849]

irritation” were recorded. Mr Shahjahan also mentioned that people complained that “their eyes are burning and are frequently watery these days".1898 BABPEX and its environmental experts do not refer to this Inventory and to this testimony and they do not provide an explanation how eye irritation could be caused by the first blowout. The Tribunal does not exclude that these could have been caused by the dust of the ejected material. BAPEX and its experts have not relied on them in their argument. Indeed, as explained above in Section 9.5.3, the Monitoring Reports recorded that the rain washed the deposited material. The Tribunal understands that among the material ejected from the blowout, the dust that had spread to a wider area was washed out first. dust is the first component of the material so affected.

3048 The 11th Monitoring Report, dated 30 October 2005,1899 contains a graph showing the rainfall during the period from 30 March to 20 October 2005, in particular the heavy rain between May and September. The graph confirms the statements in several of the Monitoring Reports about the “washout” and makes it quite unlikely that any dust from the first blowout could have caused irritation in eyes and throat for a long time:

[Chart showing rainfall data]

Y-Axis: Rain Fall (mm) [0, 50, 100, 150, 200]
X-Axis: Monitoring Date [30-Mar-05, 11-Apr-05, 23-Apr-05, 05-May-05, 17-May-05, 28-May-05, 10-Jun-05, 22-Jun-05, 04-Jul-05, 16-Jul-05, 28-Jul-05, 09-Aug-05, 21-Aug-05, 02-Sep-05, 14-Sep-05, 26-Sep-05, 08-Oct-05, 20-Oct-05]

Figure 3. Recorded Rainfall in Tengratilla, 30 May, 2005 – October 22, 2005. Dotted shade indicates measurements taken after blowout of Chhatak 2A on June 24, 2005 and the vertical dark red line indicates the cratering event at Chhatak 2A on July 05, 2005.

3049 The Tribunal also found that the chemistry of the soil fallout had been analysed and the results were shown in the Monitoring Reports; they had been characterised as “benign”. Concerning the specific health-related arguments in the BBL Experts I Report, the Tribunal notes that the material


1898 WS Shahjahan, paragraph 7. ↩
1899 Crown Agents and Tera Environmental Consultants, 11th Environmental Monitoring Report, 30 October 2005 (11th Environmental Monitoring Report), Exhibit R-117, page 6. ↩

[Page 850]

of the soil fallout is essentially formation soil and sand. It has not been asserted that the dust from this material remained in the air for a significant period of time. Apart from the reference to arsenic, BAPEX and its experts have not explained how this material, during the time until it was “washed out", had effects any different from the native soil and sand from which it was ejected. In any event, BAPEX and its experts had the information from the Monitoring Reports about the chemical composition of the soil. Neiter of them have explained what components of the soil fallout could have the negative health effects.

3050 The Tribunal concludes that, apart from possible irritation by the dust during an initial period after the first blowout, there is no evidence showing any health effects of the soil fallout; in particular, BAPEX has failed to show that this fallout had the “adverse health effects” mentioned in the BBL Experts I Report. This may explain why in the final version of this head of claim, BAPEX and its experts no longer rely on it.

3051 As mentioned above, in the final version of the health-related claim, as presented in the BMEC, the basis of BAPEX's claim is

... the existence of epidemiological evidence of “significant ongoing respiratory health issues including asthma-like symptoms requiring regular use of inhalers to alleviate symptoms and associated treatment costs for the residents of Tengratila at a rate reported to be 30 times the average in the local district”.

3052 Further, the assertion that these costs were

incurred as a result of respiratory and other maladies caused by the chronic exposure to methane occasioned by the blowout.

3053 The case thus assumes (i) a 30-fold higher rate of respiratory health issues in Tengratila compared to that of the general population in the Union of Suma and that (ii) this higher rate was caused by the methane from the first blowout.

3054 The 30-fold higher rate of respiratory health issues in Tengratila is asserted in the BBL Experts II Report where the experts state

From our field study in 2016, we have qualitative epidemiological evidence from the district medical centers of significant ongoing respiratory health issues including asthma-like symptoms requiring regular use of inhalers ...1900


1900 BBL II, paragraph 17. ↩

[Page 851]

3055 The experts do not identify the “field study” on which they rely in this passage. Under the circumstances the Tribunal considers that this must be the BBL Experts I Report which does indeed present a calculation showing a medical condition that is said to be “around 30 times that of the general population in the Union of Surma”.

3056 In the passage quoted above, the BBL Experts I Report states that “Villagers are clearly suffering the symptoms of two major health impacts, namely arsenic poisoning and respiratory problems”. The BBL Experts I Report is for the first of these two health impacts and not for respiratory problems:

3057 The BBL Experts I Report relies for the 30-fold calculation on what Dr Zillul Haque described as “List of Patients with Arsenic Poisoning provided by Dr. A.K.M. Zillul Haque”.1901 The Report presents the calculation in the following table. The table shows patients with symptoms of “arsenic poisoning":

Table 7-2 - Numbers affected by Chronic Arsenic Poisoning

Region Population Numbers with the symptoms of arsenic poisoning % of population affected
Surma 26,000 142 0.55
Tengratila (Proper) 1,500 90 6.0
Surma excluding Tengratila 24,500 52 0.2

3058 As the Claimant rightly points out, the table is an “observation at a snapshot in time"; it does not show an increase of the relative numbers following the first blowout. Moreover, and most importantly for the issue considered here, the list of Dr Zillul Haque does not concern cases of respiratory problems but arsenic poisoning, the other of the two asserted principal health impacts.

3059 The only support for these “reports” is the witness statement of Dr Gafur, who testified that “by far the largest number of patients with respiratory problems come to me from Tengratila and the Doarabazar area”.

3060 The specialist for respiratory problems is not Dr Zillul Haque but Dr Gafur. BAPEX produced a witness statement by him in which he states that he is "the only doctor specializing in respiratory problems (Respiratory Medicine) with a practice in the Sunamganj District".1902 The BBL Experts I Report treats the “increased incidents of respiratory illness” in a separate paragraph and distinct from the table referring to Dr Zillul Haque's patients. In that


1901 BBL I, list of references, item 74 and Exhibit R-126. ↩
1902 WS Gafur, paragraph 4. ↩

[Page 852]

report the BBL Experts rely on Dr Gafur's evidence and assert that there is “an increased incidence of respiratory illness”.

3061 The difficulty with Dr Gafur's evidence is that he specialised in Respiratory Medicine in Sylhet only since 2010 and his testimony concerns “the past five years", from 2010 to 2015. He does not state that he has any information to testify whether the situation was any different before 2005 when the blowouts occurred.1903

3062 The Tribunal also noted that Mr Shahjahan wrote in his Witness Statement:

“After the second blowout, people came to me to complain about the problems they had breathing. Recently, the number of people complaining to me about this has increased. I have noticed a number of my neighbours using inhalers recently, which is not something that we saw before the blowouts".1904

3063 BBL Experts recognise that “there are no comprehensive data to corroborate” the increased incidence but rely on “reports from the local authorities and the villagers”. They refer to a “significant number of individuals [who] have been prescribed inhalers” and states that “villagers reported that around 20% of people have breathing problems”.

3064 More generally, there may be doubts about the reliability of such reports. The Tribunal has reproduced above in Section 9.5.5.4 Table 7-1 of the BBL Experts I Report summarising notes taken at Doarabazar during an interview with Dr Zillul Haque showing that after the first blowout 121 people were treated by local medical staff and after the second blowout the number is said to have increased over tenfold to 1'426.1905 However, the experts do not indicate the medical conditions of the patients reportedly treated.

3065 The BBL Experts recognise that Dr Zillul Haque and Dr Gafur “have not conducted any studies upon which to estimate the incidence in the population".1906 BAPEX's environmental experts therefore recommended a “Detailed Environmental and Health Survey and Monitoring”, stating that a

... full survey of all villagers is required to identify those with adverse health problems and these individuals should be examined medically to


1903 WS Gafur, paragraph 3. ↩
1904 WS Md. Shahjahan, paragraph 7. ↩
1905 BBL II, paragraph 165, reproduced above. ↩
1906 BBL I, paragraph 170. ↩

[Page 853]

obtain a correct, independent diagnosis of their condition, which can then be treated or compensated as necessary if treatment is impossible.1907

3066 The full programme, including this survey, required the involvement of Mr Betton and Professor Leinster and its costs were estimated in 2016 between £100'000 and £120'000, over a 3-year period.1908 By 2021 the survey still had not been performed and BBL Experts II recommended “to the Government of Bangladesh that a study of the respiratory health of the population be undertaken by Dr Saker [Professor and Associated Dean of the James P. Grant School of Public Health at BRAC University in Dhaka] and her team”.1909

3067 In the same report, BBL Experts explained that, despite all the evidence which they explain to have consulted, by 2021 the authors do not know how many people were affected by the “respiratory disease”. In BBL Experts II they state that they are unable to quantify “the costs associated with the supply of inhalers and any other treatment needed for the respiratory disease suffered by individual residents of Tengratila”. This is so “due to lack of qualitative data on the number of respiratory illnesses”.1910

3068 The Tribunal therefore has difficulties in concluding that there was an increase of respiratory problems in the population of Tengratila.

3069 The other critical assumption by BAPEX and its environmental experts, is the assertion that methane from the first blowout caused the alleged increase of respiratory problems, BAPEX claims for

Additional medical costs incurred as a result of respiratory and other maladies caused by the chronic exposure to methane occasioned by the blowout.1911

3070 In the BMEC, BAPEX relies primarily on the “epidemiological evidence of “significant ongoing respiratory health issues”, mentions symptoms associated treatment costs but does not explain what “other maladies” it had in mind. Trauma and arsenic poisoning had been mentioned in previous submissions by the Respondents and the evidence on which they relied. Trauma has been discussed above; in any event it has not been attributed to “chronic exposure to methane” but to the shock of the blowouts.


1907 BBL I, paragraph 225. ↩
1908 BBL I, paragraphs 223 and 225. ↩
1909 BBL II, paragraphs 19 and 18. ↩
1910 BBL II, paragraph 23. ↩
1911 ВМЕС, paragraph 28. ↩

[Page 854]

3071 Arsenic poisoning had been identified as a major health problem. Indeed, the BBL Experts I Report stated that the “Villagers are clearly suffering the symptoms of two major health impacts, namely arsenic poisoning and respiratory problems”.1912 The Respondents identified arsenic poisoning as a health impact in earlier submissions; at the November 2020 Hearing, they described causation as follows:

The increased levels of arsenic in drinking water directly caused by the blowout have caused arsenic poisoning in the local population and continues to pose this risk to public health.1913

3072 The Claimant points out that, as recognised by BAPEX's environmental experts, arsenic is a “well-known local health issue, and that it could cause respiratory problems such as those on which BAPEX bases its claims”; and it indicates the experts' uncertainty about the causation.1914

3073 The Tribunal has examined the causation of arsenic contamination in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision. Assuming at that stage that the Respondents' explanations were correct, the Tribunal noted that arsenic is a known issue in Bangladesh; it is not a component of the blowout gas but enters the water from the soil. In the soil arsenic does not occur naturally in soluble form and the processes by which arsenic containing minerals liberate arsenic are unclear, at least BAPEX's experts have presented “several ways that levels of arsenic could have increased". The Tribunal was unable to conclude in its Decision that the processes which led to the contamination of the water in Tengratila, as described by the experts were “a natural result of Niko's fault as Operator” when it caused the first blowout. Niko's liability is therefore excluded by the law of Bangladesh and the JVA.1915

3074 Since then, the Tribunal has also considered the explanations by BAPEX and its experts about the increase of arsenic in the drinking water of Tengratila. It considered the evidence about arsenic levels. In Section 9.5.2, the Tribunal saw no basis for accepting that high levels of arsenic content of the water were due to the blowout.

3075 For these reasons, the Tribunal concludes that the damage claim by BAPEX for health effects due to alleged arsenic poisoning caused by the first blowout has not been established.


1912 BBL I, paragraph167. ↩
1913 Slides presented at the November 2020 Hearing, reproduced in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraph 519, with references to the BMD, BBL I, Wilson I and the Second Environmental Losses Report. ↩
1914 CREC, paragraph 103. ↩
1915 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, Section 10.4.3. ↩

[Page 855]

3076 BAPEX's claim for respiratory problems allegedly caused by chronic exposure to methane occasioned by the blowout rests essentially on two assumptions: (i) the first blowout exposed the population of Tengratila to “chronic exposure” to methane from the first blowout and (ii) the methane emissions produced by the first blowout caused the respiratory problems on which the claim is based.

3077 The first of these assumptions states that the first blowout exposed the Tengratila population to a high level menthane emissions. The Tribunal notes that it is undisputed that (i) the first blowout produced methane emissions, (ii) that these emissions were not limited to the immediate surrounding of the blowout well and crater but occurred over a wider range and through different cracks at various locations; and (iii) that these emissions did not end with the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation. The Tribunal concluded above that, this relief operation reduced substantially the volume of gas escaping from the Reservoir but did not stop it altogether and that Niko remains liable also for these reduced quantities of escaping gas and the resulting seeping at the surface until 8 October 2008.1916 From then on, BAPEX is responsible for the emissions.

3078 Mr Wilson conducted a chemical analysis of the gas seepage he encountered at his visit in 2016 and concluded that all of the gas captured at the surface at all monitoring locations “was gas from the Chattak reservoir and not from another source”; and that “the vast majority of the gas was coming from the Chattak 2 well”. In 2020, Mr Wilson confirmed:

It is therefore my conclusion that the vast majority, if not all, of the gas reaching the surface from the date of the Chattak 2 well blowout to the present was released from the reservoir by the Chattak 2 blowout.1917

3079 The Claimant disagrees and attributes the seeping to various causes other than the first blowout:

there are multiple potential causes or contributing factors for observed gas seepages after October 2005, including the Intervening Events that have occurred in the area. Any one of these, in particular seasonal monsoons, endemic earthquake and tectonic activity, and human activities are known to cause methane emissions and/or exposures.1918


1916 See above Section 7.6.6. ↩
1917 Wilson III, paragraph 4.1.1, page 8. ↩
1918 CREC, paragraph 100, with reference the explanations about Intervening Events and to the more detailed description of these alleged events at paragraph 45 of the CREC. ↩

[Page 856]

3080 Since the Tribunal concluded, as explained above in Section 7.5.6.3, that the Chattak 2B relief operation did not seal completely the opening the Regional Seal, it accepts that that at least some of the emissions until 8 October 2008 were due to the Chattak 2 blowout and that Niko is liable for direct damage caused by them.

3081 When BAPEX and its environmental experts assert that the respiratory problems were “caused by chronic exposure to methane occasioned by the blowout",1919 they do not explain how this “chronic exposure” in fact occurred and they do not define what they meant by “chronic” exposure. The Tribunal understands the expression to mean persistent exposure over an extended period of time. As the Claimant contests that the “methane gas exposures caused the long-term health impacts”,1920 the Tribunal examined the evidence regarding the exposure of the Tengratila population to the methane emissions from the first blowout.

3082 The Monitoring Reports record occasions where, prior to the completion of the relief operation and even thereafter, methane from the blowouts escaped to the surface through cracks, boiling points and seepage. The Fifth Monitoring Report, dated 27 June 2005, for instance, contains the following passage:

The Joint Venture's environmental team continues to monitor the size and any change of the blowing points, bubbles and seepages. Size and activities of most of the boiling points has remained largely unchanged since about early April. However, on June 5, 2005 the environmental team observed that the gas bubbling in the south paddy was spreading. Water levels in the blowout crater dropped steadily starting about mid May through early June. A large boil immediately north of the crater in the original secondary containment area subside somewhat in late April and early May but has returned to its earlier activity in recent weeks.1921

3083 Mr Wilson reported that, when he visited the site in February 2016, he noted seepage and that, when he and the team entered the Niko compound, he was subject to Niko's safety requirements, requiring evacuation of the area if flammable gas levels exceeded_10% LEL or 0.5% v/v.1922 Mr Wilson also observed gas emissions “in houses and yards where gas seeping from cracks in the floor could be set on fire and continued to burn until extinguished in


1919 ВМЕС, paragraph 28. ↩
1920 CREC, paragraph 1001. ↩
1921 Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-46, Section 3.2.4, page 15. ↩
1922 Wilson I, paragraph 5.8.8(c), page 71. ↩

[Page 857]

many instances”; and he produced a photograph showing a small flame inside a building.1923

3084 While the Parties, their witnesses and experts disagree about the importance of these seepages and about the extension of the area in which they occurred, it is clear that there were numerous locations at which methane escaped from the ground.

3085 Consequently, there were also numerous occasions when the people in Tengratila could come close to cracks and boiling points from which methane escaped. Above in Section 9.5.5.3, the Tribunal examined the argument and evidence concerning the nature of the gas that escaped at the Chattak 2 blowout. It pointed out that methane is lighter than air, raises up and is rapidly dispersed. A person approaching a crack or boil does not necessarily inhale the methane escaping from the ground. Mr Wilson had his own experience in Tengratila, showing how quickly methane emissions from the ground dispersed once in the air; so much so that “a continuous cloud of methane does not develop at ground level”, which however does not exclude the risk of ignition:

An infrared camera (FLIR TAU 2 thermal imaging camera) was used as a handheld device to observe known emissions of methane, in places where bubbling was occurring from the ground and water. The methane emissions did show up on the thermal or infrared images and useful information on the fate of methane emitted from the ground was obtained. The images indicate that the bubbles of methane coming out of the ground quickly dispersed once in the air. A continuous cloud of methane does not develop at ground level, but this does not mean that the emissions are necessarily safe. The emissions from a vent pipe were also observed and the methane from the pipe quickly dispersed down wind and within 1m of the vent could not be seen.

3086 A similar experience is reported by Mr Kelly, an employee of Safety Boss who provided HSE advice to Niko after the blowouts, in particular “overseeing the HSE monitoring of surface gas seepages and other safety impacts”. He explained that above two feet gas seeping from the ground had dissipated to the point that it would no longer be registered on the monitors:

The Gas Monitors were usually hanging from breast pockets at approximately 5 feet off the ground, or held in our hands at approximately 2 to 3 feet off the ground. If we held the monitors to within inches of cracks or fissures where there was a gas seepage, we might


1923 Wilson I, paragraph 4.2.3 and Figure 4.2. ↩

[Page 858]

get alarm readings, but at any higher than 2 feet the gas typically dissipated enough that it wouldn't register on the monitors.1924

3087 The Tribunal concludes that even a person standing close to a crack or fissure from which gas escaped, was not necessarily exposed to inhaling the gas.

3088 There is no indication nor even an allegation that people from Tengratila frequently approached seeping gas unintentionally and inhaled methane. Indeed, as the Monitoring Reports show, many of the seepage points were known and the villagers were familiar with them.

3089 Other evidence indicates that the villagers were not only aware of the seepages but used them to their advantage, collecting the escaping gas to use it for cooking in their homes. They even established networks of pipes bringing the gas into the homes. The BBL Experts report that they learned through interviews in 2016 “that a number of individuals have suffered burns, predominantly associated with lighting gas for cooking”.1925 Mr Wilson, for instance, describes how the gas for cooking was collected:

... where gas is being collected via rudimentary caps over the ground or water or from pipes driven into the ground and is used to fuel stoves by the villagers (figure 4.3). In some, but certainly not all cases, this may have been occurring since before the blowout.1926

3090 An incident with one such installation gave rise to a joint inspection by BAPEX and Niko in 2010. Niko sent the joint BAPEX/Niko report to Petrobangla alerting it to the practice:

Gas seepages in and around the Tengratila Gas Field is a matter of concern. Some villagers in the Tengratila village have covered such seepage using drums to collect gas and connected to some houses for cooking. When the usual flow of the seepages was hindered due to covering by drums, gas came out through other probable weak areas. Thereby gas was detected in few nearby houses and yard. Due to the intervention of Local Administration and Police, after notification by Niko on the unsafe practice, these drums were removed and then the gas seepage almost disappeared in the houses. Any small leakages which remained, although a concern, were within safe limits. It clearly


1924 WS Kelly, paragraph 24. ↩
1925 BBL I, paragraph 171. ↩
1926 See e.g. Wilson I, paragraph 4.2.5; Figure 4.3 is a photograph showing metal pipes in the ground. ↩

[Page 859]

demonstrated the reason for propagation of the gas seepage to the nearby houses.1927

3091 Mr Glaholt provided further details about these networks, based on his own observations and information received about the practice:

I am advised by my contacts in the community that in the last few years much of this “fugitive gas” was being collected from a point immediately adjacent to the Niko property. It was then fed into an artisanal gas distribution system for which users pay a monthly fee to one of the villagers. Other villagers have tapped into seepages nearby their homes for this purpose although these surface gas flows were not always sustained.

My contacts have also reported to me that in the early months of 2020 the gas pressure has fallen off precipitously, and currently there are only 30-40 families using this artisanal gas. These reports, along with Niko staff reports, are consistent with my own personal observations during site visits between 2005 and 2016. I am only aware of 2-3 households that have an ongoing grievance regarding a surface gas presence close to their homes, though these same families have made use of the fugitive gas for cooking purposes. Since the blowout, homes have also been built near gas seepages.1928

3092 The Tribunal concludes that gas seepages were a frequent phenomenon around the blowout site, around the Niko compound and in Tengratila. Apart from situations in which villagers used the “fugitive gas” for their own purposes, the rapid dissipation of the gas makes it unlikely that the villagers were regularly inhaling methane. In the absence of a supporting explanation by BAPEX and its experts, the seepages of gas, as they were reported in documents on the record, in the opinion of the Tribunal, do not justify the assertion that the villagers of Tengratila were subject to “chronic exposure” to methane.

3093 Furthermore, the critical element for BAPEX's health related claim is the assertion that methane caused respiratory health issues.

3094 BAPEX asserts that the alleged chronic exposure to methane caused the alleged

respiratory health issues including asthma-like symptoms requiring regular use of inhalers to alleviate symptoms and associated treatment


1927 March 2010 Joint Report, Exhibit C-95. ↩
1928 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 40 and 41. ↩

[Page 860]

costs for the residents of Tengratila at a rate reported to be 30 times the average in the local district.1929

3095 In support for this statement, BAPEX relies on a passage in which the BBL Experts assert that they have “qualitative epidemiological evidence for "significant ongoing respiratory health issues",1930 a passage which, as pointed out above, relates to the effect of arsenic poisoning and not to exposure to methane. The causation of the respiratory health issues by exposure to methane is discussed BBL Experts' first report where they rely on a recent publication about “Acute Respiratory Distress Due to Methane Inhalation".1931 They explain:

A recent paper has identified an acute effect on the human respiratory system following short-term exposure to high levels of methane. The effects reported are similar to those reported by the villagers of Tengratila and the local and regional medical staff. Previous opinion on the effects of methane has concentrated on the flammability, explosive and asphyxiant nature of the gas and the toxicity has not been considered to be of any significance, resulting in an assumption that methane does not give rise to health impacts. This assumption may not be true.

Tengratila provides a rare situation where a population has been exposed to elevated levels of methane for more than 10 years and unless the gas emissions are stopped, will continue for the foreseeable future. The effects seen in Tengratila are similar to those reported from exposure to high concentrations of methane and it is possible that Tengratila represents a situation not seen before in terms of adverse effects of methane on humans.

3096 The Claimant contests that BAPEX furnished sufficient evidence that “methane gas exposures, let alone ones for which Niko is responsible, actually caused the long-term health impacts of which BAPEX now complains”.1932 Besides relying on the quick dissipation of methane, the Claimant points out that there “is no expert report that comments upon the existence of a direct causal nexus between gas emissions from the first blowout (or at all) and the alleged long-term health impacts from methane allegedly observed in the area".1933


1929 BMEC, paragraph 22. ↩
1930 BBL II, paragraph 17. ↩
1931 BBL I, paragraph 202, referring to Yeon et al., Acute Respiratory Distress Due to Methane Inhalation, in: Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases, Vol. 74, Issue 3 (29 March 2013), Exhibit R-131. ↩
1932 CREC, paragraph 101. ↩
1933 CREC, paragraph 102. ↩

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3097 Relying on Mr Glaholt's Witness Statement, the Claimant also points out that Mr Glaholt and his team spent “time in close proximity to this gas more time in close proximity to these areas than those living in the community”. It continues by stating:

Not a single person from the monitoring team reported any adverse health impacts from their work, nor did they detect any significant adverse health impacts in the community from this gas.1934

3098 And the Claimant highlights the passage in which the BBL Experts refer to previous opinion on the effects of methane including the “assumption that methane does not give rise to health impacts” but add it “may not be true”.1935

3099 The Tribunal notes that the BBL Experts, as quoted above, recognise that “previous opinion on the effects of methane has concentrated on the flammability, explosive and asphyxiant nature of the gas ...”. These effects are uncontested: the explosive nature of the gas was demonstrated by the blowouts and its flammability was a major concern thereafter, as reflected by the Monitoring Reports. Mr Wilson explains that the “greatest hazard posed by methane is that it is flammable at concentrations of between 5% by volume in air [...] and 15% by volume in air”1936 and proposes a project to eliminate the risk.1937

3100 Asphyxiation as a potential risk of methane also has been recognised in the Arbitration: Mr Wilson discussed the nature of methane and, with respect to its health risks, states:

Methane can cause asphyxiation if it displaces oxygen.1938

3101 Mr Glaholt seems to confirm this statement when he states that he does "not dispute that in the right conditions exposure to high levels of methane can have acute effects ...".1939

3102 The view expressed by Mr Wilson is confirmed by the “recent paper” on which the BBL Experts rely:1940 it shows the potential asphyxiation when oxygen is


1934 CREC, paragraph 107, relying on WS Glaholt I, paragraph 36. ↩
1935 CREC, FN 173 at paragraph 102. ↩
1936 Wilson I, paragraph 5.4.1. ↩
1937 See below, Section 9.5.6. ↩
1938 Wilson I, paragraph 5.1.1; similarly at paragraph 5.4.6. ↩
1939 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 39. ↩
1940 Yeon et al., Acute Respiratory Distress Due to Methane Inhalation, in: Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases, Vol. 74, Issue 3 (29 March 2013), Exhibit R-131. ↩

[Page 862]

displaced by high concentrations of methane in closed places; it shows the gravity of the acute effects and the recovery after a few days.

3103 The paper points out that methane “is usually harmless” but at high concentration it may cause “suffocation” by replacing oxygen. The paper is introduced by the following paragraph:

Methane is a component of natural gas, mainly used as a fuel source and chemical feedstock in industries. It is usually harmless, however, at high concentrations, it may reduce the oxygen percentage in air, causing suffocation. It is also extremely flammable and can cause an explosion when its concentration reaches 5% to 15% in air. Previous reports focused mainly on accidents involving workers in coal mines that related to asphyxia or methane gas explosions1-3. In this report, we described the first case of acute pulmonary toxicity from accidental inhalation of methane in a medical gas supply room.

3104 The case on which this observation is based occurred in a medical gas supply company: a 21-year-old man, working in that company

[w]hile opening a methane gas tank, assuming it was a nitrogen tank he was accidently exposed in a gas supply room, approximately 10×10 т. There was no window and the doors were kept closed in the room. When the methane tank was opened, gas escaped from the tank for about one minute. Immediately after exposure, he sought refuge in a room inside of the gas supply space and soon lost consciousness.1941

3105 The patient was brought to the Emergency Department at a hospital in Korea where he “was immediately intubated because he was cyanotic and in respiratory distress”. “The patient's symptoms and chest radiographic findings were consistent with acute pneumonitis”.1942 The paper described the medical examinations and showed chest radiographies and chest computed topographies during the first 24 hours and a follow-up tomography. The description of the case concluded with the report of complete recovery:

His symptoms resolved and he was discharged after 5 days without medication. Ten days after discharge, the follow-up chest CT scan showed a complete resolution of previous bilateral air-space consolidations (Figure 1 D). The follow-up pulmonary function test showed recovery from the restrictive ventilatory defect.


1941 Case report in the article of Yeon et al. at page 120; Exhibit R-131. ↩
1942 Summary at the opening of the article. ↩

[Page 863]

3106 The discussion of the case that followed this description, addressed aspects of the case and concluded by highlighting the acute lung injury and its spontaneous resolution:

This case demonstrates that acute lung injury can occur following short exposure to high concentrations of methane gas in closed places. Acute pulmonary injury can occur with a restrictive ventilator defect. The lung injury can be spontaneously resolved without any significant sequela.

3107 Mr Glaholt stated that the case study “is looking at a fundamentally different situation than what is experienced in Tengratila”.1943 The Tribunal agrees. Because of the quick dispersion of methane in open space, as described above, it does not appear likely that intense exposure to methane inhalation occurred in Tengratila; if it had occurred and had produced the “Acute Respiratory Distress” described in the case report, it must have been a major event which would not have passed unnoticed. There is, however, no indication in the record of the Arbitration that in Tengratila incidents occurred where persons were exposed to high concentrations of methane as those in the closed room of the reported case; and there is no indication that anyone in Tengratila showed symptoms of the type described and had to be hospitalised. To the contrary, as testified by Mr Glaholt, he and his monitoring team “spent more time in close proximity to escaping natural gas and burning natural gas than community members”; they “did not detect significant health effects among our monitoring team [...] or among the community at large”.1944

3108 Moreover, the case described in the paper on which the BBL Experts rely is the exact opposite of the long-term “respiratory health issues including asthma-like symptoms requiring regular use of inhalers to alleviate symptoms and associated treatment costs”. As already expressed in the title of the paper, the case described does not concern the long-term condition alleged by the BBL Experts as “Acute Respiratory Distress” and the person affected “spontaneously resolved without any significant sequela”.

3109 The Tribunal concludes that the case reported by Yeon et al. does not justify to put into question what the BBL Experts identified as the “previous opinion": methane is “usually harmless”; it poses risks of a “flammable, explosive and asphyxiant nature”; but BAPEX and its experts have not provided any support for their assertion that methane emissions caused the type of respiratory health issues, including asthma-like symptoms, on which this aspect of the claim for losses related to human health is based. If respiratory health issues increased following the first blowout, assumption which BAPEX has not


1943 WS Glaholt II, paragraph 39. ↩
1944 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 36. ↩

[Page 864]

proven, there would be no evidence in this Arbitration that such increase was caused by methane emissions from the first blowout.

9.5.5.7 Conclusion on the claim for losses related to human health

3110 The Tribunal noted that a number of medical conditions were attributed to the first blowout and Niko's liability was invoked for the related losses at different occasions. Even though BAPEX has eventually focused its claim for respiratory health issues caused by methane from the first blowout, the Tribunal has examined also other alleged losses related to human health so as to examine the health losses caused by Niko in their entirety.

3111 The Tribunal noted that the Second Environmental Losses Report stated that some physical injury was suffered at the time of the first blowout, especially when persons close to the eruption rushed to escape the danger. In the absence of any identification of persons having suffered such injury and of the precise nature of the alleged injury, no damage has been shown to have occurred and the requirements for ordering the requested relief have not been met.

3112 With respect to the long-term traumatic effects allegedly caused by the first blowout, the Tribunal noted that the blowout and the events through which it manifested itself, the high flame, the geyser of material from the wellbore, the loud noise and the shaking ground, must have caused fear and shock. The Tribunal has, however, not been presented with concrete evidence showing that these events led to traumatic conditions that required years of treatment.

3113 The Tribunal noted that in 2016 the environmental experts of BAPEX identified arsenic poisoning and respiratory problems as the “two major health impacts”. The evidence presented by BAPEX did, however, not persuade the Tribunal that these medical conditions increased after the first blowout and that such increase, if it had occurred, would be caused by the first blowout; in the case of arsenic poisoning, the Tribunal also had noted that the processes by which the blowout would have released arsenic from the soil and increased the arsenic content in the drinking water led to absorption by people in Tengratila was so uncertain and complex that both the law of Bangladesh and the JVA excluded Niko's liability.

3114 Apart from its failure to establish that the alleged medical conditions were caused by the first blowout, BAPEX failed to justify the damage for which it claims payment. As the Claimant pointed out in the CREC, BAPEX's claim for BDT 160 million first was said to be for the rehabilitation of 400 traumatised people at BDT 400'000 each. No explanations had been given how it was

[Page 865]

determined that 400 people were traumatised, what rehabilitation treatment would be applied and how the costs for this treatment were calculated. BAPEX's experts then replaced the rehabilitation of traumatised people by losses related to human health and claimed the same amount for the treatment of respiratory problems, without explaining the treatment that was envisaged for these respiratory problems. They did not provide any justification for assuming that the rehabilitation of 400 traumatised people would cause the same costs as the treatment of an unidentified number of people suffering from respiratory problems.

3115 Similarly, the Claimant noted that there is no evidence to support BAPEX's claim for BDT 125 million for the construction and operation of a hospital that was never constructed. The Tribunal notes that the BBL Experts declare the unspecified costs for the “provision of medical facilities” in the Third Environmental Losses Report as “a valid estimate of costs for the medical facilities needed to deal with the long-term effects of the first blowout, cause[d] by exposure to methane over 16+ years”. This acceptance is all the more surprising as the experts declare that they do not have “qualitative data on the number of respiratory illnesses” and that therefore they are unable to quantify the costs for the “supply of inhalers and any other treatment need for the respiratory disease suffered by individual residents of Tengratila”.1945

3116 While BAPEX has failed to justify the claim for health-related damage as it was presented, the Tribunal is aware that the first blowout did have health-related consequences for the population of Tengratila: the Monitoring Reports mentioned “varying degrees of social stress and disruption”.1946 Niko has accepted that after the first blowout “a number of individuals reported health concerns” and that “a number of people [...] suffered stress from noise relating to the blowout”.1947.

3117 Indications of such “stress and disruption” and other health related incidents have been discussed above in Section 9.5.5.2. There are for instance indications that some people hurt or even injured them while escaping from the blowout, there are some traces that the dust from the material ejected from the wellbore caused irritation of eyes and throat, and the shock and fright from events of the blowout must have caused anxiety, even if there is no evidence for long-term traumatic effects.

3118 The Tribunal is of the view that rejecting the claims for more far-reaching health effects does not exclude compensation for these lesser effects. It will


1945 BBL II, paragraphs 21 and 23. ↩
1946 E.g. 10th and 13th Monitoring Reports, pages 35 and 40, respectively and quoted above in Section 9.5.5.2. ↩
1947 CREC, paragraphs 94 and 95, quoted above in Section 9.5.5.1. ↩

[Page 866]

consider these lesser effects in the context of the overall loss and suffering of the Tengratila population below in Section 9.5.8. In that context, the Tribunal will also take into account the health-related services which Niko provided following the first blowout, as discussed above in Section 9.5.5.2.

9.5.6 The claim for the costs of Mr Wilson's proposal

3119 BAPEX seeks payment of GBP 4'171’603, equivalent to USD 5’769’744 for a revised version of Mr Wilson's proposed project of a “soil vapour extraction remediation system” (SVE System)1948 to “[r]emove the gas from the shallow ground below the buildings and open spaces”. The cost estimate in Appendix 3 to Mr Wilson's revised estimate includes, in addition to this amount for “installation and first year of operation”, an amount of GBP 1'337'280 for fifteen years of “ongoing maintenance, monitoring and sampling plus analysis of data";1949 the claim by BAPEX makes no reference to this amount for maintenance etc.

3120 BAPEX asserts that the SVE is necessary because of the “heightened levels of methane”, which Mr Wilson observed in 2016 and which he believed in 2021 still required the SVE. The emissions from this methane are said to cause a serious risk to the local population, including the “condition where the bare earth floor could be set on fire inside a building”.1950

3121 Mr Wilson explained in his First Report that he conducted “a six day long investigation during February 2016”, including “walkover survey of the site and the surrounding area”, completed by analyses recorded in the ESG Report. He pointed out that the “scope of his investigation and walkover was limited by the amount of time that I was able to spend on the site”.1951 In this first report, Mr Wilson also examined the evidence concerning gas seepages, that had been produced in the Arbitration, in particular the Monitoring Reports. On the basis of this evidence and his own investigation he concluded

The rate at which methane is flowing from the ground surface in some parts of the surrounding area [of the Chattak 2 location] is sufficient to pose a significant risk of explosion to the residents in buildings. In the UK, USA or Australia the flow rate, together with the high concentration of methane, would prevent the construction of residential development on those affected areas unless mitigation measure were provided. This is


1948 ВМЕС, paragraph 40. Relying on Wilson III, Table 4.1 and Appendix 3, page 28. ↩
1949 Wilson III, Appendix 3, page 28. ↩
1950 BMEC, paragraphs 34 and 35, referring to Wilson III, paragraphs 4.1.3 and 4.1.6. ↩
1951 Wilson I, Executive Summary, paragraph 2, further details in section 4 of his first report. ↩

[Page 867]

because the risk of an explosion occurring in an unprotected development would be considered unacceptable.1952

3122 Mr Wilson recognised that Niko had evidence that “gas in wells and the observed surface emissions were reducing after the well kill”; but Mr Wilson opined that the

... evidence of gas emissions after the kill does not support Niko's assumption that kill was 100% effective. Evidence indicates that it had some success and gas emissions initially declined but then the indicators did not decline further, and in some cases there was an increase in gas emissions. The current emissions clearly show that gas emissions from the blow out continue to be an issue at the present time.1953

3123 Mr Wilson also concluded that the evidence suggested that “there is likely to be a large reservoir of shallow gas close to the surface at very high concentrations. There is also an immediate health and safety risk to residents that should be managed”. He recommended that a

... comprehensive site investigation and monitoring programme is also required to understand the migration mechanism and pathways. This in turn will allow a full and robust assessment of the risks to villagers and long term mitigation options to be designed.1954

3124 He confirmed his opinion about the risk posed by the gas emissions:

... in my opinion the gas emissions do pose a potentially unacceptable risk to the villagers. The very fact that flammable gas is being emitted into properties is not acceptable without some form of management to mitigate the risk. However, it is not possible with the current data to state the precise extent of the problem. A comprehensive, regular and documented investigation and monitoring programme across the village that is required in order to define which properties or areas have an unacceptable risk.1955

3125 In his Third Report, dated 20 August 2021, Mr Wilson explained that he had

... not undertaken any further fieldwork or testing beyond that described in my First Expert Report dated 23 March 2016. However, I have been provided with additional monitoring field data from a survey by ESG


1952 Wilson I, Executive Summary, paragraph 7. ↩
1953 Wilson I, Executive Summary, paragraph 14. ↩
1954 Wilson I, Executive Summary paragraphs 14 and 15. ↩
1955 Wilson I, paragraph 6.3.2. ↩

[Page 868]

Limited ( “ESG”) from the United Kingdom from a survey completed in May 2016 and from Niko which was completed between 2015 and May 2021.1956

3126 Mr Wilson explained that the “Niko flux tent data is insufficient to show any change in the need for a SVE system. The data is limited to the Niko compound and it does not include measurement of gas concentration in the shallow ground”.1957 He concluded:

I have not been provided with any additional data or evidence that clearly shows the situation has changed significantly since 2016, such that the gas remediation would not be required any more.1958

3127 At the November 2021 Hearing, Mr Wilson addressed specifically the questions concerning the presence of gas in the ground at shallow depth and the gas emissions from the ground surface. He confirmed the conclusions he had reached from the emission rates measured by Niko in 2016: these rates “are high and suggest gas is being replenished from a source at depth”. He also pointed out that the “highest concentrations and emission rates were found nearest the Chattak 2 wellbore”; and he added that these emissions rates measured by Niko are similar to those he had used to estimate in his first report the gas lost at the surface.1959

3128 Concerning the remedial work, Mr Wilson considered two long-term approaches to reduce the risk he had identified. One of these approaches would “leave that gas in the ground and provide barriers to gas ingress into buildings by sealing over floor flabs and providing venting layer below the slab"; another method adopting this approach would be “site wide remediation using capping layers.” He recognised that both methods would be highly disruptive and did not consider them a practical option.1960

3129 The other approach considered by Mr Wilson consisted in removing the gas from the ground. In order to do this, he thought it might be possible to apply a system used in land fill sites and described as “soil vacuum extraction system”. In order to use this system in circumstances prevailing in Tengratila, “a trial installation and monitoring” would be required. He summarised the method as follows:


1956 Wilson III, paragraph 1.2.1, referring to Fieldwork Records from ESG (May 2016), Exhibit R-460 and Niko revised Gas Traps Flux Data, updated May 2021, Exhibit R-463. ↩
1957 Wilson III, paragraph 4.1.7. ↩
1958 Wilson III, paragraph 4. ↩
1959 HT 2021 Day 5, pages 74, 87 and 88. ↩
1960 Wilson I, Executive Summary, paragraph 16 and Report, paragraph 6.4.2(a). ↩

[Page 869]

It may be possible to install a village wide shallow gas collection system (or more specifically a soil vacuum extraction system) that could suck gas from the ground and possibly use it to provide a gas and electricity supply. This approach is commonly used to extract gas from landfill sites, but I am not aware that it has been used in the specific circumstances of this case. Therefore, a trial installation and monitoring to assess the effectiveness of this solution would be required.1961

3130 In the body of the First Report Mr Wilson discussed these methods further and described the SVE process in general terms.1962 Removing the gas from the shallow ground below the buildings and open space

... could be done by providing a preferential pathway for gas to flow via a series of gas abstraction wells across the area. The wells are connected to an extraction system to draw gas in the shallow soils towards them. This is process is known as soil vacuum extraction (SVE). The grid of abstraction wells could be connected to a flare, gas supply for the village or a generator for electricity (or combination of all three).

3131 Mr Wilson highlighted the need for adapting the system to the setting in Tengratila and a trial installation:

A monitored trial would be necessary to determine if this approach is viable. The approach is similar to a landfill gas extraction and re-use system but appropriate to this setting (in terms of complexity and installation so that local people can construct and operate it safely).

3132 The proposal made it clear that the villagers “would not be able to influence gas migration pathways as they can do now”,1963 but Mr Wilson opined that using the gas “to power stoves and electricity generation” was a “viable option". In the 2021 version, Mr Wilson assumes this “still to be viable without up to date gas monitoring data” but qualified this assumption by stating: “witness statements indicate that it may not be because of reducing gas flow rates".1964

3133 Mr Wilson also explained that the villagers had assumed a long-term responsibility in the management of the system and referred to further needs for international experts:


1961 Wilson I, Executive Summary, paragraph 16. ↩
1962 Wilson I, paragraph 6.4.2(b). ↩
1963 Wilson I, paragraph 6.4.2(b). ↩
1964 Wilson I, paragraph 6.4.2 (b) and the table comparing the 2016 and 2021 proposals in Wilson III, Table 4.1 at page 16. ↩

[Page 870]

With all the above approaches, a village wide responsible management team will be required in the long term. A regular audit by international experts would also be preferable.1965

3134 Concerning the costs of implementing this project, Mr Wilson estimated the costs if the remediation were carried out in the UK to be “in the order of approximately GBP 3’275'000.1966 BAPEX presents USD 4'622’990 as the corresponding US Dollars amount.1967 Concerning an execution in Bangladesh, he explained that he did “not know the costs of labour and equipment for the remediation approaches discussed above in Bangladesh. However, many items would need to be sourced outside Bangladesh”. The estimate was qualified by a possible variation of 30% and the addition of GBP 1'600'000 for monitoring costs over 20 years:

This estimate could vary by +/- 30% depending on the results of further investigation of the ground and gas conditions and the detailed design of the system. Long term ongoing monitoring costs for 20 years operation would be in the order of £1,600,000 Pounds Sterling.1968

3135 The details for his estimate were set out in Appendix 4 to the first report, clarifying that the amount of GBP 3’275’376 was for “installation and first year of operation”. This was followed by a separate item for “Ongoing operation and monitoring after first year” for 20 years of GBP 80'000 per year and a total of GBP 1'600'000.1969

3136 In the Third Report, dated 20 August 2021, Mr Wilson explained that he was invited to opine whether remediation was still considered necessary and, if that would be the case, update the cost estimate for the SVE.1970 Mr Wilson opines that gas extraction is still required and explains that since his previous report in 2016 “the emission rate may have reduced”; but Niko's evidence suggested that it was still high and that there was no evidence showing clearly that the situation changed:

I have not been provided with any additional data or evidence that clearly shows the situation has changed significantly since 2016, such that the gas remediation would not be required any more. Although the emission rate of gas may have reduced, NIKO's own evidence suggests it was still high for a residential setting up to February 2020, and there is no new


1965 Wilson I, paragraph 6.4.4. ↩
1966 Wilson I, paragraph 6.5.1. ↩
1967 BMD, paragraph 374, referring to Wilson I, paragraph 6.4.2. ↩
1968 Wilson I, paragraph 6.5.1. ↩
1969 Wilson I, Appendix 4, pages 141 and 142. ↩
1970 Wilson III, Executive Summary, paragraph 3. ↩

[Page 871]

evidence regarding gas concentrations in the soil at shallow depth in the village. NIKO's flux tent measurements after February 2020 are sporadic because no measurements were taken during some months because of COVID-19. There is a sudden absence of gas emissions in the flux tents after February 2002, which seems anomalous given the emission rates recorded up to that point.1971

3137 Mr Wilson refers to Mr Glaholt's Second Witness Statement, reporting that “fewer villagers extract gas from the ground to power stoves. However, that does not mean that gas emission rates and flows are at safe levels and there is no monitoring data to determine the current level of gas in the village”. Mr Wilson nevertheless recognises that “there is some potential evidence that gas emissions are reducing” and he reduces the area that is affected by the emissions.1972 He points out, however, that “a more thorough monitoring programme on a grid would be required to delineate the zones further”.1973

3138 No further information about the SVP and its feasibility is provided by Mr Wilson; in particular he does not state that, since 2016, the system had been used in the specific circumstances of the present case and he does not provide any information about a "trial installation and monitoring” which he had considered necessary “to assess the effectiveness of this solution”.

3139 BBL Experts in their Second Report opine that if the SVE is installed it will remove the risk of explosion; but they do not provide any information about the feasibility of the SVE system and do not provide the information for which Mr Wilson thought that a “trial installation and monitoring” was required.1974

3140 For the purpose of the cost estimate, Mr Wilson“reduced the area that is assumed to require the SVE system” and reduced emission rates; and he presented an updated cost estimate.1975 The estimated amount nevertheless “increased, mainly because of the cost of steel pipe in standard pricing books".1976 The details of the increase are shown in Appendix 3 to Mr Wilson's third report. They consist primarily in percentage increases reflecting the differences in “% increase for rate in SPONS items”, the “standard pricing book” referred to by Mr Wilson.1977


1971 Wilson III, Executive Summary, paragraph 4. ↩
1972 Wilson III, Executive Summary, paragraphs 5 and 6. ↩
1973 Wilson III, paragraph 4.2.4. ↩
1974 BBL III, paragraph 24. ↩
1975 Wilson III, paragraph 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 and Appendix 3. ↩
1976 Wilson III, paragraph 6. ↩
1977 Wilson III, Appendix 3. ↩

[Page 872]

3141 As a result, the estimate in Appendix 3 to Wilson III, shows the following totals:

3142 The decrease in the operation and monitoring period from 20 years to 15 years is explained as being “due to reduced gas reservoir caused by gas loss since 2016".1978

3143 Mr Wilson's first report of 2016 had envisaged as a “viable option” that the gas extracted “can be used to power stoves and electricity generation”. With respect to this option the revised version of 2021 his third report stated: “Assumed to still be viable without up to date gas monitoring data – although witness statements indicate it may not be because of reducing gas flow rates".1979

3144 BAPEX recognises that the SVE project has not been executed. Referring to the Government's limited resources and observations by the Tribunal, BAPEX states:

... the government has not undertaken a comprehensive remedial action that has caused gas seepages to cease. As the Tribunal has acknowledged, however, the government's action or inaction is not necessarily a statement of what public health experts employing unlimited resources would undertake to achieve safety for the local population, but is rather an unfortunate fact of competing priorities that have grown only more competitive since the Decision.1980

3145 The Claimant contested the Wilson proposal when it was first made,1981 and did so when it was presented in a revised form.1982 In addition to the legal objections that it raises also against several of the claims, the Claimant contests that BAPEX failed to prove that the SVE system and proposed


1978 Wilson III, Appendix 3. ↩
1979 Wilson III, Table 4.1 Comparison of assumptions and information sources, page 16. ↩
1980 BMEC, paragraph 38. ↩
1981 CMD, paragraphs 132 - 134. ↩
1982 CREC, Section III G. ↩

[Page 873]

monitoring is required. The Claimant refers to evidence from Niko's gas traps which

... indicates that gas seepages declined to unmeasurable quantities by early 2020. It is to be recalled that three of these gas traps were built over areas with the highest observed emissions within the Niko compound. This evidence provides further support for the conclusion that the gas that escaped into the shallow subsurface has now largely migrated to surface.1983

3146 According to the Claimant, BAPEX and Mr Wilson also had not proven that any seepages that still occurred were caused by the first blowout and not by the “many other likely Intervening Events and causes for these gas seepages”.

3147 The Claimant also asserts that the record “does not support the notion that there is an actual loss or damage associated with gas seepages, much less a consequent need for an elaborate, dubious and expensive remedial underground SVE system”. It points out that “Mr Wilson himself is unsure of whether the SVE system is a credible remedial approach”. Concerning the statement of BBL Experts, the Claimant points out that these experts themselves had previously admitted that the matter was outside their expertise. In these circumstances the Claimant asserts:

... the principle that a claimant may not recover the cost of extravagant mitigation measures from a defendant is even more apt in the case of the SVE system because of its experimental nature and uncertain utility.

3148 Moreover, the Claimant points out that BAPEX's claim is not for a loss actually suffered but

... remains only a proposed “abatement measure”. It has not been implemented, trialled -or even requested – by the Respondent. BВАРЕХ has not introduced into the record any evidence to indicate that any level of Government in Bangladesh is requesting, and ready to implement, the SVE project.1984

3149 Finally, the Claimant raises a number of objections concerning the quantification of the costs of the SVE system, stating that the claim is “merely for hypothetical costs that might be incurred at some undetermined point in the future". It also describes the quantification as “speculative and


1983 CREC, paragraph 132, relying on Niko's Gas Traps Flux Data, updated May 2021, Exhibit R-463, and WS Adolph IV, paragraph 46. ↩
1984 CREC, paragraph 129(c). ↩

[Page 874]

exaggerated” and as “guesswork [that] falls short of what is required to prove a loss".1985

3150 The Tribunal notes that, when BAPEX presented the proposal of Mr Wilson, that proposal was accompanied by another project for which BAPEX also claimed. Mr Wilson had noted that some of the villagers in Tengratila used the seeping gas as an “informal cooking gas supply system”. He saw in this practice “a significant risk of explosion to the residents in buildings" and proposed an “immediate short-term measure”. BAPEX explained that

... the local inhabitants of Tengratila have jury-rigged an informal cooking gas supply system to their homes using gas that is seeping out of the ground ...

3151 Mr Wilson proposed the “provision of properly sealed gas pipes and valves to all the stoves running off the gas from the “ground”. Mr Wilson estimated the cost for this provision at GBP 3'000,

... assuming 200 dwellings require such a valve.1986

3152 The practice caused occasional intervention of the authorities, which considered it unsafe and intervened to stop it. Mr Wilson refers to correspondence in 2010 which describes “the intervention of Local Administration and Police” to stop “the unsafe practice”. It also shows the photograph of a “gas collection from a historical seepage before any drilling of well".1987

3153 The Tribunal considered in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision this claim for the supply of pipes and valves to the 200 dwellings. It found that the project concerned a risk that does not arise directly from the seepages, for which Niko may be liable, but from the decision of the villagers to use the seepages for cooking purposes. Such use may be an economically reasonable decision, drawing an advantage from the seepages. It is nevertheless an intervening event of the type that breaks the chain of causation for Niko's liability. The Tribunal dismissed the claim in the Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision1988 and now confirms this decision.

3154 At this stage, the Tribunal refers to it with the observation that the people of Tengratila have been exposed to the seepages since 2005 and possibly even "before any drilling of well”. No accident has been reported throughout this


1985 CREC, paragraphs 125 – 135. ↩
1986 BMD, paragraph 369, relying on Wilson I, paragraph 6.4.1. ↩
1987 March 2010 Joint Report, Exhibit C-95, page 1 and Photo 3; see comments in Wilson I, paragraph 5.6.4. ↩
1988 Heads of Recoverable Loss Decision, paragraphs 574 and 776(iii). ↩

[Page 875]

period. It is not known whether the precautionary measures along those proposed by Mr Wilson for GBP 3'000 have been taken; but the fact that villagers of Tengratila created such a “informal cooking gas supply system" indicates, in the eyes of the Tribunal, that the people of Tengratila seem to manage the seeping gas, draw some advantage from it and may not necessarily wish to stop it from flowing.

3155 The claim for the other proposal of Mr Wilson, the SVE system which BAPEX continues to pursue, like the one for the sealing of the pipes and valves of the existing gas distribution system, does not seek reparation of a past loss but proposes a measure to remove what Mr Wilson considers a “potentially unacceptable risk to the villagers”.

3156 The project, as proposed in the Arbitration, is an idea of Mr Wilson. BAPEX requests payment for an amount estimated by Mr Wilson. The Tribunal has shown understanding with regard to the limited resources of the Government and does not necessarily conclude from the fact that some action has not been taken that this action is not necessary. In the case of Mr Wilson's SVE idea there is, however, no indication that the SVE project has been proposed to anyone in Bangladesh. Indeed, the idea is not in a state that can form a concrete proposal which can be accepted.

3157 Mr Wilson recognised that SVE systems are used in landfill projects, but he is not aware that such a system has been tried in circumstances as those prevailing in Tengratila. The viability of such a project has not been tested, and Mr Wilson explains that a “monitored trial would be necessary to determine if this approach is viable”. As the Claimant points out, there is no indication that such a trial has taken place.

3158 Moreover, the amount claimed is not an offer for implementing the SVE system or for conducting a “monitored trial”. Mr Wilson made an estimate which the Claimant rightly characterises as “hypothetical”. The costs estimated are not for a SVE in and around Tengratila but those for such a project if it were carried out in the UK; and even for implementation in the UK, the estimate is subject to important qualifications.

3159 The project of Mr Wilson has major implications for the people in Tengratila, both at the time of its construction and during the 15 years of operation. BAPEX has not provided any information to show that the villagers in Tengratila have been consulted about this project and are prepared to support it. There is, indeed, no indication that the villagers of Tengratila or any local or national authority in Bangladesh, wishes to implement the project, assuming it passed the feasibility test; there is not even an indication that the idea of Mr Wilson was submitted as a proposal to any local or national authority.

[Page 876]

3160 It must also be pointed out that the necessity of the project is questioned for a variety of reasons. First of all, BAPEX claimed in its Post-Hearing Brief of 2 March 2022 that by 31 December 2020 the “residual underground gas flowing to surface” reached zero.1989 According to this estimate of BAPEX there was, at the date of Mr Wilson's updated estimate, no more any gas from the first blowout that escaped at the surface.

3161 The Tribunal has not accepted this flow assessment of BAPEX, as explained above in Section 7. The assessment also is not in conformity with other sources which indicate that, as of 20 August 2021, the time of Mr Wilson's third report, seepages still seem to have occurred. According to the Claimant and the evidence it produced these seepages had much declined and did not justify any remedial action.

3162 Moreover, by 2021 the villagers had lived with the situation for some 16 years without any reported incident. Even in 2005, when the seepages from the first blowout undoubtedly were more important, there is no indication that any of the explosions occurred on which Mr Wilson relies to justify the need for the SVE system in 2021. The Tribunal recognises that the concern of Mr Wilson is the risk of explosion; the fact that it did not materialise over a long period does not mean that the risk does not exist. However, the substantial reduction of seepages since 2005 and in particular since the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation suggests that the likelihood of explosions in 2021 was substantially reduced.

3163 In any event, the Tribunal has decided above in Section 7.6.6 that beyond 8 October 2008 Niko is no longer responsible for the gas escaping from the Reservoir.

3164 The Tribunal concludes that there is no basis on which it may order Niko to pay BAPEX the amount of Mr Wilson's estimate of an untested SVE which has not been implemented and not been requested by any of the Bangladesh authorities and which concerns a project of uncertain utility and necessity, remediating a situation for which Niko is not responsible.

9.5.7 Losses to Education and Social Lifestyle

3165 BAPEX seeks BDT 40 million, equivalent to USD 622’708, as compensation for “losses to education and social lifestyle”, calculated at BDT 200'000 each for 200 students. BAPEX relies on the Second Environmental Losses Report. It explains that in that Report the Committee “did not chose to reserve its estimate based on the availability of further data.


1989 B-PHB 1, Table at page 23. ↩

[Page 877]

As such, the Respondents claim the Committee's original estimate of these losses as environmental losses ...”1990

3166 The Second Environmental Losses Report values the loss as now claimed by BAPEX at BDT 40 million, based on the costs for 200 students at BDT 200'000 each. It explained the assessment of this loss as follows:

Hundreds of students of Tengratila High School and Primary School have been deprived of the opportunity to have a normal education for a period of about half a year, due to aftereffects of the fire incident in Tengratila Gas Field. In this regard, about 500 students have had to lose one year's progress in pursuit of their expected career targets. Furthermore, several students will drop out permanently. The Committee has included the costs of rehabilitation of at least 200 affected students who will drop out due to such an uncertain livelihood.1991

3167 BBL Experts II present this result without any further explanation.1992

3168 The First Environmental Losses Report records under item (6) Educational system:

Local educational institutions remain closed. Since the teachers, students has taken safe shelter in remote area, the educational system is being interrupted. It will not be possible to open the educational institutions until the fire and gas emanation is fully stopped.1993

3169 In the Third Environmental Losses Report this head of loss covered the losses both of the first and of the second blowout. The Report explained:

Several hundreds of students of Tengratila High School and Primary School were deprived of normal education for half a year in the beginning of the session after the first fire in Tengratila Gas Field. In this situation, all the students have to lose one year before attaining their expected career. On the other hand, many students would drop off for a lifetime. Considering the uncertain situation of student life, the committee has included the rehabilitation cost in the estimation, required for those who drop out of education at the national average of 2 per family.

3170 The Report quantified the loss under this head as follows:


1990 BMEC, paragraph 41. ↩
1991 Second Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-2(bis), page 5. ↩
1992 BBL II, Table at page 8. ↩
1993 First Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-1, page 6. ↩

[Page 878]

  1. Losses of education and social livelihood, for “two persons from every family, that is total 394 students of 197 families” at BDT 400'000 per student amounting to a total of BDT 157.6 million;
  2. Development/setup of Primary and High School at BDT 10 million for “having modern facilities”;
  3. Operation costs for five years at BDT 1 million per year and a total of BDT 5 million;
  4. Setup of sports field, open field and club, and promotion of environment for Tengratila Ajobpur and surroundings for the amount of BDT 5 million;
  5. Operation costs of these installations for five years at BDT 500'000 per year and a total of BDT 2.5 million.1994

3171 The Third Environmental Losses Report added some explanations supporting this quantification. These explanations referred to the “report surveyed by the District Administration”, presumably the Local Losses Report, and the number of families listed in that report. Assuming the national average size of a family in Bangladesh at 5.5 persons, it calculated that two students for each family had to be compensated, leading total of 394 students for whom the Committee proposed compensation. The Committee considered the “socioeconomic situation of Bangladesh and concluded that every student should be paid BDT 400'000 as compensation for the loss incurred “due to dropping out and loss of educational sessions etc.” so that they would be “able to fulfil their careers”. The Committee saw the need for “setting up a primary school and a high school in a safe place” which Niko should operate or support the cost for at least 5 years. In addition, “higher training to the schoolteachers” and the listed amenities, “to recover the loss of social livelihood of the local people”. The BDT 157.6 million were intended for distribution through the District Administration to which the funds for the other works would be added.1995

3172 BAPEX produced two witness statements that deal specifically with the effect of the blowouts on the schools and their activity, as well as the effect on the students:


1994 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 19. ↩
1995 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), pages 16 – 17, emphasis in the original. ↩

[Page 879]

3173 Mr Farid Uddin Ahmed in his Witness Statement, dated 5 March 2016, explained that between 1998 and 2015 he was the headmaster of the Tengratila Secondary School. That school “is very close to the Niko compound. In fact, the schoolyard abuts Niko's fence.” About the impact of the blowouts on the activity of the school, he wrote:

The blowouts had a negative impact on the education and health of my students. After the first blowout, we did not hold classes for approximately two weeks to one month. The school building had cracks in the walls. But then we decided that we needed to open the school for the eighth and tenth grade students, who had important exams coming up. Some students came to these classes.

January is the enrolment time for our school. Due to the blowouts, there were many students who did not return to school. Overall, we lost about 20% of our student population. Some of the students were too afraid to return, and others were concerned about the risk of collapse of the damaged school building. Some of the students had moved elsewhere to continue their studies while others had stopped studies altogether, due to the disruption in their lives caused by the blowouts.

3174 He described the building erected by Niko, to which schooling was moved in May 2005, as a “bamboo hut with a tin roof” and explained that the reduced quality in the “school facilities and instruction depressed the students”. He mentioned health problems of the students:

They suffer from hearing problems as a result of hearing the loud noises caused by the blowouts, as do I (primarily in my right ear). Some of the younger children suffered serious psychological trauma. They all lived in fear of another blowout. I also observed, and received complaints from parents, that a larger number of children had breathing problems, burning eyes and headaches after the blowouts. These maladies continue today, perhaps because many students need to pass through the gas-affected area on their way to the school.1996

3175 Mr Ahmed also reported on the damage he suffered personally. He explained that his "house had lots of cracks in the wall. I received Tk 10,000 from Niko as compensation for the damage to my home, but it cost me about Tk 50,000 to repair".1997 The Local Losses Report describes the damage at his house as follows:


1996 WS Farid Uddin Ahmed, paragraphs 3, 7 – 10. For his account of the blowouts see above Section 9.1.2.1. ↩
1997 WS Ahmed, paragraph 5. ↩

[Page 880]

3176 The Local Losses Report confirms the assessment of a total BDT 10'000, each item of damage being assessed at BDT 5'000.1998

3177 Mr Shahjahan wrote in his Witness Statement, dated 6 March 2016, that he was the headmaster of the Tengratila Secondary School from 1970 to 1998 and that he lives “less than one kilometer northeast of Niko's compound”:

Our community's children's education also suffered. Before the blowouts, the Tengratila Secondary School occupied a two-story building adjacent to the Niko compound. The vibrations from the blowout caused lateral and vertical cracks in the building. A structural engineer came to Tengratila and said it should not be used. Today, school is conducted in a small, one-story building. The lack of space means that students need to attend school in shifts, limiting the time they are in school. The drop in educational standards has made our children depressed. They are also frequently afraid because they need to traverse a path where there is a lot of gas leaking, where there is a risk of explosion.1999

3178 The Claimant states that the claim for the losses for the alleged 200 students in an amount of BDT 40 million is entirely speculative. It explains:

When the Second Environmental Losses Report was drafted, it had not yet been half a year since the first blowout, let alone a full year to adjudge whether students would lose progression toward career targets and in turn drop out.2000

3179 The Claimant adds that there is no evidence in the record of any students dropping out of school and failing to ever return. Nor is there any evidence on whether students dropping out of school did so as a direct result of the first blowout and not the second blowout or for any other conceivable reason why students may drop out of school.

3180 The Claimant also argues that a claim seeking compensation for 200 students dropping out of school because the loss of progression toward career targets caused by the loss of part or all of an academic school year does not concern


1998 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 45, item no 118. ↩
1999 WS Md. Shahjahan, paragraph 14. ↩
2000 CREC, paragraph 118. ↩

[Page 881]

a direct loss; it is indirect or indeed remote and clearly excluded by virtue of Section 73 of the Bangladesh Contract Act and Article 27.2 of the JVA.

3181 In any event, so the Claimant argues, Niko has provided full compensation. It explains:

Niko has provided full compensation. After the first blowout, Niko determined that the school in Tengratila should be temporarily relocated due to proximity to the blowout. To facilitate this relocation, Niko paid and arranged for the construction of a temporary school.

Damage to the school from the blowout was assessed by the Local Loss Committee. Niko provided compensation for the cost of damage to the original school. Following Niko-funded repairs to the original permanent school building, the Tengratila school was reopened by June 2006 and students returned from the temporary location.

3182 In addition, the Claimant relies on further contributions, and specifically states that it

  1. Donated sports equipment and computers to support the school;
  2. Paid for several improvements to the school, including repairing the septic system and school's roofing; and
  3. Provided additional funds to support other local schools in the area.2001

3183 Concerning the quantification of the claim in the Third Monitoring Report, the Claimant compared in C-CD2 the compensation for the career losses of the students who have dropped out (BDT 800'000 for two students per family) with the per capita monthly income of BDT 2'500 which the same Third Monitoring Report had indicated for the two villages (Tengratila and Ajobpur). It calculated that, at the corresponding annual income of BDT 30'000 per family, the compensation proposed in the Third Monitoring Report would mean that “each family would receive the equivalent of the average annual income for almost 38 years”.2002

3184 Mr Glaholt in his first Witness Statement, dated 29 May 2014, stated that Niko had paid for the damage to the original school, constructed temporary installations and provided other compensation and assistance. He referred in


2001 CREC, paragraphs 120 – 123, relying on WS Adolph I, WS Glaholt I and Exhibits C-46 and C-64. ↩

2002 C-CD.2, paragraph184 and FN 235 – 237. ↩

[Page 882]

particular to the Fifth Monitoring Report, dated 27 June 2005, which provided the support for the Claimant's argument about the compensation paid.2003

3185 Mr Adolph confirmed in his First Witness Statement, dated 28 May 2014, that Niko "paid for the construction of a temporary school and made repairs to the existing school.”2004 He also addressed a point which seems to relate to the issue of the “repair and replacement” of the schools:

The only outstanding remediation project that Niko is aware of is some unfinished renovation work to the local high school, which Niko offered to pay for, but which is yet to be completed. Otherwise, Niko believes that it has remediated all damages to private interests and property within Tengratila and the surrounding environment.2005

3186 No information has been provided about this “unfinished renovation work” and BAPEX has not claimed for it.

3187 The Tribunal notes that two schools were principally affected by the blowouts, a primary and the secondary school, situated closely to the blowout sites. The Fifth Monitoring Report, dated 27 June 2005,2006 provides basic information about the schools:

Tengratila school has two sections: primary and high school. The number of students in primary school is 550 and that of in high school is 425. These 2 sections are run in two buildings, the high school is closer to the crater, within 150m northwest of the crater, and the primary school is within 300m. As mentioned, a new school building under construction at the time of the blowout suffered minor damage as a result of ground vibration and projectile-damage. Damage resulting from the blowout was documented in NIKO's initial damage assessment and has also been documented by the Government community infrastructure damage assessment committee [presumably the Local Losses Committee] referred to previously.

3188 As from May 2005, the schooling was temporarily moved to provisional structures which Niko had erected in a safer area.2007 Schooling later returned to the repaired original buildings.


2003 Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-46, transmitted to the DoE with Niko's letter of 9 July 2005. ↩

2004 WS Adolph I, paragraph 158. ↩

2005 WS Adolph I, paragraph 112. ↩

2006 Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-46, transmitted to the DoE with Niko's letter of 9 July 2005. ↩

2007 As per Mr Ahmed's witness statement, quoted above and confirmed by other evidence. ↩

[Page 883]

3189 The Tribunal sees three principal issues to be considered in respect of this claim related to education and social lifestyle: (i) the physical damage to the school buildings, (ii) the temporary operations in the provisional buildings and (iii) the impact of the events on the students and the compensation claimed for it.

3190 Concerning the damage to the school buildings, the Local Losses Report recorded the damage to the buildings. In the “List of the institutions Victimized by Fire at Tengratila Gas Field in Sunamganj District” it assessed the damage at the school buildings:

3191 Mr Glaholt confirmed that

The cost of damage to original school was addressed by the local loss committee and compensation for those damages was paid by Niko.2008

3192 It is uncontested that Niko paid for the repair costs assessed in the Local Losses Report. The Tribunal has not seen any evidence to show that at the time additional repair costs were assessed and claimed from Niko and BAPEX has not claimed for any outstanding repair costs.

3193 The Tribunal notes the assertion of Mr Ahmed that the “old school building” was “structurally unstable” but has seen no evidentiary support for this assertion which is in contradiction with Mr Ahmed's statement that he, as headmaster, continued to use the old building for some nine years until 2015. The statement of Mr Shahjahan according to whom “school is conducted in a small, one story building” and no longer in a two-story building, has not been shown to be related to the Chattak 2 blowout. As Mr Ahmed explained in his 2016 witness statement, it was only “just recently that “a new, smaller school building, financed by the local member of Parliament, was inaugurated”.

3194 The Tribunal sees therefore no basis for the claims for the construction of new school buildings and their operation by Niko during five years and for the construction of other facilities, as they have been expressed in the Third Environmental Losses Report. In any event, as BAAPEX limits its claim to the


2008 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 106. ↩

[Page 884]

loss, as estimated by the Second Environmental Losses Committee, this head of loss estimated by the Third Committee's is not claimed in the Arbitration.

3195 The Tribunal concludes that the damage to the school buildings has been restored and Niko paid for the related costs.

3196 Concerning the temporary facilities and the duration of their use, it is uncontested that Niko built temporary facilities to which schooling was transferred in May 2005.

3197 The Local Losses Report, dated 8 June 2005, explains:

At present, the academic activities of Tengratila High School and Tengratila Primary School are being conducted in separate temporary tin-shed rooms built by NIKO. The NIKO representative informs, after drilling of the new well, that the main buildings of these institutions will be free from risk. But, if the risk of these institutions is not eliminated after drilling of the new well, NIKO will have to estimate and provide separate compensation to buy land for said three institutions and to construct the same thereon.2009

3198 Mr Glaholt explained:

After the first blowout, Niko determined that the school should be temporarily relocated, due to the proximity of the school to the blowout site and the planned relief well activities, which we felt posed a potential hazard.2010

3199 A similar statement was contained in the Fifth Monitoring Report:

Due to the presence of a continued risk factor while the relief well drilling program is underway the Joint Venture arranged to construct a temporary school facility a safe distance away from the potential hazard.2011

3200 Different opinions have been expressed about the nature and quality of these temporary facilities and the qualitative difference to the original buildings. The Eleventh Monitoring Report, dated 30 October 2005, included photographs of the buildings after schooling in them recommenced, showing


2009 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 2. ↩

2010 WS Glaholt I, paragraph 104. ↩

2011 Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-46, page 25, Section 10.1. ↩

[Page 885]

buildings which presumably are those that existed prior to the blowouts and were repaired by the time of the report:2012

Plate 20. View north of Tengratilla School where classes have recommenced
following successful drilling of the Chhaak 2B relief well.

3201 The Report also contains a photograph of a classroom “at Tengratila School” which seems to indicate the situation as it existed in the original building:

Plate 21. School children attending class at Tengratilla School, October 22, 2005


2012 11th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-117, pages 39 and 40. ↩

[Page 886]

3202 Concerning the temporary facilities, the Eleventh Monitoring Report provided the following photograph of one of these buildings:2013

Plate 19. One of three school building at Tengratilla built to temporarily house
students during the Chhatak 2A and 2B relief well drilling program.

3203 Mr Glaholt described the temporary facilities in his first witness statement, dated 29 May 2014, as follows:

It was a basic structure, consisting of bamboo and metal sheeting built on an elevated piece of ground, and it was fully completed built within four months of the first blowout. I do not recall complaints being made from the villagers about the quality of the temporary school. In any event, the Tengratila school was re-opened by June 2006 and the students moved back from the temporary location immediately thereafter.2014

3204 In the passage of his witness statement, dated 5 March 2016, quoted above Mr Farid Uddin Ahmed, the headmaster of the Tengratila Secondary School between 1998 and 2015, described these facilities as a “bamboo hut with a


2013 11th Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit R-117, page 39. ↩

2014 WS Glaholt, paragraph 105. ↩

[Page 887]

tin roof" and explained as noted above that the reduced quality in the “school facilities and instruction depressed the students".2015

3205 The Tribunal noted the statement of Mr Glaholt that there was, at the time, no complaint about the quality of the temporary facilities. The Local Losses Report, as quoted above, mentioned that the schooling was conducted “separate temporary tin-shed rooms build by Niko” without complaining about the quality of these rooms. The Tribunal has not seen any evidence of contemporary complaints about the quality of the temporary facilities. While it is aware of the difference in the type of construction, the Tribunal accepts, in the absence of contemporary complaints, that functionally the temporary facilities were sufficient for providing schooling as required during the period until a possible return to the old buildings.

3206 From the descriptions provided, the Tribunal concludes, however, that, as asserted by the Second Environmental Losses Report, the schooling in the temporary facilities could not be qualified as “normal” but was inferior.

3207 Contradictory information has been provided with respect to the duration of the schooling in the temporary facilities:

3208 As quoted above, Mr Glaholt testified that “the Tengratila school was re-opened by June 2006 and the students moved back from the temporary location immediately thereafter”.2016 The statement is confirmed by the Claimant itself.2017

3209 Mr Ahmed explained that, when the temporary facilities had been completed by Niko in May 2005, “we stopped using our original school building. We used this building for about three months”.2018 The use for only three months starting from May 2005 would mean that in August 2005 schooling resumed in the old building near the blowout site. By that time a second blowout had occurred and the blowout still had not been killed. Given the reasons for the decision to move schooling to temporary facilities further away from the blowout site, the Tribunal finds it unlikely that schooling resumed in the old building in August 2005 or at any time before the completion of the relief operation.

3210 The photograph from a classroom, in the Eleventh Monitoring Report, dated 22 October 2005, reproduced above, seems to indicate that by that time already at least some classes were held in the old building. Since the relief


2015 WS Ahmed paragraph 9. ↩

2016 WS Glaholt, paragraph 105. ↩

2017 CREC, paragraph 122. ↩

2018 WS Ahmed, paragraph 9. ↩

[Page 888]

operation of the Chattak 2B well were completed on 9 October 2005, return to the old building later in that month would not seem inconceivable. Since the gas seepages and small fires substantially reduced but did not stop immediately, return to the old school in October 2005 does not appear very plausible.

3211 The Claimant's statement, relying on Mr Glaholt's testimony, was that the school “was reopened by June 2006”, may relate to the formal reopening and does not exclude that by that time some schooling had commenced already in the repaired old building. The Tribunal considers that, as testified by Mr Glaholt, it was Niko that “determined that the school be temporarily relocated" to facilities at “a safe distance away from the potential hazard”; the Tribunal therefore also relies on Niko's determination of the time when the old school could formally be reopened. As the Claimant has not indicated any earlier date for the formal re-opening of the old school, the Tribunal relies on the June 2006 date.

3212 The Tribunal therefore concludes on the basis of the information before it that schooling in the temporary facilities continued until June 2006.

3213 The impact of the blowouts on the students was the principal subject of the quantified loss assessed by the Second and the Third Environmental Losses Reports. The claim “for losses to education and social life”, as now made by BAPEX, is limited to the losses suffered by the students. The Second Environmental Losses Report states that the students of the two schools “have been deprived of the opportunity to have a normal education”.

3214 The Tribunal notes that the two schools were particularly close to the blowout site. The description given in the Environmental Losses Reports, by BAPEX witnesses, by the Monitoring Reports and by the Claimant's witnesses concur in showing a difficult situation for the students at the two schools:

3215 The students were exposed to the noise of the blowout, the escape of gas, the flame and the ejection of debris and earth; the school building was damaged as a result of “ground vibration and projectile-damage”. When the first blowout occurred, schooling was interrupted.

3216 During the months that followed until May 2005, while they had classes in the old building, the dramatic events of the blowout had ceased but gas continued to escape from the well, reached the surface, caused bubbles in the water and some of it ignited. When schooling was removed to the structures built by Niko, the drilling of the Chattak 2A relief well caused further disruption. While the Tribunal decided that Niko was not responsible for the second blowout, it is responsible for the time it took to complete the relief operation; during this time, the students, like all of the village population, had

[Page 889]

to live with an unresolved risk situation and the continuing seepages and flames. Even after the completion of the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation, the students had to put up with the temporary facilities until the situation improved to the point that Niko notified that schooling could return to the old building.

3217 The Tribunal considers that these events, as described by Mr Ahmed, had a negative impact on the education and health of his students. The Claimant does not discuss this impact but criticises the manner in which the Second Environmental Losses Report quantified the impact.

3218 The Tribunal concludes that the blowout and its consequences reduced the quality of the schooling and caused damage in the form of suffering for the students to a degree that justifies compensation. The question that remains is how this damage must be compensated.

3219 The Claimant and Mr Glaholt describe various contributions which Niko provided in addition to the repair of the school buildings. Mr Glaholt, for instance, stated:

In addition to paying for the repairs to the Tengratila school, Niko also donated sports equipment and computers to support the school. Over time, it also paid for several improvements to the school, including repairing the septic system, and repainting the school's roofing.

As an additional gesture of goodwill, Niko made available additional funds to support other local schools in the surrounding area.2019

3220 The Local Losses Report also mentions some of the other contributions to the schooling made by Niko:

In response to the claims of the local people about the damage to educational institutions, the mosque, madrasah, etc. within some villages nearer to Tengratila gas field including the village Tengratila, the NIKO Authority, under the mediation of local members of parliament, committed to pay BDT 30,000/- (thirty thousand) to each of the three educational institutions of the area concerned and BDT 10,000/- to each of 57 schools and social institutions. The NIKO representative assures that this money will be paid very soon. Due to said reason, these enterprises were not included in the list of compensation while it was prepared.2020


2019 WS Glaholt I, paragraphs 105 and 108. ↩

2020 Local Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-3(bis), page 2. ↩

[Page 890]

3221 The text of this paragraph is also recorded as “Discussion 6” and “Decision 7", attached to the Local Losses Report.

3222 The Fifth Monitoring Report also refers to the additional funds made available to "outlying schools and madrasas within 3 km of the site”. It notes that these schools suffered no direct physical damage and explains that “the gesture is intended to help account for disruption caused by the event and to promote good will.2021

3223 The Claimant and Mr Adolph asserted that “Niko paid in full the amounts assessed by the Local Loss Committee”.2022 This is uncontested.

3224 The Tribunal understands that these additional payments of Niko may have contributed to alleviate, specifically in the schools directly concerned and in the affected population more generally, the negative impact of the blowouts. It does not believe that they were an adequate compensation for the loss and damage suffered by the students in the schools directly affected.

3225 The Tribunal has therefore considered the quantification of this loss and damage as presented in the Second Environmental Losses Report and now claimed in the Arbitration. This quantification, as explained above at paragraph 3166, is based on the assumption that 200 students “will drop out [of school] permanently [...] due to such uncertain livelihood” and that “the costs of rehabilitation” will be BDT 200'000 per student.

3226 As the Claimant rightly points out, there is no indication that such a drop out did in fact occur. And when the statement was made in April 2005, when the Second Environmental Losses Report was issued, there was no possibility to know whether such a drop-out would occur at all and, if so, how many students would be concerned. After 2005 there would have been a possibility for BAPEX to obtain, without recourse to costly foreign experts, evidence about the number of students, if any, that did drop out and the reason why they did so; and it would have been possible to provide a more substantiated assessment of any “costs of rehabilitation".

3227 While it has accepted that the students suffered damage from the schooling and the substitute location, the Tribunal concludes that basis for quantification chosen by the Second Environmental Losses Committee is not supported by evidence and does not adequately reflect the damage suffered by the students from the reduced quality of their schooling


2021 Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, Exhibit C-46, pages 23 – 24. ↩

2022 WS Adolph I. ↩

[Page 891]

3228 Examining an adequate quantification for the loss which it accepted in principle, the Tribunal first considered whether the loss claimed is compensable: The fact that two schools, located one 150m, the other 300m from the compound in which the blowout occurred, would be seriously affected by the blowout clearly is a risk that had to be anticipated. While it agrees with the Claimant that the drop-out risk of some 200 students is remote and excluded by the Contract Act and the JVA, the Tribunal is of the view that the damage of inferior schooling during a limited period and the related suffering of the students is a direct loss for which Niko is liable.

3229 When the Second Environmental Losses Report was issued in April 2005, the blowout had not been killed. The situation caused by it persisted until, further to advice by Niko concerning the end of the risk that justified removing schooling to a remote location, schooling in the old location resumed. The Tribunal therefore determines that the period of inferior schooling and suffering of the students lasted for 18 months, from January 2005 until June 2006.

3230 Considering the circumstances, the Tribunal is of the view that this loss and damage affected not only some unidentified 200 students that were assumed to drop out from school. Instead, all students were affected. As recorded in the Fifth Environmental Monitoring Report, there were 550 and 425, i. e. a total of 975 students in the schools.

3231 As the Claimant pointed out, the Third Environmental Losses Report stated that “at present, per capita monthly income is approx. BDT 2500”. In the absence of any better reference for valuing the loss caused by reduced quality of education and students' suffering, the Tribunal refers to this value for monthly income. Obviously, the students' loss does not amount to the full amount of per capita monthly income, as reported by the Third Environmental Losses Committee. The Tribunal therefore uses one half of this amount for the quantification. On this basis the Tribunal calculates 1250 x 18 months = BDT 22'500 as compensation per student and a total of BDT 21’937’500 for the entire claim of 975 students.

3232 The Tribunal therefore concludes that Niko must pay on account of the claim for Losses of Education and Lifestyle an amount of BDT 21’937’500. It expects that BAPEX will see to it that each of the students who attended the two Tengratila schools during the relevant period to which BAPEX's claim relates will receive its share in the amount of BDT 22'500.

3233 When it presented the claim for the “rehabilitation” of the 200 students that were assumed to drop out of school due to the blowouts, as it had been assessed in the Second Environmental Losses Report of 13 April 2005, BAPEX did not identify the beneficiaries of the payment sought, nor did it identify, in

[Page 892]

the relevant submission of 20 August 2021, how these beneficiaries could be identified sixteen years after the event. The Tribunal thus has no indication from BAPEX as to how the payment now ordered may be distributed.

3234 The Tribunal notes, however, that there may still be records to identify at least some of the 975 students at the two schools in 2005 who suffered from the blowout and to whom the compensation will be paid. To the extent to which this is not possible, the Tribunal believes that the purpose of the amount that is not distributed to specific students may best be served, if this amount is used for improvements of the two schools. In that manner a new generation of students (perhaps descendants of some of the students affected in 2005) can benefit from the compensation.

9.5.8 The residual damage from the stress, suffering and disruption caused by the first blowout

3235 The evidence shows that the blowouts caused great shock and disturbance to the population of Tengratila. The loss and damage caused by the first blowout to the families, businesses and institutions have been assessed in detail and one-by-one in contact with those directly concerned by the Local Losses Committee, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner Sunamganj. The assessment was included in the Local Losses Report, dated 8 June 2005.2023 The report was updated subsequently by further assessments. All these assessments were paid by Niko. In addition, Niko also provided other payments and services directly to the local population.

3236 The Second Environmental Losses Report on which the Environmental Losses claimed in the present Arbitration are based, was issued on 13 April 2005.2024 Therefore, it could not take into account of the detailed assessment by the Local Losses Committee; and it did not take into account the Monitoring Reports by Tera Consultants and Crown Agents, the environmental consultants engaged by Niko.2025 This and other evidence was produced in the Arbitration.

3237 In view of this evidence, the Parties were in a position to determine themselves about the full damage caused by the first blowout in the categories of loss now claimed by BAPEX in the Arbitration. On the basis of this evidence and the related argument the Tribunal examined BAPEX's claims and determined with respect to most of them that the corresponding losses had already been assessed and compensated or that losses which the Second Environmental


2023 For details see above Section 9.2.1.4. ↩

2024 See above Section 9.2.1.2. ↩

2025 See above Section 9.2.2.2. ↩

[Page 893]

Losses Report in April 2005 expected to occur, did in fact not arise as expected. To the extent to which it was possible to determine the losses that remained outstanding could be determined specifically by reference to one or the other claim made by BAPEX in the Arbitration, the Tribunal determined them in the preceding Sections.

3238 In these Sections, the Tribunal also identified some loss and damage that it considered inherent in some of the claim categories but that was of a more general nature and could not adequately be addressed separately in each category. This was the case specifically with respect to losses concerning

  1. damage to trees and forest resources in Section 9.5.1;
  2. damage to soil resources in Section 9.5.3; and
  3. Losses related to human health in Section 9.5.5.7.

3239 The events in these categories related to the general shock, disruption and suffering caused to the Tengratila population by the first blowout. While the second blowout on 24 June 2005 also created shock and disruption to the Tengratila population, the gas continued to escape from the Reservoir through the opening that had been created by the well that suffered the first blowout. The Tribunal therefore determined above in Section 7 that Niko's responsibility for the first blowout continued after the second blowout. The disturbance to the local population, especially through the continuing seepages and the related fires, continued until the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation on 9 October 2005. Thereafter, the seepages reduced substantially. The Tribunal determined that Niko remained responsible for these remaining seepages until 8 October 2008.2026

3240 After the completion of that relief operation, there was no longer the disturbance of the relief drilling and the risk of another blowout during this operation had ended. The reduced seeping that continued was such that the Tribunal does not believe that must be considered for the general compensation considered in the present context.

3241 In light of these considerations the Tribunal fixes the period for the compensation determined here as including 9 months from February to October 2005.

3242 When examining how the disturbance and suffering of the Tengratila population must be valued, the Tribunal noted that, according to the Third Environmental Losses Report, the per capita monthly income in 2005 was


2026 See above Section 7.6.6.3 in fine. ↩

[Page 894]

approximately BDT 2'500”.2027 Shortly after the first blowout, Niko distributed on 17 January 2005 to each of the 616 families in Tengratila BDT 5'000. It then paid to each of the relocated families BDT 6'000 in February and March 2005 and BDT 10'000 thereafter during the temporary relocation period. Pursuant to a further assessment by the Deputy Commissioner on 4 January 2006, Niko paid another BDT 5'000 for each of the Tengratila families; for that payment the number of persons affected at that time was assessed at 625.2028

3243 In view of these payments made already by Niko, the Tribunal is of the view that the most adequate additional compensation for the disruption and suffering could best be made by another monthly payment to all of the 625 families for the 9 months period from February to October 2005. Since some compensation has been paid already for the most affected part of the population for their temporary re-location and in view of the variability of the blowout effect both in time and in distance from the blowout, the Tribunal considers that an adequate additional payment would be on average BDT 5'000 per family. At the level of the Tribunal a distinction between the families according to the extent of their exposure to the blowout is not possible. The Tribunal awards therefore 9 x 5'000 x 625 = BDT 28'125'000.

3244 The Tribunal quoted above the recommendation of the Third Environmental Losses Report that the amount awarded “can be distributed among the villagers through District Administration against losses due to impact on trees, forestry resources, and vegetation”. It supports this recommendation. Alternatively, and to the extent that the people affected in 2005 can no longer be identified, the funds may be used for community purposes.

9.6 Currency and Interest

3245 BAPEX claims for all environmental losses in US Dollar.2029 BAPEX recognises that “most losses were incurred in 2005 and were estimated by the [BBL Experts] report in 2005 BDT. Brattle converted the losses into USD at the average exchange rate for the year in which they were incurred.

3246 In support of the conversion of the claim amounts into US Dollars BAPEX refers to the loss of purchasing power of the Taka relative to the US Dollars between 2005 and 2021 and adds:

Converting environmental losses calculated in 2005 BDT into USD at the exchange rate prevailing in 2005 partially avoids the loss of purchasing


2027 Third Environmental Losses Report, Exhibit Annex R-5(bis), page 16. ↩

2028 For details of these assessments and payments see above Section 9.3.1. ↩

2029 ВМЕС, paragraph 46(a) and (b); B-PHB 1, paragraph 133(d) and (e). ↩

[Page 895]

power over the intervening period, since the price levels in USD did not rise by as much as they did in BDT. It therefore does not create a windfall, but simply mitigates a loss of value caused by Niko's own delay in paying compensation.2030

3247 The Claimant objects, arguing:

It is elemental that sums awarded to compensate for a loss should be expressed in the currency in which that loss was suffered. Here, all of the losses allegedly suffered [...] would have been in Bangladesh taka. Yet BAPEX requests an award expressed in Unted States dollars. The Tribunal should decline this request.

It is evident that the taka was the only currency in which the claimed environmental losses could occur. None of these claimed losses involved other currencies. All concerned losses were allegedly incurred by Bangladesh persons within Bangladesh.2031

3248 The Tribunal notes that it is undisputed that most of the losses for which the environmental claims seek compensation were incurred in Taka or will have to be disbursed in Taka. BAPEX provides no legal basis, in the law of Bangladesh which would justify compensation in a currency other than that in which the loss was incurred.

3249 As quoted above in Section 8.4, BAPEX considered the situation that money loses value over time and stated:

Interest rates provide compensation for that loss of value. In the event that the Tribunal concludes that damages must be awarded in BDT, then pre-award interest rate should also be denominated in BDT.2032

3250 The Tribunal agrees. In the context of losses incurred in Bangladesh Taka, the loss of purchasing power should be addressed by the means provided by the law of Bangladesh. That means interest on the amount due. No other method for compensation of the loss of purchasing power has been indicated as applicable under the law of Bangladesh.

3251 The Tribunal decides that the environmental losses incurred in Bangladesh Taka or compensation to be disbursed in Bangladesh are expressed in Bangladesh Taka and payable in that currency. This applies to


2030 B-PHB 1, paragraphs 127 and 129. ↩

2031 CREC, paragraph 138; confirmed in C-PHB 2, paragraph 54. ↩

2032 B-PHB 1, paragraph 130. ↩

[Page 896]

  1. Losses of Education and Lifestyle payment of an amount of BDT 22'500 for each of the 975 students concerned, amounting to a total of BDT 21'937'500.
  2. Residual damage from the stress, suffering and disruption caused by the first blowout, payment to each of the 625 families BDT 45'000 and a total of BDT 28'125'000.

3252 With respect to BAPEX's claim for Atmospheric Pollution, the Tribunal has determined that the Claimant must pay for the sequestration of 2'010'022 tonnes of CO2 and CO2 equivalent at the rate of USD 2.50 per tonne, i.e. USD 5'025'055. This amount was calculated on the basis of Indicative Costs in a World Bank report, dated October 2022, and was expressed in US Dollars.2033

3253 As the afforestation/Reforestation work for this sequestration will have to be performed in Bangladesh, the Tribunal assumes that the costs will occur in Bangladesh Taka. The Tribunal orders payment of the US Dollars amount in Bangladesh Taka at the exchange rate at the date of payment, except for any payment in US Dollars provided in the project budget, referred to above in Section 9.4.11 in fine.

3254 Concerning interest, BAPEX claims pre-award interest by alleging delay by Niko in compensating the losses for which BAPEX claims. BAPEX also refers to the loss of purchasing power, as quoted above, and adds:

Additional mitigation of this loss of purchasing power would be provided by pre-award interest, which compensates for the time value of money in USD between 2005 and 2011.

3255 The Tribunal has examined the Parties' argument above in Section 8.4 and determined the principle of interest payment, the applicable rates and the start date. These considerations are applicable also to the interest claims concerning the environmental losses. The Tribunal therefore makes the following orders concerning interest payments on the amounts awarded for environmental losses:

3256 Interest must be paid at all amounts awarded for environmental losses at 5 % p.a. compounded annually; any amounts payable in US Dolla for the implementation of the sequestration project according to Section 9.4.11 interest is payable at the rate for six-month LIBOR + 2% until 19 November 2020 and thereafter for 180-day average SOFR + 2%.


2033 See above Section 9.4.11. ↩

[Page 897]

3257 For determining the start date for interest payments, the Tribunal considered that, concerning compensation ordered above in Sections 9.5.7 and 9.5.8, the stress and disruption occurred essentially during the period until the completion of the Chattak 2B relief operation. Thereafter, the Tribunal assumes that the marked reduction in the seepages also largely reduced the stress and disruption, even if schooling in the substitute location still continued for some time. The Tribunal decides therefore that, on these amounts, the compensation should have been paid by the end of 2005. It orders that interest payments are due from 1 January 2006 on outstanding amounts.

3258 Concerning the compensation for Atmospheric Pollution, the quantification of the sequestration costs is based on costs presented in a World Bank publication dated October 2022. As a result, any increase in the costs of remediation by way of carbon sequestration from the date from which Niko incurred such an obligation up to that date is already included in the calculation of the principal amount. Accordingly, interest on those costs runs from October 2022.

[Page 898]

10 COSTS

10.1 Cost allocation between the two cases

3259 The proceedings in the two ICSID cases were conducted concurrently until the Award on the Payment Claim. In preparation of that award, the costs for the proceedings concerning that claim were separated from those of the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration.

3260 The Tribunals in the two cases identified two phases of the proceedings that concerned both cases, the Jurisdiction phase and the Corruption Claim phase (the Joint Phases). The Tribunals relied on Article 61(2) of the ICSID Convention and distinguished between the Parties' costs and the costs of the proceedings or Arbitration Costs.2034 The present Tribunal continues to apply this distinction also in the present Award. It uses the expression “cost" to refer to both categories of costs.

3261 The two Tribunals determined the Arbitration Costs and Parties' costs relevant to each of the two Joint Phases and their allocation to one and the other of these phases. This allocation was recorded in the Award concerning the Payment Claim in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18; it is now also recorded in the present Award for ICSID Case No ARB/10/11. The liability for the costs so allocated to one or the other case remained for each Tribunal to decide in the respective Awards. The cost allocation decisions of the two Tribunals required from an administrative perspective that costs had to be reassigned between ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 and ARB/10/11. To implement the Tribunals' decisions, it was necessary to account for both the funds already disbursed from the case account established for ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 and the remaining, unused funds from that case to be transferred to the account established for ICSID Case No ARB/10/11. The expended costs were reassigned by moving USD 816’069.56 in total from the account established in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 to ICSID Case No ARB/10/11, split equally between both parties: USD 408’034.78 each to the Claimant and to the Respondent. With the authorization having been provided to the ICSID Secretariat from each Party (for the Respondent on 18 October 2021 for the Claimant on 13 October 2021), the unused funds remaining in the account established for ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 were transferred to the account established for ICSID Case No ARB/10/11 as refunds and receipts, i.e. for the Claimant USD 52'422.90, and for the Respondent USD 52'487.59, and the Parties were informed accordingly. The cost allocation decision of the two Tribunals was then reflected in ICSID's financial statements.


2034 Award on the Payment Claim, paragraphs 264 and 265. ↩

[Page 899]

3262 The two Tribunals noted that the Parties agreed that the costs incurred in the Jurisdiction phase are to be allocated in equal shares to the proceedings on the Payment Claim and to those on the Compensation Declaration. The Tribunals agreed with this position and allocated 50% of the costs of the Jurisdiction phase to each of the two cases. The present Tribunal confirms its earlier ruling on this allocation: 50% of the costs are for the Jurisdiction phase concern the case on the Compensation Declaration.

3263 Concerning the Corruption Claim phase, the Tribunals noted that by far the largest part of the Parties' argument, the related evidence and the Tribunals' work during this phase concerned the Compensation Declaration. The Tribunals therefore allocated 15% of the costs of the Corruption Claim phase to the Payment Claim. This Tribunal confirms the earlier joint decision that 85% of the costs of the proceedings on the Corruption Claim are allocated to the Compensation Declaration proceedings.

3264 These allocations concerned both the Arbitration costs and, to the extent they were claimed, the Parties' costs. The question about the liability for the costs allocated to one or the other case is a matter specific to each case. The Tribunal in the present case therefore decides which Party must bear those costs of the two phases that the two Tribunals allocated to the Compensation Declaration proceedings.

10.2 The Parties' cost claims concerning the Compensation Declaration proceedings

3265 Concerning the Compensation Declaration, the Parties submitted their cost claims on 31 May 2022 (C-Costs I and R-Costs I) and comments on their opponent's submission on 21 June 2022 (C-Costs II and R-Costs II). Further to an invitation by the Tribunal, the Parties submitted Updated Statements of Cost on 5 September 2025 (C-Costs III and R-Costs III). Neither Party requested an opportunity to make comments on its opponent's update.

3266 The Parties listed by date and amounts invoiced the costs of legal counsel, experts and expenses, without providing details about the activity covered and without supporting documentation, offering to provide supporting invoices upon request. No such requests were made and, in the absence of objections, the Tribunal sees no need for requiring further evidence and explanation on these cost claims.

3267 The Claimant commented on the key factors relevant for the Tribunal's cost decision and divided the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration into five phases. It identified for each of these phases, invoice by invoice, its costs for legal fees and expenses, and where applicable, fees and expenses for experts and witnesses and officers' and employees hearing expenses.

[Page 900]

3268 The Updated Statement of Costs, the Claimant added CAD 23’322.57 and USD 546 for legal costs.

3269 Taking account of its position concerning the allocation of costs and the update, the Claimant requested for its own costs in total, including the updates:

  1. Legal fees: CAD 6’227’274.90 and USD 36’999.37:
  2. Expert and witness fees and expenses: CAD 15’540.00 and USD 985'356.99;
  3. Officers' and employees hearing expenses: CAD 36’873.17.2035

3270 With respect to the Arbitration Costs, the Claimant identifies in its cost statements payments to ICSID in the amount of USD 1'340'000, which includes the fee for lodging the Request for Arbitration of USD 25'000 in this case and advance payments of USD 1'315'000 as indicated in the financial statement. The Tribunal does not consider the fee for lodging a request for arbitration as part of the Arbitration Costs but in line with ICSID practice as an expense incurred by the Claimant.

3271 The Claimant requests post-award interest “on all amounts awarded, including costs”.2036

3272 The Respondent submitted its cost claim describing in the title of the submission that it concerned “the Corruption Claim & the Compensation Declaration Proceedings”. The Respondent identifies the costs only with respect to the Jurisdiction Phase, the Corruption Claim Phase and the Merits Phase of the Compensation Declaration; the Respondent objects to the subdivision in additional phases as made by the Claimant.

3273 The principal table in the Respondent's cost submission (Table 4.1) lists in USD Legal Fees of Foley Hoag, Expert Fees and Administrative Costs (travel, lodging, per diem), invoiced during the period from 13 August 2015 to 20 May 2020, with a total of USD 16’445'373.47, consisting of USD 12'413'240.10 for Legal Fees, USD 2’574’560.49 for Expert Fees and USD 1’457’572.88 for Administrative Costs. The Respondent explains, however, that this table includes Foley Hoag's legal fees for the Payment Claim (USD 129’940.50) and costs incurred in the Corruption Claim phase (USD 4'563'158.86). After


2035 C-Costs II, D4. ↩

2036 C-Costs I, paragraph 31. ↩

[Page 901]

deduction of these amounts, “the adjusted amount of the Respondents' Own Costs amounts to US$ 11'512’385.61".2037

3274 For the BDT amounts, the Respondent lists BDT 4'931'000 for legal fees for Mr Moin Ghani,2038 and BDT 8'953’154.24 for administrative disbursements and costs related to the on-site visit by ESG,2039 amounting to a total of BDT 13'884'154.24.2040 From this amount the Tribunal understands the Respondent subtracts BDT 10'440'864.00.2041 In the Tribunal's calculation, this derives at BDT 3'443’290.24, rather than BDT 3'510’290.24, a figure stated by the Respondent.2042 The Tribunal nevertheless considers the difference of BDT 67'000 negligible in the circumstances and accepts the figure of BDT 3’510’290.24 listed by the Respondent.

3275 The Respondent then shows “a summary Table containing the amounts declared for merits of the Compensation proceedings [USD 11'512’385.61 and BDT 3'510'290.24], the 50% share of the jurisdiction costs relating to the Compensation Declaration [USD 172’038.48], and 85% share of the costs of the Corruption Claim phase relating to the Compensation Declaration [USD 3'930'599.87 and BDT 8'875٬068.80].

3276 The Respondent seeks an order that the Parties bear their respective own costs in the Corruption Claim phase related to the Compensation Declaration proceedings and in the Jurisdiction phase attributable to the Compensation Declaration proceedings. The Respondent seeks reimbursement from the Claimant for the fees and costs associated with the merits phase of the Compensation Declaration in the amounts of

US$ 11'512’385.61 and BDT 3’510’290.24 for Respondents' own costs (corresponding to the fees of Respondents' legal counsel and experts' fees, travel expenses, and other disbursements incurred by BAPEX and Petrobangla).2043

3277 The Respondent updated the amount of fees and costs by USD 186’184.29 to a new total of USD 11'698'569.29 and BDT 3'510'290.24.


2037 R-Costs I, paragraphs 26 – 28; paragraph 28 states that the deductions were indicated in paragraphs 27 and 28; from the context the Tribunal concludes that the reference intended concerns paragraphs 26 and 27. ↩

2038 R-Costs I, paragraph 29, Table 4.2. ↩

2039 R-Costs I, paragraph 29, Table 4.3. ↩

2040 R-Costs I, paragraph 28. ↩

2041 R-Costs I, paragraph 27. ↩

2042 R-Costs I, paragraph 28. ↩

2043 R-Costs I, paragraph 34. ↩

[Page 902]

3278 The Respondent also seeks reimbursement of USD 752’512.41 for the Respondent's payment of advances in relation to the Arbitration Costs, updated by USD 200'000 to USD 925'512.41.2044

3279 Finally, the Respondent seeks post-award interest as follows:

Order the Claimant to pay post-award interest on the amounts declared and listed in (c) above [Parties' costs and Arbitration Costs as quoted] at a rate of six-month LIBOR plus 2% compounded, for the sums declared in American dollars (US$); and the rate established by Bangladesh Bank on the date of issuance of the Award, for the sums declared in Bangladeshi Taka (BDT), or any other rates that the Tribunal deems reasonable, from the 30th day the Parties are served notice of the Award in the Compensation Declaration until the date of Claimant's payment in full.2045

10.3 The principles guiding the cost decisions

3280 Both Parties relied on Article 61(2) of the ICSID Convention and underlined the broad discretion of ICSID tribunals in the application of this provision. They listed a party's “success” as an important factor for the cost decision but did so in different manners:

3281 The Claimant understands “success” as “the party's success on the claims or defences", stating:

It is well established that the key factors relevant to the allocation of costs include the party's success on the claims or defenses presented ...2046

3282 And it determines the success separately for the different phases of the procedure it had identified, distinguishing in particular between the liability phase and two phases determining the heads of loss and quantum.

3283 BAPEX argues that, when determining “success”, the proceedings must be taken as a whole, as this was done in the Award on the Payment Claim where no distinction was made between liability and quantum. BAPEX objected to the “artificial ‘sub-divisions” and the “piece-meal approach”; and it argued that


2044 R-Costs III, Table 3 at page 3. The Tribunal notes that this amount does not correspond to the indication of payments made by the Respondent in relation to ICSD Case No ARB/10/11. A different amount is reflected on ICSID's financial statement for this case. The Tribunal adopts the amount indicated in ICSID's financial statement, which is higher than the amount indicated by the Respondent in its latest cost submission. ↩

2045 R-Costs III, paragraph 6(d). ↩

2046 C-Costs I, paragraph 5. ↩

[Page 903]

[t]he proceedings on quantum are an integral part of the liability phase of the arbitration and cannot be separated out for a micro assessment of each action of the parties. Respondents prevailed on liability and reasonably pursued their defence at all times. Niko must pay all the costs of the liability phase, including quantum.2047

3284 Both Parties referred to the Tribunals' Award on the Payment Claim,2048 which had found that “allocating costs according to the outcome of the arbitration is a widely applied principle in international arbitration in general and is also applied in ICSID proceedings”, referring to several ICSID cases. In that Award, the Tribunal also referred to

3285 With respect to these principles, the Claimant referred in particular to the following:

... whether a party's conduct in the proceedings increased their costs or resulted in delay.2050

3286 The Respondent relied on cost decisions in other ICSID cases. One of these cases was ICSD Case No ARB/12/23, Tenaris S.A. and Talta Trading e Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal Lda. v. Venezuela II (Tenaris),2051 in which the tribunal applied the “the rule that costs follow the event.”2052 The Tribunal notes that, in applying this rule, the Tenaris tribunal identified “the major issues to be ruled upon”; it attributed weight to each issue and determined the success percentage to each matter. The Tenaris tribunal applied the


2047 R-Costs II, paragraphs 4, 5 and 12. ↩

2048 C-Costs II, paragraph 12 and R-Costs I, paragraph 4 et passim. ↩

2049 Award on the Payment Claim, paragraphs 341-345. ↩

2050 C-Costs I, paragraph 5. ↩

2051 Tenaris S.A. and Talta - Trading e Marketing Sociedade Unipessoal Lda. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela II, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/23, Award (12 Dec. 2016) (Fernández Armesto, Gómez Pinzón, Stern), RLA-483, the Respondents relied on this case at R-Costs I, paragraph 23, as "granting full costs to Respondent because it had prevailed on the "principal claim" (causa principal)". ↩

2052 RLA-483. ↩

[Page 904]

percentage so determined not to the total of the Claimants' costs but only to what it called the “Reasonable Defence Expenses”, explaining that “the Claimants can only seek from the Respondent those [Defence Expenses] which are essential to reasonably defend their claim”. In that case, the Claimants had claimed close to USD 6 million. “Considering the complexity of the case at hand, the quantum of the claims and the work performed by counsel and experts”, the Tenaris tribunal found that USD 2.8 million could qualify as Reasonable Defence Expenses.2053

3287 The Tribunal shares the view of the Parties that the “success” of a party is a principal criterion for allocating the costs. It is, however, of the view that in a case like the present one, where a host of issues was argued and had to be decided, the “success” of the case should not be determined globally for the entire case, but, as explained in the Tenaris case, the major issues of a dispute should be considered separately. The division of the proceedings into phases is a suitable method for identifying these principal issues in the present case.

3288 Consequently, the Tribunal will identify first the phases of the procedure relevant for the cost decision and then determine for each of these phases the relevant issues and the “success” of one or the other Party. Where the Tribunal concludes that in a phase one Party was more successful than the other to the extent that it should be awarded its relevant costs, it will examine whether the costs claimed were reasonable.


2053 RLA-483, Tenaris v. Venezuela II, paragraphs 848-849. See also RLA-471, PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd. v. Independent State of Papua New Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/33, Award, 5 May 2015, paragraph 406(e). ↩

[Page 905]

10.4 The phases of the Compensation Declaration procedure

3289 In its first submission on costs, the Claimant identified the following phases for the Compensation Declaration proceedings:

  1. BAPEX Default phase (September 2014 – September 2015);
  2. Liability Phase (September 2013 – August 2014, October 2015 – February 2020);
  3. Corruption Claim (March 2016 – February 2019);
  4. Heads of Loss Phase (March 2020 – November 2020);
  5. Quantum Phase (September 2013 – August 2014,2054 December 2020 – May 2022).

3290 The Respondent, in its first submission on costs, treated as separate phases the proceedings concerning the Tribunals' jurisdiction and those concerning the Corruption Claim, which had been identified in the Award on the Payment Claim as phases that concerned both Arbitrations. In the Reply Cost Submission, the Respondent objected to “artificial 'subdivisions" which the Respondent described as an attempt by the Claimant to avoid the consequences of the “loser pays” principle. It argues that the Claimant

... does so by creating five artificial “sub-divisions” of the Compensation Declaration, but without reference to any ICSID jurisprudence supporting its position. In doing so, Niko not only seeks to avoid the consequences of the "costs follow the event” principle, it attempts to subvert the Parties’ positions resulting from the Decision on Liability and deny that Respondents prevailed in the Compensation Declaration which Niko itself initiated.2055

3291 The Respondent refers to the Claimant's cost submission in the Payment Claim proceedings where

Niko did not argue in favour of sub-dividing the proceedings. Niko cannot have it both ways; it must follow the basic principle of good faith with procedural conduct. Thus, just as the Tribunal ordered Respondents to bear Niko's costs for the Payment Claim as the prevailing party in that


2054 The Tribunal notes that this time period is listed by the Claimant in its Cost Submission in both, the liability and the quantum phase. ↩

2055 R-Costs II, paragraph 4. ↩

[Page 906]

proceeding taken as a whole, so should it now order Niko to bear the costs of the Compensation Declaration as a whole.2056

3292 The Tribunal has explained in the Award on the Payment Claim the criteria for allocating the responsibility for the costs of the arbitration;2057 and it has summarised above some of these criteria.

3293 The ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules provide discretion to tribunals when deciding on the allocation of costs. Allocating the costs of an arbitration and legal fees and expenses according to the outcome of the arbitration is a widely accepted principle; but in its application other considerations also are brought to bear and the “event” or outcome of the proceedings often is not fixed to a single issue. In the present case, the Parties raised many issues of varying importance, which absorbed time and efforts of the Parties and the Tribunal and contributed to the costs of the proceedings. In the Decision on Liability the Tribunal held that the first blowout was caused by Niko's breach of its obligations under the JVA and that Niko must compensate BAPEX for its direct costs; these were decisions in favour of BAPEX; but in this decision and at other occasions, the Tribunal had to address other issues with cost implications on which BAPEX did not prevail. A comprehensive cost decision requires that the Tribunal exercise its discretion by duly considering all cost factors.

3294 The Respondent points out that in its cost submission concerning the Payment Claim, Niko did not argue in favour of sub-dividing the proceedings. The Tribunal also did not consider the costs for liability and quantum separately in that case. The reasons are simple: the Payment Claim proceedings were not subdivided into proceedings on liability and quantum. Indeed, there was no justification for such a subdivision because the quantum of the claim was not controversial: the Secretary of Petrobangla quantified the total amount owed to Niko and Niko accepted that quantification.2058 The quantum of the claim was no factor in the Payment Claim proceedings.

3295 The example of the Payment Claim proceedings and the related argument and decision on costs illustrates that the allocation of costs cannot follow a fixed frame but must consider the specific situation of each case. In the present case the Tribunal examines the circumstances in which the costs of the proceedings arose, following the phases of the Arbitration as it evolved.

3296 The three respondents against which the two Arbitrations initially were directed raised objections to the Tribunals' jurisdiction. The proceedings


2056 R-Costs II, paragraph 5. ↩

2057 Award on the Payment Claim, Section 7.5.1. ↩

2058 Award on the Payment Claim, paragraphs 57 and 58. ↩

[Page 907]

dealing with these objections formed a distinct phase in both Arbitrations. The Respondent does not contest that the costs of this phase be considered distinctly. The Tribunal accepts that in the costs decision, the costs of the Jurisdiction phase be considered distinctly.

3297 Following the Decision on Jurisdiction of 19 August 2013, the Tribunals gave procedural directions on 19 September 2013 and organised the proceedings in consultation with the Parties. At this stage, no distinction between phases was made. Indeed, Niko was first invited to frame the scope of liability with respect to which it sought the Compensation Declaration. BAPEX then was invited to set out

... the particulars of the claims concerning Niko's alleged liability for the two blowouts and damage allegedly caused by Niko, including its quantum.2059

3298 In its Counter-Memorial of 30 January 2014, BAPEX provided some background on the two blowouts but did not discuss Niko's liability; as part of the requested relief, BAPEX sought a declaration “that there is no legal dispute between BAPEX and Niko under the JVA”.

3299 The Claimant filed a Reply, supported by documents, witness statements and expert reports arguing the merits of the case on liability for the blowouts. In its Rejoinder, BAPEX again failed to address the merits of this case. In the absence of a response by BAPEX, the Tribunals organised the appointment of independent experts in three different areas of expertise and received reports from them.

3300 BAPEX's new counsel, appointed on 9 July 2015, explained that due to previous counsel's “grave errors”, and “material omissions”, BAPEX found itself in the position of a party that has failed “to appear or to present his case at any stage of the proceedings”. It requested the Tribunal to “restore party equality of arms and BAPEX's right to be heard” and to provide BAPEX with an opportunity to file an additional pleading and present counter-claims.2060

3301 The Tribunal accepted that BAPEX present argument and evidence on the Compensation Declaration. Represented by its new counsel, BAPEX made a clear distinction between the conduct of the Arbitration by the previous counsel and the new approach that BAPEX started to discuss since July 2015. BAPEX made it clear that the phase before this change of approach is distinct. It was a distinct phase in the Arbitration and must be treated distinctly also for the cost decision. The Tribunal refers to this phase as BAPEX Default


2059 Procedural Order No 3 of 15 November 2013. ↩

2060 For details about this phase of the proceedings see Decision on Liability, Sections 3.2.1 – 3.2.7. ↩

[Page 908]

phase. While the new counsel who presented the changed approach was appointed in July 2015, it took several months to adjust the procedure to this new approach by which the claims in the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration were adjusted to address the substance of the claim and extended to a broader scope. The Tribunal therefore determines that the BAPEX Default phase ended in September 2015. Therefore, that phase of the proceedings spans the period September 2014 – September 2015.

3302 In the proceedings that followed, a split was made to accommodate BAPEX, which was prepared to argue liability and attend the scheduled hearing but required more time for the complex issues concerning the quantification of the loss. The Parties and the Tribunal therefore adopted a distinct phase on Liability, which was interrupted by the Corruption Claim. After that claim had been decided the liability phase was completed by the Decision on Liability and proceedings on quantum of the loss commenced.

3303 The Tribunal concludes that the Parties and the Tribunal decided to split the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration into a liability and a quantum phase. The proceedings on quantum raised a host of complex issues different from those that had arisen in relation to liability and created different costs. The Tribunal concludes that, also from the perspective of the cost decision, a distinct Liability phase has to be applied. The Tribunal considers the timeline for the Liability phase to span the period September 2013 – August 2014, and October 2015 to February 2020.

3304 The Claimant proposed for the period thereafter a further subdivision, distinguishing between a Heads of Loss phase and a Quantum phase. The Claimant explains this subdivision by stating:

Rather than simply proceed with the original procedure for quantum, as previously agreed by the parties, Respondent insisted on further changes to the procedure that required additional work by Claimant to address.2061

3305 The Tribunal is aware that different aspects of the dispute on quantum were treated successively, that the distinction was decided to allow additional time for BAPEX in quantifying its claims and that each the two sub-phases proposed by the Claimant was completed by a decision of the Tribunal. The Tribunal nevertheless recognises that both these sub-phases relate to the quantification of the loss for which BAPEX sought compensation. The Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss dealt with issues that arose in the context of the quantification of the loss of BAPEX and the Government and


2061 C-Costs I, paragraph 24. ↩

[Page 909]

anticipated the decision on some issues that otherwise would have had to be treated in the final decision on quantum. The Tribunal therefore decides to treat the related costs as those of a single phase, which it describes as the Quantum phase, which the Tribunal considers spanning the period from March 2020 to the date of the present Award.

3306 On the basis of these considerations, the Tribunal distinguishes for purposes of its rulings on costs between the following phases:

  1. Jurisdiction phase;
  2. BAPEX Default phase (09/2014 – 09/2015);
  3. Corruption Claim phase;
  4. Liability phase (09/2013-08/2014 and 10/2015 – 02/2020); and
  5. Quantum phase (03/2020 – the present Award)

3307 In the following, the Tribunal will set out the Arbitration Costs incurred, applying the phases set out above (Section 10.5), and then turning to the allocation of the Arbitration Costs and costs for legal fees and expenses for the Jurisdiction phase (Section 10.6), the BAPEX Default phase (Section 10.7), the Corruption Claim phase (Section 10.8), the Liability phase (Section 10.9) and the Quantum phase (Section 10.10).

10.5 The Arbitration Costs

3308 Apart from the legal fees and expenses incurred by the Parties, the other group of costs that the Tribunal must consider according to Article 61(2) of the ICSID Convention concerns the fees and expenses of the Tribunal and the charges for the use of the facilities of the Centre, which the Tribunal refers to as Arbitration Costs.

3309 The Tribunal recalls at the outset that at the Joint First Session, it was agreed that the Parties shall defray the cost of the proceedings in ICSID Case Nos ARB/10/11 and ARB/10/18 in equal parts, without prejudice to the final decision of the Tribunals as to the allocation of costs in each case. While ICSID Case Nos ARB/10/11 and ARB/10/18 were pending concurrently, the Parties made advance payments in ICSID Case Nos ARB/10/11 and ARB/1018 in equal amounts, and ICSID debited the case accounts in equal parts. As noted above, the Tribunals identified and allocated all disbursements in relation to the Payment Claim, and those related to the Compensation Declaration proceedings to ICSID Case Nos ARB/10/11 and ARB/10/18, respectively. The Tribunal in the latter case then decided on the allocation of Arbitration

[Page 910]

Costs in relation to the Payment Claim proceedings in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18. As noted above, the Tribunals' decision on cost allocation is also reflected in the financial statement for ICSID Case No ARB/10/11. it follows that payments originally made into the escrow account established for ICSID Case No ARB/10/18, and costs covered by those, were allocated to ICSID Case No ARB/10/11, as per the Tribunal's decision of September 2021.

3310 In this Award in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11, the Tribunal is therefore tasked to decide on the allocation of costs for the other phases of the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration and to determine the cost liability for the different phases. The costs incurred in relation to the Jurisdiction phase and the Corruption Claim phase, as explained above, have been determined already jointly by the two Tribunals. The Tribunal now determines the Arbitration Costs specific to the Compensation Declaration phases (excluding the Centre's administrative fee), i.e. BAPEX Default phase, Liability phase, Quantum phase.

3311 With respect to the Jurisdiction phase and the Corruption Claim phase, the allocation to the two cases has been determined by the two Tribunals jointly, viz. 50% of the disbursements in the Jurisdiction phase and 85% of the disbursements in the Corruption Claim phase are allocated to ICSID Case No ARB/10/18. All costs related to the Compensation Declaration phases of the procedure are also allocated to ICSID Case No ARB/10/18.

3312 Based on this calculation, the Tribunal has determined the total Arbitration Costs allocated to the Compensation Declaration proceedings to amount to USD 3'472'192.88, composed of the following cost items per phase:

[Page 911]

Jurisdiction Phase Corruption Claim Phase BAPEX Default Phase (09/2014 – 09/2015) Liability Phase (09/2013-08/2014 and 10/2015 – 02/2020) Quantum Phase (03/2020 – present Award) Total
Arbitrator Fees and Expenses
Michael E. Schneider 94'410.96 502'006.33 13'125.00 457'867.74 532'846.58 1'600'256.61
Campbell A. McLachlan 39'669.94 129'841.84 63'917.00 59'739.94 155'000.00 448'168.72
Jan Paulsson 19'291.59 101'672.00 32'229.58 83'913.57 102'190.00 339'296.74
Total Arbitrator Fees and Expenses 153'372.49 733'520.17 109'271.58 601'521.25 790'036.58 2'387'722.07
Tribunal Appointed Experts Fees and Expenses
Keith B. Masters 17'587.10
Ian Wallis 70'352.46
William Abel 139'776.79
Total Tribunal Expert Fees and Expenses 227'716.35
Total Direct Costs 27'384.31 82'419.03 24'056.50 110'370.13 56'524.49 300'754.46
Administration Fee 88'320.00 69'920.00 132'586.66 132'586.67 132'586.67 556'000.00
Total 269'076.80 885'859.20 493'631.09 844'478.05 979'147.74 3'472'192.88

[Page 912]

3313 The ICSID administration fee in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11 has been collected on an annual basis. For the purposes of cost allocation of this fee to the three main phases of the Compensation Declaration proceedings, the Tribunal has decided as follows:

3314 As a result, the Arbitration Costs for the phases of the Compensation Declaration proceedings are the following:

[Page 913]

10.6 The Jurisdiction phase

3315 As explained above, the Tribunals, acting jointly, fixed the Arbitration Costs for the Jurisdiction phase and allocated them in equal shares to the two cases. The present Tribunal confirms this joint decision. The Arbitration Costs for the Jurisdiction phase in the case on the Compensation Declaration therefore are USD 269’076.80, as shown in the table above.

3316 Concerning the liability for these costs, the Tribunal in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 decided that the Arbitration costs so allocated to this phase were to be borne in equal shares by the Parties and that each Party must bear its own costs for the Jurisdiction phase.2062

3317 The Respondent observed that in its Submission on Costs the Claimant had not presented any argument concerning the costs of the Jurisdiction phase in the Compensation Declaration proceedings. They stated:


2062 Award on the Payment Claim, paragraph 349 and 350. ↩

[Page 914]

In light of Niko's silence, Respondents hereby reaffirm their submission on costs allocation for the remaining 50% share of the costs incurred in the jurisdictional phase, and reiterate their request that the Tribunal also order each party to bear its own costs and to equally share the arbitration costs for the 50% share of the jurisdictional phase allocated to the Compensation Declaration proceedings.2063

3318 The Tribunal draws the same conclusion from the Claimant's silence about the costs for the Jurisdiction phase. It has considered the issues relevant for the Decision on Jurisdiction and concluded that the relative success on these issues is of equal weight. It therefore decides that the Arbitration Costs for the Jurisdiction phase of the Compensation Declaration proceedings shall be borne by the Parties in equal shares, each Party bearing USD 134’538.40. Each Party shall bear its own costs for legal fees and expenses for this phase. For the Claimant, this includes bearing the costs for lodging the request for arbitration with ICSID.2064

10.7 The BAPEX Default phase

3319 In part B of Procedural Order No 11, the Tribunals summarised the proceedings during the phase which, above in Section 10.4, the Tribunal accepted to describe as BAPEX Default phase. In that Procedural Order the Tribunals also described the measures they had to take to face BAPEX's default and they quoted from Procedural Order No 7 of 17 October 2014:

Given the technical nature and the complexity of many of the issues arising in this context, the Tribunals do not wish to proceed in the absence of a critical review of the technical issues arising from the Claimant's case. In the circumstances the Tribunals require the opinion of an independent expert or, given the diversity of the relevant substance matters, several experts.

3320 The Claimant pointed out that, in these circumstances “the Tribunals and the Parties embarked on a procedurally complex venture of identifying the types of experts needed, formulating the terms of reference, retaining the


2063 R-Costs II, paragraph 21. ↩

2064 The Claimant had indicated the USD 25'000 as part of its payments to ICSID and therefore as "Arbitration Costs"; however as noted above the Tribunal does not consider this fee to form part of the costs of the Arbitration as defined in this Award. ↩

[Page 915]

experts and obtaining their opinions”.2065 The Claimant also referred to the “compromise solution” that was adopted to reorganise the proceedings; and it quoted the following extract from a letter that BAPEX addressed on 19 October 2015 to the Tribunal:

BAPEX hereby informs the Tribunal that it agrees to reimburse to Niko its share of the Tribunals' fees and expenses and the Centre's charges, and the related expenses, relating to the Tribunal Experts, as well as the reasonable legal and expert costs incurred by Niko specifically attributable to the Tribunal Expert process.2066

3321 The Claimant submits that “it is entitled to an award of both the arbitration costs and the costs of its legal representation and assistance for the entirety of the BAPEX Default Phase.” It defines the period of this phase to last from October 2014 through September 2015, including the “time and attention devoted to the provisional measures request that BAPEX filed on 13 August 2015 and thereafter withdrew".2067

3322 The costs claimed by BAPEX for this phase consist of

3323 The Respondent objects to “Niko's apparent characterisation of the decision to retain new counsel from July 2015 as having created unjustified delay and adding complexity to the proceedings” and argue that a “party should not be economically sanctioned for securing the appropriate defence”. They state that the Claimant “mischaracterises BAPEX's reasonable compromise made in good faith and attempts to expand its scope to include ‘both the arbitration costs and the costs of its legal representation and assistance for the entirety of BAPEX's Default Phase'. This is not correct or appropriate."2068

3324 The Tribunal notes that the basis for the Claimant's cost claim for this phase is not complexity caused by BAPEX's new counsel but the failure of BAPEX to respond to the merits of the claim prior to the new counsel. Time and expenses


2065 C-Costs I, paragraph 9. ↩

2066 Quoted at C-Costs I, paragraph 14. ↩

2067 C-Costs I, paragraphs 15-16. ↩

2068 R-Costs II, paragraphs 6 and 7; italics in the quotation added by BAPEX. ↩

[Page 916]

during this phase became necessary because of this failure. The Respondent has presented no justification for the waste caused both to the Arbitration Costs and to the Claimant's costs.

3325 The Tribunal concludes that BAPEX is responsible for this phase of the proceeding and must bear the related costs. While BAPEX's agreement to reimburse costs confirms this conclusion, it is not the sole basis for the Tribunal's cost decision. The Tribunal therefore sees no need to verify whether the claimed costs are covered by the commitment in BAPEX's letter of 19 October 2015.

3326 The Tribunal considered, however, that the Claimant insisted that the claimed costs must be reasonable. As pointed out by the Tenaris tribunal, quoted above, when ordering that one party must compensate the other party for its costs, “Reasonable Defence Expenses” must be considered. The Tribunal noted that, by the time the Default phase started, the Claimant had presented its submissions on the merits; the costs related to these submissions are included in the costs for the Liability phase. During the BAPEX's Default phase, the principal work fell on the Tribunal and the experts it appointed; as far as the Tribunal can see, the tasks of the Claimant consisted first in participating in the Tribunal's consultation of the Parties in the process of selecting the Tribunal's experts and defining their terms of reference and at the end in commenting the reports of the Tribunals' experts.

3327 In these circumstances, the Tribunal finds it difficult to justify legal fees and expenses costs of almost CAD 1 million. It therefore decides to award to the Claimant compensation for the costs in CAD in the amount of CAD 700'000. Given the technical complexity to which the process of selecting the Tribunal experts and the definition of their terms of reference related, the claim for the costs of Claimant's experts appears reasonable.

3328 As BAPEX is responsible for the costs during the BAPEX Default phase, it also must bear its own costs for legal fees and expenses the entirety of the part of the Arbitration Costs during this phase.

3329 In conclusion, the Tribunal decides that BAPEX must bear the entirety of the Arbitration Costs for the BAPEX Default phase, amounting to USD 493'631.09 and must compensate the Claimant for the Claimant's costs for this phase in the amounts of CAD 700'000 and USD 9’500 for legal costs; and USD 37’112 for experts, i.e. for a total of CAD 700'000 and USD 46'612.

[Page 917]

10.8 The Corruption Claim phase

3330 As explained above, the Tribunals in both cases jointly determined the costs for the Corruption Claim phase are allocated in the ratio 15:85 to the Payment Claim and the Compensation Declaration proceedings. The 85% share of the latter proceeding is shown in the table above. The Tribunals fixed the Claimant's cost for the Corruption Claim phase of the arbitration and determined 15% thereof. The Tribunal in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 decided that the Respondents in that case had to bear 15% thereof in an amount determined in the Award for that case.

3331 Concerning the liability for the 85% of the costs allocated to the Compensation Declaration proceedings, the Claimant relies on the Award in the Payment Claim proceedings, where the Tribunal held that the “Claimant fully prevailed on this claim”. The Claimant argues that in the Payment Claim Award the Tribunal decided the same legal issue between the same parties; the Claimant concludes that the decision about the costs concerning the Corruption Claim is res judicata which applied also with respect to the liability for costs of the Compensation Declaration.

3332 Concerning the amounts claimed, the Claimant states that, with one exception, the tables for fees and costs presented in its Submission on Costs for the Corruption Claim are identical to those that were presented in the context of the Payment Claim; the exception being an error with respect to one invoice.2069 The total for legal fees claimed for the Corruption Claim phase in the Payment Claim proceedings was CAD 3’203’695.27;2070 the corresponding amount in the Cost Submission concerning the Compensation Declaration proceedings is CAD 3'213’047.60. There was no objection against this correction; the Tribunal accepts the corrected amount.


2069 C-Costs I, paragraph 23 and FN 74. ↩

2070 Award on the Payment Claim, paragraph 271. ↩

[Page 918]

3333 The 85% attributable to the Compensation Declaration for the legal fees and expenses related to the Corruption Claim costs, for which the Claimant seeks full compensation are:

3334 The Respondent contests the application of res judicata. It argues that the Tribunal's decision in the Payment Claim Award applied only to those proceedings. It pointed out that the corruption allegations “were intertwined with the Compensation Declaration in which the Respondent prevailed”.2071

3335 Concerning the question who should bear the costs for the Corruption Claim phase, the Respondent asserts:

One of the factors why Niko was previously allocated 15% costs for the corruption phase was because Niko was the successful party in the Payment Claim. By contrast, the prevailing party in the Compensation Declaration are the Respondents. Respondents should not be made to bear the burden of paying for Niko's cost for the Corruption Claim phase in the Compensation Declaration.2072

3336 The Respondent also refers to Niko's admission to the Canadian authorities that it had bribed a Government official. The Respondent argues again that an investment made in conflict with international public policy cannot be given the protection of the ICSID Convention. It concludes that it “would be unfair for Respondents to bear the burden of incurring costs associated with a claim brought in good faith in order to protect the sanctity of the ICSID system".


2071 R-Cost I, paragraph 9. ↩

2072 R-Costs II, paragraph 16. ↩

[Page 919]

3337 The Respondent identified the Respondent's own costs for the Corruption Claim Phase relating to the Compensation Declaration (applying 85% ratio) at USD 3'930'599.87 and BDT 8'875٬068.80;2073 it concludes:

In these circumstances, Respondents respectfully request that the Tribunal order that costs lie where they fall.2074

3338 The Tribunal has clarified above that the joint decision on the allocation of the costs between the two cases does not affect the decision of each of the Tribunals with respect to the liability for the costs so allocated. The Tribunal in the present case, therefore, does not accept the Claimant's argument according to which the decision in the award in ICSID Case No ARB/10/18 binds as res judicata also the present tribunal with respect to the decision concerning the liability for the 85% of the costs allocated to ICSID Case No ARB/10/11.

3339 This Tribunal therefore decides afresh this question of liability. It does not overlook, however, that the Corruption Claim by the Respondents concerned both the GPSA and the JVA. As the Tribunals in their joint decision considered, the reasons which determined the decision concerning the GPSA also affected the JVA.

3340 The Tribunal does not agree with the Respondent's argument according to which the cost liability for the Corruption Claim phase, insofar as it concerns the JVA and the related Compensation Declaration, should be determined by reference to the outcome of the Compensation Declaration proceedings. The two issues are distinct: the Corruption Claim concerns the question whether the JVA, as asserted by the Respondents, was obtained by corruption and should be held invalid. The issues concerning the Compensation Declaration arise under the JVA, once the Corruption Claim was dismissed and the JVA was applied. The Tribunal therefore decides the cost liability for the Corruption Claim without considering the outcome of the dispute over the Compensation Declaration.

3341 When addressing the cost liability for the Corruption Claim, the Tribunal considers the broad scope of the Respondents' corruption allegations and the diversity of charges as well as the number of procedural applications. It has considered in detail these allegations in its Decision on the Corruption Claim.


2073 R-Costs I, paragraph 33. ↩

2074 R-Costs II, paragraph 18. ↩

[Page 920]

By far the largest part of the Parties' argument concerned the many allegations concerning the period leading to the conclusion of the JVA. And on all these allegations the Claimant prevailed. The Tribunal sees no justification for placing on the Claimant any of the costs for the proceedings on these allegations. The Tribunal therefore sees no justification for denying the Claimant compensation for the 85% of the costs of the proceedings on the Corruption Claim that is allocated to the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration.

3342 The Tribunal concludes that the Claimant prevailed fully with its defence against the Corruption Claim with respect to the JVA (and the Compensation Declaration). The Respondent, therefore, must bear its own costs and the Arbitration Costs with respect to the Corruption Claim proceedings and must compensate the Claimant for its legal fees and expenses in the related phase of the proceedings.

3343 The Tribunal has considered whether the amount of the Claimant's claim for legal fees and expenses for this phase is reasonable. The Tribunal examined the information about the Parties' time and effort in arguing the Corruption Claim and the reflection of these efforts in the Tribunal's own work. It concludes that the defence against the broad scope of allegations required extensive work of the Claimant and its experts, justifying a large amount of fees. The Tribunal noted that these costs were disclosed to the Respondent already in the proceedings before the award in the Payment Claim was issued and they were disclosed to the Respondent in the context of the cost claim now considered by the Tribunal. The Respondent did not raise objections against the amount of these costs. Indeed, the Respondent's costs concerning the Corruption Claim are more than a third higher than those of the Claimant.

3344 In these circumstances the Tribunal sees no basis for considering the Claimant's costs unreasonable. It decides that the Respondent must bear its own costs for legal fees and expenses and compensate the Claimant for the full amount of the share of the Claimant's costs for the Corruption Claim in the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration, viz. CAD 2'755'963.63 and USD 93’747.49 for legal fees and expenses and must bear the full amount of the Arbitration Costs related to the Corruption Claim phase, viz. USD 885'859.20.

[Page 921]

10.9 The Liability phase

3345 The Claimant argues that the Liability phase “comprises multiple parts as a result of the interruptions to the proceedings to determine liability”. It identifies a first part immediately after the decision on Jurisdiction (September 2013 to August 2014), interrupted by the BAPEX Default phase; the Liability phase resumed “upon the commencement of the solution proposed in the 1 October 2015 pre-hearing consultation until 25 March 2016, when the Respondents presented the Corruption Claim; thereafter it resumed again with the decision on that claim issued on 25 February 2019 and lasted until the Decision on Liability on 28 February 2020.”2075

3346 The Claimant quantified its costs for the Liability Phase at CAD 3'466'309.95 and USD 120’291.00 for legal costs; USD 697’626.96 for expert cost; CAD 51٬699.77 and UK£ 30'189.74 for Officers' and Employees' Hearing Expenses.

3347 The Claimant argues that “in light of the Decision on Liability and the history leading to it, Niko is entitled to a substantial measure of costs for this phase”. The Claimant points out that it “was successful in defending against any liability for the second blowout”. It accepts that BAPEX was “successful” concerning liability for the first blowout but adds that “the Tribunal's findings in this regard were limited to narrow grounds and included the rejection of a plethora of evidence and arguments advanced by BAPEX (which required extensive evidence and argument to address)”. Among the findings favourable to it, the Claimant identified the finding that “liability must be determined exclusively under the JVA and that such findings on liability were binding on the Government of Bangladesh and Petrobangla”.2076

3348 The Claimant concludes:

Considering the totality of the Liability Phase (and the BAPEX Default Phase, defaults and other conduct of BAPEX that added unnecessary complexity to the issues and the Hearing, as well as considerable delay in the ultimate determination), Niko submits that on balance each party should bear their own costs for the Liability Phase.2077

2075 C-Costs I, paragraph 17. ↩
2076 C-Costs I, paragraph 19. ↩
2077 C-Costs I, paragraph 20. ↩

[Page 922]

3349 With respect to the Respondent's cost claim the Claimant asserts that the claimed costs are “unreasonable”. Relying on an ICSID case and statements in the Award on the Payment Claim, the Claimant argues:

Respondent's authorities on costs are clear that a key criterion in determining any allocation of costs is “the reasonableness of the parties’ legal costs, including any material disproportion that may exist between the parties' respective costs.” Indeed, as recognized in the Award on the Payment Claim, in addition to deciding whether “the action for which the costs were engaged were reasonably justified.” 2078

3350 The Claimant compares the amount of “approximately USD 11.552 million”, indicated by the Respondent for the proceedings on the merits of Compensation Declaration to its own costs for the same part of the procedure and states that it “is almost two times as much as Niko's costs incurred totally approximately USD 7.150 million”. And it adds that this “significant disproportion in fees incurred by BAPEX despite the same relative work, as the parties were participating in relatively the same staps, is profound”.2079

3351 The Respondent presents in Table 4.1 the Respondent's “Costs in the Compensation Declaration Proceedings (Legal Fees of Foley Hoag, Expert Fees, Travel Costs & Other Administrative Disbursements of Foley Hoag & Litigation Support costs in US$”. This table shows an overall total of USD 16'445'373.47, consisting of USD 12'413'240.10 for Legal Fees, USD 2’574’560.49 Expert Fees and USD 1’457’572.88 for Administrative Costs (Travel, Lodging, per diem). In a separate table 4.2, the Respondent presents the legal fees by its "local counsel Barrister Mr Moin Gani” as BDT 4'931'000 and in Table 4.3 the "Costs Related to On-Site Visit by ESG Experts and Other Administrative Disbursements” in a total of BDT 8’953’154.24.2080

3352 The Respondent explains that the costs in its Table 4.1 must be adjusted because the table includes cost items that do not concern the merits phase of the Compensation Declaration proceedings. The Respondent concludes that


2078 C-Costs II, paragraph 4, quoting from PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd v. Independent State of Papua New Guinea, ICSID Case No ARB/13/33, Award of 5 May 2015, RLA-471, paragraph 406(e). ↩
2079 C-Costs II, paragraph 5(b) and 6. ↩
2080 R-Costs I, Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. ↩

[Page 923]

[t]he adjusted amount of Respondents' Own costs amounts to US$ 11’512’385.61 and BDT 3’510’290.24.2081

3353 The Respondent requests that the Claimant be ordered to reimburse these amounts and the USD 752’512.41, amounts paid as advances to the Arbitration Costs, “associated with the merits phase of the Compensation Declaration."2082

3354 In support of its request of full compensation, the Respondent explains that "the merits phase of the Compensation Declaration constituted the heart of this case. In its Decision on Liability, the Tribunal rejected Niko's request for a declaration of non-liability for the two blowouts, as well its request for a finding of breach of warranty by BAPEX”. The Respondents insisted that they were “the prevailing party in the merits phase”. They stated:

... the Tribunal not only upheld Respondents' defense and found that Niko was not entitled to the declaration of non-liability it requested. Regarding the Chattak 2 blowout, the Tribunal also found that Niko was indeed liable for the Chattak 2 blowout, making Respondents the prevailing party in the merits phase of the Compensation Declaration proceedings.2083

3355 In response to the Claimant's argument for ordering the Parties to bear their own costs, the Respondent argues:

Niko's costs were a function of the complexity of the case. It must be recalled that Niko was the Claimant in the proceedings and Respondents, once represented by appropriate legal counsel, had the right to present a full defence. In fact, the required “extensive” and “complicated” work resulted from the strength of Respondents' arguments in the liability phase, which allowed Respondents to defend themselves properly against Niko's claim and ultimately prevail in this proceeding.2084

3356 The Tribunal considered the Respondent's argument according to which they were “the prevailing party” on the merits of the Compensation Declaration proceedings. The Tribunal noted that its Decision on Liability found that


2081 R-Costs I, paragraph 28, FN 34 and Table at paragraph 33. ↩
2082 R-Costs I, paragraph 34(c). ↩
2083 R-Costs I, paragraph 22. ↩
2084 R-Costs II, paragraph 8. ↩

[Page 924]

The first blowout at Chattak 2 was caused by Niko's breaches of its obligations as Operator under the JVA;

and

Niko must compensate BAPEX for direct loss and damage caused by the first blowout.

3357 The Tribunal agrees with the Respondent that the first blowout was critical for the entire dispute on the Compensation Declaration and the Tribunal's decision on the liability for that blowout was of predominant importance.

3358 The examination of the causes for the first blowout required the Tribunal to address a plurality of diverse issues that were raised. The diversity of issues that had to be considered in this respect ranged from the depth of casing to the cause of the kick and included others. The Tribunal does not believe that in this debate, either Party had a predominant responsibility for raising issues that unnecessarily extended the debate.

3359 The Tribunal concludes that with respect to the Liability phase BAPEX prevailed on the principal issue. It is therefore not of the view that, as requested by the Claimant, that “each party should bear their own costs for the Liability Phase”.

3360 Beside this principal issue, however, other issues had to be addressed, both with respect to the liability for the second blowout and on the scope the Tribunal's decision, and that on these other issues BAPEX did not prevail. With respect to the liability for the second blowout the Tribunal found against the Respondents and in items (i) to (iii) of the Decision on Liability the Tribunal also made findings adverse to positions taken by BAPEX. Moreover, the Tribunal considered the Claimant's arguments concerning the Respondents' conduct with respect to the proceedings in the Liability phase and found that these contributed to the costs.

3361 The Tribunal is of the view that these other aspects must be considered when deciding the costs of the Liability phase. While the aspects do not justify a decision leaving each party bearing its own costs, they militate against placing all of the costs of the Liability phase on the Claimant.

3362 In view of these considerations, the Tribunal decides that the Claimant must bear 75% of the Arbitration Costs of the Liability phase, must bear

[Page 925]

its own costs and must compensate the Respondent for part of the Respondent's costs.

3363 Concerning the Arbitration Costs in this phase, the Tribunal has determined that the costs for the Liability phase amount to USD 844'478.05. The Claimant, therefore, must bear 75% of these costs, amounting to USD 633'358.54, and the Respondent 25% of these costs, amounting to USD 211'119.51.

3364 Concerning the Respondent's costs for legal fees and other expenses, the Tribunal noted that the Respondent has identified its total costs for the merits of the proceedings on the Compensation Declaration and has not identified the share of these costs that concern the Liability phase as understood by the Claimant and the Tribunal. Considering the manner in which the Respondent has presented the costs on the merits, the Tribunal is unable to identify the costs items in the Respondent's tables of legal fees and expenses that must be allocated to the Liability phase.

3365 In the absence of the necessary information, the Tribunal has considered the relation between the Claimant's costs for legal fees and other expenses during the Liability phase and for the Quantum phase. It noted that the costs for both legal counsel and for experts is about equal between the two phases. Since both Parties had to address the same issues, the Tribunal concludes that the ratio between the two phases is similar for both Parties. On this basis the Tribunal decides to allocate the costs presented by the Respondent for the proceedings on the merits of the Compensation Claim in equal shares to the Liability phase and the Quantum phase.

3366 The amount indicated by the Respondent for legal fees and other expenses for the proceedings on the merits of the Compensation Declaration is USD 11'512’385.61; allowing for the BDT 3’510’290 for the Respondents' local counsel, these costs amount to some USD 11.540 million. The Tribunal assumes that one half of these costs, USD 5.77 million, relate to the Liability phase.

3367 The Claimant argued that the “quantum of fees and costs submitted by BAPEX are excessive and unreasonable. They are orders of magnitude higher than

[Page 926]

those incurred and submitted by Claimant and ought to be questioned in light of such a material disparity”. 2085

3368 The Tribunal has considered the Claimant's argument about what it considered the “unreasonable” amounts of the Respondent's costs, in comparison to those of the Claimant. The Claimant's costs in CAD, at the rate of 1.40 correspond to some USD 2.513 million. Adding the experts' costs of USD 0.698 million brings the Claimant's costs for the Liability phase to some USD 3.211 million. Consequently, the Respondent's costs for the Liability phase as assessed by the Tribunal are some USD 2.559 million or some 80% higher than those of the Claimant.

3369 The Tribunal does not intend to interfere with the Parties' choice of representation and experts, nor with the related financial arrangements. It must, however, consider the amount of the Parties' costs when imposing on one Party the costs of the other Party. The Tribunal is of the view that, when deciding allocation of a party's costs, it must examine whether the amount of the costs for which reimbursement is claimed is reasonable in the circumstances, as it has done with respect to other cost claims. It considered the nature of the work that had to be performed and the relation to the costs engaged by the opponent. Where it saw a disproportionate amount claimed, it has awarded only part of the costs claimed by the Party entitled to compensation for its costs, specifically with respect to the sums claimed by the Claimant on account of its costs concerning BAPEX's Default phase.

3370 On the basis of these considerations, the Tribunal decides to base the compensation for the Respondent's costs in the Liability phase on the amount of USD 4 million.

3371 On this basis, the Tribunal decides that the Claimant must bear its own costs for legal fees and expenses and compensate the Respondent for its costs for legal fees and expenses of the Liability phase by paying USD 3 million, constituting 75% of USD 4 million considered as reasonable costs for the Respondent's legal fees and expenses.

10.10 The Quantum phase

3372 The Claimant in its May 2022 submission subdivided the part of the Arbitration which the Tribunal treats as the Quantum phase in two sub-


2085 C-Costs II, paragraph 3. ↩

[Page 927]

phases, the Heads of Loss phase (March 2020 to November 2020) and the Quantum phase (repeating the time period also referenced in the context of the Liability phase, i.e. September 2013 to August 2014, and December 2020 to May 2022). It quantifies its costs for these phases at total of CAD 3'090'068.41 and 1’067’100.87. In the 2025 Update on costs, the Claimant indicates CAD 23’322.57 and USD 546 as additional legal costs;2086 these additional costs are not specifically allocated to any phase; presumably, given the date of filing, they relate to the Quantum phase of the Compensation Declaration proceedings.

3373 The total costs claimed by the Claimant consist of

3374 The Claimant argues that it “was successful in defeating numerous claims advanced by BAPEX” and refers to claims decided in the Tribunal's Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss. The Claimant also describes the “multiple parts" of the Quantum phase and refers to what it describes as “the failure of BAPEX to abide by the previously agreed and established procedure, and tis ever changing theories”. 2087 The Claimant comments on "BAPEX'S unreasonably high costs [that] stand in stark contrast to those incurred and claimed by Niko”; these comments also apply to the costs concerning the Quantum phase. 2088

3375 Concerning the allocation of costs, the Claimant submits that the costs “must be considered on a comparative basis” and adds: “Without knowing the Respondent's cost position Niko provisionally claims 50% of its costs” for the Heads of Loss sub-phase and “submits that BAPEX ought to be disentitled to the majority of its costs".2089

3376 The Claimant claims "50% of its costs from the Heads of Loss Phase” and “an appropriate portion of costs from the Quantum phase with respect to the


2086 C-Costs II, Section B. ↩
2087 C-Costs I, paragraphs 26, 29. ↩
2088 C-Costs II, paragraphs 3 – 6. ↩
2089 C-Costs I, paragraph 26. ↩

[Page 928]

Claimant's ultimate success therein". 2090 In the Comments on BAPEX's cost submission the Claimant repeats the relief requested in the first submission on costs. 2091

3377 The Respondent presents its costs for the merits phase of the Compensation Declaration proceedings and does not identify separately its costs for the Quantum phase, resulting in a total of USD 11’512’385.61. In the previous Section the Tribunal assumed that one half of the Respondent's costs of the merits phase were for the Liability phase; this leaves the other half, USD 5'756'193, as the Respondent's costs for the Quantum phase.

3378 In response to the Claimant's cost submission, the Respondent does not comment on the heads of claim which the Tribunal excluded in its Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss; but it states that “the Tribunal allowed BАРЕХ to continue its pursuit of hundreds of millions of dollars in damages against Niko"; and it points out that Niko's set-off defence was dismissed.2092

3379 The Respondent concludes: “Respondents prevailed on liability and reasonably pursued their defence at all times. Niko must pay all the costs of the liability phase, including quantum”.2093

3380 The Tribunal considers that the compensation awarded to BAPEX for its own and for the Government's loss is significantly below the amounts claimed by BAPEX; moreover, BAPEX's claims for several of its heads of loss have been dismissed. On the other hand, the amounts awarded by the Tribunal are above those which the Claimant had quantified; important claims which the Claimant had quantified at zero value were admitted by the Tribunal, in particular the claim for the value of the Government's loss of gas and the damage to atmospheric pollution. Moreover, the Claimant's set off claim has been dismissed.

3381 For this reason, the Tribunal decides that the Arbitration Costs for the Quantum phase, i.e. USD 979’147.74 must be borne by the Parties in equal shares, each Party bearing USD 489’573.87 and each Party bears its own costs for legal fees and expenses.


2090 C-Costs I, paragraph 3. ↩
2091 C-Costs II, paragraph 15. ↩
2092 R-Costs II, paragraph 10. ↩
2093 R-Costs II, paragraph 12. ↩

[Page 929]

10.11 Post-Award Interest

3382 The Claimant seeks post-award interest on all amounts awarded, including costs. 2094 It does not specify rate and start date.

3383 The Respondent notes that the Parties agree that post-award interest “on all amounts, including costs” should be ordered. It points out that the Claimant "remained silent on both the specific applicable interest rate and relevant default time period”. The Respondent requests that the Tribunal

[o]rder the Claimant to pay post-award interest on the amounts declared in listed in (c) above at a rate of six-month LIBOR plus 2% compounded, for the sums declared in American dollars (US$); and the rate established by Bangladesh Bank on the date of issuance of the Award, for the sums declared in Bangladeshi Taka (BDT), or any other rates that the Tribunal deems reasonable, from the 30th day the Parties are served notice of the Award in the Compensation Declaration until the date of Claimant's payment in full.2095

3384 The request refers to the award on the Payment Claim and to JVA Article 16(1). Relying on Article 16 of the JVA, the Respondent requests that interest be counted from the 30th day after the Parties are served notice of the Award.2096

3385 The Claimant did not respond to this request and did not object that the post-award interest which it requested be ordered at these terms.

3386 The Tribunal concludes that post-award interest is requested by both Parties and sees no reason to deny this request.

3387 Concerning the rates, the Tribunal notes that the interest rate requested by the Respondent, the start date for interest and the request for compounding remained without objection, i.e. interest at a rate of six-month LIBOR plus 2% compounded from the 30th day of this Award. The Tribunal decides to award interest at these terms; failing any specification by the Respondent about the interval, the Tribunal awards annual compounding. Since the LIBOR quotation has been discontinued, as explained above in Section 8.4, the Tribunal provides for a replacement of the LIBOR rate by a reference to the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) for the amounts in US Dollars and


2094 C-Costs I, paragraph 31. ↩
2095 R-Costs I, paragraph 34(d) and R-Costs II, paragraph 34(d). ↩
2096 R-Cost I, paragraph 34(d) and FN 41. ↩

[Page 930]

provides for the amounts in Canadian Dollars the Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average (CORRA).

10.12 Summary of the Decision on Costs

3388 Considering the Tribunal's rulings above, the following summary emerges.

3389 The Arbitration Costs for these proceedings, in a total of USD 3'472’192.88, are allocated as follows:

Phase Claimant Respondent Total
Jurisdiction phase 134'538.40 134'538.40 269'076.80
Corruption Claim phase 0 885'859.20 885'859.20
BAPEX Default phase 0 493'631.09 493'631.09
Liability phase 633'358.54 211'119.51 844'478.05
Quantum phase 489'573.87 489'573.87 979'147.74
Total 1'257'470.81 2'214'722.07 3'472'192.88

3390 As calculated by the Tribunal, the Arbitration Costs for ICSID Case No ARB/10/11 are USD 3'472’192.88. Based on ICSID's financial statement, the Claimant covered USD 1٬736'121.63 and the Respondent covered USD 1'736'096.44 of the Arbitration Costs. It follows that the Claimant has paid more than its share in the Arbitration Costs as determined by the Tribunal, and the amount paid by the Respondent falls short of its share in these costs. The difference is USD 1’736’121.63 (i.e. the amount covered by the Claimant) – USD 1’257٬470.81 (i.e. the Claimant's share of the Arbitration Costs as allocated by the Tribunal), which equals USD 478’650.82. The Claimant's payments exceed the amount of its cost liability by this amount and those of the Respondent fall short by it. The Respondent must therefore pay USD 478’650.82 to the Claimant on account of the Arbitration Costs for the Compensation Declaration proceedings as determined by the Tribunal.

[Page 931]

3391 In terms of the allocation of legal fees and expenses claimed by the Parties in relation to the Compensation Declaration proceedings, the Tribunal summarizes its conclusions as to the allocation of these costs per phase and per Party:

Phase Claimant to pay Respondent Respondent to pay Claimant
Jurisdiction phase 0 0
Corruption Claim phase 0 CAD 2'755’963.63 and
USD 93'747.49
BAPEX Default phase 0 CAD 700'000 and
USD 46'612
Liability phase USD 3'000'000 0
Quantum phase 0 0
Total USD 3'000'000 USD 140'359.49 and
CAD 3'455'963.63

3392 The Tribunal therefore concludes that (i) the Claimant must compensate the Respondent for legal fees and expenses in the amount of USD 3'000'000 and (ii) the Respondent must compensate the Claimant for legal fees and expenses in the amount of USD 140’359.49 and CAD 3’455'963.63.

3393 In conclusion on the allocation of costs in the Compensation Declaration proceedings, and considering the Tribunal's rulings above, in particular that the Respondent must pay the Claimant for Arbitration Costs in the amount of USD 478٬650.82, the Tribunal concludes that (i) the Respondent must compensate the Claimant in the amount of CAD 3'455’963.63 and USD 619'010.31 and (ii) the Claimant must compensate the Respondent in the amount of USD 3'000'000.

3394 On balance, on account of both the Parties' Costs and the Arbitration Costs, and the Tribunal's rulings above, the Claimant shall pay to the Respondent USD 2’380’989.69 and the Respondent shall pay to the Claimant CAD 3'455'963.63. Interest must be paid from the 30th day of

[Page 932]

this Award on the US Dollar amount at the rate of SOFR + 2% and on the Canadian Dollar amount at the rate of CORRA + 2%.

[Page 933]

11 THE TRIBUNAL'S AWARD

3395 Based on the arguments and evidence before it and in view of the considerations set out above and of its previous decisions, the Arbitral Tribunal now makes the following award in the dispute relating to the Compensation Declaration in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11:

  1. The previous decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal, in particular
    1. the Decision on Jurisdiction of 19 August 2013 (Attachment 1 to this Award);
    2. the Decision pertaining to the Exclusivity of the Tribunals' Jurisdiction of 19 July 2016 (Attachment 2 to this Award);
    3. the Decision on the Corruption Claim of 25 February 2019;
    4. the Decision on Liability of 28 February 2020 (Attachment 3 to this Award); and
    5. the Decision on Heads of Recoverable Loss of 18 May 2021 (Attachment 4 to this Award)
    are confirmed.
  2. The Tribunal has jurisdiction under the JVA and between the Claimant and BAPEX to decide the dispute as initiated by the request for a Compensation Declaration concerning the losses caused to BAPEX, the Government of Bangladesh and all persons and entities it represents, by the blowouts in the Chattak field in the Chattak 2 and the Chattak 2A wells.
  3. This jurisdiction is exclusive and the substance of the Award binds BAPEX, the Government of Bangladesh and all its organs and entities.
  4. No claims have been raised in this Arbitration against Petrobangla and no decision is made against it in this Award, it being understood that Petrobangla, as assignor under the JVA, is bound by the substance of decisions of this Tribunal with respect to the claim for the Compensation Declaration.

[Page 934]

  1. Niko's liability as Operator for the 2005 blowouts in the Chattak Field must be determined exclusively under the JVA between Niko and BAPEX by the present Tribunal.
  2. The blowout at the Chattak 2 well was caused by Niko's breaches of its obligations as Operator under the JVA.
  3. Within the limits of the applicable law of Bangladesh and the JVA, Niko is responsible for loss and damage caused by the Chattak 2 blowout.
  4. Niko is not responsible for the blowout in the Chattak 2A well.
  5. Niko is liable for the loss of 8.542 Bcf of gas from Sands 1 and 2 of the Chattak field.
  6. For the gas loss incurred by BAPEX, Niko must pay BAPEX the sum of USD 6'833’600 for the loss of BAPEX, payable in BDT at the exchange rate applicable on the date of payment.
  7. For the gas loss of the Government, Niko must pay BAPEX the sum of USD 9’524’330, payable in US Dollars.
  8. The natural gas emissions from the first blowout for which Niko is liable caused 2'010'022 tonnes emissions of CO2 and CO2 equivalent. Niko must pay USD 5'025'055 for carbon sequestration through forestry projects, provided BAPEX has prior to such payment notified Niko in writing as to the carbon sequestration project to which the funds will be applied and has specified details about the project, including location, methods and budget.
  9. The sum awarded for the carbon sequestration project is payable in US Dollars or BDT, depending on the cost allocation in the project information provided prior to the payment. Once the project information as defined in paragraph (12) has been provided by BAPEX to Niko, the invoiced amount is payable within 45 days.
  10. Niko must pay BAPEX:

[Page 935]

  1. BDT 21'937'500 on account of the claim for Losses of Education and Lifestyle, to compensate each of the 975 students affected in 2005 by the temporary dislocation of the schools in Tengratila by an amount of BDT 22'500, plus interest, as per above Section 9.5.7;
  2. BDT 28'125'000, as compensation for the residual damage from the stress, suffering and disruption caused by the Chattak 2 blowout by an amount of BDT 45'000, plus interest, to each of the 625 families affected in 2005, as per above Section 9.5.8.
  1. The Tribunal instructs BAPEX to see to it that each of the beneficiaries of the payments according to paragraph (14) or their successors receives its share and, to the extent they can no longer be identified, the funds be used for the improvement of the two schools concerning the funds according to (a) and to community purposes concerning funds according to (b). The Tribunal supports the recommendation by the Third Environmental Losses Committee in its report to the effect that the amounts awarded be distributed to the beneficiaries through the District Administration.
  2. Arbitration Costs and the Parties' costs for legal fees and expenses are awarded as provided in Section 10, and the Claimant shall pay to the Respondent USD 2'380’989.69 and the Respondent shall pay to the Claimant CAD 3’455’963.63.
  3. All sums awarded bear interest, compounded annually, on amounts awarded in Bangladesh Taka at the rate of 5% p.a. and on amounts awarded in US Dollars at the rate for six-month LIBOR + 2% until 19 November 2020 and thereafter at the rate for 180-day average SOFR + 2% for amounts in US Dollars and at the rate for 180-day average CORRA + 2% for amounts in Canadian Dollars.
  4. Interest must be paid until full settlement, starting
    1. on 1 January 2007 for sums awarded for gas loss;

[Page 936]

  1. on 1 October 2022 for the sum awarded for the sequestration of CO2 and CO2 equivalent emissions;
  2. on 1 January 2006 for the sums awarded in paragraphs 14 and 15 above; and
  3. from the 30th day following dispatch of this Award for the sums awarded in paragraph 16 above.
  1. The compensation ordered in this Award is exclusive; Niko owes no other compensation on account of its liability for the first blowout on 7 January 2005.
  2. The Claimant's Set-Off Claim is dismissed.
  3. All other claims raised in ICSID Case No ARB/10/11 are dismissed.

[Page 937]

Signature

Professor Campbell McLachlan KC
Arbitrator

Date: 16 December 2025

Signature

Professor Jan Paulsson
Arbitrator

Date: 16 December 2025

Signature

Mr Michael E. Schneider
President of the Arbitral Tribunal

Date: 17 December 2025