NAFTA/UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES PROCEEDING

HEARING ON THE MERITS

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. MC Building Conference Room 4-800 Washington, D.C.

The Hearing in the above-entitled matter came on, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. before:

MR. FALI S. NARIMAN, President

PROF. JAMES ANAYA, Arbitrator

MR. JOHN R. COOK, Arbitrator

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Also Present:

MS. KATIA YANNACA-SMALL, Secretary to the Tribunal

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SHEET 3 PAGE 757		P	AGE 759
	757		759
		1	MR. VIOLI: Actually, they're not. I
CONTENTS		2	was on NAAG's website this morning. NAAG is not a
		3	state government and it's not a Respondent in this
WITNESSES:	PAGE	4	case. We've requested the updated, complete
DAVID K. THOMSON		5	version of the MSA. I asked for that at the
Direct Examination	766	6	jurisdictional hearing. I asked for that prior to
	767	7	the hearing. And I would like a copy from the
Redirect Examination	814	8	Respondent, a complete version of this measure.
		9	PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Even if it's
		10	available on the website?
		11	MR. VIOLI: It's not.
		12	MR. FELDMAN: We will print one out
CONFIDENTIAL PORTIONS		13	from the website.
NUMBER 1	PAGE	14	MR. VIOLI: With all of the amendments,
100		15	please, Mr. Feldman.
1. 103	31-1031	16	MR. FELDMAN: We will print the
		17	amendments out from the website.
		18	MR. VIOLI: Okay the amendments from
		19	the website are incomplete. There was an
		20	amendment let's address this right now.
		21	There's an amendment that amended or
		22	purported to amend the Model T Statute to remove

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	758		760
1	PROCEEDINGS	1	the Allocable Share Amendment. And this is very
2	MR. VIOLI: I would like to start	2	relevant to what Mr. Crook brought up yesterday
3	before we get the witness or ask the witness to	3	regarding changes in the law and changes at what
4	step up.	4	point in time they occurred, and when did the
5	PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay. We are on.	5	measures come into effect, and what was offered or
6	MR. VIOLI: Mr. President, yesterday we	6	what was on the table for the Claimants in this
7	asked Mr. Hering some questions regarding the MSA,	7	case at any given point in time.
8	and we have an earlier version of the MSA that was	8	What I'm asking for, not printing from
9	provided to us, not by Respondent in the record,	9	the website. We would like the MSA in its
10	but it appears that there is an updated version of	10	complete form. That includes amendments,
11	the MSA, with all amendments and attachments.	11	addendum, agreements, forbearance agreements,
12	And we would request the Respondent to	12	these are all part of the MSA, and amend the MSA.
13	produce to the Tribunal and to Claimants the	13	We want a complete and accurate version of the
14	current version of the MSA with all of the	14	MSA.
15	amendments. We need it for certain questions that	15	PRESIDENT NARIMAN: You want an
16	we need to ask and certain points we'd like to	16	alternative version, which is
17	make.	17	MR. VIOLI: Indeed. Thank you.
18	So with that, I don't see it should be	18	Authoritative.
19	a problem. It's a major document of the case.	19	MR. FELDMAN: We can discuss this off
20	MR. FELDMAN: Thank you. Mr. Luddy,	20	the record.
21	the amendments are available on the NAAG's	21	(Discussion off the record.)
22	website. They're publicly available.	22	MR. VIOLI: Back on the record. A
		l	

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member of NAAG and the Respondent have spoken with Claimants regarding the MSA and we were advised that some documents which may be considered amendments to the MSA were not executed by all but were executed by some parties to the MSA but they're amendments to the MSA, and some might not be regarded as amendments to the MSA.

Respondent has offered to give what they regard as a complete version with amendments to the MSA. I specifically know of one document which -- or I've been told there is a document that is an amendment whereby the parties, the manufacturers to the MSA acknowledged that if they change, if the parties or if the Model T Statute is changed to do away with the allocable share, that the Model Statute will still constitute a qualifying statute under the MSA.

So that material change in the MSA was reflected in an amendment. I haven't seen it in completely executed form, and I'm not sure I have the most current version, but there was a point in time when the MSA was amended and parties agreed

Claimant's claims and it's relevant to the matters before the Tribunal.

So we have agreed to accept what they will provide us as amendments, particularly the one I mentioned about the allocable share provisions of the Model T and what other agreements they believe reflect an amendment to the MSA, and we'll go from there. But with that, I think we're so far okay or have come to an agreement. Thank you.

MR. FELDMAN: Thank you, counsel. I would just clarify, we've made this point over and over again in our briefs and I would just articulate it once more. The MSA is not a challenged measure in this arbitration.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay. What's next? MR. LUDDY: Mr. Thomson?

MR. FELDMAN: Yes.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: You are cross-examining your witness or the other side?

MR. LUDDY: It's the other side's

witness.

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to an amendment of the MSA in that respect.

We'll see what they provide and we'll go from there. So we've reserved our right to ask for other and additional documents. The other thing Respondent has identified or informed us is that when a party joins the MSA, there are sometimes agreements, forbearance agreements or other agreements in connection with that entry into the MSA. And it was left open, I believe, that the idea was left open that it -- that these agreements may not be amendments to the MSA.

We respectfully disagree because if a law says joined an agreement or follow this schedule of payments, right, the agreement has to be complete. It has to have fixed terms, definitions, obligations, liabilities and responsibilities. We want to know what those are.

If people are joining, exercising this right under the statute or this obligation with a certain set of parameters that remains beyond the public view and beyond our view is not offered to us, then we believe it's relevant to the

MR. FELDMAN: We'll have a few questions and I'll have a couple of preliminary remarks.

THE WITNESS: I'm going to sit on the witness side, rather than the expert side.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Yes?

MR. FELDMAN: Mr. President, I just had a few at the outset of Mr. Thomson's testimony, I just had a few preliminary remarks. We appreciate the guidance from the Tribunal yesterday regarding the scope of cross-examination and we understand that the scope of cross-examination in this matter, in fact, can exceed the scope of direct testimony.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: May exceed.

MR. FELDMAN: May exceed the scope of direct testimony. Particularly with respect to Mr. Thomson, I would emphasize that his one page declaration in this matter was on an exceptionally narrow issue concerning particular volumes of sales of Seneca cigarettes entering into New Mexico and confirming that those cigarettes were

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765 sold to a certain set of retailers within the 1 2 state of New Mexico. That was his declaration. 3 I would also add that Mr. Thomson and 4 his office have active prosecutions going on, 5 including as you're aware, of prosecution against 6 Native Wholesale Supply and any internal 7 deliberations, work product consistent with those 8 prosecutions, Mr. Thomson will obviously have to 9 respond, if there's any sort of questioning along 10 those lines. 11 But I would just impress upon the 12 Tribunal that his declaration in this matter was 13 exceptionally narrow and I am comforted to hear 14 from the Claimants that they do not plan to take 15 any extended period of time cross-examining 16 Mr. Thomson. 17 PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay. We've noted 18 that. 19 MR. LUDDY: Did you have preliminary 20 questions, Mark? 21 MR. FELDMAN: Just to clarify, any 22 questions implicating work product of

767 1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 2 BY MR. LUDDY: Good morning, sir. Rob Luddy on behalf of the defendants. 5 Good morning. I don't think we have --6 We have. Nice to meet you. I don't think it was intentional or maybe I misunderstood it, Mr. Feldman suggested in his opening remarks 9 that you have ongoing prosecutions against--10 11 Q. NWS. I take the word "prosecution" to 12 suggest criminal actions. You don't have any 13 criminal actions against NWS, correct? 14 A. That's correct. It's a civil matter 15 filed in civil court. 16 Q. Okay. How long have you been with the 17 New Mexico AG's office? 18 A. I think my ten-year anniversary was in

19 September, so a little over ten years, I suppose.
20 Q. Ten years?
21 A. Yes, sir.

Q. So after the MSA was signed?

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1 Mr. Thomson's office, he, in fact, would not be in 2 a position to respond to those questions. 3 PRESIDENT NARIMAN: You object to it? 4 MR. FELDMAN: Thank you. 5 DAVID K. THOMSON, RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, CALLED 6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 7 BY MR. FELDMAN: 8 Q. Good morning, Mr. Thomson. 9 A. Good morning. 10 Thank you for appearing today. Would

you please state your full name for the record?

A. David K. Thomson, T-H-O-M-S-O-N.

Q. What is your current position?

A. Tam Deputy Attorney General with the

A. I am Deputy Attorney General with the State of New Mexico. I oversee all the civil law divisions. Our office is divided into criminal and civil law. I oversee all the civil law divisions.

 $\ensuremath{\mathtt{Q}}.$ Have you submitted a declaration in this matter:

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you.

A. Yes. That's correct. I did not negotiate the MSA, no, sir.

Q. And what types of matters do you oversee in the office?

A. As I said, our office is divided into the civil section and the criminal section. We're not a big office, we're a small state. I don't know who else you've had on here from probably larger states, so I oversee the Environment Division, the Consumer Protection Division, the regulatory phone lines, electricity and the Litigation Division, which handles litigation on behalf of state agencies.

And then I'm, also, what's described as states often called tobacco contacts, they're the person that gets most involved in tobacco-related matters.

Q. And how long have you been the tobacco contact?

A. I think since beginning of my Attorney General King's Term 2006. I was not the tobacco contact in the previous administration.

SHEET 6 PAGE 769 769 1 Who was the contact in the previous 2 administration? 3 A. I think his name was Glen Smith. 4 Good. Can you open to core 5 Document 38? 6 A. 38, yes. 7 Can you identify that document, please? 8 Yes, that is a letter to the Foreign 9 Trade Zone. 10 0. And this was dated August 1st, is it? 11 Α. 12 August 1, 2008. How did this letter 13 come about, just generally, tell me the background 14 to it? 15 A. I think we had information that certain 16 tobacco products was entering into the state of 17 New Mexico through the Foreign Trade Zone. 18 Q. And when did you first obtain that 19 information? 20 A. I don't recall. 21 From whom did you obtain that 22 information?

thinking about it, also, we may have and I can't tell you for sure whether we found out from products showing up in New Mexico, I'm not sure if this was prior or subsequent to the location of product found in Albuquerque, but to answer your question, I think I did also find out through NAAG.

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- Q. And did you have conversations with these other Attorney Generals from California, Idaho, Oklahoma, et cetera?
- A. Generally, we -- a group get together, we often share information if there's working groups and things like that. Yeah, I would assume.
- O. And out of those discussions, with respect to the issue of product coming out of the FTZ, was there an agreed course of action that developed from those discussions?
- A. Actually, not really. I sort of took this, evaluated our statute and I had concerns. So I believe I was the first state to write the FTZ. So, we may have discussed what we know about

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A. I don't -- I'd have to go back and look. It may have been through NAAG contact. I'm not sure.

Q. Who -- with whom did you discuss the matter of NWS cigarettes coming out of the FTZ before you wrote this letter?

A. I think I may have discussed it with other states and NAAG contacts and, of course, internally in our office.

O. Who's the NAAG contacts?

A. Is it -- Bill --

Q. Michael Hering, Bill Lieblich?

A. I think it was probably Bill Lieblich and probably Michael. I don't know.

Q. And what other states?

A. As best I can recall, California, Oklahoma, maybe Idaho, Nevada maybe because it was located near Nevada.

Q. Did somebody from NAAG contact you to advise you that NWS or that there was shipments of Seneca brand from the FTZ to New Mexico?

A. I think they may have. Now that I'm

the product entering the different states, but I'm not sure we had conversations about -- well, we may have conversations, different remedies, different states may pursue.

Q. Right, I'm sorry?

A. I'm sorry.

Q. Were you finished?

A. Yeah.

And you say you reviewed the statute. What statute did you review?

Our, what I call our tobacco statutes.

Q. Is that the complementary legislation?

A. I suppose people, yeah, people -complimentary versus escrow. I deal in, I call them tobacco statutes, Title 7, Title 6.

Q. Okay. But your letter doesn't implicate the Escrow Statute, per se, it focuses more on the complimentary statute, correct?

A. I think that's right. I have to review it.

Go ahead. You can review it. I have to ask you some questions about it anyway.

A. Okay. (Reviewing document.)
Okay. I would be mostly involved in
what I call a directory issue.

Q. I'm sorry?

- A. A directory issue.
- Q. And that's under the complimentary statute?
 - A. I suppose that's true, yes.
- Q. This is not a trick question. We have developed common terminology, I just want to make sure --
- A. Yeah, I'm trying to fit into that mode, but okay.
- Q. And the purpose of the complimentary statute in the eyes of New Mexico is to help enforce its Escrow Statute, correct?
- A. I don't know -- I think that's one of the purposes. You know, another purpose, it's really what I would describe as a -- to aid the state in -- it's also sort of like a help policy statute. It aids the state in trying to understand what product is entering the state and

kind of term of art we're using. In New Mexico, we have Pueblos, they're not -- we have reservations but I use the term "reservation".

Actually in New Mexico it's fee land. As long as we understand, I don't want to misuse a term.

Q. I appreciate that clarification.

Look at the first paragraph of your 8/1

letter. This is directed to the FTZ, it's the
second line. "We are, however, concerned about
the large quantities of non compliant contraband
cigarettes being released from FTZ 89 to carriers
bound from New Mexico."

The term "contraband" there, when those cigarettes were sitting in the possession of FTZ in Nevada, they were not contraband cigarettes, were they?

- A. I don't know. You'd have to ask Nevada. That, I don't know.
- Q. Okay. Well, you called them contraband, I didn't. You called them contraband cigarettes. Why were they contraband cigarettes when they were in the possession of FTZ?

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where it's going.

- Q. Okay. And the product that was the subject of this letter coming through the FTZ, you determined that that was going to the Indian reservations in New Mexico?
- A. Some of it was. I can't tell you factually because I don't have any personal knowledge where exactly it went. The invoices seem to indicate they were going to Boskit Farms and Amos.
- Q. Both of those are located on Indian reservations, correct?
- A. Yes, but I'm not sure. You know, I can't represent that all of them went there.
- Q. But you don't have any evidence of shipments, other than to an Indian reservation?
- A. No, I don't have any evidence of shipments, other than Indian reservations. I do have some evidence of products showing up off of the reservation.
 - Q. Okay.
 - A. I shouldn't say -- I don't know the

A. Well, I said being released from FTZ to carriers bound for New Mexico.

- Q. Okay. Well, when they were released from FTZ, they were still in Nevada, correct?
- A. Yeah, but once they were bound for New Mexico . . .
- Q. So your position is they became contraband when they reached New Mexico's border, and crossed it, correct?
- A. Our jurisdiction would begin when they crossed into New Mexico.
- Q. Okay. So to the extent you were telling the FTZ that the cigarettes it was holding belonging to NWS were contraband, that wasn't correct, right?
- A. No, I mean -- the letter stands -- if you're going to ask me to read -- you're putting words into my mouth. We are, however, concerned about large quantities of non compliant contraband cigarettes being released. I didn't opine as to whether while they were holding it. The point of it was if it's contraband in New Mexico and you're

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allowing it to enter, then you're aiding and abetting.

- Q. Okay. Forgive me for parsing your letters closely, sir, but you are writing a letter to a third-party telling them that they are holding contraband cigarettes of my client and I think I'm entitled to ask exactly what you meant by that.
- A. And that's fine. And I'll explain to you the best I know but I'm not going to allow you to tell me what I meant.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Please explain.

THE WITNESS: The purpose of the letter was to advise the FTZ that we have information you're releasing into the state of New Mexico, that a carrier from New Mexico is coming in and you're releasing, and there's an address that says, it's located in New Mexico and you're releasing it to them, please be advised that you're on notice that you know that product is entering into the state of New Mexico. That's the purpose of the letter.

Q. Has a civil action ever been brought by New Mexico under that provision against any type of common carrier?

- A. Against a common carrier? Not that I know of.
- Q. Okay. And FTZ in the capacity in which they serve is essentially a common carrier in this capacity, correct?
- A. To be honest with you, sir, I'm not exactly sure what FTZ is.
- Q. Okay. Do you think it might have been useful to look into that before you threatened to bring an action against them for violation of your complementary legislation?
- A. By not -- we did try to understand what the Foreign Trade Zone was. We were comfortable with what we knew about the Foreign Trade Zone that we would have had jurisdiction to bring a civil action.
- Q. Okay. I thought you just said you didn't know what the FTZ was. What is the FTZ?
 - A. I'm not entirely clear. It appears to

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Q. Did you have -- let's look at the second page for a minute. You referred to the NMSA statute which I guess is the contraband statute or the complimentary statute?

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: NMSA.

MR. LUDDY: New Mexico SA.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Is that New Mexico escrow fund?

 $\label{eq:mr.luddy: Complementary legislation,} \ensuremath{\mathtt{I}} \ensuremath{\,^{\text{LUDDY:}}} \ensuremath{\,^{\text{Complementary legislation,}}}$ I believe.

- O. Correct?
- A. I believe that's right.
- Q. And you cite the statute here then you say FTZ may be in violation of that section, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Did you do any analysis as to whether you, your office had jurisdiction over FTZ to prosecute them for violation of that statute?
- A. We believe we would. If it came to that, we would have jurisdiction if we wanted to pursue a civil action.

be a large warehouse where product comes in, and then it's released.

- Q. And the function it serves in the stream of commerce is essentially distinguishable from that of a common carrier, is it not?
- $\label{eq:lambda} \textbf{A.} \quad \textbf{That could be your argument.} \quad \textbf{I} \ \, \textbf{don't} \\ \textbf{know.}$
- Q. What is your argument, sir? I'm not really arguing. I just want to know what your argument is. I want to know what you determined the FTZ to be, and how when you determined it to be to give you authority to take action against it under your complementary legislation? That's what I would like to know.
- A. I determined FTZ to be an entity that was holding, that took cigarettes in, was holding cigarettes, releasing cigarettes into the state of New Mexico.
- Q. It was the FTZ that was releasing them into the state of New Mexico?
- A. They were releasing them to either a common carrier or some form of distributor.

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Q. And did you determine then on the basis of those facts that your office in the state of New Mexico had personal jurisdiction over them under the U.S. Constitution?

- A. I did not sue them, so I didn't make that determination. This isn't a lawsuit. This is a notice letter. FTZ --
 - O. You didn't --

them.

- A. Can I finish? Let me finish. FTZ very well to this letter could have responded and said here's what we are, here's what we do.
- Q. Okay. That's fine. Not a lawsuit. What you were really trying to do is just threaten them so that they would stop being involved with NWS cigarettes; isn't that correct?
 - A. That is completely false.
- Q. I'm sorry then. What was the intent of your letter?
- A. The intent of the letter is the same as
 -- in all practices with regard to non compliant
 product, if we find someone dealing in non
 compliant product, we always make a good faith

I'd have to go back through my records. I apologize.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: It is peculiar. Anyway -- okay.

- Q. Okay. Let's go back to that for a minute, so I can determine exactly what your goal was in writing this letter. On Page 2, you say that you believe that the FTZ may be violating New Mexico law?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Did you hope by saying that, that they would extricate themselves from the chain of commerce between NWS and the Indian entities that were purchasing Seneca brand cigarettes?
 - A. Ask that question again?
- Q. Fair enough. By telling them that they may be in violation of New Mexico law, even though you're not determining whether you had any jurisdiction to pursue such claims, by telling them that, was it your expectation or hope that they would no longer conduct commerce in Seneca brand cigarettes?

effort to write them and say, whether it's a distributor or it's a common carrier or it's a retailer and we say, "Look, under our statute we believe you are selling, importing one version of this, of this product. Please review the statute, review the directory. We are concerned that you're" -- and they can write back and they can agree or disagree. To characterize it as to block them from that particular product is not true.

I'm not threatening them, I'm advising

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: May I just interrupt here? Did you receive any response from Nevada International Trade Corporation to this letter?

THE WITNESS: I think we did. I don't know if that's part of the record.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Is that -MR. LUDDY: I don't believe it is. I
don't know of a response which does not mean -THE WITNESS: I don't know if it was

part of this particular letter or something else.

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MR. FELDMAN: Counsel is the question expectation or hope?

MR. LUDDY: Either one.

MR. FELDMAN: Let's take them one at a time.

MR. LUDDY: Fair enough.

- Q. Expectation?
- A. The expectation and hope is that the Foreign Trade Zone as an entity, I suppose is interested in following the law, would review what they're doing and review the statute and make their own determination and will either agree on it or will disagree. I have no particular hope one way or the other. I'm not their attorney.
- Q. Okay. But you were trying to get them to stop, correct?
- A. I was trying to advise them that we believe that they were aiding and abetting in the transportation of this product that's not on the directory.
- Q. Now, you also threatened that there may be federal violations associated with their

SHEET 10 PAGE 785 PAGE 787 785 1 conduct? 1 2 2 CROSS-EXAMINATION MR. FELDMAN: Object to the 3 characterization. 3 BY MR. VIOLI: 4 Q. The last sentence of that paragraph? Q. 5 5 A. Last sentence? 6 6 Q. Sentence that reads, "There may be 7 federal violations, as well"? 7 8 A. Yeah, we thought there may be some, I 8 context. 9 guess that was with regard to, I don't know if 9 10 10 it's Jenkins or CCTA violations. A. 11 Q. I take it you don't have authority as 11 12 12 the New Mexico AG to pursue federal violations, 13 13 correct? 14 14 A. No, I don't. 15 15 Q. But that didn't stop you from

threatening them with federal violations--MR. FELDMAN: Objection. A. I was not threatening them with federal

violations. PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Mr. Luddy, I'm

sorry, this line of cross-examination is not very fair to the witness, unless you produce the

questions on a related matter.

- Good morning, Mr. Thomson.
- Good morning, Mr. Violi.

Can I -- for my own information, I'm not sure who's representing, just so I know the

Q. We're both representing the Claimants.

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- Thank you.
- Q. Mr. Thomson, you testified a few minutes ago that one of the purposes of the complementary legislation was to aid in the enforcement of the escrow statutes, right?
- A. Yes, because it requires some -- I suppose their length, in a sense.
- Q. And Mr. Luddy just asked you about the collection of taxes in New Mexico for cigarettes. New Mexico collects state excise taxes; is that right?
 - New Mexico collects state excise taxes.
 - And the mechanism in New Mexico for the

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response of Nevada. Otherwise, there's no point in all this.

MR. LUDDY: I'll move on.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: If it's on record, you produce it. If it's not on record, still you are entitled to produce it, but without that, you are asking him all these questions. The recipient of the letter would probably have said what he wanted -- what the true position was.

MR. LUDDY: Fair enough.

- Q. If you could look at the complaint that you filed against NWS which is 37 in your documents there, sir?
 - A. Okav.
- Q. Now, this complaint does not seek the collection of any taxes due in New Mexico, does it?
 - A. No.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What document? MR. LUDDY: It's 37.

21 That's all the questions I have of 22 Mr. Thomson. Mr. Violi has a few follow-up

collection of state excised cigarettes taxes is affixing New Mexico tax stamps to the packages, correct?

- A. Yes. As I understand it, and I'm not a revenue attorney, the stamp is attached, a state excise stamp and I think there's a tax exempt stamp that is also attached. So it's not one and not the other. I think there's a non SET stamp.
- Q. And under the Escrow Statute, an MPM must pay escrow for New Mexico based on the escrow statute based on the units sold in New Mexico, right, the term units sold?
- A. I'm pretty sure that's right but say the question again and I'll --
- Q. In New Mexico an MPM must pay under the Escrow Statute based upon what's called units sold in New Mexico?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. And unit sold is defined as cigarettes to which or for which the New Mexico state cigarette excise taxes have been paid, correct?
 - A. Yes.

_ PAGE 792 _

- Q. As evidenced by the affixing of the tax stamp to those cigarettes, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Now, with respect to the sales, to the Jemez Pueblo and the Isleta Pueblo that were mentioned earlier, has the state of New Mexico ever asked that, to your knowledge, has the state of New Mexico asked that either to NWS or to the entities in Jemez or in Isleta that they pay the state excise taxes for those cigarettes?
- A. To my knowledge, no, but I don't -- the Department of Revenue is a separate entity from the Attorney General's office, to my knowledge no. Have they asked Jemez or Isleta to pay --
- Q. The cigarettes that are at issue in this letter that went to Jemez and Isleta, the Seneca cigarettes that you mentioned from the Foreign Trade Zone, and that came from NWS, has the State of New Mexico, I guess the Department of Revenue, has it asked for the payment of state excise taxes, cigarette excise taxes for those cigarettes, to your knowledge?

Q. By the way, you're familiar with the MPM adjustment proceedings?

- A. Honestly, I'm not. I tried to -- the MPM adjustment proceedings were prior to me starting the -- I never really handled the MPM adjustment proceedings, but I'll do my best.
- Q. Fair enough. Have any participating manufacturer under the MSA taken the position that New Mexico failed to diligently enforce its Escrow Statute because New Mexico policy or otherwise, New Mexico law does not require that the cigarettes that we're talking about be considered units sold under the Escrow Statute or that they do require, I'm sorry, not required?

 $\label{eq:president nariman: I'm sorry I didn't follow the question.} \label{eq:president}$

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ VIOLI: I withdraw it. I'll rephrase it.

Q. Has any tobacco manufacturer in the MSA taken the position that the cigarettes that we're talking about in the last few questions, constituted units sold?

PAGE 790 _

- A. To my knowledge they haven't. To my knowledge, it would be difficult because the tobacco product at issue here was not on the directory. So I'm not sure it could have obtained any kind of stamp.
- Q. Did it ask, the Department of Revenue ask that the state tax stamp be affixed to those cigarettes in the Isleta or Jemez Pueblos, to your knowledge?
- A. To my knowledge, they didn't -- I'm not sure they could have asked a state stamp be put on a non directory product, so I don't think they would.
- Q. Is it fair to say that those cigarettes would then not constitute units sold under the Escrow Statute?
- A. For the cigarettes at issue in this case, I don't suppose they would count as units sold because, again, they're not on the directory. They couldn't obtain a stamp because they couldn't obtain the stamp by -- I don't believe they would be counted as units sold.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: He said no.
MR. VIOLI: No, no, he was about to
say --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: The answer was -MR. VIOLI: No, earlier on he said
they're not units sold. I'm asking him if the
tobacco companies -- you see, let me explain
something.

Under the MSA, the tobacco companies that are there get to reduce their payments to the state if they say the state is not diligently enforcing the law. So some of the tobacco companies, not some of them, the major ones are saying, "New York, you're not diligently enforcing this law because you're not collecting the money from the Indians," right. So that's lack of diligent enforcement.

Therefore, we want to take three percent reduction in our payments to you for every one percent market share we lose, so when you allow Indians to sell cigarettes, right, we're going to take three times that amount and deduct

PAGE 795

it from your payments. And this is called lack of diligent enforcement.

And the states, we know New York's view that that's not lack of diligent enforcement. These laws don't apply on Indian -- with respect to Indian commerce on U.S. land. So I wanted to find out from the witness, did -- are you aware whether or not the tobacco companies have taken that position vis-a-vis New Mexico's enforcement of the Escrow Statutes?

- A. I understand the question.
- Q. Sorry if it was confusing.
- A. No, this whole area of law is somewhat confusing. They are challenging New Mexico's diligent enforcement. We haven't started the arbitration in that, I'm sorry, if you can't hear me. We haven't started the arbitration, so I don't know what their legal theory is. I assume they will make that argument, but I don't know, I don't have their statement of claim, but we would, I suppose, fight the concept that we are responsible for collecting escrow on product that

Q. The certification process, let's talk about that. One of the things that a manufacturer must do to certify under the directory is certify that it is in compliance with the Escrow Statute, right?

- A. Yes.
- Q. That's a principal provision of the certification statute?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And New Mexico just recently passed its certification statute, or its most recent version, correct?
 - A. Uh-huh.
- Q. It hasn't been in effect for many years, correct?
 - A. Yeah, I don't know how long it's been.
- Q. And one of the second things the certification statute requires is that a manufacturer waive its personal jurisdiction in the state of New Mexico, doesn't it?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. So if you're a company in the

PAGE 794 _

794 PAGE 796

was imported in this state that was not on our directory, that didn't have the stamp on it.

- Q. That you're not responsible for that?
- A. Right.
- Q. You should not get a deduction for that?

A. Right, as far as the diligent enforcement element to this, but it raises an important point which is the directory statute has an element to it that goes beyond that because it's also, again, it's also, it's a health-related document. Not only for purposes of escrow but it's also for purposes when there's a stamp on it and it's a distributor to this license, we know where this product is going. So if it shows up somewhere, we know where it's been and where it's going and we know if that product, you know, when it goes through its certification that it's met all the requirements of the certification.

So my only point there is it's not just about the escrow fight or the diligent enforcement fight with the PMs.

Philippines, India or China as we've seen or even Canada, the certification statute would require, and assuming that these companies don't have any nexus or contacts with this foreign jurisdiction, that is the United States or even the Jemez or Isleta Pueblo, notwithstanding those lack of jurisdictional contacts, the certification statute requires if your cigarettes are going to be sold in the state of New Mexico, you have to fill out this certification that you're in compliance with the Escrow Act, that you're a manufacturer under the Escrow Act, and that you are waiving personal jurisdiction under this complementary legislation for purposes of enforcement of the Escrow Act, right?

- A. That's one of the many requirements.
- Q. And you have to certify that way before your products can come into the state of New Mexico, correct?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Otherwise, the State of New Mexico says it's contraband, it can't cross our borders,

SHEET 13 PAGE 797 _____PAGE

1 right?

- A. Yes.
- Q. All right. Are you familiar -- we're talking a lot about the Escrow Statute. Are you familiar with the term qualifying statute?
 - A. No.
- Q. I'm going to read for you Section 9(d)(2)(e) of the MSA. I'll read it into the record. A, quote, qualifying statute, end quote, means a settling state's statute, regulation law and/or rule applicable everywhere, the settling state has authority to legislate.

That effectively and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantages that participating manufacturers experience vis-a-vis non participating manufacturers within each settling state as a result of each of the provisions of this agreement.

Have you ever heard that agreement before?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And that's language in the MSA,

attached to the MSA as Exhibit T?

A. I believe. I wasn't there. I think they passed what would be called a model statute or qualifying statute.

- Q. Or qualifying statute?
- A. Right.
- Q. Why is it important to pass what is called a qualifying statute or the Model T Statute?
- A. I suppose, again, I wasn't there when the statute passed. Again, I'm enforcing statutes on the books now. I suppose that they agreed in the MSA to pass what would be deemed a model statute, so that the enforcement statutes were somewhat uniform.
- Q. And the reason is because if a state doesn't pass the model statute, the qualifying, what's called the qualifying statute, then the state can't qualify for an exemption from those draconian consequences we talked about before and that is the --
 - MR. FELDMAN: Object to the

PAGE 798

798 PAGE 800 -

correct?

- A. That's my understanding, yes.
- Q. And it provides a definition of or purpose for a qualifying statute, correct?
 - A. That's my understanding.
- Q. And the purpose is here, quote, effectively and fully neutralizes the cost disadvantages that participating manufacturers experience versus non participating manufacturers?
- A. That's a purpose as stated in the MSA, correct.
- Q. Then the MSA states again in that provision, quote, each participating manufacturer in each settling state agree the model statute in the form set forth in Exhibit T, is enacted without modification or addition, except for particularized state procedural or technical requirements, and not in conjunction with any other legislative or regulatory proposal shall constitute a qualifying statute, right?
 - A. I suppose you can all read the MSA.
 - Q. Now, did New Mexico pass what is

characterization.

- Q. Right?
- A. Well --
 - MR. VIOLI: I'll withdraw.
- Q. If you don't pass a qualifying statute?
 PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Mr. Violi, are you

testing his knowledge on the subject?

MR VIOLT: I would like hi

- MR. VIOLI: I would like him to confirm that there's, the state will face a reduction in MSA payments if it doesn't pass the Escrow Statute.
- A. That is true and, again it also involves the public health provisions of the MSA. It allows us -- look, we understand that tobacco is, I think it's undisputed tobacco is a nefarious product, it's a product like liquor that's regulated. So it sets up a system of uniform regulation. That's what it also does.
- Q. But this particular qualifying statute if passed, and assuming diligent enforcement, would prevent the state from facing an adjustment or reduction under the MSA, correct?

SHEET 14 PAGE 801 _____ PAGE 803

A. Yes, I think that's right.

Q. Now, I would like to read into the record now 9(d)(2)(g) of the MSA, quote, in the event a settling state proposes and/or enacts a statute, regulation, law and/or rule applicable everywhere the settling state has authority to legislate, that is not the model statute and asserts that such statute, regulation, law and/or rule is a qualifying statute, the firm shall be jointly retained by the settling states and the original participating manufacturers for the purpose of determining whether or not such statute, regulation, law and/or rule constitutes a qualifying statute.

Are you familiar with that provision of the MSA?

- A. I've read that provision, yes.
- Q. And that provision, let's try to summarize, provides that when a state is going to pass a law, rule or regulation, that is not exactly like the Model T that's attached, that's called the model legislation, that -- and the

MR. VIOLI: Indeed.

THE WITNESS: I'll do my best.

MR. VIOLI: And you're doing a good

job.

Q. Mr. Thomson -
MR. VIOLI: And you're a great guy.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, that means a

- lot.

 MR. VIOLI: Where I come from, it does.

 THE WITNESS: Okay, sorry.
 - Q. Mr. Thomson, there came a time when New Mexico changed the escrow, its Escrow Statute, correct?
 - A. Yes, I believe so.
 - Q. And it changed it to remove what's called the allocable share release provision, correct?
 - A. That's my understanding, sir.
 - Q. Did New Mexico retain a firm or to your knowledge did anybody retain a firm, an economics firm to make the determination that's noted here in 9(d)(2)(g)?

state wants to still claim that it's a qualifying statute, therefore, their payments shouldn't be reduced, if it wants to do that, then they will hire with this firm, this accounting firm, this econometric or economics firm, they will hire them to determine whether it still constitutes a qualifying statute, correct?

- A. I suppose that's true. I'm not an expert on that provision. You know the MSA is huge.
 - Q. Fair enough?
 - A. That provision says what it says.
- Q. Thank you, that's fine. I'm not here to test your knowledge. It says what it says.

MR. FELDMAN: Mr. President, I would reiterate again that Mr. Thomson has put in a one-page declaration in this arbitration.

MR. VIOLI: I agree. I only have a couple more questions and it has to deal with enforcement, what he said enforcement --

 $\label{eq:president nariman: This is a provision} \ \ \text{in, ask him. So far if he can he can.}$

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A. I don't know the answer to that. I wasn't there. I don't know. I'm not sure they

did but --

Q. Have you seen any reports from an economics firm?

A. No, I haven't.

- Q. Have you seen any reports at the time the Allocable Share Amendment was proposed and enacted that said that the Escrow Statute in its original firm did not do what the MSA said it needed to do, and that's fully neutralize the cost of NPMs?
- A. No, I haven't seen a report like that, sir, no.

MR. VIOLI: No further questions.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Mr. Thomson, I have one question. Mr. Luddy asked you showed you the complaint Document 37 in the core bundle.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: But he didn't pursue it, so I would like to know, is a complaint filed by the State of New Mexico through the

Attorney General against Native Wholesale Supply Company? Can you tell us what happened to this complaint? Is it dismissed, allowed or what happened?

THE WITNESS: Can I get those guys on the stand and ask them.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No, do you know?
THE WITNESS: Right now I think we are
-- they are challenging the jurisdiction of the
State of New Mexico. We've responded, and I think
we are considering and they can correct me if I'm
wrong, are considering a stay in the matter
pending collateral issues.

 $\label{eq:president nariman: So it's pending,} nothing has happened to it?$

THE WITNESS: That's correct.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay. That's all I wanted. Yes, there's a question here.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Good morning. If you can just explain how New Mexico regards on-reservation sales of cigarettes for taxation purposes, does it seek to tax all of those, some

exact language. It's supposed to be to a properly chartered tribal entity. So they literally, the distributor goes to taxation revenue and says, "I want X amount of tax exempt stamps," and they're given them.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: The distributor in this example being smoke shop on the reservation or distributor to a smoke shop on the reservation.

THE WITNESS: Distributor to a smoke shop, yes, sir.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And the case that we're talking about that would be the Isleta Wholesale?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And that's a

distributor on Isleta Pueblo?

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure what Isleta Wholesale is. I think they've represented that they're a distributor. They're not a licensed distributor in the state of New Mexico. They may be one on Isleta, but they're not a licensed -- they don't have a license through the state to

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PAGE 808 -

of them and how it goes about doing it, if it does?

THE WITNESS: My understanding,
Mr. Anaya, and again, I'm not the stamping
authority, but I'll give you my best understanding
is that a licensed distributor, the product comes
in, it's transferred to a licensed distributor,
that distributor has what's called stamping
authority. Then they go to taxation and revenue
and they either acquire a state excise stamp or
non SET stamp.

In your analysis, it would be the tribal stamp and there's no restriction on the number you could get. So if they go to taxation revenue, and say, "I need X amount of tax exempt stamps," then they're given them. They're placed on the product --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: How do you get a tax exempt stamp, for what purposes?

THE WITNESS: Well, legitimately the purpose would be for sales on-Reservation -- on tribal land for tribal members. I don't know the

obtain those stamps we were just talking about.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Right.

THE WITNESS: Am I being clear? It's a little confusing. If you're licensed with the state, then you get the two stamps and you put the stamps on the product.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Who would that be in New Mexico concretely with regard to sales on Indian Country lands, whether it be Pueblo fee lands.

THE WITNESS: We have a whole number of -- we have a list of distributors, licensed distributors on our website.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Would those typically be off-Reservation distributors?

THE WITNESS: Often they are.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Non Indian

ARBITRATUR ANAYA: Non distributors?

THE WITNESS: Generally yes, but it doesn't prohibit a tribal entity from being a licensed distributor.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: They're the ones

SHEET 16 PAGE 809 809 1 that get the tax stamp? 2 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 3 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: If they're going to 4 distribute to a smoke shop on Indian country land, 5 then they can get a tax exempt stamp? 6 THE WITNESS: Right. 7 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: That would be for 8 sale to tribal members only or for sales to non 9 members, as well? 10 THE WITNESS: As I understand it, 11 tribal members only. 12 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. So if there's 13 a smoke shop on Isleta Pueblo or Navaho 14 reservation or one of the apache reservations in 15 New Mexico and they're selling to non Indians, 16 they have to have the regular tax stamp on those 17 cigarettes for those sales to non Indians. 18 THE WITNESS: They probably should. 19 Generally, they have tax exempt stamps on them. 20 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Even for the sales

THE WITNESS: Generally, that's what

that's my belief but important to note they have a stamp on them. How do they have a stamp on them, they're on our directory. That's an important, significant point.

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ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. And the cigarettes that are coming through wholesale, Native Wholesale Suppliers do not have a stamp? THE WITNESS: Those are our allegations

in the complaint.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Thank you. MR. VIOLI: May I ask one more question.

- Q. The state licensing requirement, does that require a bond, a monetary bond to be posed by the state license distributor?
- A. I don't know the -- that's a taxation revenue handles the licensing. It may, I'm not sure.
- Q. Okay. Now with respect to on-Reservation distribution, does an on-Reservation distributor, is it required to get a license from the State before it can distribute

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to non Indians?

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810 1 has happened but --2 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: What position does 3 the State of New Mexico take as to those? 4 THE WITNESS: I don't know what 5 position Taxation and Revenue has taken in that 6 circumstance. I can tell you we're very leery, 7 very leery of going on-Reservation to enforce that 8 type of issue. That's why in this case it's 9 actually a step back. We're dealing with purely 10 directory. 11 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: So as a practical 12 matter, the smoke shops that are on I-25 between 13 Albuquerque and Santa Fe, right off the highway, 14 as a practical matter those smoke shops sell tax 15 exempt cigarettes? 16 THE WITNESS: Yes. 17 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Including to non 18 Indians? 19 THE WITNESS: I believe so. 20 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: In practice, I'm 21 saying?

THE WITNESS: In practice, yes, sir,

on its own land?

- A. If it's distributing on its own land, I suppose it doesn't.
- Q. You haven't -- your office hasn't prosecuted reservation distributors who are not licensed and are distributing on their own land, has it?
 - A. I don't think we have.
- Q. And when I meant prosecutor, I meant civil?
 - A. Right.

MR. VIOLI: No further questions. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Just so I'm clear, maybe I'm muddled, I'm a little unclear on the facts, perhaps, but how does that line of questioning, I'm not saying it doesn't, how does that line of questioning have to do with the facts

MR. VIOLI: Because when you're an on-Reservation --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, not in the abstract, specifically?

1 MR. VIOLI: Because the Jemez 2 distributors --3 THE WITNESS: No, that's New 1

THE WITNESS: No, that's New Mexico case, your case.

MR. VIOLI: Mr. Weiler's going to present it but we believe that violates international law, there's an encroachment on both treaty rights and customary international law when a sovereign exercises jurisdiction when it doesn't have jurisdiction to excise.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: You were talking about distributor on-Reservation, I understood.

MR. VIOLI: Right.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Where is the distributor on-Reservation here in this case?

MR. VIOLI: The Jemez and Pueblo, yeah, the Isleta Wholesale Supply and the distributor in the Jemez Pueblo, are native operating on the own reservation. We sell, NWS when I say we. We sale interstate commerce directly to, those licensed distributors, licensed by their own people, by their own sovereign nations.

through the state of New Mexico, and with regard to the directory, the products not on the directory.

- Q. And with respect to NPMs have New Mexico brought enforcement actions against NPMs?
- A. Yes. I was trying to come up with -- yes, NPMs both foreign and domestic.
 - Q. And on cross-examination you were --
- A. And let me add also distributors. And let me add it's not all about suits, so it's not a number of lawsuits we brought part of my job is working with NPMs and distributors to make sure, that's why if you look at our website, we try to be up front about here's all the brands, so they can look at that and educate themselves about the brands on our directory, sorry.
- Q. Have you worked with NPMs to get them on the directory?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. On cross-examination you were asked questions about the August 1, 2008, letter to the Nevada FTZ and I'm just going to read two short

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And the State of New Mexico is now saying in so many respects is saying we know you're licensed by your own people and you can be for tax purposes, but all of a sudden when it comes to the MSA, we're going to say the complementary legislation goes where not even the taxes go. We're going to stop you, we're going to stop nation-to-nation commerce.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. I understand.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay. Do you have any questions?

 $\label{eq:mr.feldman: Yes. Two questions.} \label{eq:mr.feldman: Yes. Two questions.}$ Thank you, $\mbox{Mr. President.}$

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. FELDMAN:

- Q. Mr. Thomson, what is the Native Wholesale activity that is being regulated under New Mexico's directory statute?
 - A. Under our complaint?
 - O. Yes.
- A. It would be the importing or causing to be imported of non directory product into and

paragraphs from that letter. The first says, "To assist you in determining whether cigarettes are contraband in New Mexico, I refer you to the website where our directory of compliant products is listed. It can be found at WWW dot NMAG dot gov. And then select tobacco manufacturer's info section. To assist in resolution of issues arising from past shipments from FTZ number 89, I would like to begin discussions to form a binding memoranda of understanding or other agreement that will ensure that non compliant products are not released by FTZ number 89 when the shipping destination on the shipping documents is any location in New Mexico.

Mr. Thomson, when your office sent the letter to the FTZ, were you threatening the FTZ?

A. No. That's why I apologized, I got a little excited about that. That's not my mode of operation. That's not unusual with other -- it's not unusual with other distributors, NPMs or retailers. I take the job of the State very seriously. We're not hammering people.

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                     It was a way to resolve it and that was
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          my approach, so . . .
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                     MR. FELDMAN: Thank you, Mr. Thomson.
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Just one question
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          Mr. Thomson. The letter says, "Please contact me
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          at your convenience, please contact me at your
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          convenience to discuss this matter."
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                     Did anybody contact you in connection
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          with this letter of yours on compliance or non
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          compliance? Did anybody from Nevada speak to you?
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                     THE WITNESS: I may have talked to
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          Nevada general counsel. I will go back through my
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          records to see if we have a written response from
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          them.
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: You have no
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          recollection.
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                     THE WITNESS: I don't but I speak to so
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         many -- I'm not sure whether we -- I spoke to the
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          general counsel or someone at the FTZ or what also
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may have happened because as we're talking about

before, we were working with Nevada and other

states where another state AG spoke --

Mr. President, before Mr. Weiler -- sorry -before Mr. Weiler begins, we've been notified by
the Claimants that they do not intend to call
Brent Kaczmarek, our valuation expert, for
cross-examination.

We just wanted to notify the Tribunal
that Mr. Kaczmarek is available at this time, in
the event the Tribunal had any questions for him.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: That's gone on
record, I take it. What you have said has gone on
record.

MR. WEILER: Good afternoon -- is it
afternoon yet? Good morning. So what I tried to

MR. WEILER: Good afternoon -- is it afternoon yet? Good morning. So what I tried to do over the evening was take a look at the transcript over the past two days and see the occasions when the Tribunal had questions. And, well, of course, we still understand we have a closing to do, we thought that we could take some of your time now to go through some of the materials and see if we can answer some of your questions.

So it seemed to me that these were four

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all yours.

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                    PRESIDENT NARIMAN: My question is what
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         happened after this letter with regards to its
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         content August 1, 2008, do you know anything about
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          it or you don't know anything about it?
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                    THE WITNESS: I don't know.
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                    PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Because you spoke
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          to counsel you said about this.
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                    THE WITNESS: Right. And I don't -- we
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         never entered into a formal memoranda, as I
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          suggested.
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                    PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay. Thanks.
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          Thank you.
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                    THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
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                    PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay. What next?
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                    MR. LUDDY: Mr. Weiler has it setup.
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                    PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No. Let him set it
17
          up. We'll take the coffee break when it comes.
18
                     (Pause in the Proceedings.)
19
                Q. Is it there?
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                    PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Mr. Weiler, it's
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MR. FELDMAN: Mr. President, before --

of the key areas that we could focus on. The first one, I heard a couple of times and it seems like a fairly important issue, why is this a NAFTA claim. So I thought that we can start with why this is a NAFTA claim.

And, again, so there isn't any confusion, I use that fancy literary word "redux." We're not abandoning any part of the case. We're trying to make it as brief and as tight as we can.

So there are two standards here, minimum standard and the, what we could call the cumulative less favorable standard. I'll start briefly with the no less favorable standard since we did talk about that a little bit yesterday, and I have a few notes I just wanted to go over with you.

So with respect to the comparison, the point of the obligation is to ensure that there's an equality of effective opportunity for the parties, and it's an individualized test because there's only one Claimant. They don't represent their country. They represent themselves.

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And as the Pope & Talbot Tribunal and the Feldman Tribunal found the comparison should be with the best treatment being received by some other foreign national. If it's most favored nation treatment or national, if it's national treatment.

The best treatment here, we think, would be the opportunity to join the MSA with grandfathering. So as a result of the Allocable Share Amendment, we are placed in a position where the status quo ante has changed, and the ideal circumstance for the Claimant would have been to have been able to join the MSA, much like the SPMs had joined the ones that had exemptions, to join on similar terms. I'm trying to read my own writing. That's a dangerous thing.

The other choice would have been to pay higher escrow. Those were essentially the choices presented. It was either seek to join the MSA, hope to get the same treatment the exempt SPMs received or pay the escrow and take your chances and see how long you last.

and MPM such as Grand River, slash, NWS and you asked about whether or not it was fair given that the exempt SPM had, quote, unquote, all of these health considerations. And I just wanted to make it clear that the types of health considerations that, the things that one would have to give up were really the kind of things that a company like Grand River wasn't doing. It would not be hard to give up.

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They weren't advertising on NASCAR. They weren't advertising on television. So the kinds of things that they would have had to give up to join the MSA, they were obviously quite willing to, and how do we know that? Because they tried to join the MSA. If they had any problem with it, well, they would have said say we'll joint subject to this or that exemption.

The only thing they wanted was the same kind of deal that the exempt SPMs received. And in that regard, it's important to note while the status quo ante is better than it is now, it still wasn't fair to be able to compete against the

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exempt SPMs, Grand River had to stay in five

markets. What they wanted to do and what Jerry

Montour's affidavit states he wanted to do was to compete in all of the markets in the U.S. off-reserve if he was going to join the MSA. He was more than willing to compete if given the opportunity to compete on a fair basis.

So there should be no confusion about the level of treatment. Grand River was more than willing to take on the negligible extra commitments in terms of healthcare. I mean, no one even asked the Claimant ever, do you -- we heard yesterday about the fire retardant cigarette paper. My clients use that. Nobody bothers to ask that. It's just assumed that they don't. The best thing we have is a Buffalo newspaper, that's not a reliable source. So if someone would just ask the Claimants rather than assuming that they're, quote, unquote, scofflaws, they might have been able to probably, I would have assumed, maybe come to some sort of arrangement but instead

And we know that in three states they didn't last and they're hanging on in two states and the numbers show that. So . . . to be clear though the opportunity was not passed up. The Claimants's did try to join the MSA.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Excuse me for interrupting. What period of time are you talking about? What period and so on, what year?

MR. WEILER: Post Allocable Share Amendment, so with the Allocable Share Amendment about to come into place, if I recall the time frame correctly, the Claimants saw this, knew what was coming because the Allocable Share Amendment was coming in in five different states with five different legislature so it didn't happen the same day. But it was clear what was happening and they did make their efforts, which is in the record to try to join the MSA.

And that's one point I wanted to make because there's one thing that concerned me because the president said yesterday, he was asking about the comparison between an exempt SPM

it didn't happen.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: For my edification, Mr. Weiler, at some point of time not just now will you just enumerate the documents, just give us a list of the documents on each side showing that you attempted to join the MSA genuinely, bona fide and that they rejected your efforts. I would just like to have that in picture form, just give

MR. WEILER: The tabs.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Yes, just the tabs.

MR. WEILER: Will do.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Stay there.

MR. WEILER: Yes, I'm not going to run off now. And let's see, the other point I wanted to make was I wanted to turn back to something that Professor Anaya said. I don't think this changes anything, but I just thought that I would make sure I was on the right page, so to speak.

So we were talking about intent and the question was assuming that we have a prima facie breach in the sense that we have less favorable

manifest on the facts. And, indeed, that's the way the WTO Tribunals have gone. Manifest on the facts, whether or not it appears that there was or was not a good reason. And it is a balancing test

Just last night I was reading -- I didn't bring it because it's too late, but it's a 2009 law article by two very well known young men who are in this field, and it's a whole article about proportionality analysis. And so while they didn't talk about national treatment, they talked about minimum standard and they talked about expropriation.

Nonetheless, it was certainly clear to me that we're at least on the same page. We're talking about this notion of how well the measure appears to meet that goal, and I think it's fair to say that protecting healthcare is a legitimate goal. And so the question is going to be manifest on the facts to what extent does it appear to be meeting that goal, balanced against what harm it's doing to the Claimants.

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treatment according to the Claimant, as compared to someone else and that the comparison sticks because they're relatively in competition.

Yes, it is relevant why they did that, but we agree with the statement you made and it is indeed the statement that many WT panels and tribunals have made that had more the natural treatment cases, it's impossible to discern intent, whose intent are we talking about.

In S.D. Myers, we were quite lucky because it was clear that there were some angry bureaucrats who gave up the Claimants an access information request that you could only dream about. We had smoking guns that said someone's got to tell the minister we can't do this under NAFTA. But we're not -- you're generally not going to get that, that's not going to happen very often. And besides, whose intent, which legislature do we want to pick.

So, it's funny because Mr. Eckhart yesterday actually pronounced the test, but with respect to local law, municipal law, he said it's

And that is something that the Tribunal will have to weigh based on all the evidence they have. So the one thing that's pretty -- that is clear though from the case law, to the extent that you feel they want to be guided by it, is that intent to discriminate on the basis of nationality is not in the text and it's not in the case law.

It's probably because it's not in the text. Though my friends, and my friends from the other NAFTA parties in the cases that I've been involved in, will continue to say that it is discrimination on the basis of nationality. Thus far, it appears that the vast majority of Tribunals don't agree with them. And I would submit you shouldn't agree with them either because it's not on the face of the text. The text doesn't require it.

Nationality is only a concern to the extent that you need to be the right kind of national to even be in the door to make this claim. So with that, I'll turn to the Article 1105. Of course, we can certainly come

back to this if you want, but with respect to the Article 1105 case, again, I tried to figure out how I can hopefully describe to you why this is a NAFTA claim.

The important point I want to make on this slide though is the word "collectively."

I'll get you the reference because I think I wrote it down on another piece of paper.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Mr. Weiler, excuse me. This is useful but what will be particularly useful and I imagine if you're going to do this in your closing, would be if you link some of what we've heard, the cross-examination, you know, the points that were being made to what you're saying.

MR. WEILER: I'm doing a little bit of it here and we'll certainly be doing more in our close.

ARBITRATOR CROOK: In a similar vein, I would be very interested if we could focus on what specifically are the measures that are being contested here.

MR. WEILER: The answer to that

would be the regulation of the sovereign entities within whose jurisdiction they were operating.

So I've heard many times my friends say they thought they could be free and clear, but that's not true. They just expected to be regulated by the sovereign jurisdictions in which they were trading.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And thereby not -- and thus, not subject to regulation by the states.

MR. WEILER: Yes, that's correct.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: At all.

MR. WEILER: And, of course, subject to the federal --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Not subject to regulation by the states, including as to sales to non Indians?

MR. WEILER: Well, the Claimants never sold to -- they're wholesalers.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, no, I mean -you know what I'm saying. I mean, including as to
those cigarettes ending up being sold to non
Indian consumers.

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question is with respect to off-reserve Allocable Share Amendment with respect to on-reserve, it is the enforcement of the escrow statutes regardless of whether it was or was not before or after the amendment as per the Tribunal's decision, and it is most definitely the Contraband Laws, which I will discuss briefly at a certain point during my presentation and we will certainly also be addressing further on, but it is the enforcement of those two pieces of legislation in these various states that we've been talking about. Those are the measures.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And you're distinguishing between on-reserve and off-reserve?

MR. WEILER: Yes, because the expectation of the Claimants with respect to their on-reserve sales, their sales that were from nation to nation, from Indian wholesaler to Indian distributor, or I think to a certain extent sometimes retailer, that the expectation was that they would not be, that the regulation that they

would be subject to in conducting those sales

MR. WEILER: The Claimant's position is that they are entitled to sell nation to nation, and if what happens to them after that --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: As far as I know, we're not talking about sales nation to nation, we're talking about sales from --

MR. WEILER: Indian to Indian.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yes, it's very different. So just to clarify things, but I want to be clear, so they're not distinguishing between those sales that ultimately are made to consumers. The chain of sales that ultimately end up --

MR. WEILER: That's correct.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: -- end up with getting the cigarettes in the hands of non Indian people. I want to be clear, there's no distinction being made there.

MR. VIOLI: With respect to that, Professor Anaya, the measures are any application of the MSA regulatory regime, so as the jurisdictional award --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I understand. It's

just that when we talk about expectations, these are in my mind relevant considerations. MR. VIOLI: Yes. So I'm trying to blueprint the measures. The measures are the MSA, the original Escrow Statute, everything they were talking about on-reserve because the view is the expectation is that they never had the right to enforce any of them, and the jurisdictional award said that, but with respect to off-reserve, I believe the jurisdictional award said --ARBITRATOR CROOK: Is that what we said? MR. VIOLI: -- on-reserve doesn't have a time --MR. FELDMAN: Counsel, did you just say the MSA is a challenged measure in this arbitration? MR. VIOLI: With respect to the on-reserve, the MSA regulatory regime, includes the Allocable Share and includes the original Escrow Statute. MR. FELDMAN: And does not include the

It gets amended in or about 2004, and it's still supposedly the choice that these Claimants face under the Escrow Statute.
Unfortunately, the Escrow Statute says join the MSA or pay under into escrow.

So with respect to you're saying the MSA, it's a little truncated and it's not entirely correct to say we're not complaining with the MSA, per se, we're talking about the regulatory measures in connection with the MSA.

MR. FELDMAN: Counsel, I am referring to the affirmative representation of Claimants in this arbitration that the MSA is not a challenged measure.

MR. WEILER: Like me try to square this circle. The MSA, an agreement between private parties and the attorneys general is not a measure, it is not capable of being a measure because it's not promulgated by states. It is, of course, relevant as an evidentiary document. Okay. Good.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: The MSA according

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1998 agreement, correct --

MR. VIOLI: The 1998 agreement is part of the statute but we're talking about on-reserve. There's a distinction between on-reserve and off-reserve. And the -- any measure, any MSA related regulatory measure on-reserve did not have a time bar, is my understanding. It was the --

MR. FELDMAN: This isn't a time bar issue. The Claimants have affirmatively stated that the MSA is not a challenged measure in this arbitration.

MR. VIOLI: If you read the second -you know, I appreciate your parsing it out but if
you read the cases that have talked about this in
the domestic courts and what we've presented all
along is that trying to divorce the MSA from the
Escrow Statutes is inappropriate.

It's inappropriate because as I said yesterday, you have one statute that says do one of two things, enter into an agreement or abide by the schedules in the NPM payments in the schedules in the Escrow Statute. That proceeds after 1998.

to you is not a measure?

MR. WEILER: It can't be.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: By any part of NAFTA for the purposes of this case?

MR. WEILER: Even if you haven't made your jurisdictional decision the way you did, you still -- it wasn't a measure. It's an agreement between private parties. It just informs the measures and, therefore, that's what Mr. Violi is getting at, that one, obviously, needs to look at the evidence. We can't divorce the fact of why they did it and I don't think Mr. Feldman has a problem with that. Okay. Good.

So with respect to why this is a NAFTA claim to switch back -- by the way, are we -ARBITRATOR ANAYA: You said something,
I'm sorry, I'm a little confused with this exchange. You said something about how the MSA is

exchange. You said something about how the MSA is a measure subject to this arbitration with regard to on-Reservation sales?

MR. WEILER: No, it's not.
MR. VIOLI: Regulatory regime.

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                    PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What's the
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         difference?
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                    ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And you mentioned
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         jurisdiction award.
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MR. WEILER: My point, Professor Anaya, was that the jurisdictional award, it didn't matter how you decided, it was still a measure, the MSA was an private agreement between parties and if we misspoke, mea culpa, if we misspoke, it is not a measure. It informs the measures that implemented it, but the MSA is -- it's the definition of a measure doesn't include agreements between parties, private parties.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: We did make a distinguish -- between on-Reservation sales, true members of federally recognized tribes and the jurisdiction award.

MR. WEILER: Yes.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And how do you see that as informing this analysis, what is the measure and also what is a reasonable expectation or any of the points that you're making?

test and, obviously, it matters the incidence of the particular measure that's involved. This isn't a tax we're talking about here. We're talking about something that doesn't have to do with the consumer coming on, taking it off and they're supposed to be paying for it.

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ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I'm sorry, I didn't really want to go down, you know, the path of trying to parse the U.S. case law which is very confused. I'm not saying it's just confusing to the reader, it's confused area of case law, so there's no surprise that we have divergent views of what it says, and even here we have divergent views, but what I want to know is how these distinctions on-Reservation, off-Reservation that you are making, the distinction sales to Indians sales to non Indians that we make in the jurisdictional award, how those relate to your claim. You're making these --MR. WEILER: If you mean the NAFTA

claim?

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yes, I mean the

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MR. WEILER: With respect to sales between -- well, perhaps as a matter of getting into the law and certainly I'm at a disadvantage compared to many people in the room.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Who can put this all together? I keep hearing, no one is an expert on this, that and the other. Someone's got to be able to put this all together.

MR. WEILER: The test, as far as I understand it, is that with respect to regulatory measures -- well, first with respect to taxation measures, with the taxation measure, if the tax, if non Indians have come on to reserve and bought cigarettes, and when they go back out, they don't pay the taxes they're supposed to pay, the case law shows it is perfectly appropriate for the state to require the seller of that product, excuse me, the seller of that product to collect information and if I'm not mistaken even collect the tax on behalf of the state. It's just the information they can collect.

With respect to -- so that's the simple

NAFTA claim.

MR. WEILER: I'm there, but if it's the evidentiary --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, I'm trying to relate all these things, okay, good. I'm sorry if I derailed things inappropriately.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Can we stop here? ARBITRATOR CROOK: We can certainly stop. I have a question.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: We'll resume at 11. (Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned until 11:00 a.m., the same day.) PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Can we start? MR. KOVAR: You can start.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Do you have an

announcement?

SECRETARY YANNACA-SMALL: Yes. The announcement with regards to the time each party has available.

The Claimants have eight hours and 17 minutes and the Respondent 13 hours and 37 minutes. Eight hours and 17 minutes for the SHEET 24 PAGE 841 ______ PAGE 843

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          Claimants and 13 hours and 37 minutes for the
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          Respondent.
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: That's the
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          remaining time?
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                     SECRETARY YANNACA-SMALL: Yes.
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                     MR. VIOLI: The redirect of Mr. Eckhart
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          last night, by Respondent, was that put towards
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          Claimant's time?
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                     SECRETARY YANNACA-SMALL: No.
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                     MR. VIOLI: Okay. So --
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                     SECRETARY YANNACA-SMALL: Everything
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          it -- and the questions from the Tribunal are
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          excluded.
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                     MR. VIOLI: For both sides.
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                     SECRETARY YANNACA-SMALL: For both
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          sides.
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                     MR. VIOLI: All right. So the
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          Respondent has used one hour and 23 minutes in all
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          of their questioning and their questioning of the
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          economics -- the evaluator yesterday, it's only
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          come out to one hour --
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                     SECRETARY YANNACA-SMALL: Yes. That's
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that certain claims were dismissed but claims with respect to retail sales on-Reservation would be considered at the stage of the merits.
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And as you present your claim I think it would be helpful to the Tribunal if you could perhaps relate it to the specific findings that we made there.

MR. WEILER: Thank you, Mr. Crook.

I also would just like to confirm when
Professor Anaya was asking me about the connection
between the NAFTA and the measures, I had wrongly
assumed that you were actually asking my opinion
of the state of Indian law, which I now understand
you weren't.

And I did want to make sure on the record that I did not take a position either on behalf of the Claimants or, for that matter, on behalf of any indigenous sovereign concerning the application of state taxes. I just wanted to make sure that was quite clear that I didn't do that and that that's certainly not the Claimant's position and probably not any sovereign's

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          the time recorded.
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                     MR. VIOLI: Okay.
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay. We will
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         begin.
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                     Mr. Crook has a question.
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                     ARBITRATOR CROOK: We were having a bit
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          of a side-bar discussion about the definition of
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          the measures. And as we proceed, I think it would
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          be useful to the panel if you could direct your
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          attention to Paragraph 72 of the jurisdictional
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          award in which we said, among other things, where
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          we addressed the question of on-Reservation sales.
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                     I will just draw your attention to one
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          sentence but I think it's really the entire
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          paragraph that would be important for you to
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          consider.
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                     On-Reservation sales of tobacco
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          products, at least such sales to members of
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          federally recognized Indian tribes, are generally
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          exempt from regulation by the states within the
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          United States as a matter of federal law. And
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then in Paragraph 103 of our dispositive we noted

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position. I just wanted to confirm that.
           If that's fine, I'll just continue on.
           ARBITRATOR ANAYA: It would be useful
perhaps if you would address Mr. Crook's point.
           MR. WEILER: Yes, I'm sorry, I had the
idea, Mr. Crook, that was as you go on as opposed
to --
           ARBITRATOR CROOK: I always hate to put
counsel in a difficult position. If you feel
you're in a position to address the point now,
please do so.
           MR. WEILER: I do not feel that I am so
I will meditate on it and work with it and build
it in as much as I can at the moment but then we
will also return to it.
           MR. VIOLI: Mr. Crook, may I ask what
the second paragraph -- well, the first one was 72
103. What was the second one?
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ARBITRATOR CROOK: 103.

point out we were very deliberate in our

MR. VIOLI: I thought that was it.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I would just like to

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jurisdictional award as to that distinction. You know, that there were certain -- the MSA claim was barred as to the off-Reservation sales but not as to the on-Reservation sales.

MR. VIOLI: Right. That was my understanding. It says March 12, 2001, for off-Reservation -- retail off-Reservation.

And one thing I would like to engage, because it's an issue when it comes up with the incidence of the regulation.

With respect to on-Reservation sales, right, Claimants here, and I know you're having trouble with this, I think it's something we should, I think, clarify at this point.

Claimants -- and I understand you know it, and when we talk about on-Reservation sales to non-members of the community, that's fine, but there's a distinction as Professor Goldberg and Professor Fletcher I believe have pointed out. The Claimants here only deal in a non-consumer sale transaction. All right. It's only a supply situation.

differed as to whether or not whether a state can come in and tell a licensed entity of the Nation, a Tribe, you know, you have to charge tax to your consumer, you have to ask this person, are they white, are they African-American, are they Native American, are they Asian. And if they're any one of those you have to charge different price and impose a tax.

I personally think the development of the law is going to be that that perpetuates civil rights violation. And it's putting a Native American retailer in an unfortunate position. And I think there's commentary on that.

So that is my position I would argue all the way to the Supreme Court if I had to.

But now we're dealing with what does

the -- what is our Claimant's position? And our Claimant's position is we only deal in the upstream supply and wholesale and that the incidence of this regulation, both the complementary legislation, because the complementary legislation doesn't just say, you

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The incidence of this regulation, however, is not on the consumer. It is on, as Professor Gold- -- Professor Clinton, excuse me, has mentioned, the incidence is on not the consumer, but the upstream supplier and manufacturer. In a transaction that takes place with a member or company owned by members of one Tribe or Nation and sometimes another Nation or sometimes a member or a company owned by a member of another Nation.

Now, those transactions may result in an ultimate sale to a non-member of that remote sovereign coming onto the territory in purchasing the product. But the incidence of this regulation is not on that remote consumer. The incidence is on the supply chain and the manufacturing part of this distribution chain.

So we think that is important because the standards, at least in a domestic Indian law, and I'm not so sure I agree with even the imposition, and as Professor Anaya said, reasonable scholars, judges and lawyers have know, residents of Arizona, residents of New Mexico, you're not native and when you go on the Native American land you have to --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Mr. Violi, you know, I don't want to really interrupt you but I think we understand your position.

The question is how does that relate to the claim.

MR. VIOLI: Indeed.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And in light of our jurisdictional award.

MR. VIOLI: Right. And so my point here is that, Professor Anaya, the award says it does not mention -- when you talk about on-reserve, it does not say on-reserve to non-reserve members.

And I viewed that rightfully interpreting the law in the application of these laws because the incidence of these laws apply not to the retailer, not to the consumer transaction. It applies -- the incidence of these laws applies to the upstream wholesale transaction. So we view

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the on-reserve transactions to be those transactions.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Which? You viewed on-reserve to be what transaction?

MR. VIOLI: The transactions between the Claimants, NWS in this case or Arthur Montour and NWS and the Native American tribes that it deals, with because it deals with tribes. It deals with companies owned by with tribal members on their land and it deals with tribal members who are sole proprietorships on their land, that upstream transaction. Not the consumer.

The taxes under U.S. Indian law, they deal with the -- predominantly with the incidence of the regulation falling on the non-Native American consumer and they create -- a fictional albeit, they create a fiction the incidence of this regulation doesn't really fall on the retailer, the Native American. It falls on the non-Native consumer who comes on and buys. But if that's the case, then deal with it -- our view is deal with it with the consumer, not go upstream

March 12, 2001, any measure before March 12, 2001, with respect to cigarettes sold at retail off-Reservation.

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We are here dealing with the questions that were presented were on-Reservation.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: The last sentence of that paragraph.

MR. VIOLI: Oh, sorry. Any such claims with respect to retail sales on-Reservation will be considered at the stage of the merits. And with respect to retail sales --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What's your case on this?

MR. VIOLI: Our case on that is, we supply the distributors on-Reservation or when a Tribe is a retailer, the Tribes on-Reservation. We supply them. There are -- the Coeur d' Alene Tribe, for example, in Idaho owns a smoke shop retailer. So --

Go ahead.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: So this doesn't apply. What we're trying to say here is that you

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and put the imposition of the tax.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: But do I understand you to say that that sentence in Paragraph 103 doesn't enter into your claim at all because it speaks of retail sales? That last sentence. I just want to know your position.

MR. VIOLI: Sure. Okay. I would read it because it's very important.

Any related enforcement measures adopted or implemented by U.S. states prior to March 12, 2001, with respect to cigarettes manufactured or distributed by any of the Claimants and sold at retail, off-Reservation, that one? That's off-Reservation.

> PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No, no, no. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, but it

implies --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: This is reserved for the merits, that portion which Mr. Crook read.

MR. VIOLI: Yeah, well, that talks about what is dismissed.

What is dismissed is anything before

can make a claim --

MR. VIOLI: Right. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: -- as to --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: They have no claim at the moment.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: But you're saying that we should just not consider this and just consider all these claims time barred.

I mean you have to relate it -- we're looking for you to relate this to the door we left open for certain kinds of claims and you're seemingly saying it just doesn't apply.

MR. VIOLI: Yep.

MR. WEILER: Just to be clear, the Contraband Laws --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: We understand that. Or I think we do.

MR. WEILER: Well, the Contraband Laws are in time and they are being applied and the incidence is falling on the wholesaler. It -- so therefore it's not directly related to that last sentence in Paragraph 103. So I wouldn't say that SHEET 27 PAGE 853 _

853 1 everything is off the table because the Contraband 2 Laws are. . . 3 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. What we did 4 was we said that any measures before March 5 whatever --6 MR. VIOLI: March 12, 2001, right. 7 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: -- 2001 are time 8 barred. 9 MR. VIOLI: Off-Reservation. 10 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yes. For retail 11 sales. And we made that distinction. 12 And then as to those cigarettes that 13 make their way --14 MR. VIOLI: Right. 15 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: -- in the stream of 16 commerce --17 MR. VIOLI: Right. 18 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: -- ultimately in 19 retail to -- off-Reservation --20 MR. VIOLI: Right. 21 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: -- those are time 22 barred.

_ PAGE 855 855 zone, it's manufac- -- and it goes to the Tribe, tribal land. It is then sold at retail on tribal land. We're not talking about -- because --ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, we understand that. This goes to the question of what then are the measures that you are --MR. VIOLI: There are two measures. There's the Escrow Statute, right, because there's no time bar on the Escrow Statute --ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Right. MR. VIOLI: -- in that situation and the complementary legislation. Because the Escrow Statute should have never been applied at any point in time.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: All right.

MR. VIOLI: To charge us \$5 per carton for sales sold on-Reservation at any point in time is a violation of the NAFTA and that's what we've pointed out.

With respect to off-reserve, we say the allocable share is what causes the damage to us. But on-reserve there never should have been this

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                     MR. VIOLI: Indeed.
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                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: As to those
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          transactions that make their way through the
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          stream of commerce to --
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                     MR. VIOLI: Retail.
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                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: -- sales retail
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          on-Reservation, you're free to still make a claim.
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                     MR. VIOLI: Okay.
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                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And so we're saying
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          how does that apply. And it seems like you're
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          saying the whole thing doesn't apply, that we
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          shouldn't think of it that way.
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                     MR. VIOLI: No. Okay. I would
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          clarify, because that's an important point.
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                     With respect to NWS's business
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          on-Reservation, all of NWS's business is
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          on-Reservation, right. What I mean by that is, it
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          sells -- as the record shows, it sells to
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          distributors in Tribes or distributors who are
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          owned by members of the Tribes or the Tribes
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          themselves on-Reservation, meaning the product
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          goes from either New York or free foreign trade
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MSA regulatory regime which only applies by way of the original Escrow Statute --ARBITRATOR ANAYA: If I'm correct,

we're actually saying that you can assert the MSA as a measure prior to 2001. And I don't --

MR. WEILER: Technically, as Mark is about to say, not the MSA but the implementation of the MSA.

MR. VIOLI: The Escrow Statute.

MR. FELDMAN: The Escrow Statute with respect to on-Reservation sales, the Escrow Statute, either in its original or amended form, is the challenge measure.

The MSA, as Mr. Weiler has confirmed, is a private agreement. It is not a challenge measure. It cannot breach the NAFTA.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: All right. I misspoke. I misspoke.

MR. VIOLI: And the states never came to us and said the MSA applies on-Reservation. What they said was the Escrow Statute and the

complementary. I'm sorry. Did we clear -- I mean

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1 is it. . . 2 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I think so. 3 MR. WEILER: Article 1105. Right up 4 there. And hopefully on your screens as well. 5 So that's the little dandy that we're 6 having fun with. I mean that in the colloquial 7 manner, just to be clear.

> Each party shall accord to investments of investors of another party treatment in accordance with international law. And then they list two possible standards that are included in

that minimum standard. And then we see right below a clarification which is binding upon Tribunals under Article 1131 sub two which states that -well, as we can see, that it prescribes the customary international law minimum standard. So clearly one of the things that that's saying is that when it says treatment in accordance with international law, they don't mean that you can try to bring a NAFTA claim because somebody violated the WTO trips agreement. Because the WTO

standard. And the most recent case, Glamis Gold versus USA, sets it out fairly well. I mean it's -- I disagree with some aspects of the case, but -- and their reasoning but it sets it up pretty well. It says there that, you know, although the circumstances of the case are, of course, relevant, the standard is not meant to vary. It's not a subjective standard that simply means whatever you think is fair is fair. It's an absolute standard. And it draws a distinction for us, which is why I highlighted this, between the minimum standard and Article 1102, the national treatment standard, which is a comparative standard.

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So as the text of that particular decision states, correctly, when you're dealing with a national treatment claim, you are again looking for the best comparable treatment. You're not looking -- it's not a floor. It's not a minimum standard.

Some of the examples then in the second paragraph there, 627, show the kinds of things

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that will breach the standard. Manifest arbitrariness. A gross denial of justice.

Blatant unfairness. Complete lack of due process. Evident discrimination. So we have a pretty good idea what we're talking about in terms of the

minimum standard.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Pardon me. May I just interrupt?

MR. WEILER: Yes.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: It would help me at least to the start if you could set out what is that treatment that you complain of in this case that is sufficiently egregious and shocking as the case says.

MR. WEILER: Luckily, Mr. Chairman, that's exactly what I'm doing.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Please, if you don't mind.

Sufficiently egregious and shocking in the current case. What are those elements. If you could first spell them out and then proceed, at least I would be more educated.

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trips agreement breach has to be heard in the WTO. So it's very clear that the NAFTA parties are saying this is meant to be a customary standard. And as a matter of custom, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security are two of the examples. Should clarify, though, of course, it does say including, so there are others. But just as municipal Indian law federally is so confused, we're talking a dog's breakfast in terms of trying to figure out whether or not you have fair and equitable or full protection and security or do you call it -- all the words end up folding into a simple concept. There's a minimum standard. There's a floor below which no one can fall, no state should be going below that. And it's clear that some deference should be shown. And as we discussed I believe

yesterday, Professor Anaya, there's -- it's a case-by-case basis in terms of figuring out exactly where that deference should fall.

But that's pretty clear about the

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ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And also as you do that, if you could relate it to what we've heard so far, the kinds of things that have come in.

MR. WEILER: It's right here. We're about to talk about it so we're -- it's right here and we're gonna -- it's the next slide so we're right on track.

So again this second slide here, it's just another example of clarifying that unjust idiosyncratic -- we won't go into any detail there.

The other point I want to make with Siemens before I turn the page is that it's clear that the current standard does include the frustration of expectations. Very down at the bottom there, Professor Anaya. The current standard does include legitimate expectations.

Another example of that premise is this case called BG Group, the duties of the host state must be examined in light of the legal business framework as represented by the investor at the time it decides to invest. Some people believe

investment treaties that are not subject to the NAFTA FTZ statement relevant? Do you think those are indications of consistent practice informed by a sense of legal obligation? Where do we go to find the customary law here?

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MR. WEILER: The Glamis Gold quote is the operative quote. It's -- I've parsed out the blue.

Arbitral awards can serve as illustrations of customary international law if they involve an examination of customary international law. BG Group PLC very clearly states around that very same area, it's talking about custom. It refers to the NAFTA standard and it says, we like this NAFTA standard. It's good because we don't want -- the Tribunal ultimately doesn't do an additive analysis because it's deciding on custom.

ARBITRATOR CROOK: So these are equivalent to the writings of the leading publicists or --

MR. WEILER: These are the equivalent

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that that can only mean some sort of investment agreement.

Other Tribunals, and I would submit that -- we've made our arguments in writing with respect to which Tribunals say which, our position is that the minimum standard includes a minimum level of transparency and certainty which admittedly is hard to breach but does exist and so that's what we mean when we say when we got here the status quo ante was the measures as we found them and then they were dynamically changed.

Yes, Mr. Crook?

ARBITRATOR CROOK: As you know, the Glamis award took a pretty traditional view of what it takes to establish a rule of customary international law.

Now, you're asserting that custom has involved to include these notions of transparency and so forth. And what do you cite as the evidence for that?

> Let me finish, please. Are decisions under bilateral

to the writings of leading publicists.

ARBITRATOR CROOK: So you're not asserting these are state practice?

MR. WEILER: No. They're evidence of a finding that state practice exists. As actually the Glamis Gold Tribunal says itself, it does not expect very often that you are going to find any Claimant capable of demonstrating the positivest doctrinal position of proving custom. That takes decades. And that's why the Glamis Gold Tribunal, as you said, being a very conservative Tribunal's approach, nonetheless says, we want to look at other cases as long as they're also pronouncing customary international law in that other Tribunal's position.

Ultimately, of course, as a Tribunal you have to decide for yourself whether you're comfortable with what these other Tribunals are saying about customary international law but the Glamis Tribunal itself did that.

ARBITRATOR CROOK: In Claimant's view, what is customary international law?

MR. WEILER: Customary international law is one of the three -- taking the doctrinal position in Article 38 of the statute of the Court of International Justice, customary international law is -- one could almost call it the common law of states. States effectively through practice and through an observation of their intent to -- strike that. They're -- it's tough to word it.

Ultimately I would just go back to the standard you guoted. Essentially it shows the

Ultimately I would just go back to the standard you quoted. Essentially it shows the state believes itself to be bound and acts like it's bound. And that's why the Glamis Tribunal did actually make a finding in that case that they're -- without going to a proof of the positivest doctrinal test, they nonetheless found, based on the case law, that there was a customary norm there. And we have many customary norms in the next pages coming up.

For example --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: So I'm clear, relating to the earlier slide and the earlier quote from Glamis, we have to find that a breach

the Gamie Tribunal suggested, and I think that they were correct in suggesting it, so I'll get to the cite soon. The Gamie Tribunal was correct, we submit, in suggesting that it's a cumulative test. You don't just parse it out and say, well, did you make it on legitimate expectations? Did you make it on denial of justice. It's all of them together. It's the whole -- you don't parse it out into little compartments.

 $\label{eq:ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I understand. But} \enskip \text{we are to find that all of them together are shocking.}$

MR. WEILER: Are shocking to the reasonable jurist today.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yes, of course, today.

MR. WEILER: As opposed to 1927.
ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yes, or as opposed

to 1540 or something.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ WEILER: Or, yeah, or even an earlier, yeah.

The concept of civilized nations is

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of the norms is shocking and outrageous?

MR. WEILER: Shocking and outrageous is actually the near standard. And most writers and scholars would suggest that it might just -- it might be shocking. It might be shocking and outrageous but the other way that they go is that they say, well, what's shocking and outrageous to someone in 1927 --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I understand. I just want to make sure that these things are together.

We're not talking about finding out -discovering a rule of customary international law
then finding that, you know, on the balance of
things it was breached. We need to find that it
was sufficiently egregious and shocking and gross
denial of justice; is that right?

MR. WEILER: Yes. And so that's why I mentioned it in the first slide. Good thing you just jogged my memory.

One of the things I was going to say with the first side when I said collective is as

sort of offensive nowadays.

So legitimate expectation.

I think I've pretty much already covered this. There's a legitimate expectation of transparency, certainty, due process.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: I'm sorry.

Speaking for myself again, see, all this is good in theory. I just want you at some point of time as soon as you can to enumerate in some detail why you say the treatment in this particular case, what is that treatment and why it is so shocking to our conscience that we should say that it is -- it falls on the relevant article.

You see, until I get that, I don't go back onto all the case law, et cetera. I want to first know what according to the Claimant is that conduct or that treatment which they have either done or failed to do, omitted to do, deliberately virtually, because it has to be shocking, it has to be deliberate. It has to be deliberate against you.

What is it -- I mean why don't you

please crystalize that? I don't get -- I went through this. If you could just crystalize that, at least I will find it very, very useful.

MR. VIOLI: Mr. Chairman, we'll do that in the closing, but I would just present just a short story here of states -- beginning of the negotiation process where they say these measures will apply to Indians on their land. And I'll just take the on-Reservation sales.

These measures are going to apply to Indians on their land. That's the federal proposal. We're going to give them payments in return for the payments under the \$5 per carton and we're going to confer with their Tribes in the negotiation of how it's going to get paid and everything like that. We start with that premise.

We then proceed with the MSA after the federal government rejects that. The states decide they're going to take it in their own hands. Forget the federal government. Forget the people, my friends across the table. They don't want it so, we'll do it ourselves, the states say.

take money back under this MSA payment scheme because you're not diligently enforcing it on-Reservation. And the states, like in New York, say, it was never meant to apply on-Reservation. We have memos that show it's not -- they opine it doesn't apply on-Reservation. All of a sudden because big tobacco says, we want it to apply on-Reservation or we're going to take money away from you, the states start knocking on the door, tapping at first lightly and then they start to encroach. And then they start to seize product. Then they start to tell people that we're dealing with contraband, something that we've been dealing -- not me personally. I'm a visitor, I'm a first-generation American. So I'm a visitor as well. But I know what it means to be a visitor in someone else's land.

They come knocking on the door to these people and say -- or other people, don't deal with them. They're contraband. Yeah, the product is only going on their land and they're dealing in Nation-to-Nation trading or

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They enter into an agreement that specifically says, this excludes Native Americans or Indian Tribes. We proceed with -- a few months after that agreement is reached. What do we do in the case where we have non-taxable sales on Indian reservations? Not a unit sold that doesn't apply. These measures don't apply. We proceed for five, six, seven years. Five, six, seven years. No enforcement on-Reservation. We go on. We invest. Build a market. Cultivate the market. These are the first people in this hemisphere to grow, cultivate and trade in tobacco. Long before the English settlers came. Right? They had tobacco trading commerce long before the companies entered into this deal.

So we have a five-, six-year history after the measures are adopted. They don't apply on-Reservation. No one comes knocking on the door and says, we now want this to apply on your Indian land, your trading commerce.

All of a sudden the big tobacco companies start to complain and say, we want to

Indian-member-to-Indian-member trading, things that have been done for probably a thousand years in this hemisphere. But now we have a problem with it under this rubric that we developed seven years ago, because tobacco companies are complaining about it and we're going to get less money.

How egregious can that be? They've admitted that it doesn't apply on-Reservation.

They never enforced it for six, seven years. And then all of a sudden because competitors, because Phillip Morris, because these big companies that have 90-something percent of the market see a Native American company that employs two, three hundred people, provides more jobs on these Reservations both in Canada and across the artificial border in the U.S. on their territories, three hundred jobs, brought more industry and economy and commerce to these nations than they ever seen since the settlement of the English colonization and subsequent revolution and independence. Right. They're growing.

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Healthcare. Donations to charities. 12 million dollars -- they're doing the best they can to develop this business and to put it back into their people.

And now we have the states who admitted that it doesn't apply coming on their land saying it now applies. Stop it. And you, you're shipping this product to there? Contraband.

Do I know that that is a violation of law? No. Did you do diligence to research whether you had authority to tell a foreign trade zone regulated only by the United States Government that they have to stop shipments to a Native American land? Did you do due diligence? No. I thought I said you may or you'd think about it.

Well, a couple of those letters from the foreign trade didn't say that. They said, cease and desist without due diligence.

So now they're shutting these people out of their Native American markets. To this day they're getting letters, and we'll see one,

it. NPMs, you get this treatment here with refunds. Right? You get refunds.

What happens after that's passed? Again, the tobacco companies say, you know what, these NPMs gained about four, five, six percent of the market, maybe eight percent which is beyond the two percent limit that we allowed, so we want you to go after them.

Well, how are we going to go after them? We're going to change the law. We're going to see e-mails from Phillip Morris's attorneys. You said it yesterday, why weren't the NPMs invited to consult on the change in the law, on the change in these measures? Why are the tobacco companies caucusing with the state AG's? Right? And the lobbyists for the tobacco companies in book room deal? We need to make this law. We need to protect this. We need to protect that. And none of it mentioned healthcare. Right? Not one word of healthcare when they were in private. We need to stop the NPM sales.

The tobacco companies, big guys, of

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course, saying, we're losing market share. That precipitated this.

We'll see e-mails where these tobacco companies, where we have the Attorney General of Oklahoma saying, Phillip Morris attorney, please tell me you approve of this language in the Allocable Share Amendment, because they were drafting it, because I need your blessing before I can go to the legislature of Oklahoma and tell them that it's safe to run with this legislation. My God, you have these people in bed with each other. You have the infiltration of the core of American democracy by a private interest that is being protected, shielding and furthered in an alliance what is called by some company an unholy alliance.

Imagine the Attorney General of Oklahoma telling a Phillip Morris attorney, I need your blessing to go to the legislature. It doesn't have a comma here or I used the word that instead of which. Is it okay, Mr. Attorney for Phillip Morris. Right?

letters back -- as recent as December 31st of this past year. Stop the business on the Reservation. That's egregious, disrespectful. It's in plain violation of even what they agreed and what they said and how it was supposed to be a supplied. And they brought a lawsuit against the tobacco companies, the big guys, to say this does not apply on-Reservation, the State of New York did. Does not apply on-Reservation. They admitted it and now they want to change the terms. Now they want to come after something -- us under something, an agreement that they've admitted all along never applied, has no basis of applying under international law, domestic Indian law or plain fairness and justice. That's on-Reservation.

Off-Reservation, they have an Allocable Share Amendment that's changed the whole deal, terms of the deal. They agreed to that, that legislation. That was what the tobacco companies in the states agreed to, the original law. The original said grandfathered exempt SPMs, they get

This is what we see when we get a snippet of what is really behind the door. The documents that exist out there. And that's why I've asked the documents and they have yet to produce them, because they will show to the Tribunal how egregious and how gross the misconduct is, how shocking it is and outrageous. We've seen it.

So now, in addition to these memos, right, we have them caucusing. We have the State of California passing a law. It's never given allocable share release. The State of New Mexico, the gentleman today, I don't know if I've ever given that. Why change the law if you've never given a release? Why change it? Did you do an economic study? We have the agreement. It says, if you're going to change the law or cast this thing it's going to affect the qualifying statute, get an economics firm to determine whether there's really a cost disadvantage. Whether these SPMs are really -- really have some kind of advantage.

Did they do that? Did they get an

passed by the state. They did no due diligence to determine whether they really needed -- whether they really needed this change in the law to remove some disadvantage, some loophole. I mean we're talking about a fundamental change in this economy, this market in this industry. Not one economic study.

Why did you pass it? Well, NAAG told me a memo that's a loophole. Any analysis that there was a market share loss? Because we have a letter from the Attorney General himself saying that NPMs grew because Phillip Morris raised its price fivefold multiples of what it had to pay under the MSA. The MSA \$3 a carton, Phillip Morris raises its price \$17 a carton. And the Attorney General says that's why SPMs have market share. You have these guys gouging consumers in the American market. Granted, it's pariah product. It's dangerous product. Now they're adding insult to injury. Now they're charging the consumer -- it's ridiculous, \$17 a carton, these Phillip Morris companies, big companies, right,

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economist? Did they go to the economist? No. Did one state do an economics analysis of this change in the law? Such a big change in the law now. We have investments. We have building up of market share, tremendous dedication, trademarks. We're building it, we're putting all the money in the market, we're developing it, cultivating the brand. Did they come to us? Did they confer with us? No.

Did they go to an economics firm and say, we need to stop the Seneca brand because there's a disadvantage? No. The agreement says, go to an economics firm. Did they do an independent study? Did they do an independent study? One economic study to be produced in this record of why they need it. No, it's all ex post facto. It's all after the fact by expert who said in federal court when the federal government brought its case, this MSA doesn't work.

He comes in and he says, well, you know, I think this economics -- nothing done nothing done at the time the allocable share was

when they only have to pay the states three.

So candidly, outside the scope of litigation, no economic studies, nothing. We have the AG saying to themselves the reason why is

because the tobacco companies are grossly abusing these MSAs to these big companies. They're abusing the MSA.

So what do we have now? We have a situation where the explanation is the big tobacco companies -- not any problem with the statute or the original law that everybody agreed on.

Nothing. Zero. Fast forwarding here. And the tobacco companies start knocking on the door and saying, we're going to start taking money back.

We're going to sue you for an NPM adjustment and we're going to go get a determination. Their own expert says, the original Escrow Statute didn't affect -- didn't cause a loss in market share.

That's what he says, their expert, which we'll hear and see.

It did not cause -- why change the statute then if it didn't cause a change in market

share? Right. Because it's about the money. The tobacco companies came knocking on the door.

And so the states, they heeded the call. They followed what the tobacco companies asked them to do. They went in and changed the law. They changed it grossly to disadvantage us. So we had that sort of dynamic, that egregious and shocking conduct, what has brought us here and we've been fighting all these years to be here. Because this is something that is unprecedented.

As I told my brother across the table, if we were dealing with them, we wouldn't be here today. We're not dealing with them. We're dealing with the states. We have no quarter with the federal government. Our quarter was with the states. They're vicariously responsible.

Did they take these measures? No. Not at all. Did they pass a new law under the FDA? And exceptions in there, Mr. President? No. Not one exemption. Any different treatment, you pay \$5, you pay \$2? No, no, no, across the board. Across the board. But that's the level.

with all this and we do think it reaches that level.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Thank you. I'm glad I provoked you.

MR. VIOLI: I apologize.

MR. WEILER: I should mention,
Mr. Chairman, we need to get you the tabs. But we
actually -- personal aside, actually my spouse has
been in tobacco reduction. When I explained this
to her, she was shocked. I remember my client
thought it was funny when he first found -- he
said basically you're trying to help me and she's
trying to put me out of business because she does
tobacco reduction. She doesn't now. She's gone
on to do a Ph.D. but she's -- it convinced her.

You go on this reserve, you see this plant, and actually I'm hoping we will have time to show you that video because the video is meant as sort of a consumer -- you know, it shows the retailer what they're doing, but you see those faces and it really does bring it home a lot better than I think that I can possibly do talking

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We have something unprecedented in the U.S. economy. We have infiltration into the poor. These are the highest law enforcement officers of the states, the attorneys general. Right? It's the fox guarding the hen house. We've allowed infiltration of private interest into that core Democratic process, because the AG's then go to the legislatures and say, we need this change in the law. Behind the curtain we're told what they need to change in the law for. On the front they say health and they say whatever. This is egregious.

I've never seen a case -- I've never seen such infiltration on a -- and some of the words are terrible, what they would call this kind of -- where a private interest has -- the highest law enforcement officer literally has them in their hands, tells them that they need our blessing before changing the law.

And that is egregious, I think the Tribunal will find during our closing, and when we get to the more slides, that's where we're going

about law. But this -- it truly is egregious and the people in the health community, they're not very thrilled about this either, because big tobacco has cut a deal with AG's.

But anyway, I'll get on with the law here.

My clients, they're not putting on a show. They really do believe in their sovereignty and they really do believe that the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Gent, three or four other treaties, that these treaties really meant something. They're very clear they were never conquered. Those treaties, as Professor Clinton explained --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Mr. Weiler, you say your clients believe in their sovereignty. I understand what you're saying but is the Mohawk Nation or any of the tribal -- or governments of the Indian Nations intervening in any way, or have they taken a formal position?

MR. WEILER: Yes, Chief William Montour has written I believe two letters and --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I know about the

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letters, but is the Nation itself?

MR. WEILER: Well, I think perhaps Mr. Montour tomorrow, you could probably ask him that question. That might be more appropriate than my trying to answer that.

MR. VIOLI: I can answer it.

With respect to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in Oklahoma, I know that they've recently brought a lawsuit -- recently brought a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the application of these measures to trading commerce on their land, but they haven't intervened in this action. They have a separate federal lawsuit that's pending.

MR. WEILER: And the AFN chief.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Yes, Mr. Violi, it would help me, at least, if you ca go through the transcript what you just told us just now and just pinpoint the various documents in this case that would support what you say. And later, when you close your argument or whatever it is, go through this transcript and just give it to us.

MR. VIOLI: Thank you.

traditional chiefs already, but I have no problem before the end of this Tribunal hearing getting you that information. And I'm sure that on an expedited basis they can check that out.

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MR. FELDMAN: Mr. President, the Claimants clearly are free to rely on what's in the record but supplementing the record is a very different issue.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yeah, and I'm not asking them to supplement the record. I'm just asking them to direct me where we can find that information for their position reflected in the record or whether it is.

MR. WEILER: We definitely can do that. I do recall in Mr. Jerry Montour's statements there was material up to that regard. I know that Mr. Montour -- Chief Montour filed a statement. It wasn't just a letter. He actually filed a statement in the first with the Memorial, so we definitely -- but, anyway, we'll get it. We do have that.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Does it make any

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ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I mean, you're relying very much on the sovereignty of the indigenous people, a Nation that is involved here.

MR. WEILER: Yes.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: -- yet your client is in fact not the Nation.

MR. WEILER: No, they're not the Nation, but --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I understand that. But it seems like, given your analysis, it would be relevant to have -- to know, you know, what the position of the Nation is as the Nation. And I understand that the chief has made a statement. And if you're saying that that's the position then I'm --

MR. WEILER: I'm happy to get the answer on the Nation. I mean there's really -there's the Seneca Nation and there's the -- and in Oswekan it's six Nations as opposed to -- and there's two councils. There's politically elected council and then there's a traditional one. I thought we had something in the record from the

difference that a sovereign Nation hasn't made a claim in this case but that --

MR. WETLER: No.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: -- examination of a company which many Indian Tribes has, does it make any difference, according to you?

MR. WEILER: Well, to qualify as an investor, I mean a sovereign Nation can be in theory --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No, no, no, no, no. No, I'm not talking of investing.

Bu whether a sovereign Nation, not being the Claimant in the present case, does that make any difference to the argument that we are a sovereign Nation that it -- that it is because we are a sovereign Nation that this entire scheme never applied to on-Reservation?

MR. WEILER: The short answer is no. And the reason why is that different nations organize themselves in different ways. In a way -- I mean some say loosely you'd say some of them are more laissez faire in terms of ownership

889 1 and rights of participation. Some of them are 2 more social democratic and outright state 3 controlled. So there's a wide variation in Indian 4 Nations as to how they organize their affairs. 5 With respect to this particular, the 6 Mohawk Nation and the Seneca Nation, they are 7 actually big fans of free enterprise. So -- and 8 I -- they support that and that's why the 9 Claimants do believe -- when they're speaking for 10 the -- I mean they speak for the Nation in more 11 than one way, one because they are part of the 12 Nation. 13 PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Montour belongs to 14 the Seneca Nation? 15 MR. WEILER: That's correct. 16 PRESIDENT NARIMAN: I mean his company 17 operates from the Seneca Nation? 18 MR. WEILER: Correct. 19 PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Within the Seneca 20 Nation? 21 MR. WEILER: Yes. And he is and it

891 yes. This is about the Dream Catcher Fund. And yes, it's in the record. I mean this is -- they are integrated. They are part of it. So yes, they do speak for the Nation.

But I mean, again, I think Mr. Montour is going to be available to ask him some direct questions about this. Mr. Montour is certainly involved in the politics, if you will, and the structure of his Nation, so I think he'd be more than happy to tell you how he feels, he can speak for his Nation.

MR. MONTOUR: Just to help, I will speak -- I will speak as an individual.

My name is Jerry Montour. And I try very, very --

MR. FELDMAN: Mr. President, this is testimony.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: That's correct. This is testimony.

> MR. MONTOUR: Okay. Sorry. MR. WEILER: So the point being that

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And Mr. Hill and Mr. Jerry Montour are both Mohawk Nation and they both participate on -that's where their plant is.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Hill and who? Mr. Hill and?

MR. WEILER: Mr. Hill and Mr. Jerry Montour.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Yes.

MR. WEILER: And I think they also speak for the Nation in another way. They are by far the largest employer. I mean this is a small community so it's not like they're off on their own sort of doing their own thing. These people have the largest charity in Canada devoted to benefiting indigenous people and it's across Canada. They're actually federally registered. So anyone from any indigenous Nation across Canada can go get a grant for teach- -- there's all sorts of things.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: You are speaking from the record?

MR. WEILER: Well, it's in the record,

they -- it's not enough to just have a heart-felt expectation. I think that's true. It's got to be based on some expectation of legal certainty. But I think that those treaties do definitely provide that to these Claimants.

And overall, there is also just the general standard that applies to anybody regardless of whether they are or not indigenous.

One, this off-reserve claim didn't need to be brought by an indigenous person. It's ridiculous that one would come and see the lay of the land and then, all of a sudden, it changes. I mean it -- actually we have them -- I'll definitely refer to it in the record again, but I was reading this last night. There's the up in smoke article which was provided with, I believe, our Claimant's first Memorial and describes a gentleman named Baillie. And Mr. Baillie, he's basically told, get yourself up here to New York to talk to these lawyers.

And he goes up and he says, I can't sign on to this. I need some time to think about

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it. They actually grant him some extension. The article doesn't say how much longer. And he goes back home and apparently within, I guess, it's either 30 days or 60 days he and his lawyer figure out, no, I'm pretty much a local seller in this particular state, maybe the one next door. I'm better to stay out of this thing because there's a provision for me. If I'm going to stay local, I'm going to stay there.

So when I hear this stuff about loophole, you know, no one thought of it. I mean, well, Mr. Baillie, some -- you know, just some fellow, you know, who's got this small tobacco plant somewhere, he and his lawyer figured it out pretty quickly. So, I mean, gee, what a shocking loophole.

I mean I think what's more likely is Mr. Baillie had every reason to rely on that. And if Mr. Baillie was a Canadian or a Mexican he could be here, but because he's an American he doesn't qualify under the NAFTA to bring a claim so Mr. Baillie is out of luck. But it's just as

for healthcare costs from a tobacco company for apparently the cost that they have to, you know, fund as part of that part of the socialized medicine that they have. It's not one case. And yet -- so there's no legal authority whatsoever and yet they want to take their money for 25 years just in case someone gets sick. And I guess in the 25 years they're hoping the law is going to change too.

Because --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: I'm sorry. I didn't follow this part of your argument.

MR. WEILER: Well, there is no --PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What is the

relevance of it?

MR. WEILER: There's just no tort law supporting the right of the states to take the money. Not for five years, not for one year, not for ten, not for 25. They don't have a legal claim in tort law to it. And so it is a denial of justice to say to somebody, okay, I have no right --

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PRESIDENT NARIMAN: I don't follow -- what is the tort here?

MR. VIOLI: Let me explain.

Mr. President, the Escrow Statute requires an NPM to put money -- every year has to put certain amount of money in and that money has to be held in the account for the benefit of the state for 25 years. And that's held there in case the state in the future tries to bring a lawsuit against the manufacturer, all right? And -- like a bond. And they have to hold it for 25 years and at the end of 25 years if the state does not bring a lawsuit against the tobacco, and win, right, the money is supposed to go back to the tobacco product manufacturer.

Now, this money that's held for 25 years can only be used in a lawsuit that's defined in the MSA, a certain kind of claim. And those claims are the ones that the states brought between 1996 and 1998. And they were settled under the MSA. They're Medicaid recoupment cost.

What happened is the states -- various

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egregious to Mr. Baillie. All he can do is complain to the Forbes Magazine.

Denial of justice. This is another one where there's no debate that there is a denial of justice standard. And it's pretty clear from the writings that we've submitted to you that this is not just a question of having a good judicial system. This is about administration. This is about executive rule making. Denial of justice is a -- basically a proxy for the notion of due process.

And I don't mean the American style of due process that is also substantive. I mean the procedural type of fundamental justice that's more common in the Canadian-British kind of system.

So there is this degree of fairness that one expects. And in this case, I've got it up there and I think you have it in front of your screen too. They're told, okay, you've never -- there's not one case that we're going to see and we haven't seen and we're not going to see, not one case of a state being able to actually collect

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states sued the tobacco companies, the big guys, and said, you lied, spiked nicotine and you conspired not to come out with a safer product. We're suing you, big companies, because we want you to pay the money for people who get sick. We have to treat them. So the state says, we have to pay for the hospital bills. We want reimbursement for that. So the states brought the lawsuits for four years and they settled them.

Now, those are the types of lawsuits for which we have to put money away for 25 years but none of those lawsuits ever went to the merits. None of the states -- the states said, let's settle with the tobacco companies. Let's enter into an agreement and let's pass this Escrow Statute. We don't want the courts to determine our fate. We don't want the courts to tell us whether we're entitled to the money or not under these types of cases.

So the Escrow Statute says, you, Grand River, must put the money away for 25 years in case the state wants to bring a similar lawsuit

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What was that case? Cipollone?

MR. VIOLI: Cipollone versus Liggett. Liggett.

That was a case brought by the widow -the widower of -- I think it was Francis Cipollone sued the Liggett Company and got sick from smoking. Cipollone got sick from smoking and then it went all the way up to the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Supreme Court of the United States said, no, no, no. There's no strict liability. There's no fraud. There's none of these kinds of claims. They don't exist. You can't sue a tobacco company. You assumed the risk and in 1964 and '69 the federal government put out a disclaimer that said, surgeon general warning label. So you know what you're -- there's a potential you're going to get sick if you consume the product. So the Supreme Court said, there's no such cause of action.

Well, the states came in under the MSA

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against you.

Now, after the MSA -- after the MSA these cases were tested. They were brought by different sovereigns. They were brought by our brothers, the federal government of the United States brought a case, same kind of case, but the federal government didn't settle. They would not agree to settle. They wanted it determined by a judge. The judge threw the case out except for one claim, RICO, racketeering, because they conspired, right, conspiracy claims.

And the court also threw away the damages. The court said, these claims that you settled back under the MSA where you try to recoup the money for healthcare costs, no such claim. Because there was a previous Supreme Court decision called Cipollone which said that there's no private right of action or even a -- there's no right of action to sue a tobacco company if someone gets sick from smoking because of the warnings, because of assumption of risk, whatever the cause may be. So that court held that --

and said, you know what, we're trying to get around Cipollone and we're going to say we have to pay when the indigent person can't pay for cancer treatment and the state has to pay, because they do. They get reimbursed by the federal government. But when the state has to pay, they come in and they say, well, you know what, Phillip Morris, you didn't lie -- I mean you lied to the consumer but we had to pay for your lie. We had to pay. So the states tried to bring this type of lawsuit, bu they didn't let to go to a judge. They would not let it go to a judge. They settled them on the eve of trial.

The federal government here said, we're not going to settle. We're going to go to the judge and get this decided by a judge.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: And what happened, what was decided?

MR. VIOLI: Whether or not there is such a claim against the tobacco company, whether a government can sue a tobacco company for healthcare costs related -- you know, expenses and

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901 1 the case against the federal government here, our 2 brother across the table, the judge said, no such 3 case exists. You cannot get damages for fraud and 4 healthcare recoupment. Threw all those claims 5 out. But the court did say, we will give you 6 injunctive relief, like a monetary type of thing, 7 you know, equity. We'll give you an equity kind 8 of remedy for a RICO violation. That's the only 9 thing that was sustained. 10 MR. WEILER: Exactly. Against the 11 health insurance companies. 12 MR. VIOLI: Now, the health insurance 13 companies, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, they sued. 14 They're numerous. We have them in the record. 15 The health insurance companies did the 16 same thing that the states did. They went and 17 sued the tobacco companies and said, hey, we had

of suing a company 25 years later after consuming a product? The statute of limitations -- I mean, there's fraudulent concealment, right? Which law extends to the one you knew or should have known that the product was dangerous, right?

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That will carry you maybe a few years, but product liability is usually three years, six years max. Twenty-five years.

Could you imagine being tobacco company 25 years from now, you put money away and -- put money away. 25 years they come knocking, God bless I hope you're still here. But they come and they knock on Mr. Jerry Montour's door and say, 24 years ago you sold a product and we want you to pay for it. So what these cases held that have determined the merits --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: But you paid up

this?

MR. VIOLI: Well, you put it in a fund. PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No, you did. Did

you do it?

MR. VIOLI: Yes, \$50 million. To date,

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thing.

or not.

So the point here, because now we're required to put money away for 25 years for those types of claims because when they formulated this statute in 1999, right, the Escrow Statute, they formulated it to require money to be paid by our clients to be put away for 25 years for those types of claims. But now all the cases have held there is no such claim.

to pay. Our customers have health insurance. We

had to pay for cancer treatment. We're suing you,

Pension funds. They did the same

Phillip Morris and the tobacco companies. The

court said, no such claim exists.

What was it Mr. Hering said yesterday? We have no claim today. It's 11 years, 10 years after that statute. Have any evidence of a

have a claim? Well, we might be able to have one --PRESIDENT NARIMAN: And this doesn't depend upon whether you belong to an Indian Tribe

violation that would give such claim? No. Do you

MR. WEILER: No.

MR. VIOLI: No, this is generally. So now, forget about the statute of limitations, Mr. President. Have you ever heard \$50 million.

So what happens is now the state 25 years -- so we have to put this money away. And the reason why we have to put this money away, because the agreement says, Phillip Morris has to pay \$5 a carton, exempt SPMs have to pay 70 cents or whatever it is a carton. We need you to pay money because of competition. We need you to neutralize the competition. That was the original plan for the Escrow Statute. Right?

So as part of that plan they said, well, we'll make you put your money away for 25 years in case we sue you at some point. But all of the contemporaneous writings talk about it's to reduce competition, to limit our ability to compete. That's why when they changed the law, it took off from 50 cents a carton we were paying to roughly \$4 a carton. It hurt us tremendously in our ability to compete.

So now the cases have all held there's no such claim. Why, then, are we being asked to put \$5 per carton, 5.60 I think it is now. \$5 per

carton into an escrow fund for 25 years when all the experts agree you could be using that money for other purposes. You can compete more effectively against the exempt SPMs. You could use it as a better capitalization for purposes of growing your investment or putting it to better use in the context of your business.

Why put millions of dollars into a fund when the states can never get that money? There's no cause of action.

All of the cases that have decided have said there's no claim. The states can't get that money. There's no such thing as a released claim.

So that is what we submit, right? That is what -- is it denial of due process of taking of a property without just cause or reason? And we ask for the evidence from the other side, where did we do something wrong at that would allow you to take this money that you're requiring us to put \$5 away for the future.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Is this the Allocable Share Amendment?

this Premier brand, which is -- what's called Ultra Buyer Shield which is made by Premier. The exempt SPM, they have a five dollar advantage over you. I'm sorry I can't buy your product anymore. And so we were shut out of the market by that increase caused by the Allocable Share.

And we've been putting the money in, we've borrowing the money to try to comply with these measures until we get some form of relief because we've been putting the money into the escrow account, so there's now \$50 million but it's been sitting there at a rate of interest of like .5 percent. It doesn't even return money on it. But the states have no right to that money. There is no claim.

So imagine, if you will, Mr. President, that you have a bonding requirement by a state. You want to engage in some kind of activity and the state says, you need to pay -- forget about that you need to pay \$5 for the bond and somebody else needs to pay \$2. You have to pay \$5 per unit or per hour, whatever, for this bonding

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MR. VIOLI: Yes. The Allocable Share made it go from 50 cents per carton to \$5 per carton, the effect of which was we had to put a lot of money in this fund. But the effect is also as they candidly admitted in other papers, that it has to raise our prices.

That is why, vis-à-vis, the exempt SPMs, we were shut out of the Oklahoma market, the Arkansas market. All of these markets, which we just couldn't hold onto because our price, as the record shows, we were at about \$10 per carton before the Allocable Share, we had to go up by two at that time, right? To about \$12. But Liggett targeted that Arkansas and Oklahoma market at 8.50 a carton, almost three, four dollar difference. And as the affidavit in the record showed, one of the biggest distributors of discount cigarettes in the Arkansas market, I'm sorry, I can't buy your product anymore.

Another one in South Carolina said, your prices going up by, it's \$5 per more carton now after the Allocable Share. We have to go to

requirement. And imagine, if you will, that the state has no claim, can never get that five -there's no cause of action, no theory of liability
upon which that state can ever get that \$5. It's
a denial of justice. That's a violation of due
process.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: The federal case, the two of you, that judgment is reported?

MR. VIOLI: It is indeed. It's in the

record. I think most of it is in the record.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Again will you just -- after you go through this transcript, will you just write it there at that point and give us that, put a tab on it.

MR. VIOLI: Yes.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay. Sorry to interrupt you.

Professor Weiler, as you and I very well know, all of the classic cases on denial of justice involved denial in the judicial system.

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909 1 Now, Claimants's last paper fervently 2 disavowed any intent to bring a denial of justice 3 claim in the classic context of denial of justice 4 in a judicial system. 5 What would you point us to in the way 6 of authority for the proposition that what 7 Mr. Violi has so eloquently described as a 8 perversion of the legislative process constitutes 9 a denial of justice? 10 MR. WEILER: The two that come to mind 11 right offhand is the Freeman book from the 1920s 12 and the Paulson book from the few years ago. 13 ARBITRATOR CROOK: I'm quite familiar 14 with the Paulson book. I reviewed it, but you 15 think if we look there we'll find support for your 16 proposition? 17 MR. WEILER: I think you'll find 18 support for the proposition that denials of 19 justice are in no way limited to judicial systems. 20 ARBITRATOR CROOK: And includes 21 perversion of the legislative process? 22 MR. WEILER: Well, in this case it's

911 respect me. Just answer the question, please. MR. WEILER: Well, the answer to your question is, we are entitled under the NAFTA to seek injunctive relief and at the same time seek damages for denial of justice. And I submit and ultimately, sir, you don't have to take my submission, obviously, but I submit taking someone's money for 25 years and not even letting -- not even -- and you know you can't win in court but you don't give me a chance to go to court, that that's a denial of justice. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: What do you mean by you don't get to go to court? MR. VIOLI: We cannot sue, Professor --I would love to, especially after I've heard all the attorneys general say this, we cannot go to court to get declaration of our right to that money back until 25 years. And after 25 years it automatically comes back. We can't go in, let's say, after the

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1 not about perversion of the legislative --2 ARBITRATOR CROOK: Well, that's what 3 Mr. Violi told us with great energy. 4 MR. WEILER: Well, with respect, sir, 5 what he said was, he said that it was perversion 6 of justice. He wasn't submitting that that was a 7 denial of justice. A denial of justice is 8 straightforward. They took the money for 25 years 9 and we didn't get to go to court. At least the 10 big companies, they got to go to court and on the 11 eve of that case they settled. But we don't get 12 to go to court. 13 ARBITRATOR CROOK: Professor Weiler, 14

haven't you been litigating rather energetically --

MR. WEILER: Not on this issue. ARBITRATOR CROOK: -- on whether the Allocable Share Amendments were proper? You haven't litigated that guestion anyplace? MR. WEILER: There's a -- that's --

with respect, sir, there's a different --ARBITRATOR CROOK: You don't have to court to challenge the escrow --

standard of limitations --

MR. WEILER: We can challenge the constitutionality of it.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: But can you go to

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MR. VIOLI: Not under international law, and not for damages.

Under the 11th amendment the states are immune from damages. We can only seek equitable relief to the extent we can. And we have. You can't get recompense. All the damage suffered to date and that will happen in the future, we will never be able to get -- monetarily recompensed for

MR. WEILER: And the NAFTA released very clear it says that one cannot seek damages in two fora, but one can seek special relief and this would be the type of special relief that constitutes no challenge. So, it is clear that we're not barred from doing it. The NAFTA language wage is clear we can seek injunctive relief, some sort of special relief, while we seek damages but frankly we want damages. We don't think it's fair.

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ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. So, what you mean when you say you can't go to court is that you can't go to court to seek damages.

MR. WEILER: We can't go to court to dispute the issue of whether or not healthcare costs can be recouped because their statue says they're keeping that money for 25 years in case we do something culpable and the definition in the statute says they can recover for healthcare costs if they can -- but we don't get to go to court and have them bring it on and have that fight and see if they can prove that there's healthcare costs and that we should be putting money away. No, instead they're just going to keep it for 25 years; they may decide to sue us on the 25th year they may not. That's -- the big tobacco companies didn't have to do that. They got to go to court right away and they got a really good settlement.

MR. VIOLI: You're right that we cannot sue for damages, though, for the harm here, but can only get injunctive relief which would not

Constitution.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: You can continue. MR. WEILER: Funny we should mention abuse of right, because that's also a customary international law doctrine and that's one of the other bases for explaining what fair and equitable treatment means and what the minimum standard means. Arbit du droit is widely accepted. The last time I saw a really strong doctrinal challenge to it was Schwartzenberger in the 1960s, and his student, Bin Chang, is actually the best source for -- and actually, I forgot, his quote is right there, for explaining what an abuse of right is. A reasonable and bona fide exercise of a right in such a case is one which is appropriate and necessary for the purpose of the right, in furtherance of the interest that the right was intended to protect. It should at the same time be fair and equitable as between the parties and not one that's calculated to procure for one of them an unfair advantage in light of the obligation assumed.

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remedy the damages caused which is--

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I understand your argument, Mr. Weiler that you keep going to but at this point I'm really trying to get clarity on it.

MR. VIOLI: Yeah, we cannot, under the 11th Amendment. And so, therefore, all of our litigation -- actually we have one litigated--a couple litigated -- we only seek -- we could sue, we haven't yet. You can get damages from an Attorney General if you sue him in an individual capacity meaning that he abused state law under the authority of state law and took some action that violated your civil rights. We haven't done that yet and quite frankly that's not a fight that we brought on. That's the only way you could -but that wouldn't be the actions of the state at that point; that would be a rogue Attorney General or attorneys general that did certain egregious conduct which would not even be brought under state law, but the 11th Amendment precludes us getting any kind of monetary relief under the

Constitution, the 11th Amendment of the

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That kind of sounds like our case here. And I've just switched the slide there. We have Mr. Eckhart actually saying on the record -- and again yes we're going to document exactly where actually -- I wrote it down at the time, he admits he didn't know whether he had the authority to send that letter, that very strong letter, to the FTZ. He didn't know whether he actually had the authority to do that. He didn't investigate whether he had the authority to do it; he just went ahead and did it. We have a special task force for deputy attorneys general called the Grand River project or -- Working Group. The Grand River Working Group.

We have deputy attorneys general getting together and having meetings so that they can plot out how to sue the Claimants.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: You must have done something egregious and shocking.

MR. WEILER: I think so. I think -no, actually, I think I disagree. I think this is
shocking and outrageous and egregious.

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1 Yes, Mr. Crook? 2 ARBITRATOR CROOK: I don't remember 3 Claimants ever arguing abuse of right before 4 today. Is this a new argument you're making? 5 MR. WEILER: No, it's in there. 6 ARBITRATOR CROOK: Is it? 7 MR. WEILER: I'll give you this, but 8 the Bin Chang is in there. I think it was the 9 First Memorial but I'd have to go back. 10 ARBITRATOR CROOK: First Memorial back 11 4 or 5 years ago. 12 MR. WEILER: I don't think it's 4 or 13 5 years ago but definitely it's in there. 14 ARBITRATOR CROOK: Okay. 15 MR. WEILER: Actually -- frankly, it's 16 in all my pleadings because I really like the 17 abuse of right as a theory. ARBITRATOR CROOK: Okay. Would you 18

the market is the rail line south. So, if we lose our quota because this man just basically decides that our, that the review doesn't suit his needs, we're out of luck.

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So, he tells us we have to bring -- he wants an audit but he wants us to bring -- it was about 50 boxes -- basically every scrap of paper up to Canada so he can take a look at it. That's not a normal audit but that's what he wanted and he claimed he didn't have authority to come down to the U.S. to do it. That's not true under the Customs Act, actually; there's a reciprocal agreement for that, but he didn't bother checking into that. He just asserted he had the authority to do it. And so, what we had to do is we brought a claim and -- well, not a claim. We brought a motion for interim measure. We actually knew we were going to lose but we wanted to put it before the Tribunal because the interim measures provision in NAFTA says you can't enjoin the measure and we were going to ask them to enjoin the measure, but we got it before the Tribunal and

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theory?

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an audit on us.

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case and it is true they never said the words "abuse of right," but if you fact pattern of Pope & Talbot, which I so happen to know well because I was in it. We've got a very similar case. In Pope & Talbot, we sued the Canadian government. We were Americans and we sued the Canadian government and we sued them because we felt that we were being mistreated, brought a fair and equitable claim, brought an expropriation claim, brought a national treatment claim, and guess what happened fairly soon after we sued them. Minister of Foreign Affairs, the man in charge of the system, he decided to do a little audit. He did

refer us to any NAFTA cases that have adopted the

I was just going to point you to the Pope & Talbot

MR. WEILER: Well, as a matter of fact,

the Tribunal said, we'll remember this for the merits and we don't think that this audit -- they looked at the audit, they looked at the whole thing and they said, we can't decide on this because we have to put it off on the merits but we don't think this audit is anything that anyone should be proceeding on.

And his audit -- he started asking us to do things that we didn't really think he had any authority to do but we didn't have much choice because what he was holding over us was the ability to recommend to the minister for us to lose our quota, and if we lose our quota we can't ship because this plant is located in between mountains in British Columbia and the only way to

A couple years later we actually had the hearing. Mr. -- it was Doug, I can't remember his last name. Doug is sitting there at the table and Doug is -- I think it might have been Black -anyway, Doug is asked some questions by the two counsel and then the Tribunal asked a question and he said -- out of his mouth pops, oh, yeah, I wrote a letter to the Minister on that. It wasn't in the record so we got the memo and the memo basically said, we're not sure. We think there might be some criminal activity going on and even though the audit wasn't the best we think maybe you should take away that quota. The Tribunal was apoplectic about this. The Tribunal -- it was actually the very first Tribunal to deal with that

new statement and it didn't like the statement and it said it didn't think it should follow it but it said it didn't matter because in this case this was shocking, egregious, and outrageous. I submit to you this is worse. We don't just have a little hint to the Minister about criminal behavior. He's got to go to court in three months and we already know from our friend, I think it was Mr. Eckhart yesterday, who said oh, yeah, I had a little chat with the federal prosecutor and, yeah /my California judge did throw that out and said they didn't believe it, but he could go to jail.

That's more than just a little kind of hint to the Minister. This is really serious.

And you have a working group of attorneys general meeting, they won't tell us about it because apparently -- obviously it's work product privilege, but I'm sorry what kind of world do we live in when a group of attorneys general can get together and plop their strategy and so far their cases aren't that -- very successful. They seem to be not doing so well. That doesn't seem to

working group. What do they discuss? What do they plot? What is the purpose of it? But they have not produced any documents. We haven't seen any Grand River Working Group documents.

MR. FELDMAN: I'm sorry, that request was never made and discovery issues are closed in this matter.

MR. WEILER: Adverse inferences aren't closed.

Actually, Mr. Chairman, we've got some slides later on that address the questions that we specifically asked. The one final point about Mr. Eckhart I just wanted to remind the Tribunal of, as Mr. Violi was questioning him -- and again, we'll point this out exactly on the record it turns out that our friend from California admitted that there was no claim under the California Escrow Statute for going after Grand River, so they used their complementary legislation. My friend's argument is that the complementary legislation is really not even a measure at all, this's just complimentary. It just helps the

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bother them, though, because they're still writing the letters and still bringing the cases. The fact that this --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Is this on record that this is called the Grand River project group?

MR. WEILER: Yes. Yes, we heard it yesterday, and the day before.

MR. VIOLI: We heard that there is a group, they do meet, we've asked --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Called Grand River project?

MR. VIOLI: Yes, it's the Grand River Working Group.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Working group.

MR. VIOLI: Yes, we are one of the few, perhaps the only entity that I'm aware of that has its own working group and an Attorney General's office for the enforcement of certain laws.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: There's no Phillip Morris working group?

MR. VIOLI: Not that I'm aware of, Mr. President, but we've asked for documents of this

Escrow Statute along. Well, if that's true -and you will have your chance if you want to
disagree -- the Escrow Statute wasn't supposed to
be enforced here. So, if my friend and he'll
correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty sure I saw
this in his arguments -- if my friend is right
that the Escrow Statute really -- I'm sorry, that
the Contraband Law isn't unique, that it's kind of
part and parcel of the same thing then we've got
another really good manifest excess of authority,
because if it's supposed to only be use today go
after escrow claims and he doesn't have one but he
uses it anyway that's problematic; that's
egregious. That's shocking to me that he would do
that.

So, this is why when I saw yesterday -when I saw him say, oh, yeah, I didn't have
authority to do that, I instantly thought of four
years ago -- actually, I guess it's about seven or
eight now. I thought of Pope & Talbot instantly
because the facts are so similar. And I will make
sure -- I know we have a couple Pope & Talbots in

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there, there were three awards, we have to make sure you have the damages award because they made two findings on 1105, once before the NAFTA parties got together and issued their statement and once after, and I'm talking about the "after" one.

By the way in the Pope & Talbot case,

By the way in the Pope & Talbot case, we actually lost our arguments. What we won on was this egregious abuse of authority for the audit afterwards.

Do you want to take a break, Mr. President? I see you were looking at the clock there.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: The abuse of authority, the abuse of right that you're talking about, are you using their terms interchangeably?

MR. WEILER: Yes, I use them interchangeably because in common law, especially in Canada, it's become a tort called the abuse of authority tort.

It is kind of a funny story because it

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I think I.
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ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I understand. You don't have to go back to that. So, when they are cumulative they can still be distinct.

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MR. WEILER: Yes.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Right? Now, are they distinct or does it just go to a different characterization of the same facts?

MR. WEILER: No, this abuse -- I mean, Mr. Crook is certainly right to wonder, well, where was this abuse of authority before because it was frankly really being used for the notion of arbitrariness, to explain how arbitrariness works.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. So, you didn't have a distinct section in your Memorial about abuse of right.

 ${\tt MR.}$ WEILER: We did. We had an abuse of right section.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I'm looking for it and I actually typed in "abuse of right" and then a find function and I --

MR. WEILER: In the Memorial or the

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cumulative.

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1 was actually--2 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I know. That's why 3 I'm asking, because it seems like there are 4 certain elements we need to find and it seems like 5 you're putting everything together, all these 6 different, as you describe them, egregious acts or 7 omissions. Is it different from just the 8 generally shocking nature that you assert here or 9 is it the distinct --10 MR. WEILER: Abuse of right is a 11

MR. WEILER: Abuse of right is a principle, and so it's a doctrine and it's a principle. The WTO calls it a principle; I usually call it a doctrine.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Are you just conflating it with all the other stuff here?

MR. WEILER: Well, no, I'm not conflating. My submission is that they're

19 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. All right.
20 MR. WEILER: What I have to do to prove
21 an 1105 breach is show you how customary
22 international law rules contribute to this norm.

Reply? ARBITRATOR ANAYA: In the Memorial. MR. WEILER: It could have been the reply, but i will certainly. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I've been looking for it and can't find it. MR. WEILER: I could--if you like, we can break and --ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I found one reference to abuse of right but it's kind of buried in a general distinction. PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Look for it in the afternoon. Yes. MR. WEILER: Okay. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I'm just trying to understand, get the structure of all of it here. MR. WEILER: Abuse of right is -- I mean, it's rooted in the general principle of good faith.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, I understand the principle.

MR. WEILER: Yeah, okay.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I'm just trying to see how you're presenting it, how you're relating it to the various facts that you're putting on the table, how you're relating it to the different elements--

MR. WEILER: No, I--

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: --out of the NAFTA standard that you're articulating, how it fits in your overall structure of your argument in your Memorial; that's what I'm trying to get to.

MR. WEILER: Until Mr. Eckhart told us that he was doing that without authority and until we found out that he was -- he admitted that he was using the Contraband Statute even though he didn't have an escrow claim, that's why, if you will, the abuse of right was rather dormant. I mean, now it --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Could you just explain that, that contraband claim was his abuse of --

MR. WEILER: Mr. Eckhart explained that he used his -- sometimes they call it a listing

enforcement of the Escrow Statute -- primarily, excuse me, enforcement of the Escrow Statute, because what the complementary legislation does is you cannot sell from January 1 to December 31 unless you do certain things under the complementary legislation. Those things are: Fill out a form, says your name, give pictures of your plant, say who you're owned by, or your address. The other thing you need to do is say you're in compliance with the Escrow Statute and that you will comply with the Escrow Statute. You must adopt as brand as your brand family. So, in this case Grand River will have to say, Seneca is my brand and the Seneca brand family is mine and I will be responsible for it.

One of the other things you have to do under the complementary legislation is waive personal jurisdiction. You have to say that you agree that the Attorney General can sue you for enforcement of the Escrow Statute. You have to waive personal jurisdiction.

Now, what we've said is that is a

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statute, a contraband law, the complementary legislation -- he admitted to Mr. Violi -- actually, Mr. Violi, if you want to actually say it, it might actually be easier.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Go ahead, whoever wants to.

MR. VIOLI: He said that -- first, he said that, as the other A G said, it enforces -- it helps the enforcement and as the NAAG documents show, it was to help the enforcement of the Escrow Statute, because the Escrow Statute you have to wait 15 months to enforce. So, you start January to December, you make sales, and then you have to make a payment on April 15 of the following year -- well that's 16 months. So, what happens is, then, if you don't make that payment on April 15th of the following year the Attorney General gets to bring a lawsuit against you under the Escrow Statute to seek enforcement.

So, as Mr. Hering testified, the complementary legislation was meant to do a couple of things, right? The first of which was to aid

little bit of a problem because it tried to correct, although they never told us why -- it tried to correct the situation where they don't have personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer, which they admitted in private. So, what they did is, let's get around the due process limitations that we have and just force a company to waive personal jurisdiction under the complementary legislation, and then we solved our foreign manufacturer problem. So, that's what the complementary legislation does and then you have to certify all that in a document. And then, when you give it to the Attorney General, he can approve or deny it and then he will -- if he approves it then he puts your brand on the approved list, the white list, and then it can be sold.

So, what I believe Mr. Eckhart's testimony was is, well, it stands alone, it also stands alone, meaning it's not just to enforce the Escrow Statute so that we make sure you pay your escrow and if you don't pay we can ban you or we

can ban you before unless you agree to pay escrow.

What it also does according Mr. Eckhart is stand alone and allows him to band the product separate and apart from, apparently, in compliance with the Escrow Statute. He's right, it does act independently that way because it acts as band, an embargo -- an interim embargo against your brand even before the time that it's due to make payment for it.

So, he said that it stand alone and it allows him to tell someone not to let the cigarettes in the state, not to sell the cigarettes in the state, or not to sell to someone in the state independently of compliance with the Escrow Statute; that's what Mr. Eckhart testified yesterday.

So, my --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: So, what's wrong

with that?

MR. VIOLI: What's wrong with it is

that it imposes a couple of thing.

First thing is the due process

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MR. VIOLI: NWS did, spend a lot of money in defending against California because California brought a lawsuit against NWS for the complementary legislation, and NWS obtained a jurisdictional award -- right -- - by the court in California. The California court said you have no jurisdiction over this NWS with respect to this Indian commerce even under the complementary legislation. You cannot ban the sale. What did the Attorney General California say yesterday? I don't care what the court says. I enforce the laws of California and to me you are violating California law and we're not putting you on the list, even though I don't have jurisdiction to prosecute you or regulate you under that law, I'm still not putting you on the list, you're not on the list, and it's over. If you want to come in, he said, at the end of his testimony, come in, pay us all the money we say is due, get certified, waive your personal jurisdiction, do all those things -- to Grand River -- and then we'll let NWS

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limitation. It requires a manufacturer, as they called it -- Philippines, India, or China -- who are not subject to personal jurisdiction in California. It requires them in international commerce they sell to a manufacturer -- they sell to a manufacturer --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: But this is only a challenge to the statute you are now saying.

MR. VIOLI: Yes, yes.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: But then, nobody has challenged the statute.

MR. VIOLI: Yes the complementary legislation is challenged; it is one of the measures. The Contraband Law --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No, by "challenge" I mean challenge in a court of law not challenged here.

MR. VIOLI: There was a challenge in the court of law but you can't get damages, again. You're limited to what you can do. You --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: But you can get a declaration that it is unconstitutional, invalid

sell.

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So, even in the face of a judicial finding. Mr. President, the judge of California has said you can't enforce this law on-Reservation with respect to NWS.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: That's Superior Court judgment?

MR. LUDDY: Yes.

MR. VIOLI: Indeed, indeed. Not withstanding a judge telling the Attorney General -- and it's always been the system of a law i think in the world let alone the United States that the courts are the authority; they're the final authority. Not in this case. The court of law does not exist with respect to these laws; it's amazing. We had the South Dakota Attorney General -- Grand River went all the way up to the Supreme Court of South Dakota because their product went to the Sioux, the Yankton Sioux in South Dakota through various channels. So, it gets up to the Tribe--they sue--South Dakota Attorney General sues Grand River, all the way up

to the Supreme Court of South Dakota. South Dakota court says sorry just like the Wisconsin court, just like the other Superior Court in California. There's no jurisdiction over at Grand River. It is a foreign manufacturer; it deals with the NWS, the Nation trading, and then it goes through interstate channels or international channels and it gets here to a tribe in California, Wisconsin, or South Dakota. We don't have jurisdiction -- South Dakota Supreme Court, it's a six-member panel, whatever it was. What does the South Dakota Attorney

What does the South Dakota Attorney
General say? We -- we -- may have lost this
battle but I can assure you we did not lose the
war. With all due respect, who is the "we"? The
highest court of South Dakota has told the
Attorney General, back off: You don't have the
authority to enforce this law.

authority to enforce this law.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: How many such actions there are in which you have judgments secured in the present case which are on record, roughly?

this against Grand River. He submits in an article -- he says in an article -- he says, I am working -- we are all working together with other states -- "we," right? And although we lost this battle, I can assure you we did not lose the war. What is the battle? What is this working group? PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What is this article you are talking? MR. VIOLI: Right after Grand River secured the --PRESIDENT NARIMAN: It's on record? MR. VIOLI: No, no, in south Dakota, right after--MR. FELDMAN: Counsel, is this on record? MR. VIOLI: It's in the record. It's in the materials. MR. FELDMAN: What do you mean by "the materials"? MR. VIOLI: It was submitted in the

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MR. VIOLI: There are default judgments which Mr. Luddy spoke about yesterday. There are quite a few. I think Mr. Hering said maybe a dozen, few more -- a dozen --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Can you give us a list in your closing argument.

MR. VIOLI: We can of what they said.

Then, we went back in select states
where the states really tried to push South
Dakota, Wisconsin, and California where the states
tried to push their enforcement of these default
judgments. We went back in the state courts and
in every case so far that has been decided, we
have won.

So, the courts have recognized -- but $\mbox{\ensuremath{\mbox{my}}}$ point is that the South --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Can you give us that.

MR. VIOLI: We will, absolutely.

What was particularly egregious is the South Dakota Attorney General is told by his highest court in his state, you cannot enforce

know if it's in the Memorial.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: You better check on it.

materials in the case -- the South Dakota opinion

in the articles is certainly in the case. I don't

MR. VIOLI: Yeah. And that's where we saw this claim of, we lost the battle but I can assure you we have not lost the war.

In all due respect, this is the highest court telling the Attorney General you don't have authority to enforce. Why is the South Dakota Attorney General engaged in a war in battles in other jurisdictions? He has no jurisdiction in other states. He has no jurisdiction to meet with NAAG and the California Attorney General or the New Mexico Attorney General or the South -- but that's what's going on: They are waging a war evidenced by that Grand River working group.

Now, I submit we did not know it was called the Grand River working group so I did not ask for all documents of the Grand River -- you can't ask for that which you don't know, but we know there's a working group. Wouldn't the Respondent have seen unto itself if they knew

there was a Grand River working group to produce those in good faith and to the other side? They have not. Even absent our request, because we didn't know that working group existed, even absent that, didn't they have an obligation to produce that to the Tribunal and to us? So, with that, your Honor. . .

MR. WEILER: So Professor Anaya, with respect to the abuse of rights argument, essentially I'd say it would boil down to two things, the new evidence we heard from Mr. Eckhart about issuing directions without authority or without a known authority, and the other one is, and this is -- I understand the gravity of what I'm saying, a number of attorneys general appear to be on some sort of warpath against our clients and it doesn't seem -- they're not deterred by statements of law in their court.

Now, I understand my friend will say, with respect to Mr. Eckhart, well he's got it on appeal. I understand there's some niceties there, but the bottom line is this just doesn't smell

claim in a particular way in your -- the last two pleadings you've done. As Professor Anaya pointed out abuse of right doesn't seem to have been in there. I don't recall it and if it is I apologize. But I certainly don't remember it being there and apparently he can't find it.

Now, we've just had a brand new presentation of the abuse of right claim with respect to matters that really weren't laid out in any of the written materials. At some point, does the Tribunal need to sort of try to freeze the claim?

MR. WEILER: I think probably the Tribunal --

MR. VIOLI: Can I explain -- do you mean that we didn't bring up the South Dakota opinion and how -- or something else? I'm sorry, Mr. Crook?

ARBITRATOR CROOK: I don't recall the law review article or the attorneys general being on the warpath before. If it was, I apologize but I don't really recall that.

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like the normal public authority use. This sound like overzealous prosecution of a particular group which does reminds me of Duplesy versus the Crown -- or no, it was Duplesy versus -- I can't remember, but anyway the Duplesy case. That's the case for abuse of authority in Canada that actually went -- it was a Quebec case, went over to the Crown because the privy counsel was still in charge and then came back to Canada in the common law as an abuse of authority tort even though this left the country as civil law which is kind of neat, which by the way explains the whole notion of abuse of authority and how it crosses different legal cultures, left Canada as a civil law claim came back as a common law tort. So---PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Mr. Crook has a question.

MR. WEILER: Yes.

ARBITRATOR CROOK: Okay. So, Professor Weiler you're now -- I'm just concerned about the way the claims keep evolving.

You presented the denial of justice

MR. WEILER: We actually feel kind of aggrieved, too, Mr. Crook, because we only found out about it the past few days. And we asked --we did ask --we're going to get to those slides when I'll show you what we asked for. We did not get the production about a Grand River working group. We did not find out that it turns out that Mr. Eckhart was freelancing on his authority. We didn't know there was a working group. So, I would agree with you, it was definitely not in our statement of claim because we didn't find out about it until yesterday.

MR. VIOLI: But the South Dakota -- the point we have made is that throughout, since day one, because the South Dakota case started before this one, I believe, is that they proceeded without the diligence required to determine whether they had personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction at all over these Claimants.

There's an assumption which we'll find out and read. The assumption is that if your cigarette is found in the State of South Dakota SHEET 50 PAGE 945 _____ PAGE 947

and everywhere else -- and it's in the first slide of the presentation they gave yesterday --if your cigarettes are found in the state, the assumption is you sold it in the state. And on that assumption, which violates every principle of due process that I know of and I've read in either in international or domestic law -- on the assumption that due -- that your jurisdiction --the jurisdiction follows the product. A company in India that sells it to an importer who's in Germany who then has it imported into the United States and then sold eventually in Illinois -- and I know because I represent this Indian company, okay? It ends up in Illinois, the company in India doesn't own the trademark; it doesn't have any control over it after it's sold to the immediate seller, and it ended up in Illinois, Illinois brings one of the most massive cases against this Indian company and the personal jurisdiction and the owner of the Indian company says, this violates international law. This is over eight years ago. How can the State of

their diligence when they went and sued Grand River in California, when they sued them in Wisconsin, when they sued them in South Dakota. All of the courts have held no personal jurisdiction.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: The fact they lost doesn't mean they didn't come to a good faith argument, or at least good faith from the standpoint of their standpoint.

MR. VIOLI: Their standpoint.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Well, do you have to win an argument -- I mean, is that what you're saying, to win --

MR. VIOLI: No, but give the basis for

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Well, he said that they had basis.

MR. VIOLI: Not really. I don't see anything in the record that has basis.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: He said there were documents and the lady judge overlooked them; that's what he said.

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         Illinois reach across the world simply because --
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                    ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Mr. Violi, that's
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         not this case, is it?
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                   MR. VIOLI: It is.
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                    ARBITRATOR ANAYA: It is. Okay.
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                    MR. VIOLI: It is indeed because this
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         is why -- this is why: The states just assume
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ARBITRATOR ANAYA: It is. Okay.

MR. VIOLI: It is indeed because this is why -- this is why: The states just assume that if your product is in their state they have personal jurisdiction over you. That's an exercise of jurisdiction that has never been placed before anywhere in the record books. It was an abuse. They did no research, Professor Anaya, to determine whether they had jurisdiction over Grand River before and when they launched their lawsuits. We saw it today, no jurisdiction -- it's a pattern. I don't know if I have jurisdiction over the Foreign Trade Zone,
Mr. Eckhart said, so did Mr. Thomson, but I'm going to write the letter, anyway.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I don't know if he said that, but I --

MR. VIOLI: Certainly they didn't do

 $\ensuremath{\mathtt{MR.\ VIOLI:}}$ Indeed, between NWS and California.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. So, we have to -- so, we need, I mean what I'm trying -- I'm grappling with -- I mean, I may not agree with his position on the law and the substance and the outcome of the California litigation and I may happen to agree -- I'm not saying I do, I'm just saying I may happen to agree with the Superior Court decision, but that's one thing. Quite another thing is for me to say they were comitting an abuse of authority even taking that position and they're committing an abuse of authority in appealing. I mean, that's quite --

MR. VIOLI: What you'll find on this issue that I find concretely and was stated in the slide by the Government, which is nowhere -- there's no precedent for it anywhere.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No what?

MR. VIOLI: No precedent for it -- is that they assumed jurisdiction.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: If it's found

there.

MR. VIOLI: If the product they assume in rem jurisdiction over the manufacturer if the product is found in a jurisdiction in a state. That, Professor Anaya, there's no precedent for it anywhere.

Now, if the foreign manufacturer commits a tort, makes it defective tire rim or tube; like in the Asahi case in Japan, or valve that goes into a tube that goes into California and when the tire blows in California -- right -- then you look at foreseeability, as Justice O'Connor said, and you have this plurality opinion, I would agree, but when there's no allegation of the commission of a tort but only the need to put money away based on a future potential liability -- when there is no tort, there is no authority for following the jurisdiction in rem over the person wherever his product goes. That is unprecedented. I've never seen it in international law. Certainty, I

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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: That memo. All
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          right. Give it to him.
                     MR. LUDDY: I believe it's core
          document --
                     SPEAKER: No, not the QA --
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Not the Q&A, the
          other one. The other one.
                     MR. WEILER: Professor Anaya, just to
9
          be clear, I didn't--
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                    MR. LUDDY: Core Document 11.
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                     MR. WEILER: I did not want to give you
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          the impression that I think appealing a judgment
13
          is an abuse of authority and no way did I intend
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          to say that.
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                     What I think is happening is a number
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          of state attorneys general seemed to be going out
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          of their way to almost, I would say, in a
18
          vindictive fashion against these Claimants.
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                     MR. VIOLI: I'll read it. Let me --
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                     MR. WEILER: But to be clear, people
21
          are allowed to appeal.
                     MR. VIOLI: I will read that for the
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for it high and low. That is where I think they have abused their authority, by trying to extend jurisdiction in a way that has no basis.

haven't seen it in domestic law and I've looked

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Well, according to you, Mr. Violi, why are they, as it were, according to you, going for you, all these states? What for? What's your explanation?

MR. VIOLI: Competition, Mr. President.
PRESIDENT NARIMAN: But states have no competition.

MR. VIOLI: The tobacco companies that they get their money from under the MSA. It is in all of the papers we've seen so far. We have to reduce the NPMs, take all steps necessary. Remember the NPM, the NAAG memo, take all steps necessary to reduce NPMs, because when you reduce NPMs, you raise the MSA -- OPMs, Phillip Morris, and when you raise them up high, you get \$3 per carton from them.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Do you have that memo, Mr. Luddy.

MR. VIOLI: The NAAG memo.

record, not to get off the point.

These results -- this is the result of the lower payments and the lower sales by Phillip Morris and those companies and the highest sales by our client, NPMs.

"These results underscore the urgency of all states taking steps to deal with the proliferation of NPM sales, including enactment of complementary legislation and allocable share legislation and consideration of other measures designed to serve the interest of the states in avoiding reductions in tobacco settlement payment."

He goes on: "It should be stressed NPMs sales anywhere in the country hurt all states."

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Hurt all of them? MR. VIOLI: Hurt all states.

All payment calculations are done on the basis of cigarette sales nationally. NPMs sales in any state reduce the payments to every other state. All states have an interest in

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construction. So, the whole point is we're not trying to say that a good faith breach in and of itself is cause to find a breach of the minimum standard but rather that it is further evidence, if you will, to help you construe the obligation, should you choose. So, it's the construction as opposed to the right base because the right base has to come from fair and equitable treatment.

I have here some submissions taken from WTO cases in which the Respondent to a certain extent admits or, if you will, stipulates what it considers the purpose of Article 31(3)(c) to be. It acknowledges that the provision is supposed to be used to interpret a particular treaty term, and it does agree that it can apply to agreements.

I would certainly acknowledge, though that in the Banana (ph.) Submission, the point that the U.S. wanted to make was that they thought it should be restricted to custom but nonetheless they did seem to admit that an agreement between two states could have relevance in the WTO treaty, even though the agreement between those states

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A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N
PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay, are we ready?
MR. WEILER: So, we begin, again, with
our march through the legal justification, the
"Why is this a NAFTA claim?", and I've so far gone
through denial of justice and reasonable
expectation and abuse of right.

And now, I'm going to have a look at international human rights and how it may have some bearing on the fair and equitable treatment for protection and security standards. I remember on the first day I did go over Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, and I would submit that it is authority for a Tribunal to look to other sources of law to make a determination as to how to construe a treaty obligation.

I give an example which is actually this interesting exchange between Senator Root and Sir Robinson which I think does encapsulate, even though it's a century old this year, I think from, the case from which it's quoted. The effect of rule of international law is rather a rule of

could be completely outside the WTO framework.

And as -- I'm assuming we all know, but just to be sure the WTO with a Lex Bes E Alis and very well accepted lex specialis, very strong dispute settlement rules built into the treaty mechanism; and yet, nonetheless, despite that fact, the appellate body has consistently ruled that it is still nonetheless a creature of Public International Law and that, therefore, from time to time when interpreting a provision, other parts or other quadrants of Public International Law may be relevant.

So shrimp turtle is another example which I don't have here but there are a number of examples where the appellate body may be interested to know whether or not a convention on environmental protection has been signed by all parties or what have you.

In this context, we would submit that the treaty obligations undertaken by the United States with respect to Haudenosaunee peoples and the obligation it undertook to the British empire

in Jay Treaty and then further in the Treaty of Ghent for the benefit of Haudenosaunee and other indigenous peoples is relevant to the extent that it helps the Tribunal form an opinion of what fair and equitable treatment means with respect to how it is keeping its obligations.

That does not mean, though, that I'm suggesting that the a breach of the Jay Treaty is an instant after breach because that would contradict the third paragraph of the January -- I'm sorry, the July 31st interpretive statement which says that a simple breach of another agreement is not constitutive of a breach of the minimum standard. So, it's clear it's about construing the obligation. It has to be interpretive exercise and no more.

That is, I submit to you, one reason why human rights obligations that --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Excuse me, are you going to get into at some point how, what specifically the implications of the Jay Treaty are?

never conquered they never had to make a treaty of some sort of peace and amnesty. They evolved much like the Two-Row Wampum Belt: They evolved together with our societies.

They don't see this treaty, this Jay
Treaty, as somehow just because it's a little old
that it doesn't matter anymore. But this is a
constitutional democracy that's been around since,
oh, I think it is about six, seven hundred years
now.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yeah, the bar counters the argument are pretty well understood, I think, but do you have, like, authority, and are you saying that this --

MR. WEILER: The authority is the treaty.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay any interpretive court decisions or...

MR. WEILER: The expert submission of Professor Fletcher is the primary authority we use to --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Fletcher or Clinton?

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MR. WEILER: Yes. They are under submissions under --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: This theoretical exposition is -- I think we've heard that. It's always useful to go over things but I think what we're really interested in -- well, speaking for myself -- I should speak for myself, the specifics of how the particular treaty is relevant.

of how the particular treaty is relevant.

MR. WEILER: In this case, the

Claimants are of a strong belief and I think a

very reasonable belief that they have a right to
unhindered commerce and trade, unhindered by both
the Canadian Government which is the successor to
the British Empire and also the United States
Government. They do not accept the United States
Government's argument that simply because they
omitted to continue the protections that were
supposed to be there -- that because they just
omitted them from a customs act that they just
magically disappear -- as far as they're concerned
they're still there and they make the point, and
again, rightfully so, that they never -- they were

MR. WEILER: I'm sorry.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Clinton, right?

MR. WEILER: Clinton, who is an expert
on the Jay Treaty and who provides us with the
authority we believe is necessary.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. Is he arguing
that trade between native peoples across the
border are subject to no regulation?

MR. VIOLI: I believe his statement -ARBITRATOR ANAYA: You said -
"unhindered" was the terminology.

MR. VIOLI: I believe it's across the border in friends wherever situated.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Pardon me.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$ VIOLI: Across the border in friends wherever situated. I am trying to picture --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And "friends"?

MR. VIOLI: Friends wherever situated.

We have the three treatise, right, Jay, Ghent, and
Canandaigua, and we have a situation where the
early 1800s, late 1700s, the location of the

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various members, nations of first nations of the six nations -- first nations of the six nations, then five I believe it was -- throughout North America was not delineated by states or geographic boundaries but in some cases a particular region, but maybe crossed over to more than one region.

We then have the movement of these

We then have the movement of these nations, right, marched across the country or -put the Seneca Cayuga down in Oklahoma, with whom we continued to deal or trade with. It's not across the border but also across the United States.

Now, what is -- as Professor Goldberg I believe would not opine on any treaty right. So. We have -- at least, initially in her first report. We have --

 $\label{eq:ARBITRATOR ANAYA: She did in the reply.} \label{eq:ARBITRATOR ANAYA: She did in the reply.}$

MR. VIOLI: In the rebuttal which I think may have been in the Rejoinder, excuse me.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Whatever you call

it, I'm sorry.

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Mr. Crook?
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 $\tt ARBITRATOR$ CROOK: Mr. Violi, maybe we can take a second and pull out the text of the Jay Treaty.

MR. VIOLI: We could, Mr. --

ARBITRATOR CROOK: That wasn't in any of your -- it wasn't in your Memorial but I guess it is attached as an exhibit to one of your documents.

MR. VIOLI: It is. Why don't we -when we get to it in due course we can take it out, but --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: It in one of the core documents I can't remember where.

MR. VIOLI: Yeah.

ARBITRATOR CROOK: It is in the U.S. documents, I think.

MR. VIOLI: But I wanted to come back with to it with more specificity I wanted to deal with one specific issue that I saw as the issue and you said, what are really the issues where the parties are --

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MR. VIOLI: Yeah, I mean --ARBITRATOR ANAYA: We know what --MR. VIOLI: Professor Clinton gives an opinion and she doesn't reply to it and another brief later which I think procedurally was a little off, but the situation is that the Claimants believe -- and there are cases, the Lezore case and a couple of -- the Carnouth case, although contrasting it we, have the State Department still recognizing the Jay Treaty, so we have confusion among the various branches of the Federal Government as to whether the Jay is in full effect or was restored, whether it was restored for purposes of just passage or for also commerce. And the key thing as I see it is -- and one of the big points is, well, is this common

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What?

among Indians not in bales, right?

MR. VIOLI: Not in bales. At that time, when you transported in trade and product, commerce, typically the archeological evidence says they would use bales to carry -- yes

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, I -- he said -- Mr. Weiler said the position of the clients is subject to no regulation in their trade across borders.

MR. VIOLI: That's our position. That's the Claimant's position.

 $\label{eq:arbitrator} \mbox{ARBITRATOR ANAYA:} \quad \mbox{Right, no} \\ \mbox{regulation.}$

MR. VIOLI: When you're dealing with travel and you're dealing with commerce, it was unfettered commerce. But when we're dealing with -- since there there's no border, right, between the United States and Canada. That was the principal focus and idea of these treatise.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yes, I'm somewhat familiar with the history.

MR. VIOLI: Right.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: But I'm interested in how -- what the position is now and believe me I'm not being hostile. I'm just trying to understand --

MR. VIOLI: You mean the positions now

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          in this proceeding or among the Claimants or...
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                                                                          something and I was going to get into the other.
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                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: In this proceeding,
                                                                                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, we're talking
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                                                                3
         yeah.
                                                                          about -- let's say we don't want to limit it to
 4
                                                                          that --
                     MR. VIOLI: That there's a right among
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                                                                                     MR. VIOLI: It's just -- okay, so we
          these Claimants.
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                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Unfettered with no
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                                                                          went into tobacco--
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          state regulation.
                                                                                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: --but we extend it
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                                                                8
                     MR. VIOLI: No state regulation.
                                                                          to this. Yeah.
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                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Or federal
                                                                                     MR. VIOLI: Okay. Let's say we applied
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                                                                10
          regulation?
                                                                          that product --
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                     MR. VIOLI: The treaty says free from
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                                                                                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: To commercial sales
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                                                                          of tobacco in significant quantities usually --
          molestation or without -- shall be able to freely
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                                                                                     MR. VIOLI: Not uncommon to Indians and
          pass and trade. And we're talking about trade
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                                                                14
          among, first, Native Americans in North America.
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                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, I understand.
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                                                                                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, but we're using
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                     MR. VIOLI: So, really the only
                                                                          various -- yeah, I'm not contesting that it's not
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          regulation at issue is tax -- in this case we're
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                                                                          uncommon, always, but I mean, you are talking
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          talking about contrabanding or whatever.
                                                               18
                                                                          about commercial sales of tobacco across the
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                     ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Right, but if we
                                                                         border using various means of transportation and
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          take this interpretation in order to sustain this
                                                                          so forth.
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          position it seems like that interpretation would
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                                                                                     MR. VIOLI: Indian to Indian, right.
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          have broader implications.
                                                                          Indian to Indian or Indian to native tribe or
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_ PAGE 968 -_ PAGE 966 __ 966 1 MR. VIOLI: Not necessarily. 1 sovereign triable in the case. 2 2 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No? Okay. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yeah, it involves 3 MR. VIOLI: Because we're talking about that, but it involves -- as you know, we need to 4 the commerce, right? We're talking about whether paint an accurate picture of it and I'm not 5 5 a duty imposed or excise, and back then that's the predetermining the outcome of it I'm just saying 6 way you burdened commerce among sovereigns or 6 that, with this characteristics -- trade with 7 persons doing business: Duty, excise, or imposed. these characteristics you're saying is exempt from 8 That, I think a logical extension is, no state 8 any kind of regulation. 9 excise tax. The logical extension is no escrow in 9 MR. VIOLI: I don't know if I have to 10 this circumstance. It's in the form of duty, 10 go that far with this proceeding --11 11 excise, or imposed. It's a burden on the ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yeah, that's what 12 commerce. 12 I'm trying ---13 13 What I wanted to speak to you, MR. VIOLI: --I don't have to go that 14 14 Professor, and perhaps I'm jumping -- because far --15 15 that's the thing that screams out to me is the ARBITRATOR ANAYA: That's what I 16 16 idea that -- I mean, it's the notion that this understood it -- okay. 17 should be limited to peltries and to perhaps bales 17 MR. VIOLI: Yeah, we don't have to go 18 18 of corn or tobacco as opposed to the commerce now? that far. 19 19 No treaty --It's exempt from state regulation --20 20 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: But that's not what ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. 21 21 we're talking about. MR. VIOLI: -- state regulation that's 22 at issue here. MR. VIOLI: Okay. You're talking about

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MR. WEILER: And that's clear to the point. We don't have to go that far but we're stating the Claimant's --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I'm trying to get the basis for interpreting the treaty to get precisely to that point. Go ahead, sorry.

MR. WEILER: No, no, that's fine.

The Claimant's position is that unfettered means unfettered and it should be unfettered. They do pay federal excise taxes as in the record; we know that. So, we know that we're not talking about federal regulation in this case. We're talking about state regulation.

So, clearly it's not necessary to construe the Jay Treaty with respect to federal powers with -- in this case. It's not germane. The question is state authority for this case.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: But you have to concede we need to come to a principle basis for getting to that precise interpretation, and that's what I'm sort of grappling with.

MR. WEILER: Yes, and the principle

Jay Treaty were restored, and as throughout the 18th and 19th century, and you look for a history of the federal government taxing or putting a duty on any trade or commerce of the six Nations, and the same thing with the Yakuma in Washington under their border to border, ocean to ocean treaty, you see no imposition of a duty, an excise, an import or any kind of tax.

That imposition or that -- I think that's the way you have to interpret a treaty when it's written and give it room for expansion but what the parties, and particularly the people that didn't draft it, which are the Native Americans, what was their interpretation and understanding? And they perceived throughout a long history, trading in tobacco, trading in a number of product and there is no state tax or even federal imposed duty or excise imposed on that trade. So, as a point of reference I, think that's where the Tribunal should begin and I think Professor Clinton -- I mean, obviously, I cannot speak as professor Clinton would, but his report, I think,

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should be unfettered.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: But if we go unfettered, that would seem to be unfettered vis-à-vis the federal government as well.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ WEILER: Well, and that is the Claimant's position.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: It is the position.

MR. WEILER: The Claimant's position is that it is unfettered.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay.

MR. WEILER: It's not necessary in this chase to go that far but that is definitely their position. They do not recognize the border between Canada and the United States. It's imposed and their territory is their territory and that treaty is pretty much one of the only vestiges left of the comity that was supposed to be shown between the United States and the Haudenosaunee.

MR. VIOLI: I think in that respect, if you go back in time to the early 1800s when the Jay Treaty was restored or the rights under the

makes it clear we would stand by the way he's presented the argument in the report, and certainly maintain those arguments here.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Thanks.

MR. VIOLI: And one of the things that is -- again, not being an expert, but Professor Clinton talked about the Jay Treaty -- and many treaties acknowledged that which is inherent. I mean, a treaty sometimes doesn't give you a right or confer a right upon you as much as it acknowledges the right, a right since time immemorial, I think, what is written, but what is it that's acknowledged, and I think if we look back in time we would see that an unfettered trade, commerce, all across the North American continent certainly for 100 or 150 years, and nothing that would detract from it in a way that would suggest that the states could impose this particular regulatory burden is something the states haven't done before in this context as we submit Professor Clinton has stated it well that would be a protected trade under these various

Mr. --

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treaties.

MR. WEILER: We would have preferred to have Professor Clinton here but the Respondent as is its right, chose not to call him and we didn't call Professor Goldberg, so it does leave us a little wanting to answer your questions because I think we're going to, in a certain extent, referring you to our experts.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yeah, that's fine.
MR. WEILER: To go on, this one is
actually more tender than the last one.

It's very difficult to talk about the obligation to consult without unfortunately bumming into Professor Anaya's opinion. So, I do apologize for citing. It's not the kind of form I like to show, but honestly it's very difficult to do that, the root article seems to come from that one book.

That being said, though, I think that there's very strong basis for it as you see in our memorials. I think that our memorials do a good job of explaining why we think consultation

demonstrated on the record with respect to other attorneys general from the various nations that might have been interested. One of the witnesses, I believe it was the first day, didn't apparently know that attorneys general actually existed on First Nations' territory which was a little surprising to say the least but it may explain to a certain extent the level of disconnect that seems to exist between the state regulators and our Claimants.

It seems like the state regulators really dropped the ball when it came to just being diligent about consulting the people they should have consulted before they started doing what they did.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Excuse me,
Mr. Weiler, what authority do you have that the
duty to consult, even if it is part of customary
international law, extends to consultations with
indigenous individuals as opposed to indigenous
Nation or people itself through its representative
institutions?

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obligation has formed as a matter of customary International law. It's important to note again, though, that what I'm asking to you do for the Claimants is not to say that, because there is a breach of a customary international norm, which my friend will contest is a customary international norm does not mean that you get a breach of the NAFTA but rather we have a number of different avenues which cumulatively, certainty, lead to the results that we want. The outrageous conduct when cumulatively added breaches a number of customary international law doctrines and rules and we would submit that this is one of them.

And in this case, I can't stress enough the frustration of the Claimants about not being consulted at the various stages of these many years of measures. As the Chairman asked, why didn't they ask the NPMs, and specifically, why didn't they ask by far the largest and clearly a very important NPM, the largest Native American NPM, why didn't they consult them and why isn't there any consultation -- there's no consultation

MR. WEILER: I'd refer you to our Memorial. I would like to actually take a peak at it, though, because one of the human rights treaties actually --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Just to make clear, you are not attributing that to me, anything I've written.

MR. WEILER: No, no. I just -- no, it's -- let's just see if I can find the particular treaty.

MR. VIOLI: In the meantime, leaving aside the indigenous aspect of it, the record is replete with consultations between the states proposing the measures and the big tobacco companies --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: That's not the issue

MR. VIOLI: (Off microphone.)

MR. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yeah, I know, but that's not the issue.

MR. VIOLI: If there was an obligation to consult I'm just saying it hasn't fallen upon

the states --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: You are asserting an obligation in customary international law to consult with indigenous peoples and extending it to indigenous individuals, that's what I'm interested in, and I'm not making a determination it exists or arguing that it doesn't exist right now I'm trying to find out what the authority is.

MR. WEILER: I understand. I'm trying to get the authority. I understand, Professor, and I--I chose the wrong computer. The other one I actually had in the note the actual paragraphs. I could have just grabbed right to -- I apologize for the delay. I think I'll get back to it.

We'll get back to it but there is a treaty, a human rights treaty obligation, which we submit articulates a standard that does involve individuals as well as sovereigns and again I would --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I'm just curious, I mean, how do you then see these authorities that you're putting up? You don't have to comment on

Enterprises, that within Mohawk social political structures that that would be the way --

MR. WEILER: I would like to get back to you on that question, if I may, Professor Anaya.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I'm telling you, if you're going to invoke the duty to consult, from my point of view, this is critical because it's --

MR. WEILER: Yes, I understand.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And just to put this up there and then have us make that leap is asking a good bit of us.

MR. VIOLI: I would note that I don't have it in the record, but there is a letter from the Mohawk Attorney General -- Seneca Attorney General, Jim Gildersleeve who wrote a letter -- I can get it if the Tribunal so wishes commenting about how the Seneca were never consulted in the context of this MSA, were never asked to participate, or its members to participate and/or negotiate or, and he raised issue with -- and actually I believe the letter --

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the reference to me, but how do you see the reference up here which is the duty to consult with indigenous people's which is about indigenous peoples and their own representative institutions? How do you see that? I mean, you put it up here for us and by doing that you're representing that it extends here, so, at least, if could you

articulate what that is.

MR. WEILER: Yes, yes. The way we articulate it is that, again, we return to the nature of the socioeconomic structure and a governmental -- or the state structure of the sovereigns, and in respect of the Mohawk and the Seneca, they have a more diversified socioeconomic structure such that the rights are not all held in the state. The state being the tribal council.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Do you have any evidence in the record of this so we could understand that the duty to consult with indigenous people is in the context. The Mohawk people really is a right that applies through representative institutions like the Grand River

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ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Is that part of your argument?

MR. WEILER: Yes, it would be. Okay, and I think he goes into the --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I understand that, and yeah, that's a different thing and that's a point that I understand.

MR. VIOLI: Actually, he raised it and I thought he raised some of the legal principles but --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: But you keep talking about the failure to consult your client. You repeat that and it's in your Memorial which is your main argument and that is what I'm -- I understand the other and that does fall within what I understand to be the duty to consult that arises in treaties and is developing within customary international law or has developed however way you want to characterize it.

MR. WEILER: I do very much understand your question and I would like to give you a full answer, and I will before this hearing ends.

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ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I would appreciate it if you could focus on it and not sort of -bringing in -- conflating these things. I understand the other points you want to make association with it, but this is a particular point that has to do with your argument that's, in my view, a key part of your argument in this regard.

MR. VIOLI: I understand.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I want to give your argument a full consideration, that's the gist of my questioning, it's not to be dismissive about it it's to be clear about it, to the extent you have represented that what I have written has something to do with this duty that you're talking about when in fact it's an extension of that or a difference on that.

MR. WEILER: We're exactly copacetic on the same page, and you'll have your answer.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I need you to be sensitive about that, as well --

22 MR. WEILER: I am very sensitive about not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceeding in accordance with the principles of due process and by no principle legal systems of the world.

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It does, we assert, demonstrate even a partial acceptance on the part of the Respondent that procedural fairness extends beyond the judicial phase. I understand that the word "adjudicatory" is in there. We don't need to get into administrative law minutia with respect to what's adjudicatory and what's decision making but it's clear it does involve administration and executive -- the exercise of executive powers.

Now, we think it also confirms the interpretation we're suggesting you adopt with respect to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention because it's talking about principle legal systems of the world and it's talking about the notion of due process being embodied in them. So, it seems to me that's a definite reference to principle, that's 381 sub -- it's either two or B, I can't remember which -- but that's principles

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it --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: You put my name up there representing I said something and then extended it to something else and I'm having to bring out the distinction, okay?

MR. WEILER: Yes.

MR. MONTOUR: May I say something I have something to reserve that I testified that he's not --

MR. FELDMAN: Mr. President, we haven't yet called Mr. Montour.

MR. VIOLI: He just wanted to make a point he would like to speak on his own behalf with respect to these matters, that's all he said, and not necessarily through Mr. Weiler, and as a Claimant, I think he has that right on this particular matter -- when you call him obviously.

MR. WEILER: With respect to the interpretation of the minimum standard, we look to the language of the United States model bilateral investment treaty, which I have up there. Fair and equitable treatment includes the obligation

that's not customary. It doesn't sound like a customary international rule I'm seeing there. I'm seeing it referenced to principles. So, I would submit that the only way that would make sense is if we are looking at principles through the prism of Article 31(3)(c).

And it seems that U.S. investment treaty practice, therefore, explicitly supports due process as this fundamental concept that demonstrates that we can also look to principles with respect to the remainder of this case on 1105, and I'm sorry if I am going on about this, but I think it's very important to set the theoretical groundwork to be able to show you why this is a NAFTA claim, because there's been a lot said about the minimum standard and how one reaches it. And I think it's important to see that there is still a place for Article 31(3)(c).

We covered some of this already, so I think I can probably slip past the slide but I want to see -- it makes the point that I was making earlier. The Claimants really were

surprised that they didn't -- -hat there wasn't more of a cooperative regulatory format, and I would point to the Pope & Talbot damages decision where actually that was the kind of language that the Tribunal used, that one day what seemed to be cooperative, normal regulation became adversarial and that change was attributed to the state. And we would submit that if there ever was a period where this was a normal regulatory environment and I'm not sure it was, but I would submit that we have seen the animus from the deputy attorneys general with respect to the client -- sorry, the Claimant and it's adversarial -- it's clearly adversarial. This is not cooperative regulation. Even if we don't need to go as far as saying that it is a duty to consult as a customary international rule, this is just a simple good faith, which again informs how we look at fair and equitable treatment.

MR. VIOLI: I wanted to mention the complementary legislation at this point, if I may. What we said before, with the complementary -- you

person who bought them from you but somebody sold Seneca cigarettes in my state. I deem you to be the manufacturer regardless of jurisdiction. I deem you must pay this amount and you must do the following before your product can be sold in my state. Judge, jury, and executioner. No due process no reasonable opportunity to be heard before the measure is enforced. And in that respect, just one small respect among many, we believe there's been a failure of fair and equitable treatment here.

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MR. WEILER: That completes our analysis of the minimum standard of treatment and its roots and its root in customary international law and principles in international law, and the ways in which we believe these other doctrines and principles can and should be used to interpret that provision.

I now move to the definition of investment enterprise which was another question the Chairman had in the first day.

In this regard. I think it's one thing

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remember how I described how the Escrow Statute had worked before? It was enacted, product was sold in jurisdiction, and then the state would come in and require compliance by making a payment or bringing a lawsuit in which the manufacturer could contest the regulatory measure. That's how the law was between '99 and roughly 2002 vis-à-vis Grand River. The states would make a claim, threat of prosecution, bring on the prosecution or the civil action, and then Grand River would have had its day in court to litigate and deal with those issues. What the complementary legislation did, in effect, and we mentioned this, is it made the Attorney General something that we normally don't see under administrative law. It made the Attorney General the judge, the jury, and the executioner. Under the complementary legislation, the Attorney General says unfettered, complete and absolute discretion, I think you are a manufacturer and you sold this many cigarettes in my state. Granted you didn't sell them, but

somebody sold them, and granted it was not the

we should note which doesn't come out often until -- well. Until this stage when you're doing an oral argument. There's two issues when it comes to investment. The one question is, do you meet the threshold to be here and that's one the Claimant had to bear the burden of proving. The other one, the other notion of investment has to do with causation and damages.

There are a number of ways in which one can surmount that threshold test, and we submit we have demonstrated a number of ways in which we've done that. To be clear, though, when we talk about the investment in terms of the impairment of the investment, we have decided that it is best to measure the brand which is a type of investment and that's why you see the brand analysis.

So, just to be clear, but now before one gets there, you recall that my friends were asking Mr. Wilson about why this \$27 million figure would still be there. This is the incremental cost of the various assets used by Grand River in Ohsweken to produce cigarettes for

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the United States market exclusively.

The reason that that's there is because we have two claims, two types of claim. We have an Article 1116 claim, which is a claim by the investor on its own behalf and we have an Article 1117 claim, which is a claim by the investor on behalf of an investment enterprise. To be clear, the \$27 million claim is a claim by the investor, Grand River enterprises. The impairment claims that we're making are Article 1117 claims made by the other Claimants on behalf of the enterprise which they operate on Seneca territory for the promotion of the brand.

Now, I'm going to attempt to demonstrate to you why we are confident that we have an investment enterprise which is an association on Seneca land.

First, the definition as to why we get there. We're talking about an enterprise because the definition of investment includes an enterprise. We refer to Article 201 the general definition provision to figure out what enterprise Well, Mr. Jerry Montour, Mr. Arthur Montour, Mr. Hill, they're engaged in a business endeavor. It's very clear that they're engaged in a business endeavor and they have been form a number of years and that's to promote these brands. It's also very clear that, in the tobacco business, brand is everything. For example, we see the -- and we do have this and again, my colleagues are recording this to give you the exact pinpoint references -we do have on the record documentation from the majors in other jurisdictions, other countries, demonstrating how seriously they take their investment in brand in response to the proposal of plain paper packaging regulation, the idea that you no longer put your mark on the product but instead it's blank. Maybe it says your name, but there's no style, no symbol, no trademark, no colors. They're vehement in their opposition to that. And in the case of Canada when that was taking place, they didn't pull any punches. They made it very clear, they would bring a Chapter 11-case if -- these are American Corporations in

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means and this is a very inclusive choice. Investment enterprise means any entity -- any entity -- constituted or organized, and key there, "organized," under applicable law, whether or not for profit, whether or not privately or governmentally owned and it includes these various species, corporation, trust, partnership, proprietorship, joint venture, and other association. We submit that, if you recall, the object and purposes of this treaty which is to protect investment and to promote investment, that you should construe this provision broadly and purposefully. That doesn't mean I'm suggesting that you're in any way departing from the text. The text is very clear it says "association" but I would submit that if it was a toss up, this one goes to the -- the tie goes to the runner. In this case you would want to, if you have two choices of interpretation, both seem equally solid, you would want to choose the one that more befits the object and purpose of the treaty.

So, what is the investment enterprise?

Canada -- they would bring a Chapter 11 case if plain paper packaging came in. That makes perfect sense to us, because that's the nature of the business. Cigarettes are essentially a tube with a filter and a blend, a proprietary blend, of tobacco.

You know, it's not that hard for someone to go use a machine and start making them; that's not where the investment is, that's not where the money is. That's in building a brand and it takes time it takes a lot of time, and we submit that these three investors have done that. They have created an investment in the brand and they have done it via their association together.

Now, Professor Goldberg, in her criticism of this approach, tries to draw some strict interpretation of the language of the applicable law and we think it's necessary to go over some of that.

Very clear, that once again it's evidenced on the record that the Seneca Nation licenses NWS, that NWS is 100 percent owned by

Arthur Montour and that he is 100 percent member of the Seneca Nation.

And as necessary, because Article 2.201(a) of the Business Code for the Seneca Nation says that has to be the case and so it is; that's for a wholesaler.

Article 1.109 very clearly vests jurisdiction with the Peacemakers Court, and we highlighted the word association to demonstrate that it's that same word: It's an association. It is recognized in this legal system that one can have an association as differentiated from a firm, partnership, corporation, business entity.

It goes onto point out exactly how -it does personal jurisdiction, does subject matter
jurisdiction, does territorial jurisdiction. You
see it's broad and it's even more important to
note that the parties themselves and their
cross-licensing arrangements contemporaneously at
that time cited Seneca law. They fully intended
-- they certainly didn't fully intend to fight
each other, but if there ever was something it was

That's the contribution. That, by the way loan -- that's defined. I find it frustrating personally as a small business person to see the Respondent -- counsel for the Respondent questioning -- well they say that, you know, there's no specific maturity date. Where's your specific loan agreement? A loan is pretty straightforward. A loan is when somebody gives to another person something of value either expecting it back or expecting it back with interest. The NAFTA provision doesn't specify any more than that. It leaves it at loan and says it has to have a maturity date more than three years. It doesn't specify it has to be in writing or any other such thing.

So, I would submit that not only is this loan evidence of the joint commitment of these Claimants to this association that they have which is governed by Seneca law, it is also in and of itself clearly meeting the threshold of investment here, that loan in and of itself.

So, the next point to make is that my

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going to go to the Seneca Peacemakers Court and it was going to be decided under Seneca Nation law.

We show you the definition of business. We show you the simple common dictionary definition of what an association is. We submit that this is -- it is baby steps but it seems important in light of professor Goldberg's criticism that we demonstrate that all of those steps are followed.

So what do we have here? We clearly have three men who are in control of their corporations, their two separate corporations. They clearly have a shared and collective interest in these trademarks succeeding, in the brands that the trademark supports. Succeeding. Significant commitments on the record, capital, so much capital committed by these interim -- I'm sorry, loans which were originally going to be of five-year duration and ended up seven or eight years ended up being. But it's very clear that NWS would not have been able to do that alone, they needed the loan from GRE.

friend mentioned -- they say, hey, wait a second this association doesn't have a license and everybody has to have a license. Well, no, actually, not true. NWS is the exclusive wholesaler of these products and when we look at the Seneca business -- I'm sorry, the Second Nation Business Code or their fuel and -- Tobacco and Fuel Ordinance it's very clear you don't actually -- if you're an association with someone who has that license and your association is not selling cigarettes in and of itself, which it isn't here, it's promoting a brand -- that's the venture -- it doesn't need a license to do that. The Seneca code specifically says in the case of a partnership, association, or joint venture no business license shall be required of any partner whose not selling cigarettes.

And there is no evidence on the record that Mr. Montour, Jerry Montour, or Kenneth Hill is selling cigarettes in the United States, much less the Seneca Nation. There is no evidence of that individually.

What there is a lot of evidence I would submit is that these three partners -- I'm sorry, strike that -- these three investors are in association together for a purpose. And I note what I see in the preamble and then again in the early text of this business statute.

The Nation couldn't be more clear about what it's saying. It's explaining it has sovereign inherent authority, and I think Mr. Violi made the point that's probably worth repeating that the Claimants don't so much look to these older treaties as a source of rights but rather a confirmation of what's already their's. Much like the original Two-Row Wampum Belt between the Dutch and the Haudenosaunee when they were the Five Nations it symbolizes inherent sovereignty they already hold and the relationship they hold with the other sovereign. We, in common law terms, so often I think treat treaties as if they're statutes and think that's actually where the power comes from but it's more complicated than that, and I think it was necessary for me to

clear right there in Article 1-103(a)(ii) that the purpose of this code is to permit the orderly initiation of new businesses.

I'm sorry to Professor Goldberg that the Seneca Nation didn't decide to have a real fancy incorporation statute, but that's their right. They don't have to have a big fancy incorporation statute to be able to validly designate what is and isn't a business on their territory.

And we would submit to you that this language here is very clear. And with that, actually, I'm going to go back to another issue of investment, but I have to go back this far. There we go.

So, I've covered the loan. I had a point to tell me to make sure I covered that.

One of the things I want to stress is we really think that if you look -- if the Tribunal looks at the evidence on the record, that the real life facts speak for themselves. The whole point, the thrust of a tobacco enterprise is

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just clarify that on behalf of the Claimants.

So Canandaigua Treaty, and forgive me for mangling that, is also cited by the Seneca Nation, so it's very clear they know exactly what they're doing when they pass this business regulation. They cite the treaty of 1794 that cites that famous phrase, the United States will never claim, same, nor disturb them or either the six Nations nor their Indian friends residing thereupon, and united with them in the free use and enjoyment of their land. That's why the Claimants say no, federal -- no federal regulation either. Again, we don't need to go that for that case but they're very serious about that.

Now, this one I felt a little -- I was surprised at with respect to Professor Goldberg because she point to these other statutes, these other First Nation statutes and other parts of North America and she demonstrates how they have these very elaborate systems for quantifying and validating what is and isn't an enterprise. With respect, that's not very respectful. It's pretty

to establish and support and build equity in the tobacco brand. That's why it is so deadly for a brand to be taken off the shelf even for two weeks.

Yes, Professor Weiler.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Clearly --

MR. WEILER: I'm sorry, no, I'm Professor Weiler, you're Professor Anaya.

 $\label{eq:ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Yes, I think that's still the case.} \\$

MR. WEILER: Could we trade? Actually, I would like to trade.

 $\label{eq:ARBITRATOR ANAYA:} \mbox{ I've been on that side plenty of times.}$

But back to the point on business association, I understand you say it's an investment because it's a business association under Seneca law; is that right?

MR. WEILER: Yes, it's a business enterprise, their association together.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Do we get -- MR. WEILER: They are working in

concert together to promote the brand is an association.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: And hence it's an investment under NAFTA.

MR. WEILER: Hence, it is an investment enterprise under NAFTA.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Do we have to find that Seneca --that it is a business enterprise or association under Seneca law in order to find that it's an investment under NAFTA or is that just one of --

MR. WEILER: It's one of the ways.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: One of the ways.

MR. WEILER: We thought it was worth
going through the details of that because, you
know, we've had a lot of kicks at the can in this
case in terms of -- and by the way, I'm thinking
probably it is a particular statement of claim
where we might find the good faith. Remember that
was a long time ago.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: That's one of the ways. Are there any other independent ways if we

it and so we felt it behooved us to address it.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I understand the
Respondent is taking issue with all these other
arguments, as well.

MR. WEILER: None of which required the opinion of an expert, but we're more than happy -- I mean we have 15 hours and we're --

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. No, no. Okay. Well, all right.

MR. WEILER: --more than happy to spend time on any of the investment issues you'd like to discuss.

 $\label{eq:ARBITRATOR ANAYA: So do you have --} are there any -- sorry.$

MR. VIOLI: The other reason we wanted to demonstrate that it was an association, a business association, an investment enterprise, among Native Americans and governed by Native American law, in this case Seneca law, is because -- and I remember dealing with this issue -- should any one or more of these individuals or the companies try to attain an Indian trader statute.

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didn't find --

MR. WEILER: The loan is another independent way. The brand is another independent way. There's more, I just have to turn my mind to them because I'm fixated on those ones. Do either of you two want to name one of the other ones?

MR. VIOLI: I think under any law, certainty U.S. law, the trademark licensing agreement, Professor Anaya, with the attendant exclusivity to use the trademark for purposes having the exclusive right to manufacture cigarettes for the U.S. market, the contract manufacturing relationship among them, I think evidence is their association as a matter of even domestic law.

ARBITRATOR ANAYA: You seem to put a lot of emphasis on the assertion that it's a business association under Seneca law. Is that because you think it's the best argument for finding this as investment under NAFTA.

MR. WEILER: No it's because Professor Goldberg, in the final Rejoinder, took issue with

And when I researched the law, Indian trader statute really applied -- particularly to non-native enterprises doing business on Indian land. And so, what I think this did and the agreement I mentioned before says it governed by Seneca Nation law, what it does is it reinstilled in them in their mind for their own understanding, that they were really dealing in -- maybe it's misplaced and I use it wrong and forgive me -- what I call Nation-to-Nation commerce. I view Nation-to-Nation commerce, perhaps incorrectly, but I think it's still nonetheless protected.

When a member of the Seneca Nation deals with the Coeur d'Alene or the Isleta Pueblo, either directly with those tribes or nations or with their tribal-owned distributors or with their tribal-licensed entities. Including entities that are owned by tribal members. That's what we've used generally to mean Nation-to-Nation. Maybe it doesn't mean that in the real Indian law sense but certainly when we have association among First Nations members and their businesses constituted

SHEET 65 PAGE 1005 -PAGE 1007 1005 1007 1 and certainly their relationship governed by 1 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I'm not arguing with 2 2 Nation law and they trade with their friends or your interpretation. 3 3 other nations, I think it, what we understood and MR. VIOLI: No, other than Professor 4 what they understood and what I understood them to Clinton's -- I mean, discussion of native law, but 5 5 understand is that it really -- it was really a 6 6 focus it was an intent to deal in Nation-to-Nation ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, no. He's 7 commerce, to have their relationships and this discussing Federal Indian Law; right? 8 business constitute or come within 8 MR. VIOLI: Yeah, this is the dilemma 9 Nation-to-Nation commerce the way they understood 9 we found, Professor Anaya --10 10 it and I understood it. So, that's why we mention ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Just please --11 it here, but it's not precluded as being 11 MR. WEILER: No, we did not have an 12 12 association under domestic law, individuals elder --13 13 setting up a --MR. VIOLI: No, see, it presupposes we 14 14 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. Yeah, that could have done -- this is what --15 15 was one point. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: No, it doesn't 16 16 Okay, but as to this argument that it's presuppose you could have done it: I'm perfectly 17 a business association under Seneca law, do you 17 18 have any -- is anything in the record -- I don't 18 MR. VIOLI: We tried to. 19 19 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: --willing to hear recall seeing it -- any kind of expert opinion and 20 20 I don't mean it has to be a legal expert, or why could not have of done it. Yeah, I mean, 21 21 believe me -expert trained in U.S. law but an elder or some

(Simultaneous discussion.)

_ PAGE 1006 _ _ PAGE 1008 _ 1 matter? I mean, you're advancing interpretation 1 MR. VIOLI: That's what I want to do, I 2 2 of Seneca law. want to tell you why. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: -- I understand you 3 MR. VIOLI: Yes. 4 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: So I'm wondering if, 5 5 you know, often, in many justice systems or MR. VIOLI: I'm sorry. 6 indigenous justice systems, you have people who ARBITRATOR ANAYA: I'm sorry. I 'm 7 are authorized or authorities in the law of that, sorry. Please. 8 and so we look to the people or the elders or 8 Look, please don't prejudge what I'm 9 other kinds of indigenous authorities to give 9 trying to say, I'm trying to say this in a 10 expert opinions. Sometimes it's touchy because 10 sensitive way. I understand how sometimes this 11 11 those matters are somewhat private or sensitive can not be an easy thing to do for a number of 12 otherwise, but in any case I'm asking, do you have 12 reasons. I'm just asking if you have any such --13 13 any kind of -- such evidence in the record of MR. WEILER: We do not have --14 14 Seneca -- or is it just the argument you're ARBITRATOR ANAYA: --or if I just have 15 15 presenting to us on the basis of your own to rely -- we just have to rely on your own 16 16 interpretations of the code and the sociology or interpretations as lawyers. 17 17 political make-up or authority of the Nation? MR. WEILER: You have to rely. 18 18 MR. VIOLI: It's consistent with the ARBITRATOR ANAYA: On you as lawyers. 19 19 plain terms of the Seneca code. MR. WEILER: Yes, you have --20 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Okay. So you don't 20 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: --then it's a 21 21 have it. different kind of analysis put into place. 22 MR. VIOLI: We don't. MR. WEILER: Yes, that is what we have.

authority in Seneca law that has opined about this

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We do not have an elder's opinion -
ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Now, then, my next

question is -
MR. WEILER: --and there were very few

-- there were no court cases for this -
Arbitrator ANAYA: My next question is,

MR. VIOLI: Sorry, Professor, I apologize greatly.

now you can --

is there any reason for that, and hence you can --

It's never been a dispute before there was no dispute and there's never been a dispute that we've been able to find in a Peacemakers Court or otherwise, but we endeavor to ask a Peacemaker for a declaration. They don't have a declaratory judgment or declaratory rights statute that would have allowed us to get without some kind of controversy -- if this controversy was there, we were told, we would be able to get a declaration. Ironically, that's what the status of the U.S. law was in the original court system of the Justice Act. Unless there was a case or

1011 MR. WEILER: That's for the record. ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Just so you know, I wouldn't require it be a lawyer, I mean, in the sense that we, you know, or that the western world thinks of lawyers. It's just someone with due expertise on Seneca law and authorized by Seneca. MR. WEILER: Back to speaking. Sorry. PRESIDENT NARIMAN: One question Mr. Weiler. MR. WEILER: Oh, yes. PRESIDENT NARIMAN: (Off microphone) --is trading activity an investment? MR. WEILER: In this case it is because we're talking about the promotion of the establishment and promotion of a brand. The word "trading" is coming from these treaties that are hundreds of years old. So, in one sense, when one calls oneself --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: I'm not talking of treaties. I'm saying, quite apart from the treaty the aspects of it, I assume you had nothing to do with the Indian tribes, et cetera or Indian

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1 controversy pending in that Tribunal you couldn't 2 get --3 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Which Tribunal? 4 MR. VIOLI: Peacemakers Court. 5 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: Peacemakers Court. 6 We hired a Seneca lawyer who practiced 7 in the Peacemaker, and that's what we found. I 8 apologize trying to chomp at the bit to get that 9 out to you, but we did in earnest try to get a 10 declaration or finding and they said, we'd love 11 to, but we're bound by our jurisdictional 12 limitations which don't allow us to give a 13 declaratory judgment in that respect unless there 14 was a case in --15 MR. WEILER: Just to be for the record, 16 the fellow -- I think his name was Jeffrey that 17 was helping -- I can't remember his last name --18 he actually is not a lawyer; he's an advocate. 19 MR. VIOLI: Yeah, they have advocates. 20 They don't have lawyers. 21 ARBITRATOR ANAYA: That's not 22 determinative.

Nation. Is a trading activity, simpliciter (ph), within a particular state or a nation an investment? I mean, do you trade in cigarettes or do you manufacture them within this territory? You don't. You trade in them. Now, is trading activity an investment?

MR. WEILER: Trading without more is

MR. WEILER: Trading without more is not investment.

 $\label{eq:president nariman: That's what I} \ensuremath{\text{\textbf{wanted}}} \ensuremath{\text{\textbf{to}}} \ensuremath{\text{\textbf{know.}}}$

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ WEILER: It requires something more such as the loan --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Something more. What is that something more in your

case?

MR. WEILER: The one example, there is this association that we've been discussing which is an enterprise established under Seneca law which qualifies under the investment code -- I'm sorry, the investment definition.

The next one is the seven-year loan of inventory in kind from the manufacturer arm to the

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distributor arm which we have evidence on the record stating was necessary to make the whole operation work. So, and this loan, we chart -the charts are in the record, again. It went into the high millions for many periods of time. So, and it even did have a credit limit. Admittedly, I think the credit limit -- the first time I saw the credit limit was about five years in which maybe is because the evidence is they thought it would take five years and then when I was looking at the records I started finally seeing -- about five years in I saw there's a credit limit that can't go above this amount. Again, sounds like a loan to me. So, the fact that they did not give them millions of dollars but instead advanced them millions of dollars of cigarettes without asking for the money right away, that's a loan in kind, and that's a very big commitment of capital. It's a very big investment, and it was necessary for this operation to work.

MR. VIOLI: Mr. President. May I add under the investment, we have one of the

all constituting physical assets in the territory.

MR. WEILER: Yes, Mr. Crook?

ARBITRATOR CROOK: Factual

clarification on what Mr. Violi said about the 50 million.

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I was a little confused from the description. Is that Grand River's money? Is that Tobaccoville's money that was secured by a security interest in product that you shipped to Tobaccoville? Whose money is that?

MR. VIOLI: The money is money that's held for the benefit of various states because of Grand River being the manufacturer. Now --

ARBITRATOR CROOK: I'm sorry, Mr. Violi, let me try to be more precise.

What is the source of the funds? Who cut the check? Did Grand River cut the check or Tobaccoville cut the check?

MR. VIOLI: Actually, it's done through our royalty. So, it would be Grand River's money and Tobaccoville's money. The bank account and the escrow agreement that governs the bank account

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1 Claimants, Mr. Montour, Arthur Montour, he owns a 2 company situated in the United States that's 3 operating on land in the United States that has 4 assets in the United States, that owns a United 5 States trademark. Certainty, a patent or 6 trademark is an investment within the jurisdiction 7 as we know. We have a cross-licensing of that 8 trademark right. We also have the investor, the 9 individual investors through Grand River 10 Enterprises and Grand River Enterprises investing 11 now close to \$50 million, which is held in bank 12 accounts in the United States as a condition to 13 doing business. Under those Escrow Statutes, you 14 must put that money in U.S. bank account in order 15 to continue to do business otherwise you will be 16 band under the complimentary statutes. So, you 17 have that investment and the Respondent's expert 18 said that's a savings account, it's like a forced 19 savings account. These are all the investments 20 that these -- it's not just merely just the sale 21 of goods. There's a trademark, there's assets 22 here, vehicles here, there are bank accounts here,

had -- well, the Arkansas bank account is only in Grand River's name and it's only Grand River's money. And the other bank accounts are Tobaccoville and Grand River -- is listed on the account as the TPM. So, Grand River's name is under that escrow agreement and the money is there to security judgments against --

 $\label{eq:ARBITRATOR CROOK: I'm actually} familiar with the purpose of the escrow, thank you.$

MR. VIOLI: So, the monies are sourced from, in many cases Grand River directly and in other cases they're Grand River's monies but they're coming from Tobaccoville in the form of royalties or expenses that they have to incur under their contract manufacturing agreement. The contract manufacturing agreement says you must pay all U.S. obligations --

ARBITRATOR CROOK: Okay. You've answered my question, thank you.

MR. VIOLI: Okay.

But there are bank accounts in Grand

_ PAGE 1020 _

River's name here and the funds there are held under the escrow agreements as Grand River's monies.

MR. FELDMAN: Counsel, is this information in the record?

MR. VIOLI: It is indeed. We've said what the bank accounts -- that there's bank accounts escrow accounts in the record. I think Mr. --isn't it in the expert reports as well, the amounts of money that are there? Certainly the financial statements show it.

MR. WEILER: Just one point before I move on to the next set of slides. I want to stress that the Contraband Law, if you prefer, the -- slipping from me all of a sudden --

 $\label{eq:president nariman: Complementary legislation.} \textbf{PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Complementary legislation.}$

MR. WEILER: Thank you, the complementary legislation, it operates by identification of brand, no two ways about it.

So, not only does it demonstrate the importance of that concept in the tobacco

So, first, the Chairman asked if there were any other internal NAAG documents earlier in this proceeding. You asked if there were these other internal NAAG documents. I think you said.

would be a matter of raising of inferences."

other internal NAAG documents, I think you said, that may have been amended or placed a gloss on them -- a gloss on the opinion or whose correctness and apparently that was Mr. Hering did agree that there were and again we'll confirm that on the record but it appeared that there are these other NAAG documents and we wanted to know about

documents concerning the negotiation drafting implementation or enforcement of the MSA provision

that, too, which is why we asked for, quote, all

that relates to SPMs or NPMs.

Now. My friends answer at the time was pretty uncategorically -- he said, no, it's not relevant and then he mentioned also as they did, I think, in all of the answers that it was too broad and burdensome and unspecific. I would submit to you that those NAAG documents are pretty relevant and I think they should have included. And --

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business, but again it demonstrates the nexus between the measure and the investment. So, you'll be happy to hear that we're getting towards finished. This is actually the only point I wanted to make I already made on that.

And then the final one is a couple of thoughts about the state of the evidentiary record.

On May 14, 2007, the Tribunal issued its order and it said that requests numbers 1 to 22 are not in conformity with Article 3 of the IBA Rules and therefore are denied. It goes on and it says, "however, the Respondent is directed to disclose such documents as are mentioned generally in Items 1 to 22 of the Claimant's request to produce," which Respondent considers to be included within the scope of Paragraph 1 of this order.

And then, on January 28th, 2008, and again confirmed on February 4, 2008, the Tribunal stated, "Each party is reminded that any unexplained non production of relevant documents

MR. WEILER: I asked for -PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No, they are in
your core bundle, a few of them.

MR. WEILER: Yes, the ones we received, I will let Mr. Violi or Mr. Luddy explain how they came into the Claimant's possession, but we're talk about the ones we didn't get that the witness said existed but we never saw and you haven't seen. If -- assuming the witness was correct -- they may have seen. I'm not saying -- we don't know. We asked for documents that pertain to, that related to the SPMs and NPMs and the enforcement or implementation of the MSA's implementation measures, but we didn't get them. So, we would submit that that's -- these are relevant documents that we didn't get.

MR. VIOLI: I can speak to that also.
MR. FELDMAN: Mr. President, the
Tribunal on several occasions has indicated
discovery is closed in this matter.

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                     MR. LUDDY: I don't believe we're
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                                                                          working group but no documents -- they produced
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          looking for additional discovery.
                                                                          nothing of the sort.
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: He's pointing out
                                                                                     MR. WEILER: No memorandum, no e-mail.
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          your evidentiary omissions. That's what he's
                                                                                     ARBITRATOR CROOK: And Mr. Violi, in
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                                                                          your opinion, it's immaterial the Tribunal denied
          leading too, that's why he's mentioning. He's not
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          saying, now you produce it or don't produce it.
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                                                                          that request?
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          He's only commenting on it.
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                                                                                     MR. VIOLI: I don't think the Tribunal
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                     ARBITRATOR CROOK: Mr. Weiler, the
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                                                                          knew -- well, let me ask -- I'm not going to ask
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          request you just read us, was that one of the
                                                                          the Tribunal but I'll leave it to you if you had
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          original 28 or was that subsequent to the
                                                                          known there was a Grand River working group and
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          Tribunal's order?
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                                                                          you had known that they knew and we didn't know
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                     MR. WEILER: One of the 22.
                                                                          would you have denied the request nonetheless.
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                     ARBITRATOR CROOK: One of the 22.
                                                                          I'd leave that to you and then you would have to
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                     MR. WEILER: Yes. I actually -- funny,
                                                                          make the material -- I'm not going to make the
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                                                                          materiality finding.
          the one I found the guickest --
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                     ARBITRATOR CROOK: Was that one of
                                                                                     MR. WEILER: But I would add,
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          those that --
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                                                                          Mr. Crook, as I read back the orders while the
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                     MR. WEILER: Yes one of the ones that
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                                                                          requests were ruled contrary to IBA(3) that
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          was said --
                                                                          nonetheless the word "however" is there. The
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                     ARBITRATOR CROOK: That was denied.
                                                                          Respondent is directed to disclose these documents
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What was the answer
                                                                          and then -- and it does say though that it feels
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          to it?
                                                                          is relevant but then we have two admonitions, I
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MR. WEILER: The answer was, no, it's not relevant and also that it was insufficiently specific, overly broad and unduly burdensome.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: But, then, couldn't

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: But, then, couldn't you have narrowed it, because it is broad? Your request is very, very broad. Any documents pertaining to NAAG -- they can't bring cartloads of documents from NAAG.

MR. VIOLI: We did make a specific request with respect to what we think falls within the working group, Mr. President.

On the second request, number six we asked for all documents analyzing, comparing, or summarizing the operation effect or enforcement of the escrow statutes as amended or by the MSA or as originally enacted.

In respect of Claimant's, in particular, or considering other tobacco industry members, but as a class or whole.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: (Off microphone.)

MR. VIOLI: Yeah, we asked for this,
here, number six. And now we find out there's a

think, because we wrote too much to you, but we have two admonitions that say each party is reminded that unexplained non production of relevant documents would be a matter of raises inferences. I am requesting inferences to be raised on this point, which is the --I think we're fairly clear on that. So I'll move on.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What do you want? If these documents which you imagine to be there were produced, what would they have shown? I mean, what's your hunch?

MR. VIOLI: May I speak to that? PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Yeah.

MR. VIOLI: From what we've seen, the few documents we've seen, they will show number of meetings between the tobacco companies and the attorneys general dealing with changing the law, the reason for changing the law. The effects of changing the law and he repercussions to Claimants. We will also see a particular working group something I've never seen before where imagine a whole country of attorneys general

focussing on one company and one particular industry. I thank them for their attention, but my time is limited, Mr. President, among many matters that's what we have. We have a concerted effort and we've seen the results of this concerted effort. Letters to Foreign Trade Zone, and I don't want to bring it up again, but these documents which shed light on the measures at issue and their enforcement, and we think they would go direct -- because everything -- we would get a piece of document here or someone would give us a document that they found somewhere, not through our friends, and none of them mentioned healthcare; we noticed that. There's a common theme throughout all these documents that are beyond the public purview, not one -- they all mention money, they mention reduction in market share, but they don't mention healthcare. So, it goes to the healthcare issue

share, but they don't mention healthcare.

So, it goes to the healthcare issue also. But certainly it goes to the intent, the purpose, and the effect of the measures at issue.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What is the

1105, right? We have to reach the shocking and sort of outrageous and we're really close -- we're really close as I explained this morning and I submit that they didn't want to provide the documents because we'd be past where we need to be. I think we're there, because these documents, like I said this morning, it confounds -- it's unbelievable that the government would do this. You have this working group and all that, so I think we met the standard but if there's a question whether we're just below that --

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Which document you're talking about?

MR. VIOLI: The state's. The
Respondent is vicariously responsible for the
state's conduct. I'm talking about the state -PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Vicariously under

what?

MR. VIOLI: NAFTA.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: NAFTA itself?

MR. VIOLI: Yeah, the federal
government is responsible -- I'm not saying the

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inference you want us to draw?

MR. VIOLI: The inference to draw is, number one, with respect to health measures, that they're either neutralized or nonexistent in comparison to what is the true purpose of these measures, and that is to take the market share away from the NPMs; that's the first inference, that the healthcare measures really aren't substantiated when we see that documents exist really speak to the true purposes of these inferences.

The second inference to draw is that there was an intent and an acknowledgement that these measures would harm Claimants in a quantifiable way, as measured by market share, lost volumes, and profits. So we think an inference can be drawn in that respect.

Also the inference that can be drawn -- and we'll speak more to it in the closing -- the egregiousness of the conduct at issue. I think we have to reach that level of shock -- in one of the tests, in one of the provisions -- I believe it's

federal government did anything wrong here in these measures. It's the state governments that the federal government is responsible for under NAFTA. NAFTA says we cannot sue -- if we would have brought the claim here against the states, we would have, but we can only bring the federal government and they have to stand in the shoes of their states.

So, what I was submitting before is that if you think we're just below that egregious standard and outrageous, shocking and outrageous, I submit that the documents, the little bit that we saw -- if we were given all of their documents -- and they're demonstrated here -- and brought before the Tribunal, they would be much worse than what I attempted to describe to you this morning. The picture would be much bleaker, much more grave.

Finally the inference is that -competition. I'm not permitted to speak to you
about something called an NPM proceeding,
adjustment proceeding. I'm bound by a court order

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that says I -- and their requirement that I not disclose certain matters to you. There's been a whole body of proceeding that the individuals testified where the tobacco companies want money back under the MSA; they want a credit, and they are adversarial to the states. The states are saying, we diligently enforce the law and there's been no market share lost and whatever they want to make as an argument.

In those proceedings, I can only tell you personally that they will or would have materially affected your decision on whether competition was affected -- competition was affected by these measures; whether we were harmed by these measures; and, third, whether they were truly needed.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Who injected you from --

MR. VIOLI: In the federal anti-trust case in New York where we're seeking a declaration -- we can't seek damages -- we were provided documents of --

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              CONFIDENTIAL SESSION
          MR. WEILER: Quick non-closed point.
          When you have to draw an adverse
inference, you only have the evidence that you
have, and you have to -- you make an inference
based on what you have. The few documents that we
were able to get definitely point you in a
direction that says absolutely nothing about
healthcare; it talks about market sharing, what
have you.
          PRESIDENT NARIMAN: No, my question was
-- sorry, this is not on record.
           (Discussion off the record.)
           (Closed session. )
          MR. VIOLI: We will address the full
impact of the adverse inferences at the closing,
if that's okay, Mr. President.
           PRESIDENT NARIMAN: (Off microphone) I
just want you to know -- all that you can get out
of this case was these five documents --
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MR. LUDDY: Some.

MR. VIOLI: Some documents, not all. They fought us on the some we received, where the states took a position and one of the documents that's in the record I believe --

MR. LUDDY: This is confidential.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ VIOLI: No, the one that's the public one.

MR. WEILER: The New York decision.

MR. LUDDY: No, no. Sorrell is the one who said that. If you're going to mention any of the NPM documents that are in the record, we have to go private.

MR. VIOLI: Can we go closed for one second -- or ten seconds or whatever. Closed, yes.

Closed, please.

MR. WEILER: And then wait on the -(End of open session. Confidential

business information redacted.)

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allowed four.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: (Off microphone)
And your complaint is only made -- the Respondent
is only --

is only -
COURT REPORTER: I can't hear you.

MR. VIOLI: Right. For here, they only

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Yeah, okay.

MR. KOVAR: Mr. President, may I ask
you a question, please?

I'm a little bit unclear about the discomfort you have here. There's a discovery order in this case that was reached after submissions by both parties, it was duly considered by the Tribunal.

The Claimants now are bringing in a lot of wild accusations where there's no information on the record, and I don't -- if there's a discomfort on the part of the Tribunal, I don't think you have information with which to address that. And I don't want to be in a position where the Respondents would be prejudiced simply because the Claimants are upset and are making allegations. I think that creates a situation that could lead to unfairness.

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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: (Off microphone) --
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          you have 13 hours to explain to us. I have no
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          objection to listen to you. I haven't made up my
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          mind, speaking for myself, but I am a little
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          disturbed, you are right. (Off microphone) -- of
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          this, even if there are wild allegations, you
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          please tell us later when it gets to your turn. I
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          am willing to accept it. Yes, that's right.
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                     MR. KOVAR: Okay. We'll address it
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          then, thank you.
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                     MR. LUDDY: In terms of the rest of the
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          day, I think -- are we going to take our break
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          now? And then, I think we're going to run into an
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          impasse on witnesses until tomorrow morning. We
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          may -- we're going to consult amongst ourselves.
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: (Off microphone) --
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          have some sort of a --
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                     MR. LUDDY: We have -- we actually have
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          a brief tape of GRE that's in the record that we
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          may play for the Tribunal.
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: What's that on?
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witnesses that haven't been called yet, and through no fault, I'm sure, of Respondent's, and certainly not our own, Professor Gruber is not here until tomorrow, and we've been trying to work around the schedule. So, we're doing the best we can, your Honor. If we have a dead hour, one dead hour in the week I consider that a small victory and go on.
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PRESIDENT NARIMAN: (Off microphone) -- have a break now and meet again or...

 $\ensuremath{\mathtt{MR}}.$ FELDMAN: That's fine. That's fine.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Until 4:00 o'clock? MR. VIOLI: Yes, please.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken from 3:40 to 4:00 p.m.)

MR. WEILER: What we're about to see -- (VIDEO PLAYED.)

(VIDEO STOPPED.)

MR. LUDDY: We were going to describe that briefly. It's just a brief promotional video produced during the course of this litigation. It

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What's that on?

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                     MR. LUDDY: It's a historical tape of
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          GRE that tells a little bit about the company.
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: (Off microphone) --
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          do you have any objection to any --
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                     MR. FELDMAN: It's in the record.
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                     MR. LUDDY: It's in the record.
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                     MR. FELDMAN: We don't have an
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          objection.
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                     MR. LUDDY: And I think that's about
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          20 minutes or so. So, if we broke now that will
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          probably take us to closer to 4:30, but then I
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          iust --
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: (Off microphone) --
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          we don't have to speed up -- want to do something;
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          otherwise --
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                     MR. LUDDY: Yeah.
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                     PRESIDENT NARIMAN: -- let us have some
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          argument on your part or something -- what's the
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use of wasting time -- because we have until 5:30.

of the problem is that, in terms of some of the

arguments that we have left -- deals with

MR. LUDDY: Yeah. Well, I mean, part

shows the facilities and the commitments of the company that we produce frankly for the Tribunal to see. I think the, I think we're probably at that hour that I forecasted before, Mr. President, where we may have a dead hour. If that's the only dead hour we have for the week, as I said, personally we consider it a success. Tomorrow we're planning on Professor Gruber first thing in the morning and then because Mr. Montour's counsel has to head to the west coast -- you know actually, either Gruber or Arthur Montour, first thing.

MR. FELDMAN: Yes.

MR. LUDDY: And one other witness tomorrow afternoon. After those two at some point, we'll -- I think that's it. All right. I think that's all for today.

PRESIDENT NARIMAN: Okay.

MR. LUDDY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned until 9:00 a.m., the following day.)