IN THE MATTER OF AN ARBITRATION

- before -


- between -

THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR

- and-

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AWARD

29 September 2012

ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL:
Professor Luiz Olavo Baptista (Chair)
Professor Raúl Emilio Vinuesa
Professor Donald M. McRae

REGISTRAR:
Mr. Martin Doe Rodríguez

REGISTRY:
Permanent Court of Arbitration
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE PARTIES

1. The Claimant in this arbitration is the Republic of Ecuador (hereinafter the “Claimant” or “Ecuador”). The Claimant is represented in these proceedings by:

   Dr. Diego García Carrión, Procurador General del Estado
   Ms. Christel Gaibor, Directora de Asuntos Internacionales y Arbitraje (Encargada), Procuraduría General del Estado
   Ms. Cristina Viteri, Abogada, Procuraduría General del Estado
   Mr. Paul Reichler, Foley Hoag LLP
   Mr. Mark Clodfelter, Foley Hoag LLP
   Mr. Andrew Loewenstein, Foley Hoag LLP
   Mr. Bruno Leurent, Foley Hoag AARPI

2. The Respondent in this arbitration is the United States of America (hereinafter the “Respondent” or “U.S.” or “United States”). The Respondent is represented in these proceedings by:

   Mr. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
   Mr. Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
   Ms. Lisa J. Grosh, Deputy Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
   Mr. Jeremy K. Sharpe, Chief, Investment Arbitration, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
   Mr. Lee M. Caplan, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
   Ms. Karin Kizer, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
   Ms. Neha Sheth, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
B. BACKGROUND TO THE ARBITRATION


4. The Claimant contends that since certain questions concerning the interpretation of Article II(7) of the Treaty have not been resolved through consultation or diplomatic channels, that a dispute exists regarding the interpretation and application of the Treaty and therefore submits these questions to an arbitral tribunal for binding decision in accordance with the applicable rules of international law.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Claimant’s Request, ¶1.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

5. By a Request and Statement of Claim dated 28 June 2011, Ecuador commenced arbitration proceedings against the United States of America, pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty and Article 3 of the UNCITRAL Rules.

6. By letter dated 29 August 2011, Ecuador advised the United States that it had appointed Professor Raúl Emilio Vinuesa as arbitrator. By letter of the same date, the United States advised Ecuador that it had appointed Donald M. McRae as arbitrator.

7. By letter dated 8 February 2012, the Secretary-General of ICSID, acting as the appointing authority pursuant to Article VII(2) of the Treaty, appointed Dr. Luiz Olavo Baptista as President of the Arbitral Tribunal.

8. By letters dated 12 March 2012, the Parties agreed for the PCA to act as registry in these proceedings.

9. On 21 March 2012, the Tribunal held a Preparatory Hearing at the Peace Palace, The Hague, the Netherlands. Present at this meeting were:

   **The Tribunal:**
   Professor Luiz Olavo Baptista
   Professor Raúl Emilio Vinuesa
   Professor Donald M. McRae

   **For the Claimant:**
   Ms. Cristina Viteri
   Mr. Paul Reichler
   Mr. Mark Clodfelter
   Mr. Bruno Leurent

   **For the Respondent:**
   Mr. Harold Hongju Koh
   Mr. Jeffrey Kovar
   Mr. Jeremy Sharpe
   Mr. Lee Caplan
   Mr. John Kim
   Ms. Karen Johnson

   **For the Permanent Court of Arbitration:**
   Mr. Martin Doe Rodriguez
   Ms. Jara Mínguez Almeida
   Ms. Hinda Rabkin
10. On 9 April 2012, taking into account the agreements reached between the Parties and the Tribunal on procedural issues during the 21 March 2012 hearing, the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 1 providing, inter alia, that the languages of the arbitration would be English and Spanish, and setting out the terms regarding the written submissions, communications, witnesses, experts, and hearings. Procedural Order No. 1 set forth the following schedule of the proceedings:

XIV. Procedural Calendar

60. In accordance with Article VII(3) of the Treaty, the Tribunal establishes the following schedule of proceedings, without prejudice to the Tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction.

61. By 29 March 2012, the United States shall submit its Statement of Defence.

62. By 25 April 2012, the United States shall submit its Memorial on Jurisdiction.

63. By 23 May 2012, Ecuador shall submit its Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction and Memorial on the Merits.

64. By 20 June 2012, the United States shall submit its Counter-Memorial on the Merits.

65. On 25-26 June 2012, a hearing on jurisdiction shall be held at the seat of the PCA in the Peace Palace at The Hague.

66. By 13 July 2012, Ecuador shall submit its Reply Memorial on the Merits.

67. By 30 July 2012, the United States shall submit its Rejoinder Memorial on the Merits.

68. On 6-9 August 2012, a hearing on the merits shall be held at the seat of the PCA in the Peace Palace at The Hague.

11. Procedural Order No. 1 also set forth the following terms regarding confidentiality:

XII. Confidentiality

49. The award may be made public only with the consent of both parties.

50. Hearings shall be held in camera and the transcripts shall remain confidential unless the parties agree otherwise.

51. The pleadings and submissions of the Parties shall remain confidential, except that, on the date of the opening of the hearing on jurisdiction, or as soon thereafter as any redactions may be agreed by the Parties, the Statements of Claim and Defense, as well as Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction and Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on
Jurisdiction, will be made publicly available on the PCA website, and the Parties are free
to disclose them, subject to the redaction of any confidential information. On the date of
the opening of the hearing on the merits, if any, or as soon thereafter as any redactions
may be agreed by the Parties, the Parties’ memorials on the merits will be made publicly
available on the PCA website, and the Parties are free to disclose them, subject to the
redaction of any confidential information. Failing agreement between the Parties on the
appropriateness of any redactions, the matter shall be decided by the Tribunal. Any
information provided by a Party which has been designated as confidential by that Party
shall be kept confidential and treated as confidential, unless the Tribunal determines that
it shall not be redacted.

12. On 29 March 2012, the Respondent submitted its **Statement of Defence**.

13. On 13 April 2012, the Respondent submitted the Spanish translation of its Statement of
Defence.

14. On 25 April 2012, the Respondent submitted its **Memorial on Jurisdiction**.

15. On 11 May 2012, the Respondent submitted the Spanish translation of its Memorial on
Jurisdiction.

16. On 11 May 2012, the Claimant submitted the Spanish translation of its Request for
Arbitration and Statement of Claim.

17. On 23 May 2012, the Claimant submitted its **Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction** and
**Memorial on the Merits**.

18. By letter dated 1 June 2012, the Respondent applied to have the hearing on jurisdiction
extended by one day to present an expert witness. By letter dated 5 June 2012, the Claimant
opposed the Respondent’s application.

19. On 8 June 2012, the Claimant submitted the Spanish translation of its Memorial on the
Merits.

20. On 12 June 2012, the Claimant submitted the Spanish translation of its Counter-Memorial
on Jurisdiction.

21. By letter dated 11 June 2012, the Respondent responded to the Claimant’s letter dated 5
June 2012 and notified the Claimant and the Tribunal that it intended to present Professor
Christian Tomuschat as an expert witness at the hearing on jurisdiction. By letter dated 14
June 2012, the Claimant objected to the presentation of Professor Christian Tomuschat at
the hearing on jurisdiction on the basis that the notification provided by the Respondent
was untimely according to Article 25(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules. By letter dated 15 June 2012, the Respondent responded to the Claimant’s objection.

22. On 20 June 2012, the Tribunal decided that the Respondent’s notification of its intent to present Professor Tomuschat as an expert witness was untimely and, consequently, that the hearing on jurisdiction would not be extended by an additional day. The Tribunal indicated, however, that it was prepared to hold a supplementary hearing for the examination of expert witnesses, if it was deemed necessary after the hearing on jurisdiction. The Parties were also invited to consult and attempt to agree on the order of proceedings for the hearing on jurisdiction.

23. On 20 June 2012, the Respondent submitted its *Counter-Memorial on the Merits* and accompanying documents.

24. By letter dated 21 June 2012, the Claimant requested that the Respondent’s Counter-Memorial on the Merits be disregarded in the Tribunal’s consideration of the jurisdictional issues since the Memorial allegedly dealt with jurisdictional rather than merits issues.

25. By letter dated 23 June 2012, the Respondent requested that the Claimant’s letter of 21 June 2012 be disregarded since, according to Procedural Order No. 1, the Claimant should file its Reply Memorial on 13 July 2012 and only then respond to the Respondent’s Counter-Memorial on the Merits.

26. On 22 June 2012, a pre-hearing telephone conference call was held between the Tribunal and the Parties to discuss the order of proceedings for the hearing on jurisdiction.

27. On 25 and 26 June 2012, a Hearing on Jurisdiction was held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, the Netherlands. Present at the meeting were:

**The Tribunal:**
- Professor Luiz Olavo Baptista
- Professor Raúl Emilio Vinuesa
- Professor Donald M. McRae

**For the Claimant:**
- Dr. Diego García Carrión
- Ms. Christel Gaibor
- Ms. Cristina Viteri
- Ms. Ana Maria Gutierrez
- Mr. Paul Reichler
28. By letter dated 3 July 2012, the Respondent requested a brief extension to file the Spanish translations of the Counter-Memorial on the Merits and accompanying witness statements.

29. By letter dated 5 July 2012, the Claimant stated that it had no objection to the Respondent’s request for a brief extension.

30. On 12 July 2012, the Respondent submitted the Spanish translation of its Counter-Memorial on the Merits.


32. On 13 July 2012, the Claimant submitted its Reply Memorial on the Merits.

33. On 20 July 2012, the Claimant submitted the Spanish translation of its Reply Memorial on the Merits.

34. On 30 July 2012, the Respondent submitted its Rejoinder on the Merits.
35. By letter dated 2 August 2012, the Tribunal informed the Parties that “[t]he Tribunal has reached a decision on the question of its jurisdiction: by a majority consisting of Prof. McRae and Prof. Baptista (with Prof. Vinuesa dissenting), the Tribunal has concluded that it has no jurisdiction, and the case must consequently be dismissed in its entirety, due to the absence of the existence of a dispute falling within the ambit of Article VII of the Treaty. Under the circumstances, and in particular in view of the imminent Hearing on the Merits scheduled to commence next week, the Tribunal has also, by majority, decided to inform the Parties of the above decision, with full reasons to follow in due course in its award.” The Tribunal consequently cancelled the Hearing on the Merits.

36. By letter dated 2 August 2012, Professor Vinuesa informed the Parties that his decision to dissent from the Tribunal’s decision was “under reservation of the right to manifest in due time [his] dissidence over the [Tribunal’s] conclusion and the said reasons as well as under reservation of [his] right to agree or disagree over any other reasoning not [expressed by the majority] at the time [he] manifested [his] dissidence.”
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

37. The following section sets out the facts regarding the background to this arbitration relevant to the present decision.


39. By a notice of arbitration dated 21 December 2006, Chevron and TexPet commenced an arbitration against Ecuador under paragraph 3(a)(iii) of Article VI of the Treaty and the UNCITRAL Rules claiming inter alia a denial of justice under Article II(7) for the manner in which seven commercial cases that were filed by TexPet against Ecuador in Ecuadorian courts were treated by these courts between 1991 and 1994. In 2007, the Ecuadorian government established a Special Commission to review each of its 23 BITs and publicly stated its intention not to renew its BIT with the United States. On 6 July 2009, Ecuador denounced the ICSID Convention.

40. On 30 March 2010, the arbitral tribunal rendered a partial award on claims raised under the Treaty in PCA Case No. 2007-2: Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The Republic of Ecuador (hereinafter “Chevron Partial Award”). In that award, the tribunal found Ecuador in violation of inter alia Article II(7) of the Treaty because of undue delay by the Ecuadorian courts in adjudicating Chevron and Texaco’s claims. The Chevron tribunal found that Article II(7) set out an “effective means” standard and therefore “constituted lex specialis and not a mere restatement of the law on denial of justice.”

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3 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 12.
5 Claimant’s Request, ¶6; Respondent’s Statement of Defense, pp. 4-5; Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 7-10, citing Chevron Partial Award, supra note 2.
6 Chevron Partial Award, supra note 2, ¶262.
7 Chevron Partial Award, supra note 2, ¶242.
41. By Diplomatic Note No.4-2-87/10 dated 11 June 2010, transmitting a copy of Diplomatic Note No. 1352-GM/2010 dated 8 June 2010 (hereinafter the “June 8 Note”), the Government of Ecuador informed the Government of the United States that it disagreed with certain aspects of the Partial Award, expressly pointing to the interpretation and application of Article II(7) of the Treaty which the Claimant considered erroneous and overbroad.\(^8\) The Note detailed the Claimant’s concern that the Chevron Partial Award’s interpretation of Article II(7) had “put into question the common intent of the Parties with respect to the nature of their mutual obligations regarding investment of nationals or companies of the other Party.”\(^9\) The Note raised three matters of interpretation which the Claimant sought to clarify with the Respondent:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[i.] The obligations of the Parties under Article II(7) are not greater than those required to implement obligations under the standards of customary international law;
  \item[ii.] The Article II(7) requirement of effective means refers to the provision of a framework or system under which claims may be asserted and rights enforced, but does not create obligations to the Parties to the Treaty to assure that the framework or system provided is effective in particular cases;
  \item[iii.] The fixing of compensation due for losses suffered as a result of a violation of the requirements of Article II(7) cannot be based upon a determination of rights under the law of the respective Party that is different from what the courts of that Party have determined or would likely determine, and thus do not permit arbitral tribunals under Article VI(3) of the Treaty to substitute their judgment of rights under municipal law for the judgments of municipal courts.\(^10\)
\end{itemize}

The Note then provided specific examples of where, according to the Claimant, the Chevron Partial Award incorrectly interpreted and applied Article II(7) of the Treaty.\(^11\)

42. The Note requested that the Government of the United States confirm by diplomatic note its agreement with the Claimant’s interpretation and application of Article II(7) of the Treaty.\(^12\) The Note also gave notice that if such a confirming note was not forthcoming, “an unresolved dispute must be considered to exist between the Government of the Republic of

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\(^8\) June 8 Note, p. 1 [R-2]; Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 10; Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶13-14.
\(^9\) June 8 Note, p. 1.
\(^10\) June 8 Note, p. 3.
\(^11\) June 8 Note, p. 2.
\(^12\) June 8 Note, p. 3.
Ecuador and the Government of the United States of America concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty.”\textsuperscript{13}

43. On 17 June 2010, following Ecuador’s request, Ecuador’s ambassador to the United States, Mr. Luis Benigno Gallegos, met with the US Legal Advisor, Mr. Harold Hongju Koh, to discuss the interpretation of Article II(7). According to the Claimant, Ecuador “explained its views on the three matters of interpretation raised therein and sought the United States’ views.”\textsuperscript{14} The US Legal Advisor informed Ecuador that the United States would study Ecuador’s views and initiate its inter-agency process for determining the United States’ position on this issue.\textsuperscript{15}

44. On 7 July 2010, the Claimant brought a claim before the District Court of The Hague to set aside the interim and partial awards, contending among other things that the tribunal committed legal error in its finding of a breach of Article II(7) of the Treaty and that the error justified setting aside the \textit{Chevron} Partial Award.\textsuperscript{16}

45. On 23 August 2010, the Respondent sent a reply by Diplomatic Note No. Prot 181/2010 to Ecuador’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter the “August 23 Note”), attaching a letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs which stated that “the U.S. government is currently reviewing the views expressed in your letter and considering the concerns that you have raised,” and that the United States “look[s] forward to remaining in contact about this”.\textsuperscript{17} According to the Claimant, due to the lack of response from the Respondent, the Ecuadorian Embassy in Washington “made multiple attempts to call Mr. Koh [the U.S. Legal Adviser] in order to follow up on its request for the United States to provide its interpretation of Article II(7).”\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{13} June 8 Note, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{14} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶15.
\textsuperscript{15} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶16.
\textsuperscript{17} Letter from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo A. Valenzuela to Ecuadorian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Trade and Integration Ricardo Patiño (23 August 2010) [R-3] (hereinafter “Valenzuela Letter”).
\textsuperscript{18} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶18, citing Witness Statement of Luis Benigno Gallegos (23 May 2012) (hereinafter “Gallegos Witness Statement”), ¶7 (emphasis in original).
46. On 4 October 2010, Mr. Koh placed a telephone call to Ambassador Gallegos at the Ecuadorian Embassy in Washington. According to the Respondent, “the Legal Adviser informed Ambassador Gallegos, in an informal conversation, that it would be difficult to consider a request for interpretation of the Treaty while Ecuador was in the process of terminating that agreement.”

In the Claimant’s view, Mr. Koh “stated that the United States would give no response at all,” saying that “his Government will not rule on this matter,” but did not provide any explanation for the United States’ refusal. Ambassador Gallegos reported on this conversation to Ecuador’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Integration, describing in Spanish what, according to the Ambassador, Mr. Koh had told him in English.

47. On 25 November 2010, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court ruled that the Treaty’s investor-State and State-State provisions were unconstitutional due to the binding nature of arbitral decisions rendered under the Treaty.

48. In November 2010, Ecuador announced its intention to terminate all of Ecuador’s BITs. The Parties’ diplomatic relationship underwent difficulty in April 2011 when the Claimant declared the U.S. ambassador to Ecuador persona non grata and ordered her immediate departure from Ecuador, which prompted a reciprocal response from the United States.

49. In April 2011, Ecuador requested its parliament to terminate 13 BITs, including its BIT with the United States, formally denounced its BITs with France, Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and terminated its BIT with Finland.
IV. KEY APPLICABLE LEGAL PROVISIONS

A. THE TREATY

PREAMBLE

The United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador (hereinafter the “Parties”);

Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them, with respect to investment by nationals and companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party;

Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties;

[...]

Article II

[...]

7. Each Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment, investment agreements, and investment authorizations.

[...]

Article V

The Parties agree to consult promptly, on the request of either, to resolve any disputes in connection with the Treaty, or to discuss any matter relating to the interpretation or application of the Treaty.

Article VI

1. For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and a national or company of the other Party arising out of or relating to (a) an investment agreement between that Party and such national or company; (b) an investment authorization granted by that Party's foreign investment authority to such national or company; or (c) an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment.

2. In the event of an investment dispute, the Parties to the dispute should initially seek a resolution through consultation and negotiation. If the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the national or company concerned may choose to submit the dispute, under one of the following alternatives, for resolution:

(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Party that is a party to the dispute; or
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute-settlement procedures; or

c) in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3.

3. (a) Provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the dispute for resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b) and that six months have elapsed from the data on which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may choose to consent in writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding arbitration:

(i) to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“Centre”) established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965 (“ICSID convention”), provided that the Party is a party to such Convention; or

(ii) to the Additional Facility of the Centre, if the Centre is not available; or

(iii) in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); or

(iv) to any other arbitration institution, or in accordance with any other arbitration rules, as may be mutually agreed between the parties to the dispute.

(b) once the national or company concerned has so consented, either party to the dispute may initiate arbitration in accordance with the choice so specified in the consent.

4. Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for settlement by binding arbitration in accordance with the choice specified in the written consent of the national or company under paragraph 3. Such consent, together with the written consent of the national or company when given under paragraph 3 shall satisfy the requirement for:

(a) written consent of the parties to the dispute for Purposes of Chapter II of the ICSID Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules; and


5. Any arbitration under paragraph 3(a) (ii), (iii) or (iv) of this Article shall be held in a state that is a party to the New York Convention.

6. Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute. Each Party undertakes to carry our without delay the provisions of any such award and to provide in its territory for its enforcement.
7. In any proceeding involving an investment dispute, a Party shall not assert, as a
defense, counterclaim, right of set-off or otherwise, that the national or company
concerned has received or will receive, pursuant to an insurance or guarantee contract,
indemnification or other compensation for all or part of its alleged damages.

8. For purposes of an arbitration held under paragraph 3 of this Article, any company
legally constituted under the applicable laws and regulations of a Party or a political
subdivision thereof that, immediately before the occurrence of the event or events giving
rise to the dispute, was an investment of nationals or companies of the other Party, shall
be treated as a national or company of such other Party in accordance with Article 25 (2)
(b) of the ICSID Convention

Article VII

1. Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the
Treaty which is not resolved through consultations or other diplomatic channels, shall be
submitted, upon the request of either Party, to an arbitral tribunal for binding decision in
accordance with the applicable rules of international law. In the absence of an agreement
by the Parties to the contrary, the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), except to the extent modified by the Parties or by
the arbitrators, shall govern.

2. Within two months of receipt of a request, each Party shall appoint an arbitrator. The
two arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator as Chairman, who is a national of a third
State. The UNCITRAL Rules for appointing members of three member panels shall apply
mutatis mutandis to the appointment of the arbitral panel except that the appointing
authority referenced in those rules shall be the Secretary General of the Centre.

3. Unless otherwise agreed, all submissions shall be made and all hearings shall be
completed within six months of the date of selection of the third arbitrator, and the
Tribunal shall render its decisions within two months of the date of the final submissions
or the date of the closing of the hearings, whichever is later.

4. Expenses incurred by the Chairman, the other arbitrators, and other costs of the
proceedings shall be paid for equally by the Parties. The Tribunal may, however, at its
discretion, direct that a higher proportion of the costs be paid by one of the Parties.

B. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (“VCLT”)

Article 26

“Pacta sunt servanda”

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith.

 […]
**Article 31**

*General rule of interpretation*

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:

(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;

(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

**Article 32**

*Supplementary means of interpretation*

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:

(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or

(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
V. RELIEF REQUESTED

50. The Respondent requests that the Tribunal render an award:

   i. dismissing the Claimant’s request in its entirety and with prejudice;

   ii. ordering such further and additional relief as the Respondent may request and
      the Tribunal may deem appropriate;

   iii. ordering that the Claimant bear the costs of this arbitration, including the
      Respondent’s costs for legal representation and assistance, pursuant to Article
      VII(4) of the Treaty and Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules.  

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51. The Claimant requests that the Tribunal render an award:

   i. dismissing the Respondent’s objections to jurisdiction in their entirety.  

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28 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 67.
29 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶138.
VI. SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

52. The Respondent objects to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, alleging the absence of a “dispute” under Article VII of the Treaty. The Respondent argues that the Claimant has failed to satisfy the two essential elements necessary to establish the existence of a dispute under international law: concreteness and positive opposition. The Respondent also submits that the Claimant was obliged to and did not engage in meaningful consultations in good faith with the Respondent prior to resorting to arbitration. The Respondent further contends that it is under no obligation to respond to the Claimant’s assertions regarding the proper interpretation of the Treaty. In addition, the Respondent maintains that Article VII does not create advisory, appellate, or referral jurisdiction and argues that exercising jurisdiction would be contrary to the Treaty’s object and purpose and would have far-reaching and destabilizing consequences for investment treaty arbitration.

53. The Claimant contends that Article VII of the Treaty authorizes the Tribunal to make a binding decision in a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of Article II(7) and that international law imposes no requirement of allegation of treaty breach or any other measure of concreteness beyond what the Claimant articulated in its Request. Furthermore, the Claimant maintains that a dispute does exist since the Respondent has expressly stated its positive opposition to the Claimant’s interpretation of Article II(7) and that its positive opposition can also be inferred. The Claimant further argues that upholding its Request would not create appellate, advisory, or referral jurisdiction and that extra-legal concerns should not prevent the Tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over a legal dispute regarding the interpretation and application of the Treaty.

1. The Respondent’s Position

54. The Respondent objects to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal due to the absence of any “dispute” between Ecuador and the United States under Article VII of the Treaty. The Respondent argues that “the United States never consented to submit to purely advisory matters of this kind to arbitration under Article VII.”\(^{30}\) According to the Respondent, Ecuador’s “‘dispute’ is not with the United States, but with the award rendered by the

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\(^{30}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 15.
*Chevron* tribunal, an investor-state arbitration constituted under Article VI.” The Respondent argues that “Ecuador fails to cite even one case where an international tribunal has taken jurisdiction under a State-to-State compromissory clause like Article VII when the disputed interpretation or application involved third persons and not the other Treaty Party.”

a) The ordinary meaning of the terms of Article VII

55. The Respondent maintains that the use of the term “dispute” in Article VII, together with the fact that the Tribunal is to render a “binding decision” demonstrates the Parties’ intention to create contentious jurisdiction, rather than advisory, appellate, or referral jurisdiction. The Respondent contests the Claimant’s emphasis on the word “any” preceding the word “dispute”, submitting that “[w]hether it is ‘any’ or even ‘all’, the Article makes clear that there must be a dispute. The limitation in the provision is the word ‘dispute’”.

56. Relying on the expert opinion of Professor Tomuschat, the Respondent contends that the word “dispute” has “obtained a specific meaning in international practice” which requires that the parties to a treaty put themselves “in positive opposition with one another over a concrete case involving a claim of breach under the treaty.”

57. The Respondent charts the development of the definition of “dispute” in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, citing *Mavrommatis*, *Southwest Africa*, and *Northern Cameroons*. The Respondent highlights the ICJ’s pronouncement in *Southwest Africa* that “it must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other…a mere assertion is not sufficient to prove the existence of a dispute” and its statement in *Northern Cameroons* that

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31 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 15.
32 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 110.
33 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 16.
34 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 104.
the Court may “pronounce judgment only in connection with concrete cases where there exists at the time of the adjudication, an actual controversy.”  

58. The Respondent avers that a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty cannot arise in the abstract and that the Claimant’s claim fails because “it presents nothing more than abstract legal questions about the general meaning of Article II(7).”  

The Respondent argues that the Claimant mischaracterizes the phrase “interpretation or application” in Article VII by attempting to “disconnect it from the requirement of a ‘dispute’” and thus distorts the plain meaning of the text.  

According to the Respondent, the plain meaning of the phrase “dispute concerning the interpretation or application” is that a “claim concerning the interpretation of the Treaty must also be concrete, involving allegations of non-compliance with the Treaty and positive opposition between the Parties.”  

Furthermore, the Respondent argues that “the distinction between interpretation or application is not relevant to the question of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction here” since the inclusion of “interpretation” in Article VII was meant to ensure that disputes over the interpretation of the Treaty in the context of an allegation of Treaty non-compliance would be justiciable.  

59. The Respondent alleges that disputes under Article VII of the Treaty must be “between the Parties” and cannot arise out of a separate controversy or a dispute with a third party.  

The Respondent submits that the Claimant takes issue with the *Chevron* tribunal’s interpretation of Article II(7) and not with the Respondent, who the Claimant has not accused of failing to perform its obligations under the Treaty.  

60. According to the Respondent, the phrase “for binding decision in accordance with the applicable rules of international law” in Article VII confirms that Article VII covers legal and not political disputes, which requires a conflict of claims or rights between the Parties, based on the Treaty, that is capable of binding resolution by the application of legal rules

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36 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 105-106. Respondent’s hearing slides
38 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 17.
39 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 102, 122.
40 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 102.
41 Respondent’s Hearing on Jurisdiction, Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 119-120.
42 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 17-18.
and principles.\textsuperscript{43} The Respondent argues that the Claimant has “no legal dispute with the United States to resolve under international law” since there are no facts at issue or concrete disagreement between the Parties concerning the interpretation of Article II(7).\textsuperscript{44}

61. The Respondent further argues that the term “binding” in Article VII “reflects traditional notions of res judicata” and that “in the absence of a concrete case, there would be no future set of facts to which the decision could apply”.\textsuperscript{45} The Respondent submits that any award issued by the Tribunal could not apply to the \textit{Chevron} case because the decision of the Article VI tribunal is, by its own terms, “final and binding on the Parties to the dispute.”\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{b) Article VII read in context}

62. The Respondent contrasts Article V and Article VI of the Treaty with Article VII, noting that they provide the essential context for interpreting Article VII in accordance with Article 31(1) of the VCLT. With respect to Article V, the Respondent asserts that it provides a forum for discussion of a wide range of subjects including “any matter relating to the interpretation or application of the Treaty” and that, unlike a dispute, a “matter” does not need to arise out of assertions by Parties of contrary rights or claims and thus establishes a much broader scope for discussions between the Parties.\textsuperscript{47} The Respondent contends that “to the extent Ecuador’s claim is that the United States refused to enter into negotiations with it to agree on the meaning of Article II(7), it is Article V and not Article VII that provides the mechanism for raising that complaint.”\textsuperscript{48}

63. The Respondent also contrasts Article VII with the investor-State dispute resolution mechanism in Article VI, which contemplates annulment and set-aside proceedings under the applicable arbitration rules and law as the exclusive means for challenging awards rendered by investor-State tribunals. According to the Respondent, “[Article VI] serves as the principal mechanism for binding dispute settlement” and an award rendered by an Article VII tribunal could not prevent a future Article VI tribunal from finding a different

\textsuperscript{43} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{44} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 112-113.
\textsuperscript{45} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 112-113.
\textsuperscript{46} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 113-114.
\textsuperscript{47} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 18; Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 114-115.
\textsuperscript{48} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 19.
interpretation of Article II(7) which the Claimant would be obliged to comply with. The Respondent argues that “this confirms that a State-to-State tribunal constituted under Article VII has no appellate jurisdiction over such awards.” Relying on Professor Reisman’s expert opinion, the Respondent asserts that Articles VI and VII create “two distinct tracks of arbitration” that assign different disputes to each track. However, the Respondent rejects Claimant’s characterization that “the U.S. has put forward a theory of exclusive jurisdiction whereby Article VI and Article VII are in conflict somehow,” contending that they are two different articles with different grants of jurisdiction. The Respondent submits that “there may be cases of alleged breach which could be brought directly by an investor under Article VI or by a State under Article VII, but that question is not presented by this case.”

64. Article VII is, according to the Respondent, a “residual procedural mechanism for ensuring Party compliance with the Treaty in limited circumstances,” for example to resolve a dispute over a Party’s failure to pay an award rendered under Article VI of the Treaty.

c) Article VII read in light of the Treaty’s object and purpose

65. The Respondent alleges that, when read in light of the Treaty’s object and purpose as required by Article 31(1) of the VCLT, Article VII provides a tribunal “jurisdiction only to adjudicate a (1) concrete case alleging a violation of the Treaty by one Party that is (2) positively opposed by the other Party” and that the Claimant has failed to satisfy either requirement. The Treaty’s object and purpose is the “encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment” and, while Article VI serves as the principal avenue for dispute resolution involving investors, “Article VII is meant to address real controversies regarding a Party’s failure to live up to its Treaty obligations.” The Respondent further contends

49 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 116.
50 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 20.
51 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 20, citing Expert Opinion of Professor W. Michael Reisman dated 24 April 2012, ¶23 (hereinafter “Reisman Opinion”).
52 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 328:21-25.
53 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 328:25-329:3.
54 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 20.
55 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 20-21.
56 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 117-118.
that, “in case of doubt, [these provisions] are to be interpreted in favor of the natural liberty and independence of the party concerned.”  

66. The Respondent argues that, under the ordinary meaning of Article VII, read in context and in light of its object and purpose, decisions of tribunals constituted under Article VII are binding only between the Parties to the case and regarding the subject matter in dispute. The Respondent alleges that the Claimant is attempting to bind other tribunals and third parties through this Tribunal’s award.

d) The requirement of a “concrete case” alleging a treaty violation

67. In the Respondent’s view, Article VII applies only to a “dispute” between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty. The Respondent argues that a “dispute” must entail an “actual controversy before the Tribunal concerning a Party’s alleged breach of the Treaty” and that it “must be concrete in the sense that one Party claims that the other Party’s act or omission has violated its legal rights, thereby warranting judicial relief capable of affecting the Parties’ rights and obligations.” The Respondent alleges that “at the core of the concreteness requirement is a Party’s complaint about the other Party’s act, omission, or course of conduct.”

68. According to the Respondent, the requirement of a “concrete case” regarding an alleged treaty violation has “been recognized by nearly every form of international dispute-settlement tribunal, from investor-State to State-to-State tribunal.” The Respondent rejects the Claimant’s attempt to cite cases which refute the existence of the concreteness requirement, arguing that all these cases “arose out of clear allegations of treaty violation or are otherwise manifestly distinguishable because the Parties consented to broader jurisdiction.” Furthermore, the Respondent argues that “the stark separation between interpretation and application that Ecuador proposes is artificial” since in all cases, even

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57 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 21, citing Arbitral Decision Rendered in Conformity with the Special Agreement Concluded on December 17, 1939, Between the Kingdom of Sweden and the United States of America Relating to the Arbitration of a Difference Concerning the Swedish Motor Ships Kronprins Gustaf Adolf and Pacific, reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 834, p. 846 [R-41].
58 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 341:4-20.
59 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 342:4-25.
60 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 21.
61 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 127.
62 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 21-22.
63 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 128, 136-137.
those cited by the Claimant, “there may be elements of both interpretation and application.” The Respondent notes that the compromissory clauses of some of the cases cited by the Claimant are broader than Article VII of the Treaty. In any event, the Respondent argues that these cases would also meet the concreteness requirement.65

69. The Respondent cites the Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission decision in the *Cases of Dual Nationality*, which explicitly addressed the issue of the “concrete case” requirement and determined that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain abstract claims.66 The Respondent contends that the Anglo-Italian Commission, looking at a compromissory clause with virtually identical operative language as the one at issue in the case at hand, found that it could not entertain the United Kingdom’s request to interpret the meaning of a provision outside of a concrete case, lest it improperly engage in judicial lawmaker.67

70. The Respondent takes issue with the Claimant’s attempts to distinguish the *Cases of Dual Nationality*. First, while the Anglo-Italian Commission expresses concern over making abstract pronouncements when not all the parties to a multilateral agreement are party to the proceeding, the Respondent argues that there is no difference between the non-party States and Italy, who also did not consent to the exercise of such competence by the Anglo-Italian Commission.68 Second, the Respondent disputes that the compromissory clause in *Cases of Dual Nationality* was somehow inherently limited to concrete cases. According to the Respondent, nowhere in the Anglo-Italian Commission’s decision is there support for this theory. The Anglo-Italian Commission “interpreted the scope of its jurisdiction only by reference to Article 83(2) of the Treaty”.69

71. The Respondent further points to pronouncements by the ICJ on the importance of a “concrete case” to establish its contentious jurisdiction.70 The Respondent in particular relies on the *Northern Cameroons* case where the ICJ stated that its contentious jurisdiction allows it to “pronounce judgment only in connection with concrete cases where there exists

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64 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 137.
65 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 138-139.
66 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 21, citing *Cases of Dual Nationality*, XIV UN REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 27 [R-30].
67 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 21, citing *Cases of Dual Nationality, supra* note 66.
68 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 131.
69 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 132.
70 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 23.
at the time of the adjudication an actual controversy involving a conflict of legal interests between the parties.”

71 The Respondent argues that the same “concreteness” concept is found in the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. Under that mechanism, a dispute only arises in “situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member.”

72 The Respondent cites *United States Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses*, where the WTO Appellate Body ruled that “we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to make law by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute.”

73 The Respondent asserts that investor-State tribunals similarly require an actual controversy in a concrete case to take jurisdiction. The Respondent cites *Maffezini v. Spain*, where the tribunal concluded that a “dispute must relate to clearly identified issues between the parties and must not be merely academic.”

74 Professor Schreuer has observed that “[t]he disagreement between the parties must also have some practical relevance to their relationship and must not be purely theoretical. It is not the task of [investor-State tribunals] to clarify legal questions in abstracto.” The Respondent further points to *ad hoc* tribunals that had come to similar conclusions, such as the *Aminoil* arbitration where the tribunal found that despite years of negotiations and the expression of divergent legal positions over the rights and obligations under various concession agreements, a concrete step such as nationalization had to be taken for there to be a dispute which would found arbitral jurisdiction.

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71 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 23, citing *Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom)*, Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 2 December 1963, 1963 I.C.J. Reports 13, p. 34 [R-10][C-129] (hereinafter “Northern Cameroons”).

72 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 24, citing WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 3.9 [R-17] (hereinafter “DSU”).

73 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 132.

74 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 24-25, citing *Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain*, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (25 January 2000), ¶94 [R-45] (hereinafter “Maffezini”).


73. The Respondent distinguishes several of the cases relied upon by the Claimant, arguing that none of these cases were abstract or involved requests for interpretation outside the context of an actual controversy.\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 140.} The Respondent divides the cases cited by the Claimant into “breach cases,” where the claim involved an allegation of breach, and “consent cases,” where the parties agreed to a broader jurisdictional grant. The Respondent contends that these cases “demonstrate precisely how the United States understands Article VII to operate in practice.”\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 137.} In the “consent cases,” Case A/2 and Case A/17 before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the Respondent submits that the U.S. and Iran consented that the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal address various issues concerning the interpretation of the Algiers Accords outside of the context of a concrete case.\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 140, 158-159.} However, even then the Respondent alleges that “[t]here often was a conflict of rights at issue. There may not have been allegations of breach as such, but there was a real conflict of issues.”\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 333:6-10.}

74. The Respondent also distinguishes the “breach” cases. In Revaluation of the German Mark, the premise of the claimant’s case was that Germany had violated the terms of the London Debt Agreement by revaluing its mark and refusing to make payments on the basis of new par values as allegedly required by the guarantee clause. The Respondent therefore argues that the tribunal did not abstractly interpret the guarantee clause in the treaty but did so in the context of a concrete allegation of breach.\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 140-143.} In Rights of U.S. Nationals in Morocco, while France brought the case before the ICJ and raised interpretive questions about its obligations, the U.S. had alleged multiple treaty violations, notably that France had breached the MFN clause in a commercial treaty by depriving U.S. nationals of economic and consular rights.\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 140-143.}

75. In the case of Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Respondent first notes that the compromissory clause covered the broader category of “differences of opinion”.\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 147-148.} The Respondent also addresses the statement in that case that a court could provide an abstract interpretation of a treaty since it had already done so in Judgment Number 3. The
Respondent submits that Judgment Number 3 was the *Treaty of Neuilly* case in which Bulgaria and Greece submitted a question of treaty interpretation to the PCIJ’s summary chamber by special agreement. Judgment Number 3 therefore falls squarely into the category of “consent cases” according to the Respondent. The Respondent further distinguishes *Upper Silesia* by arguing that the case arose out of clear allegations by Germany that Poland had breached the underlying peace treaty by expropriating the property of German nationals. The second question posed by Germany to the PCIJ, concerning what attitude should have been adopted by Poland so as not to breach the treaty, was in fact not decided by the PCIJ, since Germany did not convert this abstract question into a justiciable one.

76. In the case of the *Statute of the Memel Territory*, the Respondent first notes that the compromissory clause also covered “differences of opinion” and takes issue with the Claimant’s attempts to assimilate “disputes” with “differences of opinion”. The fact that this particular treaty provided that “differences of opinion” would be treated as disputes of an international character does not alter the definition of a “dispute” in international practice. The Respondent asserts in any event that the concreteness requirement is satisfied since the Allied Powers accused Lithuania of wrongly dismissing the president of the Memel Territory directorate. Furthermore, the Respondent notes that the court refused to rule on the more abstract question of whether “the right to dismiss the President exists only under certain conditions or in certain circumstances and what those conditions or circumstances are.”

77. In the *Pensions of Officials of the Saar Territory*, the Respondent notes once again that the clause in question is broader, covering “serious differences of views.” The Respondent also contends that, although the parties did not plead their cases in terms of treaty breaches, the arbitration nonetheless arose out of Germany’s allegations that the Commission had

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86 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 151:8-150:7.
breached the Baden-Baden Agreement by drawing on the pension reserve fund to pay pensions.  

78. The Respondent also argues that the Amabile case is inapposite, since in that case the U.S.-Italian Conciliation Commission merely established a general rule of procedure regarding the admission of written testimony, which it was competent to do pursuant to the terms of the Peace Treaty. In any event, the Commission did not do so in the abstract but in order to assess evidence proffered by Ms. Amabile in support of her claim.  

79. Finally, the Respondent alleges that the U.S. Air Services Agreement case clearly falls within the category of breach cases, since the question at issue concerned the conflicting rights claimed by the United States and France under the Services Agreement with real consequences flowing from the determination of those rights to various airlines.  

80. The Respondent maintains that it has long taken the position that State-to-State dispute settlement clauses that it included in FCN treaties and BITs permit only the resolution of “disputes between the Parties concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty” and that the U.S. government has pronounced that “it is in the interest of the United States to be able to have recourse to [State-to-State dispute settlement] in case of treaty violation.”  

81. Furthermore, the Respondent notes that the Claimant has also recognized the requirement of an actual controversy. The Claimant argued before the Chevron tribunal that “simply making an arbitration demand stating that a dispute exists is insufficient to invoke the BIT.”  

82. The Respondent contends that in the case at hand the Claimant “presents no coherent theory for determining when a controversy has sufficient concreteness to constitute a dispute” and denies the existence of such a requirement, relying solely on positive

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91 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 331:5-13.  
93 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 27, citing Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2007-2, Interim Award (1 December 2008), ¶94 [R-32] (hereinafter “Chevron Interim Award”).
opposition to found the dispute.

The Respondent notes that this leaves undetermined “what theoretical framework could possibly guide this Tribunal’s analysis to Ecuador’s conclusion?”

83. The Respondent points to the report by the Claimant’s expert, Professor Pellet, where he recognizes a concreteness requirement, at least for purposes of Article V and submits that the U.S.’ failure to respond to Ecuador’s demand breached the U.S.’ obligation to consult under Article V. The Respondent disagrees with Professor Pellet’s conclusion that the U.S. has breached its Article V obligations and notes that the Claimant has never claimed this breach, but it does “agree with Professor Pellet’s basic approach to Article V” where a dispute is based on an act, omission, or a course of conduct that is alleged to violate the BIT. The Respondent submits that Professor Pellet’s analysis is strained when he examines whether there is a dispute concerning the interpretation of Article II(7) of the BIT, and that even Professor Pellet concedes that “the problem is that this dispute concerns the implementation of Article V and not, primarily, the interpretation of Article II(7).” The Respondent, however, rejects Professor Pellet’s reasoning that, since the Parties would probably not agree on the meaning of Article II(7) when consulting under Article V, it would be more efficient for the Tribunal to directly decide the issue.

84. The Respondent asserts that the Claimant has manifestly failed to establish the existence of a concrete case as required under Article VII. The Respondent contends that “by its own admission, Ecuador makes no allegation that the United States has failed to comply with the Treaty,” citing the Claimant’s pronouncements that:

Ecuador has not accused the United States of any wrongdoing. It does not accuse the United States of violating any of its international obligations. It does not seek compensation from the United States. It does not seek an order against the United States.

The Respondent avers that the Claimant is asking the Tribunal to rule on “open-ended questions, not connected to any concrete facts” pointing to the fact that the Claimant asked the Tribunal at the First Preparatory Meeting to rule on the Claimant’s precise obligations

94 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 134.
95 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 134.
96 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 134-135.
97 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 135-136.
98 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 27-28, citing Transcript (Preparatory Meeting), 21 March 2010, p. 18.
under Article II(7), such as how to organize its court system to comply with the Treaty and how aggressively it must act to speed up cases and by which methods.99

85. The Respondent stresses that the questions the Claimant put to the Tribunal “provide the strongest justification for why the ‘concrete case’ requirement is essential.”100 The Respondent contends that these questions lead to an advisory opinion and that the Tribunal is not “a general advisor” of the Claimant regarding how it is to implement changes to its judiciary.101 Furthermore, the concreteness requirement “prevents Article VII from being construed so broadly as to deprive a Party of its discretion to interpret the BIT or to undermine the bilateral economic dialogue under a BIT.”102

c) Lack of positive opposition by the Parties

86. The Respondent argues that to establish the existence of a “dispute”, the Claimant must prove that the Parties are in “positive opposition” to one another in a concrete case involving a breach of the Treaty.103 Despite certain statements to the contrary in its Counter-Memorial, the Respondent submits that, at the hearing on jurisdiction, the Claimant accepted the requirement of positive opposition to found a dispute.104

87. To establish the lack of positive opposition in this case, the Respondent notes the Claimant’s acknowledgment that the Respondent “did not affirmatively oppose Ecuador’s unilateral interpretation of Article II(7) of the Treaty.”105 The Respondent stresses that “it has never taken a position on the substance of Ecuador’s interpretation of Article II(7)…either before or after Ecuador presented its Diplomatic Note.”106 The Respondent objects to the Claimant’s reference to the Respondent’s pleadings to found positive opposition. The Respondent relies on Georgia v. Russia to argue that “jurisdiction must be

99 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 28.
100 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 28.
101 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 28-29.
102 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 130.
103 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 29.
104 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 164.
105 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 29.
106 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 167; Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 334:19-22.
established at the time of an application” and that therefore the positive opposition must have materialized as of 28 June 2011.107

88. In any event, the Respondent denies that its pleadings put it in positive opposition, rejecting the argument that the characterization of the Claimant’s interpretation as unilateral means that the Respondent necessarily disagrees with it.108 The Respondent submits that its calling the Claimant’s interpretation unilateral is a fact, and is without prejudice as to whether the Respondent agrees with the Claimant’s interpretation.109 Furthermore, the Respondent rejects the Claimant’s view that because the Respondent’s expert, Professor Reisman, characterized the Chevron award as res judicata, then this necessarily means that the U.S. agrees with the Chevron award as binding for Ecuador’s obligations vis-à-vis the United States as well.110 The Respondent stresses that Professor Reisman’s opinion only described the Chevron award as res judicata in the context of explaining the relationship between Article VI and Article VII of the Treaty and in no way implied that the award was res judicata for future tribunals.111

89. The Respondent contests the Claimant’s argument that the Respondent put itself in positive opposition through its silence: “[s]ilence alone cannot establish positive opposition. It is only when a party’s actions make it clear that its views are positively opposed to the other party, that silence can serve as an objective determination of positive opposition.”112 The Respondent points to the ILC guidelines on unilateral interpretive declarations which states that silence is a common and indeterminate response and can express either agreement or disagreement with the proposed interpretation.113 The Respondent also relies on Professor Tomuschat’s view that “in the absence of an obligation to provide an answer, silence alone cannot be deemed to constitute rejection.”114 The Respondent notes that the Claimant has

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107 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 167-169.
108 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 169.
109 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 170, 190.
110 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 190-191.
111 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 191.
112 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 29.
113 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 192-193.
114 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 193.
conceded that the Respondent “has taken no action whatsoever,” meaning that it cannot have created positive opposition.\textsuperscript{115}

90. The Respondent defines positive opposition, with reference to international jurisprudence, as “a conflict of legal views or interests between two parties.”\textsuperscript{116} To establish positive opposition, the Respondent argues that a “tribunal must make an ‘objective determination’ that ‘the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other.’”\textsuperscript{117} The Respondent notes that positive opposition is often established by diplomatic exchanges or is manifested in public statements.\textsuperscript{118} The Respondent sets out the two factors required to establish positive opposition:

one party must allege that the party’s acts, omissions, or course of conduct amount to international wrongdoing, or otherwise conflict with or offend the first party’s rights under the treaty. Second, the accused Party must deny the allegation of wrongdoing, either expressly or implicitly.\textsuperscript{119}

The Respondent submits that taking a position on the underlying matter may be done explicitly or implicitly through action. However, one party cannot force the other into positive opposition nor can one party unilaterally create a dispute.\textsuperscript{120}

91. The Respondent argues that the cases cited by the Claimant in claiming that the existence of a dispute can be established by a party’s conduct, including silence, actually contradict the Claimant’s assertion. The Respondent analyses \textit{Georgia v. Russia}, \textit{Cameroon v. Nigeria}, and \textit{UN Headquarters} and contends that in those cases, one party had claimed that the other had breached international obligations owed to that party, which demanded a response. The Respondent alleges that in the case at hand, no allegation of a breach of the Treaty has been put forward, and there is therefore no obligation to respond to the Claimant’s request for interpretation.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{115} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 29-30.
\textsuperscript{117} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 30, citing \textit{Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania} (First Phase), Advisory Opinion (30 March 1950), 1950 I.C.J. \textsc{Reports} 65, p. 74 [R-6][C-137] (hereinafter “\textit{Interpretation of Peace Treaties}”).
\textsuperscript{118} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 165-166.
\textsuperscript{119} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{120} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{121} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 30-31.
92. As regards Georgia v. Russia, the Respondent maintains that Georgia had claimed that Russia had violated a human rights treaty and that Russia had expressly and publicly denied those claims, which is why the ICJ determined that the parties were in positive opposition. Georgia v. Russia is thus inapposite to the matter at hand since the Claimant has never alleged any breach of the Treaty, nor has the Respondent publicly or privately affirmed or denied the Claimant’s interpretation of Article II(7). With respect to UN Headquarters and Cameroon v. Nigeria, the Respondent contends that the actions of the accused parties, allegedly contrary to their treaty obligations, provided clear evidence that they opposed the claim of breach, thus giving rise to a dispute. In UN Headquarters, the United States passed a law in direct violation of its alleged international obligations. Meanwhile, in Cameroon v. Nigeria, the ICJ found that Nigerian troops had engaged in “incidents and incursions” into the territory claimed by Cameroon. Furthermore, in that case, the parties had agreed that there was a dispute over part of the border but not over the entirety of the border and therefore the question was one of the scope of the dispute, not its existence. The Respondent submits that Cameroon v. Nigeria is inapposite to the case at hand: “there have been no troop invasions, no border skirmishes, and no admission of even the smallest of disputes.” In this case, the Claimant does not allege that the Respondent has taken any action whatsoever contrary to its obligations under the Treaty.

93. The Respondent asserts that the Claimant cannot “unilaterally create ‘positive opposition’” since positive opposition requires an objective determination by the Tribunal that one party’s claims of a treaty breach are refuted by the other party. Even if the US Legal Adviser had stated that the United States “will not rule” on the Claimant’s request that it agree to the Claimant’s interpretation—a fact the Respondent denies—this would not

122 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 31, citing Case Concerning the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russia), Judgment on Preliminary Objections (1 April 2011), ICJ, ¶112 [R-9][C-122] (hereinafter “Georgia v. Russia”); Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 172-173.
124 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 177.
125 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 178.
126 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 31-32.
127 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 34.
create positive opposition over the interpretation of Article II(7).\textsuperscript{129} The Claimant cannot show that the Respondent contradicted a claim of treaty violation by Ecuador in diplomatic or public statements, and thus no objective assessment of this alleged statement could lead to the conclusion that the Parties were in positive opposition.\textsuperscript{130} The Respondent maintains that the ICJ has concluded similarly, finding in \textit{Certain Property} that diplomatic exchanges between Liechtenstein and Germany demonstrating a clear difference of views manifested positive opposition over whether there was a breach of an international obligation.\textsuperscript{131} Unlike the German Foreign Minister’s statement to the Foreign Minister of Liechtenstein that it was “known that the German Government [did] not share the legal opinion” of Liechtenstein on this matter, which the ICJ took to establish the requisite positive opposition, the US Legal Adviser allegedly stated that the Respondent “would not rule” on the Claimant’s request—not that it disagreed with the Claimant’s interpretation of Article II(7) of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{132}

94. The Respondent contends that the Claimant cannot force the Parties into positive opposition by ultimatum. It cannot unilaterally put the Respondent in the “untenable position” of having no choice but to agree with the Claimant’s interpretation or be deemed to be in positive opposition by remaining silent.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, the Respondent alleges that “the most Ecuador can do is to say that the failure of the United States to answer Ecuador’s either/or demand […] created the dispute […] But that alleged dispute is over whether Ecuador had a right to issue such an ultimatum or demand and whether the Respondent had an obligation to answer. It’s not over the interpretation or application of Article II(7).”\textsuperscript{134}

95. Finally, the Respondent argues that it cannot see how its silence prejudices the Claimant or requires the Claimant to give U.S. investors greater advantages than Ecuador agreed to provide, since Ecuador’s interpretation was successful in one investor-State arbitration. The Respondent alleges that the Claimant seems to be treating the \textit{Chevron} award as binding

\textsuperscript{129} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{130} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{131} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 34, citing \textit{Case Concerning Certain Property} (Liechtenstein v. Germany), Judgment (10 February 2005), 2005 I.C.J. REPORTS 6, ¶25 [R-7] (hereinafter “\textit{Certain Property}”).
\textsuperscript{132} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 35, citing \textit{Certain Property}, \textit{supra} note 131, ¶23.
\textsuperscript{133} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 35-36.
\textsuperscript{134} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 108-109.
f) The Respondent does not owe the Claimant an obligation to respond to or confirm the Claimant’s unilateral interpretation of the Treaty

96. The Respondent disputes the Claimant’s theory that the principle of good faith obligates the Respondent to respond to or confirm the Claimant’s unilateral interpretation of Article II(7). The Respondent asserts that the Claimant has no right under the Treaty or general international law to demand that the Respondent confirm its own interpretation of Article II(7) or be thereby forced to submit to arbitration. For the Claimant to be able to unilaterally create a dispute about the substance of its claim would “turn international treaty practice on its head.” The Respondent contends that States retain the discretion to mutually agree to a joint interpretation but are under no obligation to reach such agreement.

97. According to the Respondent, a State may bind itself under international by a unilateral act but cannot bind another State by that act. Allowing the Claimant to bring into being a mechanism not provided by the Treaty which would force the Respondent to pronounce itself on the interpretation of provisions of the Treaty whenever the Claimant found it necessary, is inconsistent with the notion of mutuality which underlies the obligations on State parties to a treaty.

98. The Respondent maintains that nothing in the Treaty contains any provision obligating the Respondent to interpret the Treaty “beyond the four corners of the text itself.” The Respondent notes that the only provision in the Treaty under which the Respondent is committed to engage in consultations regarding the meaning of the Treaty provisions is Article V which, as the Respondent’s expert Professor Tomuschat opines, “would have been the proper avenue to see if the Parties could agree to a mutually acceptable

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135 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 194-195.
136 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 36.
137 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 36.
138 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 37.
139 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 37.
140 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 37-38.
141 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 38.
interpretive statement.”142 The Respondent also cites *Oppenheim’s International Law* for the proposition that “[w]hile consultations must be undertaken in good faith, they do not give to any of the states involved a right to have its views accepted by the others or to stop them acting in whatever way they propose.”143 The Respondent contends that it did in fact respond to the Claimant by stating that “it would remain silent on Ecuador’s interpretation.” While this may not have been the desired response, the Respondent argues that it was made in good faith and is fully consistent with the Treaty.144

99. The Respondent counters the Claimant’s assertion that the principles of good faith and *pacta sunt servanda* obligate the Respondent to respond to its demand for interpretation.145 The Respondent alleges that the principle of good faith is one of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations but “is not itself a source of obligations where none would otherwise exist.”146 Any legal obligation to respond to the Claimant’s demand must therefore have a basis in the Treaty.147 The Respondent adds that in *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, the ICJ rejected Nigeria’s argument that Cameroon’s failure to give Nigeria prior notice of its intent to bring a claim before the ICJ was a breach of good faith.148 The Respondent submits that the Claimant’s efforts to argue here that the Respondent did not fulfill its obligations under the Treaty in good faith are similarly unavailing. According to the Respondent, given that the Claimant never invoked Article V, it cannot now argue that the United States did not consult in good faith.149

100. Furthermore, the Respondent contends that the principle of good faith is incumbent on both Parties and that it is difficult to find good faith in the Claimant’s decision to invoke Article VII of the Treaty only a few months after having successfully petitioned its courts to declare that provision unconstitutional.150

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144 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 186.
145 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 39.
147 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 39.
148 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 187.
149 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 187-188.
150 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 40.
101. The Respondent also disputes the Claimant’s reliance on the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* as a means to require the Respondent to express a view on the proper interpretation of the Treaty. While the Respondent concedes that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed in good faith, the Claimant can point to no obligation that the Respondent has failed to perform under the Treaty, or that it has acted in bad faith, or that the lack of response by the Respondent somehow prevents the Claimant from performing its obligations under the Treaty.\(^{151}\)

102. The Respondent argues that international law does not compel States to respond to unilateral interpretive declarations, nor does it prohibit them from remaining silent when confronted with such declarations.\(^{152}\) The Respondent notes that, when confirmed by the other State party, interpretations contained in such declarations may become part of the context in which the terms of a treaty are to be read.\(^{153}\) The Respondent however, avers that it is aware of no instance where a party unilaterally imposed its view on another party through arbitration and that such an attempt was firmly rejected in *Cases of Dual Nationality*.\(^{154}\)

103. Furthermore, the Respondent cites State and treaty practice in support of its position.\(^{155}\) The Respondent contends that it can find no treaty imposing the obligation of responding to a demand for interpretation, nor an example of a State party responding to such a demand under the belief that it was obliged to do so.\(^{156}\) The Respondent maintains that, where it and its treaty partners have made express provisions for States to offer their unilateral views on the meaning of a provision of an investment treaty, “they have created a discretionary rather than a mandatory right,” such as under the North American Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter “NAFTA”) where a non-disputing party to the NAFTA may make a submission to an investor-State tribunal on a question of interpretation of the treaty, as well as under the United States’ more recent BITs and FTAs.\(^{157}\) The Respondent agrees with Professor Pellet’s opinion, relying on the *S.S. Wimbledon* case, that limits on sovereign

\(^{151}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 40-41.  
\(^{152}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 41-42.  
\(^{153}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 42-43.  
\(^{154}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 43.  
\(^{155}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 43.  
\(^{156}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 43.  
\(^{157}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 43-44.
discretion must be express. The Respondent argues that no such express limitation can be found in Article V or any other provision of the Treaty.\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 185.}

104. Where State practice exists, the Respondent claims that this practice confirms that States have the discretion—rather than the obligation—to agree to a joint interpretation.\footnote{Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 44.} The Respondent points to the examples of the Netherlands consenting to offer its interpretation of the Czech-Netherlands BIT under the consultations provision of that treaty, and that of Argentina and Panama issuing an exchange of notes to reach a joint interpretation on the meaning of the MFN clause in the Argentina-Panama BIT.\footnote{Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 45.} In neither case did the States in question act as if under an obligation to offer an interpretation.\footnote{Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 45.}

105. The Respondent contends that investment treaties which provide for the issuance of joint interpretations to clarify the meaning of a treaty, expressly require the parties’ mutual agreement, such as is found in Article 1131 of NAFTA.\footnote{Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 46.} Similar provisions to Article 1131 of NAFTA have been included in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and recent U.S. FTAs, but remain the exception rather than the rule in international practice.\footnote{Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 46.} The Respondent points to Professor Reisman’s opinion that Article VII of the Treaty is not equivalent to Article 1131 of NAFTA, and that in any event “even NAFTA Article 1131 does not compel joint interpretations.”\footnote{Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 46-47, citing Reisman Opinion ¶44.}

106. The Respondent submits that issuing an interpretation of a treaty obligation requires a complicated inter-agency process and is only done in a contentious case with a genuine dispute.\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 317:20-319:19.}

\textbf{g) The Claimant has not fulfilled its obligation to consult}

107. The Respondent argues that, as the ICJ held in \textit{Georgia v. Russia}, a tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction until all preconditions are fulfilled under the relevant compromissory clause. According to the Respondent, under Article VII of the treaty, this would require the Claimant to seek to resolve the dispute through consultations or other diplomatic channels
after the dispute had arisen.\textsuperscript{166} The Respondent contends that, even accepting the Claimant’s theory that a dispute arose in October 2010 when Mr. Koh told Ambassador Gallegos that the U.S. would not provide a response to Ecuador’s Diplomatic Note, the Claimant failed to meaningfully pursue consultations, under Article V or otherwise, prior to commencing arbitration under Article VII.\textsuperscript{167} The Respondent alleges that all the actions relied upon by the Claimant to satisfy its obligations to consult took place prior to the date on which the Claimant itself alleges that the dispute crystallized.\textsuperscript{168}

### h) Article VII does not create advisory, appellate or referral jurisdiction

108. The Respondent claims that had the Parties to the Treaty intended to provide the Tribunal with broader powers to address abstract legal questions, they would have had to do so expressly.\textsuperscript{169} The Respondent alleges that “[a]bsent the expressed consent of both Parties, the Tribunal has no authority to act as an advisory, appellate or referral body.”\textsuperscript{170}

109. The Respondent notes that the question the Claimant has asked the Tribunal is similar to those posed to the ICJ in its capacity as an advisory body competent to offer non-binding opinions under the ICJ Statute. The Treaty is, however, devoid of any equivalent enabling provisions.\textsuperscript{171}

110. The Respondent asserts that Article VII also does not provide for appellate jurisdiction, unlike the Dispute Settlement Understanding which grants the Appellate Body of the WTO the power to decide “issues of law covered in the [underlying] panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.”\textsuperscript{172} The Respondent notes that, when in the past it has considered the creation of appellate jurisdiction, it has done so expressly, as in recent BITs and investment chapters of FTAs.\textsuperscript{173} The Respondent argues that the inclusion of express provisions regarding the potential creation of appellate jurisdiction in its BIT

\textsuperscript{166} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{167} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 311:7-16.
\textsuperscript{168} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 110-111.
\textsuperscript{169} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 47-48.
\textsuperscript{170} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{171} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{172} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 50, citing DSU, \textit{supra} note 72, Article 17.6.
\textsuperscript{173} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 50.
practice shows that Article VII of the Treaty is not and was never intended to function as an appellate mechanism.\textsuperscript{174}

111. The Respondent contends that, although the Claimant claims that it does not intend to ask the Tribunal to overturn the \textit{Chevron} case, a press statement issued by the Claimant “implied that its goal in this arbitration is to undo the award.”\textsuperscript{175} The Respondent notes that the Claimant’s request for an interpretation was prompted by the \textit{Chevron} award and that its letter to the Tribunal of 21 June 2012 states that “Ecuador’s Memorial on the Merits and attachments set forth Ecuador’s interpretation of Article II(7) and explain why the interpretation given by the Arbitral Tribunal in \textit{Chevron Corp and Texaco Petroleum Company versus the Republic of Ecuador} was incorrect.”\textsuperscript{176} The Respondent argues that this indicates that Ecuador is seeking to relitigate the \textit{Chevron} award and is thus equivalent to a request for appeal, over which the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{177} The Respondent alleges that the Claimant is at least seeking to attack the \textit{Chevron} award collaterally in violation of Article VI of the treaty, pursuant to which that award is to be treated as final and binding.\textsuperscript{178}

112. The Respondent points to the case of \textit{X v. Y}\textsuperscript{179} and \textit{Lucchetti v. Peru}\textsuperscript{180} as examples of cases where disguised appeals were not granted. In \textit{X v. Y}, company X, after a partial award was rendered against it by the tribunal, commenced a new arbitration under the same contract seeking a declaration on the validity of the parties’ underlying agreement, as well as setting aside proceedings in Swiss courts. It then asked the initial tribunal to stay its proceedings. The Swiss Federal Court rejected company X’s impermissible attempt to defeat the tribunal’s partial award and the initial tribunal declined to stay its proceedings.\textsuperscript{181} In \textit{Lucchetti v. Peru}, after the claimant had brought a case against Peru under the Chile-Peru BIT, Peru began arbitration under the State-State arbitration clause and asked the \textit{Lucchetti

\textsuperscript{174} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{175} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{176} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 200.
\textsuperscript{177} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{178} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 203-204.
\textsuperscript{179} X S.A. v. Y Ltd., Case 4A_210/2008/ech, Oct. 29, 2008 (Swiss Federal Court, 1\textsuperscript{st} Civ. Law Division), 27 ASA Bull., No. 2, 309, p. 323 [R-12].
\textsuperscript{180} Empresas Lucchetti S.A. and Lucchetti Peru S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/04, Award (7 February 2005) [R-50] (hereinafter “Lucchetti”).
\textsuperscript{181} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 51-52.
tribunal to suspend its proceedings in light of the concurrent State-to-State dispute, which the tribunal refused to do. The Respondent also relies on Professor Orrego Vicuña’s view that resorting to State-to-State arbitration to avoid the obligation the State has accepted with respect to an investor “constitutes an ‘abus de droit’ sufficient for the inter-State tribunal to decline its jurisdiction.”

113. The Respondent highlights its expert Professor Reisman’s opinion that the Claimant’s attempt to use the State-to-State track to invent a procedure for appellate review is at odds with the two-track jurisdictional regime of the Treaty. The Respondent argues that taking jurisdiction and ruling on the questions presented in this case would force the Respondent into a proceeding to relitigate a final award in which it had not participated.

114. Finally, the Respondent submits that Article VII does not allow for referral jurisdiction which would permit the consideration of preliminary legal questions by a third party. The Respondent contends that when States establish referral jurisdiction, they do so expressly by two methods: the “case-stated” method where a national court sua sponte refers a question to an international court for binding decision, such as under Article 9F of the Treaty of Lisbon, or by “evocation” procedures where a disputing party may request the removal of a legal issue from one court to another for decision, such as is found in the 1922 Treaty of Upper Silesia. The Respondent avers that States know how to establish referral mechanisms and the absence of these mechanisms in the Treaty indicates that the Parties intended to confer no such power on the Tribunal.

i) A finding of jurisdiction would exceed the tribunal’s judicial function and would constitute judicial law-making

115. The Respondent alleges that because the Tribunal is empowered to take only original and contentious jurisdiction, it cannot rule on Ecuador’s request for an abstract interpretation of

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182 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 52, citing Lucchetti, supra note 180.
183 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 52-53, citing Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Lis Pendens Arbitralis, Parallel State and Arbitral Procedures in International Arbitration: Dossiers – ICC Institute of World Business Law, p. 207, 214 [R-92].
184 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 53, citing Reisman Opinion ¶51.
185 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 53.
186 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 53.
187 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 53-54.
Article II(7) as this would exceed its judicial function.\(^{188}\) The Respondent submits that the
Claimant’s request for an interpretation that would bind future tribunals is outside the
scope of Article VII, since it would “deprive them of the right to be the masters of the
meaning of their treaties.”\(^ {189}\) The Respondent points to the Nuclear Tests case, where Judge
Gros stated that the tendency to submit political disputes to adjudication would result in the
“institution, on the international plane, of government by judges.”\(^ {190}\) The Respondent also
highlights the warning of the Aminoil tribunal against arbitral tribunals stepping into the
shoes of the parties to regulate their affairs without their express consent.\(^ {191}\)

116. The Respondent argues that the Claimant is asking the Tribunal to act as an international
legislator, not arbitrator, and to substitute its own interpretation of a provision of the Treaty
for that of sovereign consent.\(^ {192}\) The Respondent points again to the reasoning in the Cases
of Dual Nationality where the Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission ruled that a dispute
settlement provision providing for jurisdiction over “disputes concerning the application or
interpretation” of the treaty in question did not grant it jurisdiction to decide abstract and
general questions, stating that “the arbitrator cannot substitute the legislator”.\(^ {193}\) The
Respondent contends that the Claimant is making the same request of this Tribunal that the
United Kingdom made to the Cases of Dual Nationality tribunal, since it asks the Tribunal
to issue an interpretation of a provision of the Treaty absent party consent and outside the
context of a concrete case.\(^ {194}\)

\textbf{j) Exercising jurisdiction would be contrary to the Treaty’s object and
purpose and would destabilize international adjudication}

117. The Respondent argues that granting the Claimant’s request would “jeopardize the system
of investment treaties, particularly investor-State dispute settlement provisions” and would
have the effect of “judicializing diplomacy”, chilling the free exchange of views essential

\(^ {188}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 55.
\(^ {189}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 55-56.
\(^ {190}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 56, citing Separate Opinion of Judge Gros, Nuclear Tests
\(^ {191}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 56, citing Aminoil, supra note 76, pp. 1015-16.
\(^ {192}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 57.
\(^ {193}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 57-58, citing Cases of Dual Nationality, supra note 66, pp.
29, 35.
\(^ {194}\) Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 58-59.
to foreign relations.\textsuperscript{195} The equivalent to Article VII is found in a countless number of investment treaties and, should the Claimant’s request be granted, this would open the door to State-to-State arbitrations for matters that the parties never consented to litigating.\textsuperscript{196}

118. The Respondent submits that taking jurisdiction would undermine stability, predictability and neutrality, which it argues are “key principles built into Article VI”.\textsuperscript{197} The Treaty does not provide for further review or appeal other than the permissible annulment or set-aside proceedings.\textsuperscript{198} The Respondent argues that an “authoritative interpretation” rendered by an Article VII tribunal could be used to collaterally attack an award rendered pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, such as the \textit{Chevron} award, and the Claimant could seek to use an award rendered by the Tribunal to deny enforcement of the \textit{Chevron} award.\textsuperscript{199}

119. Second, the Respondent asserts that granting the Claimant’s request would undermine the depoliticization of investment disputes, a principal rationale for investor-State arbitration. In any actual or impending investor-State arbitration, the State of the investor would then face the threat of arbitration.\textsuperscript{200} The Respondent points to the opinion of its expert, Professor Reisman, who contends that allowing the Claimant’s request to proceed would encourage respondent States and States of investors to initiate State-to-State arbitrations to reverse the effect of awards.\textsuperscript{201} The Respondent argues that this would “erode the effectiveness of BITs’ investor-State arbitration.”\textsuperscript{202} The Respondent rejects Professor Amerasinghe’s opinion and deems his conclusion—that the Parties “intended to deviate from their BIT practice and establish a novel control mechanism by which one ad hoc tribunal is authorized, sub silentio, to render an authoritative and definitive interpretation that bind other ad hoc tribunals”—to be not only improbable but wholly unsupported by law.\textsuperscript{203}

120. Third, the Respondent submits that if the Claimant’s request is granted, it would create a “new and unprecedented referral mechanism for investment arbitration” which is not under

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{195} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 59.
\item\textsuperscript{196} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 59.
\item\textsuperscript{197} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 59.
\item\textsuperscript{198} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 60.
\item\textsuperscript{199} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 60.
\item\textsuperscript{200} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, pp. 60-61.
\item\textsuperscript{201} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 61, citing Reisman Opinion ¶54.
\item\textsuperscript{202} Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 61.
\item\textsuperscript{203} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 208.
\end{itemize}
the purview of Article VII. A respondent State could seek fast-track State-to-State arbitration to obtain an interpretation of a treaty provision to influence ongoing investor-State arbitrations. The Respondent disputes the Claimant’s argument that exercising jurisdiction would lead to less politicization by clarifying the Parties’ rights and obligations under the Treaty. The Respondent avers that “by dragging the investor’s home State into the dispute, Ecuador is ensuring that the potential friction becomes actual diplomatic tension.”

Finally, the Claimant’s broad interpretation of Article VII would judicialize significant aspects of the Parties’ bilateral relationships and could limit potentially useful lines of communication and agreement between the Parties. The Respondent avers that the Tribunal’s assumption of jurisdiction in this case would “drastically change this dynamic” and both Parties would have to exercise extreme caution with every request for discussion of the Treaty, since even silence could land the Parties in State-to-State arbitration. The Respondent contends that if the Claimant’s broad interpretation of “disputes” were adopted, consultations under Article V—which allows discussions on “any matters” and which is meant to foster discussion—would always proceed under the threat of arbitration. According to the Respondent, the structure of Article V which foresees consultations on disputes as well as other matters indicates that these are two separate categories. Furthermore, the Respondent maintains that the Claimant’s position would permit a Party to bypass consultations under Article V altogether and turn immediately to arbitration, as the Claimant has attempted to do in the case at hand.

The Respondent submits that finding jurisdiction would establish a dangerous general precedent for the interpretation of other treaties, and that discussions among treaty partners about the meaning of treaties would be chilled, as they would proceed under the constant threat of State-to-State arbitration. The Respondent notes that similar State-to-State
dispute resolution clauses appear in many bilateral and multilateral treaties beyond the investment protection area, such as the UN Convention Law of the Sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS”), and asserts that the Tribunal’s acceptance of the Claimant’s proposal could have far-reaching destabilizing consequences that could “unravel the longstanding system of international treaties.”

123. The Respondent concludes that the Claimant “invites the Tribunal not just to exceed its authority in this case, but more fundamentally, to displace the role of bilateral diplomatic discussion and to destabilize the entire system of inter-State arbitration.”

2. The Claimant’s Position
   a) The factual background

124. As a preliminary matter, the Claimant notes that it accepts that the Chevron Partial Award is final and binding and does not seek in these proceedings to “affect, let alone appeal, set aside or nullify that award.” However, the Claimant submits that the Chevron Partial Award gave rise to “considerable uncertainty regarding the meaning of Article II(7) and the scope of Ecuador’s obligations thereunder, in particular whether Ecuador is now obliged to take additional steps (and if so, what they might be) in order to satisfy the requirements of that Article.”

125. According to the Claimant, it waited more than eight months before proceeding to arbitration despite what it characterizes as “Mr. Koh’s categorical refusal to respond to Ecuador’s request for the U.S. interpretation of Article II(7).” The Claimant submits that it elected arbitration as a last resort after “having its efforts to engage in discussion firmly and definitively rebuffed.”

   b) The ordinary meaning of Article VII

126. Article VII of the Treaty confers jurisdiction over “any dispute…concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty.” In the Claimant’s view, the ordinary meaning

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213 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 66.
214 Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, p. 67.
215 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶11.
216 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶12.
217 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶22.
218 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶25.
of the provision as well as the jurisprudence and practice of international courts and tribunals confirm that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over abstract disputes as long as the dispute in question concerns the “interpretation or application” of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{219} The Claimant disputes the Respondent’s submission that there is an \textit{a priori} requirement that the dispute concern a breach of treaty obligations or that international law imposes a greater requirement of concreteness than what is contained in the clause.\textsuperscript{220}

127. The Claimant submits that the plain meaning of Article VII, when interpreted in accordance with Article 31 of the VCLT establishes that the “Parties have conferred this Tribunal with the widest possible grant of jurisdiction: the competence to arbitrate ‘any dispute...concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty.’” The Claimant contends that the PCIJ interpreted a similar compromissory clause to confer jurisdiction over a “dispute...of any nature” because the clause’s jurisdictional reach was “as comprehensive as possible.”\textsuperscript{221} It also notes that the wording of Article VII includes the adjective qualifier \textit{any}, “which entails that the covered disputes may be of any nature.”\textsuperscript{222}

128. The Claimant stresses the disjunctive nature of the phrase in Article VII “interpretation or application,” arguing that “it signifies the Parties’ intention to confer upon the tribunal jurisdiction over disputes concerning both the interpretation of the Treaty, and separately, disputes concerning its application,” which are two distinct separate legal grounds for the submission of disputes to arbitration.\textsuperscript{223} The Claimant avers that “interpretation” and “application” are two separate concepts, referring to the Harvard Law School Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, which defines “interpretation as ‘the process of determining the meaning of a text’” and application as “the process of determining the

\textsuperscript{219} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶25. \textit{See also} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 223:14-224:14.
\textsuperscript{220} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶25.
\textsuperscript{221} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶27, citing \textit{Mavrommatis, supra} note 116, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{222} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 225:20-23. \textit{See also} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 64:22-65:1 (“the use of the adjective qualifier ‘any’ denotes that disputes covered by Article VII may be of any nature. This follows from the construction of the Permanent Court of International Justice of a similarly worded compromissory clause in the Mavrommatis Case.”).
\textsuperscript{223} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶28. \textit{See also} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 65:8-17 (“The use of the disjunctive ‘or’ establishes beyond any doubt the Parties’ intention to confer upon tribunals operating under Article VII jurisdiction over disputes concerning solely the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty; in other words, disputes that arise irrespective of the application of such provisions and specific factual situations.”).
consequences which, according to the text, should follow in a given situation.” 224 The Claimant also refers in this regard to the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ehrlich in the Chorzów Factory Case and to the Indus Waters Tribunal’s Order on Interim Measures. 225

129. Therefore, according to the Claimant, disputes over interpretation and application can be arbitrated independently of one another. The Claimant refers to the Oil Platforms case where Judge Higgins wrote that the phrase “‘application or interpretation’ contains ‘two distinct elements which may form the subject-matter of a reference to the Court.’” 226 The Claimant also points to the Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel in the UN Headquarters Agreement case, who in the context of discussing breach, wrote that while every allegation of breach entails elements of interpretation, “even in the absence of allegations of treaty breaches a lack of ‘concordance of views of the parties concerning [the treaty] interpretation’ can independently give rise to a dispute over interpretation.” 227

130. The Claimant argues that the United States itself acknowledged the distinction between disputes regarding the interpretation of treaties and those regarding their application, in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, where the United States asserted claims under the Iran-US FCN’s compromissory clause that conferred jurisdiction over “any dispute...as to the interpretation or application” of the treaty. 228 The United States accepted that under that provision, disputes regarding interpretation are separately

224 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶29, citing Harvard Law School’s Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties [C-134].
225 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 226:11-22, citing Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ehrlich (Judgment-Jurisdiction), 1927, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 9, p. 39 [C-127] (“Interpretation constitutes the process of ‘determining the meaning of a rule’ while application is the process of ‘determining the consequences which the rules attaches to the occurrence of a given fact.’”); Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 227:23-228:4 (“The term ‘or’ introduces alternative elements which can each satisfy a given solution. In the words of the distinguished Indus Waters Tribunal, [i]f a purely interpretive dispute were not arbitrable under Article VII, the word ‘or’ inserted between interpretation and application would be meaningless, and this would be at odds with the cardinal rule of treaty interpretation that ‘[e]ach and every clause of a treaty is to be interpreted as meaningful rather than meaningless.’”).
226 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶30, citing Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins (12 December, 1996), 1996 I.C.J. REPORTS 803, ¶3 [C-144].
justiciable from disputes over application and argued that “if the Government of Iran had made some contention in this Court that the United States interpretation of the Treaty is incorrect or that the Treaty did not apply to Iran’s conduct in the manner suggested by the United States, the Court could clearly be confronted with a dispute relating to the ‘interpretation or application of the Treaty’.”

The Claimant also notes that in the negotiating history of the FCN treaty, the United States sought to reinstate the reference to “application” since as it explained that the “United States wanted to avoid any narrowing of the jurisdictional provision.”

The Claimant submits that “[h]ad interpretive disputes been predicated on allegations of treaty breaches…the compromissory clause’s grant of jurisdiction could not have been ‘narrowed’ by deleting the reference to ‘application’.”

131. The Claimant also notes that the enumeration of various categories of legal disputes that a State may subject to compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of ICJ Statute makes the distinction between interpretation and application. In its view, the same distinction is implicitly acknowledged by the Respondent’s expert, Prof. Tomuschat, who allegedly “does not exclude the possibility that disputes may arise in the absence of […] allegations” by one of the parties.

132. The Claimant emphasizes that this is a dispute about interpretation and not a dispute about the failure to give an interpretation. It is not suggesting that the Respondent breached any obligation in failing to respond to its Diplomatic Note and it expressly acknowledges that it disagrees with its own expert Professor Pellet in this regard. Nonetheless, it contends that

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229 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶32, citing Consular Staff, supra note 228, p. 153.
230 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶32-33, citing Consular Staff, supra note 228.
231 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶34. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 226:23-227:14.
232 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 229:11-23 (“Indeed, the enumeration of various categories of legal disputes the State may subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36(2) of the statute of the Court makes this very distinction. It distinguishes between disputes concerning, ‘the interpretation of a treaty,’ and, ‘the existence of any fact, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation.’ According to Manley Hudson’s 1943 seminal treatise on the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice, this distinction in Article 36(2) reflects an understanding that, ‘Application will usually involve interpretation, but interpretation will not always include application.’”).
235 Id., p. 345:6-17.
such a failure “can give rise to an inference, and that’s the relevance of their failure to respond in this case.”

133. Finally, the Claimant argues that the Treaty does not provide that investor-State tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes concerning the protection of investment. It notes that Article VII does not contain the subject matter limitations found in Article VI. Moreover, it avers that the Respondent’s own Treaty practice demonstrates that Article VII was not intended to exclude investment protection disputes from the jurisdictional reach of State-to-State Tribunals. In this regard, the Claimant points to the Cameroon-US BIT and to the US 2004 and 2012 Model BITs and concludes that “there are thus no grounds for accepting the [Respondent’s] thesis that Article VII was intended sub silentio to exclude all but a few narrow categories of disputes from the jurisdiction of inter-State tribunals.”

134. The Claimant thus concludes that the Parties are entitled under Article VII “to convene an international tribunal with authority to render a legally binding decision when there is a dispute between them regarding the meaning of a provision of a treaty, and nothing more. […] This is a clear consequence of the text of Article VII, and none of the limiting factors the United States is invoking can detract from this conclusion.”

c) The interpretation by international courts and tribunals of compromissory clauses similar to Article VII of the Treaty

135. The Claimant counters the Respondent’s argument that no international court or tribunal has taken jurisdiction over an interpretive dispute in the abstract, referring to several international judgments by the PCIJ, ICJ, and Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal that exercised jurisdiction over an abstract interpretive dispute. In its view, “other international courts and tribunals have routinely interpreted compromissory clauses similar to Article VII as conferring contentious jurisdiction over disputes concerning issues of treaty interpretation disconnected to any allegation or backdrop involving Treaty breach.”

136. First, the Claimant argues that the PCIJ in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia explicitly accepted that a tribunal could exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate an

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236 Id., p. 358:1-3.
238 Id., p. 294:1-296:3.
abstract dispute over treaty interpretation. In particular, the Claimant submits that the PCIJ observed that Article 14 of the Covenant provided the PCIJ with the power to hear any international dispute which the Parties submit to it and that there were numerous clauses providing for the PCIJ’s compulsory jurisdiction over questions of the interpretation and application of a treaty, including Article 23 of the Geneva Convention which “appear also to cover interpretations unconnected with concrete cases of application.” The Claimant submits that the PCIJ further noted that “there is no lack of clauses which refer solely to the interpretation of a treaty” including provisions of the PCIJ’s Statute, and that therefore the PCIJ held that it could exercise jurisdiction over abstract issues of treaty interpretation:

[t]here seems to be no reason why States should not be able to ask the Court to give an abstract interpretation of a treaty; rather would it appear that this is one of the most important functions which it can fulfill. It has, in fact already had occasion to do so in Judgment No. 3 [Treaty of Neuilly].

137. The Claimant’s expert, Professor McCaffrey, observes that the PCIJ simply provided the term “interpretation” its natural meaning. As to the Respondent’s assertion that the applicable compromissory clause referred to “differences of opinion” rather than disputes, the Claimant argues that “a conflict of legal views is itself enough to give rise to a dispute” and that “there is no difference between difference of opinion and dispute regarding interpretation.”

138. The Claimant points to the Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco as a further example of a court exercising jurisdiction over a purely interpretive dispute in the abstract. According to the Claimant, despite no allegations of treaty breach being made, the ICJ proceeded to rule on France’s and the United States’ differing interpretations of the MFN clauses in relation to U.S. consular jurisdiction in the

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241 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶35-36, citing Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Judgment (Merits), 1926 P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 7 [C-130] (hereinafter “Upper Silesia”).
242 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶37, citing Upper Silesia, supra note 241, pp. 18-19.
243 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶37, citing Upper Silesia, supra note 241, pp. 18-19.
244 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶38, citing Expert Opinion of Professor Stephen McCaffrey, ¶37 (hereinafter “McCaffrey Opinion”).
245 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 243:11-245:16.
The Claimant notes that in that case the “United States itself put an abstract question of interpretation to the same tribunal in reply to the French submission, seeking confirmation of particular consular rights that had been granted by the same treaty.”

The Claimant also cites the jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. For example, in *Case No. A/2*, Iran relied on analogous compromissory clauses under the General Declaration and Claims Settlement Declaration, which conferred jurisdiction over “any dispute” as to “the interpretation or performance of any provision” of the Declarations, to demand a decision on whether the Declarations permitted Iran to bring claims against U.S. nationals. The tribunal ruled that, even in the absence of allegations of a breach of the Declarations, “the Tribunal has not only the power but the duty to give an interpretation on the point raised by Iran.” In *Case No. A/17* the tribunal also ruled, on the basis of the same clause in the Declarations, that it could provide the “merely interpretive guidance” requested by the United States as to whether the IUSCT had jurisdiction over certain pending claims before the Chamber that had been brought by Iranian banks against U.S. banking institutions.

The Claimant thus argues that “these two cases prove beyond argument that tribunals operating under compromissory clauses like Article VII may decide purely interpretive disputes, even in the absence of an allegation of breach by the other Party” and it notes that the Respondent was a party to both cases and relied on these provisions as a basis for jurisdiction. The Claimant indicates that in none of the cases did there exist an allegation of breach: there was “nothing more concrete [than] the [P]arties different interpretations of

249 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶41.
250 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶41, citing Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, Case No. A/2, Decision No. DEC 1-A2-FT (26 January 1982), Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Decision, Part II [C-139] (hereinafter “Case No. A/2”).
251 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶39, citing Case No. A/2, supra note 250. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 233:14-234:4.
252 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶42, citing United States of America v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Case A/17, Decision No. DEC .37-A17-FT (18 June 1985) [C-152]. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 234:5-21.
The Claimant also refutes the assertion by the Respondent that these were the result of special consents by the parties, observing that “neither of these awards makes any reference to such special consent” and that the only document filed by the Respondent to support this theory comes from “a completely separate case, Case A/18” and in no way constitutes a special grant of jurisdiction.

141. The Claimant further points to other arbitral tribunals which have exercised jurisdiction over disputes concerning treaty interpretation in the abstract. In *Pensions Officials of the Saar Territory*, the tribunal did not decline to exercise jurisdiction over a matter of treaty interpretation, despite there being no allegations of treaty breaches. In *Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory*, the PCIJ, under a compromissory clause which provided that “any difference of opinion in regard to questions of law or fact concerning these provisions,” held that a difference of opinion regarding questions of law or fact could arise without any allegation of a treaty breach, noting that the clause had two prongs, one which allowed the Court to examine infractions, the other which concerned differences of opinion.

142. The Claimant disputes the Respondent’s interpretation of the *Cases of Dual Nationality*, arguing that the Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission declined jurisdiction because the

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255 Id., pp. 235:14-236:19 (“[N]ot only does the document fail to support the assertion of a special grant of jurisdiction, it actually undercuts the U.S. position because it affirms the Tribunal's purely interpretive jurisdiction, even in circumstances where a previous decision has been rendered. The parallels to our situation are striking. While the U.S. argues here that you should not assert jurisdiction because it would interfere with Article VI tribunals, in Case A/18, the United States stated that it had no such concern with respect to private investor claims heard by the Iran Tribunal's three Chambers. Thus the case, Case A/18, rendered by the Tribunal operating under a similar compromissory clause to Article VII, disproves the United States's allegations that you cannot exercise jurisdiction over disputes, absent a breach or absent a special consent.”).
256 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶44, citing *Pensions of officials of the Saar Territory* (Germany, Governing Commission of the Saar Territory), III UN REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 1553 (1934), pp. 1555-1556 [C-145].
257 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶45, citing *Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory*, Judgment (Preliminary Objection) (24 June 1932), 1932 P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 47, pp. 247-248 [C-138]. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 245:9-246:23 (“[The PCIJ] noted that the two procedures envisaged in Article 17, one over infractions and one over differences of opinion regarding questions of law or fact, related to two different objects [...]: ‘The object of the procedure before the council is the examination of ‘an infraction of the provisions of the Convention,’ which presupposes an act already committed, whereas the procedure before the Court is concerned with ‘any difference of opinion in regard to questions of law or fact.’ Such difference of opinion may arise without infraction having been noted.”).
compromissory clause “expressly required the existence of a prior concrete claim.” The Claimant argues that Article 83 of the Peace Treaty required the satisfaction of five elements before the Commission could exercise jurisdiction over interpretive disputes relating to the Peace Treaty: (1) a Member State of the UN or one of its nationals had to submit a claim under the Peace Treaty for the return of property under Article 78; (2) the Italian government had to refuse to honor the property claim; (3) any dispute arising out of that property claim had to be submitted to a two-member Conciliation Commission; (4) the two-member Conciliation Commission had to fail to resolve the dispute within three months; and (5) a third person had to be appointed to form a three-member Commission. Only once the above conditions were fulfilled could a three-member Conciliation Commission be properly seized to exercise jurisdiction over the interpretation of the Peace Treaty. The Claimant highlights that Article 83(2) grants the three-person Commission “jurisdiction over all subsequent disputes concerning the application or interpretation of the specific treaty provisions connected to the dispute originally submitted to the two-member Conciliation Commission.”

143. The Claimant submits, that in that case, the United Kingdom had simply attempted to obtain a ruling on the abstract question of whether nationals of UN governments could submit a claim if they had previously held Italian nationality and intended for the ruling to be binding on all future cases involving claims by dual nationals. Given the limitations imposed on it by Article 83 of the Peace Treaty, the Claimant argues that the Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission was mindful not to exceed its jurisdiction under a multilateral treaty and issue an abstract interpretation that would bind all parties without their express consent. However, the Claimant maintains that “the treaty-based limitations found in the Peace Treaty have no analogues in Article VII of the Ecuador-US BIT” which provides the

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258 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶47-48. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 239:4-242:9.
259 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶50.
260 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶50.
261 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶49.
262 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶51.
263 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶51.
Tribunal with plenary power to exercise jurisdiction over “any dispute” relating to the Treaty’s interpretation or application. 264

144. The Claimant further asserts that the Commission did not shy away from offering general interpretations of provisions of the Peace Treaty in the context of specific claims. In the Amabile case for example, the US-Italian Conciliation Commission ruled on a broadly formulated question put to it by the United States on whether the submission of a claim based only on \textit{ex parte} testimonial instruments obligated Italy to investigate the claim further if it was not \textit{prima facie} frivolous or fraudulent. 265 Not only did the US-Italian Conciliation Commission provide such an interpretation, but it also observed that its interpretation was intended to serve as “future guidance.” 266

145. The Claimant further refers to the Air Services Agreement case, wherein France objected to one question of treaty interpretation submitted by the United States because it was not connected to the application of the Treaty in specific circumstances. 267 According to the Claimant, the Tribunal “also emphasized that it was not requested to state whether or not the existence of any fact or situation constitutes a breach of an international obligation. It thus distinguished this category of legal disputes from legal disputes concerning only the interpretation of a treaty; and, in respect of this, it cited the distinction [the Claimant] pointed out earlier in this respect in Article 36 of the ICJ Statute.” 268

264 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶52. \textit{See also} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 241:10-242:1 (“[T]he United States’ [...] assertion that the compromissory clause in the Dual Nationals case is virtually identical to Article VII is simply not true. It ignores the fact that the Commission read both paragraphs of Article 83 of the compromissory clause together as a whole. There is no parallel whatsoever with Article VII of the BIT. Unlike Article 83 which limited jurisdiction to claims arising in giving effect to the provisions of the Treaty, Article VII gives this Tribunal plenary authority to arbitrate any dispute concerning interpretation or application of the Treaty. As Professor McCaffrey states in his opinion, and I’m citing from Paragraph 33, ‘It is striking that the Dual Nationals Claims was the only case the United States could find that purportedly supports its restricted approach, and that the decision its exhaustive research turned up is one in which the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was confined to disputes concerning certain specified provisions of the applicable multilateral treaty.’”).

265 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶53-54, citing \textit{Amabile Case – Decision No. 11}, XIV UN REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 115 (1952), pp. 119-129 [C-116] (hereinafter “\textit{Amabile}”).

266 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶43, citing \textit{Amabile, supra} note 265, p. 129.

267 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 250:20-254:16, citing \textit{Case concerning Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and France, XVIII UN REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 417 (1978) [C-154] (hereinafter “\textit{Air Services Agreement}”).

268 \textit{Id.}, p. 251:17-23.
Finally, the Claimant cites the tribunal in *Question of the Revaluation of the German Mark* as another example of a justiciable dispute being found to exist independently of any claim of breach:

The Applicant’s right to an authoritative interpretation of the clause in dispute...is grounded on the bedrock of the considerations which the Applicants gave and the concessions which they made in exchange for the disputed clause. They have a right to know what is the legal effect of the language used. The tribunal in the exercise of its judicial functions is obliged to inform them.\(^{269}\)

d) International law imposes no additional measure of concreteness or allegation of breach

The Claimant submits that “[j]ust as international law contains no requirement that a breach allegation must exist for a dispute to arise, so too is there no such requirement in relation to whether a dispute is sufficiently concrete.”\(^{270}\) The Claimant refers to Professor McCaffrey’s observation that while States more often bring cases to the ICJ that arise out of alleged breaches than those calling for an interpretation of a treaty does not mean that the latter class of cases cannot be brought before international tribunals.\(^{271}\) The Claimant refers to the cases mentioned above to argue that international jurisprudence is filled with examples of tribunals taking jurisdiction in the absence of breach allegations since the absence of such allegations does not render interpretive disputes inadequately concrete.\(^{272}\)

The Claimant further argues that, while an allegation of breach is one possible manifestation of the existence of a dispute, the existence of a concrete case does not depend on the existence of a breach.\(^{273}\) The Claimant submits that the Respondent mischaracterizes the ICJ’s judgment in *Northern Cameroons* to elevate the concreteness requirement far beyond what the ICJ intended.\(^{274}\) In *Northern Cameroons*, Cameroon applied to the ICJ to declare that the United Kingdom had breached its obligations in applying the Trusteeship

\(^{269}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶56, citing *The Question whether the re-evaluation of the German Mark in 1961 and 1969 constitutes a cause for application of the clause in article 2(e) of the Annex I A of the 1953 Agreement on German External Debts*, XIX UN REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 67 (1980), p. 89 [C-149]. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 242:10-243:10.

\(^{270}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶58.

\(^{271}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶58, citing McCaffrey Opinion, ¶42.

\(^{272}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶58.

\(^{273}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶59.

\(^{274}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶59.
Agreement. However, two days after its application, the Trusteeship Agreement was terminated by the UN and therefore the United Kingdom ceased to have rights and obligations with regard to Cameroon under the Trusteeship Agreement. The Claimant submits that it is in this context that the ICJ declined to exercise jurisdiction, since “it would be impossible to render a judgment capable of effective application.”

Thus, the ICJ explained:

> the function of the Court is to state law, but it may pronounce judgment only in connection with concrete cases where there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual controversy involving a conflict of interest between the parties. The Court’s judgment must have some practical consequences in the sense that it can affect existing legal rights or obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal relations.276

149. The Claimant distinguishes *Northern Cameroons* from the case at hand, noting that in these proceedings there is “an ongoing controversy involving the substantive interest related to the determination of obligations under Article II(7).” The Tribunal’s interpretation will have a clear practical consequence since it will remove uncertainty regarding existing legal rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties and will have continuing applicability on future acts of interpretation or application of Article II(7) by the Contracting Parties or tribunals constituted under Article VI.277

150. The Claimant submits that its three experts agree that the Claimant’s Request satisfies the requirement of concreteness within the meaning of *Northern Cameroons* and international law generally.278 The Claimant thus concludes that it has complied with the element of concreteness and “has a right to know the legal effect of the language used in Article II(7), and the Tribunal, in the exercise of its judicial function under Article VII, must not...
e) The existence of a dispute regarding the interpretation and application of Article II(7) can be established by the Respondent’s express statements

151. The Claimant asserts that the existence of a dispute concerning Article II(7) of the Treaty is clear from the Respondent’s express statements. The Claimant notes that the existence of a dispute is the threshold question and cites the Mavrommatis definition of a “dispute”: “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between two persons.” The Claimant argues that under this meaning of dispute, “a dispute concerning interpretation can arise with no more than opposing attitudes regarding the meaning of a treaty.” The Claimant also asserts that the question of the existence of a dispute is “a matter for objective determination” that “must turn on an examination of the facts,” including the Parties’ exchanges and their conduct prior and after the commencement of legal proceedings, with substance prevailing over form.

152. The Claimant argues that the Parties are fundamentally in agreement on the applicable legal principles. It contends that both the Claimant and the Respondent agree on the following applicable principles:

(i) the concept of dispute in international law is defined in Mavrommatis;

(ii) the existence of a dispute must be objectively determined by the Tribunal, and does not depend on the subjective views of the Parties, as explained in Cameroon v. Nigeria and South West Africa;

(iii) it must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other; and

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279 Id., pp. 255:25-256:8, citing Northern Cameroons, supra note 71 and Air Services Agreement, supra note 267.
280 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶64.
281 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶65, citing Nuclear Tests, supra note 190, ¶58, and Mavrommatis, supra note 116, p. 11.
282 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 225:15-17.
283 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶65, citing Interpretation of Peace Treaties, supra note 117; Georgia v. Russia, supra note 122, ¶30; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada), Judgment (Jurisdiction) (4 December 1998), 1998 I.C.J. REPORTS 432, ¶31 [C-132].
(iv) positive opposition does not require that the respondent has verbally expressed its disagreement.\textsuperscript{284}

153. The Claimant contends that the facts demonstrate that the Parties are in dispute concerning the interpretation of Article II(7). The Claimant finds that the Respondent has manifested positive opposition to the Claimant’s interpretation in the following ways: (1) the Respondent considered the Claimant’s position to be “unilateral” which means that the Respondent does not share the Claimant’s interpretation given to Article II(7);\textsuperscript{285} and (2) the Respondent’s position that the \textit{Chevron} tribunal’s interpretation is \textit{res judicata} not only for purposes of that dispute but also for the Claimant’s relationships with other parties.\textsuperscript{286} In relation to the latter, the Claimant asserts that “[b]y advancing the position that \textit{Chevron}’s interpretation of Article II(7) is not restricted to that arbitration, the United States has placed itself in positive opposition to Ecuador.”\textsuperscript{287} The Claimant also argues that the Respondent’s refusal to respond to the Claimant’s Request suggests that the Respondent agrees with the \textit{Chevron} tribunal’s interpretation and therefore expressly demonstrates that a dispute exists.\textsuperscript{288}

\textbf{f) The existence of a dispute regarding the interpretation and application of Article II(7) can be established by inference}

154. The Claimant also submits that the Respondent’s opposition can be established by inference from its refusal to respond to the Claimant’s Request regarding the interpretation of Article II(7) when a response was called for. The Claimant argues that a response was called for because “Ecuador will have wrongfully suffered as a result of the misinterpretation of the provision by the tribunal in the \textit{Chevron} case, by the pressing need it has to determine what it must do to be in compliance with the provision and by its interest in avoiding future wrongful liability.”\textsuperscript{289} The Claimant contends that if the


\textsuperscript{285} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶66, citing Reisman Opinion, ¶¶47-51.

\textsuperscript{286} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶66, citing Reisman Opinion, ¶¶47-51.

\textsuperscript{287} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶66, 71.

\textsuperscript{288} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶72.

\textsuperscript{289} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶67.
Respondent had agreed with its interpretation of Article II(7), it would have said so and thus obviated the need for this arbitration. The Claimant asserts that the Respondent’s persistent silence with respect to the Claimant’s request for interpretation gives rise to the inference that the Respondent agrees with the *Chevron* award’s interpretation of Article II(7) and disagrees with the Claimant’s interpretation.  

155. The Claimant argues that the objective determination of a dispute can be obtained by inference.  

The Claimant points to the ICJ’s pronouncement in *Cameroon v. Nigeria* 

that “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests, or the positive opposition of the claim of one party by the other need not necessarily be stated *expressis verbis*.”  

The Claimant observes that the basis on which the ICJ inferred that a dispute existed in that case was that Nigeria withheld its agreement with Cameroon on the land boundary and yet refused to indicate its position on that issue.  

The ICJ also held in the *Certain Property* case that the inquiry into positive opposition is undertaken “for the purpose of verifying the existence of a legal dispute” but that positive opposition is not a necessary precondition for finding that a dispute exists.

156. The Claimant argues that the Respondent’s refusal to address the interpretation of Article II(7) is therefore compelling evidence that a dispute exists. As the ICJ held in *Georgia v. Russia*, “the existence of a dispute may be inferred from the failure of a State to respond to a claim in circumstances where a response is called for.”  

The Claimant argues that this principle of international law was authoritatively elucidated in *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, where the ICJ held that Nigeria’s refusal to respond to Cameroon’s boundary delimitation request, claiming that there was no dispute, was in fact supportive of the inference that a dispute did exist.  

The Claimant disputes the Respondent’s attempt to distinguish *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, supra note 284.

\[\text{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, pp. 82-92.}\]

\[\text{Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶74.}\]

\[\text{Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶74, citing *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, supra note 284, ¶89.}\]

\[\text{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 263:8-12.}\]

\[\text{Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶74, citing *Certain Property*, supra note 131, ¶24.}\]

\[\text{Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶74, citing *Georgia v. Russia*, supra note 122, ¶30. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 258:15-21.}\]

\[\text{Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶76-78, citing *Cameroon v. Nigeria*, supra note 284. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 263:7-12 (“[T]he Court found that Nigeria’s silence in regard to whether it agreed or disagreed with Cameroon’s boundary claim was sufficient grounds for inferring that a dispute existed, even though Nigeria was, ‘entitled not to advance arguments,’ on the issue. That is, Nigeria was under no legal obligation to state its position.”).}\]
The Claimant argues that the cross-border incursions that the Respondent cites as significant concerned only a small portion of the border and were on the whole irrelevant to the core jurisdictional issue of whether a dispute existed as regarded the entire course of the boundary. The Claimant stresses that the ICJ specifically “disclaimed reliance on the very facts that the United States invokes to try and distinguish Cameroon v. Nigeria.”

157. The Claimant points to yet another reason why Cameroon v. Nigeria “is especially pertinent to our case.” The Claimant recalls that, when specifically asked to state whether the assertion that there was no dispute signified that there was an agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon on the geographical coordinates of the boundary, “instead of responding to this question from the Court, Nigeria replied by maintaining its stance that there was no dispute.” The ICJ drew the inference from this refusal to respond that a dispute existed. In the Claimant’s view, the factual situation is analogous to the case at hand:

The United States, like Nigeria, has refused to state whether it agrees or disagrees with Ecuador's claims. It simply maintains there is no dispute. And just as Nigeria refused to answer the Court’s question about whether it agreed with Cameroon, so too the United States has refused to comply with the Tribunal’s Procedural Order calling upon it to state in a Counter-Memorial on the Merits filed on 20 June whether it agrees or disagrees with Ecuador's claims in regard to Article II(7).

158. The Claimant further refers to the Headquarters Agreement advisory opinion. In that case, the United States argued that there was no dispute because it had never expressly opposed the UN Secretary-General’s views and had not referred to the matter as a “dispute”. However, the ICJ rejected these arguments and found that a dispute did exist. According
to the Claimant, the Court also made clear in its judgment that a claim for breach of treaty obligations is not a prerequisite for finding that a dispute exists.\textsuperscript{300}

159. The Claimant counters the Respondent’s comments on the \textit{Georgia v. Russia} case. While the Claimant acknowledges that the ICJ’s findings of a dispute was based on Russia’s express denials of ethnic cleansing, the ICJ’s “factual determination was not germane to its explanation of the general rule that the existence of a dispute may be inferred from the failure of a State to respond ‘in circumstances where a response is called for.’”\textsuperscript{301}

160. In the case at hand, the Claimant argues that a response from the Respondent was called for. The Claimant cites \textit{Georgia v. Russia} for the proposition that a response is called for where “the parties engaged in ‘exchanges’ that refer[ed] to the subject-matter of the treaty with sufficient clarity to enable a State against which a claim is made to identity that there is, or may be, a dispute with regard to that subject-matter” and that “[w]here having been presented with such a request, a State fails to respond, a dispute can be said to exist.”\textsuperscript{302}

The Claimant maintains that Ecuador has unquestionably satisfied this standard, given that the June 8 Note specifically detailed the subject-matter of its concerns. The Claimant avers that the situation is similar to the one presented in \textit{Cameroon v. Nigeria} since the Respondent was apprised of the Claimant’s concerns and failed to respond.\textsuperscript{303} The Claimant argues that a response from the Respondent was especially warranted because the \textit{Chevron} tribunal’s interpretation of Article II(7) introduced uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of the Claimant’s obligations under Article II(7). The \textit{Chevron} tribunal’s interpretation conflicts with that given by the tribunal in \textit{Duke Energy v. Ecuador}, as well as with the Claimant’s longstanding view that the obligations reflect only customary international law.\textsuperscript{304} Without clarification, the Claimant argues, it will be de facto forced to implement the \textit{lex specialis} rule described in the \textit{Chevron} award despite believing it to be incorrect. The Claimant therefore has a justifying and compelling need to clarify its obligations under Article II(7).\textsuperscript{305}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{300} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶83, citing \textit{UN Headquarters Agreement, supra} note 123, ¶42.
\item \textsuperscript{301} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶84, citing \textit{Georgia v. Russia, supra} note 122, ¶30.
\item \textsuperscript{302} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶86, citing \textit{Georgia v. Russia, supra} note 122, ¶30.
\item \textsuperscript{303} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶87-88, citing Pellet Opinion, ¶25.
\item \textsuperscript{304} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶89.
\item \textsuperscript{305} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶91.
\end{itemize}
161. The Claimant further contends that the Respondent’s failure to take active steps to fulfill the object and purpose of the Treaty and ensure its effectiveness is inconsistent with its obligations to perform the Treaty in good faith and to comply with the principle of *pacta sunt servanda.* The Claimant argues that the Respondent’s inaction is inconsistent with the Preamble to the Treaty which states that one of the Parties’ cooperative objectives is to stimulate the flow of private capital and economic development through agreement upon the standards of treatment to be accorded to the investments of the other Party. In its view, a ruling by an Article VII tribunal on the proper interpretation of the Treaty would promote and protect investment by eliminating uncertainty in the standards of treatment required by the Treaty. The Claimant avers that the Respondent’s failure to respond under the circumstances creates a strong inference of a dispute.

162. In the Claimant’s view, “the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the [Respondent’s] conduct is that it disagrees with [the Claimant’s] interpretation of Article II(7).” The Claimant argues that the Respondent must have its own interpretation of Article II(7) given that text of Article II(7) was taken verbatim from the U.S. model, but simply does not want to share its views. The Claimant notes that when the Respondent made a deliberate decision not to respond the Claimant’s diplomatic note, it “was deviating from its own established policy and practice in regard to treaty partners.” The Claimant is of the view that “if the [Respondent] had agreed with Ecuador, there would have been no reason for it to break with its standard diplomatic practice, to deliberately refuse to respond to [the Claimant], or to refuse to consult, to discuss, or exchange views with [the Claimant] on Article II(7).” Moreover, the Claimant notes that the Respondent had every incentive to inform the Claimant that it had the same interpretation of Article II(7), if that were the case, since it would have avoided arbitration and all the costs and consequences associated with it.

306 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶92.
307 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶93.
308 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 356:3-15.
309 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶93.
310 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 266:12-15.
311 Id., p. 266:15-24.
312 Id., p. 270:2-13.
313 Id., pp. 270:21-271:4
163. The Claimant further argues that the Respondent’s support for the Chevron Tribunal's interpretation of Article II(7) “as opposed to [the Claimant’s] interpretation can be presumed from the [Respondent’s] interest in securing greater protections for the investments of its own nationals, which is what the Chevron interpretation accomplished.” 315 The Claimant also avers that the support is evident by the Respondent’s conduct in these proceedings: “[i]ts efforts to foreclose consideration of Ecuador's interpretation, if successful, would eliminate any risk that this Tribunal might agree with Ecuador or adopt another interpretation of Article II(7) different from the one adopted by the Chevron Tribunal.” 316 In addition, the Claimant contends that, even if the Respondent’s refusal to respond to the Claimant’s claim could be attributed to a political decision not to interfere with the interpretations of investor-State tribunals, it would constitute still further evidence that the Respondent opposes that claim. 317

164. The Claimant also argues, relying on Professor Cheng and Judge Fitzmaurice, that the Respondent’s lack of response conflicts with the principle of good faith because such a duty calls for the Respondent to make reasonable efforts to ensure that Article II(7) is interpreted and applied correctly. 318 The Claimant alleges that the Respondent’s withholding of its position on the interpretation of Article II(7) forces the Claimant to accord to American investors advantages that may exceed those to which they are entitled under the Treaty. 319 The Claimant submits that Article V of the Treaty further underscores that a response was called for since it enshrines the Parties’ commitment to discuss matters relating to the interpretation or application of the Treaty. 320 According to the Claimant, the principle of good faith in a treaty relationship serves to ensure trust and confidence and creates legitimate expectations concerning the development of a legal relationship between

316 Id., p. 275:4-13.
318 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶94. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 271:5-12 (“If the United States had agreed with Ecuador, good faith would have prompted it to say so to Ecuador rather than leave a treaty partner and ally unsure as to what its actual treaty obligations were or how to comply with them. Since we believe in the good faith of the United States, it can only be inferred that the United States did not agree with Ecuador on Article II(7), and chose not to respond to Ecuador's request because it did not wish to express its disagreement. Even assuming that Article II(7) applies equally to both States, the Chevron Tribunal's interpretation still primarily benefits U.S. investors since there are more than of them in Ecuador than there are Ecuadorian investors in the United States.”)
319 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶94-95.
320 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶96.
the parties and the Respondent’s failure to respond thus gives rise to a legitimate inference that it disagrees with the Claimant’s interpretation of Article II(7).\textsuperscript{321}

165. The Claimant disputes the Respondent’s assertion based on \textit{Cameroon v. Nigeria} that absent an applicable treaty obligation, a State may not justifiably rely on the principle of good faith to support a claim.\textsuperscript{322} In that case, Nigeria had argued that Cameroon’s failure to inform it that it had accepted the ICJ’s jurisdiction and intended to file an application breached the principle of good faith.\textsuperscript{323} The ICJ rejected this argument holding that “there is no specific obligation in international law for States to inform other States parties to the [ICJ] Statute that they intend to subscribe or have subscribed to the Optional Clause,” nor to inform of their “intention to bring proceedings before the [ICJ]].”\textsuperscript{324} Therefore, the Claimant maintains that its invocation of the principle of good faith bears no resemblance to Nigeria’s.\textsuperscript{325}

166. The Claimant further disputes the relevance of the fact that it terminated its BIT with Finland or tasked a Special Commission to review each of its 23 BITs. The Claimant argues that the domestic measures it might have undertaken or was considering taking did not affect its obligations on the international plane.\textsuperscript{326} The Claimant argues that any discretion the Respondent may have to reserve its position on the interpretation of Article II(7) is subject to good faith which means that it “must be exercised reasonably, honestly, in conformity with the spirit of the law and with due regard to the interests of the other.” The Claimant thus asserts that, while the Respondent retains its discretion not to submit an interpretation, it cannot in good faith seek to avoid the inference that a dispute exists.\textsuperscript{327}

\textbf{g) The exercise of the Tribunal’s contentious jurisdiction}

167. The Claimant takes issue with the Respondent’s characterization of the Claimant’s request as seeking the exercise of appellate, referral, or advisory jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{328}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{321}] Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶97-98, citing Nuclear Tests, \textit{supra} note 190, ¶49.
\item[\textsuperscript{322}] Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶99.
\item[\textsuperscript{323}] Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶99, citing \textit{Cameroon v. Nigeria}, \textit{supra} note 284, ¶36.
\item[\textsuperscript{324}] Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶99, citing \textit{Cameroon v. Nigeria}, \textit{supra} note 284, ¶39.
\item[\textsuperscript{325}] Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶99.
\item[\textsuperscript{326}] Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶100.
\item[\textsuperscript{327}] Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶101, citing B. Cheng, \textit{GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY COURTS AND TRIBUNALS} (2006), pp. 133-134 [C-119].
\item[\textsuperscript{328}] Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶103.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
168. The Claimant alleges that these proceedings do not bear the hallmark of an appeal, which by definition would involve a superior court review of a lower court decision with binding effect on that decision.\(^2\) The Claimant stresses that, while it disagrees with the *Chevron* tribunal’s interpretation, it accepts the award as final and binding subject to the procedures available to it under relevant municipal law.\(^3\) The Claimant further disputes the allegation that the Ecuadorian government has expressed a desire to use the State-to-State arbitration as an appeal, stating that the Ecuadorian government only said that initiating the State-to-State arbitration is consistent with the overall goal of “avoiding the generation of an ominous precedent for Ecuador” being pursued in the District Court in The Hague.\(^4\) Moreover, the Claimant notes that the remainder of the press release quoted by the Respondent clarified that Ecuador’s motivation for commencing these proceedings was to resolve “the problems of interpretation of the BIT… and to avoid future legal claims that could harm Ecuador.”\(^5\)

169. Secondly, the Claimant takes issue with the Respondent’s characterization of its Request as asking the Tribunal to exercise referral jurisdiction.\(^6\) According to the Claimant, referral jurisdiction is a procedure under which one court refers a legal question to a “coordinate court for resolution” which, once decided, is applied in the underlying proceeding. The Claimant alleges that “an essential prerequisite is missing: a court has not referred a question to this tribunal for use in another proceeding.” Moreover, no such referral could be made since the *Chevron* tribunal’s mandate has expired and, even if the decision of the District Court in The Hague were appealed, the appeals court could not refer any question to an arbitral tribunal constituted under the Treaty.\(^7\)

\(^2\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶105. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 289:10-290:4.

\(^3\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶105. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 286:25-287:4 (“Ecuador agrees that this arbitration cannot collaterally attack the *Chevron* Award because that award, under the terms of Article VI, is final and binding, subject only to the procedures available under Dutch law.”).

\(^4\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶106.

\(^5\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶107, citing Press Release of the Ecuadorian Office of the Attorney General (4 July 2011) [C-146].

\(^6\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶109.

\(^7\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶111. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 291:11-18 (“The dispute that Ecuador has brought before you was not referred to you by any other court or arbitral tribunal seeking your guidance on a matter pending before that court or
170. Finally, the Claimant submits that these proceedings cannot constitute an exercise of advisory jurisdiction, since this would involve the provision of non-binding legal advice to organs or institutions that have requested such opinions.\textsuperscript{335} According to the Claimant, advisory opinions are not a binding means of settling disputes whereas here the Parties are in dispute regarding the interpretation of Article II(7) and any award made by the Tribunal will be binding upon them.\textsuperscript{336} The Claimant is of the view that the Respondent’s argument in this regard “is really a repackaging of the [Respondent’s] claim that there is no dispute between the Parties.”\textsuperscript{337}

171. Furthermore, the Claimant disputes the Respondent’s arguments that exercising jurisdiction over its request for an interpretation of Article II(7) would exceed the judicial function of the Tribunal under Article VII of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{338} The Claimant stresses that “[t]he clarification of the content of Articles II(7) and VII, as opposed to the act of their creation, is independent from States’ consent; therefore there can be no question of judicial law-making in this case.”\textsuperscript{339}

172. The Claimant argues that the Respondent’s reliance on the separate opinion of Judge Gros in the \textit{Nuclear Tests} case and on the \textit{Aminoil} award is misplaced.\textsuperscript{340} With respect to the opinion of Judge Gros, the Claimant avers that the context in that case was the absence of any properly pleaded legal right or cause of action by Australia. Therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICJ in that case would have been tantamount to usurping the legislative function from States. Meanwhile, the case at hand deals with existing rules of law since the legal validity of Article VII is not in dispute.\textsuperscript{341} As regards the \textit{Aminoil} award, the Claimant

\textsuperscript{335} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶112.

\textsuperscript{336} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶112. \textit{See also} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 290:5-22 (“[T]here is a dispute between Ecuador and the United States in regards to Article II(7), over which the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction under Article VII. So, if Ecuador is right that there is a dispute that satisfies Article VII, the United States’ characterization of this arbitration as an Advisory Opinion necessarily fails. The United States is not helped by arguing that the question that Ecuador has put to this Tribunal is virtually identical to the kinds of questions that the ICJ is asked when it is requested to give Advisory Opinions.”).

\textsuperscript{337} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 290:10-12.

\textsuperscript{338} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶113.

\textsuperscript{339} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶114.

\textsuperscript{340} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶116.

\textsuperscript{341} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶116.
contends that it is not seeking an equitable revision of Article II(7) or Article VII as was sought in that case; nor are the provisions an “incomplete contract.” The Claimant submits that it is not asking the Tribunal to “create a new rule of international law empowering it to exercise jurisdiction over Ecuador’s request. Nor does Ecuador ask the Tribunal to substitute Article II(7) for a new rule of international law. Rather, Ecuador asks that the Tribunal decide the proper interpretation of an existing rule of international law that is manifest in Article II(7) of the Treaty.”

**h) The Parties’ dispute is a legal dispute whose resolution will not have the far-reaching consequences alleged by the Respondent**

173. The Claimant takes issue with the Respondent’s characterization of the dispute as a political disagreement, noting that the ICJ made clear in *Border and Transborder Armed Actions Case* that political aspects do not render a dispute non-legal:

> The Court is aware that political aspects may be present in any legal disputes brought before it. The Court, as a judicial organ, is however only concerned to establish, first, that the dispute before it is a legal dispute, in the sense of a dispute capable of being settled by the application of principles and rules of international law, and secondly, that the Court has jurisdiction to deal with it, and that jurisdiction is not fettered by any circumstance rendering the application inadmissible…. [I]t cannot concern itself with the political motivation which may lead a State at a particular time, or in particular circumstances, to choose judicial settlement.\(^\text{344}\)

174. The Claimant avers that, since the issues in these proceedings are capable of resolution by principles and rules of international law, there is no doubt it is a legal dispute over which the Tribunal can take jurisdiction.\(^\text{345}\) The Claimant responds to the Respondent’s characterization of its June 8 Note as a “unilateral interpretive declaration.” The Claimant argues that its Note was not a unilateral declaration but an invitation to discuss the interpretation of Article II(7) that, once rebuffed, left the Claimant no choice but to seek an authoritative interpretation from the Tribunal.\(^\text{346}\)

\(^{342}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶117.
\(^{343}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶118.
\(^{344}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶119, citing *Border and Transborder Armed Actions*, supra note 146.
\(^{345}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶120.
\(^{346}\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶121-122.
175. The Claimant further submits that taking jurisdiction is consistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty and would not have the destabilizing consequences alleged by the Respondent.\^{347} First, the Claimant avers that the decision would have no effect on the *Chevron* award and is not a re-litigation or appeal of that award.\^{348}

176. Secondly, the Claimant disputes the Respondent’s assertion that an exercise of jurisdiction would undermine the stability and predictability of the dispute settlement process; in the absence of a doctrine of precedent in international investment law, an authoritative interpretation would “promote uniformity and stability of the law.”\^{349} Moreover, according to the Claimant, exercising jurisdiction would not politicize investment disputes, but rather would remove uncertainty from the Parties’ legal relations and would further the Parties’ agreement on the treatment to provide to investors consistent with the objectives of the Treaty.\^{350} In its view, “ascertaining jurisdiction […] would be a strong message to the States that [the] commitments must not be taken lightly, and that may dissuade some […] cat-and-mouse games that could be observed otherwise.”\^{351}

177. The Claimant also denies that the assertion of jurisdiction by the Tribunal would result in other States initiating such arbitrations to stop investment arbitration proceedings initiated by investors. It argues that these are two different tracks (Article VI and Article VII) and that “the Article VI Arbitrators are totally free to let the proceedings before them develop or to stay the proceedings, depending on the judgment they make, on the seriousness or the frivolity of the interpretative issue raised by the State in the Article VII arbitration.”\^{352} The Claimant relies on *Lucchetti v. Peru* as an example of where the arbitrators decided not to stay the proceedings.\^{353}

178. The Claimant disputes the Respondent’s assertion that exercising jurisdiction would judicialize aspects of the Parties’ relationship and hinder the exchange of views. First, the

\^{347} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶123-124. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 355:19-357:16.

\^{348} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶125, citing Reisman Opinion ¶52. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 287:1-9 (“[T]his arbitration cannot collaterally attack the *Chevron* Award because that award, under the terms of Article VI, is final and binding, subject only to the procedures available under Dutch law.”).

\^{349} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶126.

\^{350} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶127.

\^{351} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 386:6-20.

\^{352} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 383:12-384:1.

\^{353} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 384:2-6, citing *Lucchetti*, supra note 180.
Claimant emphasizes that it is the Respondent who shut down lines of communications regarding this exchange.\textsuperscript{354} Secondly, whatever the effect of Article VII, the Parties included it in the Treaty with the express understanding that it coexists with the possibility of consultations under Article V.\textsuperscript{355} The Claimant disagrees with the Respondent’s assertion that consultation about “matters” and “disputes” are two distinct mechanisms that operate in isolation of one another, and asserts that international law holds negotiation and adjudication to be complementary forms of dispute settlement.\textsuperscript{356} According to the Claimant, the use of the words “matter” and “dispute” merely reflects that, at the initial stage of consultations, the Parties have not yet determined whether a dispute exists.\textsuperscript{357} The Claimant avers that the fear that bringing an arbitration following the failure of negotiations would “chill” dialogue with its treaty partner would apply to all instances of State-to-State arbitration, but that the inclusion of State-to-State dispute settlement clauses indicates that States intended to provide such recourse.\textsuperscript{358}

179. The Claimant also casts some doubts on “the prophecy that [the Tribunal’s] assertion of jurisdiction would open the floodgates to State-to-State arbitrations.”\textsuperscript{359} The Claimant argues, that “differences between States, the States themselves, on the interpretation of the protection provided for in the treaty are rare.” Furthermore, it argues that “arbitration between States may be a waste of time. It may be costly, costly money wise and also costly to the relationship between the two States. And for this reason, States are not likely to engage in arbitrations lightly.”\textsuperscript{360}

180. The Claimant concludes by countering the Respondent’s suggestions that exercising jurisdiction would set a dangerous precedent in international law, submitting that the Tribunal cannot decline jurisdiction based on extraneous non-legal considerations. The Claimant cites Orakhelashvili who states that “[i]f interpretation is meant to clarify the content of law that has crossed the threshold of legal regulation, it naturally follows that the

\textsuperscript{354} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 385:24-386:5.
\textsuperscript{355} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶128-130.
\textsuperscript{356} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶131-132, citing Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Jurisdiction, Judgment (19 December 1978), 1978 I.C.J. REPORTS 3, ¶29 [C-114]; Alps Finance and Trade AG v. Slovakia, UNCITRAL, Award (5 March 2011), ¶204 [C-115].
\textsuperscript{357} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶134.
\textsuperscript{358} Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶135.
\textsuperscript{359} Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 386:21-23.
\textsuperscript{360} \textit{Id.}, p. 387:9-18.
process of interpretation has to be independent of non-legal considerations” and that “interpretation is a purely legal, not political, task”.  

i) The Claimant has fulfilled its obligation to consult

181. The Claimant refutes the Respondent’s assertion that it had not fulfilled the preconditions set forth in Article VII. The Claimant notes that the UNCITRAL Rules do not allow a party to raise a new jurisdictional objection for the first time at the oral hearings. In addition, it contends that it “unquestionably pursued a resolution through diplomatic channels” and it observes that it was Mr. Koh who put an end to the diplomatic process on behalf of the Respondent, when he “unilaterally cut off dialogue with [the Claimant] in October 2010, advising [the Claimant] at the time that [the Respondent] had made a decision not to share with [the Claimant] its interpretation of Article II(7).” The Claimant further avers that it “did, indeed, seek and engage in consultations and other diplomatic means in this matter until the State Department, the United States Government chose to close the door on further discussions and to refuse to respond to Ecuador’s Note and its concerns and its apprehensions.” It further explains that “it is absolutely wrong to characterize [the Diplomatic Note] as an ultimatum,” which mischaracterization is in its view also demonstrated by the Parties’ subsequent conduct.

182. Finally, the Claimant contends that invoking Article V cannot be a prerequisite for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, since it is not mentioned in Article VII whatsoever.

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361 Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶¶136-137, citing A. Orakhelashvili, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008), p. 293 [C-113]. See also Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 356:9-23 (“[I]t is said that your assertion of jurisdiction may bring in the future to politicizing investment disputes. One may have very serious doubts about this. These agreements on the interpretation of the investment BITs. At the year between investors and on the States because they have conflicting interests, but between the two States that are the signatories of the Bilateral Investment Treaty, as such, differences are likely not to occur often. The State of the investor as a State is likely to have concerns similar as the State hosting the investments to keep the Undertakings made by the two States within the reasonable boundaries they agreed. So I think that the fear of politicization--of making more politic--political the settlement of disputes in the field of investment is very grossly overstated.”).


365 Id. p. 359:6-10.
j) The applicability and effects of the decision is not a matter for the Tribunal

183. The Claimant notes that it does not seek a decision that is binding *erga omnes*. It is only asking for a decision which would be binding between the two Parties to the Treaty. The Claimant is of the view that the applicability of such a decision is not a matter for the Tribunal, who does not have “to decide anything about the effects of [its] decision except that is binding upon the two Parties, and it is binding in the relations between them.”

184. The Claimant concedes that both Parties have obligations under Article VI to comply with awards of Article VI Tribunals, “and that would not change, even though a decision has emanated from an Article VII Tribunal.” Moreover, it claims that if either Party refused to pay an award, the other State would be able to provide diplomatic protection, “not espousing a claim under the interpreted provision, Article II(7), but a claim for nonperformance of the obligation to pay the award.”

185. As mentioned above, the Claimant insists that the decision would have no effect on the *Chevron* award. The Claimant asserts that awards made by Article VI tribunals are safe, since they have their “own authority and an erroneous interpretation of the law in regard to what [the Tribunal] would decide, that would have been made in the past by an Article VI Arbitral Tribunal would certainly not be a ground to seeking to setting aside of this arbitral award.” The Claimant also notes that a misinterpretation of the law is not a ground for refusal of enforcement of the award under any relevant international instrument.

186. Finally, the Claimant contends that in the end the authority of any eventual decision by the Tribunal will have to be determined by those called upon to consider that question. In particular, it observes:

   The last question, one they have is what will be the authority of the decision you will make on the interpretation if you proceed to the merits? One may make guesstimates, but in the end it will be incumbent on the

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366 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 1, 25 June 2012, p. 69:6-17.
368 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 383:2-6.
369 Id., p. 383:7-11. See also p. 364:3-10 (“And as we have already seen in the case of Ecuador in Article II(7), two different tribunals can to two very different conclusions already. And because Article VI Tribunals and Investor-State Tribunals in general do not enjoy stare decisis and their decisions are not binding on anybody but the Parties relating to that dispute, it would be no ground for a Third Party to insist that it relied upon a particular decision of an arbitral tribunal.”)
arbitration community to organize itself. No doubt, arbitrators in investment disputes would recognize the role, the leading role, that an Article VII interpretation should have. It will be incumbent on these arbitrators to determine the exact views they make of your determination, but this should be no way be a reason for you to decline the jurisdiction that is conferred upon you by the Treaty.\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, p. 388:7-18.}
VII. TRIBUNAL’S REASONING

1. Preliminary considerations

187. While not being made express elsewhere in this decision, two broad considerations guide the Tribunal’s reasoning in this decision and deserve preliminary comment.

188. First, an arbitral tribunal, even though not bound by any strict doctrine of stare decisis, should try as far as possible to decide in a manner consistent with other applicable judicial decisions. However, when evaluating the authorities cited by the Parties in these proceedings— parsing through the obiter dictae and restricting oneself to the conclusions actually employed to reach a resolution of the case—the Tribunal has concluded that the case at hand is truly a novel one. While the jurisprudence guides and informs the Tribunal’s decision, the Tribunal has not found any decision that truly qualifies as precedent on the fundamental questions posed by the Parties’ arguments.

189. Secondly, the Tribunal notes that the two main jurisdictional issues— “concreteness” and “positive opposition”—are intertwined. As elaborated below, the Tribunal’s principal concern in deciding both jurisdictional questions in this State-to-State arbitration is whether the claim on the merits has some implications or consequences for the relations between Parties at the State-to-State level. The issue of the existence of a sufficiently “concrete” State-to-State claim is therefore intimately connected to the existence or not of a State-to-State “dispute”. The two objections may in fact be considered different prongs of the Mavrommatis formula for determining what constitutes a proper “dispute” for adjudication. The Tribunal’s conclusions on these issues, while stated separately, must be read together and both depend on the unique factual matrix presented by this case.

2. The so-called “concreteness” requirement

a) The legal framework

190. The Tribunal need not repeat here the extensive arguments put forth by the Parties already summarized above. In essence, the Respondent relies on a passage from the Northern Cameroons case, where the ICJ states that “it may pronounce judgment only in connection with concrete cases where there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual controversy
involving a conflict of legal interests between the parties.”  

On the basis of this case and a number of further authorities on the inherent limitations of the international judicial function, the Respondent concludes that a case is not justiciable before an international tribunal in the absence of an allegation of breach.

191. By contrast, the Claimant emphasizes the immediately following sentence of the ICJ’s judgment, requiring only that “[t]he Court's judgment must have some practical consequence” and not be entirely academic.  

The Claimant then points to various pronouncements by international tribunals of their duty to decide important questions put before them, whether abstract or not, as long as they are capable of resolution according to law.

192. At the hearing, the Claimant put forward what it considered to be examples of rulings on abstract questions of interpretation, and the Respondent sought to distinguish each case produced. The Claimant eventually appeared to accept a slightly higher threshold of “practical consequences” and the Respondent appeared to acknowledge that the spectre of an allegation of breach might be enough. Despite softening their positions, the Parties nonetheless continued to draw diametrically opposite conclusions from the same cases and facts.

193. With due respect for the skilled advocacy observed, both sides seem to focus on specific excerpts to the exclusion of considering the meaning of the passage and decision as a whole. To recall, the full passage from *Northern Cameroons* which both Parties regard as authoritative reads as follows:

> The function of the Court is to state the law, but it may pronounce judgment only in connection with concrete cases where there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual controversy involving a conflict of legal interests between the parties. The Court's judgment must have some practical consequence in the sense that it can affect existing legal rights or obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal

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371 See *supra*, section VI(1), ¶57, 71. *Northern Cameroons*, supra note 71, pp. 33-34 (emphasis added).

372 See *supra*, section VI(2), ¶148-149. *Northern Cameroons*, supra note 71, p. 34 (emphasis added).


375 Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), Day 2, 26 June 2012, pp. 350:15-351:8.

relations. No judgment on the merits in this case could satisfy these essentials of the judicial function.\footnote{Northern Cameroons, supra note 71, pp. 33-34 (emphasis added).}

194. The present case is, however, very different from \textit{Northern Cameroons}, which was primarily concerned with the efficacy of a decision in that case:

\begin{quote}
If the Court were to proceed and were to hold that the Applicant’s contentions were all sound on the merits, it would still be impossible for the Court to render a judgment capable of effective application.\footnote{Northern Cameroons, supra note 71, p. 33.}
\end{quote}

195. At issue in \textit{Northern Cameroons} was not whether—in the parties’ respective views on the application of various UN decisions, the management of the Trust, and the treaties that instituted the mandates—there was a sufficient “conflict of legal interests between the parties,” but whether its decision would “affect \textit{existing} legal rights or obligations of the parties.” The ICJ concluded that it could not give a decision from which any practical consequence could result in light of the situation created by the end of the Trust. The case had been rendered entirely moot:

\begin{quote}
The Court finds that the proper limits of its judicial function do not permit it to entertain the claims submitted to it in the Application of which it has been seised, with a view to a decision having the authority of \textit{res judicata} between the Republic of Cameroon and the United Kingdom. Any judgment which the Court might pronounce would be without object.\footnote{Northern Cameroons, supra note 71, p. 38.}
\end{quote}

196. \textit{Northern Cameroons} is nonetheless instructive in certain respects. Much of the argument between the Parties in the instant case revolved around whether the tribunal could answer an abstract question of interpretation. But that is a false issue: a tribunal can answer such an issue if properly put before it. The ICJ in \textit{Northern Cameroons} deemed it “undisputable” that “the Court may, in an appropriate case, make a declaratory judgment…[that] expounds a rule of customary law or interprets a treaty which remains in force, [which] judgment has a continuing applicability.” The issue is whether the context of such a decision grants it the necessary practical consequence, beyond the mere elucidation of the meaning of the treaty itself, for the parties before the tribunal.

197. The relevant question does not thus merely concern the practical effect arising from a decision on the merits writ large, but requires that the decision affect the “legal rights or...
obligations of the parties, thus removing uncertainty from their legal relations.” The use of
the plural “parties” is significant, as is the phrase “their legal relations.” They clarify that
the “practical consequences” must affect and relate to both Parties who are the object of the
decision to be rendered in the present case. In other words, they must relate to rights or
obligations owed by Ecuador to the United States and vice-versa.

b) The existence of practical consequences in the present case

198. This case has seen discussion of the Parties’ respective duties to consult or respond to each
other. However, the fundamental interpretative questions put before the Tribunal—the
issues of practical consequence—focus on Ecuador’s obligations with respect to US
investors such as Chevron, and not on obligations that are in contention with the United
States. In fact, the Parties agree:

(a) that Ecuador makes no claim that the US is in violation of its obligations under
Article II(7) of the Treaty;

(b) that no claim has been advanced by the US that Ecuador is in violation of its
obligations under Article II(7) of the Treaty; and

(c) that the US does not take issue with Ecuador’s actual or proposed
implementation of Article II(7) of the Treaty.

199. However, the Parties strongly disagree over whether Ecuador is entitled to an authoritative
interpretation of Article II(7) of the Treaty in order to protect itself from liability to US
investors on the basis of what it claims to be an erroneous construction of that provision.

200. Concretely, in the light of the Chevron award, Ecuador claims that it must know whether
and how it is to adapt its legal system to comply with the Chevron interpretation or have
confirmation that it does not have to do so. Ecuador admits, however, that this Tribunal’s
ruling will have no impact on the Chevron award itself. Indeed, Ecuador has explicitly
committed itself to complying with the Chevron award, subject to the exhaustion of the
recourses and defenses available to it in accordance with the lex arbitri and international
instruments governing the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. So, Ecuador’s
expressed concern is prospective: it wants a decision of this Tribunal in order to better
predict the outcome of future disputes regarding the interpretation of Article II(7) before
future Article VI tribunals and if necessary to reform its judicial system to avoid adverse
outcomes in investor-State arbitrations.
201. The US objects to resort to an Article VII arbitration for this purpose, claiming that it would undermine a principal object of BITs:

Compelling States to reach an agreed interpretation in the context of an investor-State dispute whenever demanded by another State, at pain of arbitration if they fail, would eviscerate a principal rationale for investor-State dispute mechanisms, which is to depoliticize investment disputes and permit neutral and binding arbitration between the State and the investor.  

202. Even if the questions advanced in this case could be considered to have clear practical consequences for Ecuador, how is this a matter that affects Ecuador’s relationship with the US? Following the reasoning developed by the Parties on this point, the crucial question is how the Tribunal’s decision on the merits stands to remove any legal uncertainty in that bilateral relationship.

203. Even in the cases dealing with those treaties most akin to modern BITs, the “abstract question” was of clear consequence for both parties to the treaty. For example, in the Rights of US Nationals in Morocco, the case concerned the disputed question of whether U.S. nationals were entitled to certain economic and consular rights as a result of a MFN clause in a commercial treaty. The same is true for the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal cases A2 and A17, where the question concerned whether nationals of either State could bring claims before the tribunal. In essence, in all the cases cited, there were practical consequences for both parties in the resolution of the matter of interpretation placed before the tribunal. Such consequences do not arise in the instant case as it has been pleaded before this Tribunal.

204. There exists the possibility that the United States could directly allege a breach of the “effective means” obligation in Article II(7) against Ecuador, in which case there would be clear “practical consequences” for both Parties. Such a case could arise in the context of either a direct claim for breach or a claim by way of diplomatic protection by the U.S. of

one of its investors against Ecuador.\textsuperscript{382} Contrary to the view expressed in Prof. Reisman’s opinion submitted by the Respondent,\textsuperscript{383} some commentators consider that recourse to State-to-State dispute resolution for breaches of a BIT may be possible, in particular where the investment dispute in question has not already been submitted to investor-State arbitration under Article VI.\textsuperscript{384} The Tribunal makes no finding on this point, but is not persuaded to exclude this possibility outright.

205. This prospect remains theoretical, however, and was in any event not pleaded by the Claimant here. Moreover, as further discussed below in relation to the existence of a dispute, it is impossible to exclude the possibility that the U.S., when approached by an aggrieved U.S. investor, might agree with the interpretation of Article II(7) that Ecuador has put forward.

206. Returning to \textit{Northern Cameroons}, the present situation is not unlike the failure by Cameroon to claim any reparation for the breaches it alleged, a fact on which Judge Fitzmaurice focuses in his Separate Opinion. Had Cameroon claimed any compensation or other appropriate relief for the breaches it alleged, the result might have been different. Alternatively, had the Trusteeship Agreement remained in force, or had the possibility of a future allegation of breach remained, the judgment would have obtained the necessary “practical consequences”:

for in that case, any finding in favour of the plaintiff State functions as a prohibition on the continuance or repetition of the breach of treaty, and this may be all that is required, and in any event makes the judgment effective. Moreover, the latter necessarily operates as a finding about the correct

\textsuperscript{382} See e.g. \textit{Italy v. Cuba}, where Italy alleged a breach of its rights under the Italy-Cuba BIT and brought a claim of diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals under a comparable State-to-State compromissory clause, despite the availability of investor-State arbitration under the same Italy-Cuba BIT.

\textsuperscript{383} Reisman Opinion, ¶23. (“[T]he central jurisdictional feature of the BIT’s dual-track jurisdictional regime is its assignment of a different range of disputes exclusively to each of the tracks.”).

interpretation or application of the treaty, and therefore serves a useful and effective legal purpose during the lifetime of the treaty. 385

207. The outcome might well have been different here as well if the Respondent had put forward an opinion that differed from that of Ecuador on the proper interpretation of Article II(7), expressed approval for the *Chevron* award’s conclusions, or taken issue with Ecuador’s actual or proposed implementation of its obligations under Article II(7). However, under the circumstances, and particularly in light of the Tribunal’s conclusion below that no dispute exists regarding the interpretation of Article II(7), the Tribunal cannot conclude that a proper case for adjudication has been presented by the Claimant.

3. The existence of a dispute

a) The legal framework

208. In order to determine whether it has jurisdiction, the Tribunal must interpret Article VII in accordance with the general rules of treaty interpretation contained in Article 31 and following of the VCLT. Article VII confers jurisdiction over “[a]ny dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which is not resolved through consultations or other diplomatic channels.” In construing the meaning of this grant of jurisdiction to State-to-State arbitral tribunals, the Tribunal must determine whether a “dispute” exists between the Parties. However, there is a qualification regarding which disputes the Tribunal may assert jurisdiction over—it must be a dispute “concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty.” More precisely, the issue to be addressed is whether there is a dispute between the Parties over the interpretation or application of Article II(7) of the Treaty.

209. As with the question of “concreteness”, the Parties have put forward diametrically opposed positions regarding the existence of a dispute. For the Claimant, the dispute arises out of the situation described by Ambassador Luis Benigno Gallegos in his witness statement:

> A diplomatic note was therefore prepared that set out Ecuador’s views on what it understood to be the Contracting Parties’ common intentions with respect to Article II(7), and asked the United States to confirm that, in fact, it shared Ecuador’s interpretation of that provision. The diplomatic note further observed that, if the United States had a different understanding of

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385 *Northern Cameroons*, Separate Opinion, p. 98
Article II(7) than was described in the note, or if the United States did not respond, Ecuador would consider itself to be in dispute with the United States over the interpretation of the Treaty.

210. This was part of a broader “strategy outlined by the President of the Republic” whereby Ecuador sought to discredit the interpretation made by the Chevron tribunal and to validate its own views on Article II(7) of the Treaty.386

211. The United States initially acknowledged Ecuador’s Diplomatic Note and “look[ed] forward to remaining in contact about this,” but then chose not to respond further. The Respondent has also abstained from addressing the substance of the June 8 Note throughout these proceedings.

212. The Parties both acknowledge that the term “dispute” has a specific meaning in international law and practice and are largely in agreement on the legal framework to be applied, aptly and succinctly summarized by the ICJ in its judgment in Georgia v. Russia:

The Court recalls its established case law on that matter, beginning with the frequently quoted statement by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case in 1924: “A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons.” (Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11.) Whether there is a dispute in a given case is a matter for “objective determination” by the Court (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 74). “It must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other” (South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa: Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328) (and most recently Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 40, para. 90). The Court’s determination must turn on an examination of the facts. The matter is one of substance, not of form. As the Court has recognized (for example, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 315, para. 89), the existence of a dispute may be inferred from the failure of a State to respond to a claim in circumstances where a response is called for.387

387 Georgia v. Russia, supra note 122, ¶30.
213. In respect of the existence of disagreement between the Parties, the Respondent claims that it has never expressed an opinion on—and therefore never opposed—the position of Claimant on the meaning of Article II(7). It has simply refused to express any opinion about the interpretation and remained silent on this subject. Thus, according to the Respondent, there is no disagreement or conflict between the Parties; there is no “positive opposition” between them.

214. The Claimant argues, however, that the facts and circumstances surrounding the Respondent’s silence support the inference that it opposes the Claimant’s position regarding the proper interpretation of Article II(7). The Claimant emphasizes that “the existence of a dispute may be inferred from the failure of a State to respond to a claim in circumstances where a response is called for.” The Claimant acknowledges that the Respondent had no strict obligation under the Treaty to respond to the June 8 Note and was entitled to remain silent. However, it considers that the progression, from the issuance of the Chevron award, to the Claimant’s June 8 Note to the Respondent, and then the Respondent’s sudden decision not to respond to the note or engage in discussions on the subject, create a situation where “a response is called for.”

215. The specific issue facing the Tribunal is thus whether the facts of this case allow for the inference that the Respondent disagrees with the position of the Claimant regarding the interpretation of Article II(7).

b) The inference of positive opposition

216. Three facts directly support the inference that the Claimant asks the Tribunal to draw. First, the Treaty was negotiated on the basis of the 1992 US Model BIT and the “effective means” provision was adopted verbatim from this model—which itself was the product of the inter-agency discussions that the Respondent purports to be necessary to form a view on the proper interpretation of Article II(7). The US cannot therefore plead ignorance of the intended meaning of Article II(7) of the Treaty, at least not for such fundamental questions as whether the provision is reflective of customary law or constitutes lex specialis. The Claimant argues therefore that the Respondent could only “either agree or disagree” with

388 See supra section VI(2), ¶¶154-166.
the Claimant’s interpretation and, if it agreed, it would have said so, leaving the Tribunal to deduce that it must not agree.\footnote{Transcript (Hearing on Jurisdiction), 26 June 2012, pp. 266-272.}

217. Second, as the Respondent has itself acknowledged, its decision not to respond to the June 8 Note was a departure from its regular practice with its treaty partners. Indeed, this was an about-face after having courteously acknowledged receipt of the June 8 Note and stated that “the U.S. government is currently reviewing the views expressed in your letter and...look[s] forward to remaining in contact about this and other important issues that affect our two nations.” This behavior confers greater significance on the Respondent’s silence, from which the Claimant invites the Tribunal to infer that the Respondent disagrees with the Claimant and is trying to protect the \textit{Chevron} interpretation from scrutiny by a State-to-State tribunal.

218. Third, the Respondent has repeatedly insisted on remaining silent on the interpretation of Article II(7) even in situations where the Respondent would be expected to address the substance of Ecuador’s views on Article II(7), including in the various pleadings on the merits in these proceedings. This suggests that the Respondent’s position has not been solely motivated by its objection to being presented with an “ultimatum” in the June 8 Note. Indeed the implication of such a motivation is in any event belied by the Respondent’s initial response, which expressed no objection to the form or content of the June 8 Note.

219. However, the Tribunal does not regard any of these arguments—individually or collectively—as establishing an inference that the Respondent in fact disagreed with the Claimant’s position. One cannot exclude other reasonable explanations for the Respondent’s behavior that do not depend on the Respondent’s disagreement with the Claimant’s interpretation of Article II(7). In particular, the Respondent’s behavior is consistent with a principled stance of not wanting to interfere with the decisions of Article VI investor-State tribunals, be they right or wrong. Given the existence of such a plausible explanation for the United States’ silence, the circumstances of this case do not warrant the inference of “positive opposition”.
220. The jurisprudence cited by the Parties supports this conclusion. For example, in *Georgia v. Russia*, Russian representatives made somewhat ambiguous statements in response to the claims leveled against the Russian Federation regarding both the unlawful use of force and ethnic cleansing. The oblique rejection by Russia of the accusatory statements made by Georgian representatives could not tenably be construed as rejecting only the claims regarding the unlawful use of force, as that would imply an admission that the Russian Federation was engaging in ethnic cleansing.

221. The situation is similar to that in the *UN Headquarters Agreement* case. The UN Secretary-General claimed that the U.S. was violating its international obligations by forcing the closing of the office of the PLO Mission to the United Nations in New York. Although the U.S. never expressly opposed the UN Secretary-General’s views, its course of conduct could only reasonably be interpreted as indicating that it believed that its actions were justified.\(^3\)

222. The same is true for *Cameroon v. Nigeria*. Nigeria’s silence on where certain sections of the boundary should lay between the two countries could not, given clear disputes regarding other portions of the boundary, reasonably be interpreted as indicating that it had no opinion on the boundary or that it agreed with Cameroon’s position. The only reasonable interpretation was that Nigeria disagreed, even if it had not explicitly expressed its disagreement.

223. These cases demonstrate that the inference of “positive opposition” is warranted only when all other reasonable interpretations of the respondent’s conduct and surrounding facts can be excluded. Such may be the case when a State remains silent when faced a serious allegation of breach of its international obligations or when the situation presents mutually-exclusive binary alternatives, one of which may be discarded as unreasonable.

224. But that is not the case here. The Claimant asserts that, if the Respondent agreed with its position, a response to its June 8 Note would be required by virtue of the Respondent’s good faith obligations. Even if this were so, the Tribunal finds—as a factual matter—that the Respondent has put forward a reasonable alternative explanation for its decision not to

\(^3\) Claimant’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, ¶82, citing *UN Headquarters Agreement, supra* note 123, ¶36.
respond that precludes the inference that the Respondent opposes the Claimant’s views on the interpretation of Article II(7) of the Treaty.

c) **The scope of the dispute: the obligation to respond or consult**

225. The above reasoning does not mean that there may not be a dispute between the Parties. However, the dispute, if one exists, concerns the Respondent’s refusal to respond to the June 8 Note as encapsulated in the Respondent’s statement at the hearing that “the most Ecuador can do is to say that the failure of the United States to answer Ecuador’s either/or demand […] created the dispute […] But that alleged dispute is over whether Ecuador had a right to issue such an ultimatum or demand and whether the Respondent had an obligation to answer. It’s not over the interpretation or application of Article II(7).”

226. Seen from another point of view, the question concerns the obligation to agree to a joint interpretation or engage in consultations regarding the proper interpretation of Article II(7) of the Treaty when faced with a demand such as Ecuador’s. In essence, the Parties disagree about the validity of the United States’ justification for not responding: that it does not want to interfere with the proper functioning of the investor-State arbitration system and thus matters subject to investor-State arbitration should be left to investor-State tribunals.

227. Such a dispute might have been brought within the ambit of Article VII if the Claimant had alleged a violation of the duty to consult under Article V in light of the Respondent’s subsequent refusal to discuss the matter despite its initial indication that it “look[ed] forward to” doing so. However, Ecuador neither invoked Article V nor argued a breach thereof. Moreover, since Ecuador agrees that there is no obligation under the Treaty to respond to a request to give an interpretation and bases its arguments on general obligations of good faith in the performance of treaties and the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* such a dispute could not concern the “interpretation or application of the Treaty.”

228. The Tribunal is thus left with no dispute over which it can assert jurisdiction.

4. **The prerequisite obligation to consult**

229. Given it conclusions leading to an absence of jurisdiction due to the absence of a dispute, the Tribunal need not consider the Respondent’s further objection that the precondition of

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negotiation in good faith prior to resort to arbitration were not fulfilled by the Claimant, including the question of whether this allegedly late-arising objection is admissible.

5. **Costs**

230. The Respondent has claimed costs, including its costs for legal representation and assistance, in accordance with Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules, which establishes a presumption that “the costs of arbitration shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party.” However, Article VII(4) of the Treaty—while preserving the Tribunal’s discretion to “direct that a higher proportion of the costs be paid by one of the Parties”—appears to abrogate that presumption and even suggest a presumption that the “costs of the proceedings shall be paid for equally by the Parties.” It is also not clear whether the Treaty permits the Tribunal to order apportionment of the Parties’ costs of legal representation and assistance.

231. In any event, the Tribunal finds no reason to depart from an even division of the costs of the proceedings. Not only would this comport with the Treaty and customary practice in State-to-State arbitration, but in a novel case such as this, where substantial and reasonable arguments are made by each party, each party should bear its own costs and divide the costs of the proceedings equally.

232. The PCA shall render a final accounting of the costs of arbitration to the Parties following the issuance of this award.

6. **Conclusion**

233. In light of its conclusions, the Tribunal must therefore dismiss the case as a whole and put an end to the arbitration. The Tribunal nonetheless takes this final opportunity to praise the Parties and counsel on both sides for their exemplary advocacy and collaboration in what has been novel and challenging case—both procedurally and substantively. The Tribunal also wishes to thank the PCA and in particular the Registrar, Martin Doe Rodriguez, for their support to the Tribunal in meeting these challenges.
VII. DECISION

For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal decides, by majority, as follows:

1. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction, and the case must consequently be dismissed in its entirety, due to the absence of the existence of a dispute falling within the ambit of Article VII of the Treaty; and

2. The fees and expenses of the Tribunal and the Registry, and other costs of the proceedings shall be paid for equally by the Parties in accordance with Article VII(4) of the Treaty.

Done this 24th day of September 2012.

[Signatures]

Professor Raúl Emilio Vinueza
(subject to dissenting opinion)

Professor Donald M. McRae

Professor Luiz Olavo Baptista
Chairman

Martin Doe Rodríguez
Registrar