OPUS2

Elliott Associates, L.P. v Republic of Korea

Day 9

November 26, 2021

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Day	9
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1	Friday, 26 November 2021
2	(10.00 am)
3	THE PRESIDENT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It
4	looks like we are all ready and can start ahead of time.
5	Anything else we need to discuss before we start the
6	closing statements. Mr Partasides?
7	MR PARTASIDES: Good morning, Mr President, members of the
8	tribunal. Not on our side.
9	THE PRESIDENT: And Mr Turner?
10	MR TURNER: Nor on ours, sir, thank you.
11	THE PRESIDENT: Very good. So we then start and it will be
12	the Claimant's closing statement.
13	Claimant's closing submissions
14	Submissions by MR PARTASIDES
15	MR PARTASIDES: Thank you. Mr President, members of the
16	tribunal, I think I can speak for everyone in this room
17	when I say that the last two weeks have been intensive.
18	We have worthy adversaries opposite us, some of whom are
19	
20	old friends, and we have had the privilege of appearing
	before a tribunal that is obviously very prepared and
21	has been attentive throughout, for which we are very
22	grateful .
23	As you've seen and heard over the last two weeks,
24	members of the tribunal, the facts of this arbitration
25	are truly uncommon. I feel able to predict that we will
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1	not see facts like these again for some time to come in
2	international arbitration .
3	The backdrop is a high stakes manoeuvre by Samsung's
4	family to save enormous amounts, over \$5 billion, in
5	inheritance tax, while maintaining control of the
6	Samsung Group, the centrepiece of which would be
7	a merger at distorted prices between SCT and Cheil that
8	would transfer vast value, 9 trillion Korean Won, from
9	the shareholders of the former to the shareholders of
10	the latter, in particular the family.
11	But that could only be achieved with sufficient
12	shareholder support. Indeed, enhanced shareholder
13	
13 14	support. A super—majority of at least 66.67% of SCT's own shareholders.
	But the Samsung's family found themselves
15	
16	opposed by this Claimant, a longstanding repeat investor
17	in Samsung C&T. An investor that knew that
18	a restructuring on fair terms to minority shareholders

could generate and release significant values for all
 stakeholders of SCT, that applied its corporate acumen,

- 21 its added value, to develop a restructuring plan that
- would both generate and release significant value forall shareholders fairly. That invested a significant
- amount of money, over US\$600 million, on the basis of
- 25 that plan and expectation, and that mobilised to oppose

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an unfair merger between SC&T and Cheil. So in one way Samsung's family and the Elliott Group agreed, members of the tribunal, on at least one thing, and that was that the prize was indeed substantial. Elliott would not have invested the many hundreds of millions of dollars that it did and take the public position that it did to oppose Korea's most powerful Chaebol family if this was not true, and Samsung, the family in particular, would not have gone to the lengths, we now know the criminal lengths, that it did go to if this was not true from its perspective as well. The stakes were so high that the family heir, , decided to enlist the connivance of the Korean Government. He did so because he recognised that the outcome of the merger would depend upon the vote of Korea's National Pension Service, as it had for other mergers and other major restructurings of other Chaebol groups in Korea. So he corrupted a President who is now in prison because of it, and she gave the order that cascaded down through the Ministry of Health and Welfare to the NPS, to the effect that one way or the other it must support the merger in the shareholder vote, and so it did. Now, that government intervention has already been 3 judicially confirmed by the kind of evidence that is unusual to see in international arbitration, because it

3	follows independent criminal investigation, a criminal
4	investigation that followed the impeachment of
5	a President, investigations, prosecutions and
6	convictions. Evidence that could not and would not have
7	been obtained in these proceedings otherwise, to include
8	telephone recordings, seized documents, and compelled
9	statements to prosecutors; evidence that reveals the
10	kind of criminal governmental conduct that goes far
11	further than typical investment Treaty cases.
12	So this is not a case about a piece of legislation
13	that impairs an investor's legitimate expectation. This
14	is not a case about a regulatory approval that has been
15	withheld or removed. You have here, members of the
16	tribunal, criminal conduct, and the Claimant comes
17	before you as the targeted victim of this crime.
18	So this is not a case about the assumption of market
19	risk . This is a case about the basic disregard of the
20	rule of law.
21	If it was a defence to a claim under an investment
22	Treaty that an investor assumes the risk of gross
2.2	

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 Treaty that an investor assumes the risk of gross

 23
 governmental conduct, that would have profound

24 implications for the meaning and value of investment25 treaties as safeguards for the international rule of

1 law. 2 So the facts of $% \left({{{\left[{{{{\rm{liability}}}} \right]}_{\rm{riability}}}} \right)$, members of the tribunal, 3 are extraordinarily serious here and that is why my 4 learned friend began his opening at the beginning of 5 last week by turning very quickly, you may remember, to 6 the quantum of Elliott's damages. 7 That was no accident. That was the consequence of 8 experienced counsel recognising that quantum is indeed 9 the key battle ground remaining in this case, and so it 10 is. 11 Now, Ms Snodgrass will speak to this at greater 12 length, but let me begin our closing by recapping our 13 case on quantum because sometimes, as testimony 14 proliferates , it is worth recalling the case in very 15 simple terms. 16 ${\sf I}$ shall do so in five simple propositions on breach 17 and causation and how they lead to our case on the loss 18 that we claim, and you will see these propositions begin 19 on slide 2. 20 I should say, members of the tribunal, that for your 21 convenience, the slide deck that we have presented 2.2 includes references to the record that has all been 23 hyperlinked for you, should and when you access it on 24 the system. 25 Proposition 1. The conduct we complain of is the

Proposition 1. The conduct we complain of is

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1	illegal governmental intervention that resulted in the
2	NPS voting to support the merger at the EGM on 17 July.
3	Proposition 2. But for that intervention, the NPS
4	would not have voted in support of the merger on 17 July
5	and the super-majority the second family needed to achieve
6	their merger would not have been achieved.
7	Proposition 3. Defeating the merger vote would have
8	led to a major increase in the price of SCT shares. As
9	Mr Boulton has testified, avoiding a giveaway of
10	9 trillion Korean Won of value could only have led to an
11	increase in the price of SCT shares.
12	Proposition 4. Quantifying that increase the day
13	after the counterfactual no vote is the right date. If,
14	as we argue, the SCT share price would have risen after
15	a dispossessing merger was voted down, Elliott could
16	have taken the benefit of the profit that it gained
17	immediately; or it could have maintained its position,
18	implemented its restructuring plan, that could have led
19	to greater value generation over time as Mr Smith
20	explained to you.
21	That greater value over time may have been available
22	but it is perfectly orthodox and indeed conservative to
23	calculate damages on the basis that EALP could have

cashed out immediately after a no vote.

25 This leads to our proposition 5. The observed

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1	consequence of the yes vote is the best evidence of the
2	discount that would have remained on SC&T once the risk
3	of a predatory merger had been removed.
4	One thing we can be most sure about, members of the
5	tribunal, is that the risk of a predatory merger was
6	eliminated, at least in the short term, but the vote in
7	favour of the merger, because the merger was then done,
8	and so the effect of the yes vote on new SCT provides
9	the most direct empirical evidence of what would have
10	happened to the discount by removing the merger risk at
11	that time.
12	Let us be clear. Our case does not require an
13	evaluation of the effect of market manipulation before
14	the shareholder vote and apportioning some to the
15	government and some to Samsung's conduct or a mix of
16	both. Our case is simpler than that. It requires us to
17	evaluate what would have happened to the value of our
18	investment if the merger had been rejected.
19	Our case also does not require us to value the
20	effect of any individual element of governmental conduct
21	we complain of on the share price before the shareholder
22	vote. That is because the conduct was concealed, as
23	we've seen, from us and from the market, and because its
24	effect on the share price occurred only when the NPS

joined a vote to support the merger, tipping the vote

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over the super-majority needed on 17 July.
That is why our valuation date is the day before
that vote, 16 July 2015. That is the day our investment
still incorporated an inherent value, suppressed by the
risk of a predatory merger, that would have been
released if the merger was voted down the next day.
That is the day before that value was permanently lost
as soon as the merger and the merger ratio was
definitively approved.
Now, our expert, Mr Boulton, gave you a resulting
valuation range, based on the net asset value of SCT,
prior to that value transfer, and applying that observed
post—merger vote discount to new SCT that, as we say, is
the best indicator of what the discount would remain
when you remove the risk of the predatory merger.
The Respondent's expert, as we see on slide 3,
Professor Dow, gave you nothing. A zero valuation, like
all his other zero valuations, in every Treaty case he
has identified he's been involved in for the Respondent
over time. And nothing else.
Now, while Professor Dow was willing to speculate
about many things, members of the tribunal, some of them
factual, and as requested we will provide you with
a list in due time, he was not willing to give you his
estimate of what the share price increase would have

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1 been if the merger had been voted down. 1 2 He waivered between agnosticism, ie no view, and 2 3 a grudging acceptance of a more limited increase in 3 4 value that he has never himself quantified. 4 5 You see his answer to the question that he was asked 5 by the President of the tribunal on slide 3. We say it 6 6 7 is not this tribunal's responsibility to do the work the 7 8 Respondent, perhaps strategically, has chosen not to do. 8 9 As we are talking about risks in this case, members 9 10 10 of the tribunal, that is a risk that our friends 11 opposite have taken in this arbitration. All or 11 12 12 nothing, or nothing, or all . And there it is . 13 You will see our roadmap on slide 4, members of the 13 14 14 tribunal. You have just heard our introduction, and so 15 I will move quickly to the facts that we wish to focus 15 16 16 on in this oral closing submission. 17 As you see on slide 5, we can be far more focused 17 18 now at the end of this hearing on the question of facts 18 19 19 because the Respondent does not deny the facts on which 2.0 20 existing convictions have been pronounced by its courts, 21 because of course it cannot. 21 22 In my learned friend's memorable words, they are 22 stuck with those decisions. And let's just remind 23 23 24 ourselves what those decisions already are, because much 24 25 was said about the second indictment of the Korean 25 9 1 Prosecutor, and we shall come back to that. But let's 1 not forget that there are existing convictions already 2 3 that our friends opposite have confirmed they are stuck 4 with. 5 They are stuck with the existing conviction of 6 . You see this on slide 6. This is the Minister 7 Central District Court conviction decision, convicted 8 for unlawful uses of his general powers as a public 9 official, by issuing, you see this underlined at the 10 bottom of the slide, "detailed instructions to intervene 1 in a matter that should be independently decided by the 11 1 12 NPS through its voting process". An existing 1 13 conviction 1 14 We see this in the conviction on slide 7 of the 1 15 NPS's Chief Investment Officer , already convicted 1 16 for criminal breach of duty, for organising the 1 17 "manipulated ... synergy effect", the court's words, not 1 18 ours, by "ultimately causing the Committee [that's the 1 19 Investment Committee] to decide in favour of the 1 2.0 2 Merger", thereby going against the defendant's 21 2 occupational duty. 2.2 The court's findings -- not just our submission, 2 23 members of the tribunal -- that as you see in the final 2

- 24 extract, "had a direct effect of profiting the major
- 25 shareholders of the Samsung Group such as N".

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the family. An existing finding, members of the tribunal It is not in dispute that the criminal conduct, including specifically in relation to the merger, was concealed by the government. As you see on slide 8, it was concealed because -- and you will remember this, I'm sure: Now, we don't need to repeat all that, members of the tribunal. That is not how we wish to spend our time this morning. Instead we focus, as you see on slide 9, on those limited areas of factual dispute which have been the focus of the defence you heard from the Respondents over the course of the last two weeks, and I shall walk you through each of them in turn, offering our answers to each of those questions. Let's move to question 1. Against the backdrop of concealed governmental conduct, the Respondent has repeatedly submitted that in any event the Claimant anticipated the possibility of a merger. But this attempts to confound, members of the tribunal, as you see on slide 11, an important and surely obvious distinction between the prospect of a restructuring of the Samsung Group, including by way of 11 a merger on the one hand, and a merger being proposed at confiscatory value that would be approved b

2	a confiscatory value that would be approved by
3	a super-majority of SCT shareholders on the other hand.
4	Now, that ought to be an obvious distinction. As
5	you see on slide 12, James Smith kept drawing that same
6	distinction during his testimony before you, and that is
7	because this Claimant was aware that the prospect of
8	a restructuring of the Samsung Group was possible,
9	perhaps even likely. There is no dispute about that.
10	Indeed, it was that prospect, members of the
11	tribunal, that created the investment opportunity. The
12	opportunity to address structural anomalies within the
13	group that were undoubtedly suppressing value. And that
14	is why the Claimant itself prepared its own
15	restructuring plan that proposed itself a merger,
16	although in a way that would not be unfair to the
17	shareholders of SCT.
18	You see again an extract from that restructuring
19	proposal. It's C -380 for the record. We've become
20	familiar with it . $\{{\sf C}/380/1\}$
21	James Smith during his testimony explained $$ let's
22	go back, please $$ that it would involve a merger on
23	fair terms. He explained that it could allow the
24	family to maintain control in a manner that was
25	consistent with Korea's new corporate governance

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slide 18.

- 1 regulations. In this regard advice was taken, as
- 2 Mr Smith confirmed, from two law firms, Nexus Group and
- 3 Akin Gump. You will see their advice listed in the
- 4 privilege logs submitted in this case, entries 208 to
- 5 214, advice obtained to ensure that this was a proposal
- that would meet the family's control objectives, 6
- 7 while at the same time not being unfair to shareholders.
- You heard Mr Smith describe it as a win/win. 8
- 9 Now, it was surely a notable moment in this hearing 10 that Mr Smith, during his lengthy cross-examination, was 11 not cross-examined on this document at all. Indeed, an 12 objection was made when I sought to take him back to it 13 on re-direct examination, you will remember.
- 14 The truth is that neither the Respondent nor its 15 team of experts has contested the feasibility of this 16 plan, its compliance with Korean law or its prospects of 17 success at any point through this arbitration. And that 18 is because there is no basis to contest it . This is 19 what the Claimant does. It is not an investor that for the large part simply waits for general beta movements 2.0 21 on the stock exchange. It applies its acumen to 22 generate and liberate alpha movement, as Mr Smith 23 explained.
- 24 Now, as we see on slide 14, James Smith also 25 explained during questioning from the tribunal the

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- 1 rationale for this plan. Again, he was not crossed on 2 this 3 And if we turn to slide 15, we also see his 4 reference to the fact that parts of the plan pertaining 5 to Samsung Electronics alone were in fact implemented the following year. 6
- 7 Now, this was no flight of fancy, members of the 8 tribunal. This was a concrete plan, later in part, to 9 the extent that it could be, implemented.
- 10 This appeared in his testimony, paragraph 68 of his 11 second witness statement, and again he was not examined 12 on it by Respondent's counsel.
- 13 So we say, returning to our first question, whether 14 the Claimant anticipated the possibility of a merger by 15 way of a restructuring, we say that is not the question.
- 16 The question is whether it anticipated a merger at
- 17 a confiscatory value being accepted by a super-majority
- 18 of SCT shareholders who would suffer because of it. 19 That leads us to our question 2. Should EALP have 2.0 anticipated that a merger at a confiscatory value would
- 21 have been accepted by a super-majority?
- 2.2 Now, a lot of time was spent, you will recall,
- 23 during the examination of Professor SH Lee repeating the 24 self-evident fact that the merger ratio is fixed by
- 25 statute. Well, of course it is. That is precisely the

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1 mechanism that gives controlling shareholders the means 2 to tunnel value from one corporate entity to another: by 3 affecting the value of those two entities and fixing the 4 timing of the merger. 5 But that merger proposal must pass with enhanced 6 shareholder support, a super-majority, and that is why 7 minority shareholders' most significant protection is 8 the shareholder vote, and that lies at the heart of this 9 case. 10 Indeed, we can now say definitively that the merger vote would not have obtained sufficient super-majority 11 12 without a ves vote from the NPS. 13 You heard a reference to 50,000 shareholders a few 14 times during the opening submission of the Respondent. 15 That cannot cloud the very clear arithmetic. A super-majority of more than 66.67% of the attending 16 17 vote was needed and we now know as fact that the 18 family would not have achieved that super-majority 19 without the NPS. 2.0 Indeed, as you see from the same slide you saw in 21 our opening, it would not have got its yes vote even if 22 the NPS had abstained. That's the lower of our columns. 23 This isn't merely our hindsight, members of the tribunal, because literally everyone, as you see on 24

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1	
2	and
3	this has been recognised as well, as you see in the
4	bottom right, by the Korean courts.
5	Of particular importance, as you see on slide 19,
6	Samsung knew. It knew on 4 June $$ this is an internal
7	Samsung document obtained on document production in this
8	case in October of this year $$ that
9	
10	
11	So the NPS was certainly the key. Everyone knew it.
12	And there was no reason to expect the NPS to vote in
13	a manner that would impair the value of the National
14	Pension Fund.
15	Here we come to another important distinction that
16	the Respondent has attempted to confound these last
17	two weeks. Distinction number 2. You see it on
18	slide 20.
19	The distinction between knowing you are entering
20	a Chaebol economy on the one hand, and anticipating
21	gross government illegality on the other. Surely an
22	obvious distinction . Our Korean capital markets expert
23	Professor Milhaupt, as you see on slide 21, articulated
24	the distinction well, and as you look at his testimony,
25	I want to pause here because this is a critical

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1 distinction , and I want us all to think about it. 2 You may know you are investing in a Chaebol economy, 3 members of the tribunal. You may know that they have 4 been around for some time, that they may have originally 5 had some justification, and that they involve significant power being exercised by those Chaebols in 6 7 the Korean jurisdiction. 8 But how can an investor be found to have reasonably 9 expected gross governmental illegality, particularly 10 when it was concealed, as we know it was here, for 11 a period of over a year, which is why you can look 12 through by way of example the appraisal price court 13 decisions, the last of which was rendered at the end of 14 May 2016. You will find it at $\{C/53/1\}$. And you will 15 find no reference to the governmental conduct that we 16 complain of here because it had not yet become known by 17 anyone within Korea. That's the middle of 2016, the 18 vear after the merger. 19 Let me also note by way of legal submission that 20 this is not a case based on legitimate expectations. 21 It's a case involving arbitrary conduct, a breach of the 22 minimum standard of treatment; conduct that shocks or at 23 least surprises a sense of juridical propriety. 24 So conflating knowledge of the Chaebol economy 25 generally with an expectation of gross governmental 17 1 conduct that has been concealed is not only a factual 2 fallacy; it would involve legal confusion as well.

3 Now, that distinction that I have just referred to, 4 members of the tribunal, is also apparent when you look at the advice that Elliott was receiving at the time 5 6 about the NPS. 7 Let's turn to slide 22. This is a summary of the 8 IRC report that NPS commissioned in the spring of 9 2015 -- you may remember that Mr Smith was asked many 10 questions about it -- and which makes clear, if we focus 11 on the second of the three bullet points: 12 "The Fund's stance on Samsung is favourable, which 13 means the Fund may make decisions a little favourable to 14 Samsung as long as their decision making ... is not 15 against the investment principle -1) stability, 2) 16 profitability ... the Fund would try to make decisions 17 100% based on investment principles when they have to 18 make decisions on conglomerates-related matters, to 19 which people are paying attention. 2.0 "The safest way for the Fund to minimise possible 21 legal responsibilities is making decisions based on the 2.2 principles .'

23 Let's turn to those principles again, slide 23. We 24 are all now familiar with those fundamental fund

25 management principles. Here you see them again, in

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1	particular the principle of profitability and management
2	independence. And the Respondent's answer to these
3	principles , as we understand it, is to suggest that the
4	NPS's approach may have been different in practice.
5	I suppose what they're saying is that the tribunal
6	should apparently put these principles to one side
7	because the NPS did, which is an interesting legal
8	submission, but it is also wrong as a matter of fact.
9	You were referred to 25,000 decisions that the NPS
10	has made over the years. You should understand the vast
11	majority of those are mundane decision relating to
12	director appointments, director removals, director
13	remunerations. There are nevertheless a number related
14	to mergers and major restructurings, and you have been
15	pointed to not one in which the principle of
16	profitability has been ignored by the NPS.
17	The closest analogy that we have in this case is to
18	the SK mergers case, and we all know how the NPS voted
19	in that case, against the SK merger, opposing the
20	Chaebol, SK, because it did not comport with the
21	principles that we are looking at.
22	Turn to slide 23.
23	, who we all saw last week, described
24	in detail the NPS's no vote in the SK merger in his
25	witness statements, and to some degree during his

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witness statements, and to some degree during his

cross-examination.

2	He described very clearly, at least in his witness
3	statements, the reason for the no vote by the NPS's
4	Experts Voting Committee, in terms, as you see on
5	slide 24, that are surely difficult to ignore in the
6	context of the issues before us.
7	This leads us to question 3. Was the Blue House's
8	intervention in the NPS's vote motivated by corruption?
9	As I said to you in our opening, we don't need to prove
10	corruption, members of the tribunal. All we need to
11	prove is that there was a government misconduct, which
12	is heartily apparent.
13	But we say that there has been a surprising attempt
14	to sow some doubt as to whether the evidence and
15	existing judicial findings of a corrupt quid pro quo
16	between President and pertained specifically
17	to the merger. In particular, it was put to you that
18	this may not be the case because of the timing of one of
19	the two meetings that took place between and the
20	President, a meeting that took place just after the
21	merger vote, later in July 2015.
22	Now, I have to say that the idea that a bribe must
23	be paid before the misconduct to be related to the
24	misconduct is an odd legal defence in and of itself , but
25	it also ignores the evidence. So let us return to the

Day 9

1 demonstrative B that our friends showed you during their 2 opening, the chronology that you were asked to focus on 3 in particular 4 What we have done here, members of the tribunal, is 5 repeated Respondent's chronology and we have added to 6 it, with red text, supplementations that we think are 7 important properly to understand the chronology that you 8 were presented with. 9 That chronology shows that the first meeting between 10 and the President took place, as you see on the 11 far left , on 15 September, and you were also taken to 12 the fact that the second meeting took place just after 13 the 17 July shareholder vote on 25 July. You see that 14 on the right of the timeline. 15 But our friends opposite said very little about what 16 happened in between. So let's begin by walking through 17 this timeline by focusing first on the period around 18 15 September, the first meeting between and 19 President We've added the letter A. 20 Now, as we understand it, the Respondent seeks to 21 downplay the significance of the 15 September 2014 2.2 meeting because it happened so long before the merger 23 took place the following year. 24 While it may have been the inception of the criminal 25 quid pro quo, they say, it didn't necessarily relate to 21 1 procuring NPS support for the merger specifically, over 2 six months later. 3 But let us look together, members of the tribunal, 4 as you look at slide 27, to a memo that was circulating 5 within Blue House just before the 15 September meeting. 6 I took you to it in my opening. Mr President, you 7 asked me what the date of this memo was. We've added 8 confirmation of the date in the bottom extract, which is 9 a question and answer statement report of the author of 10 this memo, identifying it as 11 12 13 lt 14 15 16 17 So Blue House is already getting specific about 18 using the rights to vote in NPS shares in the context of 19 an opportunity created by the succession plans of the 2.0 family. 21 Now, let's return back to our timeline. That was on 22 September 2014, and what you weren't drawn attention to 23 during our friends' opening last week is what happened 24 on 24 June 2015.

Now, let's remember that this was an important date.

22

1	24 June was the day that the Experts Voting Committee
2	voted no to the SK merger. So an important date.
3	And now let's move forward to slide 28, because that
4	was the day, the very same day that Samsung communicated
5	again a reminder to the President, in the words of
6	Korea's own prosecutor that you see at the bottom of the
7	slide $$ this is an extract from the second
8	indictment $$ to enlist the President's influence
9	specifically over NPS's voting rights.
10	This was less than a month before the shareholder
11	vote in the SCT merger, and just before the chain of
12	governmental instructions that I took you through
13	painstakingly from Blue House that began at the end of
14	June 2015 that has not been contested in this
15	arbitration .
16	So a recap of the offer of a quid pro quo.
17	Let's return again to our timeline or rather the
18	Respondent's timeline, because their focus is on the
19	fact that the second, as far as we know the final,
20	meeting between and President took place on
21	25 July, after the 17 July shareholder vote.
22	Now, it is not clear what help the Respondents seek
23	to derive from the fact that the next meeting with the
24	President took place days after the merger vote on
25	17 July, given the terms of the High Court's conviction

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1	of President for bribery relating to the facts of
2	that meeting that you see on slide 29, because the
3	High Court in Seoul, as we can see in terms, has already
4	found that President made demands at that meeting
5	for the decisive assistance she had already provided,
6	past tense, and for which the bribe of 7 billion Won $$
7	that's approximately US \$6 million $$ was paid.
8	So we say, members of the tribunal, that
9	a chronology only confirms what the High Court has
10	already found in convicting President , and that is
11	that the quid pro quo related specifically to the
12	control that was obtained through the SCT shareholder
13	vote.
14	If we move to slide 30, we find it particularly
15	surprising , members of the tribunal, that an attempt is
16	being made on the part of the Republic of Korea to
17	separate the judicially established quid pro quo from
18	the merger because, as we speak, its own prosecutor,
19	again, in its second indictment in Seoul, is maintaining
20	the very opposite. Again we see an extract from the
21	second indictment of Korea's public prosecutor in which
22	the allegation is being made, again, that the President
23	exercised influence on virtually all areas of issue of
24	succession by influencing specifically the NPS's
25	exercise of voting rights.

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Let's turn to our question 4. Did the government 2 intervention result in subversion of processes by which 3 the ROK's assets in the National Pension Fund were to be 4 managed? Now, before we focus on the NPS, let's recall again 5 that there is simply no challenge at all to the evidence 6 7 of the Presidential order or to the ministerial order that was dispatched down to the NPS in the clearest 8 9 possible terms that could not be ignored and that was 10 not ignored. 11 On the next slide, 32, we see one example of the 12 evidence of that government instruction. I offered you 13 others during my opening submission. You've heard 14 nothing from the other side about them. How could you? 15 It has never been contested, nor could it. 16 So there has been something from our perspective, 17 something rather unreal, members of the tribunal, about 18 the efforts to suggest that due process somehow 19 nevertheless wasn't subverted within the NPS, despite 20 this senior governmental instruction. 21 The centre of that artifice is the proposition that 22 there can be some debate about whether the relevant 23 operational guidelines for the fund or the Voting 24 Guidelines in relation to the fund left the decision of 25 referral to the Experts Voting Committee exclusively to 25 the discretion of the NPS's Investment Committee itself. 1 2 On the next slide, 33, we see the relevant provision 3 again of the operational guidelines, which lists, as we 4 now know by heart, separately the right to the NPSIM, 5 that's the Investment Management Division, not specifically the Investment Committee, but the 6 7 Investment Management Division, to refer matters to the 8 Experts Voting Committee, and separately, the right of 9 the chairperson of the Experts Voting Committee to have 10 matters referred to his committee as he deems necessary. 11 As you heard me say in our opening, members of the 12 tribunal, we do not need to engage in a theoretical 13 debate today about what they mean, and whether there is 14 any conflict between the Voting Guidelines on the one 15 hand and the operational guidelines promulgated pursuant 16 to statute on the other. We only need to look at the 17 evidence of what those involved at the time thought, 18 because the evidence confirms that they all thought that 19 the matter should be referred to the Experts Voting 2.0 Committee. Both the NPS thought that and so did the 21 Experts Voting Committee.


2.2 The only reason that the matter wasn't referred, as 23 we now know, is because both were leant on by the 24 Ministry of Health and Welfare.

25 Now, we showed you evidence of that contemporaneous

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1 unanimous conviction that this should be referred during 2 our opening. Let us run through it very quickly again, 3 as it wasn't touched upon since my opening submission. Slide 34. This is 4 5 Uncontested. 6 7 If we move to slide 35, again we showed you this 8 before. It wasn't touched on since my opening. The 9 order coming back from the ministry: have the internal 10 Investment Committee decide this issue. Again, that 11 ukase from the ministry is not contested. 12 Slide 36. The evidence of this demand that 13 14 is extensive in this case. None of it has been 15 contested. 16 It extended members of the tribunal to the 17 chairperson of the Experts Voting Committee himself. 18 Slide 37 we will see the first of two communications 19 that he wrote early in the morning of 10 July, before 20 the Investment Committee met, 21 22 That was his interpretation 23 of the guidelines that we've been told there can be some 24 dispute about, in the same way that it was the NPS's 25 interpretation as well until they were overruled by the 27 1 ministry. 2 Here we can return to the evidence of Mr 3 slide 38, who told us during testimony that he had 4 helped the chairman write that letter as he was legally 5 qualified, the letter that says "I find that this is 6 a decision that should be referred to the EVC", and he 7 confirmed on cross-examination that he and his fellow 8 committee members were surprised that it wasn't, 9 considered it inappropriate that it wasn't, considered 10 the situation outrageous that it wasn't. Now, in fact Mr statements to the public 11 12 prosecutor, both general and specific, as we saw during 13 his examination, now on the record of this arbitration. 14 showed us a lot more than this, members of the tribunal 15 They confirmed, as we see on slide 39. 16 17 18 19 2.0 21 2.2 23 His statement to the prosecutor records 24

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15 cross-examine him, why he was presented as a witness in 16 this case. And then the timing dawned on me. His first 17 witness statement, which made no reference to his 18 statement reports to the prosecutor, was submitted in 19 this arbitration before we or you had possession of his 2.0 statement reports; before it was clear that we would 21 ever have possession of those statement reports. 22 On the basis of the attendance of

hearings, we made a document production request for the
 evidence on which those hearings was based. You granted
 that order, members of the tribunal. We obtained his

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1 statement reports after his first witness statement. 2 And then he had to explain them away. 3 Let's look at slide 40. So he was confronted with 4 his prior statements to the prosecutor in which he told 5 the prosecutor that 6 7 8 ; and yet in his witness statement to you 9 he said that Director appeared only in the capacity 10 of an administrative secretary and made some reasonable 11 points that the committee took into account. 12 I put that contradiction between his statement 13 reports to the prosecutor and what he was testifying to you in his witness statements directly to Mr and you 14 15 see his answer to my question on slide 40. 16 Mr , we say, had obviously been put in 17 a difficult position in being asked to testify by his 18 government and we invite you to draw your own 19 conclusions about the evidence that he gave to you in 2.0 this arbitration in the light of what he previously told 21 Korea's own prosecutors.

Let us remember that the NPS ultimately has itself published its own conclusions about whether there were preaches of its due process

breaches of its due process. Slide 41, please.

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1 The NPS conducted its own audit, members of the 2 tribunal -- you haven't been referred to this document 3 during this hearing but it appeared in our amended 4 Statement of Claim; it's exhibit C-84 $\{C/84/1\}$ -- in June of 2018, in which the NPS sought to reach its own 5 conclusions about what had happened within its own 6 7 building. 8 It concluded by confirming, as you see on the top 9 extract, the factual findings of the relevant court 10 decisions in relation to valuation improprieties, and it 11 concluded by confirming the falsity of the synergy 12 effect calculation. You see that in the bottom extract. 13 On the basis of these conclusions that itself was 14 drawing, members of the tribunal, as see on slide 42, it 15 found its own officers responsible for significant 16 violations of duties of care 17 Investment manager A is Mr 18 the research group within the NPSIM, and investment 19 managers B and C are two members of his team who were found responsible for significant violations of duty of 20 21 care. 22 So on our question 4, members of the tribunal, our 23 conclusion is it would be paradoxical indeed to find 24

that the NPS due process was respected when the NPS has found itself that it wasn't.

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1 Question 5. Did the government intervention result 2 in the NPS ves vote? 3 Well, let me begin by addressing a theoretical 4 question on causation, members of the tribunal, that was 5 raised during the Respondent's opening. 6 Causation, according to the Respondent, requires the 7 Claimant to demonstrate that the NPS might not anyway 8 have voted in favour of the merger, even if the 9 government hadn't intervened in the way we now know it 10 did 11 Members of the tribunal, that is not how causation 12 works in law. The Respondent intervened in the ordinary 13 course of events and so has rendered what might have happened anyway legally irrelevant. 14 15 If my learned friend raises his pistol, points it at 16 me, shoots a bullet that hits me in the chest and I drop 17 dead as a result, he cannot say, as a defence to 18 a charge of murder, that it must be proven that I would 19 not have died anyway because I might have a serious 2.0 illness . There is no theoretical basis for such 21 a proposition, which is why you don't find it in 2.2 Hart & Honore because it isn't there. 23 So let's turn to the true question of causation, 24 whether the evidence confirms on the balance of 25 probabilities that the conduct of which we complain led

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1 to the NPS's vote in favour of the merger. 2 To begin with, we invite you to take a step back and 3 ask the following rather obvious question: why would 4 those in government have taken the extraordinary illegal steps that they did if it wasn't necessary? Again, 5 there is something unreal about the suggestion, given 6 7 the outcome that they intended was indeed achieved. You 8 could end your enquiry on causation there. 9 But let's see what happens when you do look at the 10 evidence. First, let's consider the evidence presented 11 by the Respondent. Slide 44, please. 12 As we all have noted, they have presented no member 13 of the Investment Committee to appear before you to give evidence as to what they would have decided had the 14 15 fraud not been achieved. 16 The one witness they have presented confirms that he 17 has no way of knowing the views of the Investment 18 Committee members, and of course how could he; and even his own view, as you see on the bottom of slide 44, is


- his own view, as you see on the bottom of slide 44, is
 apparently that he's unclear as to how he would have
 voted on the Experts Voting Committee.
 Members of the tribunal he is the one witness that
- Members of the tribunal, he is the one witness that
 has been presented by the Republic of Korea and he is
 unwilling to say that he would have voted in favour of
 the merger. One wonders what those other committee

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1 members that haven't been presented to you would have 2 said.

3 But we don't have the benefit of those other 4 committee members. We do have the benefit -- let's turn 5 to slide 45 -- of their testimony or records of 6 interviews to the Korean Prosecutor or before the Korean 7 courts. And you will recall that we compiled those 8 views on one slide in our opening which gave references 9 to the record in which we found confirmations of them 10 saying that they would have voted differently with the 11 benefit of a fuller knowledge of the fabrications they 12 were presented with. 13 We were accused, and this is the Respondent's slide, 14 of being unjustifiably cavalier -- surely the word 15 " unjustifiable " is unnecessary there -- with the

16 evidence.
17 So what we have done, members of the tribunal, is we
18 have gone back to the evidence that we cited in our
19 slide and we've provided you, in the slides that follow,
20 with the extracts we relied on to show those committee
21 members saying they would have voted differently.






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Let's turn to the last of these at slide 51 because,

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1 as you consider each of these statements individually, what vou won't find in any of those statements or in the 2 3 minutes of the Investment Committee meeting of 10 July 4 itself , which are also on the record of this 5 arbitration, is any reference to the voting decision 6 being determined by way of a binary question of whether 7 the appraisal price was higher than the share price. 8 You will remember that this proposition was put to 9 you all during Respondent's opening, that somehow, if 10 the appraisal price was higher, they would vote against 11 to take the benefit of it, and if the share price was 12 higher, they would vote in favour of the merger to take 13 the share price. 14 Now, if that was the determinant, members of the 15 tribunal, one wonders why you need a committee meeting 16 at all . It would be a mechanical decision. And when 17 you scratched the surface of that proposition and asked 18 the question pertaining to the one concrete example that 19 we have before us of the SK merger, we saw that the NPS 2.0 voted against the SK merger in June 2015, even though 21 the appraisal price was lower than the share price. 2.2 exploding this binary relationship. 23 Again, you will find no reference to that binary 2.4 relationship in the Investment Committee meetings at the 25 time explaining how and why this decision was made.

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1	What you also won't find in the Investment Committee	
2	meeting minutes is any consideration of the broader	
3	portfolio valuation implications of the merger being	
4	approved on the NPS's other Samsung holdings. The	
5	proposition was put to you, I think, that: perhaps the	
6	NPS would lose out here, but if you look at the	
7	portfolio holistically , the outcome might be different.	
8	If that was the justification , members of the	
9	tribunal, again, you would see it in the Investment	
10	Committee meetings. No mention of it at all.	
11	The only mention is of the effect on the NPS's	
12	interests in SCT and Cheil together. And if some	
13	broader portfolio justification existed, we have to ask	
14	the question: why did the research team of the NPS go to	
15	the trouble, the criminal trouble, of falsifying	
16	valuations, forging a synergy effect calculation, if	
17	they didn't need to because the portfolio effect was	
18	positive?	
19	Let's remind ourselves of that evidence, slide 52,	
20	the first valuation on 30 June 2015 that the NPS arrived	
21	at, suggesting	
22	, which would reflect a huge	
23	dispossession for the NPS, resulting in, as we see on	
24	slide 53, a few days later,	
25	Why would they need to	
	37	
1	try a little harder if the portfolio effect was positive	
2	for the NPS?	

for the NPS? If we look at slide 54, the revised calculation just a few days later, extraordinarily arrived at by a transformed discount rate which still left a hole in value, why would this have been a problem if there was a holistic portfolio positive that the NPS would benefit from? But instead of noting a portfolio positive, as you see on slide 55, we see You will recall on slide 56 exactly how that synergy effect calculation was calculated; described as

14 15 16 Why would they go to all this trouble, members of 17 the tribunal, if there was a holistic portfolio 18 justification ? Very simply, because there wasn't. 19 In fact, as you see on slide 57, the Claimant did 2.0 the portfolio calculation for the NPS in July 2015 21 precisely to demonstrate that when you took account of 2.2 all of the NPS's Samsung holdings, the loss to the NPS 23 was even greater. This was the letter that was sent by

24 Elliott to the NPS on 8 July 2015 attaching that 25 portfolio, analysis and revealing an NPS loss of

portfolio analysis and revealing an NPS loss of

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1 approximately 0.6 trillion Won, which is about 2 US\$500 million, which was never contested, and although 3 it was suggested to you that a holistic analysis might 4 lead to a different result, you have never been provided 5 with a different calculation of that number, because it doesn't exist. 6 7 Members of the tribunal, on questions of causation, 8 ultimately we could have asked the Investment Committee 9 members, in front of you, how they would have voted if 10 the impairment in value that the National Pension Fund 11 research team itself had identified was made clear to 12 them. 13 The Respondent has made sure that we can't ask those questions, but we say on the evidence we really don't 14 15 have to 16 Question 6. Has the damage resulting from the 17 merger been remedied by the exercising of appraisal 18 rights attaching to some of SCT's shares? 19 Well, as I told you in our opening, all receipts from the Claimant's appraisal price litigation and 20 21 settlement with Samsung have already been netted off 22 from the amount that we claim. In respect of any 23 further possible recovery, depending on if and when the 24 Supreme Court finally hears the Ilsung Pharmaceuticals 25 appeal, it's been pending for about six years now, 39 1 I told you that any issue of future recovery against Samsung would raise a future question of double recovery 2 3 for Samsung to raise before the Korean courts. It is 4 not a matter for you, because there has been no double 5 recovery at this time. 6 My learned friend offered other practical solutions. 7 You see them on slide 59. Some form of assignment of rights under the Settlement Agreement; some form of 8 9 clawback. 10 So we say, one way or the other, any further

11 possible payments at some ill-defined point in the 12 future made by Samsung pursuant to the Settlement 13 Agreement need not obstruct your full award on the basis 14 of amounts already received both on our case and, it 15 appears, on the case of those opposite. 16 More importantly, the statutory appraisal rights 17 that the Claimant has already exercised does not and 18 does not seek to compensate the Claimant for the loss 19 that we are claiming before you. We are claiming in 2.0 this arbitration that which would have happened to the 21 share price once the merger had been rejected, ie 2.2 a forward-looking price. That isn't what the court was 23 determining in the appraisal price litigation . The 2.4 Korean High Court said so itself. 25 Let's turn to the next -- sorry yes, slide 60. This

1	is an extract at the top of the slide that you see from
2	the appraisal price litigation , the High Court decision.
3	Professor SH Lee explained the limits of that remedy
4	as well on testimony, and there was no equivalent expert
5	in the Capital Markets Act presented by the Respondent
6	to suggest otherwise. It has been a partial remedy that
7	we have already set off.
8	Members of the tribunal, we move now from questions
9	of fact to questions of attribution and I ask you to
10	recognise my partner, Georgios Petrochilos.
11	Submissions by MR PETROCHILOS
12	MR PETROCHILOS: Mr President, members of the tribunal, good
13	morning. Issues of attribution in this case are neither
14	hard, nor are they novel. I need touch upon only three
15	matters in closing briefly , and these are now on your
16	screen.
17	The first matter is that the tribunal need not dwell
18	on attribution at great length. That is to say it is
19	open to the tribunal to hold that on the record before
20	it, issues of attribution either do not arise at all or,
21	if they arise, they are open and shut.
22	These are two separate decision-making paths. So
23	let me outline each one in turn.
24	The first path is to conceive of the critical
25	delict , as indeed Korea's courts and prosecutors have
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1	conceived of it . You have it now on slide 63.
2	The major actors of malfeasance and conspiracy were
3	located in the Presidential office , the Blue House, and
4	the Ministry of Health and Welfare.
5	As you see on this slide , Korea's own record shows
6	that the President, the Minister of Health and Welfare,
7	and their direct close subordinates ordered exactly how
8	the NPS should approve the merger in the
9	Investment Committee.
10	And in this way what occurs within the NPS is simply
11	a predetermined outcome, decided and compelled by the
12	ministry and the Blue House.
13	So the NPS is not an independent actor in this
14	story; on the facts it has no discretion but to approve
15	the merger and to do so in the Investment Committee.
16	The NPS simply executes a task decided and commanded by
17	others in charge.
18	And so on that approach, issues of attribution did
19	not arise because it is common ground that those in
20	charge, the President, the minister and their close
21	subordinates, are organs of Korea.
22	So I now come to a further decision-making path,
23	which revealed itself in the course of this hearing in
24	fact .
25	You will recall that our friends opposite

1	represented to you that in the Dayyani case, which
2	concerned conduct by the Korean Asset Management
3	Company, or KAMCO for short, the tribunal attached
4	decisive importance, you were told, to one factor in
5	holding KAMCO to be a Korean State organ. That one
6	factor, you were told on Day 2, was that KAMCO itself
7	had asserted this to be the case before foreign courts.
8	Now, as this tribunal has remarked already, for an
9	entity to claim sovereign immunity, it must be able to
10	assert that it is a state agency or instrumentality.
11	And as you know, Korea does not deny that the NPS can
12	claim, or in fact has claimed sovereign immunity, and of
13	course it would be very straightforward for Korea to do
14	so, if it could, by producing evidence of NPS's practice
15	or internal legal analysis, and it has not.
16	From this, you can draw your own conclusions.
17	But I'm putting that to one side because
18	I respectfully submit that the tribunal has affirmative
19	and direct evidence that the NPS does take the position,
20	and it is accepted by the courts, that it is a state
21	organ, a state organ exercising the delegated
22	governmental function of operating the National Pension
23	Fund.
24	And the evidence is now on your screen as slide 64.
25	Here we have two Korean court judgments, which you
	43
1	will recall we looked at with Professor Kim between
2	pages 46 and 54 of the Day 5 transcript {Day5/46:1}.

-	win recail we looked at with riolessol run between
2	pages 46 and 54 of the Day 5 transcript $\{Day5/46:1\}$.
3	And in that case the NPS was seeking to be exempted from
4	a tax on a purchase of shares, very much like our case,
5	or analogous to our case.
6	Why was the NPS doing that? Because acquisitions by
7	the state are tax exempt. And the NPS said $$ you see
8	that in the first extract on the slide $$ that an
9	acquisition made by the NPS is an acquisition made by
10	the state.
11	The court agreed. You have that immediately below,
12	under "Judgment", having regard to what Professor Kim
13	was keen to stress to you was the principle of substance
14	over form.
15	You remember that was Day 5 of the transcript,
16	pages 52 to 53. {Day5/52:1}
17	So the substance of the matter, members of the
18	tribunal, is that the state has chosen to act through
19	the form of the NPS.
20	And you see further down the slide, this is the
21	appellate court decision now, that the court reasons
22	that the NPS's management powers over the pension fund
23	stemmed specifically from statutory source, the National
24	Pension Act, Articles 125 and 102.
25	Now, our friends agree that the Korean court

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decisions are binding on the Republic of Korea.	1	separate legal personality, if it has one,
Memorable phrase: they're stuck with them. And these	2	the range of factors to consider as part of
decisions here spell out that the NPS's mandate to	3	analysis . The further analysis is whether
manage the National Pension Fund, which is the subject	4	entity is a parastatal entity for purposes
of this case before you, has a statutory source. It's	5	Article 5.
not a private law entitlement. The NPS has no agency	6	So to the extent that legal personality
mandate, we will come to look at this, and it has no	7	to play, this is an analysis under ILC Art
ownership of the assets.	8	analysis under ILC Article 4, which concer
So these decisions also spell out that the NPS	9	the status of an organ.
manages the pension fund on behalf of the State of	10	Now, I say legal personality is one in
Korea.	11	factors . Let me make good on that. We
And it is incontrovertible, members of the tribunal,	12	the matrix of factors examined by various
that an entity which in substance acts on behalf of the	13	This is on slide 66. As you can see, we h
state is a State organ under international law. The	14	inserted a row at the very top which conce
official ILC commentary makes this plain and we will	15	so you the tribunal can compare it with th
come to see this now.	16	examined in the other cases.
So this brings me to my second subject for the day,	17	This is by of way of an aide memoire.
which is the status of the NPS as a state organ.	18	the full context of the cases relied upon
Korea's submission is that the NPS cannot be an	19	you can turn to it in your own time. But
organ of the state. Why? Because it has its own legal	20	caution is again that these are Article 5 o
personality as a juridical person without capital.	21	parastatal entities , not Article 4 cases.
This submission, I say with respect, ignores rather	22	So having put that to one side, what w
elementary rules of international law. Let's look at	23	assistance to you is to understand the pos
them.	24	functions of the NPS within Korea's legal
On slide 67 you have relevant portions of the	25	where, inevitably, they have to be found.
45		47
official ILC commentary, and I'm happy to leave this	1	Now, the experts on both sides address
with you for a quiet moment. It will all be very	2	question whether the NPS is to be regarded
familiar to you. But you will see that paragraphs 1, 6,	3	agency from the perspective of Korean law
11 and 12 of the commentary make the position crystal	4	recall this is perhaps the only word I can
clear .	5	pronounce in Korean. The notion is called
States consist typically of a multitude of entities ,	6	guk—ga—gi—gwan, and this is found in th
some of which are given separate personality, and some	7	Korea's Constitution.
of which are even given independence of operations, for	8	Now, Professor CK Lee has opined that
example the police or the courts.	9	such an agency. He has done so on a func
Now, each of these entities is an organ, an organ of	10	of its duties and its powers, and that of o

10 Now, each of these entities is an organ, an organ of 11 a unitary legal person, called the state, which is how 12 international law conceives of the state on the international legal plane. 13

14 If the tribunal wishes to read further into this 15 uncontroversial point, wholly uncontroversial point, the ILC discussed it in its 1998 session in the first volume 16 17 of the ILC yearbook for that year. The discussion is 18 between pages 242 and 243.

19 So our friends, $\, {\rm I} \,$ say with respect, are doing the 20 tribunal a disservice in suggesting that there is 21 contrary authority. What authority there is goes to 22 a different point altogether. 23 It goes to the point: where it is clear, settled,

24 that an entity is not part of the organisation of the 25 state, and therefore it is not a state organ, its

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ity, if it has one, is one of consider as part of a further analysis is whether or not that entity for purposes of ILC at legal personality has a role alysis under ILC Article 5, not an cle 4, which concerns itself with ersonality is one in a range of good on that. We have tabulated xamined by various tribunals. s you can see, we have also ery top which concerns the NPS, compare it with the entities ases of an aide memoire. So you have cases relied upon opposite, and our own time. But the word of hese are Article 5 cases, ot Article 4 cases. to one side, what we submit is of understand the position and the vithin Korea's legal order. That's

1	Now, the experts on both sides addressed the
2	question whether the NPS is to be regarded as a state
3	agency from the perspective of Korean law. You may
4	recall this is perhaps the only word I can decently
5	pronounce in Korean. The notion is called
6	guk–ga–gi–gwan, and this is found in three provisions of
7	Korea's Constitution.
8	Now, Professor CK Lee has opined that the NPS is
9	such an agency. He has done so on a functional analysis
10	of its duties and its powers, and that of course is
11	a mainstream classical kind of analysis in Korean public
12	law, as in other systems of public law.
13	He was not challenged on this important aspect of
14	his expert testimony at all, and you can see that, for
15	example, on page 70 of the Day 4 transcript. ${Day4/70:1}$
16	Now, let us turn to Professor Kim, Korea's expert.
17	He in his scholarly writings has in fact written that an
18	all — encompassing single conception of Korea's
19	administrative organisation law would be, his word,
20	" difficult "; difficult given the many types of entities
21	which are part of the administration.
22	And among those entities, in the same writing he
23	expressly refers to public institutions . And of course
24	the NPS is a public institution , and in fact it is
25	a quasi-government public institution.

1	So we saw that passage, which you will find in
2	exhibit C-699 {C/699/1}. It's a very short exhibit
3	which was written in 2017. I recalled it to
4	Professor Kim, and this was Day 5 of the transcript
5	between pages 9 and 12. {Day5/9:1}
6	Now, before you Professor Kim takes a different
7	approach, one that he has never adopted in his scholarly
8	writings, one which no court or scholar in Korea has
9	ever adopted, and Professor Kim readily admitted that
10	this was the case; again Day 5, page 3.
11	But notwithstanding the novelty of his approach and
12	the word "difficult" used in his writings, when he
13	delivered his scripted presentation to the tribunal, the
14	impression that he sought to convey was that the issue
15	is, after all, the very opposite of being difficult .
16	It's blindingly obvious.
17	The blindingly obvious answer, according to
18	Professor Kim, writing for this case, is that only
19	agencies that are designated as central administrative
20	agencies are state agencies in the constitutional sense
21	of guk-ga-gi-gwan.
22	Yet he freely admits that the NPS is such
23	a constitutional agency for two of the three provisions
24	of the Constitution: Article 27, the right of citizens
25	to petition, and Article 97, the jurisdiction of the

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1	National Board of Audit.
2	Professor Kim took no view $$ perhaps he was
3	agnostic like Professor Dow $$ as to the third
4	provision, which is Article 111, which concerns disputes
5	as between state agencies. And you will find his
6	admissions between pages 15 and 22 of the Day 5
7	transcript , $\{{\sf Day5}/{ m 15:1}\}$ at paragraph 50 of his first
8	report, and at paragraph 45 of his second report.
9	Professor Kim, and this is also important from your
10	perspective, was also sanguine about the outcomes to
11	which his approach leads. Let's look at the outcomes.
12	For one thing, he was categorical that the Bank of
13	Korea $$ this is the central bank of the country $$ is
14	not a state organ or agency, as you can see on slide 67.
15	International law regards this as an absurd conclusion,
16	as you can also see on the slide , if you need authority
17	for that proposition.
18	He was equally categorical that local governments
19	are not organs of the state either, and you can see
20	that, slide 68. Once more, such a conclusion is absurd
21	in terms of the Treaty that you're called upon to apply
22	for customary international law.
23	So much in terms of outcomes.
24	But it is useful to see precisely on what criterion
25	Professor Kim crafted the approach that Korea urges you

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1	to adopt. So you can see for yourselves that he is
2	drawing a fine distinction under Korean law which, with
3	all respect, makes no difference under international
4	law.
5	So Professor Kim says $$ this is his criterion $$
6	that only entities which are directly answerable to the
7	President of Korea $$ he calls that oversight $$ are
8	administrative state agencies, and these are all
9	designated as central administrative agencies. And the
10	best source or sources for this proposition are
11	paragraphs 69 and 70 of his first report and slides 7
12	and 12 of his presentation to you on Day 4.
13	Now, as we have considered a number of state
14	entities in this case, and during this hearing, I have
15	set out the lines of oversight, within the Kim sense,
16	for a number of such entities.
17	So at the very top of this diagram you have the
18	President of the Republic. The President can directly
19	supervise the Prime Minister, all other ministers and
20	all central administrative agencies.
21	Now, let us go one level down on the left-hand side
22	of the slide . The Minister of Health and Welfare is, of
23	course, supervised by the President. You see that on
24	the second level on the left -hand side.

And in turn, if we go one more level down, you see

51

1	the minister directly supervising the NPS.
2	And so the conclusion here is that the NPS is
3	supervised, has oversight by the President, indirectly
4	through the Minister of Health.
5	Now, let us look on the right—hand side of the
6	diagram, and here on the second level in the
7	administrative hierarchy we have the Prime Minister, and
8	he or she is of course supervised directly by the
9	President.
10	Now, on the third level, one level down, we have the
11	FSC, the Financial Services Commission, which
12	Professor Kim says is a classic example of a central
13	administrative agency. You find that in his first
14	report, paragraphs 14 and 15.
15	As you can see here, the FSC is supervised by the
16	President in two ways: directly, you see the line of
17	oversight, and indirectly via the Prime Minister.
18	So the conclusion from this, members of the
19	tribunal, is that central administrative agencies or
20	central government agencies are subject to both direct
21	presidential oversight and, just like the NPS, indirect
22	presidential oversight.
23	Now that we understand fully what fine distinctions
24	Professor Kim was drawing, and our friends rely upon for
25	their international law argument, I respectfully submit

1 we can all be clear that these fine distinctions make no 2 difference in terms of international law. 3 I now come to my third and last, you will be pleased 4 to hear, subject, which concerns the notion of governmental authority. This is a notion relevant under 5 the analysis in terms of ILC Article 5. 6 7 Now, Korea invites you to hold that in managing the National Pension Fund the NPS exercises the functions of 8 9 a fund manager, no more, no less. 10 We say Korea adopts the wrong analytical framework, 11 and perforce comes to the wrong conclusion. 12 Let me start with the analytical framework. The 13 main elements of it are set out on this slide 70. This is exactly as I did for ILC Article 4. We have key 14 15 portions of the official commentary, and I'll leave this 16 with you, if I may. 17 Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the commentary are central for 18 my purposes. They explain the notion of governmental 19 authority, and they say that governmental activity is to 20 be distinguished from private or commercial activity. 21 That is to say -- this is my submission to you -- an 22 activity will not be governmental if the law authorises 23 anyone, not just a specifically empowered entity, to 24 exercise a certain function which the activity serves to 25 fulfil . 53 1 The commentary also says, and this is part of the 2 same analysis, that in assessing whether the authority 3 conferred is governmental in nature or it is not, one 4 must look at -- now I'm quoting from paragraph 6 which 5 is at the bottom of the slide: " ... not just the content of the powers, but the way 6 7 in which they are conferred on an entity, the purposes 8 for which they are to be exercised and the extent to 9 which the entity is accountable to government for their

11 Korea's submissions to you fail to engage in the 12 round, as they must, with the multiple elements of this legal test. The reasons for this become apparent when 13 one so much as outlines the NPS's functions under the 14 15 applicable law and regulations. 16 The diagram now on your screen, slide 71, serves to

17 do just that. And so you see on the left-hand side of 18 the diagram that the NPS collects mandatory pension 19 contributions from Korea's population. And it is common 2.0 ground, as of course it would be, that this is a public 21 law governmental activity. 2.2 The monies collected are state property, but they

23 don't go into the general treasury. They come into the 24 National Pension Fund, which is specifically and 25

specially established under the National Pension Act,

54

Article 101.

1 2 Now, let us turn to the right-hand side of this 3 diagram. What the NPS does in the end is to determine 4 who is eligible to receive a pension; then makes the 5 pension payments that fall due, and to do that it utilises of course the resources of the pension fund, 6 7 and that activity too is agreed by all to be a public 8 law governmental activity. 9 It is therefore paradoxical, to put it no higher, 10 that Korea should contest that the necessary link 11 between these two governmental activities of the NPS is 12 also a public law governmental activity. You see this 13 activity pictured in the middle of the diagram with some 14 further explanations and references and I'll come to that in a minute. 15 16 Members of the tribunal, in the design of the Korean 17 National Pension System, administering the national 18 fund, that which Professor Kim called the vault of the 19 country on Day 4, is the complement of the NPS's power 20 to collect the compulsory pension contributions, and it 21 is also the necessary vault, as I say, out of which the 22 NPS makes pension payments as required by law. 23 In this context I specifically and respectfully 24 recall the content of slide 84 that I used in opening. 25 I would invite you respectfully to turn to it in your

55

1	own time, but I would add the following observations.
2	We now know that in administering the vault of the
3	Korean nation, the NPS does not perform a commercial
4	service . It has no contract. We saw that. It has no
5	private law agency relationship. We discussed that with
6	Professor Kim. It does not charge a commission or fees
7	to the state. And that is why the NPS has no revenue of
8	its own to speak of, as our friends admit.
9	We now know also that the NPS does not have
10	discretion, as an ordinary party would, in choosing in
11	which types of assets to invest. The permitted assets
12	are specifically enumerated in Article 102 of the
13	National Pension Act.
14	Nor does the NPS have private sector discretion in
15	its decision—making process. Its decision—making
16	process has been made for it, has been stipulated for it
17	by the superior authority, the Ministry of Health, and
18	we have discussed at some length the various guidelines.
19	Nor is the NPS accountable in the manner that
20	a private fund manager would be accountable. The NPS is
21	subject to audits, in particular, by the National Audit
22	Board each year without exception.
23	We now know also that the NPS has no ownership of
24	the pension fund assets, we looked at that point
25	earlier , and it derives its management authority from

56

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exercise.'

1	a specific statutory mandate under the National Pension
2	Act. So not a private law entitlement.
3	Finally, we now know $$ this was Professor Kim, Day
4	5 page 26 $\{Day5/26:1\}$, that the state's constitutional
5	duty to provide pensions would remain approximate even
6	if, perish the thought, the NPS had squandered the
7	assets in the fund. What does this mean for your
8	purposes? It means that the state's constitutional duty
9	hasn't been discharged once and for all by appointing
10	the NPS in respect of the function of managing the
11	National Pension Fund. The state has an ongoing
12	responsibility and the NPS is its mere auxiliary that
13	the state uses to fulfil that responsibility .
14	In light of all this, members of the tribunal,
15	a suggestion that the NPS's duties are, after ${\ }$ all ,
16	private, run-of-the-mill commercial activity would
17	offend, I respectfully submit, any Korean holder of
18	public office .
19	We had in fact occasion to test such a suggestion
20	and to dismiss it with Professor Kim. We looked at the
21	Bank of Korea's functions and activities . This was
22	Day 5, pages 33 to 38 $\{Day5/33:1\}$ and the parallels
23	between Bank of Korea and the NPS are striking for your
24	purposes. Let us turn to slide 72.

You will be able to gauge these close parallels from

57

1 this slide, which extracts the legal texts, the primary 2 texts, which are applicable to the Bank of Korea and the 3 NPS. And I'm happy to skip the detailed references for 4 now and leave these primary texts for you to consider in 5 your own time. 6 What I submit you will see emerges from these texts 7 is as straightforward as it is fundamental. We have 8 a statute, that is on the right-hand side, authorising 9 the Bank of Korea to do certain things. We have 10 a statute, on the left-hand side, authorising the NPS to 11 do certain things. Both of these institutions are 12 authorised specifically to enter into certain enumerated 13 transactions, such as buying securities. 14 The law does not simply say that the Bank of Korea 15 or the NPS has all the transactional freedom of a commercial corporation. That would have been of 16 17 course a very simple thing to express in a law, easy to 18 write it into it . But the law doesn't do that. It 19 allows only for specific types of transactions. And it 20 does so by expressly describing these transactions as 21 a means to serve the statutory functions that are 22 entrusted to the Bank of Korea and the NPS respectively. 23 So, simply put, neither the NPS nor the Bank of 24 Korea is a commercial actor pursuing its own private 25 ends. No. They're set up by the state to perform

58

1	functions that the state has reserved to itself
2	exclusively .
3	That would conclude my submissions, members of the
4	tribunal, and I would ask you to call upon Mr Partasides
5	to continue.
6	MR PARTASIDES: Members of the tribunal, given our
7	discussion of facts, there is no need to spend time
8	again on breach. So we will move directly to matters of
9	quantum and our slide 78 and I invite you to recognise
10	my partner, Elizabeth Snodgrass.
11	Submissions by MS SNODGRASS
12	MS SNODGRASS: Members of the tribunal, over the last few
13	days you have heard at times very detailed, technical,
14	and sometimes quite discursive evidence on issues that
15	relate to the quantum of damages.
16	My objective in these necessarily summary
17	submissions is to set out the Claimant's straightforward
18	case on damages in a bit more detail than Mr Partasides
19	previewed at the outset of our submissions, in a way
20	that makes plain the key propositions on which we rely,
21	and the analytical framework for the damages that are
22	claimed.
23	I hope in this way to remove the confusion that, if
24	my friends opposite will forgive me for saying so, it
25	seems that the ROK is deliberately trying to create on

59

1	this issue.
2	One observation at the outset. We should not fall
3	into the trap of thinking that because in this case the
4	numbers that a correct valuation analysis yields are
5	large, the analysis must necessarily be complex.
6	Notwithstanding the ROK's continuing efforts to
7	caricature and demonise, and Professor Dow's efforts to
8	sow doubt about quantum in this case in order to support
9	his habitual conclusion that no damages should be
10	awarded, this is actually a simple quantum case.
11	As of the valuation date, the Claimant had an
12	investment: shares in SC&T. There is no dispute, as we
13	will see on slide 78, that the valuation date should be
14	16 July 2015, which is the day immediately before the
15	extraordinarily general meeting of SC&T shareholders to
16	vote on the merger.
17	To the extent there is any confusion about that, it
18	may arise from the fact that in the counterfactual
19	scenario, that of course unfolds after the merger vote.
20	That is typical and it doesn't change the valuation
21	date.
22	On the day after the valuation date, the inexorable
23	outcome and culmination of the ROK's breaches of the
24	Treaty, the NPS casting vote in favour of the merger,
25	caused the Claimant to suffer a loss in respect of its

1	investment in the SC&T shares.	1	tails you lose positions. They exposed Elliott to the
2	Specifically, at that time, as you can see on	2	same risk in respect of the outcome of the merger as the
3	slide 79, the loss caused by the value transfer from	3	SC&T shares did, which is why, as Professor Dow
4	SC&T shareholders to Cheil shareholders that resulted	4	recognises, they resulted in a loss when the merger went
5	from the merger being consummated at distorted share	5	through.
6	prices became permanent and irreversible.	6	One function of the swaps was to dampen down market
7	So the mechanism by which SC&T shareholders were	7	volatility, and in that way to isolate the investment
8	harmed was a scheme to meticulously prepare a lopsided	8	risk, the alpha, ensuring that the Claimant remained
9	merger ratio by driving the SC&T share price down and	9	exposed to it, but to minimise exposure to general
10	the Cheil share price up, and then force it through	10	market volatility, which Mr Smith described as the beta,
11	a shareholder vote.	11	or the beta (pronounced) in American English.
12	It was Samsung's scheme, but one with which it was	12	As I said, the Claimant does not claim for its
13	later revealed the ROK actively and knowingly colluded,	13	losses on the swaps.
14	in breach of the Treaty.	14	Finally, as we see on slide 82, contrary to the
15	The ROK's Treaty breaches actually caused the	15	calculations that Professor Dow presented, the Claimant
16	Claimant several losses. First, as slide 80 shows, but	16	actually suffered trading losses.
17	for the ROK's breaches of the Treaty, the Claimant's	17	As Mr Smith explained in his evidence, the Claimant
18	investment in SC&T shares would have increased in value	18	suffered an immediate trading loss on its shares in SCT
19	when the merger was rejected. The resulting legally	10	of \$87 million. After deducting gains on the swaps the
20	cognisable damages are quantified by Mr Boulton, who has	20	net trading loss was \$45 million. But the Claimant does
21	shown that the share price would have risen to within	20	not advance a separate claim for these trading losses.
22	5-15% of the full intrinsic value of the Claimant's	22	So turning now to how we say the tribunal should
23	shareholding in SC&T. I'll return to this in more	23	frame the quantum analysis, we say this case gives rise
24	detail later.	23	to a typical quantum analysis. What would Claimant's
24	Second, the Claimant stood to earn more on its	24	investment in the SC&T shares have been worth in the
25	Second, the claimant stood to earn more on its	2.5	investment in the SC&T shares have been worth in the
	61		63
1			
1	investment in SC&T shares if Elliott's restructuring	1	immediate aftermath of a no vote, ie in the
1 2	investment in SC&T shares if Elliott's restructuring plans had gained traction, after a group of minority	1 2	immediate aftermath of a no vote, ie in the counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached
2	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority	2	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached
2 3	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to	2 3	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty?
2 3 4	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction.	2 3 4	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore
2 3 4 5	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction. Now, those gains might have resulted from further	2 3 4 5	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore a straightforward comparison of the actual and the
2 3 4 5 6	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction. Now, those gains might have resulted from further reducing the discount to NAV, from the stock trading at	2 3 4 5 6	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore a straightforward comparison of the actual and the counterfactual. What the shares would have been worth,
2 3 4 5 6 7	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction. Now, those gains might have resulted from further reducing the discount to NAV, from the stock trading at a premium to NAV, as it had done at points in the past,	2 3 4 5 6 7	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore a straightforward comparison of the actual and the counterfactual. What the shares would have been worth, counterfactual, less what the Claimant actually
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction. Now, those gains might have resulted from further reducing the discount to NAV, from the stock trading at a premium to NAV, as it had done at points in the past, or even from increasing the NAV. We have advanced	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore a straightforward comparison of the actual and the counterfactual. What the shares would have been worth, counterfactual, less what the Claimant actually received, the actual.
2 4 5 7 8 9	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction. Now, those gains might have resulted from further reducing the discount to NAV, from the stock trading at a premium to NAV, as it had done at points in the past, or even from increasing the NAV. We have advanced evidence showing that there are good reasons to believe	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore a straightforward comparison of the actual and the counterfactual. What the shares would have been worth, counterfactual, less what the Claimant actually received, the actual. This is of course the normal damages framework, but
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction. Now, those gains might have resulted from further reducing the discount to NAV, from the stock trading at a premium to NAV, as it had done at points in the past, or even from increasing the NAV. We have advanced evidence showing that there are good reasons to believe that by adopting the measures the Claimant proposed, the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore a straightforward comparison of the actual and the counterfactual. What the shares would have been worth, counterfactual, less what the Claimant actually received, the actual. This is of course the normal damages framework, but it is notably not addressed by any expert on behalf of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction. Now, those gains might have resulted from further reducing the discount to NAV, from the stock trading at a premium to NAV, as it had done at points in the past, or even from increasing the NAV. We have advanced evidence showing that there are good reasons to believe that by adopting the measures the Claimant proposed, the Claimant could have realised at least up to the full	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore a straightforward comparison of the actual and the counterfactual. What the shares would have been worth, counterfactual, less what the Claimant actually received, the actual. This is of course the normal damages framework, but it is notably not addressed by any expert on behalf of the ROK.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction. Now, those gains might have resulted from further reducing the discount to NAV, from the stock trading at a premium to NAV, as it had done at points in the past, or even from increasing the NAV. We have advanced evidence showing that there are good reasons to believe that by adopting the measures the Claimant proposed, the Claimant could have realised at least up to the full undiscounted intrinsic value of its investment in SC&T. But the Claimant accepts that Mr Boulton's analysis supports a claim for damages subject to the $5-15\%$	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore a straightforward comparison of the actual and the counterfactual. What the shares would have been worth, counterfactual, less what the Claimant actually received, the actual. This is of course the normal damages framework, but it is notably not addressed by any expert on behalf of the ROK. So we say that in the counterfactual scenario the merger would not have been approved. This we say is a matter of simple arithmetic.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	plans had gained traction, after a group of minority shareholders demonstrated their negative control to block a predatory transaction. Now, those gains might have resulted from further reducing the discount to NAV, from the stock trading at a premium to NAV, as it had done at points in the past, or even from increasing the NAV. We have advanced evidence showing that there are good reasons to believe that by adopting the measures the Claimant proposed, the Claimant could have realised at least up to the full undiscounted intrinsic value of its investment in SC&T. But the Claimant accepts that Mr Boulton's analysis supports a claim for damages subject to the 5–15% discount and not beyond. Third, as we see on slide 81, the Claimant would also have enjoyed gains on other assets, namely the Cheil short swaps that Professor Dow realised, acknowledged, would have materialised if the merger had	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	counterfactual scenario that the ROK had not breached the Treaty? The framework for calculating damages is therefore a straightforward comparison of the actual and the counterfactual. What the shares would have been worth, counterfactual, less what the Claimant actually received, the actual. This is of course the normal damages framework, but it is notably not addressed by any expert on behalf of the ROK. So we say that in the counterfactual scenario the merger would not have been approved. This we say is a matter of simple arithmetic. We also note the total absence of any evidence, any actual evidence, beyond Professor Dow's inexpert speculations that Samsung had any plan B for achieving the merger beyond the desperate and corrupt scheme it actually deployed to secure the NPS votes. If that had
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1	And in the final weeks before the merger
2	vote, we see on the slide,
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4	He says:
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6	As we see from the evidence referred to on slide 84,
7	
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11	So as against this realtime analysis from Samsung
12	itself , the ROK offered only wholly unsupported
13	assertion, which we see on slide 83.
14	We say, as Professor Milhaupt stated, that it
15	follows axiomatically that SC&T's share price would
16	react immediately in the event of successful opposition
17	to the merger. The risk of the merger being approved
18 10	was already priced into the shares, as we see from the
19 20	excerpt on slide 86. In the semi-strong efficient
20	market that everybody agrees the shares were traded in,
21 22	the fact of the merger being defeated would certainly have been reflected in the share price and it would have
22	been reflected instantaneously.
2.4	It is almost universally accepted that the merger
25	was a predatory transaction that transferred value from
2.5	
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1	SC&T shareholders to Cheil shareholders. That's
2	summarised on slide 87. This was the view not just of
3	Mr Boulton, but also of both parties' experts on the
4	Korean capital markets, Professor Milhaupt and
5	Professor Bae.
6	The only exception was Professor Dow, and we see his
7	position depicted on slide 88, expressing uncredible,
8	incredible , agnosticism concerning the very existence of
9	tunneling as a phenomenon.
10	But, as Mr Boulton persuasively testified, if the
11	SC&T shareholders were 9 trillion Korean Won better off
12	after the merger was rejected, this news would have been
13	instantaneously reflected in the market price.
14	9 trillion Won was half the value of SC&T in the market.
15	So any market reaction to this news can have been
16	expected to be significant .
17	Moreover, in the counterfactual scenario, there
18	would have been a galvanised blocking minority to oppose
19	future such predatory transactions, and indeed this was
20	precisely what Elliott had identified going into the
21	investment.
22	As Mr Smith set out in his uncontested evidence $$
23	I'm referring here to his first witness statement,
24	paragraph 15 —— Elliott was alert at the time it
25	invested in SC&T to the fact that the $\hfill family$ and
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SC&T, and that is what led Elliott to conclude that, notwithstanding some rumours, a merger would only take place on fair terms, as Mr Partasides took you through earlier So the key quantum question really is, therefore, not would the SC&T share price have gone up in the counterfactual scenario, but by how much. And answering that question requires a specific focus on what would have happened to SC&T's share price if the merger had not been approved. On that key quantum question you heard from Professor Dow himself in testimony excerpted on slide 89. His analysis is of no use to you. He doesn't offer you an answer. As you see from the excerpt on slide 90, Mr Boulton's analysis does answer that question. That was the central focus of his second report. Mr Boulton quantifies by how much SC&T's share price would have increased on news of a shareholder vote against the merger, in three steps. So first, he values the investment, being Claimant's shares in SC&T, as of the valuation date, using sum of the parts methodology. Second, in order to determine by how much they were 67 discounted, he compares that to market price. And then finally, he evaluates by how much the shares would have appreciated in value, by how much the discount would have reduced, in the counterfactual scenario

Samsung affiliates held only a minority position in

Taking each step in turn, in terms of valuing the shares on the valuation date, and this is an area where obviously the experts disagree, we say the shares cannot properly be valued at the share price on the valuation date, for two reasons. First, we say so because using the share price on

the valuation date would patently undervalue them, and it would not remove the effects of the ROK's wrongdoing. There was at the time widespread consensus that SC&T shares were undervalued, and there was no real mystery as to why that was, at least in large part.

The market perceived a risk, not a certainty, but a risk that SC&T would be the target of a tunneling merger, and it was pricing that uncertainty into the share price.

In addition, as we now know, for years prior to that date the share price had been the subject of a sustained campaign by Samsung and the **subject** of a sustained share price in order to accomplish the very tunneling merger that ultimately caused the loss at issue here.

1	Indeed, as the evidence that's recalled on slide 91
2	shows, the assertion that the share price was affected
3	by the Samsung campaign is based on things the ROK's
4	courts have either already found or allegations that the
5	ROK is itself currently advancing.
6	On Wednesday you heard Professor Dow suggesting that
7	only impacts on share price due to market manipulation
8	should be taken into account, while those due to
9	tunneling should not. That argument, an excerpt of
10	which is shown on slide 92, is fundamentally
11	misconceived, as we will explain in greater detail in
12	written submissions.
13	But perhaps the biggest problem with it is that the
14	distinction breaks down as soon as one understands that
15	what Professor Dow categorises as market manipulation is
16	the method by which tunneling was achieved in this
17	situation .
18	Market manipulation was used to drive the share
19	price down so that the merger could affect the value
20	transfer . In this way, to extend Professor Dow's
21	analogy, the watch was smashed or at least tampered with
22	so thoroughly by market manipulation so that it had
23	entirely ceased to tell time on any reliable basis.
24	Notably, and importantly, there is absolutely no
25	evidence that the SC&T share price was meaningfully
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1	affected at any point prior to the valuation date by
2	market appreciation of governmental involvement or
3	a breach of the Treaty.
4	Notwithstanding Professor Dow's eagerness to draw
5	the analogy, this case is not RosInvestCo, and the ROK
6	has advanced no evidence to counter the Claimant's
7	contention that, like everybody else in Korea, it was
8	unaware of the concealed collusion between the
9	government and Samsung until the corruption scandal
10	broke in 2016, one year after the merger was
11	consummated.
12	It would also be wrong as a matter of logic and
13	principle to use a distorted share price as the measure
14	of value when entrenching the distorted share price was
15	the very means by which the loss was inflicted. Doing
16	so would only obscure the loss. It would not serve as
17	a reliable measure or method for measuring it.
18	It would be equivalent to measuring the market value
19	of an expropriated business after the government had
20	announced its plan to expropriate. The Treaty tells us
21	that cannot be done, and the same underlying principles
22	should defeat the ROK's preferred methodology here.
23	So if, as we say, you cannot use the actual share
24	price, then you have to use some other method of
25	valuation, and there seems to be no serious dispute that

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1 the proper way to value an entity like SC&T is the sum 2 of the parts methodology that Mr Boulton used. We see 3 that on slide 93, Professor Dow accepting that market 4 price is only a starting point. Despite the oft-repeated label of "subjective" being 5 6 applied to Mr Boulton's modelling choices, no analytical 7 errors have been identified in his sum of the parts 8 valuation and none were raised with him on 9 ${\sf cross-examination}.$ 10 Professor Dow's only criticism of Mr Boulton's analysis is that the residual holding company discount 11 12 that he applies is too low, an issue that does not go to 13 the integrity of the sum of the parts valuation itself . 14 Indeed, as you can see on slide 94, Mr Boulton has 15 adopted a number of conservative assumptions in his 16 analysis . In the interests of time, $\mathsf{I}'\mathsf{m}$ not going to go 17 through all of them, but I' II leave those with you for 18 your further review. 19 And of course, and fundamentally, the ROK offers no 20 alternative valuation of SC&T itself. Certainly 21 Professor Dow's musings on Wednesday about possible 2.2 alternative valuation methods that the tribunal might 23 wish to consider undertaking shouldn't be taken 24 seriously, given that he didn't actually do any of that 25 analysis himself.

71

1	Instead, Professor Dow's approach is the deeply
2	unsatisfactory one of identifying the question that
3	needs to be answered, what is the quantification of
4	Claimant's loss, and simply saying that it's too hard,
5	so the answer should be zero.
6	With respect, that answer simply abdicates the task
7	that Professor Dow should have performed. His approach
8	is of absolutely no assistance to the tribunal, who is
9	faced with the task of quantifying damages. And it's
10	a particularly unattractive approach to the issue of
11	quantification of damages in a case in which, in my
12	respectful submission, there can be no serious question
13	as to whether a loss has been suffered.
14	So when it comes to working out what Claimant's SC&T
15	shares would have been worth in the counterfactual
16	scenario, the analysis here is notably simpler than the
17	typical counterfactual scenarios that the tribunal might
18	be used to considering.
19	It is a single metric: what would the price of the
20	share of a single company be? We have observable data
21	about the price of the share of the company into which
22	SC&T was merged that we can analyse to give us
23	information about how the counterfactual scenario would
24	play out. And we are dealing with predicting prices
25	over a very short time frame, instantaneously, so there

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1 is no difficulty over discounting. 2 Whether Professor Dow wanted to admit it or not, we 3 are dealing with information that plainly was and would 4 have been incorporated into price. The risk of the 5 merger was affecting price. So the certainty of no merger undoubtedly would have done so. 6 7 There can be no credible debate concerning the 8 directional impact on price. No merger was only good 9 news for SC&T shareholders. 10 Indeed, as the tribunal will recall by reference to 11

the evidence that's shown on slide 95, the NPS research team itself concluded contemporaneously that

Professor Dow's sarcastic attempts to downplay the significance of this contemporaneous analysis by the ROK's own pension experts should be ignored. The fact is that it was deemed sufficiently important to be censored by Mr , head of the NPS research team. Further, the analysis by the Seoul High Court in the appraisal price litigation shows that the NPS research team was not alone in its views. The court referred to contemporaneous analysis from Hanhwa Investment that

24 concluded that if the merger were to fail, the potential 25 upturn in the share price will reach 40%.

73

1 So the direction of travel is clear. It's also clear that the impact would have been 2 3 rapid and significant. As you can see on slide 96, 4 Mr Boulton noted in his oral evidence that even though 5 he does not agree with the conclusions of 6 Professor Dow's event study, he agreed that it shows the 7 market -- and I'm quoting -- "is responding fast to 8 signals about whether the merger is likely to go 9 through" 10 Specifically, Mr Boulton noted that if something that merely moves the dial of the likelihood of the 11

12 merger caused a 10% change in the market, as many of the 13 events in Professor Dow's event study did, he said then that absolute news, the merger has not gone through, is 14 15 going to have a more significant effect.

16 The contemporaneous note by Samsung Securities 17 excerpted on slide 97 recognised the same swift and 18 significant impact that was caused by news that simply 19 made the merger more likely, more or less likely 2.0 Samsung Securities noted on 10 June 2015, with 21 2.2 23 and it further remarked that

74

1 So what remains for the tribunal to decide is the 2 amplitude: how high would the price go. Mr Boulton 3 presents the tribunal with a precise figure based on 4 robust analysis. As we see on slide 98, Professor Dow 5 simply refused to engage. Mr Boulton quantifies the Claimant's damages in four 6 7 steps. 8 First, he calculates the sum of the parts value of 9 SC&T. 10 Second, he subtracts a holding company discount for 11 SC&T of 5% or 15%. Why 5 or 15%? This derives from 12 Mr Boulton's merged entity analysis, and this is 13 illustrated on slide 99. 14 Now, the merged entity analysis is an analytical 15 method of separating the discount attributable to fears 16 of a predatory merger from other factors. It comprises, 17 first, combining the depressed listed price of SC&T and 18 the inflated listed price of Cheil to calculate a merged 19 entity listed price, and this has the effect analytically of removing the effect on price of fears of 2.0 21 the predatory merger, because the two cancel each other 22 out 23

Mr Boulton then combines his sum of the parts 24 valuations for SC&T and Cheil, and subtracts the sum from the merged entity listed price.

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1	The result is the holding company discount with
2	concerns about the predatory merger removed.
3	On 25 May 2015, one day prior to the merger
4	announcement, and 1 September 2015, which was the day
5	the merger was completed, Mr Boulton observes that
6	discount was approximately 5%. Within 30 days before
7	and after that range, so moving out 30 days from either
8	side of that range, the highest observed discounts in
9	that period were approximately 13.9%, and that is where
10	Mr Boulton derived the conservatively calculated $5{-}15\%$
11	range for SC&T's holding company discount in the
12	counterfactual scenario.
13	He then subtracts this discount from the sum of the
14	parts value of SC&T to identify SC&T's adjusted
15	intrinsic value, and he subtracts from this intrinsic
16	value of SC&T's shares the amounts that EALP has
17	received, the actual, to derive the damages calculation.
18	Professor Dow's focus on Wednesday appeared to be to
19	argue that the residual discount that Mr Boulton
20	calculated was too low. Now, we'll have to address a
21	number of Professor Dow's arguments in written
22	submission, but perhaps the most egregious of the
23	arguments we heard from him involved his use of the
24	trading plans prepared by Elliott as a basis for
25	imputing to the Claimant a view on the holding company

1	discount for SC&T, and I do want to take just one minute
2	to address that today.
3	The effort to equate those trading plans with an
4	assessment by Elliott of the expected long-term holding
5	company discount is completely baseless.
6	First, Mr Smith testified that the unwind plan did
7	not reflect an intended sales strategy at all .
8	Moreover, as Mr Smith testified in his witness
9	statements and repeatedly confirmed in
10	cross—examination, "The trading plans entirely ceased to
11	be relevant whenever we adopted a more active approach
12	to an investment". That's his third witness statement
13	at paragraph 18. And Elliott did that in relation to
14	this investment after March 2015.
15	What's more, Professor Dow did not address in
16	Figure 7 of his second report, which we addressed with
17	him in re—examination on Wednesday, what Mr Smith
18	actually said about what Elliott actually knew about
19	SC&T's long-term discount, and we see this on our final
20	slide , slide 100, that in the more than seven-year
21	period from July 2007 to November 2014, SC&T's discount
22	to NAV, SC&T traded at an average of an approximately
23	16% discount to intrinsic value. That's exhibit C -395
24	{C/395/1}.
25	Professor Dow just ignored that, presumably because
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1	that degree of historical cross—check actually bears out

-	that degree of instoned cross check detailing bears out
2	Mr Boulton's range, and Mr Smith's further evidence,
3	which was completely untested in cross-examination, and
4	I'm quoting here from paragraph 23 of his third witness
5	statement, that:
6	"Defeating the merger would have gone a significant
7	way towards narrowing the discount to NAV of SC&T
8	shares. I expected that the discount would have reduced
9	to 10% or less."
10	In the light of all the evidence and the experts'
11	analysis, and to conclude, the Claimant contends that
12	instantaneously upon rejection of the merger, SC&T's
13	share price can be expected to have incorporated the
14	information that the specific risk of the merger had
15	been averted. The share price would have risen
16	accordingly.
17	Mr Boulton's analysis should give the tribunal
18	confidence that this would be to within $5{-}15\%$ of full
19	intrinsic value, meaning damages of between \$379,270,999

and \$486,314,418.

- It will be for the tribunal to judge where within
- that range to set an award of damages, and this is
- a point that we'll develop more in our written
- submissions. But in circumstances where the 5% discount is supported by the evidence of the merged entities

1	discount closest in time to the date on which in the
2	counterfactual scenario the market would have impounded
3	the information that the merger had been rejected, there
4	are clear grounds for considering that an award towards
5	the top of that range is warranted here.
6	With that, I will conclude our closing submissions.
7	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Ms Snodgrass.
8	MR THOMAS: Ms Snodgrass, I'm just going to go back to
9	around page 67 of the [draft] transcript .
10	I'm sorry, mine is moving a little slowly.
11	Okay. It's starting at line 22.
12	MS SNODGRASS: Yes.
13	MR THOMAS: You said:
14	" as we now know for years prior to that date the
15	share price had been the subject of a sustained campaign
16	by Samsung and the family to depress the share
17	price "
18	{Day9/68:18}
19	What do you say $$ can you tell the tribunal what
20	that period of time is?
21	MS SNODGRASS: You're testing my recollection here.
22	I believe the evidence shows that beginning with the
23	listing of SDS and then the listing of Cheil, the entire
24	succession scheme began with a proposal to line up all
25	of the Samsung subsidiaries to move towards eventually
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1	listing of Everland, Cheil, and prepare the merger so

listing of Everland, Cheil, and prepare the merger so
that Cheil would be in position to be the merger
vehicle, and its share price would be in the right
state, ie at a premium, and then $SC\&T$'s share price
would be at a depressed state.
So this $$ could someone give me the date of the SDS
listing? November 2014 is the SDS listing.
MR THOMAS: Okay. That's when I thought that listing took
place. But you said for years, for a period of years.
MS SNODGRASS: That is a mis-statement by me then. I stand
corrected. November 2014.
MR THOMAS: Okay, because I'm trying to understand your

- point about the impact of the campaign on the suppression of the price, and you're saying now that
- it's November of 2014?
- MS SNODGRASS: Indeed.

- MR THOMAS: Not any time ---
- MS SNODGRASS: November 2014 was the Cheil listing. So
- that's a mis-statement by me.
- MR THOMAS: Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that.
- MR GARIBALDI: Ms Snodgrass, I hope that in your submissions
- you're going to address the question of the discount for
- taxes and the fact that the calculations of Mr Boulton
- were $\ensuremath{\mathsf{pre-tax}}$ and also, something that I'm interested in
- particularly , which is the effects , if any, of the

- 1 announcement of the vote of NPS in favour of the merger 2 which took place a few days before the actual vote. 3 MS SNODGRASS: Yes, we will address those in written 4 submissions MR PARTASIDES: Mr Garibaldi, if I can address you briefly 5 on the second of those two questions, and let's just 6 7 remind ourselves of the timing. 8 The Investment Committee meeting took place on 9 10 July, a Friday. The Experts Voting Committee meeting 10 we've heard so much about took place on 14 July, 11 a Tuesday. The extraordinary general meeting of 12 shareholders of SC&T took place on 17 July, the 13 following Friday. 14 There were rumours following the Investment 15 Committee meeting on 10 July that the Investment 16 Committee had taken the decision. Those rumours were 17 circulating from 11 July, but there were no rumours as 18 to the outcome of the decision before 17 July. We're 19 not aware of any evidence that it was known what the 2.0 Investment Committee's decision was before the EGM on
- 21 17 July So we see no effect between 11 July, the Monday, and 22 23 17 July, the EGM, to the share price resulting from the
- 24 rumour only of the Investment Committee taking the
 - decision, rather than the Experts Voting Committee.

81

1	But we can set that out in more detail in our
2	written closing submission.
3	MR GARIBALDI: I hope you do. So it follows from what you
4	have just said that the communication of the result of
5	the vote of the Investment Committee was a communication
6	only to Samsung and to the Blue House and all that. But
7	it didn't go to the market at large; is that right?
8	MR PARTASIDES: Yes. There was no public communication.
9	There were rumours in the market, and indeed the key
10	piece of information that would have made it on to the
11	market, but didn't until after the 17th, was the
12	Experts Voting Committee statement that, as we heard,
13	was delayed until after the vote.
14	MR GARIBALDI: Thank you very much.
15	MR THOMAS: Just to follow up that, this is an important
16	issue, Mr Partasides.
17	Just to clarify also, on your analysis of the
18	evidence, there's no evidence as to the opinion of the
19	chairman of the Experts Voting Committee, on record,
20	that occurred during that one-week period between the
21	vote of the Investment Committee and the extraordinary
22	general meeting?
23	MR PARTASIDES: That's right, Mr Thomas. There was no
24	public knowledge of the dismay that was ultimately

- public knowledge of the dismay that was ultimately 24 25
- reflected in a toned-down press release that was made

82

1 after the extraordinary general meeting. 2 MR THOMAS: Thank you. 3 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. We break for an hour for lunch and we will resume at 4 1.05. Thank you very much. 5 (12.07 pm) 6 7 (The short adjournment) 8 (1.00 pm) THE PRESIDENT: Welcome back. I understand -- it looks like 9 10 at least everybody is ready to resume. So we don't need 11 to necessarily wait for a few minutes to start. 12 We are good to go. So, Mr Turner. 13 Respondent's closing submissions 14 Submissions by MR TURNER MR TURNER: Thank you, sir, good afternoon. 15 16 Let me begin by echoing my learned friend's comments 17 at the beginning of his closing speech this morning, 18 thanking the arbitrators for their attention over the 19 last fortnight. It's been a long haul, and I share my 20 learned friend's thoughts as to the spirit of 21 collegiality with which this hearing has been conducted. 22 Can I begin by asking -- which I hadn't intended to 23 do, but which is prompted by Mr Thomas' question at the 24 end of the Claimant's submissions this morning, asking 25 the Opus operator to put a page of the Claimant's Reply

83

1	on the screen, please. It is Opus reference $\{B/6/117\}$.
2	This relates to the question that was asked of my
3	learned friend Ms Snodgrass by Mr Thomas and which was
4	in the end answered by Mr Partasides.
5	This is an extract from my learned friend's Reply
6	$\{{\sf B}/{\sf 6}/{ m 117}\}$ at paragraph 147, and I'll go through the
7	first two pages quickly.
8	This is the discussion in the Reply of the famous
9	meeting of the Investment Committee of the NPS on
10	10 July 2015, and a number of allegations are made about
11	it on page 117.
12	If you go over the page to page 118 $\{B/6/118\}$,
13	paragraph (e), my learned friend says:
14	"It is also apparent that the outcome of the
15	Investment Committee meeting was leaked to the media by
16	the NPS's CIO and Chairman , as recorded in
17	text messages"
18	Etc.
19	Then on page 119 $\{B/6/119\}$ he sets out a table, and
20	then in paragraph (f) he notes that:
21	" the day after the NPS's Merger decision, the
22	Korean press reported that the NPS Investment Committee
23	had decided that the NPS would vote in favour of the
24	Merger."
25	The footnote reference is to my Statement of Defence

1	and also exhibit R–131, and if we can put $\{R/131/1\}$ on
2	the screen, this is a press release posted $$ you can
3	see under the picture $$ on 11 July 2015. That's the
4	Saturday after the Friday on which the decision was
5	made, which also answers the question that was put to
6	Professor Dow as to when that decision was known.
7	The press release says, and we need only look at the
8	first paragraph, although the fourth is also
9	interesting :
10	"It is reported that the National Pension
11	Service \dots the largest shareholder of Samsung C&T, has
12	decided to vote yes to the merger between Samsung C&T
13	and Cheil Industries ."
14	So that is the answer to your question to
15	Mr Partasides that I wanted to begin with.
16	Sir, as I say, we have been here for the last
17	fortnight and the question is what we have learned.
18	The Claimant has taken the decision, which is
19	perfectly proper and legitimate, I'm not at all seeking
20	to suggest otherwise, to present the tribunal today with
21	a summary of its case.
22	We have made the decision to deal with highlights of
23	the evidence as it has unfurled before you over the last
24	two weeks, and we will not be repeating our opening
25	submissions. Where therefore we do not deal with
	85

85

1 certain subjects, and one that was dealt with at length 2 and in respect of which a number of corrections as to 3 what is agreed and not agreed will have to be made in 4 writing, being attribution, it is not that we are -- no 5 inference is to be drawn from our not dealing with 6 topics such as that this afternoon, as to how we situate 7 that in our case. 8 We will deal with all of that in our written closing 9 submissions in due course. 10 So what is the big issue that we have heard over the 11 last fortnight that has changed the shape of this case? 12 And the answer is, in one word: swaps. 13 We have learned that there was one transaction with 14 two parts. Elliott made an investment in SC&T and it 15 also made an investment, not in the technical sense of 16 the Treaty, but in economic terms, in Cheil through the 17 swaps that have been the subject of discussion with the 18 arbitral tribunal and also were covered with the quantum 19 experts on Tuesday and Wednesday. 20 It is important to recognise, and I' II come on to

21 this in more detail, that this was indeed one 22 transaction, part of which, the Cheil part, was withheld 23 from the arbitral tribunal, from us, and indeed, as we 24 saw, from Mr Boulton.

25 We say this is the beginning and the end of the

86

1	case. The Claimant made no loss at all. Indeed,
2	overall it made a trading profit.
3	Sir, in introducing our closing submissions this
4	afternoon, I would like to repeat one point from our
5	opening submissions, which has also cropped up once or
6	twice over the last fortnight, and that is the Republic
7	of Korea's position so far as the ongoing and completed
8	legal proceedings, both criminal and civil, are
9	concerned. That is that the Republic of Korea is
10	a state governed by the rule of law. The Republic of
11	Korea in no way seeks to resile from the decisions of
12	its courts. We ask the arbitral tribunal to look at
13	those decisions, whether they are of the criminal courts
14	or of civil courts, in the context in which they were
15	rendered and for the purposes for which they were
16	rendered, and we ask the tribunal to look at the claim
17	that is defended by the Republic of Korea in the light
18	of the Treaty.
19	It is a claim under the Treaty, and the Claimant
20	needs to meet all of the requirements of the Treaty. In
21	so doing, we do not seek in any way, I repeat, to resile
22	from the decisions of the Korean courts, which must
23	though be seen in their context in the Korean legal
24	system.
25	Sir, before I hand over to my learned friend

87

1	Mr Lingard, who will deal with questions of liability ,
2	let me also raise one other introductory point. That
3	is $$ and we heard a lot about it from my learned friend
4	Mr Partasides this morning $$ the Claimant's assumption
5	of risk.
6	This cannot be simply dismissed with a wave of the
7	hand. It is clear that when the Claimant bought the
8	7.7 million – odd shares between January and the end of
9	May 2015 $$ that is to say before the announcement of
10	the merger and the setting of the merger ratio $$ it
11	knew of the regulatory environment in the Republic of
12	Korea. It knew how merger ratios were to be set. It
13	knew of the prospect of a merger in order to $\ensuremath{re-organise}$
14	the Samsung Group, as had been widely discussed as
15	Mr Smith was taken to by Mr Lingard in
16	cross-examination. It knew that there was a risk of
17	what has been called tunneling $$ which we understand,
18	by the way, to be a term that comes from ultimately the
19	Czech Republic, but Eastern Europe more widely after the
20	fall of the Berlin Wall to describe the risk of
21	shareholders taking assets from companies, and which has
22	been widely debated as a known and current phenomenon in
23	the Korean market.
24	Not only did they know that that was a risk, which
25	gives rise to the Korea discount itself , but they also

92

1	knew that the price at which they were buying was	1	If we turn then to slide 3 in our deck, we see in
2	necessarily affected by those risks .	2	further questioning from Mr Garibaldi that Professor CK
3	As Professor Dow shows in his first report at	3	Lee quickly resiled from his published view, saying he
4	table 4 at page 52, Elliott made a profit on those	4	had gotten it wrong. We can see his answer at line 22
5	7.7 million shares.	5	on the slide:
6	Furthermore, after the merger announcement, Elliott	6	"Now that you have posed that question,
7	bought 3.4 million—odd further shares. The price	7	I realise [I] was not correct."
8	between the merger announcement and a week or so later	8	We would simply urge the members of the tribunal to
9	of SC&T shares went up, as we discussed with Mr Boulton	9	accept the consequences of Professor CK Lee's written
10	by 38%. Rather than taking advantage of that increase	10	opinion, not the one he offered on the fly on
11	in price, in the light of its own trading plans, the	11	examination in this hearing. We say it follows that the
12	Claimant bought 3.4 million—odd further shares.	12	NPS must not found to be an organ of the Korean State.
13	Sir, with that introduction, I pass the floor to my	13	That's all I propose to say for now on the subject
14	partner, Mr Lingard, who will deal with questions of	14	of preliminary objections. Once again, we will return
15	liability .	15	to those and other aspects of the Republic's defence in
16	Submissions by MR LINGARD	16	writing in due course.
17	MR LINGARD: Mr President, members of the tribunal, good	17	I turn then to the question of liability and key
18	afternoon.	18	developments in the facts as they've emerged over the
19	I'm going to continue the theme Mr Turner has begun,	19	past two weeks that go to the case for breach advanced
20	and that is to focus only on highlights of the evidence	20	against us.
21	as they've emerged over the past two weeks, and I begin,	21	The tribunal will of course recall that the alleged
22	before turning squarely to questions of liability , with	22	breaches are two. There is first an allegation that the
23	just one point on the Republic's preliminary objections.	23	Republic breached the minimum standard of treatment, and
24	The tribunal will of course be aware that we	24	second, an allegation that the Republic breached the
25	maintain all of those objections and will say more about	25	guarantee of national treatment. We've heard nothing
	89		91
1	them in our written closings in due course, but one	1	from the Claimant about the latter of those allegations
2	point to highlight now from the testimony over the past	2	in this hearing. We say it is not a serious allegation
3	weeks.	3	and so my focus this afternoon will be on the allegation
4	It's this, and it begins in slide 2 in our deck, to	4	of breach of the minimum standard.
5	which I'd invite the members of the tribunal now to	5	As Mr Turner did, I begin in that context with the
6	turn.	6	question of assumption of risk.
7	It arises from the testimony of the Claimant's	7	If we turn to slide 4, we see on the left of that
8	administrative law expert, Professor CK Lee. The	8	slide an example of a proposition that repeatedly has
9	tribunal will of course recall Professor CK Lee telling	9	been put by the Claimant in these proceedings. It's
10	us all that he was the only expert there was on the	10	that it bought shares in SC&T on the basis that the
11	subject of the interrelationship of the NPS and the	11	shareholder vote approving the merger was, and these are
12	National Pension Fund and their respective positions in	12	the words from the Claimant's opening in these
13	the Korean administrative structure.	13	proceedings, "extremely unlikely". You see that in the
14	The starting premise in his cross-examination was an	14	final highlighted extract on the left of this slide 4.
15		1 -	
	uncontroversial one. It's on the left – hand side of	15	Again, from the Claimant's opening.
16	uncontroversial one. It's on the left—hand side of slide 2. That is that one organ of the state can	16	Again, from the Claimant's opening. That proposition, that the shareholder vote going in
16 17	slide 2. That is that one organ of the state can obviously not sue another organ of the state.	16 17	
16 17 18	slide 2. That is that one organ of the state can obviously not sue another organ of the state. But in support of his written opinion in this case	16 17 18	That proposition, that the shareholder vote going in
16 17 18 19	slide 2. That is that one organ of the state can obviously not sue another organ of the state.	16 17 18 19	That proposition, that the shareholder vote going in favour of the merger was extremely unlikely, as the
16 17 18 19 20	slide 2. That is that one organ of the state can obviously not sue another organ of the state. But in support of his written opinion in this case before this tribunal that the NPS was in fact an organ of the state, he cited only one of his published works	16 17 18 19 20	That proposition, that the shareholder vote going in favour of the merger was extremely unlikely, as the Claimant would have it, is simply not borne out in the contemporaneous evidence. I invite you to compare that proposition put by the
16 17 18 19 20 21	slide 2. That is that one organ of the state can obviously not sue another organ of the state. But in support of his written opinion in this case before this tribunal that the NPS was in fact an organ of the state, he cited only one of his published works in support, and he was taken to that published work, and	16 17 18 19 20 21	That proposition, that the shareholder vote going in favour of the merger was extremely unlikely, as the Claimant would have it, is simply not borne out in the contemporaneous evidence.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	slide 2. That is that one organ of the state can obviously not sue another organ of the state. But in support of his written opinion in this case before this tribunal that the NPS was in fact an organ of the state, he cited only one of his published works in support, and he was taken to that published work, and that published work said quite the opposite. That	16 17 18 19 20 21 22	That proposition, that the shareholder vote going in favour of the merger was extremely unlikely, as the Claimant would have it, is simply not borne out in the contemporaneous evidence. I invite you to compare that proposition put by the Claimant to the contemporaneous advice it received from Spectrum Asia, which we have extracted on slide 4.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	slide 2. That is that one organ of the state can obviously not sue another organ of the state. But in support of his written opinion in this case before this tribunal that the NPS was in fact an organ of the state, he cited only one of his published works in support, and he was taken to that published work, and that published work said quite the opposite. That published work said, and we see it on the right—hand	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	That proposition, that the shareholder vote going in favour of the merger was extremely unlikely, as the Claimant would have it, is simply not borne out in the contemporaneous evidence. I invite you to compare that proposition put by the Claimant to the contemporaneous advice it received from Spectrum Asia, which we have extracted on slide 4. Again, it's exhibit R-255. {R/255/1}.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	slide 2. That is that one organ of the state can obviously not sue another organ of the state. But in support of his written opinion in this case before this tribunal that the NPS was in fact an organ of the state, he cited only one of his published works in support, and he was taken to that published work, and that published work said quite the opposite. That	16 17 18 19 20 21 22	That proposition, that the shareholder vote going in favour of the merger was extremely unlikely, as the Claimant would have it, is simply not borne out in the contemporaneous evidence. I invite you to compare that proposition put by the Claimant to the contemporaneous advice it received from Spectrum Asia, which we have extracted on slide 4.

90

Opus 2

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1 second, that there was no reason to believe the NPS

- 2 would oppose the merger. That goes squarely to the
- 3 question of the shareholder vote. We can see the second
- 4 extract from Spectrum Asia on slide 4:
- 5 "So far, the NPS's stake has not upended the complex 6 web of cross-shareholdings..."
- 7 And Spectrum continues in its contemporaneous advice8 to the Claimant:
- 9 "... there is no evidence that it intends to."
 - More specifically, we learned from Mr Smith in
- 11 cross-examination that the merger, this merger, the 12 merger that is impugned before this international
- 13 tribunal, had all along been part of the Claimant's
- 14 modelling. If we turn to slide 5, we see an example of
- 15 that. You can see Mr Smith accepting in the extract on
- 16 the left that a merger involving C&T and Cheil was part 17 of his own proposals and plans.
- of his own proposals and plans.
 He then concludes with a qualification that, as
 counsel opposite this morning rightly said, Mr Smith
- 20 made repeatedly throughout his examination, and that is
- 21 that any such merger would be on what Mr Smith called 22 fair terms. We see that at the bottom of the extract on
- the left of slide 5.It is not entirely clear what Mr Smith meant by
- 25 fairness. It may have been Elliott's own unilateral

93

- 1 conception of fairness. It may have been a merger derived from a merger ratio based on Elliott's 2 3 calculation of the net asset value of the companies. 4 And to be fair to Mr Smith, there was a suggestion of 5 that in his examination at Day 3 of the transcript at page 86, lines 13 to 18 {Day3/86:13-18}. Of course 6 7 there is no such provision in Korean law, nor had there 8 been at any relevant time, for a merger to be concluded 9 based on net asset values.
- 10More generally, let me make three observations in11response to the testimony we heard from Mr Smith about12the merger being on his construction of fair terms.
- The first observation is this. Elliott knew, as
 indeed any investor in South Korea would know, that the
 merger ratio was to be fixed based on market prices.
 That's made clear in the Enforcement Decree to the
 Capital Markets Act which is in the record at exhibit
 R-25 {R/25/1}.

19	The members of the tribunal may recall the letter
20	I showed in our opening slide deck, a letter written by
21	Elliott to SC&T, less than a week after its first
22	purchase of shares. It's a letter dated February 4,
23	2015. It's in the record as exhibit C–11 {C/11/1},
24	a letter in which Elliott rightly referred to the market
25	price—based merger ratio as being mandatorily

94

1 applicable. "Mandatorily applicable" were the words 2 Elliott used, and they were right. 3 That mandatorily applicable merger ratio derived 4 exclusively from market prices may be a good law or it may be a bad law. You heard Professor Dow's testimony 5 that in his economic view it is in fact a good law 6 7 designed to protect shareholders. He said that at 8 {Day8/36:15}. 9 But frankly, the characterisation of the law is 10 wholly beside the point. It was the law, it was the law 11 on which any public company merger was to be conducted, 12 and Elliott knew it. There is not, and nor could there 13 be, any claim against the Republic impugning that law. 14 The second observation is this. Elliott knew, as 15 any sophisticated investor in Korea would have known, 16 that the timing of a public company merger was wholly in 17 the discretion of the merging companies. The managers 18 of those companies could propose the merger at any time. 19 It follows that any unfavourable merger ratio, as 20 determined from the perspective of the shareholders of 21 one of those companies, could be the result of what 22 we've come to know as tunneling. It could be the result 23 of tunneling properly so-called. That is the ordinary 24 preference of a controlling family or controlling 25 shareholder, to direct contracts to one company rather

95

than the other

1	than the other.
2	If that resulted in an unfavourable merger ratio, it
3	would result from the timing of the merger's proposal,
4	and that timing was, as the Claimant knew, wholly in the
5	control of the companies.
6	The third observation is this. Elliott also knew,
7	as any sophisticated investor in South Korea would know,
8	that the two factors ${\sf I}$ have just spoken to inexorably
9	led to the conclusion that a merger ratio may not be in
10	the best interests of the shareholders of one of the
11	companies.
12	Recall on the right—hand side of slide 5 that
13	Spectrum's advice to Elliott was similarly unambiguous
14	on this point. See the second highlighted extract on
15	the right of slide 5; C&T shareholders may not
16	necessarily benefit from the merger.
17	Before I leave Spectrum Asia, let me note briefly on
18	slide 6 that there can be no doubt but that the Claimant
19	relied on Spectrum Asia in connection with this
20	investment, as indeed it had evidently on frequent
21	occasions with respect to other investments.
22	The Claimant also evidently knew of the particular
23	transaction structure that came to characterise this
24	merger. We see that as we turn then to slide 7.
25	$Mr\xspace$ Smith confirms on cross–examination that he knew that

1	Cheil, the company that was previously called Samsung
2	Everland, was likely to become the ultimate holding
3	company.
4	Note that he confirms he knew that in April 2014,
5	some eight months before the Claimant's first purchase
6	of shares in SC&T.
7	We've heard, as I have already said, a lot of
8	discussion over the past two weeks of tunneling, and
9	Mr Turner will return to discuss the consequences of
10	that concept for the prices of shares traded on the
11	Korean Exchange. I want for now to make a different
12	point. It's this, and it's on slide 8.
13	The Claimant's expert, Professor Milhaupt, confirmed
14	that any sophisticated investor in Korea, logically
15	enough, would be aware of that risk, that risk of
16	tunneling.
17	I also want to be clear that our assumption of risk
18	arguments apply to the entirety of the Claimant's
19	shareholding, to all 11.1 million shares. Professor Dow
20	was asked on examination about a smaller portion of
21	those shares. That is the 3.4 million shares that were
22	bought after the formal announcement of the merger. He
23	was cross—examined on his testimony in the RosInvest
24	case.
25	The tenor of those questions was that the merger was
	97
	77
1	not certain at the time the Claimant bought those
2	3.4 million shares. There had been an announcement but
3	not yet a shareholder vote, and of course that is

1	not certain at the time the Claimant bought those
2	3.4 million shares. There had been an announcement but
3	not yet a shareholder vote, and of course that is
4	factually true.
5	But it is, we say, not at all how risk is to be
6	understood. Risk is risk. Risk is not certainty.
7	An investor makes a bet and it may win or lose that bet.
8	That is precisely, we say, risk, risk that the Claimant
9	here assumed, and that is most acutely true with respect
10	to the 3.4 million shares bought after the merger
11	announcement, but the argument holds, we say, also with
12	force, with respect to the 7.7 million shares bought
13	before the formal announcement of the merger.
14	Recall once again the advice to the Claimant from
15	Spectrum Asia. That was dated March 19, 2015, from the
16	very earliest days of the Claimant's share purchases in
17	SC&T.
18	Now, we've heard the Claimant seek to draw
19	a distinction between the assumption of commercial risk
20	on the one hand, and government risk on the other,
21	and I need at least briefly to respond to that.
22	Our argument here does not for a moment go to the
23	question of wrongfulness or international illegality ,
24	but rather the assumption of the risk that the
25	government might support the merger.

98

1	If we go ahead to slide 10, we can see the
2	Claimant's own realisation of that very fact, again,
3	from the earliest days of its acquisition of shares in
4	SC&T.
5	This internal Elliott research note, dated
6	February 18, 2015 $$ it's exhibit R -252 {R $/252/1$ } $$
7	describing the importance of Samsung to the Korean
8	economy, and the possibility that Samsung would lobby
9	the government for approval and support and $$ and I'm
10	quoting:
11	" we suspect Gov support may not be withheld
12	given Samsung's size and status."
13	Let me turn now from the question of assumption of
14	risk to the Claimant's so-called restructuring plans.
15	And I turn to this subject because it is related to our
16	submissions on assumption of risk, though clearly it
17	also goes to our submissions on damages, to which
18	Mr Turner will come.
19	Mr Smith spoke at some length about these so-called
20	restructuring plans in re-direct examination by counsel
21	opposite. Members of the tribunal will recall the
22	reference in those plans to Elliott 's success, as it
23	characterised it, with the restructuring of a Hong Kong
24	group, there being no reference in those plans whatever

to any success in restructuring any Korean company,

99

1	Chaebol or otherwise.
2	But in any event, it's our submission that those
3	plans represent nothing more than an artifice. They
4	were draft internal ideas. The document to which
5	counsel opposite took Mr Smith on re-direct examination
6	is plainly marked "Draft", and altogether more
7	importantly, as we see on slide 11, it was simply never
8	communicated to the company.
9	Mr Smith testified that he engaged the individual
10	identified in the documents as phillipham63@gmail.com as
11	an intermediary in order to help him pass the plans to
12	Samsung C&T. Mr Smith also accepted on
13	cross—examination that this Mr Ham got no traction in
14	those discussions. See his answer in the top extract on
15	the right of slide 11:
16	"The CEO did not express to Mr Ham that this was
17	something he wanted to discuss with him."
18	And as to the written materials, the materials to
19	which counsel opposite took Mr Smith on re-direct
20	examination, Mr Smith was plain that he had no reason to
21	believe they got beyond his bankers at Goldman Sachs to
22	the company. He says in answer to the question:
23	"You do not know if they went were Goldman Sachs to
24	Samsung C&T?
25	"Answer: I'm not sure. I'm not sure that they went

1	further . "
2	And that, we say, is the end of the matter with
3	respect to the so-called restructuring plans.
4	I turn then to a different subject, and that is the
5	subject of the NPS's own decision-making as to how to
6	vote its shares on this merger.
7	I begin with the Investment Committee.
8	The members of the tribunal will recall our lengthy
9	submissions on opening, walking through the minutes of
10	the Investment Committee meeting on July 10, 2015.
11	Those minutes are at exhibit R -128 , $\{R/128/1\}$ and also
12	the reference we made to a longer, somewhat more
13	detailed, informal note of the meeting, which is in the
14	record at exhibit C-428 {C/428/1}.
15	You have also heard about the importance for the NPS
16	of reviewing its portfolio in an holistic fashion. That
17	is considering its holdings across the entire Samsung
18	Group.
19	That point was confirmed at the level of economic
20	common sense by Professor Bae. I have that on slide 12.
21	This is about the content of the Investment Committee's
22	decision .
23	There is a different question about which we've
24	heard some in submissions from counsel opposite in these
25	proceedings, and it's the counterfactual at the
	101
	101
1	Investment Committee level. That is the question of how
2	the Investment Committee members might have voted absent
3	what is alleged to be fabricated merger synergy
4	calculations by employees of the National Pension
5	Service.
6	You will recall the Claimant's opening slides, the
7	table of how those members of the Investment Committee
8	might have voted in the absence of the allegedly
9	fabricated synergy calculations. Those for the
10	transcript are slides 68 and 134 from the Claimant's
11	opening.
12	You will also recall, and I move now to slide 13,
13	you will also recall how the Claimant characterised that
14	in opening. That is, the Investment Committee members
15	having said themselves how they would have voted.
16	Now, the evidence here is substantial and it is
17	complicated. The limit of my submission today that we
18	will expand in writing is this: it is to respectfully

In opening. That is, the investment committee member
having said themselves how they would have voted.
Now, the evidence here is substantial and it is
complicated. The limit of my submission today that we
will expand in writing is this: it is to respectfully
urge the members of the tribunal to study all of the
evidence as to what the members of the
Investment Committee said as to how they would have
voted, not simple extracts from that evidence.
We sought to complete the evidentiary record, or

23 We sought to complete the evidentiary record, or 24 extracts from that record already before you in the

24 extracts from that record already before you in the 25 demonstrative we provided in our opening submission

demonstrative we provided in our opening submissions.

102

1 That's the Republic's demonstrative C, setting out the 2 full context of precisely what the members of the 3 Investment Committee in fact said, rather than the 4 conclusions drawn by the Claimant. 5 I have been speaking to the Investment Committee. 6 I turn now to a separate question, and this separate 7 question had, at least until the hearing, been, as we 8 understood it, the thrust of the case advanced against 9 its Republic. It's the question of which committee 10 ought to have made the decision, whether it be the 11 Investment Committee or the Special Committee. 12 As I turn to that question. I begin, as we say we 13 must, with the text of the Voting Guidelines, and that's 14 on slide 14 of our deck 15 The central provision here is Article 8, sub 2, of 16 the Voting Guidelines, and that is set out at the top of 17 slide 14. 18 It provides that if the Investment Committee finds 19 a matter difficult , that's the word used, it may, and 20 again that is the word used, "may", request a decision 21 from the Special Committee. 22 Now, I'm reluctant to say this, $\,$ I say it with some 23 trepidation, but it is our understanding that it is 24 accepted that there must first be a finding of 25 difficulty . It seems to us that is the natural 103

1 consequence of at least the testimony of the Claimant's 2 expert Professor CK Lee, and I turn to that on slide 15. 3 It seems to us that Professor CK Lee could not quite 4 bring himself to say it, but there is only one thing to 5 be drawn from the contortions one sees extracted on this slide 15. 6 7 Professor CK Lee says that the Investment Committee 8 or, as I understand his testimony, only one member of 9 the Investment Committee, need simply intuit, that's the 10 word he used, need simply "intuit" that a matter is 11 difficult, and that would constitute a finding. 12 As a mechanism, we say that simply makes no sense. 13 As a mechanism for a committee finding, the intuition in 14 Professor CK Lee's construction of a finding of 15 difficulty cannot suffice. But this testimony should 16 suffice to establish that a finding of such difficulty 17 is in fact necessary. 18 If we compare to the process adopted in connection 19 with the SK merger on which the Claimant places such 2.0 emphasis, it is plain from the record that the 21 Investment Committee members there in fact voted, as one 2.2 would expect for a body comprised of more than one 23 individual, voted to find that that matter was 24 difficult , and thus that it ought be referred to the 25 Special Committee. We see that in the minutes at 104.

Let me note briefly before I leave the SK merger,	1	transaction.
let me note by way of a guide to the evidence on this,	2	Now, it's no doubt true that Mr
the testimony from Mr as to reasons why that merger,	3	a straightforwardly honest witness presented by the
the SK merger, ought be considered different from the	4	Republic in these proceedings, there is no doubt that he
merger that concerns us in these proceedings.	5	was angry, as he testified before you, he was angry that
On cross-examination at {Day3/195:11} through	6	this matter was not referred to his committee.
{Day3/196:12}, Mr $\hfill {\rm max}$ testified to the relevance of the	7	That anger, though, we say, tells you nothing at all
treasury shares that were issued in connection with the	8	about what the guidelines require.
SK merger; and in his witness statements, he testified	9	Mr was similarly clear, and I have this set out
in both of his witness statements to the relevance of	10	in slide 17, on cross—examination, that he had not
the judicial imprimatur that had been granted by way of	11	previously engaged with the question of how matters came
civil court proceedings in the SCT-Cheil merger that was	12	to the Special Committee. His testimony was,
not present in the SK merger.	13	and I quote:
That testimony appears at paragraph 21 of his first	14	"Prior to this SC&T merger case, the requirement for
witness statement and paragraph 6 of his second witness	15	any referral to the Special Committee was never handled
statement.	16	or discussed."
Returning though to the process question, the	17	In other words, he saw matters that came to his
finding of difficulty , which is documented in the	18	committee; he did not deal with the question of how
minutes of the Investment Committee meeting on the SK	19	those matters got there.
merger, there is simply no such evidence of a finding by	20	We also heard a lot in the cross—examination of
the Investment Committee here.	21	Mr , and indeed again this morning, about the meeting
What then do we have? We have evidence of sustained	22	convened by the Special Committee to discuss these
deliberation of the merger at the Investment Committee,	23	process questions. On that subject, Mr was clear
and evidence of a clear mechanism decided at that	24	that regardless of what the members of the Special
meeting for finding the matter difficult . It was not	25	Committee may have wished for, that they may have wishe
105		107
a mechanism designed to make it difficult to find the	1	this merger to come to them for decision, Mr was
matter difficult , but rather that there be clarity on	2	clear that his committee had no legal authority at all
the process, and that is the open voting system to which	3	to overturn the decision that had been taken.
I spoke on opening.	4	That testimony is extracted on slide 18. His
We see that set out at pages 14 and 15 of the	5	evidence was unambiguous:
IC minutes in the SCT-Cheil merger at exhibit R-128	6	"We reviewed the relevant regulations and confirmed
{R/128/1}.	7	that there was no basis in the regulations for us to
In the absence of a finding by the	8	overturn the Investment Committee's decision, and to do
Investment Committee of difficulty, we say on a proper	9	so, to overturn the Investment Committee's decision,
analysis of which body ought make the decision, that is	10	would be problematic from a legal standpoint."
the end of the matter. There being no such finding,	11	In that context, and finally on this point for now,
that is the end of the matter.	12	there is a question that was raised again this morning
Mr , on cross—examination, was asked at great	13	about whether the chair of the Special Committee had
length about the potential role of the Special	14	authority to convene a meeting to decide how the NPS
Committee. But over the three and a half hours of his	15	would vote.
cross—examination, he was not asked at all, not once,	16	The members of the tribunal may recall the reference
about his view as to what the Special Committee might	17	made by the Claimant to Article 5, sub 5, sub 6 of the
have done if it had been asked to decide the SCT-Cheil	18	Fund Operational Guidelines. Those are at exhibit $R-99$
merger.	19	$\{R/99/1\}$, providing that the chair of the Special
He did testify to that subject in his two witness	19 20	Committee can call the meeting with respect to "other
	20	matters" that are deemed necessary by the chair of the
statements. I have an extract on slide 16. We know		
that his testimony is that he simply did not believe it	22	Special Committee.
was possible to predict a decision of the Special	23	In short, our submission is that the Claimant wholly
Committee before in fact there had been Special	24	ignores the word "other" this that provision. That
Committee deliberations on the substance of a particular	25	provision follows the standard provision that it is for
106		108

1	the Investment Committee to decide how to vote, but if
2	the Investment Committee decides that the matter is
3	difficult, it may refer to the Special Committee.
4	Thereafter there is the provision that the chair of the
5	Special Committee can convene a meeting for other
6	matters.
7	No suggestion on the text of the guidelines, nor in
8	Mr 's evidence, that the Special Committee
9	unilaterally could usurp the standalone regular power of
10	the Investment Committee to decide how to vote shares.
11	Those then in summary are our short submissions on
12	highlights from the past two weeks on the questions of
13	the facts as they go to liability for the claims
14	advanced against the Republic. With that, I will stop
15	and invite you once again to recognise Mr Turner on the
16	questions of damages. Thank you very much.
17	Further submissions by MR TURNER
18	MR TURNER: And I very much hope you do recognise me, sir,
19	after these ten days of hearing.
20	Sir, I will begin with one or two remarks on the
21	question of causation, picking up on the points that my
22	partner, Mr Lingard, has just taken you to.
23	Let me begin on slide 19 with Professor Dow's
24	presentation of the counterfactual in his view, what he
25	called his but-for scenarios.

1	There is a third scenario that Professor Dow did not
2	include on this. It was a matter that he did not need
3	to deal with, but that is that there remains the
4	possibility that the NPS's vote itself is not what my
5	learned friend has called the casting vote, and this is
6	an example of where you need to look at decisions of
7	courts and people's discussions in the light of how
8	people use language in an imprecise way. Nobody has
9	been called upon to analyse what other shareholders
10	would have done in the light of the NPS's decisions one
11	way or the other.
12	But let us look just at these two decision trees.
13	If the NPS vote was unchanged, then nothing changes. If
14	the NPS had voted against the merger, the merger could
15	either still have been approved or rejected. And it is
16	important for you, the arbitrators , to take all of these
17	possibilities into account in the light of what
18	Mr Lingard has explained, about what the Investment
19	Committee might have done in different circumstances,
20	and the Claimant's burden of proof to show that the bad
21	acts that it complains of, if you find them proved, were
22	the proximate cause of its loss.
23	This comes back to the point that I made both in
2.4	opening and in introducing these closing remarks, about

- \qquad opening and in introducing these closing remarks, about
- the need for you to consider this case and the

1	Claimant's claims in the light of this free trade
2	agreement, and where the Claimant bears the burden of
3	proving causation as well as other matters.
4	There is no certainty that the Investment Committee
5	would have voted to reject the merger without the
6	alleged government interference. There is no certainty,
7	as we have seen, and if we can go to slide 21, somewhat
8	out of sequence. You have seen this slide just now from
9	Mr Lingard's submissions. There is no certainty as to
10	what the Special Committee would have done had the
11	matter been referred to them as being too difficult for
12	the Investment Committee.
13	You have got to know on the appropriate standard
14	what would have happened in order to accept my learned
15	friend 's case on causation.
16	If we go back to slide 20, there is a further matter
17	that was picked up by the Claimant during the course of
18	closing submissions this morning, and that is whether or
19	not the extensive holdings of the NPS, and we saw that
20	they had holdings in no fewer than 17 Samsung companies,
21	could have been a reason for a decision to vote in
22	favour of the merger. We will develop all of these
23	points more fully in writing.
24	But you will see here on slide 20 that Mr Boulton
25	accepted, when I took him to the table that showed the
	111
1	extent of those holdings, that considering the holdings
2	overall would have been an alternative perspective for
3	the NPS to vote in favour of the merger.

3	the NPS to vote in favour of the merger.
4	I refer you, in the light of the comments made by my
5	learned friends this morning, to the minutes of the
6	Investment Committee, especially on page 11. That's
7	R-128 {R/128/12}. A summary of that decision,
8	especially on page 2, at C–428, $\{C/428/2\}$ and the
9	evidence of Mr $$$ at C–500 {C/500/1}. All of
10	those go to show that this was indeed something that the
11	NPS had in mind.
12	Furthermore, the Claimant's damages claim depends on
13	a rejection of the merger leading to, and we saw it
14	again in the Claimant's slides this morning,
15	a skyrocketing of the SC&T share price.
16	Nothing alleged against the Republic of Korea would
17	have, in the absence of those allegations , changed the
18	persistent nature of the Korea discount. And we will
19	come back to that during the course of these submissions
20	this afternoon.
21	I turn from that to the question of swaps, and we

 21
 I turn from that to the question of swaps, and we

 22
 saw this morning a calculation -- I thought I had noted

 23
 the slide, but I clearly haven't -- from my learned

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 friend Ms Snodgrass purporting to show that when the

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 tribunal looks at the transaction in the round -- that

1 is to say the shares in SC&T and the swaps in Cheil and 1 2 the other far lesser swaps in SC&T shares -- that that 2 3 gives rise to a trading loss 3 4 The figures used on that slide are the figures that 4 5 Mr Smith has given as those numbers that were received 5 by Elliott from the settlement with Samsung after paying 6 6 7 tax on that settlement. 7 That is not the Claimant's damages case. The 8 8 9 numbers that the Claimant has put forward on which its 9 10 10 damages claim has been calculated, and which is still 11 advanced, looking at the numbers given at the end of her 11 12 12 submissions by my learned friend. Ms Snodgrass, are the 13 figures that Mr Boulton analyses in his report and which 13 are put forward also by my learned friend in his 14 14 15 submissions of the gross proceeds which one takes from 15 16 16 the gross investment to look at the overall trading 17 loss, which has been the number of 49.5 billion Korean 17 18 Won that the parties have been debating since the 18 19 beginning of this case. 19 2.0 If my learned friend is now changing his damages 20 21 case, then we will have something to say about that in 21 22 due course. 22 23 23 Sir, if you look now -- we go to slide 22. I said 24 earlier this afternoon that the full existence of this 24 25 side of the Claimant's transaction in SC&T and Cheil had 25 113 1 been withheld from us, from you and from Mr Boulton. 1 2 And Mr Boulton was very candid about this when we spoke 2 3 to him on Tuesday. He confirmed that he had not been 3 4 told, indeed his second expert report contains 4 5 a definitive statement to the contrary, that there had 5 6 been a transaction, short swaps involving Cheil. 6 7 7 Mr Boulton did not consider that to be a matter of 8 8 relevance to his damages calculation. We will come on 9 9 to that in due course this afternoon. 10 But if we go to slide 23, it is absolutely apparent 10 11 from Mr Smith's evidence-in-chief -- this is 11 12 paragraph 11 of his fourth witness statement, you will 12 13 13 remember, the witness statement that he prepared at 14 short notice because of the disclosure during the course 14 15 15 of this hearing of the extent of these swaps. He said 16 in the passage that is highlighted in the middle of this 16 17 extract: 17 18 "These short swaps could therefore be expected to 18 19 neutralise any beta-derived changes in value to our long 19 2.0 2.0 position in SC&T shares (so-called 'beta-hedging')."

21He went on:22"Third, in (what we considered at the time) the very23unlikely event that the Merger was approved, the Cheil24swaps would offset some of the downward movement in the25price of SC&T shares that was to be expected following

114

their exchange into overvalued New SC&T shares upon the consummation of the Merger." It is absolutely obvious and apparent from this extract, as well as from any sensible analysis of the underlying documents, that the SC&T share acquisition and the Cheil swap acquisition were two sides of the same transaction. Mr Smith accepted that the overall transaction gave rise to a profit, as we can see from the next slide, slide 24 Now, we disagree with the actual calculation. I refer you to slide 12 of Professor Dow's presentation for the number of 2.5 billion Korean Won that we say was the overall profit on the transaction. Obviously we will develop this in our written submissions. I just note here that no questions were asked of Professor Dow about those calculations that he presented on Wednesday morning at all. But Mr Smith accepts that even on his calculation of the figures arising out of the swaps, there was an overall trading profit for Elliott . We said at paragraph 387 of our Rejoinder that if there was any loss at all to the Claimant, it was its trading loss, calculated, as I have said, on the basis of the numbers that the Claimant had put forward.

115

If that loss is accepted by the tribunal, it has been wholly wiped out by the profit, whether on our or Mr Smith's calculation, on the short swaps Even on that acceptance of loss, there is therefore no right to damages at all because there has been in fact no loss. The Claimant's profits are real and attested. The losses that they claim in this proceeding are not only unreal and certainly unattested, as I shall discuss in a moment; they are an attempt to extract from this arbitral tribunal a litigation windfall that could never have been obtained in reality. With that discussion of swaps, I pass to the quantum of damages, and I note that in closing submissions today the Claimant has abandoned its primary claim, which I showed to Mr Boulton on Tuesday, of damages without any discount to Mr Boulton's sum of the parts or net asset value calculation of the value of SC&T. The claim that is now made before you is that that sum of the parts valuation should be discounted by at 21 least 5% and up to 15%. There is no case now that no 2.2 discount should be applied at all. 23 Sir, what is the standard that this tribunal has to 24

apply in assessing the Claimant's damages claim? The answer that both experts give, and we discussed this at

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some length with Mr Boulton on Tuesday, is fair market
 value.

The question is what fair market value means. On
slide 25 we have Mr Boulton's position as to the role of
the market price in setting fair value, fair market

6 value

7 He believes that the people who believe that the 8 market is everything and that the market price is always 9 right are on the extreme of the idea that the collective 10 wisdom of thousands of investors is to be preferred to 11 anything else. That's Mr Boulton's position as to the 12 relevance of the market price.

 13
 His own authority on slide 26 was put to him during

 14
 cross-examination, and it's extracted on the slide in

 15
 front of you:

16 "Question: ... One often hears statements such as 17 'I couldn't get anywhere near the value of my house if 18 I put it on the market today' or 'The value of XYZ 19 Company stock is really much more (or less) than the 2.0 price it's selling for on the New York Stock Exchange 21 today'. The standard of value contemplated by such 22 statements is some standard other than fair market 23 value ...

24 And Mr Boulton agreed with that. He nonetheless 25 preferred what he called intrinsic value, and one

117

1	definition of several from his own authority is
2	extracted on the next slide, slide 27.
3	It begins, on the right-hand side:
4	"It is a subjective value in the sense that the
5	analyst must apply his own [or her own] individual
6	background and skills to determine it, and estimates of
7	intrinsic value will vary from one analyst to the next."
8	In other words, the market price is objective. The
9	intrinsic value as defined by Mr Boulton is his view or
10	any analyst's view of what a given asset is worth, and
11	all such opinions are different, as Mr Boulton accepted
12	on the next slide:
13	"Question: the fact is that those analysts'
14	reports came up with different net asset values for
15	SC&T, didn't they?
16	"Answer: I'm sure they did. They would have done,
17	yes."
18	Sir, I take a digression here to address a question
19	that Mr Thomas put at $\{Day8/224:15-23\}$ about the
20	difference in the discount observed by Elliott as
21	a result of the listing of Samsung SDS, just to clarify
22	the position.
23	Elliott 's net asset value calculation was based on
24	its subjective analysis of the worth of the investment
25	held by SCRT in Someone SDS Someone SDS was listed and

25 held by SC&T in Samsung SDS. Samsung SDS was listed and

118

1 Elliott removed its subjective valuation of that stock 2 and applied the market price. 3 That caused the net asset value of SC&T, as seen by Elliott , to go up by more than 70%. Elliott interpreted 4 5 that as the discount widening and acted accordingly; whereas in fact, and as Mr Smith acknowledged in 6 7 cross-examination, and indeed Mr Boulton did as well, there had in fact been no widening of the discount 8 9 per se in any objective sense. There was simply 10 a correction of one subjective valuation within the net 11 asset value calculation for an objective valuation, the 12 market price, that changed therefore the overall 13 subjective net asset valuation, and therefore its 14 perceived deviation from the market price. That is an 15 object lesson in the subjectivity of a so-called 16 intrinsic valuation. 17 I remind the tribunal that Elliott had had 18 valuations, including one from Deutsche Bank, that 19 showed, we say, that the fair market value for SC&T was 20 indeed market value. 21 You will recall, as we discussed in opening, that 22 the valuation from Deutsche Bank was withheld on what we 23 say are spurious grounds of confidentiality, and we have

asked the tribunal to draw an adverse inference from that.

119

1 Now. Mr Boulton himself of course, and as he 2 accepted, had to make choices in the net asset value for 3 SC&T that he calculated. We see that on slide 29. 4 Now, Mr Boulton said that we had to draw a line 5 through the market price, but let us look at the 6 elements of the market price that we have to take into 7 consideration. 8 First, it is common ground, and indeed we heard this 9 from the Claimant this morning, that the market price 10 includes the assessment of the risk of the merger or any 11 merger taking place. As Professor Dow explained in his 12 presentation on Wednesday, it is in any event circular 13 because there is a fear of the merger taking place, but 14 as the merger takes place at market price in Korea, it 15 is a circular fear because the market will always then 16 reflect the market price. But in any event, as we see on slide 30, Mr Boulton 17 18 accepts that the market price at which, I remind the 19 tribunal, Elliott bought shares in SC&T, reflects the 2.0 potential for the merger. 21 So that is not a reason for saving it is not fair 2.2 market value. Market participants recognise there is 23 a potential merger, and that will be taken into account 24 in the market price, and of course, as we see on the 25 next slide, 31, Professor Dow agrees.

1	That leaves us, if we look at slide 32, only with
2	allegations of manipulation of the price that could lead
3	us to reject market price as the fair market value, and
4	that is what Mr Boulton is saying on this slide 32:
5	"Providing false information would all be aspects of
6	manipulation. But I wasn't referring to the broader
7	tunneling issues ."
8	Manipulation, as opposed to tunneling, as it has
9	been described, which is the way in which a controlling
10	shareholder can divert value from one company that he
11	controls to another, needs to be serious enough,
12	significant enough, to justify drawing a line through
13	the market price, rather than making a necessary
14	adjustment.
15	First, on slide 33 we can see Professor Dow
16	expounding on his malfunctioning or smashed watch
17	analogy. The question was put to him:
18	"The tribunal should consider the market price only
19	if they could be confident that the process was robust
20	and conflict-free?"
21	He agrees:
22	"This is like my watch. If I think the watch is
23	totally smashed I would have to draw a line through the
24	market price, as Mr Boulton said
25	"So if's completely smashed, if the market price

121

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1	means nothing, I can't trust it."
2	As we see on slide 34, though, in deciding what to
3	consider as to whether the watch is smashed, you have to
4	carefully distinguish between tunneling and
5	manipulation. Mr Boulton agreed.
6	"Question: you have been careful to distinguish
7	between the two categories that we talked about earlier,
8	namely allegations of what Professor Milhaupt called
9	tunneling, and withholding information, disclosing false
10	information, and the like.
11	"Answer: I think I do understand that distinction
12	[said Mr Boulton], as I said to you earlier , and what
13	has been concerning me [ie about the reliability of the
14	market price] is not the general threat of tunneling,
15	but rather the items that I list on slide 8."
16	Which are allegations by the prosecutor in the
17	second indictment against
18	And the reason that only manipulation could
19	invalidate the market price is that the governance
20	questions, the tunneling questions, are already
21	integrated into the market price.
22	In any event, one should see, as is shown on
23	slide 35, that one should not assume that even tunneling
24	would be different in a counterfactual. And the point
25	that Professor Dow is making in his evidence on slide 35

1	is that if an independent SC&T, that is to say an SC&T
2	that has rejected the merger, is no longer the company
3	merged with Cheil, as it is in reality at what
4	Professor Dow called the top of the Samsung food chain,
5	it wouldn't expect to get many favours from the Samsung
6	Group, and therefore housing contracts, as was discussed
7	between him and my learned friend Ms Snodgrass.
8	The point that you need to bear in mind, we say,
9	members of the arbitral tribunal, is that this is why
10	there is a Korea discount.
11	On slide 36 you can see Professor Milhaupt's
12	explanation. He was asked:
13	"I have it right, don't I, that in your view, the
14	Korea discount exists because of the risk that value
15	might be expropriated from minority shareholders and
16	transferred to Chaebol controllers?
17	"Answer: Yes, I believe that the Korea discount is
18	unique to Korea in the sense that it reflects corporate
19	governance risk. That's the way that I would explain
20	the Korea discount. It reflects corporate governance
21	risk "
22	There is a corporate governance problem. It is
23	known to the market. The market pays a lower price $$
24	attributes a lower price to the companies that are
25	susceptible to that risk . The price that is then set is
	123

25 1 the fair market price for those companies. 2 I will not dwell on this, but any manipulation that 3 has to be shown to this arbitral tribunal also needs to 4 be in the appropriate time window and I will refer 5 briefly on slide 37 to what happens purely 6 coincidentally , $\,$ I assure the arbitrators , to be slide 37, of Professor Dow's presentation on Wednesday. 7 I stress, as did Professor Dow, that we take 8 9 allegations of share price manipulation very seriously. 10 South Korea is a state governed by the rule of law. 11 These allegations are, if they are made, to be heard in 12 court. They are, as the learned arbitrator Mr Garibaldi 13 accepted, {Day6/56:10–12}, the subject of evidence, and 14 they are the subject of hearings in independent courts 15 at which the defendants have the right to defend themselves. 16 17 But we take them very seriously. What we are saying 18 is that they need to be shown, they need to be shown to 19 be in the right time window, and they need to be shown 20 to have had a measurable effect on fair market value or 21 on the market price in order for the market price to be 22 adjusted to reflect fair market value.

> That all needs to be proved by the Claimant. The only allegation in the relevant time window relating to SC&T, the SC&T share price, is the Qatar

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124

122

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1	contract. This was fully examined by Professor Dow, his
2	first report, paragraphs 108 to 116. He concluded that
3	there would be a very small effect, if any, on the share
4	price and thus the merger ratio had that been taken into
5	account.
6	Professor Dow also examined the effect of
7	Mr Boulton's allegations relating to Biogen on the Cheil
8	share price in paragraph 109 of his second report.
9	Professor Dow concluded, and this was not
10	challenged, that any such very small effect was
11	quantifiable and he thus quantified it .
12	We do not accept that these allegations are proved.
13	Insofar as they exist, though, Professor Dow shows that,
14	to go back to his watch analogy, the watch was a minute
15	or two out. It was not smashed. It needs to be
16	adjusted at most.
17	I should just add that the Seoul High Court in the
18	buyback proceedings about which we have heard so much
19	over the last fortnight concluded that in fact the
20	non-disclosure of the letter of intent in that contract
21	was not shown to be a breach of market rules. But
22	I leave that to one side; the burden of proof is
23	a matter for my learned friend.
24	That means that you should have regard to the market
25	price as the fair market value, and if you do that, then

1 even though I note that it upsets my learned friend 2 Ms Snodgrass that we say there are no damages, that is 3 the only logical conclusion that you can draw, because 4 there would be no loss, because the Claimant's transactions in SC&T -- I leave in that analysis to one 5 6 side the countervailing transactions in Cheil -- led to 7 no loss. And if there is no loss, there are no damages. 8 Let me turn to Mr Boulton's evidence. 9 First, he valued damages as at the valuation date. 10 and here, sir, members of the arbitral tribunal, I am at 11 a loss. I am at a loss for words and that rarely 12 happens, as both my colleagues and my family would 13 attest I do not know what my learned friend's case is. On 14 15 slide 4 of the Claimant's slides today, it was said that 16 the valuation should be effected the day after the 17 merger, Saturday, 18 July, I assume. But my learned 18 friend Ms Snodgrass said that the valuation date was 19 still the valuation date, 16 July 2015, the day before 2.0 the merger. That is indeed the date used by Mr Boulton 21 in both of his reports. I remind the tribunal that 2.2 there was no counterfactual whatsoever in his first 23 report. 24 But my learned friend Ms Snodgrass also said that 25 there are two reasons why the value cannot be assessed

on the valuation date. We heard that this morning. 1 2 I haven't got a reference, I'm afraid, it goes too 3 quickly for me on the screen, but you will pick it up 4 when you look at the transcript. 5 I don't understand. 6 If we look at slide 38 - - ah, we're there already --7 I asked Mr Boulton how he would value an expropriation 8 claim as at the valuation date, 16 July 2015, the day 9 before the merger. 10 He said that the starting point would be the market 11 value of those shares on that date. He made the very 12 fair point that expropriation cases give rise to lavers 13 of complexity, and the analysis can be taken only so 14 far. But that's right, we say. The value of 15 a shareholding the day before the merger, when the 16 outcome of the merger vote is still uncertain, even on 17 my learned friend's case, must be the value of the 18 shares 19 I take advantage of that discussion to make a point 20 about the nature of the merger, and we'll develop all of 21 these points more in writing, of course. But everything 22 that is said on the other side of the room proceeds from 23

127

the premise that the merger was "predatory", involved

a massive transfer of value. Economically, looking at

the movement of the shares in the companies, this is

simply not true.

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2	On slide 39 we have Professor Dow's slide 12. This
3	was in the context of the analysis of the trading gain,
4	and you can see the calculation on the slide . But you
5	will contrast this with my learned friend's showing you
6	the slide before this in Professor Dow's presentation,
7	slide 11, and it's the Claimant's slide 81, where he
8	showed what Elliott's bet was.
9	Elliott 's bet was that the share prices would move
10	in opposite directions. They didn't. Their bet, the
11	value transfer theory, was wrong. That is why they made
12	a profit on the Cheil swaps, because the Cheil shares
13	after the merger, the supposedly incredible transfer of
14	9 trillion Won, I think my learned friend Ms Snodgrass
15	said this morning, was not perceived by the market as
16	such. Cheil shares went down. So the Claimant made
17	money on its short swaps.
18	Now, Mr Boulton, sticking with his evidence, as we
19	know, applied no discount to his sum of the parts
20	valuation in his first report at all . Didn't think
21	about it. Didn't think of a holding company discount.
22	Common or garden, holding company discount applies
23	everywhere. Didn't think of a Korea discount, the Korea
24	discount that Professor Milhaupt explained earlier in
25	our submissions this afternoon.

128

1	Accepted he wasn't a Korea expert. Indeed, he is so
2	far from being a Korea expert that he did not take those
3	things into account whatsoever. Didn't ask any
4	questions about it. Didn't think it might be a point
5	that he would talk to the Claimant about, the Claimant's
6	trading plans all having identified the discount and
7	tried to bet on the discount and what they considered to
8	be the net asset value narrowing. He didn't apply
9	a discount at all .
10	And yet in his second report Mr Boulton ventured
11	where angels fear to tread and he is the only person who
12	has been able to distinguish between a Korea discount
13	and a holding company discount.
14	Neither Professor Milhaupt nor Professor Bae could
15	do this, as we see on the next slides.
16	This was the question asked by the President of both
17	of the capital markets experts after their evidence on
18	Monday: how would you distinguish between a Korea
19	discount and a holding company discount? And
20	Professor Milhaupt said:
21	"It's admittedly challenging I think that one of
22	the interesting features of this case is it's, to my
23	knowledge, the first case that would require [it to be
24	done]."
25	But never fear, Mr Boulton can do it.

1	On slide 41, you see Professor Bae could not answer
2	the question either.
3	But on slide 42 you can see that Mr Boulton,
4	although he knew that neither of the capital markets
5	experts could do it, he could, and he did.
6	He came up with a discount to be applied to his sum
7	of the parts valuation, his subjective analysis of the
8	value of SC&T of between 5 and 15%.
9	Now, one of the subjective choices that Mr Boulton
10	made was to include in his net asset value the value of
11	listed holdings of SC&T that is to say, their
12	investments in other companies that were also listed, he
13	valued at the market price. Now, we say in principle
14	that is quite right, because the market price is the
15	fair market value.
16	So in principle he begins in the right place.
17	But then he falls into error because he does not
18	account for tax. Elliott in their net asset values
19	always accounted for tax. We can see Mr Smith's
20	acceptance of this on slide 43:
21	"We've taken off taxes on any gain as between these
22	amounts and the acquisition costs for Samsung of these
23	stakes which Nomura [the analyst that he was discussing
24	with my learned friend Mr Lingard] didn't do."
25	Elliott, and we heard something about trading plans,

130

1	my learned friend Ms Snodgrass said that Professor Dow's
2	reliance on this was egregious. I don't quite see how
3	that could follow, given that these trading plans exist,
4	show the discount to net asset value as calculated by
5	Elliott at which Elliott intended to begin its
6	investment, and also show the smallest discount at which
7	they would have completely sold their investment. And
8	there are three such trading plans in evidence at $C\!-\!368$
9	$\{C/368/1\},\ C-374\ \{C/374/1\}$ and $C-684\ \{C/684/1\}.$
10	But, leaving the categorisation of those to one
11	side, you can see from those trading plans that Elliott
12	calculated the discount from the traded price to its net
13	asset value as being the difference between the traded
14	price and the net asset value after tax.
15	We'll come on to how this affects Mr Boulton, but
16	you can see from the simple arithmetic, it is an
17	equivalent to 14.6% of the gross net asset value.
18	You will recall that with Mr Boulton we went back to
19	gross up Elliott's net asset value calculation Figure
20	for tax. When you do that, you arrive at a Figure, and
21	taking the January trading plan, which was C -368
22	$\{C/368/1\},$ the net asset valuation is a gross Figure,
23	having grossed up for tax, of 111,232 Won per share.
24	The tax that has been deducted was 16,266 Won per share,
25	which implies a tax deduction of 14.6%.

131

1	Now, obviously the precise numbers vary from
2	valuation to valuation because the calculated profit on
3	those investments would differ, but the principle is
4	important.
5	The point is that Mr Boulton doesn't do this. He
6	takes a discount of at most 15% using a net asset value
7	that includes the gross figures for the listed
8	investments. And we can see from that simple
9	calculation, looking at Elliott 's net asset value, that
10	the most that Mr Boulton's highest discount does is take
11	account of the tax liability . In other words, he is
12	attributing no discount at all for governance issues or
13	any other issues.
14	We say that is highly implausible. You need to be
15	aware of that when you are considering the plausibility
16	of Mr Boulton's evidence.
17	Now, if we look at slide 44, this is also from
18	Professor Dow's presentation, his slide 34, and you can
19	see the effect on the chart where he puts a range of
20	figures for the NAV discounts that one sees in
21	South Korea, and the Elliott figures translate into the
22	light green bars.
23	You can see that the Elliott figures go up from
24	a discount of between 32.8 and 44.6%, to 42.5 and 52.1%
25	respectively . In other words, those were the discounts,

1	grossed up, therefore on an equivalent basis to
2	Mr Boulton, that Elliott was observing in the market.
3	We showed by conducting the same exercise with
4	Mr Boulton that grossing up his numbers implied
5	a discount of at least 32.8%; $\{Day7/141:20\}$ to
6	{Day7/142:6}.
7	In so doing, we are not accepting that his net asset
8	valuation is right, and we aren't accepting that 32.8%
9	is the right discount. We are simply showing that
10	mechanically his own figures, taking a discount of 20%
11	on an Elliott basis, ie after tax, is equivalent to
12	a discount to his number of 32.8%. And I remind the
13	tribunal that in Elliott 's trading plans the lowest
14	Figure for a discount was 20%.
15	They never forecast the gap narrowing further. We
16	say that 20% is extremely low in any event, but if you
17	take a 20% discount on after—tax NAV, you have, taking
18	Mr Boulton's numbers, a 33% discount mechanically.
19	Sticking with this slide 44, you also see
20	Mr Boulton's comparables in the purplish bars on the
21	right .
22	Now, these are the figures that Professor Dow
23	calculated from Mr Boulton's list of comparable
24	companies, having taken the outliers out. You remember
25	that some of Mr Boulton's comparables showed holding

1	company premiums rather than holding company discounts.
2	And what Professor Dow did was to take those out as
3	outliers , because, with them in, the mean and the median
4	were very far apart.
5	These figures here are after that adjustment.
6	But let me remind you that Mr Boulton himself
7	calculated a median with what he himself considered to
8	be the unusual companies with premiums of 35.5% median
9	discount, and he quite properly accepted that the median
10	is to be preferred over the mean, simply because it
11	accounts for any difference that is caused by outliers
12	and we see that on slide 45.
13	If we go back to slide 44, and we look at the
14	left —hand side of the graph, we see the two companies
15	that Professor Dow looked at in his first report, namely
16	SK, about which we've heard a great deal because of its
17	involvement in a merger, and LG. Both of those
18	companies, and we saw this in the annexes to
19	Professor Bae's report $$ I won't take you to it this
20	afternoon $$ which have a clean holding company
21	structure, at least clean by reference to the spaghetti
22	diagram of the Samsung structure before the merger, we
23	see that both trade at very substantial discounts to net
24	asset value indeed.
25	It's particularly interacting to see that for SK

25 $$\mbox{It\,'s}$ particularly interesting to see that for SK $\mbox{K}$$

134

1	because, as we know, the SK merger that was put forward
2	by that particular Chaebol was one that the NPS voted
3	against.
4	Just to put this in context, and Mr Lingard has
5	explained that we do in fact contest the realism of
6	Elliott 's restructuring plan at C–380 $\{C/380/1\},$ but as
7	we understand it, what Elliott was seeking to do,
8	realistically or unrealistically , was to make a more
9	conventional holding company structure for Samsung.
10	We look at the examples of SK and LG, which have
11	a more traditional holding company structure, and we see
12	that there is no magic bullet in so doing that would
13	result in the discounts disappearing, which is what
14	Mr Boulton says it would once you account for tax.
15	So Mr Boulton says, and the Claimant adopts as its
16	case, that the day after the merger the share price of
17	SC&T, had the merger been rejected, would have
18	skyrocketed.
19	This is wholly implausible on at least three levels.
20	The first is the persistence of the discount, which
21	I have just taken you through.
22	The second is, as we said in our defence at
23	paragraph 1, and the exhibit number is R–88 {R/88/1},
24	the relevant regulations at the time in any event
25	prevented a more than 15% movement on the Korean Stock

135

1	Exchange in any stock on any day.
2	The third is that if you wake up on the Saturday
3	morning, after the merger, and you postulate that the
4	merger has been rejected on the Friday, nothing has
5	changed. Samsung's spaghetti junction structure is the
6	same. The governance of the Samsung Group is the same.
7	The incentives on are the same. The regulatory
8	environment that gives rise to mergers at market prices
9	and the way in which the courts interpret that, all of
10	that is the same.
11	Mr Boulton had not taken into account, when he
12	prepared his opinion, that not everybody who was against
13	the merger thought that the price would skyrocket.
14	Indeed, far from that. And if we look at slide 46, we
15	see Mr Boulton's acceptance that we were right to point
16	out to him that ISS in their report at C–30 $\{C/30/1\}$ had
17	predicted that if the merger did not go through, there
18	would be a short-term downside of as much as 22.6%.
19	We also know that in the counterfactual world, and
20	whatever the valuation date may be $$ and I just add, in
21	complement to the submissions I made earlier about the
22	significance of the valuation date that, if that is
23	being changed again, submissions would be needed and we
24	would he have a word to say about that.
25	But that apart from Mr Boulton, nobody else can

1	predict the magnitude of any increase in the share
2	price. Certainly Professor Milhaupt could not, as we
3	see on slide 47:
4	"Question: just to make sure I have your
5	response you have not considered the magnitude of
6	that immediate reaction in the stock price?
7	"Answer: That's correct.
8	"Question: Would you expect it to effectively be
9	doubling the stock price overnight, Professor?
10	"Answer: I have undertaken no effort to gauge or to
11	measure the magnitude Mr Boulton is the evaluation
12	expert."
13	Here again, I submit to the tribunal, Mr Boulton
14	knows better than the Korea experts.
15	Sir, that brings me to slide number 48, and I would
16	like to spend a moment or two with the tribunal going
17	through a number of numbers.
18	Let me explain this slide to the tribunal.
19	Yesterday, at {Day8/218:15–23}, Mr Garibaldi asked
20	a question that related to the price of SC&T shares
21	before the leak of the NPS's decision to vote in favour
22	of the merger.
23	In the light of that question we have compiled the
24	following table.
25	The first line of this table shows the average price
	137
	107
1	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share.
2	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and
2 3	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why.
2 3 4	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for
2 3 4 5	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger
2 3 4 5 6	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to
2 3 4 5 6 7	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the
2 3 5 6 7 8 9	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C-53 which we will
2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C–53 which we will come on to $\{C/53/1\}$.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C–53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C–53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C–53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C–53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C–53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement. Those two are added together as being —— or are averaged out as being the receipt price that is deducted
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C–53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement. Those two are added together as being —— or are averaged out as being the receipt price that is deducted from the average price per share to give the trading
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C-53 which we will come on to $\{C/53/1\}$. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and 1 will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C–53 which we will come on to $\{C/53/1\}$. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement. Those two are added together as being —— or are averaged out as being the receipt price that is deducted from the average price per share to give the trading loss in SC&T shares as we've discussed already.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and 1 will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C-53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement. Those two are added together as being or are averaged out as being the receipt price that is deducted from the average price per share to give the trading loss in SC&T shares as we've discussed already. The next row or line is the market price on 10 July 2015. This was a Friday. It was the day on
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and I will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C-53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement. Those two are added together as being or are averaged out as being the receipt price that is deducted from the average price per share to give the trading loss in SC&T shares as we've discussed already. The next row or line is the market price on 10 July 2015. This was a Friday. It was the day on which the Investment Committee met to decide how to vote
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and 1 will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C-53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement. Those two are added together as being or are averaged out as being the receipt price that is deducted from the average price per share to give the trading loss in SC&T shares as we've discussed already. The next row or line is the market price on 10 July 2015. This was a Friday. It was the day on which the Investment Committee met to decide how to vote the NPS's shares in SC&T. As we have seen, from my
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and 1 will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C-53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement. Those two are added together as being or are averaged out as being the receipt price that is deducted from the average price per share to give the trading loss in SC&T shares as we've discussed already. The next row or line is the market price on 10 July 2015. This was a Friday. It was the day on which the Investment Committee met to decide how to vote the NPS's shares in SC&T. As we have seen, from my learned friend 's Reply at paragraph 147(f) and exhibit
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and 1 will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C-53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement. Those two are added together as being or are averaged out as being the receipt price that is deducted from the average price per share to give the trading loss in SC&T shares as we've discussed already. The next row or line is the market price on 10 July 2015. This was a Friday. It was the day on which the Investment Committee met to decide how to vote the NPS's shares in SC&T. As we have seen, from my learned friend 's Reply at paragraph 147(f) and exhibit R-131 {R/131/1}, that decision was leaked therefore to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 paid by Elliott : 61,621 Won a share. We have broken the receipts down into two lines and 1 will explain in a moment why. The first line is the price received by Elliott for the 7,732,779 shares bought before the merger announcement. These are the shares that are subject to the buyback right and that were the subject of the buyback price appraisal litigation , including the decision of the Seoul High Court at C-53 which we will come on to {C/53/1}. The third row is the average price per share that Elliott received for the 3,393,148 shares bought after the merger announcement. Those two are added together as being or are averaged out as being the receipt price that is deducted from the average price per share to give the trading loss in SC&T shares as we've discussed already. The next row or line is the market price on 10 July 2015. This was a Friday. It was the day on which the Investment Committee met to decide how to vote the NPS's shares in SC&T. As we have seen, from my learned friend 's Reply at paragraph 147(f) and exhibit

1 So the price on 10 July is unaffected because that 2 decision had not been made, let alone leaked. And that 3 price is 64,400 Won per share. 4 The valuation date price, interestingly, several days, of course, after the market knew that the NPS was 5 6 going to vote in favour of the merger, is 5,000-odd Won 7 higher at 69,300 Won. So that's another number. 8 The market price determined by the Seoul High Court 9 in the buyback litigation is in the next line. It is 10 66,602 Won per share. 11 And I pause there because this ties in with the answer given by my learned friend Ms Snodgrass to 12 13 Mr Thomas' question just before lunch about when it is 14 said that Samsung began to do bad things to the $\mathsf{SC}\&\mathsf{T}$ and 15 Cheil share prices . And I say bad things not in 16 a flippant way, but because we know there are two 17 categories of things that could be done, one of which, 18 tunneling, is priced in because the market knows it is 19 likely to go on and does go on, and one of which, 20 manipulation, is not priced in because it isn't known. 21 My learned friend, in answer to the learned 2.2 arbitrator Mr Thomas, said that the earliest on which 23 that could be said to have begun is November 2014 with the famous listing of Samsung SDS that gave rise to the 24 25 difficulty in the perceived discount in Elliott 's net

139

1	asset value models, and the listing of Cheil in
2	December 2014.
3	It is the latter that was taken by the Seoul
4	High Court as being a relevant date that removes all
5	influence of the merger from the price. And that is why
6	it went back and applied the statutory formula to the
7	period leading up to the date of Cheil's listing , and it
8	arrived, applying that formula, at a price of 66,602 Won
9	a share.
10	I pause there to make the point that my learned
11	friend also referred to in our opening submissions: if
12	that price is upheld by the Korean Supreme Court, under
13	the terms of the Settlement Agreement between Elliott
14	and Samsung, Elliott, although no longer party to the
15	buyback price litigation , will get the benefit of it .
16	And that would be some 72.4 billion Korean Won.
17	We will deal with this in our written submissions,
18	but a way needs to be found in order to ensure that if
19	the tribunal were to award any damages to Elliott, that
20	there could be no double recovery.
21	But as I say, I'll deal with that further in written
22	submissions.
23	Yes, sir?
24	MR GARIBALDI: Before you turn to the next slide, because
25	you did me the honour of attempting to answer my

138

1

1	question, I would point out that I was interested in the
2	movement of the market price between the date of the
3	vote of the Investment Committee on the assumption that
4	that vote was leaked in some way $$ that is a question
5	of fact that is to be assessed by the tribunal $$ and
6	the date of the vote on the merger.
7	Now, it seems to me, and this is for the written
8	submissions and not for now, that that movement of the
9	share price should be compared to the movement of the
10	market as a whole. In other words you have to take into
11	account the beta, to isolate, if possible, the movement
12	of this particular share. That is what I'm interested
13	in.
14	I'm not interested in the movement of the market as
15	a whole or the effects that that could have had on the
16	price of the shares. Just as a point of clarification
17	on my question. Thank you.
18	MR TURNER: Thank you, sir. As we have said, both sides,
19	I think, we're very interested in having the arbitral
20	tribunal's questions, and clearly we will look forward
21	to receiving all of them and deal with those in our
22	written submissions.
23	I take the learned arbitrator 's point about
24	isolating from the general market movement. You have
25	the two numbers on this slide. You don't have that
	141
	141
1	analysis . And we will obviously address that in our
2	written submissions.
3	Sir, you have the two numbers. Between 10 July and
4	16 July, you have 64,400 to 69,300.
5	I have dealt with the line after that, which is the
6	Seoul High Court buyback appraisal price litigation, and
7	then we come on to three presentations of numbers that
8	apply a discount to Mr Boulton's sum of the parts
9	valuation.
10	Before coming to those, may I ask you to turn to
11	slide 49, which puts this in context. Professor Dow
12	said in his presentation, but also in cross—examination:
1 2	" I think the unbels issue of shows muice users

" \ldots I think the whole issue of share price versus 13 net asset value is a bit of a red herring because even 14 15 if one started from net asset value, I don't think 16 a realistic discount would take you very far from the 17 share price." 18 I stress, if we go back to slide 48, that the third 19 line up from the bottom is not that calculation. It is 20 an illustration .

21You have heard the difficulty that we have with22Mr Boulton's sum of the parts valuation and its

23 before—tax nature, but apart from that, just for the 24 purposes of illustration if you applied a 40% discou

24purposes of illustration , if you applied a 40% discount25to it , you would get to a share price of 69,235 Won

142

2 $5{-}15\%$, the figures, and of course you have those in his 3 report and the references are on the slide, you have 4 98,000-odd and 109,622 Won a share respectively for the beginning and end of Mr Boulton's range. 5 6 I think, although it's useful for illustrative 7 purposes, we can now take the last line off, because we 8 have heard that the Claimant no longer maintains a claim 9 for Mr Boulton's sum of the parts valuation with no 10 discount. 11 There are two notes that I should draw the 12 tribunal's attention to. The second I have dealt with. 13 The first is that while, if the tribunal awards damages 14 that are not the trading loss, the trading loss is 15 absorbed within the damages that are claimed, it must 16 nonetheless have regard to the trading profit . Not the 17 whole of the amount that was made on the Cheil swaps, 18 but the difference between the trading loss on the SC&T 19 shares and the trading profit on the Cheil swaps. 20 In other words, the trading loss in SC&T shares 21 would be absorbed within the Claimant's damages 22 calculation, but they have not given credit for the 23 profit over and above that trading loss that they made 24 on the other side of their overall transaction. 25 So that 2.5 billion Won would in any event, if the

a share; and if you apply his preferred discounts of

143

1	tribunal were to award damages that were not just the
2	trading loss, need to be taken into account.
3	With that, sir, and with the remark that you've
4	already heard, that we will deal further with these
5	matters in our written submissions, perhaps to
6	a discussion of which we will shortly come, I will close
7	the Respondent's submissions this afternoon.
8	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.
9	Questions from THE TRIBUNAL
10	MR GARIBALDI: I have three questions, or three topics of
11	questions.
12	Mr Turner, let me start with something that may be
13	in the nature of a clarification .
14	Twice in the last few days have you referred to
15	a comment that I made in the course of the hearing, and
16	I want to make sure that this comment is put in the
17	right context lest it be interpreted as prejudging one
18	issue .
19	I was referring to the allegations of the public
20	prosecutor in the recent indictment on market
21	manipulation and other related offences, and in that
22	context I pointed out, in asking a question in an
23	offhand way, that those allegations were subject to
24	proof, in Korean courts, of course.
25	I was not referring to the value, if any, of those

1	allegations in this proceeding, evidentiary value or
2	otherwise, of those allegations in this proceeding, or
3	the value in this proceeding of the evidence, if any, on
4	which those allegations are made to the extent that that
5	evidence may be made available to us.
6	I want to make that absolutely clear, so that my
7	remarks, which you have used twice, are not
8	misinterpreted .
9	Now, going to the substance of your closing
10	argument, two areas.
11	I am still confused about your position on
12	causation. I thought that that had been clarified to
13	some extent in answer to my questions after your opening
14	statement, but now certain statements that you make, you
15	have just made, again introduce this source of confusion
16	in my mind.
17	So I understand the argument being that there is no
18	evidence or not sufficient evidence to prove a causal
19	relationship between A and B. But that is one thing,
20	and that is understandable. That is a question of fact.
21	Another different question is to say that there is
22	no causal relationship between A and B because B could
23	have been caused by something else.
24	Let me give you an example. Mr Partasides asked
25	a question, made an example in referring to this topic,

145

1	but I'll give you a different one, which I think
2	clarifies the matter in my mind better.
3	To take an example based on a recent case, let's
4	suppose that the armourer in a movie set gives a loaded
5	gun to an actor. The actor shoots the gun and kills
6	another actor.
7	Now, one thing is to say that the armourer caused
8	the death of the victim. Another thing is to say that
9	there is no sufficient evidence to prove that there was
10	intent or that that armourer was the person who loaded
11	the gun or all sort of issues of fact of that kind.
12	A different thing is to say that there is no
13	causation because the actor who shot the other actor
14	could have on his own decided to shoot the other actor.
15	That, I think, is a theory of causation that I don't
16	understand. And you may not mean this theory of
17	causation, but some of your statements suggest that to
18	my mind, and I hope that that is clarified in the
19	written submissions.
20	Now, let me turn to the last question I have.
21	The Republic of Korea has put a lot of emphasis on
22	a defence of assumption of risk. The argument has been
23	mostly factual and my question is a legal question.
24	We all know that assumption of risk is an
25	affirmative defence, at least in American common law of

146

1	torts, but I would like to know: what is the legal basis
2	in the Treaty and/or in customary international law as
3	defined in the Treaty for the proposition that
4	assumption of risk is an affirmative defence under
5	international law, either as a factor that precludes the
6	unlawfulness of the action, or otherwise.
7	I'm not looking for an answer which consists of
8	a sound bite, like, for example, Maffezini v Spain.
9	Maffezini is not a legal theory. Maffezini is a sound
10	bite .
11	I would like to know what the real legal basis is
12	for this proposition.
13	Thank you.
14	MR TURNER: Sir, I understand that you are expecting us to
15	deal with these points in our written submissions and
16	they will be. I thought I would just clarify very
17	quickly on your second point $$ your first point is well
18	taken, sir, and thank you for the clarification .
19	I don't think there was any misunderstanding, but in any
20	event, the clarification is on the transcript.
21	On the second, sir, I think one needs to distinguish
22	between causation of liability and causation of damages.
23	It was to the latter that we were addressing our
24	remarks, and I think that should set your mind at, at
25	least, more ease, to understand what our position is,

147

1	but we will clearly develop that further. There's no
2	time now for us to develop that further this afternoon.
3	MR THOMAS: I just had a factual question, perhaps two.
4	Would you go back to slide 10 of your presentation,
5	please. Sorry, it 's (Pause)
6	The question I had, and it may be that the record
7	has not really been developed in this area because of
8	the relatively later emergence of Cheil as an issue, but
9	the internal Elliott email speaks of the view that the
10	NPS has a 13% shareholding of Samsung C&T and is
11	currently not a shareholder of Cheil Industries,
12	and I guess the question I had is: is there any evidence
13	on the record as to when the NPS began to acquire shares
14	in Cheil?
15	MR LINGARD: As I sit here, Mr Thomas, I'm afraid I cannot
16	give you an answer. But we shall undertake to provide
17	one in writing. In other words, as to whether this
18	statement in exhibit R–252 $\{R/252/1\},$ that at this date,
19	February 18, the NPS was not a shareholder in Cheil,
20	whether that statement is correct and, if it is, when it
21	became a shareholder. We will check the record
22	thoroughly and come back with an answer in writing, if
23	we may.
24	MR THOMAS: Just a supplementary to that, and this is a more
25	general question of the operation of the Korean capital

November 26, 2021

1	markets, but would that information be discoverable by
2	the public or by the investing public?
3	MR LINGARD: The short answer again, for supplementing in
4	writing, the short answer is: at a certain threshold.
5	Disclosure is required once a certain shareholding
6	threshold is met, and there has been a dispute about,
	• • •
7	for example, whether the Claimant complied with those
8	disclosure obligations upon the acquisition of a certain
9	threshold. And again, we can provide more detail on
10	that in writing.
11	But the short answer is yes, once the shareholding
12	reaches a certain threshold.
13	MR THOMAS: I'm interested not only in the Claimant; I'm
14	interested in the NPS as well.
15	MR LINGARD: Of course.
16	MR THOMAS: Thank you.
17	THE PRESIDENT: I have two questions, both of which I should
18	have asked earlier, so apologies in advance.
19	Can we go back to your slide 7. It's sort of
20	loosely related to what you say there about there being
21	discussion about Everland, as Cheil was known back then,
22	to become the ultimate owner of shares in any Samsung
23	holding company. That was of course several months
24	before Cheil was listed .
	before Cheil was listed. My question is simply whether there is anything in
24 25	before Cheil was listed. My question is simply whether there is anything in
	My question is simply whether there is anything in
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25	My question is simply whether there is anything in 149
25	My question is simply whether there is anything in 149 the record about when Cheil was listed in December 2014, any type of disclosure about what its business plans
25 1 2 3	My question is simply whether there is anything in 149 the record about when Cheil was listed in December 2014, any type of disclosure about what its business plans were, why it was being listed, what was the purpose of
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25 1 2 3 4 5	My question is simply whether there is anything in 149 the record about when Cheil was listed in December 2014, any type of disclosure about what its business plans were, why it was being listed, what was the purpose of the listing at the time. It would assist us if you point to $$ you don't need to do it now, it might take
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20 It would help the tribunal also if you could clarify 21 in your written submissions as to what the Claimant's

- 22 theory is, whether this means an adjustment in the
- 23 Claimant's position on the valuation date or whether
- this simply goes to another question which is the basisof the valuation, rather than the valuation date.

150

1	I understood you were talking about the basis of the
2	valuation date, but perhaps it should have been
3	clarified .
4	So these two comments are more $$ we don't expect
5	that you need to address them now. It would be helpful
6	if you addressed them in your written submissions, just
7	to make sure that you have a full opportunity to make
8	sure that the tribunal understands what your position
9	is .
10	I think that brings the closing statements to an
11	end, although we are opening a new phase in the
12	proceedings. So that's not too far off.
13	So, unless there's something else from my
14	colleagues, we could go back to more interesting issues
15	of housekeeping and try to agree on the steps going
16	forward.
17	Housekeeping
18	THE PRESIDENT: There are several items and maybe we start
19	in an order of logical priority about the post—hearing
20	submissions.
21	We asked the parties to confer and see whether you
22	can agree on the timing, length, and whether one or two
23	rounds would be sufficient. If there is anything that
24	has been agreed, it would be good to know.
25	Mr Partasides?
	151

151

1	MR PARTASIDES: Thank you, Mr President. We did receive
2	a proposal from Respondent's counsel yesterday. We have
3	not had an opportunity yet to respond to that proposal.
4	What I might suggest is, if agreeable to the tribunal,
5	if we adjourn for five minutes we may see whether we can
6	present you with an agreed proposal. If that's
7	suitable, we could have five minutes now and then
8	revert.
9	THE PRESIDENT: That is certainly agreeable. And maybe
10	I just list the other items that we thought should be
11	discussed.
12	One is cost submissions, whether we should already
13	fix dates now. The tribunal doesn't feel strongly. If
14	the parties want to think about it and suggest dates for
15	cost submissions and agree on the number of rounds, that
16	would be certainly acceptable:
17	There are more technical issues like the corrections
18	to transcripts and so on, redactions to transcripts . It
19	will be helpful to have deadlines agreed. Again,
20	I think that's something that can be done between
21	parties after the hearing, if we agree on the date by
22	which you could come back for the tribunal, and some
23	smaller items, but maybe we can discuss those after the
24	break.
25	Ten-minute break, and we will resume at 3.15.

1	(3.04 pm)	1
2	(A short break)	2
3	(3.15 pm)	3
4	THE PRESIDENT: Shall we? Mr Partasides?	4
5	MR PARTASIDES: Thank you, Mr President. I'm pleased to say	5
6	that we have had a fruitful dialogue. Just before	6
7	I tell you the fruits of that, one important point of	7
8	housekeeping. It happens to be today the birthday of	8
9	one of our team members, Julia Sherman.	9
10	THE PRESIDENT: We can certainly congratulate, but let's	10
11	postpone the singing until after .	11
12	MR TURNER: Can I record, I'm afraid with a day's delay, but	12
13	it was Ms Tan's birthday yesterday. So I feel honours	13
14	are equal on both sides.	14
15	THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely, congratulations to both.	15
16	MR PARTASIDES: Now, back to less significant dates. I'm	16
17	pleased to say, members of the tribunal, the parties	17
18	have been able to reach agreement on the following	18
19	steps.	19
20	Due to various commitments on both sides, we've	20
21	agreed on a deadline of 4 March for the first round	21
22	post-hearing brief, which would comprise 100 pages as	22
23	suggested by the tribunal.	23
24	We've also agreed second round post-hearing brief of	24
25	40 pages to be filed on 8 April. And a cost submission	25
	153	
1	to be filed following that two weeks thereafter on	1
2	22 April.	2
3	No page limit for the cost submission, but hopefully	3
4	that won't be necessary.	4
5	MR TURNER: For the sake of the transcript, I confirm all of	5
6	that, sir.	6
7	THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Just to understand, is	7
8	that going to be a cost submission or simply a cost	8
9	statement?	9
10	MR PARTASIDES: In the normal way, what we would propose is	10
11	a cost submission, typically they are brief, in other	11
12 13	words basis for the claim, justification for the claim, and then the costs. I wouldn't have expected it to be	12
14		13 14
15	anything in the length of anything more than 20 pages, likely less than that. Certainly on our side.	14
16	MR TURNER: Yes, that's what we would have in mind, sir.	16
17	I think you would want to be addressed on potential	10
18	outcomes and how that would affect the exercise of your	18
19	discretion in awarding costs. Obviously we are in the	19
20	tribunal's hands, but I think we share a view as to what	20
21	sort of submission that would be.	21

- 22 $\;$ THE PRESIDENT: As long as it is agreed and clear to
- everybody, that is certainly fine with the tribunal.
 I suggest we leave the more mundane issues of
- 24
 I suggest we leave the more mundane issues of

 25
 corrections to transcript and redactions for a later
 - 154

2 through the PCA logistical issues relating to the 3 availability of the Opus database. It would be helpful 4 if that would remain available for the tribunal and the PCA for at least some time after the hearing. It's 5 6 quite helpful and we'll organise -- maybe we can revert 7 to that through the PCA in the coming days. 8 Anything else that either party would like to raise 9 before we close? 0 MR PARTASIDES: Only to thank our friends opposite and the 1 tribunal, as I said earlier today, for strong opposition 2 and great attention from the tribunal. We're very 3 grateful. 4 MR TURNER: Seconded, of course, sir, and I add our thanks, .5 and I'm sure those of my learned friends to the court 6 reporters and to the representatives of the PCA. 7 Everything has gone extremely smoothly, and just so far 8 as the court reporters are concerned, I imagine that any 9 corrections to the transcript will be minimal. It has 0 been, as we've been working through it every evening, 1 very good indeed as a first cut. 2 So I echo everything my learned friend has said. 3 THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Then it just remains 4 for the tribunal to thank the parties, counsel, for 5 a very constructive hearing over the last two weeks. 155 1 I trust I can speak on behalf of my colleagues when triinal b be be ÷1. . . .

date. There are a few other issues we will communicate

2	I say that the tribunal has been greatly assisted by the
3	exceptionally high level of advocacy on both sides.
4	It's rare that issues are equally crystallised at the
5	end of the hearing as they are now. Both parties are in
6	good hands.
7	Of course, we also want to thank the court
8	reporters, the interpreters, the technical people, as
9	well as the PCA for the hard work over the last
10	two weeks. Now that the holiday period is approaching,
11	the tribunal wants also to give something back to the
12	parties. That will be in the form of questions to be
13	addressed in your written submissions. I believe they
14	are fresh from the oven as we speak.
15	So again to repeat, these are not exhaustive and
16	they are not intended to prevent the parties from
17	addressing all the issues that you feel you need to
18	address in your post—hearing submissions.
19	As you will see, these are mostly questions that
20	seek to clarify some of the issues that have been
21	debated and nothing should be read into these questions
22	in terms of decisions that have already been $$ would
23	already have been taken. There are no decisions taken
24	on these issues . The tribunal will deliberate . We have
25	had preliminary discussions but we have not reached

25

1	final conclusions on these points, the points that are
2	raised in these questions. Just to make it clear, the
3	tribunal's minds remain open to be persuaded otherwise
4	through your written submissions.
5	With all that, thank you very much all and safe
6	travels home for those who will be travelling. Not all
7	of us will be. But some will. Most of you will. Thank
8	you very much, and enjoy the weekend.
9	(3.25 pm)
10	(The hearing concluded)
11	
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16	
17	
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19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

157

1	INDEX	
2	PAGE	
3	Claimant's closing submissions1	
4	Submissions by MR PARTASIDES1	
5	Submissions by MR PETROCHILOS41	
6	Submissions by MS SNODGRASS59	
7	Respondent's closing submissions83	
8	Submissions by MR TURNER83	
9	Submissions by MR LINGARD89	
10	Further submissions by MR TURNER109	
11	Questions from THE TRIBUNAL144	
12	Housekeeping151	
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
	158	

87:25 88:9 89:22 90:19

93:12 96:17 97:5 98:13

116:19 126:19 127:9.15

102:24 105:1 106:24 107:5

128:6 134:22 137:21 138:5

abandoned (1) 116:15 abdicates (1) 72:6 ability (1) 150:19 able (5) 1:25 43:9 57:25 129:12 153:18 above (1) 143:23 absence (4) 64:15 102:8 106:8 112:17 absent (1) 102:2 absolute (1) 74:14 absolutely (6) 69:24 72:8 114:10 115:3 145:6 153:15 absorbed (2) 143:15,21 abstained (1) 15:22 absurd (2) 50.15 20 accept (3) 91:9 111:14 125:12 acceptable (1) 152:16 acceptance (4) 9:3 116:4 130:20 136:15 accepted (14) 14:17,21 43:20 65:24 100:12 103:24 111:25 115:8 116:1 118:11 120:2 124:13 129:1 134:9 accepting (4) 71:3 93:15 133:7,8 accepts (3) 62:13 115:19 120:18 access (1) 5:23 accident (1) 5:7 accomplish (1) 68:24 according (2) 32:6 49:17 accordingly (2) 78:16 119:5 account (13) 30:11 38:21 69:8 110:17 120:23 125:5 129:3 130:18 132:11 135:14 136:11 141:11 144:2 accountable (3) 54:9 56:19.20 accounted (1) 130:19 accounts (1) 134:11 accused (1) 34:13 achieve (1) 6:5 achieved (6) 2:11 6:6 15:18 33:7,15 69:16 achieving (1) 64:17 acknowledged (2) 62:19 119:6 acquire (1) 148:13 acquisition (7) 44:9,9 99:3 115:5,6 130:22 149:8 acquisitions (1) 44:6 across (1) 101:17 acted (1) 119:5 action (1) 147:6 active (1) 77:11 actively (1) 61:13 activities (2) 55:11 57:21 activity (10) 53:19,20,22,24 54:21 55:7.8.12.13 57:16 actor (8) 42:13 58:24 146:5,5,6,13,13,14 actors (1) 42:2 acts (2) 45:13 110:21 actual (7) 64:5,8,16 70:23 76:17 81:2 115:11 actually (10) 60:10 61:15 63:16 64:7,19 71:24 77:18,18 78:1 150:16 acumen (2) 2:20 13:21 acutely (1) 98:9 add (4) 56:1 125:17 136:20 155:14 added (5) 2:21 21:5,19 22:7 138:14 addition (1) 68:21 address (11) 12:12 76:20 77:2.15 80:22 81:3.5 118:18 142:1 151:5 156:18 addressed (6) 48:1 64:10 77:16 151:6 154:17 156:13 addressing (3) 32:3 147:23 156:17

adjourn (1) 152:5 adjournment (1) 83:7 adjusted (3) 76:14 124:22 125:16 adjustment (3) 121:14 134:5 150:22 administering (2) 55:17 56:2 administration (1) 48:21 administrative (11) 30:10 48:19 49:19 51:8.9.20 52:7.13.19 90:8.13 admissions (1) 50:6 admit (2) 56:8 73:2 admits (1) 49:22 admitted (1) 49:9 admittedly (1) 129:21 adopt (1) 51:1 adopted (5) 49:7,9 71:15 77:11 104:18 adopting (1) 62:10 adopts (2) 53:10 135:15 advance (2) 63:21 149:18 advanced (6) 62:8 70:6 91:19 103:8 109:14 113:11 advancing (1) 69:5 advantage (2) 89:10 127:19 adversaries (1) 1:18 adverse (1) 119:24 advice (9) 13:1,3,5 18:5 92:21,24 93:7 96:13 98:14 advocacy (1) 156:3 affect (2) 69:19 154:18 affected (3) 69:2 70:1 89:2 affecting (2) 15:3 73:5 affects (1) 131:15 affiliates (1) 67:1 affirmative (3) 43:18 146:25 147:4 afraid (3) 127:2 148:15 153:12 after (49) 6:13,14,24 17:18 20:20 21:12 23:21,24 29:7 30:1 49:15 57:15 60:19,22 62:2 63:19 66:12 70:10.19 76:7 77:14 82:11.13 83:1 84:21 85:4 88:19 89:6 94:21 97:22 98:10 109:19 113:6 126:16 128:13 129:17 131:14 133:11 134:5 135:16 136:3 138:12 139:5 142:5 145:13 152:21.23 153:11 155:5 aftermath (1) 64:1 afternoon (12) 83:15 86:6 87:4 89:18 92:3 112:20 113:24 114:9 128:25 134:20 144:7 148:2 aftertax (1) 133:17 again (39) 2:1 12:18 14:1,11 18:23,25 23:5,17 24:19.20.22 25:5 26:3 27:2.7.10 33:5 36:23 37:9 47:20 49:10 59:8 91:14 92:15,23 98:14 99:2 103:20 107:21 108:12 109:15 112:14 136:23 137:13 145:15 149:3,9 152:19 156:15 against (19) 10:20 11:18 18:15 19:19 36:10.20 40:1 65:11 67:21 74:21 91:20 95:13 103:8 109:14 110:14 112:16 122:17 135:3 136:12 agencies (9) 49:19,20,20 50:5 51:8,9,20 52:19,20 agency (8) 43:10 45:6 48:3.9 49:23 50:14 52:13 56:5 agnostic (1) 50:3 agnosticism (2) 9:2 66:8 agree (6) 44:25 74:5 151:15,22 152:15,21 agreeable (2) 152:4,9 agreed (14) 3:3 44:11 55:7 74:6 86:3.3 117:24 122:5 151:24 152:6,19 153:21,24

154.22 agreement (5) 40:8,13 111:2 140:13 153:18 agrees (3) 65:20 120:25 121:21 ah (1) 127:6 ahead (2) 1:4 99:1 aide (1) 47:17 akin (1) 13:3 alert (1) 66:24 allegation (6) 24:22 91:22,24 92.2.3 124.24 allegations (16) 69:4 84:10 92:1 112:17 121:2 122:8,16 124:9,11 125:7,12 144:19,23 145:1,2,4 alleged (4) 91:21 102:3 111:6 112:16 allegedly (1) 102:8 allencompassing (1) 48:18 allow (1) 12:23 allows (1) 58:19 almost (1) 65:24 alone (3) 14:5 73:22 139:2 along (1) 93:13 alpha (2) 13:22 63:8 already (24) 3:25 9:24 10:2,15 22:17 24:3,5,10 39:21 40:14,17 41:7 43:8 65:18 69:4 97:7 102:24 122:20 127:6 138:17 144:4 152:12 156:22,23 also (62) 7:19 13:24 14:3 17.19 18.4 19.8 20.25 21:11 36:4 37:1 45:9 47:13 50:9,10,16 54:1 55:12,21 56:9,23 62:17 64:15 66:3 70:12 74:2 80:24 82:17 84:14 85:1,5,8 86:15,18 87:5 88:2,25 96:6,22 97:17 98:11 99:17 100:12 101:11,15 102:12,13 107:20 113:14 124:3 125:6 126:24 130:12 131:6 132:17 133:19 136:19 140:11 142:12 150:20 153:24 156:7,11 alternative (3) 71:20,22 112:2 although (8) 12:16 29:2 39:2 85:8 130:4 140:14 143:6 151:11 altogether (2) 46:22 100:6 always (3) 117:8 120:15 130:19 amended (1) 31:3 american (2) 63:11 146:25 among (1) 48:22 amount (4) 2:24 35:17 39:22 143:17 amounts (4) 2:4 40:14 76:16 130:22 amplitude (1) 75:2 analogous (1) 44:5 analogy (5) 19:17 69:21 70:5 121:17 125:14 analyse (2) 72:22 110:9 analyses (1) 113:13 analysis (40) 38:25 39:3 43:15 47:3,3,7,8 48:9,11 53:6 54:2 60:4,5 62:13 63:23,24 65:11 67:14,17 71:11.16.25 72:16 73:16,20,23 75:4,12,14 78:11,17 82:17 106:10 115:4 118:24 126:5 127:13 128:3 130:7 142:1 analyst (3) 118:5,7 130:23 analytical (5) 53:10,12 59:21 71:6 75:14 analytically (1) 75:20 andor (1) 147:2

angels (1) 129:11

anger (1) 107:7

angry (2) 107:5,5 annexes (1) 134:18 announced (2) 65:8 70:20 announcement (11) 76:4 81:1 88:9 89:6.8 97:22 98:2,11,13 138:6,13 anomalies (1) 12:12 another (10) 15:2 16:15 65:3 90:17 121:11 139:7 145:21 146:6.8 150:24 swer (35) 9:5 19:2 22:9 30:15 35:5.13.20 49:17 67:15.17 72:5.6 85:14 86:12 91:4 100:14,22,25 116:25 118:16 122:11 123:17 130:1 137:7,10 139:12,21 140:25 145:13 147:7 148:16.22 149:3.4.11 answerable (1) 51:6 answered (2) 72:3 84:4 answering (1) 67:8 wers (2) 11:16 85:5 anticipated (4) 11:20 14:14,16,20 anticipating (1) 16:20 anyone (3) 17:17 38:15 53.23 anything (8) 1:5 117:11 149:25 150:6 151:23 154:14.14 155:8 anyway (3) 32:7,14,19 anywhere (1) 117:17 apart (3) 134:4 136:25 142.23 apologies (1) 149:18 apparent (6) 18:4 20:12 54:13 84:14 114:10 115:3 apparently (3) 19:6 29:2 33:20 appeal (1) 39:25 appear (1) 33:13 appeared (4) 14:10 30:9 31:3 76:18 appearing (1) 1:19 appears (2) 40:15 105:14 appellate (1) 44:21 applicable (5) 54:15 58:2 95:1.1.3 applied (8) 2:20 71:6 116:22 119:2 128:19 130:6 140:6 142:24 applies (3) 13:21 71:12 128:22 apply (7) 50:21 97:18 116:24 118:5 129:8 142:8 143:1 applying (2) 8:12 140:8 appointing (1) 57:9 appointments (1) 19:12 apportioning (1) 7:14 appraisal (13) 17:12 36:7.10.21 39:17.20 40:16,23 41:2 73:21 138:8 142:6 150:12 appreciated (1) 68:3 appreciation (1) 70:2 approach (10) 19:4 42:18 49:7,11 50:11,25 72:1,7,10 77:11 approaching (1) 156:10 appropriate (2) 111:13 124:4 approval (2) 4:14 99:9 approve (2) 42:8,14 approved (9) 8:9 12:2 35:18 37:4 64:13 65:17 67:11 110:15 114:23 approving (1) 92:11 approximate (1) 57:5 approximately (5) 24:7 39:1 76:6,9 77:22 april (3) 97:4 153:25 154:2 arbitral (8) 86:18,23 87:12 116:11 123:9 124:3 126:10 141:19 arbitrarily (1) 38:14 arbitrary (1) 17:21

arbitration (11) 1:24 2:2 4:2 9:11 13:17 23:15 28:13 29:19 30:20 36:5 40:20 arbitrator (2) 124:12 139:22 arbitrators (4) 83:18 110:16 124:6 141:23 area (2) 68:7 148:7 areas (3) 11:12 24:23 145:10 arent (1) 133:8 argue (2) 6:14 76:19 argument (7) 52:25 69:9 98:11.22 145:10.17 146:22 arguments (3) 76:21,23 97:18 arise (4) 41:20,21 42:19 60:18 arises (1) 90:7 arising (1) 115:20 arithmetic (3) 15:15 64:14 131:16 armourer (3) 146:4,7,10 around (3) 17:4 21:17 79:9 arrive (2) 35:10 131:20 arrived (3) 37:20 38:4 140:8 article (14) 47:5,7,8,20,21 49:24,25 50:4 53:6,14 55:1 56.12 103.15 108.17 articles (1) 44:24 articulated (1) 16:23 artifice (2) 25:21 100:3 asia (5) 92:22 93:4 96:17,19 98:15 ask (9) 33:3 37:13 39:13 41:9 59:4 87:12,16 129:3 142.10 asked (24) 9:5 18:9 21:2 22:7 29:13 30:7,17 35:11 36:17 39:8 84:2 97:20 106:13.16.18 115:16 119:24 123:12 127:7 129:16 137:19 145:24 149:18 151:21 asking (3) 83:22,24 144:22 aspect (1) 48:13 aspects (2) 91:15 121:5 assert (1) 43:10 asserted (1) 43:7 assertion (2) 65:13 69:2 assessed (2) 126:25 141:5 assessing (2) 54:2 116:24 assessment (2) 77:4 120:10 asset (28) 8:11 43:2 94:3.9 116:18 118:10.14.23 119:3,11,13 120:2 129:8 130:10,18 131:4,13,14,17,19,22 132:6,9 133:7 134:24 140:1 142:14,15 assets (8) 25:3 45:8 56:11,11,24 57:7 62:17 88:21 assignment (1) 40:7 assist (2) 150:4,9 assistance (3) 24:5 47:23 72:8 assisted (1) 156:2 assume (2) 122:23 126:17 assumed (1) 98:9 assumes (1) 4:22 assumption (12) 4:18 88:4 92:6 97:17 98:19,24 99:13,16 141:3 146:22,24 147:4 assumptions (1) 71:15 assure (1) 124:6 attached (1) 43:3 attaching (2) 38:24 39:18 attempt (5) 20:13 24:15 65:3,4 116:10 attempted (1) 16:16 attempting (1) 140:25 attempts (2) 11:22 73:15 attendance (1) 29:22 attending (1) 15:16 attention (5) 18:19 22:22 83:18 143:12 155:12

attentive (1) 1:21 attest (1) 126:13 attested (1) 116:7 attributable (1) 75:15 attributes (1) 123:24 attributing (1) 132:12 attribution (6) 41:9,13,18,20 42:18 86:4 audit (3) 31:1 50:1 56:21 audits (1) 56:21 author (1) 22:9 authorised (1) 58:12 authorises (1) 53:22 authorising (2) 58:8,10 authority (12) 46:21,21 50:16 53:5,19 54:2 56:17,25 108:2,14 117:13 118:1 auxiliary (1) 57:12 availability (1) 155:3 available (3) 6:21 145:5 155:4 average (4) 77:22 137:25 138:11,16 averaged (1) 138:15 averted (1) 78:15 avoiding (1) 6:9 award (5) 40:13 78:22 79:4 140:19 144:1 awarded (1) 60:10 awarding (1) 154:19 awards (1) 143:13 aware (6) 12:7 35:14 81:19 89:24 97:15 132:15 away (1) 30:2 axiomatically (1) 65:15 b (6) 21:1 31:19 64:17 145:19.22.22 b6117 (2) 84:1,6 b6118 (1) 84:12 b6119 (1) 84:19 back (25) 10:1 12:22 13:12 22:21 27:9 33:2 34:18 79:8 83:9 110:23 111:16 112:19 125:14 131:18 134:13 140:6 142:18 148:4,22 149:19,21 151:14 152:22 153:16 156:11 backdrop (2) 2:3 11:18 background (1) 118:6 bad (4) 95:5 110:20 139:14,15 bae (4) 66:5 101:20 129:14 130:1 baes (1) 134:19 balance (1) 32:24 bank (11) 50:12.13 57:21.23 58:2,9,14,22,23 119:18,22 bankers (1) 100:21 bars (2) 132:22 133:20 based (13) 8:11 17:20 18:17,21 29:24 35:4 69:3 75:3 94:2,9,15 118:23 146:3 baseless (1) 77:5 basic (1) 4:19 basis (19) 2:24 6:23 13:18 29:22 31:13 32:20 40:13 69:23 76:24 92:10 108:7 115:24 133:1,11 147:1,11 150:24 151:1 154:12 battleground (1) 5:9 bear (1) 123:8 bears (2) 78:1 111:2 became (2) 61:6 148:21 become (5) 12:19 17:16 54:13 97:2 149:22 before (63) 1:5,20 4:17 7:13.21 8:2.7 12:6 20:6.23 21:22 22:5.11.11 23:10.11 25:5 27:8,19 29:19,20 33:13 34:6 36:19 40:3,19

41:19 43:7 45:5 49:6 60:14

65:1 76:6 81:2.18.20 85:23

139:13 140:24 142:10 149:24 153:6 155:9 beforetax (1) 142:23 began (5) 5:4 23:13 79:24 139:14 148:13 begin (15) 5:12,18 21:16 32:3 33:2 83:16.22 85:15 89:21 92:5 101:7 103:12 109:20,23 131:5 beginning (6) 5:4 79:22 83:17 86:25 113:19 143:5 begins (3) 90:4 118:3 130:16 begun (2) 89:19 139:23 behalf (4) 45:10,13 64:10 156:1 being (34) 12:1 13:7 14:17 17:6 22:10 24:16,22 30:17 34:14 35:23 36:6 37:3 49:15 61:5 64:20 65:17,21 67:22 71:5 86:4 94:12,25 99:24 106:11 111:11 129:2 131-13 136-23 138-14 15 140.4 145.17 149.20 150.3 believe (8) 62:9 79:22 93:1 100:21 106:22 117:7 123:17 156:13 believes (1) 117:7 below (1) 44:11 benefit (8) 6:16 34:3,4,11 36:11 38:7 96:16 140:15 berlin (1) 88:20 beside (1) 95:10 best (4) 7:1 8:14 51:10 96:10 bet (6) 98:7,7 128:8,9,10 129:7 beta (4) 13:20 63:10,11 141:11 betaderived (1) 114:19 betahedging (1) 114:20 bets (1) 62:24 better (3) 66:11 137:14 146:2 between (45) 2:7 3:1 9:2 11:24 16:19 20:16,19 21:9,16,18 23:20 26:14 30:12 44:1 46:18 49:5 50:5.6 55:11 57:23 70:8 78:19 81:22 82:20 85:12 88:8 89:8 98:19 122:4,7 123:7 129:12,18 130:8,21 131:13 132:24 140:13 141:2 142:3 143:18 145:19,22 147:22 152:20 beyond (4) 62:15 64:16,18 100:21 big (1) 86:10 biggest (1) 69:13 billion (6) 2:4 24:6 113:17 115:13 140:16 143:25 binary (3) 36:6,22,23 binding (1) 45:1 biogen (1) 125:7 birthday (2) 153:8,13 bit (2) 59:18 142:14 bite (2) 147:8.10 blindingly (2) 49:16,17 block (1) 62:4 blocking (1) 66:18 blue (8) 16:1 20:7 22:5,17 23:13 42:3,12 82:6 board (2) 50:1 56:22 body (2) 104:22 106:10 borne (1) 92:18 both (28) 2:22 7:16 26:20,23 28:12 40:14 48:1 52:20 58:11 66:3 87:8 105:10 110:23 116:25 126:12,21 129:16 134:17.23 141:18 149:17 150:14.14 153:14.15.20 156:3.5 bottom (9) 10:10 16:4 22:8

23:6 31:12 33:19 54:5

121.9

93.22 142.19 bought (11) 88:7 89:7.12 92:10 97:22 98:1.10.12 120:19 138:5.12 boulton (56) 6:9 8:10 61:20 66:3,10 67:19 71:2,14 74:4,10 75:2,6,23 76:5,10,19 80:23 86:24 89:9 111:24 113:13 114:1.2.7 116:16 117:1.24 118:9.11 119:7 120:1.4.17 121:4.24 122:5.12 126:20 127:7 128:18 129:10,25 130:3,9 131:15,18 132:5 133:2,4 134:6 135:14,15 136:11,25 137:11,13 boultons (23) 62:13 67:17 71:6.10 75:12 78:2.17 116:17 117:4.11 125:7 126:8 132:10,16 133:18,20,23,25 136:15 142:8.22 143:5.9 breach (9) 5:16 10:16 17:21 59:8 61:14 70:3 91:19 92:4 125:21 breached (3) 64:2 91:23.24 breaches (5) 30:24 60:23 61:15,17 91:22 break (4) 83:4 152:24,25 153:2 breaks (1) 69:14 bribe (2) 20:22 24:6 bribery (1) 24:1 brief (4) 62:23 153:22,24 154:11 briefly (6) 41:15 81:5 96:17 98:21 105:1 124:5 bring (1) 104:4 brings (3) 45:17 137:15 151:10 broader (3) 37:2,13 121:6 broke (1) 70:10 broken (1) 138:2 building (1) 31:7 bullet (3) 18:11 32:16 135:12 burden (3) 110:20 111:2 125:22 business (2) 70:19 150:2 butfor (1) 109:25 buyback (6) 125:18 138:7,8 139:9 140:15 142:6 buying (3) 58:13 89:1 150:8 c (2) 31:19 103:1 c11 (1) 94:23 c111 (1) 94:23 c30 (1) 136:16 c301 (1) 136:16 c368 (2) 131:8,21 c3681 (2) 131:9,22 c374 (1) 131:9 c3741 (1) 131:9 c380 (2) 12:19 135:6 c3801 (2) 12:20 135:6 c395 (1) 77:23 c3951 (1) 77:24 c428 (2) 101:14 112:8 c4281 (1) 101:14 c4282 (1) 112:8 c500 (1) 112:9 c5001 (1) 112:9 c53 (1) 138:9 c531 (2) 17:14 138:10 c684 (1) 131:9 c6841 (1) 131:9 c699 (1) 49:2 c6991 (1) 49:2 c84 (1) 31:4 c841 (1) 31:4 calculate (2) 6:23 75:18 calculated (13) 34:25 35:2 38:13 76:10,20 113:10 115:24 120:3 131:4.12 132:2 133:23 134:7

calculates (1) 75:8 calculating (1) 64:4 calculation (23) 31:12 35:10 37:16 38:3.11.13.20 39:5 76:17 94:3 112:22 114:8 115:11,19 116:3,18 118:23 119:11 128:4 131:19 132:9 142:19 143:22 calculations (5) 63:15 80:23 102:4,9 115:17 call (2) 59:4 108:20 called (13) 46:11 48:5 50:21 55:18 88:17 93:21 97:1 109:25 110:5,9 117:25 122:8 123:4 calls (1) 51:7 came (5) 96:23 107:11,17 118:14 130:6 campaign (4) 68:23 69:3 79:15 80:13 cancel (1) 75:21 candid (1) 114:2 cannot (11) 9:21 15:15 32:17 45:19 68:8 70:21,23 88:6 104:15 126:25 148:15 cant (2) 39:13 122:1 capacity (1) 30:9 capital (8) 16:22 41:5 45:21 66:4 94:17 129:17 130:4 148:25 care (2) 31:16,21 careful (1) 122:6 carefully (1) 122:4 caricature (1) 60:7 cascaded (1) 3:21 cases (6) 4:11 47:16,18,20,21 127:12 cashed (1) 6:24 casting (3) 16:1 60:24 110:5 categorical (2) 50:12,18 categories (2) 122:7 139:17 categorisation (1) 131:10 categorises (1) 69:15 causal (2) 145:18.22 causation (16) 5:17 32:4,6,11,23 33:8 39:7 109:21 111:3,15 145:12 146:13,15,17 147:22,22 cause (1) 110:22 caused (10) 60:25 61:3,15 68:25 74:12 18 119:3 134:11 145:23 146:7 causing (1) 10:18 caution (1) 47:20 cavalier (4) 34:14 35:23,24,24 ceased (2) 69:23 77:10 censored (1) 73:19 central (11) 10:7 49:19 50:13 51:9,20 52:12,19,20 53:17 67:18 103:15 centre (1) 25:21 centrepiece (1) 2:6 ceo (1) 100:16 certain (11) 53:24 58:9.11.12 86:1 98:1 145:14 149:4,5,8,12 certainty (6) 68:17 73:5 98:6 111:4.6.9 (2) 31:17 73:19 chaebol (9) 3:9,18 16:20 17:2,24 19:20 100:1 123:16 135:2 chaebols (1) 17:6 chain (2) 23:11 123:4 chair (4) 108:13,19,21 109:4 chairman (3) 28:4 82:19 84:16 chairperson (2) 26:9 27:17 challenge (1) 25:6 challenged (2) 48:13 125:10 challenging (1) 129:21 change (2) 60:20 74:12 changed (5) 86:11 112:17 119:12 136:5.23 changes (2) 110:13 114:19

changing (1) 113:20 characterisation (1) 95:9 characterise (1) 96:23 characterised (2) 99:23 102:13 charge (4) 32:18 42:17,20 56:6 chart (1) 132:19 check (1) 148:21 cheil (42) 2:7 3:1 37:12,22 61:4.10 62:18.22 66:1 75:18.24 79:23 80:1.2.18 85:13 86:16.22 93:16 97:1 113:1,25 114:6,23 115:6 123:3 125:7 126:6 128:12,12,16 139:15 140:1 143:17,19 148:8,11,14,19 149:21.24 150:1 cheils (1) 140:7 chest (1) 32:16 chief (1) 10:15 child (1) 11:7 (13) 19:23 28:2 29:11 30:14,16 105:3,7 106:13 107:2,9,21,23 108:1 (5) 28:24 29:4 30:7,9 84:16 (1) 30:5 choice (1) 28:22 choices (3) 71:6 120:2 130:9 choosing (1) 56:10 (3) 28:11.20 109:8 chosen (2) 9:8 44:18 chronology (5) 21:2,5,7,9 24.9 cio (1) 84:16 circular (2) 120:12,15 circulating (2) 22:4 81:17 circumstances (2) 78:24 110:19 cited (2) 34:18 90:20 citizens (1) 49:24 civil (3) 87:8,14 105:12 ck (9) 48:8 90:8.9 91:2.9 104:2.3.7.14 claimant (65) 2:16 4:16 11:20 12:7,14 13:19 14:14 32:7 38:19 40:17,18 60:11,25 61:16,25 62:10,11,13,16,20 63:8.12.15.17.20.64:7 76:25 78:11 85:18 87:1.19 88:7 89:12 92:1.9.18.21 93:8 96:4,18,22 98:1,8,14,18 102:13 103:4 104:19 108:17,23 111:2,17 113:9 115:23,25 116:15 120:9 124:23 128:16 129:5 135:15 143:8 149:7,13 150:16 claimants (44) 1:12.13 39:20 59:17 61:17.22 63:24 67:22 70:6 72:4,14 75:6 83:24,25 88:4 90:7 92:12,15 93:13 97:5,13,18 98:16 99:2.14 102:6.10 104:1 110:20 111:1 112:12,14 113:8,25 116:7.24 126:4.15 128:7 129:5 143:21 150:21.23 158:3 claimed (3) 43:12 59:22 143:15 claiming (2) 40:19,19 claims (2) 109:13 111:1 clarification (4) 141:16 144:13 147:18.20 clarified (3) 145:12 146:18 151:3 clarifies (1) 146:2 clarify (6) 80:20 82:17 118:21 147:16 150:20 156:20 clarity (1) 106:2 classic (1) 52:12

classical (1) 48:11

clawback (1) 40:9 clean (2) 134:20,21 clear (23) 7:12 15:15 18:10 23:22 29:20 39:11 46:5.23 53:1 74:1.2 79:4 88:7 93:24 94:16 97:17 105:24 107:9.23 108:2 145:6 154:22 157:2 clearest (1) 25:8 clearly (5) 20:2 99:16 112:23 141:20 148:1 close (5) 42:7.20 57:25 144:6 155:9 closest (2) 19:17 79:1 closing (19) 1:6,12,13 5:12 9:16 41:15 79:6 82:2 83:13,17 86:8 87:3 110:24 111:18 116:14 145:9 151.10 158.3 7 closings (1) 90:1 cloud (1) 15:15 cognisable (1) 61:20 coincidentally (1) 124:6 colleagues (3) 126:12 151:14 156:1 collect (1) 55:20 collected (1) 54:22 collective (1) 117:9 collects (1) 54:18 collegiality (1) 83:21 colluded (1) 61:13 collusion (1) 70:8 columns (1) 15:22 combines (1) 75:23 combining (1) 75:17 come (21) 2:1 10:1 16:15 42:22 45:7,16 53:3 54:23 55:14 86:20 95:22 99:18 108:1 112:19 114:8 131:15 138:10 142:7 144:6 148:22 152:22 comes (5) 4:16 53:11 72:14 88:18 110:23 coming (3) 27:9 142:10 155:7 commanded (1) 42:16 comment (3) 144:15,16 150:17 commentary (6) 45:15 46:1,4 53:15,17 54:1 comments (3) 83:16 112:4 151:4 commercial (6) 53:20 56:3 57:16 58:16,24 98:19 commission (2) 52:11 56:6 commissioned (1) 18:8 commitments (1) 153:20 committee (103) 10:18,19 16:2 20:4 23:1 25:25 26:1,6,8,9,10,20,21 27:6.10.13.17.20.22 28:8.18.20.25 29:5 30:11 33:13,18,21,25 34:4,20 35:13 36:3,15,24 37:1,10 39:8 42:9,15 81:8.9.15.16.24.25 82:5,12,19,21 84:9,15,22 101:7,10 102:1,2,7,14,21 103:3.5.9.11.11.18.21 104:7.9.13.21.25 105:19,21,23 106:9,15,17,24,25 107:6.12.15.18.22.25 108:2.13.20.22 109:1,2,3,5,8,10 110:19 111:4,10,12 112:6 138:20 141:3 committees (5) 28:16 81:20 101:21 108:8,9 common (6) 42:19 54:19 101:20 120:8 128:22 146:25 communicate (1) 155:1 communicated (2) 23:4 100:8 communication (3) 82:4,5,8

communications (1) 27:18 companies (16) 88:21 94:3 95:17.18.21.96:5.11 111:20 123:24 124:1 127:25 130:12 133:24 134:8,14,18 company (30) 43:3 71:11 72:20,21 75:10 76:1,11,25 77:5 95:11,16,25 97:1,3 99:25 100:8.22 117:19 121:10 123:2 128:21.22 129:13.19 134:1.1.20 135:9.11 149:23 comparable (1) 133:23 comparables (2) 133:20,25 compare (3) 47:15 92:20 104:18 compared (1) 141:9 compares (1) 68:1 comparison (1) 64:5 compelled (2) 4:8 42:11 compensate (1) 40:18 compiled (2) 34:7 137:23 complain (5) 5:25 7:21 16:10 17:16 32:25 complains (1) 110:21 complement (2) 55:19 136.21 complete (1) 102:23 completed (2) 76:5 87:7 completely (4) 77:5 78:3 121:25 131:7 complex (2) 60:5 93:5 complexity (1) 127:13 compliance (1) 13:16 complicated (1) 102:17 complied (1) 149:7 comport (1) 19:20 comprise (1) 153:22 comprised (1) 104:22 comprises (1) 75:16 compulsory (1) 55:20 concealed (7) 7:22 11:5,6,18 17:10 18:1 70:8 conceive (1) 41:24 conceived (1) 42:1 conceives (1) 46:12 concept (1) 97:10 conception (2) 48:18 94:1 concerned (3) 43:2 87:9 155:18 concerning (3) 66:8 73:7 122:13 concerns (6) 47:8,14 50:4 53:4 76:2 105:5 conclude (4) 59:3 67:2 78:11 79:6 concluded (9) 31:8,11 73:12,24 94:8 125:2,9,19 157:10 concludes (1) 93:18 conclusion (9) 31:23 50:15,20 52:2,18 53:11 60:9 96:9 126:3 conclusions (8) 30:19,23 31:6.13 43:16 74:5 103:4 157:1 concrete (2) 14:8 36:18 conduct (17) 4:10.16.23 5:25 7:15,20,22 11:3,8,19 16:10 17:15,21,22 18:1 32:25 43:2 conducted (3) 31:1 83:21 95:11 conducting (1) 133:3 confer (1) 151:21 conferred (2) 54:3,7 confidence (1) 78:18 confident (1) 121:19 confidentiality (1) 119:23 confirm (1) 154:5 confirmation (1) 22:8 confirmations (1) 34:9 confirmed (10) 4:1 10:3 13:2 28:7.15 77:9 97:13 101:19 108:6 114:3

confirming (2) 31:8,11 confirms (6) 24:9 26:18 32:24 33:16 96:25 97:4 confiscatory (3) 12:2 14:17.20 conflating (1) 17:24 conflict (1) 26:14 conflictfree (1) 121:20 confound (2) 11:22 16:16 confronted (1) 30:3 confused (1) 145:11 confusion (4) 18:2 59:23 60:17 145:15 conglomeratesrelated (1) 18:18 congratulate (1) 153:10 congratulations (1) 153:15 connection (3) 96:19 104:18 105.8 connivance (1) 3:14 consensus (1) 68:14 consequence (3) 5:7 7:1 104:1 consequences (4) 29:1,2 91:9 97:9 conservative (2) 6:22 71:15 conservatively (1) 76:10 consider (9) 33:10 36:1 47:2 58:4 71:23 110:25 114:7 121:18 122:3 considerable (1) 22:15 consideration (2) 37:2 120:7 considered (9) 28:9,9 51:13 92:25 105:4 114:22 129:7 134.7 137.5 considering (5) 72:18 79:4 101:17 112:1 132:15 consist (1) 46:6 consistent (1) 12:25 consists (1) 147:7 conspiracy (1) 42:2 constitute (1) 104:11 constitution (2) 48:7 49:24 constitutional (4) 49:20,23 57:4.8 construction (2) 94:12 104:14 constructive (1) 155:25 consummated (2) 61:5 70:11 consummation (1) 115:2 contains (1) 114:4 contemplated (2) 65:7 117:21 contemporaneous (8) 26:25 64:24 73:16,23 74:16 92:19,21 93:7 contemporaneously (1) 73:12 contends (1) 78:11 content (3) 54:6 55:24 101:21 contention (1) 70:7 contest (3) 13:18 55:10 135:5 contested (6) 13:15 23:14 25:15 27:11.15 39:2 context (14) 20:6 22:18 47:18 55:23 87:14.23 92:5 103:2 108:11 128:3 135:4 142:11 144:17.22 continue (2) 59:5 89:19 continues (1) 93:7 continuing (1) 60:6 contortions (1) 104:5 contract (3) 56:4 125:1,20 contracts (2) 95:25 123:6 contradiction (1) 30:12 contrary (3) 46:21 63:14 114:5 contrast (1) 128:5 contributions (2) 54:19 55:20 control (6) 2:5 12:24 13:6 24:12 62:3 96:5

controllers (1) 123:16

controlling (4) 15:1 95:24,24

controls (1) 121:11 convene (2) 108:14 109:5 convened (2) 28:17 107:22 convenience (1) 5:21 conventional (1) 135:9 convey (1) 49:14 convicted (2) 10:7,15 convicting (1) 24:10 conviction (6) 10:5,7,13,14 23.25 27.1 convictions (3) 4:6 9:20 10:2 corporate (6) 2:20 12:25 15:2 123:18,20,22 corporation (1) 58:16 correct (4) 60:4 91:7 137:7 148:20 corrected (1) 80:11 correction (1) 119:10 corrections (4) 86:2 152:17 154:25 155:19 corrupt (2) 20:15 64:18 corrupted (1) 3:20 corruption (3) 20:8,10 70:9 cost (7) 152:12,15 153:25 154:3,8,8,11 costs (4) 65:5 130:22 154.13 19 couldnt (1) 117:17 counsel (9) 5:8 14:12 93:19 99:20 100:5,19 101:24 152:2 155:24 counter (1) 70:6 counterfactual (19) 6:13 60.18 64.2 6 7 12 66.17 67:8 68:4 72:15.17.23 76:12 79:2 101:25 109:24 122:24 126:22 136:19 countervailing (1) 126:6 country (2) 50:13 55:19 course (42) 9:21 11:14 14:25 32:13 33:18 42:23 43:13 48:10,23 51:23 52:8 54:20 55:6 58:17 60:19 64:9 71:19 86:9 89:24 90:1.9 91:16,21 94:6 98:3 111:17 112:19 113:22 114:9,14 120:1,24 127:21 139:5 143:2 144:15,24 149:15,23 150:8 155:14 156:7 courts (20) 9:20 10:17,22 16:4 23:25 34:7 40:3 41:25 43:7.20 46:9 69:4 87:12,13,14,22 110:7 124:14 136:9 144:24 covered (1) 86:18 crafted (1) 50:25 create (1) 59:25 created (2) 12:11 22:19 credible (2) 64:22 73:7 credit (1) 143:22 crime (1) 4:17 criminal (11) 3:11 4:3,3,10,16 10:16 11:3 21:24 37:15 87:8,13 criterion (2) 50:24 51:5 critical (2) 16:25 41:24 criticism (1) 71:10 cropped (1) 87:5 crosscheck (1) 78:1 crossed (1) 14:1 crossexamination (19) 13:10 20:1 28:7 71:9 77:10 78:3 88:16 90:14 93:11 96:25 100:13 105:6 106:13,16 107:10,20 117:14 119:7 142:12 crossexamine (1) 29:15 crossexamined (2) 13:11 97:23 crossshareholdings (1) 93:6 crystal (1) 46:4 crystallised (1) 156:4 ct (8) 2:17 85:11,12 93:16 96:15 100:12.24 148:10 culmination (1) 60:23

current (1) 88:22

currently (2) 69:5 148:11

74:4 78:2.10.25 79:22

customary (2) 50:22 147:2 cut (1) 155:21 czech (1) 88:19 damage (1) 39:16 damages (38) 5:6 6:23 59:15,18,21 60:9 61:20 62:14,21 64:4,9 72:9,11 75:6 76:17 78:19.22 90:25 99:17 109:16 112:12 113:8,10,20 114:8 116:5,14,16,24 126:2,7,9 140:19 143:13,15,21 144:1 147.22 dampen (1) 63:6 data (1) 72:20 database (1) 155:3 date (39) 6:13 8:2 22:7,8,25 23:2 60:11,13,21,22 67:23 68:7,10,12,22 70:1 79:1,14 80:6 126:9 18 19 20 127:1.8.11 136:20.22 139:4 140:4.7 141:2.6 148:18 150:23,25 151:2 152:21 155:1 dated (3) 94:22 98:15 99:5 dates (3) 152:13,14 153:16 dawned (1) 29:16 day (35) 6:12 8:2,3,6,7 23:1,4,4 43:6 44:2,15 45:17 48:15 49:4.10 50:6 51:12 55:19 57:3.22 60:14,22 74:23 76:3,4 84:21 94:5 126:16,19 127:8,15 135:16 136:1 138:19.24 day319511 (1) 105:6 day319612 (1) 105:7 dav3861318 (1) 94:6 dav4701 (1) 48:15 day5151 (1) 50:7 day5261 (1) 57:4 day5331 (1) 57:22 day5461 (1) 44:2 day5521 (1) 44:16 day591 (1) 49:5 day6561012 (1) 124:13 dav714120 (1) 133:5 dav71426 (1) 133:6 day82181523 (1) 137:19 day82241523 (1) 118:19 day83615 (1) 95:8 day96818 (1) 79:18 days (14) 23:24 37:24 38:4 59:13 76:6 7 81:2 98:16 99:3 109:19 139:5 144:14 153:12 155:7 dayyani (1) 43:1 dead (1) 32:17 deadline (1) 153:21 deadlines (1) 152:19 deal (13) 85:22,25 86:8 88:1 89:14 107:18 110:3 134:16 140:17.21 141:21 144:4 147:15 dealing (3) 72:24 73:3 86:5 dealt (3) 86:1 142:5 143:12 death (1) 146:8 debate (3) 25:22 26:13 73:7 debated (2) 88:22 156:21 debating (1) 113:18 december (2) 140:2 150:1 decently (1) 48:4 decide (8) 10:19 27:10 75:1 106:18 108:14 109:1,10 138:20 decided (9) 3:14 10:11 33:14 42:11.16 84:23 85:12 105:24 146:14 decides (1) 109:2 deciding (1) 122:2 decision (37) 10:7 18:14 19:11 25:24 27:21 28:6

36:5.16.25 41:2 44:21 81:16.18.20.25 84:21 85:4.6.18.22 101:22 103:10.20 106:10.23 108:1.3.8.9 110:12 111:21 112:7 137:21 138:9,23 139:2 150:12 decisionmaking (5) 41:22 42:22 56:15,15 101:5 decisions (19) 9:23,24 17:13 18:13.16.18.21 19:9 31:10 45:1.3.9 87:11.13.22 110:6.10 156:22.23 decisive (2) 24:5 43:4 deck (5) 5:21 90:4 91:1 94:20 103:14 decree (1) 94:16 deducted (2) 131:24 138:15 deducting (1) 63:19 deduction (1) 131:25 deemed (2) 73:18 108:21 deems (1) 26:10 deeply (1) 72:1 defeat (1) 70:22 defeated (1) 65:21 defeating (2) 6:7 78:6 defend (1) 124:15 defendants (2) 10:20 124:15 defended (1) 87:17 defined (2) 118:9 147:3 definition (1) 118:1 definitive (1) 114:5 definitively (2) 8:9 15:10 degree (2) 19:25 78:1 delay (1) 153:12 delaved (2) 29:6 82:13 delegated (1) 43:21 deliberate (1) 156:24 deliberately (1) 59:25 deliberation (1) 105:23 deliberations (1) 106:25 delict (1) 41:25 delivered (1) 49:13 demand (1) 27:12 demands (1) 24:4 demonise (1) 60:7 demonstrate (2) 32:7 38:21 nonstrated (1) 62:3 nonstrative (3) 21:1 102:25 103:1 deny (2) 9:19 43:11 depend (1) 3:16 depending (1) 39:23 depends (1) 112:12 depicted (1) 66:7 deployed (1) 64:19 depress (2) 68:23 79:16 depressed (2) 75:17 80:5 derive (2) 23:23 76:17 derived (3) 76:10 94:2 95:3 derives (2) 56:25 75:11 describe (2) 13:8 88:20 described (5) 19:23 20:2 38:13 63:10 121:9 describing (2) 58:20 99:7 description (1) 35:1 design (1) 55:16 designated (2) 49:19 51:9 designed (2) 95:7 106:1 desperate (1) 64:18 despite (2) 25:19 71:5 detail (7) 19:24 59:18 61:24 69:11 82:1 86:21 149:9 detailed (4) 10:10 58:3 59:13 101:13 determinant (1) 36:14 determine (3) 55:3 67:25 118:6 determined (3) 36:6 95:20 139:8 determining (1) 40:23 deutsche (2) 119:18,22 develop (7) 2:21 78:23 111:22 115:15 127:20 148:1.2 developed (1) 148:7

developments (1) 91:18 deviation (1) 119:14 diagram (7) 51:17 52:6 54:16.18 55:3.13 134:22 dial (1) 74:11 dialogue (1) 153:6 didnt (14) 21:25 37:17 71:24 82:7,11 118:15 128:10,20,21,23 129:3,4,8 130.24 died (1) 32:19 differ (1) 132:3 difference (6) 51:3 53:2 118:20 131:13 134:11 143:18 different (17) 19:4 37:7 39:4,5 46:22 49:6 97:11 101:4.23 105:4 110:19 118-11 14 122-24 145-21 146:1.12 differently (2) 34:10,21 difficult (14) 20:5 30:17 48:20,20 49:12,15 103:19 104:11,24 105:25 106:1,2 109:3 111:11 difficulty (8) 73:1 103:25 104:15.16 105:18 106:9 139.25 142.21 digression (1) 118:18 direct (6) 7:9 10:24 42:7 43:19 52:20 95:25 direction (1) 74:1 directional (1) 73:8 directions (1) 128:10 directly (7) 30:14 51:6,18 52:1.8.16 59:8 director (8) 19:12,12,12 28:24 29:4 30:5,7,9 disagree (2) 68:8 115:11 disappearing (1) 135:13 disavowed (1) 65:3 discharged (1) 57:9 disclosing (1) 122:9 disclosure (4) 114:14 149:5,8 150:2 discount (71) 7:2,10 8:13,14 38:5 62:6,15 68:4 71:11 75:10,15 76:1,6,11,13,19 77:1,5,19,21,23 78:7,8,24 79:1 80:22 88:25 112:18 116:17.22 118:20 119:5.8 123:10.14.17.20 128:19.21.22.23.24 129:6,7,9,12,13,19,19 130:6 131:4,6,12 132:6,10,12,24 133:5,9,10,12,14,17,18 134:9 135:20 139:25 142:8,16,24 143:10 discounted (2) 68:1 116:20 discounting (1) 73:1 discounts (7) 76:8 132:20.25 134:1,23 135:13 143:1 discoverable (1) 149:1 discretion (6) 26:1 42:14 56:10.14 95:17 154:19 discursive (1) 59:14 discuss (6) 1:5 97:9 100:17 107:22 116:9 152:23 discussed (11) 46:16 56:5.18 88:14 89:9 107:16 116:25 119:21 123:6 138:17 152:11 discussing (1) 130:23 discussion (9) 46:17 59:7 84:8 86:17 97:8 116:13 127:19 144:6 149:21 discussions (3) 100:14 110:7 156:25 dismay (1) 82:24 dismiss (1) 57:20 dismissed (1) 88:6 dispatched (1) 25:8 disposed (1) 150:18

dispossessing (1) 6:15

dispossession (1) 37:23

dispute (7) 11:3,12 12:9 27:24 60:12 70:25 149:6 disputes (1) 50:4 disregard (1) 4:19 disservice (1) 46:20 distinction (14) 11:24 12:4,6 16:15,17,19,22,24 17:1 18:3 51:2 69:14 98:19 122:11 distinctions (2) 52:23 53:1 distinguish (5) 122:4,6 129:12.18 147:21 distinguished (1) 53:20 distorted (4) 2:7 61:5 70:13,14 district (1) 10:7 divert (1) 121:10 division (3) 26:5,7 27:5 document (6) 13:11 16:7,7 29:23 31:2 100:4 documented (1) 105:18 documents (3) 4:8 100:10 115:5 does (25) 7:12,19 9:19 13:19 40:17,18 43:11,19 55:3 56:3,6,9,14 57:7 58:14,20 63.12 20 67.17 71.12 74.5 98.22 130.17 132.10 139:19 doesnt (6) 39:6 58:18 60:20 67:14 132:5 152:13 doing (6) 44:6 46:19 70:15 87:21 133:7 135:12 dollars (1) 3:7 done (16) 7:7 21:4 34:17 48:9 62:7.21 70:21 73:6 106:18 110:10,19 111:10 118:16 129:24 139:17 152:20 dont (17) 11:9 20:9 32:21 34:3 35:5 39:14 54:23 83:10 123:13 127:5 131:2 141:25 142:15 146:15 147:19 150:5 151:4 double (3) 40:2.4 140:20 doubling (1) 137:9 doubt (6) 20:14 29:8 60:8 96:18 107:2,4 dow (35) 8:17,21 50:3 62:18 63:3,15 66:6 67:13 69:6,15 71:3 72:7 73:2 75:4 77:15.25 85:6 89:3 97:19 110:1 115:16 120:11.25 121:15 122:25 123:4 124:8 125:1,6,9,13 133:22 134:2,15 142:11 down (15) 3:21 6:15 8:6 9:1 25:8 44:20 51:21,25 52:10 61:9 63:6 69:14,19 128:16 138:2 downplay (2) 21:21 73:15 downside (1) 136:18 downward (1) 114:24 dows (21) 60:7 62:24 64:16 69:20 70:4 71:10,21 72:1 73:15 74:6.13 76:18.21 95:5 109:23 115:12 124:7 128:2,6 131:1 132:18 draft (3) 79:9 100:4.6 drafted (1) 22:10 draw (9) 30:18 43:16 70:4 98:18 119:24 120:4 121:23 126:3 143:11 drawing (5) 12:5 31:14 51:2 52:24 121:12 drawn (4) 22:22 86:5 103:4 104:5 drive (1) 69:18 driving (1) 61:9 drop (1) 32:16 due (13) 8:24 25:18 30:24 31:24 55:5 69:7,8 86:9 90:1 91:16 113:22 114:9 153:20 during (22) 12:6.21 13:10.25 14:23 15:14 19:25 21:1

22.23 25.13 27.1 28.3 12 31:3 32:5 36:9 51:14 82:20 111:17 112:19 114:14 117:13 duties (3) 31:16 48:10 57:15 duty (5) 10:16,21 31:20 57:5,8 dwell (2) 41:17 124:2 e (1) 84:13 eagerness (1) 70:4 ealp (3) 6:23 14:19 76:16 earlier (11) 56:25 67:5 113:24 122:7,12 128:24 136:21 149:18 150:9,16 155-11 earliest (3) 98:16 99:3 139:22 early (1) 27:19 earn (1) 61:25 ease (1) 147:25 eastern (1) 88:19 easy (1) 58:17 echo (1) 155:22 echoing (1) 83:16 economic (3) 86:16 95:6 101:19 economically (1) 127:24 economy (4) 16:20 17:2,24 99:8 effect (26) 3:23 7:8,13,20,24 10:17.24 31:12 34:24 35:4.9 37:11.16.17 38:1.11.13 74:15 75:19.20 81:22 124:20 125:3,6,10 132:19 effected (1) 126:16 effectively (1) 137:8 effects (3) 68:13 80:25 141:15 efficient (1) 65:19 effort (2) 77:3 137:10 efforts (3) 25:18 60:6,7 egm (4) 6:2 74:21 81:20,23 egregious (2) 76:22 131:2 eight (1) 97:5 either (8) 41:20 50:19 69:4 76:7 110:15 130:2 147:5 155:8 electronics (1) 14:5 element (1) 7:20 elementary (1) 45:23 elements (3) 53:13 54:12 120:6 eligible (1) 55:4 eliminated (1) 7:6 elizabeth (1) 59:10 elliott (51) 3:2.6 6:15 18:5 38:24 63:1 66:20,24 67:2 74:21 76:24 77:4,13,18 86:14 89:4,6 94:13,21,24 95.2 12 14 96.6 13 99.5 113:6 115:21 118:20 119:1.4.4.17 120:19 130:18.25 131:5.5.11 132:21.23 133:2.11 135:7 138:1,4,12 140:13,14,19 148:9 elliotts (14) 5:6 62:1 65:7 93:25 94:2 99:22 118:23 128:8.9 131:19 132:9 133-13 135-6 139-25 else (8) 1:5 8:20 70:7 117:11 136:25 145:23 151:13 155:8 email (1) 148:9 emerged (2) 89:21 91:18 emergence (1) 148:8 emerges (1) 58:6 emphasis (2) 104:20 146:21 empirical (1) 7:9 employees (1) 102:4 empowered (1) 53:23 end (16) 9:18 17:13 23:13 33:8 55:3 83:24 84:4 86:25

113:11 143:5 151:11 156:5 ends (1) 58:25 enforcement (1) 94:16 engage (3) 26:12 54:11 75:5 engaged (2) 100:9 107:11 english (1) 63:11 enhanced (2) 2:12 15:5 enjoy (1) 157:8 enjoyed (1) 62:17 enlist (2) 3:14 23:8 enormous (1) 2:4 enough (3) 97:15 121:11.12 enquiry (1) 33:8 ensure (2) 13:5 140:18 ensuring (1) 63:8 enter (1) 58:12 entering (1) 16:19 entire (2) 79:23 101:17 entirely (3) 69:23 77:10 93:24 entirety (1) 97:18 entities (11) 15:3 46:6,10 47:15,21 48:20,22 51:6,14,16 78:25 entitlement (2) 45:6 57:2 entity (14) 15:2 43:9 45:13 46.24 47.4 4 53.23 54.7 9 71:1 75:12,14,19,25 entrenching (1) 70:14 entries (1) 13:4 entrusted (1) 58:22 enumerated (2) 56:12 58:12 environment (2) 88:11 136:8 equal (1) 153:14 equally (2) 50:18 156:4 equate (1) 77:3 equivalent (5) 41:4 70:18 131:17 133:1.11 error (1) 130:17 errors (1) 71:7 especially (2) 112:6,8 essential (1) 16:9 establish (1) 104:16 established (2) 24:17 54:25 estimate (1) 8:25 estimates (1) 118:6 etc (1) 84:18 (1) 35:16 europe (1) 88:19 evaluate (1) 7:17 evaluates (1) 68:2 evaluation (2) 7:13 137:11 evc (1) 28:6 even (18) 11:7 12:9 15:21 32:8 33:18 35:19 36:20 38:23 46:8 57:5 62:8 74:4 115:19 116:4 122:23 126:1 127:16 142:14 evening (1) 155:20 event (13) 11:20 65:16 74:6.13 100:2 114:23 120:12,17 122:22 133:16 135:24 143:25 147:20 events (2) 32:13 74:13 eventually (1) 79:25 ever (3) 29:3,21 49:9 everland (3) 80:1 97:2 149:21 every (2) 8:18 155:20 everybody (5) 65:20 70:7 83:10 136:12 154:23 everyone (4) 1:16 15:24,25 16:11 everything (4) 117:8 127:21 155:17,22 everywhere (1) 128:23 evidence (75) 4:1.6.9 7:1.9 20:14,25 25:6,12 26:17,18,25 27:12 28:2 29:24 30:19 32:24 33:10,10,14 34:16,18 35:23 37:19 39:14 43:14.19.24.59:14.62:9 63:17 64:15 16 24 65:6 66:22 69:1,25 70:6 73:11

88:8 101:2 106:11.12

81-19 82-18 18 85-23 89:20 92:19 93:9 102:16.20.22 105:2,20,22,24 108:5 109:8 112:9 122:25 124:13 126:8 128:18 129:17 131:8 132:16 145:3,5,18,18 146:9 148:12 evidenceinchief (1) 114:11 evidentiary (2) 102:23 145:1 evidently (2) 96:20,22 exactly (3) 38:12 42:7 53:14 examination (10) 13:13 14:23 28:13 91:11 93:20 94:5 97:20 99:20 100:5,20 examined (5) 14:11 47:12,16 125:1.6 example (14) 17:12 25:11 36:18 46:9 48:15 52:12 92:8 93:14 110:6 145:24,25 146:3 147:8 149:7 examples (1) 135:10 exception (2) 56:22 66:6 exceptionally (1) 156:3 excerpt (3) 65:19 67:16 69:9 excerpted (3) 64:25 67:13 74:17 exchange (5) 13:21 97:11 115:1 117:20 136:1 exclusively (3) 25:25 59:2 95:4 executes (1) 42:16 exempt (1) 44:7 exempted (1) 44:3 exercise (5) 24:25 53:24 54:10 133:3 154:18 exercised (4) 17:6 24:23 40:17 54:8 exercises (1) 53:8 exercising (2) 39:17 43:21 exert (1) 22:15 exhaustive (1) 156:15 exhibit (16) 31:4 49:2.2 77:23 85:1 92:23 94:17,23 99:6 101:11,14 106:6 108:18 135:23 138:22 148:18 exist (3) 39:6 125:13 131:3 existed (1) 37:13 existence (2) 66:8 113:24 existing (6) 9:20 10:2,5,12 11:1 20:15 exists (1) 123:14 expand (1) 102:18 expect (5) 16:12 104:22 123:5 137:8 151:4 expectation (3) 2:25 4:13 17:25 expectations (1) 17:20 expected (8) 17:9 66:16 77:4 78:8,13 114:18,25 154:13 expecting (1) 147:14 experienced (1) 5:8 expert (15) 8:10,16 16:22 41:4 48:14,16 64:10 90:8,10 97:13 104:2 114:4 129:1.2 137:12 experts (29) 13:15 16:2 20:4 23:1 25:25 26:8,9,19,21 27:6,17 28:16,20 29:5 33:21 48:1 66:3 68:8 73:17 78:10 81:9.25 82:12.19 86:19 116:25 129:17 130:5 137:14 explain (6) 30:2 53:18 69:11 123:19 137:18 138:3 explained (12) 6:20 12:21,23 13:23,25 29:3 41:3 63:17 110:18 120:11 128:24 135:5 explaining (1) 36:25 explanation (1) 123:12 explanations (1) 55:14 exploding (1) 36:22

exposed (2) 63:1,9

implications (2) 4:24 37:3

exposure (1) 63:9 expounding (1) 121:16 express (2) 58:17 100:16 expressing (1) 66:7 expressly (4) 48:23 58:20 65:2.7 expropriate (1) 70:20 expropriated (2) 70:19 123.15 expropriation (2) 127:7,12 extend (1) 69:20 extended (1) 27:16 extensive (2) 27:14 111:19 extent (8) 14:9 47:6 54:8 60:17 112:1 114:15 145:4,13 extract (20) 10:24 12:18 22.8 23.7 24.20 31.9 12 41:1 44:8 84:5 92:14 93:4,15,22 96:14 100:14 106:21 114:17 115:4 116:10 extracted (5) 92:22 104:5 108:4 117:14 118:2 extracts (4) 34:20 58:1 102.22.24 extraordinarily (3) 5:3 38:4 60:15 extraordinary (4) 33:4 81:11 82:21 83:1 extreme (1) 117:9 extremely (4) 92:13,17 133:16 155:17 f (1) 84:20 fabricated (3) 35:18 102:3,9 fabrications (1) 34:11 face (1) 65:7 faced (1) 72:9 factor (3) 43:4.6 147:5 factors (5) 47:2.11.12 75:16 96:8 factual (6) 8:23 11:12 18:1 31:9 146:23 148:3 factually (1) 98:4 fail (2) 54:11 73:24 failed (3) 64:20 65:4,9 failure (2) 28:19 74:22 fair (20) 2:18 12:23 67:4 93:22 94:4.12 117:1,3,5,5,22 119:19 120:21 121:3 124:1,20,22 125:25 127:12 130:15 fairly (1) 2:23 fairness (2) 93:25 94:1 fall (3) 55:5 60:2 88:20 fallacy (1) 18:2 falls (1) 130:17 false (2) 121:5 122:9 falsifying (1) 37:15 falsity (1) 31:11 familiar (3) 12:20 18:24 46:3 family (18) 2:4,10,15 3:2.9.10.13 6:5 11:1 12:24 15:18 22:14.20 66:25 68:23 79:16 95:24 126:12 familys (1) 13:6 famous (2) 84:8 139:24 fancy (1) 14:7 far (14) 4:10 9:17 21:11 23.19 87.7 93.5 113.2 127:14 129:2 134:4 136:14 142:16 151:12 155:17 fashion (1) 101:16 fast (1) 74:7 favour (16) 7:7 10:19 32:8 33:1,24 35:3,15 36:12 60:24 81:1 84:23 92:17 111:22 112:3 137:21 139:6 favourable (2) 18:12.13 favours (1) 123:5 fear (5) 29:8 120:13,15 129:11.25 fears (2) 75:15,20

feasibility (1) 13:15 features (1) 129:22 february (3) 94:22 99:6 148:19 feel (4) 1:25 152:13 153:13 156:17 fees (1) 56:6 fellow (1) 28:7 few (9) 15:13 34:22 37:24 38:4 59:12 81:2 83:11 144:14 155:1 fewer (1) 111:20 figure (6) 75:3 77:16 131:19,20,22 133:14 figures (12) 113:4,4,13 115:20 132:7,20,21,23 133:10,22 134:5 143:2 filed (3) 74:21 153:25 154:1 final (6) 10:23 23:19 65:1 77:19 92:14 157:1 finally (5) 39:24 57:3 63:14 68:2 108:11 financial (1) 52:11 find (17) 17:14,15 24:14 28:5,19 31:23 32:21 36:2,23 37:1 49:1 50:5 52.13 104.23 106.1 110.21 150.6 finding (11) 11:1 103:24 104:11,13,14,16 105:18,20,25 106:8,11 findings (3) 10:22 20:15 31:9 finds (1) 103:18 fine (4) 51:2 52:23 53:1 154.23 firms (1) 13:2 first (49) 14:13 21:9,17,18 27:18 28:21 29:16 30:1 33:10 37:20 41:17.24 44:8 46:16 50:7 51:11 52:13 61:16 66:23 67:22 68:11 75:8,17 77:6 84:7 85:8 89:3 91:22 92:24 94:13.21 97:5 103:24 105:14 120:8 121:15 125:2 126:9.22 128:20 129:23 134:15 135:20 137:25 138:4 143:13 147:17 153:21 155:21 five (3) 5:16 152:5,7 fix (1) 152:13 fixed (2) 14:24 94:15 fixing (1) 15:3 flight (1) 14:7 flippant (1) 139:16 floor (1) 89:13 fly (1) 91:10 focus (12) 9:15 11:11,13 18:10 21:2 23:18 25:5 67:9.18 76:18 89:20 92:3 focused (1) 9:17 focusing (1) 21:17 follow (3) 34:19 82:15 131:3 followed (1) 4:4 following (11) 14:6 21:23 28:18 33:3 56:1 81:13.14 114:25 137:24 153:18 154:1 follows (6) 4:3 65:15 82:3 91:11 95:19 108:25 food (1) 123:4 footnote (1) 84:25 force (2) 61:10 98:12 forecast (1) 133:15 foreign (1) 43:7 forget (1) 10:2 forging (1) 37:16 forgive (1) 59:24 form (5) 40:7,8 44:14,19 156:12 formal (2) 97:22 98:13 former (1) 2:9 formula (2) 140:6,8 fortnight (5) 83:19 85:17 86:11 87:6 125:19 forward (8) 23:3 64:23

141.20 151.16 forwardlooking (1) 40:22 found (14) 2:15 17:8 24:4.10 27:21 31:15.20.25 34:9 47:25 48:6 69:4 91:12 140:18 four (1) 75:6 fourth (2) 85:8 114:12 frame (2) 63:23 72:25 framework (5) 53:10,12 59:21 64:4.9 frankly (1) 95:9 fraud (1) 33:15 free (1) 111:1 freedom (1) 58:15 freely (1) 49:22 frequent (1) 96:20 fresh (1) 156:14 friday (6) 1:1 81:9.13 85:4 136:4 138:19 friends (24) 1:19 9:10,22 10:3 21:1,15 22:23 42:25 44:25 46:19 52:24 56:8 59:24 83:16,20 84:5 111:15 112:5 126:14 127.17 128.5 138.22 155.10 15 front (2) 39:9 117:15 fruitful (1) 153:6 fruits (1) 153:7 fsc (2) 52:11.15 fulfil (2) 53:25 57:13 full (8) 40:13 47:18 61:22 62.11 78.18 103.2 113.24 151:7 fuller (1) 34:11 fully (3) 52:23 111:23 125:1 function (4) 43:22 53:24 57:10 63:6 functional (1) 48:9 functions (6) 47:24 53:8 54:14 57:21 58:21 59:1 fund (24) 16:14 18:13.16.20.24 25:3.23.24 39:10 43:23 44:22 45:4,10 53:8,9 54:24 55:6,18 56:20,24 57:7,11 90:12 108:18 fundamental (2) 18:24 58:7 fundamentally (2) 69:10 71:19 funds (1) 18:12 further (27) 4:11 39:23 40:10 42:22 44:20 46:14 47:2,3 55:14 62:5,23 71:18 73:20 74:23 78:2 89:7.12 91:2 101:1 109:17 111:16 133:15 140:21 144:4 148:1,2 158:10 furthermore (2) 89:6 112:12 future (4) 40:1.2.12 66:19 G gain (2) 128:3 130:21 gained (2) 6:16 62:2 gains (3) 62:5,17 63:19 galvanised (1) 66:18 gap (1) 133:15 garden (1) 128:22 garibaldi (9) 80:21 81:5 82:3.14 91:2 124:12 137:19 140:24 144:10 gauge (2) 57:25 137:10 gave (7) 3:21 8:10,17 30:19 34:8 115:8 139:24 general (13) 10:8 13:20 28:12 29:9 54:23 60:15 63:9 81:11 82:22 83:1 122.14 141.24 148.25 generally (2) 17:25 94:10 generate (3) 2:19,22 13:22 generation (1) 6:19 gentlemen (1) 1:3 georgios (1) 41:10

113-9 14 115-25 135-1

get (4) 117:17 123:5 140:15 142.25 getting (1) 22:17 give (12) 8:24 33:13 72:22 78:17 80:6 116:25 127:12 138:16 145:24 146:1 148:16 156:11 giveaway (1) 6:9 given (15) 11:7 23:25 33:6 46:7,8 48:20 59:6 71:24 99:12 113:5.11 118:10 131:3 139:12 143:22 gives (6) 15:1 63:23 88:25 113:3 136:8 146:4 goes (7) 4:10 46:21,23 93:2 99:17 127:2 150:24 going (14) 10:20 35:6 66:20 71:16 74:15 79:8 80:22 89.19 92.16 137.16 139.6 145:9 151:15 154:8 goldman (2) 100:21,23 gone (6) 3:10 34:18 67:7 74:14 78:6 155:17 good (15) 1:3,7,11 41:12 47:11 62:9 73:8 83:12,15 89:17 95:4,6 151:24 155.21 156.6 gotten (1) 91.4 gov (1) 99:11 governance (7) 12:25 122:19 123:19,20,22 132:12 136:6 governed (2) 87:10 124:10 government (21) 3:15,25 7:15 11:5 16:10,21 20:11 25.1 12 30.18 32.1 9 33.4 52:20 54:9 70:9.19 98:20,25 99:9 111:6 governmental (21) 4:10,23 6:1 7:20 11:18 17:9.15.25 23:12 25:20 43:22 53:5,18,19,22 54:3,21 55:8,11,12 70:2 governments (1) 50:18 granted (2) 29:24 105:11 graph (1) 134:14 grateful (2) 1:22 155:13 great (4) 41:18 106:13 134:16 155:12 greater (5) 5:11 6:19,21 38:23 69:11 greatly (1) 156:2 green (1) 132:22 gross (10) 4:22 16:21 17:9,25 113:15,16 131:17,19,22 132:7 grossed (2) 131:23 133:1 grossing (1) 133:4 ground (3) 42:19 54:20 120.8 grounds (2) 79:4 119:23 group (14) 2:6 3:3 10:25 11:25 12:8.13 13:2 31:18 62:2 88:14 99:24 101:18 123:6 136:6 groups (1) 3:19 grudging (1) 9:3 guarantee (1) 91:25 guess (1) 148:12 guide (1) 105:2 guidelines (12) 25:23,24 26:3,14,15 27:23 56:18 103:13,16 107:8 108:18 109:7 gukgagigwan (2) 48:6 49:21 gump (1) 13:3 gun (3) 146:5,5,11 н habitual (1) 60:9 hadnt (2) 32:9 83:22 half (2) 66:14 106:15 ham (2) 100:13.16 han (1) 35:9 hand (7) 12:1,3 16:20 26:15

87:25 88:7 98:20

handled (1) 107:15

hands (2) 154:20 156:6 hanhwa (1) 73:23 happened (10) 7:10,17 21:16.22 22:23 31:6 32:14 40:20 67:10 111:14 happens (4) 33:9 124:5 126:12 153:8 happy (2) 46:1 58:3 hard (3) 41:14 72:4 156:9 harder (2) 37:25 38:1 harmed (1) 61:8 hart (1) 32:22 hasnt (1) 57:9 haul (1) 83:19 havent (4) 31:2 34:1 112:23 127:2 having (7) 44:12 47:22 102:15 129:6 131:23 133.24 141.19 head (2) 31:17 73:19 heads (1) 62:25 health (7) 3:22 26:24 42:4,6 51:22 52:4 56:17 hear (1) 53:4 heard (32) 1:23 9:14 11:13 13:8 15:13 25:13 26:11 59.13 67.12 69.6 76.23 81.10 82.12 86.10 88.3 91:25 94:11 95:5 97:7 98:18 101:15,24 107:20 120:8 124:11 125:18 127:1 130:25 134:16 142:21 143:8 144:4 hearing (17) 9:18 13:9 31:3 42.23 51.14 83.21 91.11 92:2 103:7 109:19 114:15 144:15 152:21 155:5,25 156:5 157:10 hearings (3) 29:23,24 124:14 hears (2) 39:24 117:16 heart (2) 15:8 26:4 heartily (1) 20:12 heir (1) 3:13 held (3) 22:16 67:1 118:25 help (3) 23:22 100:11 150:20 helped (1) 28:4 helpful (4) 151:5 152:19 155:3,6 here (35) 4:15 5:3 16:15,25 17:10,16 18:25 21:4 28:2 37:6 43:25 45:3 52:2.6.15 66:23 68:25 70:22 72:16 78:4 79:5.21 85:16 98:9.22 102:16 103:15 105:21 111:24 115:16 118:18 126:10 134:5 137:13 148:15 herring (1) 142:14 hes (2) 8:19 33:20 hierarchy (1) 52:7 high (16) 2:3 3:13 23:25 24:3.9 40:24 41:2 73:20 75:2 125:17 138:9 139:8 140:4 142:6 150:12 156:3 higher (5) 36:7,10,12 55:9 139.7 highest (2) 76:8 132:10 highlight (1) 90:2 highlighted (3) 92:14 96:14 114:16 highlights (3) 85:22 89:20 109:12 highly (1) 132:14 himself (9) 9:4 27:17 65:2 67:13 71:25 104:4 120:1 134:6.7 hindsight (1) 15:23 historical (1) 78:1 hits (1) 32:16 hold (2) 41:19 53:7 holder (1) 57:17 holding (18) 43:5 71:11 75:10 76:1,11,25 77:4 97:2 128:21.22 129:13.19 133:25 134:1.20 135:9.11 149:23

holdings (8) 37:4 38:22 101:17 111:19,20 112:1,1 130:11 holds (1) 98:11 hole (1) 38:5 holiday (1) 156:10 holistic (4) 38:7,17 39:3 101:16 holistically (1) 37:7 home (1) 157:6 honest (1) 107:3 (3) 10:15 84:16 99:23 honore (1) 32:22 honour (1) 140:25 honours (1) 153:13 hope (5) 59:23 80:21 82:3 109:18 146:18 hopefully (1) 154:3 hour (1) 83:4 hours (1) 106:15 house (8) 16:1 22:5,17 23:13 42:3,12 82:6 117:17 housekeeping (4) 151:15,17 153:8 158:12 houses (1) 20:7 housing (1) 123:6 huge (1) 37:22 hundreds (1) 3.6 hyperlinked (1) 5:23 ic (1) 106:6 id (1) 90:5 idea (2) 20:22 117:9 ideas (1) 100:4 identified (6) 8:19 39:11 66:20 71:7 100:10 129:6 identifies (1) 22:13 identify (1) 76:14 identifying (2) 22:10 72:2 ie (6) 9:2 40:21 64:1 80:4 122:13 133:11 ifs (1) 121:25 ignore (1) 20:5 ignored (5) 19:16 25:9,10 73:17 77:25 ignores (3) 20:25 45:22 108:24 ilc (9) 45:15 46:1,16,17 47:4.7.8 53:6.14 ill (8) 53:15 55:14 61:23 71:17 84:6 86:20 140:21 146:1 illdefined (1) 40:11 illegal (2) 6:1 33:4 illegality (3) 16:21 17:9 98:23 illness (1) 32:20 illustrated (1) 75:13 illustration (2) 142:20,24 illustrative (1) 143:6 ilsung (1) 39:24 im (33) 11:6 35:6 43:17 46:1 54:4 58:3 62:22 66:23 71:16 74:7 78:4 79:8.10 80:12.24 85:19 89:19 99:9 100:25.25 103:22 118:16 127:2 141:12,14 147:7 148:15 149:13,13 153:5,12,16 155:15 imagine (1) 155:18 immediate (3) 63:18 64:1 137.6 immediately (6) 6:17,24 44:11 60:14 64:23 65:16 immunity (2) 43:9,12 impact (5) 29:8 73:8 74:2,18 80:13 impacts (1) 69:7 impair (1) 16:13 impairment (1) 39:10 impairs (1) 4:13 impeachment (1) 4:4 implausible (2) 132:14 135:19

implemented (3) 6:18 14:5.9

implied (1) 133:4 implies (1) 131:25 importance (4) 16:5 43:4 99:7 101:15 important (13) 11:23 16:15 21:7 22:25 23:2 48:13 50:9 73:18 82:15 86:20 110:16 132:4 153:7 importantly (3) 40:16 69:24 100.7 impounded (1) 79:2 imprecise (1) 110:8 impression (1) 49:14 imprimatur (1) 105:11 improprieties (1) 31:10 impugned (1) 93:12 impugning (1) 95:13 imputing (1) 76:25 inappropriate (2) 28:9 30:7 incentives (1) 136:7 inception (1) 21:24 include (3) 4:7 110:2 130:10 included (1) 62:20 includes (3) 5:22 120:10 132:7 including (4) 11:4,25 119:18 138.8 incontrovertible (1) 45:12 incorporated (3) 8:4 73:4 78:13 increase (7) 6:8,11,12 8:25 9:3 89:10 137:1 increased (2) 61:18 67:20 increasing (2) 62:8 74:22 incredible (2) 66:8 128:13 independence (2) 19:2 46:8 independent (5) 4:3 16:2 42:13 123:1 124:14 independently (1) 10:11 index (1) 158:1 indicator (1) 8:14 indictment (6) 9:25 23:8 24:19.21 122:17 144:20 indirect (1) 52:21 indirectly (2) 52:3,17 individual (4) 7:20 100:9 104:23 118:5 individually (1) 36:1 industries (2) 85:13 148:11 inevitable (1) 92:25 inevitably (1) 47:25 inexorable (1) 60:22 inexorably (1) 96:8 inexpert (1) 64:16 inference (2) 86:5 119:24 inflated (1) 75:18 inflicted (1) 70:15 influence (4) 22:15 23:8 24:23 140:5 influencing (1) 24:24 informal (1) 101:13 information (9) 72:23 73:3 78:14 79:3 82:10 121:5 122:9,10 149:1 informing (1) 27:20 inherent (1) 8:4 inheritance (1) 2:5 injunction (1) 74:21 inserted (1) 47:14 inserting (1) 28:25 insofar (1) 125:13 instantaneously (4) 65:23 66:13 72:25 78:12 instead (3) 11:11 38:9 72:1 institution (2) 48:24,25 institutions (2) 48:23 58:11 instruction (3) 25:12.20 37:24 instructions (2) 10:10 23:12 instrumentality (1) 43:10 integrated (1) 122:21 integrity (1) 71:13 intended (5) 33:7 77:7 83:22 131:5 156:16 intends (1) 93:9

Opus 2 Official Court Reporters

mean (5) 26:13 57:7

intensive (1) 1:17 intent (2) 125:20 146:10 intention (1) 65:3 interested (7) 80:24 141:1.12.14.19 149:13.14 interesting (5) 19:7 85:9 129:22 134:25 151:14 interestingly (1) 139:4 interests (3) 37:12 71:16 96.10 interfered (1) 28:16 interference (1) 111:6 intermediary (1) 100:11 internal (7) 16:6 27:9,13 43:15 99:5 100:4 148:9 internally (1) 22:13 international (16) 2:2 4:2,25 45:14.23 46:12.13 50:15.22 51:3 52:25 53:2 93.12 98.23 147.2.5 interpret (1) 136:9 interpretation (2) 27:22,25 interpreted (2) 119:4 144:17 interpreters (1) 156:8 interrelationship (1) 90:11 intervene (1) 10:10 intervened (2) 32:9,12 intervention (7) 3:25 6:1,3 20:8 25:2 29:4 32:1 interventions (1) 30:6 interviews (1) 34:6 into (27) 30:11 46:14 54:23,23 58:12,18 60:3 65:18 66:20 68:19 69:8 72.21 73.4 110.17 115.1 120:6.23 122:21 125:4 129:3 130:17 132:21 136:11 138:2 141:10 144:2 156:21 intrinsic (10) 61:22 62:12 76:15,15 77:23 78:19 117:25 118:7,9 119:16 introduce (1) 145:15 introducing (2) 87:3 110:24 introduction (2) 9:14 89:13 introductory (1) 88:2 intuit (2) 104:9,10 intuition (1) 104:13 invalidate (1) 122:19 invest (1) 56:11 invested (3) 2:23 3:6 66:25 investigation (2) 4:3.4 investigations (1) 4:5 investing (2) 17:2 149:2 investment (89) 4:11,21,24 7:18 8:3 10:15,19 12:11 18:15,17 26:1,5,6,7 27:4,10,13,20 31:17,18 33:13,17 35:13 36:3,24 37:1.9 39:8 42:9.15 60:12 61:1.18 62:1.12 63:7.25 66:21 67:22 73:23 77:12,14 81:8,14,15,20,24 82:5,21 84:9,15,22 86:14,15 96:20 101:7.10.21 102:1,2,7,14,21 103:3.5.11.18 104:7.9.21 105:19.21.23 106:9 108:8,9 109:1,2,10 110:18 111:4,12 112:6 113:16 118:24 131:6,7 138:20 141:3 investments (4) 96:21 130:12 132:3,8 investor (10) 2:16,17 4:22 13:19 17:8 94:14 95:15 96:7 97:14 98:7 investors (2) 4:13 117:10 invite (7) 30:18 33:2 55:25 59:9 90:5 92:20 109:15 invites (1) 53:7 involve (3) 12:22 17:5 18:2 involved (4) 8:19 26:17 76:23 127:23 involvement (2) 70:2 134:17 involving (3) 17:21 93:16 114:6 irc (1) 18:8 irrelevant (1) 32:14 irreversible (1) 61:6 isnt (4) 15:23 32:22 40:22 139:20 isolate (2) 63:7 141:11 isolating (1) 141:24 iss (1) 136:16 issued (1) 105:8 issues (18) 20:6 41:13,20 42:18 59:14 121:7 132:12,13 146:11 151:14 152:17 154:24 155:1,2 156:4,17,20,24 issuing (1) 10:9 items (4) 122:15 151:18 152:10.23 its (104) 2:20.21 3:12 6:17,18 7:23 9:20 10:12 12:14,19 13:14,16,16,21 15:21 16:9 17:21 24:18.19 30:23,24 31:1,4,5,6,15 39:25 45:5,20 46:16,25 48:10,10 49:2,16 56:8.15.15.25 57:12 58:24 60.25 61.25 62.12 21 63:12,18 70:20 72:4,9 73:22 74:2 79:11 80:3,15 83:19 85:21 87:12 89:11 90:4.15 92:9.23 93:7 94:21,22,23 97:12,12 99:3,6 100:2 101-6 16 17 25 103-9 9 107:2 110:22 113:9 115:23 116:15 117:14,20 118:24 119:1,13 128:7,17 129:21.22 131:5.12 134:16,25 135:15 142:22 143:6 148:5 149:19 150:2 155:5 156:4 itself (22) 12:14,15 16:2 20:24 26:1 30:22 31:13.25 36:4 39:11 40:24 42:23 43:6 47:8 59:1 65:12 69:5 71:13,20 73:12 88:25 110:4 iames (3) 12:5.21 13:24 january (2) 88:8 131:21 (1) 35:9 joined (1) 7:25 judge (1) 78:21 judgment (1) 44:12 judgments (1) 43:25 judicial (2) 20:15 105:11 judicially (2) 4:1 24:17 iulia (1) 153:9 july (40) 6:2,4 8:1,3 20:21 21:13,13 23:21,21,25 27:19 28:17 29:7,9 30:6 36:3 38:20.24 60:14 77:21 81:9,10,12,15,17,18,21,22,23 84:10 85:3 101:10 126:17.19 127:8 138:19.25 139:1 142:3.4 junction (1) 136:5 june (8) 16:6 22:24 23:1,14 31:5 36:20 37:20 74:20 juridical (2) 17:23 45:21 jurisdiction (2) 17:7 49:25 justification (5) 17:5 37:8,13 38:18 154:12 justified (1) 35:18 justify (1) 121:12 (11) 3:14 10:25 20:16,19 21:10,18 22:12 23:20 65:2 122:17 136:7 kamco (3) 43:3,5,6

key (8) 5:9 16:11 53:14 59:20 67:6,12 82:9 91:17 kills (1) 146:5 kim (19) 35:16 44:1.12 48:16 49:4,6,9,18 50:2,9,25 51:5,15 52:12,24 55:18 56:6 57:3,20 kind (4) 4:1,10 48:11 146:11 knew (21) 2:17 15:25 16:6.6.11 77:18 88:11.12.13.16.89:1.94:13 95:12.14 96:4.6.22.25 97:4 130:4 139:5 mow (34) 3:11 11:7 15:17 17:2,3,10 19:18 23:19 26:4,23 32:9 43:11 56:2.9.23 57:3 68:21 79:14 88.24 94.14 95.22 96.7 100:23 106:21 111:13 126:14 128:19 135:1 136:19 139:16 146:24 147:1.11 151:24 knowing (2) 16:19 33:17 knowingly (1) 61:13 knowledge (4) 17:24 34:11 82.24 129.23 known (10) 17.16 34.24 35:14 81:19 85:6 88:22 95:15 123:23 139:20 149:21 knows (2) 137:14 139:18 kong (1) 99:23 korea (50) 3:19 17:17 24:16 33.23 42.21 43.11 13 45:1.11 49:8 50:13.25 51:7 53:7,10 55:10 57:23 58:2,9,14,22,24 70:7 87:9.11.17 88:12.25 94:14 95:15 96:7 97:14 112:16,18 120:14 123:10,14,17,18,20 124:10 128:23,23 129:1,2,12,18 132:21 137:14 146:21 korean (42) 2:8 3:14 6:10 9:25 13:16 16:4,22 17:7 34:6,6 40:3,24 43:2,5,25 44:25 48:3,5,11 51:2 55:16 56:3 57:17 66:4,11 84:22 87:22,23 88:23 90:13 91:12 94:7 97:11 99:7.25 113:17 115:13 135:25 140:12.16 144:24 148:25 koreas (17) 3:8,17 12:25 23:6 24:21 30:21 41:25 42:5 45:19 47:24 48:7,16,18 54:11,19 57:21 87:7 krw (1) 35:17 label (1) 71:5 ladies (1) 1:3 language (1) 110:8 large (4) 13:20 60:5 68:16 82:7 largest (1) 85:11 last (22) 1:17,23 5:5 11:14 16:16 17:13 19:23 22:23 35:25 53:3 59:12 83:19 85:16.23 86:11 87:6 125:19 143:7 144:14 146:20 155:25 156:9 later (10) 14:8 20:21 22:2 37:24 38:4 61:13,24 89:8 148:8 154:25 latter (4) 2:10 92:1 140:3 147:23 layers (1) 127:12 lead (4) 5:17 29:1 39:4 121:2 leading (3) 16:9 112:13 140:7 leads (4) 6:25 14:19 20:7 50:11

kept (1) 12:5

leaked (4) 84:15 138:23 139:2 141:4 leant (1) 26:23 learned (41) 5:4 9:22 32:15 40:6 83:16.20 84:3.5.13 85:17 86:13 87:25 88:3 93:10 110:5 111:14 112:5,23 113:12,14,20 123:7 124:12 125:23 126:1,14,17,24 127:17 128:5.14 130:24 131:1 138:22 139:12 21 21 140:10 141:23 155:15.22 least (19) 2:13 3:3 7:6 17:23 20:2 62:11 68:16 69:21 83:10 98:21 103:7 104:1 116:21 133:5 134:21 135:19 146:25 147:25 155.5 leave (9) 46:1 53:15 58:4 71:17 96:17 105:1 125:22 126:5 154:24 leaves (1) 121:1 leaving (1) 131:10 led (7) 6:8,10,18 32:25 67:2 96:9 126:6 (36) 2:4,10,15 3.2 10 13 14 6.5 10.25 11:1 12:23 13:6 14:23 15:17 20:16,19 21:10,18 22:12,13,20 23:20 41:3 48:8 65:2 66:25 68:23 79:16 90:8,9 91:3 104:2,3,7 122:17 136:7 (2) 91:9 104:14 left (7) 21:11 25:24 38:5 92:7,14 93:16,23 lefthand (6) 51:21,24 54:17 58:10 90:15 134:14 legal (23) 17:19 18:2,21 19:7 20:24 43:15 45:20 46:11,13 47:1,6,10,24 54:13 58:1 87:8.23 108:2.10 146:23 147:1.9.11 legally (3) 28:4 32:14 61:19 legislation (1) 4:12 legitimate (3) 4:13 17:20 85:19 length (9) 5:12 41:18 56:18 86:1 99:19 106:14 117:1 151:22 154:14 lengths (2) 3:11.11 lengthy (2) 13:10 101:8 less (9) 23:10 53:9 64:7 74:19 78:9 94:21 117:19 153:16 154:15 lesser (1) 113:2 lesson (1) 119:15 lest (1) 144:17 let (33) 5:12 7:12 17:19 20:25 22:3 27:2 30:22 32:3 41:23 47:11 48:16 51:21 52:5 53:12 55:2 57:24 83:16 88:2 94:10 96:17 99:13 105:1.2 109:23 110:12 120:5 126:8 134:6 137:18 139:2 144:12 145:24 146:20 lets (28) 9:23 10:1 11:17 12:21 18:7,23 21:16 22:21,25 23:3,17 25:1,5 30:3 32:23 33:9,10 34:4,22 35:6.25 37:19 40:25 45:23 50:11 81:6 146:3 153:10 letter (9) 21:19 28:4,5 38:23 94:19:20.22.24 125:20 level (9) 51:21.24.25 52:6,10,10 101:19 102:1 156:3 levels (1) 135:19 leverage (1) 65:9 Ig (2) 134:17 135:10 liability (8) 5:2 88:1 89:15,22 91:17 109:13 132:11 147:22

liberate (1) 13:22 lies (1) 15:8 light (12) 30:20 57:14 78:10 87:17 89:11 110:7.10.17 111:1 112:4 132:22 137:23 like (18) 1:4 2:1 8:17 44:4 50:3 52:21 70:7 71:1 83:9 87:4 121:22 122:10 137:16 147:1,8,11 152:17 155:8 likelihood (1) 74:11 likely (7) 12:9 74:8,19,19 97:2 139:19 154:15 limit (2) 102:17 154:3 limited (2) 9:3 11:12 limits (1) 41:3 line (14) 52:16 79:11,24 91:4 120:4 121:12,23 137:25 138:4,18 139:9 142:5,19 143:7 lines (3) 51:15 94:6 138:2 lingard (13) 88:1,15 89:14,16,17 109:22 110:18 130:24 135:4 148:15 149:3,15 158:9 lingards (1) 111:9 link (1) 55:10 list (4) 8:24 122:15 133:23 152.10 listed (12) 13:3 75:17,18,19,25 118:25 130:11,12 132:7 149:24 150:1.3 listing (14) 79:23,23 80:1,7,7,8,18 118:21 139:24 140:1.7 150:4.7.10 lists (1) 26:3 literally (2) 15:24 64:25 litigation (10) 39:20 40:23 41:2 73:21 116:11 138:8 139:9 140:15 142:6 150:13 little (5) 18:13 21:15 37:25 38:1 79:10 loaded (2) 146:4,10 lobby (1) 99:8 local (1) 50:18 located (1) 42:3 logic (1) 70:12 logical (2) 126:3 151:19 logically (1) 97:14 logistical (1) 155:2 logs (1) 13:4 long (5) 18:14 21:22 83:19 114:19 154:22 longer (5) 101:12 123:2 140:14 143:8 150:10 longstanding (1) 2:16 longterm (2) 77:4,19 look (31) 16:24 17:11 18:4 22:3,4 26:16 30:3 33:9 37:6 38:3 45:7.23 50:11 52:5 54:4 85:7 87:12.16 110:6.12 113:16.23 120:5 121:1 127:4,6 132:17 134:13 135:10 136:14 141:20 looked (4) 44:1 56:24 57:20 134:15 looking (5) 19:21 113:11 127:24 132:9 147:7 looks (3) 1:4 83:9 112:25 loosely (1) 149:20 lopsided (1) 61:8 lose (3) 37:6 63:1 98:7 loss (35) 5:17 38:22,25 40:18 60:25 61:3 63:4,18,20 68:25 70:15 16 72:4 13 87:1 110:22 113:3.17 115:23.24 116:1.4.6 126:4,7,7,11,11 138:17 143:14,14,18,20,23 144:2 losses (6) 61:16 62:21 63:13,16,21 116:8 lost (1) 8:7 lot (6) 14:22 28:14 88:3 97:7 107:20 146:21

low (3) 71:12 76:20 133:16

155:6

123:23.24 lowest (1) 133:13 lunch (2) 83:4 139:13 maffezini (3) 147:8,9,9 magic (1) 135:12 magnitude (3) 137:1,5,11 main (1) 53:13 mainstream (1) 48:11 maintain (2) 12:24 89:25 maintained (1) 6:17 maintaining (2) 2:5 24:19 maintains (1) 143:8 major (5) 3:18 6:8 10:24 19.14 42.2 maiority (1) 19:11 makes (8) 18:10 45:15 51:3 55:4,22 59:20 98:7 104:12 making (5) 18:14,21 65:1 121:13 122:25 malfeasance (1) 42:2 malfunctioning (1) 121:16 man (1) 38:15 manage (1) 45:4 managed (1) 25:4 management (8) 18:25 19:1 26:5,7 27:4 43:2 44:22 56:25 manager (3) 31:17 53:9 56:20 managers (2) 31:19 95:17 manages (1) 45:10 managing (2) 53:7 57:10 mandate (3) 45:3,7 57:1 mandatorily (3) 94:25 95:1,3 mandatory (1) 54:18 manipulated (1) 10:17 manipulation (14) 7:13 69:7,15,18,22 121:2,6,8 122:5.18 124:2.9 139:20 144:21 manner (3) 12:24 16:13 56:19 manoeuvre (1) 2:3 many (6) 3:6 8:22 18:9 48:20 74:12 123:5 march (3) 77:14 98:15 153:21 marked (1) 100:6 market (90) 4:18 7:13,23 63:6,10 65:20 66:13,14,15 68:1,17 69:7,15,18,22 70:2.18 71:3 73:12 74:7.12 79:2 82:7.9.11 88:23 94:15.24 95:4 117:1.3.5.5.8.8.12.18.22 118:8 119:2.12.14.19.20 120:5,6,9,14,15,16,18,22,22,24 121:3,3,13,18,24,25 122:14,19,21 123:23,23 124-1 20 21 21 22 125:21,24,25 127:10 128:15 130:13,14,15 133:2 136:8 138:18.24 139:5.8.18 141:2.10.14.24 144:20 markets (7) 16:22 41:5 66:4 94:17 129:17 130:4 149:1 massive (1) 127:24 materialised (1) 62:19 materials (2) 100:18,18 matrix (1) 47:12 matter (26) 10:11 19:8 26:19,22 28:19 40:4 41:17 44:17 64:14 70:12 101:2 103:19 104:10,23 105:25 106:2,11,12 107:6 109:2 110:2 111:11.16 114:7 125.23 146.2 matters (12) 18:18 26:7.10 41:15 59:8 107:11,17,19 108:21 109:6 111:3 144:5 maybe (4) 151:18 152:9,23

lower (4) 15:22 36:21

134:3.10 146:16 meaning (2) 4:24 78:19 meaningfully (1) 69:25 means (9) 15:1 18:13 57:8 58:21 70:15 117:3 122:1 125:24 150:22 meant (1) 93:24 measurable (1) 124:20 measure (3) 70:13,17 137:11 measures (1) 62:10 measuring (2) 70:17,18 mechanical (1) 36:16 mechanically (2) 133:10,18 mechanism (6) 15:1 61:7 104:12,13 105:24 106:1 media (1) 84:15 median (4) 134:3,7,8,9 meet (2) 13:6 87:20 meeting (35) 20:20 21:9,12,18,22 22:5,11 23:20,23 24:2,4 28:17 29:10 30:6 35:14 36:3.15 37:2 60:15 81:8,9,11,15 82:22 83:1 84:9,15 101:10,13 105:19,25 107.21 108.14 20 109.5 meetings (3) 20:19 36:24 37:10 member (2) 33:12 104:8 members (79) 1:7,15,24 3:3 4:15 5:2.20 7:4 8:22 9:9.13 10:23 11:1,9,22 12:10 14:7 15:23 17:3 18:4 20:10 21:4 22.3 24.8 15 25.17 26.11 27:16 28:8.14 29:25 31:1,14,19,22 32:4,11 33:18,22 34:1,4,17,21 35:7.21 36:14 37:8 38:16 39:7,9 41:8,12 44:17 45:12 52:18 55:16 57:14 59:3,6,12 89:17 90:5 91:8 94:19 99:21 101:8 102:2.7.14.19.20 103:2 104:21 107:24 108:16 123:9 126:10 153:9,17 memo (3) 22:4,7,10 memoire (1) 47:17 memorable (2) 9:22 45:2 mention (2) 37:10,11 mere (2) 11:7 57:12 merely (2) 15:23 74:11 merged (7) 72:22 75:12,14,18,25 78:25 123:3 merger (207) 2:7 3:1,16,24 6:2,4,6,7,15 7:3,5,7,7,10,18,25 8:5,6,8,8,15 9:1 10:20 11:4.21 12:1.1.15.22 14:14.16.20.24 15:4.5.10 17:18 19:19.24 20:17.21 21:22 22:1 23:2,11,24 24:18 32:8 33:1,25 35:4,19 36:12,19,20 37:3,21 39:17 40:21 42:8.15 60:16.19.24 61:5,9,19 62:19 63:2,4 64:13.18.20.20.25 65:1.4.8.8.17.17.21.24 66:12 67:3.10.21 68:19.25 69:19 70:10 73:5,6,8,14,24 74:8,12,14,19,22,25 75:16.21 76:2.3.5 78:6.12.14 79:3 80:1.2 81:1 84:21.24 85:12 88:10.10.12.13 89:6.8 92:11.17.25 93:2.11.11.12.16.21 94:1,2,8,12,15,25 95:3,11,16,18,19 96:2,9,16,24 97:22,25 98:10,13,25 101:6 102:3 104:19 105:1.3.4.5.9.12.13.20.23 106:6.19 107:14 108:1 110:14,14 111:5,22

(1) 35:1

leak (1) 137:21

keen (1) 44:13

person (4) 45:21 46:11

129:11 146:10

112:3.13 114:23 115:2 120:10.11.13.14.20.23 123:2 125:4 126:17.20 127:9.15.16.20.23 128:13 134:17.22 135:1.16.17 136:3,4,13,17 137:22 138:5,13 139:6 140:5 141:6 mergers (5) 3:18 19:14,18 96:3 136:8 merging (1) 95:17 messages (1) 84:17 met (3) 27:20 138:20 149:6 method (4) 69:16 70:17,24 75:15 methodology (3) 67:24 70:22 71:2 methods (1) 71:22 meticulously (2) 61:8 64:21 metric (1) 72:19 middle (3) 17:17 55:13 114:16 midterm (1) 150:11 might (17) 32:7,13,19 37:7 39:3 62:5 71:22 72:17 98:25 102:2,8 106:17 110-19 123-15 129-4 150-5 152.4 milhaupt (9) 16:23 65:14 66:4 97:13 122:8 128:24 129:14.20 137:2 milhaupts (1) 123:11 million (11) 2:24 24:7 39:2 63:19,20 89:5 97:19,21 98.2 10 12 millionodd (3) 88:8 89:7.12 millions (1) 3:7 mind (7) 112:11 123:8 145:16 146:2,18 147:24 154:16 minds (1) 157:3 mine (1) 79:10 minimal (1) 155:19 minimise (2) 18:20 63:9 minimum (3) 17:22 91:23 92:4 minister (9) 10:6 42:6,20 51:19,22 52:1,4,7,17 ministerial (2) 25:7 27:13 ministers (1) 51:19 ministry (12) 3:22 26:24 27:5.9.11 28:1.15.24 29:4 42:4.12 56:17 ministrys (1) 30:5 minority (7) 2:18 15:7 62:2 65:9 66:18 67:1 123:15 minute (3) 55:15 77:1 125:14 minutes (11) 36:3 37:2 83:11 101:9,11 104:25 105:19 106:6 112:5 152:5.7 misconceived (1) 69:11 misconduct (3) 20:11,23,24 misinterpreted (1) 145:8 misstatement (2) 80:10,19 misunderstanding (1) 147:19 mix (1) 7:15 mobilised (1) 2:25 modelling (2) 71:6 93:14 models (1) 140:1 moment (6) 13:9 46:2 98:22 116:10 137:16 138:3 monday (2) 81:22 129:18 money (2) 2:24 128:17 monies (1) 54:22 month (1) 23:10 months (3) 22:2 97:5 149:23 (1) 10:6 more (43) 9:3,17 15:16 28:14 40:16 50:20 51:25 53:9 59:18 61:23,25 74:15,19,19 77:11,15,20 78:23 82:1 86:21 88:19 89:25 93:10 94:10 100:3.6 101:12 104:22 111:23 117:19 119:4 127:21

135:8.11.25 147:25 148:24 149:9 151:4.14 152:17 154:14.24 moreover (2) 66:17 77:8 morning (21) 1:3.7 11:11 27:19 41:13 83:17,24 88:4 93:19 107:21 108:12 111:18 112:5,14,22 115:18 120:9 127:1 128:15 136:3 138:24 nost (10) 3:8 7:4,9 15:7 76:22 98:9 125:16 132:6.10 157:7 mostly (2) 146:23 156:19 motivated (1) 20:8 move (11) 9:15 11:17 23:3 24:14 27:7 35:6 41:8 59:8 79:25 102:12 128:9 ent (10) 13:22 114:24 127:25 135:25 141:2,8,9,11,14,24 movements (1) 13:20 moves (1) 74:11 movie (1) 146:4 moving (2) 76:7 79:10 ms (24) 5:11 59:11,12 79.781221 80.10 16 18 21 81.3 84.3 112:24 113:12 123:7 126:2,18,24 128:14 131:1 139:12 153:13 158:6 much (24) 9:24 44:4 50:23 54:14 67:8,19,25 68:2,3 79:7 81:10 82:14 83:3,5 109-16 18 117-19 125-18 136:18 144:8 154:7 155:23 157:5,8 multiple (1) 54:12 multiplying (1) 38:14 multitude (1) 46:6 mundane (2) 19:11 154:24 murder (1) 32:18 musings (1) 71:21 must (16) 3:23 15:5 20:22 32:18 43:9 54:4.12 60:5 65:5 87:22 91:12 103:13,24 118:5 127:17 143:15 myself (1) 29:13 mystery (1) 68:15 N n (1) 10:25 namely (3) 62:17 122:8 134:15 narrowing (3) 78:7 129:8 133:15 nation (1) 56:3 national (21) 3:17 16:13 25:3 39:10 43:22 44:23 45:4 50:1 53:8 54:24,25 55:17,17 56:13,21 57:1,11 85:10 90:12 91:25 102:4 natural (1) 103:25 nature (5) 54:3 112:18 127:20 142:23 144:13 nav (7) 62:6.7.8 77:22 78:7 132:20 133:17 near (1) 117:17 necessarily (6) 21:25 59:16 60:5 83:11 89:2 96:16 ecessary (8) 26:10 33:5 55:10.21 104:17 108:21 121:13 154:4 need (32) 1:5 11:9 20:9,10 26:12,16 36:15 37:17,25 38:10 40:13 41:14.17 50:16 59:7 83:10 85:7 98:21 104:9,10 110:2,6,25 123:8 124:18,18,19 132:14 144:2 150:5 151:5 156:17 needed (5) 6:5 8:1 15:17 37:25 136:23 needs (8) 72:3 87:20 121:11 124:3,23 125:15 140:18 147:21

negative (1) 62:3 neither (5) 13:14 41:13 58:23 129:14 130:4 net (27) 8:11 63:20 94:3.9 116:17 118:14.23 119:3,10,13 120:2 129:8 130:10.18 131:4,12,14,17,19,22 132:6,9 133:7 134:23 139:25 142:14.15 netted (1) 39:21 neutralise (1) 114:19 never (10) 9:4 25:15 39:2.4 49:7 100:7 107:15 116:11 129:25 133:15 nevertheless (2) 19:13 25:19 news (7) 66:12,15 67:20 73:9 74:14,18,20 next (16) 8:6 23:23 25:11 26:2 35:6 40:25 115:9 118:2,7,12 120:25 129:15 138:18,24 139:9 140:24 nexus (1) 13:2 nobody (2) 110:8 136:25 nomura (1) 130:23 nondisclosure (1) 125:20 none (2) 27:14 71:8 nonetheless (2) 117:24 143:16 nor (12) 1:10 13:14 25:15 41:14 56:14,19 58:23 64:22 94:7 95:12 109:7 129:14 normal (2) 64:9 154:10 notable (1) 13:9 notably (3) 64:10 69:24 72:16 note (12) 17:19 64:15 74:16 96:17 97:4 99:5 101:13 105:1,2 115:16 116:14 126:1 noted (6) 33:12 38:10 74:4,10,20 112:22 notes (2) 84:20 143:11 nothing (13) 8:17,20 9:12,12 25:14 91:25 100:3 107:7 110:13 112:16 122:1 136:4 156:21 notice (1) 114:14 noting (1) 38:9 notion (4) 48:5 53:4,5,18 notwithstanding (4) 49:11 60:6 67:3 70:4 novel (1) 41:14 novelty (1) 49:11 november (7) 1:1 77:21 80:7,11,15,18 139:23 nps (117) 3:22 6:2,3 7:24 10:12 15:12,19,22 16:1,1,8,11,12 18:6,8 19:7.9.16.18 22:1.16.18 25:5.8.19 26:20 30:22 31:1,5,24,24 32:2,7 36:19 37:6,14,20,23 38:2,7,20,22,24,25 42:8.10.13.16 43:11.19 44:3,6,7,9,19 45:6,9,18,19 47:14.24 48:2.8.24 49:22 52:1.2.21 53:8 54:18 55:3.11.22 56:3,7,9,14,19,20,23 57:6,10,12,23 58:3,10,15,22,23 60:24 64:19 73:11.19.21 81:1 84:9,22,23 90:11,19,25 91:12 93:1 101:15 108:14 110:13.14 111:19 112:3.11 135:2 139:5 148:10.13.19 149:14 150:8 npsim (3) 26:4 27:20 31:18 npss (28) 10:15 19:4,24 20:3,8 23:9 24:24 26:1 27:4.24 33:1 37:4.11 38:22 43:14 44:22 45:3 54:14 55:19 57:15 84:16.21 93:5 101:5 110:4,10 137:21

138.21 number (18) 16:17 19:13 35:10 39:5 51:13,16 71:15 76:21 84:10 86:2 113:17 115:13 133:12 135:23 137:15,17 139:7 152:15 numbers (13) 38:14 60:4 113:5,9,11 115:25 132:1 133:4,18 137:17 141:25 142:3.7 0 object (1) 119:15 objection (1) 13:12 objections (3) 89:23,25 91:14 objective (4) 59:16 118:8 119:9.11 objectives (1) 13:6 obligations (1) 149:8 obscure (1) 70:16 observable (1) 72:20 observation (5) 60:2 62:23 94:13 95:14 96:6 observations (2) 56:1 94:10 observed (4) 6:25 8:12 76:8 118:20 observes (1) 76:5 observing (1) 133:2 obstruct (1) 40:13 obtained (7) 4:7 13:5 15:11 16:7 24:12 29:25 116:12 obvious (7) 11:24 12:4 16:22 33:3 49:16.17 115:3 obviously (8) 1:20 30:16 68:8 90:17 115:14 132:1 142:1 154:19 occasion (1) 57:19 occasions (1) 96:21 occupational (1) 10:21 occurred (2) 7:24 82:20 occurs (1) 42:10 october (1) 16:8 odd (1) 20:24 offences (1) 144:21 offend (1) 57:17 offer (2) 23:16 67:15 offered (4) 25:12 40:6 65:12 91:10 offering (1) 11:15 offers (1) 71:19 offhand (1) 144:23 office (2) 42:3 57:18 officer (1) 10:15 officers (1) 31:15 official (4) 10:9 45:15 46:1 53:15 offset (1) 114:24 offsetting (1) 62:24 often (1) 117:16 oftrepeated (1) 71:5 okay (3) 79:11 80:8,12 old (1) 1:19 once (12) 7:2 40:21 50:20 57:9 87:5 91:14 98:14 106:16 109:15 135:14 149:5.11 oneweek (1) 82:20 ongoing (2) 57:11 87:7 open (4) 41:19,21 106:3 157:3 opening (33) 5:4 15:14,21 20:9 21:2 22:6.23 25:13 26:11 27:2.3.8 32:5 34:8 36:9 39:19 55:24 85:24 87:5 92:12,15 94:20 101:9 102:6.11.14.25 106:4 110:24 119:21 140:11 145:13 151:11 operating (1) 43:22 operation (1) 148:25 operational (4) 25:23 26:3,15 108:18 operations (1) 46:8 operator (1) 83:25

opinion (4) 82:18 90:18 91:10 136:12 opinions (1) 118:11 opportunity (7) 12:11.12 22:14.15.19 151:7 152:3 oppose (4) 2:25 3:8 66:18 93:2 opposed (2) 2:16 121:8 opposing (1) 19:19 opposite (18) 1:18 9:11 10:3 21:15 24:20 40:15 42:25 47:18 49:15 59:24 90:22 93:19 99:21 100:5.19 101:24 128:10 155:10 opposition (3) 65:8,16 155:11 opus (3) 83:25 84:1 155:3 oral (2) 9:16 74:4 order (16) 3:21 25:7,7 27:9.13 29:25 47:24 60:8 67:25 68:24 88:13 100:11 111:14 124:21 140:18 151:19 ordered (1) 42:7 ordinary (3) 32:12 56:10 95:23 organ (15) 43:5,21,21 45.14 18 20 46.10 10 25 47:9 50:14 90:16,17,19 91:12 organisation (2) 46:24 48:19 organise (1) 155:6 organising (1) 10:16 organs (2) 42:21 50:19 originally (1) 17:4 orthodox (1) 6:22 others (3) 25:13 35:24 42:17 otherwise (7) 4:7 41:6 85:20 100:1 145:2 147:6 157:3 ought (5) 12:4 103:10 104:24 105:4 106:10 ours (2) 1:10 10:18 ourselves (3) 9:24 37:19 81:7 outcome (10) 3:16 29:9 33:7 37:7 42:11 60:23 63:2 81:18 84:14 127:16 outcomes (4) 50:10,11,23 154:18 outliers (3) 133:24 134:3,11 outline (1) 41:23 outlines (1) 54:14 outrageous (1) 28:10 outset (2) 59:19 60:2 oven (1) 156:14 over (33) 1:23 2:4,24 6:19,21 8:1,20 11:14 17:11 19:10 22:1 23:9 44:14,22 59:12 72:25 73:1 83:18 84:12 85:23 86:10 87:6,25 89:21 90:2 91:18 97:8 106:15 125:19 134:10 143:23 155:25 156:9 overall (8) 87:2 112:2 113:16 115:8,14,21 119:12 143:24 overnight (1) 137:9 overruled (1) 27:25 oversight (6) 51:7,15 52:3,17,21,22 overturn (3) 108:3.8.9 overvalued (1) 115:1 own (33) 2:14 12:14 23:6 24:18 30:18,21,23 31:1,5,6,15 33:19 35:8 42:5 43:16 45:20 47:19 56:1,8 58:5,24 73:17 89:11 93:17.25 99:2 101:5 117:13 118:1.5.5 133:10 146:14 owner (1) 149:22 ownership (2) 45:8 56:23 Р pages (11) 44:2,16 46:18 49:5 50:6 57:22 84:7 106:5

153:22.25 154:14

paid (3) 20:23 24:7 138:1

opined (1) 48:8

paragraph (18) 14:10 50:7,8 54:4 66:24 77:13 78:4 84:6.13.20 85:8 105:14.15 114:12 115:22 125:8 135:23 138:22 paragraphs (5) 46:3 51:11 52:14 53:17 125:2 parallels (2) 57:22,25 arastatal (2) 47:4,21 (8) 20:16 21:19 22:12.13 23:20 24:1.4.10 part (12) 13:20 14:8 24:16 46:24 47:2 48:21 54:1 68:16 86:22,22 93:13,16 partasides (24) 1:6,7,14,15 59:4.6.18 67:4 81:5 82:8.16.23 84:4 85:15 88:4 145:24 151:25 152:1 153:4,5,16 154:10 155:10 158:4 partial (1) 41:6 participants (1) 120:22 particular (11) 2:10 3:10 16:5 19:1 20:17 21:3 56:21 96.22 106.25 135.2 141.12 particularly (5) 17:9 24:14 72:10 80:25 134:25 parties (11) 66:3 113:18 150:14 151:21 152:14,21 153:17 155:24 156:5.12.16 partner (4) 41:10 59:10 89:14 109:22 parts (16) 14:4 67:24 71:2.7.13 75:8.23 76:14 86:14 116:17,20 128:19 130:7 142:8,22 143:9 party (3) 56:10 140:14 155:8 pass (4) 15:5 89:13 100:11 116:13 passage (2) 49:1 114:16 past (7) 24:6 62:7 89:21 90:2 91:19 97:8 109:12 patently (1) 68:12 path (2) 41:24 42:22 paths (1) 41:22 pause (4) 16:25 139:11 140:10 148:5 paying (2) 18:19 113:6 payments (3) 40:11 55:5,22 pays (1) 123:23 pca (5) 155:2.5.7.16 156:9 pejorative (1) 62:25 pending (1) 39:25 pension (27) 3:17 16:14 25:3 39:10 43:22 44:22,24 45:4,10 53:8 54:18,24,25 55:4,5,6,17,20,22 56:13,24 57:1,11 73:17 85:10 90:12 102:4 pensions (1) 57:5 people (4) 18:19 110:8 117:7 156:8 peoples (1) 110:7 per (7) 119:9 131:23,24 138:11,16 139:3,10 perceived (4) 68:17 119:14 128:15 139:25 perfectly (2) 6:22 85:19 perforce (1) 53:11 perform (2) 56:3 58:25 performed (1) 72:7 perhaps (10) 9:8 12:9 37:5 48:4 50:2 69:13 76:22 144:5 148:3 151:2 period (9) 17:11 21:17 76:9 77:21 79:20 80:9 82:20 140:7 156:10 perish (1) 57:6 permanent (1) 61:6 permanently (1) 8:7 permitted (1) 56:11 persistence (1) 135:20 nersistent (1) 112:18

persistently (1) 28:24

painstakingly (1) 23:13

paradoxical (2) 31:23 55:9

personality (5) 45:21 46:7 47:1.6.10 personally (1) 30:7 perspective (6) 3:12 25:16 48:3 50:10 95:20 112:2 persuaded (1) 157:3 persuasively (1) 66:10 pertained (1) 20:16 pertaining (2) 14:4 36:18 netition (1) 49:25 petrochilos (4) 41:10,11,12 158:5 pharmaceuticals (1) 39:24 phase (1) 151:11 phenomenon (2) 66:9 88:22 phillipham63gmailcom (1) 100:10 phrase (2) 29:6 45:2 pick (1) 127:3 picked (1) 111:17 picking (1) 109:21 picture (1) 85:3 pictured (1) 55:13 piece (2) 4:12 82:10 pistol (1) 32:15 place (17) 20:19.20 21:10,12,23 23:20,24 67:4 80:9 81:2,8,10,12 120:11.13.14 130:16 places (1) 104:19 plain (5) 45:15 59:20 92:24 100:20 104:20 plainly (2) 73:3 100:6 plan (13) 2:21.25 6:18 12:15 13:16 14:1,4,8 64:17 70:20 77:6 131:21 135:6 plane (1) 46:13 plans (21) 22:19 62:2 76:24 77:3,10 89:11 93:17 99:14,20,22,24 100:3,11 101:3 129:6 130:25 131:3.8.11 133:13 150:2 plausibility (1) 132:15 play (2) 47:7 72:24 pleading (1) 27:5 please (5) 12:22 30:25 33:11 84:1 148:5 pleased (3) 53:3 153:5,17 pm (5) 83:6,8 153:1,3 157:9 pointed (2) 19:15 144:22 points (10) 18:11 30:11 32:15 62:7 109:21 111:23 127:21 147:15 157:1,1 police (1) 46:9 population (1) 54:19 portfolio (11) 37:3,7,13,17 38:1,7,9,17,20,25 101:16 portion (1) 97:20 portions (2) 45:25 53:15 posed (1) 91:6 position (19) 3:8 6:17 30:17 43:19 46:4 47:23 65:10 66:7 67:1 80:2 87:7 114:20 117.4 11 118.22 145.11 147:25 150:23 151:8 positions (2) 63:1 90:12 positive (4) 37:18 38:1.7.9 possession (2) 29:19.21 possibilities (1) 110:17 possibility (5) 11:20 14:14 74:22 99:8 110:4 possible (8) 12:8 18:20 25:9 39:23 40:11 71:21 106:23 141:11 posted (1) 85:2 posthearing (4) 151:19 153:22,24 156:18 postmerger (1) 8:13 postpone (1) 153:11 postulate (1) 136:3 potential (5) 73:24 106:14 120:20.23 154:17 power (3) 17:6 55:19 109:9 powerful (1) 3:8

republics (3) 89:23 91:15

powers (4) 10:8 44:22 48:10 54:6 practical (1) 40:6 practice (2) 19:4 43:14 precise (2) 75:3 132:1 precisely (6) 14:25 38:21 50:24 66:20 98:8 103:2 precludes (1) 147:5 predatory (13) 7:3,5 8:5,15 62:4 64:20 65:3.25 66:19 75:16.21 76:2 127:23 predetermined (1) 42:11 predict (3) 1:25 106:23 137:1 predicted (1) 136:17 predicting (1) 72:24 preference (1) 95:24 preferred (5) 70:22 117:10.25 134:10 143:1 prejudging (1) 144:17 preliminary (3) 89:23 91:14 156:25 premise (2) 90:14 127:23 premium (3) 62:7 74:24 80:4 premiums (2) 134:1,8 prepare (2) 61:8 80:1 prepared (7) 1:20 12:14 29:14 64:21 76:24 114:13 136.12 present (3) 85:20 105:13 152:6 presentation (10) 49:13 51:12 109:24 115:12 120:12 124:7 128:6 132:18 142:12 148:4 presentations (1) 142:7 presented (14) 5:21 21:8 29:12,15 33:10,12,16,23 34:1,12 41:5 63:15 107:3 115:17 presents (1) 75:3 president (49) 1:3,7,9,11,15 3:20 4:5 9:6 20:16,20 21:10,19 22:6,12,13 23:5.20.24 24:1.4.10.22 41:12 42:6.20 51:7,18,18,23 52:3,9,16 79:7 83:3,9 89:17 129:16 144:8 149:17 151:18 152:1,9 153:4,5,10,15 154:7,22 155:23 presidential (4) 25:7 42:3 52:21.22 presidents (1) 23:8 press (4) 82:25 84:22 85:2,7 presumably (1) 77:25 pretax (1) 80:24 prevent (1) 156:16 prevented (1) 135:25 previewed (1) 59:19 previously (3) 30:20 97:1 107:11 price (137) 6:8.11.14 7:21.24 8:25 17:12 36:7,7,10,11,13,21,21 39:20 40:21.22.23 41:2 61.9 10 21 65.15 22 66.13 67:7,10,19 68:1.9.11.20.22.24 69:2.7.19.25 70:13.14.24 71:4 72:19.21 73:4,5,8,13,21,25 74:24 75:2,17,18,19,20,25 78:13.15 79:15.17 80:3.4.14 81:23 89:1.7.11 112:15 114:25 117:5.8.12.20 118:8 119:2.12.14 120:5.6.9.14.16.18.24 121:2,3,13,18,24,25 122:14,19,21 123:23,24,25 124:1,9,21,21,25 125:4,8,25 130:13,14 131:12.14 135:16 136:13 137:2.6.9.20.25 138:4.8.11.15.16.18 139:1,3,4,8 140:5,8,12,15

141:2.9.16 142:6.13.17.25 pricebased (1) 94:25 priced (3) 65:18 139:18,20 prices (9) 2:7 61:6 72:24 94:15 95:4 97:10 128:9 136:8 139:15 pricing (1) 68:19 primary (3) 58:1,4 116:15 prime (3) 51:19 52:7,17 principle (8) 18:15 19:1,15 44:13 70:13 130:13.16 132:3 principles (8) 18:17.22.23.25 19:3,6,21 70:21 prior (7) 8:12 30:4 68:21 70:1 76:3 79:14 107:14 priority (1) 151:19 prison (1) 3:20 private (8) 45:6 53:20 56:5.14.20 57:2.16 58:24 privilege (2) 1:19 13:4 prize (1) 3:4 pro (5) 20:15 21:25 23:16 24:11,17 probabilities (1) 32:25 problem (3) 38:6 69:13 123.22 problematic (1) 108-10 proceeding (4) 116:8 145:1,2,3 proceedings (10) 4:7 87:8 92:9.13 101:25 105:5.12 107:4 125:18 151:12 proceeds (2) 113:15 127:22 process (11) 10:12 25:18 30:24 31:24 56:15.16 104:18 105:17 106:3 107:23 121:19 processes (1) 25:2 procuring (1) 22:1 producing (1) 43:14 production (2) 16:7 29:23 professor (100) 8:17,21 14:23 16:23 41:3 44:1.12 48:8.16 49:4.6.9.18 50:2,3,9,25 51:5 52:12,24 55:18 56:6 57:3,20 60:7 62:18,24 63:3,15 64:16 65:14 66:4,5,6 67:13 69:6,15,20 70:4 71:3,10,21 72:1,7 73:2,15 74:6,13 75:4 76:18.21 77:15.25 85:6 89:3 90:8.9 91:2.9 95:5 97:13,19 101:20 104:2,3,7,14 109:23 110:1 115:12,16 120:11,25 121:15 122:8,25 123:4,11 124:7,8 125:1,6,9,13 128:2.6.24 129:14 14:20 130:1 131:1 132:18 133:22 134:2.15.19 137:2.9 142:11 profit (12) 6:16 87:2 89:4 115:9,14,21 116:2 128:12 132:2 143:16,19,23 profitability (3) 18:16 19:1,16 profiting (1) 10:24 profits (1) 116:7 profound (1) 4:23 proliferates (1) 5:14 prompted (1) 83:23 promulgated (1) 26:15 pronounce (1) 48:5 pronounced (2) 9:20 63:11 proof (3) 110:20 125:22 144:24 proper (4) 37:21 71:1 85:19 106:9 properly (4) 21:7 68:9 95:23 134:9 property (1) 54:22 proposal (8) 12:19 13:5 15:5 79:24 96:3 152:2,3,6 proposals (1) 93:17

6:3.7.12.25.25:21.28:21 32:21 36:8.17 37:5 50:17 51:10 92:8,16,20 147:3,12 150:16 propositions (3) 5:16,18 59:20 propriety (1) 17:23 prosecutions (1) 4:5 prosecutor (16) 10:1 23:6 24:18.21.28:12.21.23 29:11,14,18 30:4,5,13 34:6 122:16 144:20 prosecutors (3) 4:9 30:21 41:25 prospect (4) 11:24 12:7,10 88.13 prospects (1) 13:16 protect (2) 65:10 95:7 protection (1) 15:7 prove (4) 20:9,11 145:18 146:9 proved (3) 110:21 124:23 125:12 proven (1) 32:18 provide (4) 8:23 57:5 148:16 149:9 provided (5) 24:5 34:19 35:22 39:4 102:25 provides (2) 7:8 103:18 providing (2) 108:19 121:5 proving (1) 111:3 provision (8) 26:2 50:4 94:7 103:15 108:24.25.25 109:4 provisions (2) 48:6 49:23 proximate (1) 110:22 public (21) 3:7 10:8 24:21 28:11 29:11 48:11,12,23,24,25 54:20 55:7,12 57:18 82:8,24 95:11,16 144:19 149:2,2 publication (1) 29:7 published (6) 30:23 90:20,21,22,23 91:3 purchase (3) 44:4 94:22 97:5 purchases (1) 98:16 purely (1) 124:5 purplish (1) 133:20 purporting (1) 112:24 purpose (3) 150:3.7.10 purposes (8) 47:4 53:18 54:7 57:8,24 87:15 142:24 143:7 pursuant (2) 26:15 40:12 pursuing (1) 58:24 puts (2) 132:19 142:11 putting (1) 43:17 Q qatar (1) 124:25 qualification (1) 93:18 qualified (1) 28:5 quantifiable (1) 125:11 quantification (2) 72:3.11 quantified (3) 9:4 61:20 125:11 quantifies (2) 67:19 75:6 quantifying (2) 6:12 72:9 quantum (13) 5:6,8,13 59:9.15 60:8.10 63:23.24 67:6.12 86:18 116:13 quasigovernment (1) 48:25 question (87) 9:5,18 11:8,17 14:13,15,16,19 20:7 22:9 25:1 30:15 31:22 32:1,4,23 33:3 35:11 36:6,18 37:14 39:16 40:2 48:2 67.6 9 12 17 72.2 12 80.22 83:23 84:2 85:5 14.17 91:6,17 92:6 93:3 98:23 99:13 100:22 101:23 102:1 103:6.7.9.12 105:17 107:11.18 108:12 109:21 realtime (1) 65:11

154.10

proposed (3) 12:1,15 62:10

proposition (19) 5:25

112:21 117:3.16 118:13.18 121.17 122.6 129.16 130.2 137:4.8.20.23 139:13 141:1.4.17 144:22 145:20.21.25 146:20.23.23 148:3,6,12,25 149:25 150:13.15.15.24 questioning (2) 13:25 91:2 questions (29) 11:16 18:10 39:7,14 41:8,9 81:6 88:1 89.14 22 97.25 107.23 109:12.16 115:16 122:20.20 129:4 141:20 144:9,10,11 145:13 149:17 156:12,19,21 157:2 158:11 quickly (8) 5:5 9:15 27:2 35:7 84:7 91:3 127:3 147.17 quid (5) 20:15 21:25 23:16 24:11.17 quiet (1) 46:2 quite (7) 59:14 90:22 104:3 130:14 131:2 134:9 155:6 quo (5) 20:15 21:25 23:16 24:11,17 quote (2) 92:25 107:13 quoting (4) 54:4 74:7 78:4 99.10 r128 (3) 101:11 106:6 112:7 r1281 (2) 101:11 106:7 r12812 (1) 112:7 r131 (2) 85:1 138:23 r1311 (2) 85:1 138:23 r25 (1) 94:18 r251 (1) 94:18 r252 (2) 99:6 148:18 r2521 (2) 99:6 148:18 r255 (1) 92:23 r2551 (1) 92:23 r88 (1) 135:23 r881 (1) 135:23 r99 (1) 108:18 r991 (1) 108:19 raise (4) 40:2,3 88:2 155:8 raised (4) 32:5 71:8 108:12 157:2 raises (1) 32:15 range (11) 8:11 47:2,10 76:7.8.11 78:2.22 79:5 132:19 143:5 rapid (1) 74:3 rare (1) 156:4 rarely (1) 126:11 rate (1) 38:5 rather (15) 23:17 25:17 33:3 35:23 45:22 81:25 89:10 95:25 98:24 103:3 106:2 121:13 122:15 134:1 150:25 ratio (15) 8:8 14:24 37:21 61:9 64:21 74:25 88:10 94:2,15,25 95:3,19 96:2,9 125:4 rationale (1) 14:1 ratios (1) 88:12 reach (3) 31:5 73:25 153:18 reached (1) 156:25 reaches (1) 149:12 react (1) 65:16 reaction (2) 66:15 137:6 read (3) 29:13 46:14 156:21 readily (1) 49:9 ready (2) 1:4 83:10 real (3) 68:15 116:7 147:11 realisation (1) 99:2 realise (1) 91:7 realised (2) 62:11,18 realism (1) 135:5 realistic (1) 142:16 realistically (1) 135:8 reality (2) 116:12 123:3 really (4) 39:14 67:6 117:19 148:7

reason (8) 16:12 20:3 26:22 93:1 100:20 111:21 120:21 122:18 reasonable (1) 30:10 reasonably (1) 17:8 reasons (6) 44:21 54:13 62:9 68:10 105:3 126:25 recall (22) 14:22 25:5 34:7 38:12 42:25 44:1 48:4 55:24 73:10 90:9 91:21 94:19 96:12 98:14 99:21 101:8 102:6.12.13 108:16 119:21 131:18 recalled (2) 49:3 69:1 recalling (1) 5:14 recap (1) 23:16 recapping (1) 5:12 receipt (1) 138:15 receipts (2) 39:19 138:2 receive (2) 55:4 152:1 received (7) 40:14 64:8 76:17 92:21 113:5 138:4.12 receiving (2) 18:5 141:21 recent (2) 144:20 146:3 recognise (6) 41:10 59:9 86.20 109.15 18 120.22 recognised (4) 3:15 15:25 16:3 74:17 recognises (1) 63:4 recognising (1) 5:8 recollection (1) 79:21 record (20) 5:22 12:19 28:13 34:9 36:4 41:19 42:5 82:19 94.17 23 101.14 102.23 24 104:20 148:6.13.21 150:1,7 153:12 recorded (1) 84:16 recordings (1) 4:8 records (2) 28:23 34:5 recovery (5) 39:23 40:1,2,5 140:20 red (2) 21:6 142:14 redactions (2) 152:18 154:25 redirect (4) 13:13 99:20 100:5,19 reduced (2) 68:4 78:8 reducing (1) 62:6 reexamination (1) 77:17 refer (6) 26:7 28:19 109:3 112:4 115:12 124:4 reference (16) 14:4 15:13 17:15 29:17 35:8 36:5.23 73:10 84:1,25 99:22,24 101:12 108:16 127:2 134:21 references (5) 5:22 34:8 55:14 58:3 143:3 referral (2) 25:25 107:15 referred (17) 18:3 19:9 26:10.19.22 27:1.22 28:6 31:2 65:6 73:22 94:24 104:24 107:6 111:11 140:11 144:14 referring (5) 66:23 121:6 144:19.25 145:25 refers (1) 48:23 reflect (4) 37:22 77:7 120:16 124:22 reflected (4) 65:22.23 66:13 82:25 reflects (3) 120:19 123:18,20 refused (1) 75:5 regard (4) 13:1 44:12 125:24 143:16 regarded (1) 48:2 regardless (1) 107:24 regards (1) 50:15 regrettable (1) 29:6 regular (1) 109:9 regulations (5) 13:1 54:15 108:6,7 135:24 regulatory (3) 4:14 88:11 136:7 reject (2) 111:5 121:3 rejected (10) 7:18 40:21

61-19 62-20 66-12 79-3 110:15 123:2 135:17 136:4 rejection (3) 73:13 78:12 112:13 reioinder (1) 115:22 relate (2) 21:25 59:15 related (7) 19:13 20:23 24:11 99:15 137:20 144:21 149:20 relates (1) 84:2 relating (5) 19:11 24:1 124:25 125:7 155:2 relation (4) 11:4 25:24 31:10 77:13 relationship (5) 36:22,24 56:5 145:19,22 relative (1) 74:24 relatively (1) 148:8 release (5) 2:19,22 82:25 85:2.7 released (1) 8:6 relevance (4) 105:7,10 114:8 117:12 relevant (11) 25:22 26:2 31:9 45:25 53:5 77:11 94:8 108:6 124:24 135:24 140:4 reliability (1) 122:13 reliable (2) 69:23 70:17 reliance (1) 131:2 relied (3) 34:20 47:18 96:19 reluctant (1) 103:22 rely (2) 52:24 59:20 remain (4) 8:14 57:5 155:4 157:3 emained (2) 7.2 63.8 remaining (1) 5:9 remains (3) 75:1 110:3 155:23 remark (1) 144:3 remarked (2) 43:8 74:23 remarks (4) 109:20 110:24 145:7 147:24 remedied (1) 39:17 remedy (2) 41:3,6 remember (10) 5:5 11:6 13:13 18:9 22:25 30:22 36:8 44:15 114:13 133:24 remind (8) 9:23 37:19 81:7 119:17 120:18 126:21 133:12 134:6 reminder (1) 23:5 removals (1) 19:12 remove (3) 8:15 59:23 68:13 removed (5) 4:15 7:3 30:8 76:2 119:1 removes (1) 140:4 removing (2) 7:10 75:20 remunerations (1) 19:13 rendered (4) 17:13 32:13 87:15.16 reorganise (1) 88:13 repeat (5) 2:16 11:9 87:4.21 156:15 repeated (1) 21:5 repeatedly (4) 11:19 77:9 92.8 93.20 repeating (2) 14:23 85:24 reply (4) 83:25 84:5,8 138:22 report (20) 18:8 22:9 50:8.8 51:11 52:14 67:18 77:16 89:3 113:13 114:4 125:2,8 126:23 128:20 129:10 134:15.19 136:16 143:3 reported (2) 84:22 85:10 reporters (3) 155:16,18 156:8 reports (8) 29:14,18,20,21 30:1.13 118:14 126:21 represent (1) 100:3 representatives (1) 155:16 represented (1) 43:1 republic (18) 24:16 33:23 45:1 51:18 87:6.9.10.17 88:11.19 91:23.24 95:13 103:9 107:4 109:14 112:16

146:21

103-1 request (3) 29:23 103:20 150:14 requested (1) 8:23 require (4) 7:12,19 107:8 129:23 required (2) 55:22 149:5 requirement (1) 107:14 requirements (1) 87:20 requires (3) 7:16 32:6 67:9 research (7) 31:18 37:14 39:11 73:11 19 21 99:5 reserved (1) 59:1 residual (2) 71:11 76:19 resile (2) 87:11,21 resiled (1) 91:3 resources (1) 55:6 respect (14) 39:22 45:22 46:19 51:3 57:10 60:25 63:2 72:6 86:2 96:21 98:9,12 101:3 108:20 respected (1) 31:24 respectful (1) 72:12 respectfully (6) 43:18 52:25 55:23,25 57:17 102:18 respective (1) 90:12 respectively (3) 58:22 132:25 143:4 respond (2) 98:21 152:3 respondent (13) 8:19 9:8,19 11:19 13:14 15:14 16:16 21:20 32:6,12 33:11 39:13 41:5 nondents (14) 8.16 11.14 14:12 19:2 21:5 23:18.22 32:5 34:13 36:9 83:13 144:7 152:2 158:7 responding (1) 74:7 response (2) 94:11 137:5 responsibilities (1) 18:21 responsibility (3) 9:7 57:12.13 responsible (2) 31:15,20 restructuring (15) 2:18,21 6:18 11:25 12:8,15,18 14:15 62:1 99:14,20,23,25 101:3 135:6 restructurings (2) 3:18 19:14 result (12) 25:2 29:3 32:1,17 39:4 76:1 82:4 95:21.22 96:3 118:21 135:13 resulted (5) 6:1 61:4 62:5 63:4 96:2 resulting (5) 8:10 37:23 39:16 61:19 81:23 resume (3) 83:4,10 152:25 return (7) 20:25 22:21 23:17 28:2 61:23 91:14 97:9 returning (2) 14:13 105:17 revealed (2) 42:23 61:13 revealing (1) 38:25 reveals (1) 4:9 revenue (1) 56:7 reverseengineered (1) 35:10 revert (2) 152:8 155:6 review (1) 71:18 reviewed (1) 108:6 reviewing (1) 101:16 revised (1) 38:3 righthand (6) 52:5 55:2 58:8 90:23 96:12 118:3 rightly (2) 93:19 94:24 rights (6) 22:18 23:9 24:25 39:18 40:8,16 rise (7) 63:23 88:25 113:3 115:9 127:12 136:8 139:24 risen (3) 6:14 61:21 78:15 risk (42) 4:19,22 7:2,5,10 8:5,15 9:10 63:2,8 65:17 68:17,18 73:4 78:14 88:5,16,20,24 92:6 97:15.15.17 98:5.6.6.6.8.8.19.20.24 99:14.16 120:10 123:14,19,21,25 146:22,24

propose (3) 91:13 95:18

147:4

stuck (4) 9:23 10:3,5 45:2

risks (2) 9:9 89:2 roadmap (1) 9:13 robust (2) 75:4 121:19 rok (8) 59:25 61:13 64:2.11 65:12 69:5 70:5 71:19 roks (9) 25:3 60:6,23 61:15,17 68:13 69:3 70:22 73:17 role (3) 47:6 106:14 117:4 room (2) 1:16 127:22 rose (1) 74:24 rosinvest (1) 97:23 rosinvestco (1) 70:5 round (4) 54:12 112:25 153:21,24 rounds (2) 151:23 152:15 row (3) 47:14 138:11,18 rules (2) 45:23 125:21 rumour (1) 81:24 rumours (5) 67:3 81:14,16,17 82:9 run (2) 27:2 35:6 runofthemill (1) 57:16 sachs (2) 100:21,23 safe (1) 157:5 safeguards (1) 4:25 safest (1) 18:20 sake (1) 154:5 sales (1) 77:7 same (16) 12:5 13:7 15:20 23:4 27:24 48:22 54:2 63:2 70:21 74:17 115:7 133:3 136:6,6,7,10 samsung (55) 2:6,17 3:9 10:25 11:25 12:8 14:5 16:6.7 18:12 14 23:4 37:4 38:22 39:21 40:2.3.12 64:17 65:7.11 67:1 68:23 69:3 70:9 74:16.20 79:16,25 82:6 85:11,12 88:14 97:1 99:7,8 100:12,24 101:17 111:20 113:6 118:21,25,25 123:4,5 130:22 134:22 135:9 136:6 139:14,24 140:14 148:10 149:22 samsungs (7) 2:3,15 3:2 7:15 61:12 99:12 136:5 (2) 34:23 112:9 sanguine (1) 50:10 sarcastic (1) 73:15 saturday (4) 85:4 126:17 136:2 138:24 save (1) 2:4 saw (12) 15:20 19:23 28:12 36:19 49:1 56:4 86:24 107:17 111:19 112:13,22 134:18 saying (11) 19:5 29:1 34:10,21 59:24 72:4 80:14 91:3 120:21 121:4 124:17 scandal (1) 70:9 scenario (11) 60:19 64:2.12 66:17 67:8 68:5 72:16,23 76:12 79:2 110:1 scenarios (2) 72:17 109:25 scheme (4) 61:8,12 64:18 79:24 scholar (1) 49:8 scholarly (2) 48:17 49:7 scratched (1) 36:17 screen (6) 41:16 43:24 54:16 84:1 85:2 127:3 scripted (1) 49:13 sct (94) 2:7,20 3:1 6:8,11,14 7:2,8 8:11,13 12:3,17 14:18 23:11 24:12 29:10 37:12.21 60:12.15 61:1,4,7,9,18,23 62:1,12 63:3,18,25 66:1,11,14,25 67:2,7,23 68:14,18 69:25 71:1.20 72:14.22 73:9.13

74:23 75:9.11.17.24 76:14 77:1.22 78:7 81:12 86:14 89:9 92:10 94:21 97:6 98:17 99:4 107:14 112:15 113:1.2.25 114:20.25 115:1,5 116:18 118:15,25 119:3,19 120:3,19 123:1,1 124:25,25 126:5 130:8,11 135:17 137:20 138:17,21 139:14 143:18.20 sctcheil (3) 105:12 106:6,18 scts (12) 2:13 39:18 65:15 67:10.19 76:11.14.16 77:19,21 78:12 80:4 sds (7) 79:23 80:6,7 118:21,25,25 139:24 se (1) 119:9 second (34) 9:25 14:11 18:11 21:12 23:7.19 24:19.21 45:17 50:8 51:24 52:6 61:25 67:18,25 75:10 77:16 81:6 91:24 93:1,3 95:14 96:14 105:15 114:4 122:17 125:8 129:10 135:22 143:12 147:17,21 150:15 153:24 conded (1) 155:14 secretary (1) 30:10 sector (1) 56:14 secure (1) 64:19 securities (3) 58:13 74:16,20 see (134) 2:1 4:2 5:18 8:16 9:5,13,17 10:6,9,14,23 11:5,11,23 12:5,18 13:3,24 14.3 15.20 24 16.3 5 17 23 18:25 20:4 21:10.13 23:6 24:2,3,20 25:11 26:2 27:18 28:15 30:15 31:8,12,14 33:9.19 37:9.23 38:10,10,19 40:7 41:1 42:5 44:7,20 45:16 46:3 47:13 48:14 50:14,16,19,24 51:1,23,25 52:15,16 54:17 55:12 58:6 60:13 61:2 62:16 63:14 65:2.6.13.18 66:6 67:16 71:2,14 74:3 75:4 77:19 81:22 85:3 90:23 91:1,4 92:7,13,24 93:3,14,15,22 96:14,24 99:1 100:7,14 104:25 106:5 111:24 115:9 120:3.17.24 121:15 122:2.22 123:11 128:4 129:15 130:1,3,19 131:2,11,16 132:8,19,23 133:19 134:12,14,23,25 135:11 136:15 137:3 151:21 152:5 156:19 seek (5) 23:22 40:18 87:21 98:18 156:20 seeking (3) 44:3 85:19 135:7 seeks (2) 21:20 87:11 seems (5) 59:25 70:25 103:25 104:3 141:7 seen (8) 1:23 7:23 64:24 87:23 111:7.8 119:3 138:21 sees (2) 104:5 132:20 seized (1) 4:8 selfevident (1) 14:24 selling (1) 117:20 semistrong (1) 65:19 senior (1) 25:20 se (11) 17:23 38:15 49:20 51:15 86:15 101:20 104:12 118:4 119:9 123:18 150:13 sensible (1) 115:4 sent (1) 38:23 seoul (9) 24:3,19 73:20 125:17 138:9 139:8 140:3 142:6 150:12 separate (7) 24:17 41:22 46:7 47:1 63:21 103:6,6 separately (2) 26:4,8 separating (1) 75:15 september (7) 21:11,18,21

22:5.11.22 76:4 equence (1) 111:8 serious (7) 5:3 29:1 32:19 70:25 72:12 92:2 121:11 seriously (3) 71:24 124:9.17 serve (2) 58:21 70:16 serves (2) 53:24 54:16 service (4) 3:17 56:4 85:11 102:5 services (1) 52:11 session (1) 46:16 set (15) 41:7 51:15 53:13 58:25 59:17 66:22 78:22 82:1 88:12 103:16 106:5 107:9 123:25 146:4 147:24 sets (1) 84:19 setting (3) 88:10 103:1 117:5 settled (2) 29:5 46:23 settlement (6) 39:21 40:8,12 113:6.7 140:13 sevenyear (1) 77:20 several (5) 61:16 118:1 139:4 149:23 151:18 sh (2) 14:23 41:3 shall (6) 5:16 10:1 11:15 116:9 148:16 153:4 shape (1) 86:11 share (70) 6:14 7:21.24 8:25 36:7,11,13,21 37:21 40:21 61:5,9,10,21 65:15,22 67:7.10.19 68:9.11.20.22.24 69:2,7,18,25 70:13,14,23 72:20,21 73:25 74:23 78.13 15 79.15 16 80.3 4 81:23 83:19 98:16 112:15 115:5 124:9,25 125:3,8 128:9 131:23,24 135:16 137:1 138:1.11.16 139:3,10,15 140:9 141:9,12 142:13,17,25 143:1,4 154:20 shareholder (23) 2:12,12 3:24 7:14.21 15:6.8 21:13 23:10.21 24:12 61:11 67:20 85:11 92:11,16 93:3 95:25 98:3 121:10 148:11,19,21 shareholders (32) 2:9,9,14,18,23 10:25 12:3,17 13:7 14:18 15:1.7.13 29:10 60:15 61:4.4.7 62:3 65:9 66:1,1,11 73:9 81:12 88:21 95:7,20 96:10,15 110:9 123:15 shareholding (6) 61:23 97:19 127:15 148:10 149:5,11 shares (67) 6:8,11 22:16,18 37:22 39:18 44:4 60:12 61:1.18 62:1 63:3.18.25 64:6 65:18.20 67:23 68:3,7,8,15 72:15 76:16 78:8 88:8 89:5,7,9,12 92:10 94:22 97:6.10.19.21.21 98:2,10,12 99:3 101:6 105:8 109:10 113:1,2 114:20.25 115:1 120:19 127:11.18.25 128:12.16 137:20 138:5,6,12,17,21 141:16 143:19,20 148:13 149:22 150:8 sherman (1) 153:9 shocks (1) 17:22 shoot (1) 146:14 shoots (2) 32:16 146:5 short (17) 7:6 43:3 49:2 62:18 72:25 83:7 108:23 109:11 114:6,14,18 116:3 128:17 149:3,4,11 153:2 shortly (1) 144:6 shortterm (1) 136:18 shot (1) 146:13 should (42) 5:20.23 10:11 14:19 19:6,10 26:19

27:1.5.21 28:6 42:8 55:10 60:2.9.13 63:22 69:8.9 70:22 72:5 7 73:17 78:17 104:15 116:20.22 121:18 122:22.23 125:17.24 126:16 141:9 143:11 147:24 149:17 150:15 151:2 152:10,12 156:21 shouldnt (1) 71:23 show (6) 34:20 110:20 112:10.24 131:4.6 showed (11) 21:1 26:25 27:7 28:14 94:20 111:25 116:16 119:19 128:8 133:3,25 showing (3) 62:9 128:5 133:9 shown (9) 61:21 69:10 73:11 122:22 124:3,18,18,19 125:21 shows (10) 21:9 42:5 61:16 69:2 73:21 74:6 79:22 89:3 125:13 137:25 shut (1) 41:21 side (25) 1:8 19:6 25:14 43:17 47:22 51:21,24 52:5 54:17 55:2 58:8,10 76:8 90:15,24 96:12 113:25 118-3 125-22 126-6 127-22 131-11 134-14 143-24 154:15 sides (6) 48:1 115:6 141:18 153:14.20 156:3 signals (1) 74:8 significance (3) 21:21 73:16 136:22 significant (14) 2:19,22,23 15:7 17:6 31:15.20 66:16 74:3,15,18 78:6 121:12 153:16 similar (1) 64:22 similarly (2) 96:13 107:9 simple (8) 5:15,16 58:17 60:10 64:14 102:22 131:16 132:8 simpler (2) 7:16 72:16 since (4) 15:25 27:3.8 113:18 singing (1) 153:11 single (3) 48:18 72:19,20 sir (23) 1:10 83:15 85:16 87:3,25 89:13 109:18,20 113:23 116:23 118:18 126:10 137:15 140:23 141:18 142:3 144:3 147:14.18.21 154:6.16 155:14 sit (1) 148:15 situate (1) 86:6 situation (2) 28:10 69:17 six (2) 22:2 39:25 size (1) 99:12 sk (17) 19:18,19,20,24 23:2 36:19.20 104:19 105:1.4.9.13.19 134:16.25 135:1,10 skills (1) 118:6 skip (1) 58:3 skyrocket (2) 73:13 136:13 skyrocketed (1) 135:18 skyrocketing (1) 112:15 slide (191) 5:19.21 8:16 9:6.13.17 10:6.10.14 11:5,11,23 12:5 13:24 14:3 15:20,25 16:5,18,23 18:7.23 19:22 20:5 22:4 23:3.7 24:2.14 25:11 26:2 27:4,7,12,18 28:3,15 30:3.15.25.31:14.33:11.19 34:5.8.13.19.23 35:16.22.25 37:19.24 38:3,10,12,19 40:7,25 41:1 42:1,5 43:24 44:8,20 45:25 47:13 50:14,16,20 51:22 53:13 54:5,16 55:24 57:24 58:1 59:9 60:13 61:3.16 62:16 63:14 64:25 65:2.6.13.19.66:2.7 67:14,16 69:1,10 71:3,14

73:11 74:3.17 75:4.13 77:20.20 90:4,16,24 91:1,5 92:7.8.14.22 93:4.14.23 94:20 96:12 15 18 24 97:12 99:1 100:7.15 101:20 102:12 103:14,17 104:2,6 106:21 107:10 108:4 109:23 111:7,8,16,24 112:23 113:4,23 114:10 115:9.10.12 117:4.13.14 118:2.2.12 120:3.17.25 121:1.4.15 122:2.15.23.25 123:11 124:5,7 126:15 127:6 128:2,2,4,6,7,7 130:1,3,20 132:17,18 133:19 134:12,13 136:14 137:3.15.18 140:24 141:25 142:11.18 143:3 148:4 149:19 slides (8) 34:19 51:11 102:6,10 112:14 126:15 129:15 150:17 slowly (1) 79:10 small (2) 125:3,10 smaller (2) 97:20 152:23 smallest (1) 131:6 smashed (6) 69:21 121:16,23,25 122:3 125:15 smith (34) 6:19 12:5,21 13:2,8,10,22,24 18:9 63:10.17 66:22 77:6.8.17 88:15 93:10,15,19,21,24 94:4,11 96:25 99:19 100:5.9.12.19.20 113:5 115:8.19 119:6 smiths (4) 78:2 114:11 116:3 130:19 smoothly (1) 155:17 snodgrass (24) 5:11 59:10,11,12 79:7,8,12,21 80:10,16,18,21 81:3 84:3 112:24 113:12 123:7 126:2.18.24 128:14 131:1 139:12 158:6 socalled (6) 95:23 99:14,19 101:3 114:20 119:15 sold (1) 131:7 solutions (1) 40:6 somehow (2) 25:18 36:9 someone (1) 80:6 something (15) 25:16,17 33:6 74:10 80:24 100:17 112:10 113:21 130:25 144:12 145:23 150:11 151:13 152:20 156:11 sometime (1) 22:10 sometimes (2) 5:13 59:14 somewhat (2) 101:12 111:7 soon (2) 8:8 69:14 sophisticated (3) 95:15 96:7 97:14 sort (3) 146:11 149:19 154:21 sought (4) 13:12 31:5 49:14 102:23 sound (2) 147:8,9 source (4) 44:23 45:5 51:10 145:15 sources (1) 51:10 south (4) 94:14 96:7 124:10 132:21 sovereign (2) 43:9,12 sow (2) 20:14 60:8 spaghetti (2) 134:21 136:5 spain (1) 147:8 speak (7) 1:16 5:11 24:18 56:8 150:19 156:1.14 speaking (1) 103:5 speaks (1) 148:9 special (18) 103:11,21 104:25 106:14,17,23,24 107:12.15.22.24 108:13,19,22 109:3,5,8 111:10 specially (1) 54:25

specific (6) 22:17 28:12 57:1 58:19 67:9 78:14 specifically (17) 11:4 20:16 22:1.16 23:9 24:11.24 26:6 44:23 53:23 54:24 55:23 56:12 58:12 61:2 74:10 93:10 spectrum (6) 92:22 93:4,7 96:17,19 98:15 spectrums (1) 96:13 speculate (1) 8:21 speculations (1) 64:17 speech (1) 83:17 spell (2) 45:3,9 spend (3) 11:10 59:7 137:16 spent (1) 14:22 spirit (1) 83:20 spoke (3) 99:19 106:4 114:2 spoken (1) 96:8 spring (1) 18:8 spurious (1) 119:23 squandered (1) 57:6 squarely (2) 89:22 93:2 stability (1) 18:15 stake (1) 93:5 stakeholders (1) 2:20 stakes (3) 2:3 3:13 130:23 stance (1) 18:12 stand (1) 80:10 standalone (1) 109:9 standard (8) 17:22 91:23 92:4 108:25 111:13 116:23 117:21,22 standpoint (1) 108:10 start (7) 1:4,5,11 53:12 83:11 144:12 151:18 started (2) 142:15 150:8 starting (4) 71:4 79:11 90:14 127:10 stated (1) 65:14 statement (30) 1:12 14:11 22:9 28:23,25 29:7,14,17,18,20,21 30:1.1.8.12 31:4 66:23 77:12 78:5 82:12 84:25 105:15,16 114:5,12,13 145:14 148:18,20 154:9 statements (18) 1:6 4:9 19:25 20:3 28:11 30:4,14 36:1,2 77:9 105:9,10 106:21 117:16.22 145:14 146:17 151:10 states (3) 46:6 57:4.8 status (3) 45:18 47:9 99:12 statute (4) 14:25 26:16 58:8,10 statutory (6) 40:16 44:23 45:5 57:1 58:21 140:6 stemmed (1) 44:23 step (2) 33:2 68:6 steps (5) 33:5 67:21 75:7 151:15 153:19 sticking (2) 128:18 133:19 still (7) 8:4 38:5 110:15 113:10 126:19 127:16 145.11 stipulated (1) 56:16 stock (9) 13:21 62:6 117:19.20 119:1 135:25 136:1 137:6.9 stood (1) 61:25 stop (1) 109:14 stopped (1) 28:24 story (1) 42:14 straightforward (4) 43:13 58:7 59:17 64:5 straightforwardly (1) 107:3 strategically (1) 9:8 strategy (1) 77:7 stress (3) 44:13 124:8 142:18 striking (1) 57:23 strong (1) 155:11 strongly (1) 152:13 structural (1) 12:12 structure (7) 90:13 96:23

134:21,22 135:9,11 136:5

study (3) 74:6,13 102:19 sub (3) 103:15 108:17,17 subject (21) 45:4,17 52:20 53:4 56:21 62:14 68:22 79:15 86:17 90:11 91:13 99:15 101:4,5 106:20 107:23 124:13,14 138:6,7 144:23 subjective (8) 71:5 118:4,24 119:1.10.13 130:7.9 subjectivity (1) 119:15 subjects (1) 86:1 submit (6) 43:18 47:22 52:25 57:17 58:6 137:13 submitted (3) 11:19 13:4 29:18 subordinates (2) 42:7,21 subsequently (1) 28:17 subsidiaries (1) 79:25 substance (5) 44:13,17 45:13 106:25 145:9 substantial (3) 3:5 102:16 134:23 subtracts (4) 75:10,24 76:13,15 subversion (1) 25:2 subverted (1) 25:19 success (3) 13:17 99:22,25 successful (1) 65:16 succession (4) 22:14,19 24:24 79:24 sue (2) 90:17,24 suffer (2) 14:18 60:25 suffered (3) 63:16.18 72:13 suffice (2) 104:15.16 sufficient (5) 2:11 15:11 145:18 146:9 151:23 sufficiently (1) 73:18 suggest (10) 19:3 25:18 35:22 41:6 64:22 85:20 146:17 152:4,14 154:24 suggested (2) 39:3 153:23 suggesting (3) 37:21 46:20 69:6 suggestion (5) 33:6 57:15,19 94:4 109:7 suitable (1) 152:7 sum (15) 67:23 71:1,7,13 75:8,23,24 76:13 116:17,20 128:19 130:6 142:8.22 143:9 summarised (1) 66:2 summary (5) 18:7 59:16 85:21 109:11 112:7 superior (1) 56:17 supermajority (10) 2:13 6:5 8:1 12:3 14:17,21 15:6,11,16,18 supervise (1) 51:19 supervised (4) 51:23 52:3.8.15 supervising (1) 52:1 supplementary (1) 148:24 supplementations (1) 21:6 supplementing (1) 149:3 support (15) 2:12,13 3:23 6:2,4 7:25 15:6 16:8 22:1 60:8 90:18.21 98:25 99:9.11 supported (1) 78:25 supports (1) 62:14 suppose (2) 19:5 146:4 supposedly (1) 128:13 suppressed (1) 8:4 suppressing (1) 12:13 suppression (1) 80:14 supreme (2) 39:24 140:12 sure (11) 7:4 11:7 39:13 100:25,25 118:16 137:4 144:16 151:7,8 155:15 surely (6) 11:24 13:9 16:21 20:5 34:14 35:20 surface (1) 36:17 surprised (1) 28:8 surprises (1) 17:23

surprising (2) 20:13 24:15

wednesday (8) 69:6 71:21

76:18 77:17 86:19 115:17

susceptible (1) 123:25 suspect (1) 99:11 sustained (3) 68:22 79:15 105:22 swap (1) 115:6 swaps (21) 62:18,22 63:6,13,19 86:12,17 112:21 113:1,2 114:6.15.18.24 115:20 116:3.13 128:12.17 143:17.19 swift (1) 74:17 synergy (11) 10:17 31:11 34:24 35:4,9,17 37:16 38:10,12 102:3,9 system (4) 5:24 55:17 87:24 106:3 systems (1) 48:12 table (7) 64:21 84:19 89:4 102:7 111:25 137:24,25 tabulated (1) 47:11 tails (1) 63:1 taken (25) 6:16 9:11 13:1 21:11 33:4 69:8 71:23 81:16 85:18 88:15 90:21 108:3 109:22 120:23 125:4 127:13 130:21 133:24 135:21 136:11 140:3 144:2 147:18 156:23.23 takes (4) 49:6 113:15 120:14 132:6 taking (9) 68:6 81:24 88:21 89:10 120:11,13 131:21 133:10,17 talk (1) 129:5 talked (1) 122:7 talking (2) 9:9 151:1 tampered (1) 69:21 tans (1) 153:13 target (1) 68:18 targeted (1) 4:17 task (3) 42:16 72:6,9 tax (14) 2:5 44:4,7 113:7 130:18,19 131:14,20,23,24,25 132:11 133:11 135:14 taxes (2) 80:23 130:21 team (8) 13:15 31:19 37:14 39:11 73:12.19.22 153:9 technical (4) 59:13 86:15 152:17 156:8 telephone (1) 4:8 telling (1) 90:9 tells (2) 70:20 107:7 ten (1) 109:19 tenminute (1) 152:25 tenor (1) 97:25 tense (1) 24:6 term (3) 7:6 88:18 150:11 terminology (1) 62:25 terms (18) 2:18 5:15 12:23 20:4 23:25 24:3 25:9 50:21.23 53:2.6 67:4 68:6 86:16 93:22 94:12 140:13 156:22 test (2) 54:13 57:19 testified (8) 6:9 66:10 77:6,8 100:9 105:7,9 107:5 testify (2) 30:17 106:20 testifying (1) 30:13 testimony (23) 5:13 12:6,21 14:10 16:24 28:3 34:5 41:4 48:14 67:13 90:2,7 94:11 95:5 97:23 104:1.8.15 105:3,14 106:22 107:12 108:4 testing (1) 79:21 text (4) 21:6 84:17 103:13 109:7 texts (4) 58:1,2,4,6 thank (25) 1:10,15 79:7 80:20 82:14 83:2,3,5,15 102:17 116:14 117:18,21

147-13 18 149-16 152-1 153:5 154:7 155:10.23.24 156:7 157:5.7 thanking (1) 83:18 thanks (1) 155:14 thats (32) 10:18 15:22 17:17 24:7 26:5 35:5 47:24 66:1 69:1 73:11 77:12,23 80:8,19 82:23 85:3 91:13 94:16 103:1.13.19 104:9 112:6 117:11 123:19 127:14 137:7 139:7 151:12 152:6.20 154:16 theme (1) 89:19 themselves (3) 2:15 102:15 124:16 theoretical (3) 26:12 32:3,20 theory (5) 128:11 146:15,16 147:9 150:22 thereafter (2) 109:4 154:1 thereby (1) 10:20 therefore (12) 46:25 55:9 64:4 67:6 85:25 114:18 116:4 119:12,13 123:6 133:1 138:23 theres (4) 82:18 148:1 150:6 151-13 theyre (3) 19:5 45:2 58:25 theyve (2) 89:21 91:18 thing (9) 3:4 7:4 50:12 58:17 104:4 145:19 146:7,8,12 thinking (1) 60:3 third (12) 50:3 52:10 53:3 62:16 77:12 78:4 96:6 110-1 114-22 136-2 138-11 142:18 thomas (19) 79:8,13 80:8,12,17,20 82:15,23 83:2.23 84:3 118:19 139:13,22 148:3,15,24 149:13,16 thoroughly (2) 69:22 148:22 though (9) 36:20 74:4 87:23 99:16 105:17 107:7 122:2 125:13 126:1 thought (10) 26:17,18,20 57:6 80:8 112:22 136:13 145:12 147:16 152:10 thoughts (1) 83:20 thousands (1) 117:10 threat (1) 122:14 three (12) 18:11 41:14 48:6 49:23 67:21 94:10 106:15 131:8 135:19 142:7 144:10,10 threshold (4) 149:4,6,9,12 through (35) 3:22 10:12 11:15 13:17 17:12 21:16 22:16 23:12 24:12 27:2 34:22 35:7 44:18 52:4 61:10 63:5 65:5 67:4 71:17 74:9.14 84:6 86:16 101:9 105:6 120:5 121:12,23 135:21 136:17 137:17 155:2,7,20 157:4 throughout (2) 1:21 93:20 thrust (1) 103:8 thus (3) 104:24 125:4,11 ties (1) 139:11 time (40) 1:4 2:1 6:19.21 7:11 8:20,24 11:10 13:7 14:22 17:4 18:5 26:17 35:13 36:25 40:5 47:19 56:1 58:5 59:7 61:2 66:24 68:14 69:23 71:16 72:25 79:1.20 80:17 94:8 95:18 98:1 114:22 124:4 19.24 135:24 148:2 150:4 155:5 timeline (5) 21:14,17 22:21 23:17,18 times (2) 15:14 59:13 timing (8) 15:4 20:18 29:16 81:7 95:16 96:3,4 151:22 tipping (1) 7:25 today (10) 26:13 77:2 85:20

126-15 153-8 155-11 together (4) 22:3 37:12 38:14 138:14 told (10) 27:23 28:3 30:4.20 35:9 39:19 40:1 43:4.6 114:4 toneddown (1) 82:25 too (7) 55:7 71:12 72:4 76:20 111:11 127:2 151:12 took (21) 20:19.20 21:10.12.23 22:6 23:12:20:24:30:11:38:21 50:2 67:4 80:8 81:2,8,10,12 100:5,19 111:25 topic (2) 62:22 145:25 topics (2) 86:6 144:10 torts (1) 147:1 total (1) 64:15 totally (1) 121:23 touch (1) 41:14 touched (2) 27:3,8 towards (3) 78:7 79:4,25 traction (2) 62:2 100:13 trade (2) 111:1 134:23 traded (5) 65:20 77:22 97:10 131-12-13 trading (31) 62:6 63:16,18,20,21 76:24 77:3,10 87:2 89:11 113:3.16 115:21.24 128:3 129:6 130:25 131:3,8,11,21 133:13 138:16 143-14 14 16 18 19 20 23 144:2 traditional (1) 135:11 transaction (14) 62:4 64:23 65:25 86:13.22 96:23 107:1 112:25 113:25 114:6 115:7,8,14 143:24 transactional (1) 58:15 transactions (6) 58:13,19,20 66:19 126:5.6 transcript (13) 44:2.15 48:15 49:4 50:7 79:9 94:5 102:10 127:4 147:20 154:5,25 155:19 transcripts (2) 152:18,18 transfer (7) 2:8 8:12 61:3 69:20 127:24 128:11.13 transferred (2) 65:25 123:16 transformed (1) 38:5 translate (1) 132:21 trap (1) 60:3 travel (1) 74:1 travelling (1) 157:6 travels (1) 157:6 tread (1) 129:11 treasury (2) 54:23 105:8 treaties (1) 4:25 treatment (3) 17:22 91:23,25 treaty (17) 4:11,22 8:18 50:21 60:24 61:14,15,17 64:3 70:3,20 86:16 87:18,19,20 147:2,3 trees (1) 110:12 trepidation (1) 103:23 tribunal (132) 1:8.16.20.24 3:3 4:16 5:2,20 7:5 8:22 9:6,10,14 10:23 11:2,10,23 12:11 13:25 14:8 15:24 17:3 18:4 19:5 20:10 21:4 22:3 24:8,15 25:17 26:12 27:16 28:14 29:25 31:2.14.22 32:4.11 33:22 34:17 35:7.21 36:15 37:9 38:17 39:7 41:8,12,17,19 43:3,8,18 44:18 45:12 46:14,20 47:15 49:13 52:19 55:16 57:14 59:4,6,12 63:22 71:22 72:8.17 73:10 75:1.3 78:17.21 79:19 85:20 86:18,23 87:12,16

89:17.24 90:5.9.19 91:8.21 93-13 94-19 99-21 101-8 102:19 108:16 112:25 116:1.11.23 119:17.24 120:19 121:18 123:9 124:3 126:10,21 133:13 137:13.16.18 140:19 141:5 143:13 144:1,9 150:9,20 151:8 152:4,13,22 153:17.23 154:23 155:4.11.12.24 156:2.11.24 158:11 tribunals (6) 9:7 47:12 141:20 143:12 154:20 157:3 tried (1) 129:7 trillion (8) 2:8 6:10 35:11,17 39:1 66:11,14 128:14 trouble (3) 37:15.15 38:16 true (7) 3:9.12 32:23 98:4.9 107:2 128:1 truly (1) 1:25 trust (2) 122:1 156:1 truth (1) 13:14 try (4) 18:16 37:25 38:1 151:15 trying (2) 59:25 80:12 tuesday (6) 28:17 81:11 86:19 114:3 116:16 117:1 tunnel (1) 15:2 tunneling (18) 66:9 68:18,24 69:9.16 88:17 95:22.23 97:8,16 121:7,8 122:4,9,14,20,23 139:18 turn (35) 11:15 14:3 18:7.23 19:22 25:1 32:23 34:4 35:25 40:25 41:23 47:19 48:16 51:25 55:2,25 57:24 68:6 90:6 91:1.17 92:7 93:14 96:24 99:13,15 101:4 103:6,12 104:2 112:21 126:8 140:24 142:10 146:20 turner (23) 1:9.10 83:12.14.15 89:19 92:5 97:9 99:18 109:15,17,18 141:18 144:12 147:14 150:18,18 153:12 154:5,16 155:14 158:8,10 turning (3) 5:5 63:22 89:22 twice (3) 87:6 144:14 145:7 type (1) 150:2 types (3) 48:20 56:11 58:19 typical (4) 4:11 60:20 63:24 72:17 typically (2) 46:6 154:11 υ ukase (1) 27:11 ultimate (2) 97:2 149:22 ultimately (7) 10:18 29:5 30:22 39:8 68:25 82:24 88.18 unaffected (1) 139:1 unambiguous (2) 96:13 108:5 unanimous (1) 27:1 unattested (1) 116:9 unattractive (1) 72:10 unaware (1) 70:8 uncertain (1) 127:16 uncertainty (1) 68:19 unchanged (1) 110:13 unclear (1) 33:20 uncommon (1) 1:25 uncontested (2) 27:6 66:22 uncontroversial (3) 46:15,15 90:15 uncredible (1) 66:7 underlined (1) 10:9 underlying (2) 70:21 115:5 understand (20) 19:3.10 21:7,20 47:23 52:23 80:12 83:9 88:17 104:8 122:11 127:5 135:7 145:17 146:16 147:14.25 150:9.18 154:7

understandable (1) 145:20 understanding (1) 103:23 understands (2) 69:14 151:8 understood (4) 29:3 98:6 103:8 151:1 undertake (1) 148:16 undertaken (1) 137:10 undertaking (1) 71:23 undervalue (1) 68:12 undervalued (1) 68:15 undiscounted (1) 62:12 undoubtedly (2) 12:13 73:6 unfair (3) 3:1 12:16 13:7 unfavourable (2) 95:19 96:2 unfolds (1) 60:19 unfurled (1) 85:23 unilateral (1) 93:25 unilaterally (1) 109:9 unique (1) 123:18 unitary (1) 46:11 universally (1) 65:24 unjustifiable (1) 34:15 unjustifiably (1) 34:14 unlawfulness (1) 147:6 unless (1) 151:13 unlikely (3) 92:13,17 114:23 unnecessary (1) 34:15 unreal (3) 25:17 33:6 116:9 unrealistically (1) 135:8 unsatisfactory (1) 72:2 unsupported (1) 65:12 untested (1) 78:3 until (7) 27:25 29:7 70:9 82:11,13 103:7 153:11 unusual (2) 4:2 134:8 unwilling (1) 33:24 unwind (1) 77:6 upended (1) 93:5 upheld (1) 140:12 upon (12) 3:16 27:3 41:14 47:18 50:21 52:24 59:4 73:13 78:12 110:9 115:1 149:8 upsets (1) 126:1 upturn (1) 73:25 urge (2) 91:8 102:19 urges (1) 50:25 us500 (1) 39:2 us600 (1) 2:24 used (12) 49:12 55:24 69:18 71:2 72:18 95:2 103:19,20 104:10 113:4 126:20 145:7 useful (2) 50:24 143:6 uses (2) 10:8 57:13 using (4) 22:18 67:23 68:11 132:6 usurp (1) 109:9 utilised (1) 74:25 utilises (1) 55:6 v (1) 147:8 valuation (50) 8:2,11,17 31:10 37:3.20 60:4,11,13,20,22 67:23 68:7.9.12 70:1.25 71:8.13.20.22 116:20 119:1,10,11,13,16,22 126:9,16,18,19 127:1,8 128:20 130:7 131:22 132:2,2 133:8 136:20,22 139:4 142:9.22 143:9 150:23.25.25 151:2 valuations (4) 8:18 37:16 75:24 119:18 value (96) 2:8,21,22 4:24 6:10,19,21 7:17,19 8:4,7,11,12 9:4 12:2,13 14:17,20 15:2,3 16:13 38:6 39:10 61:3,18,22 62:12 65:25 66:14 68:3 69:19 70:14 18 71:1 74:24 75:8 76:14,15,16 77:23 78:19 94:3 114:19 116:18,18 117:2,3,5,6,17,18,21,23,25

119:3.11.19.20 120:2.22 121:3.10 123:14 124:20.22 125:25 126:25 127:7.11.14.17.24 128:11 129:8 130:8.10.10.15 131:4,13,14,17,19 132:6,9 134:24 140:1 142:14,15 144:25 145:1,3 valued (3) 68:9 126:9 130:13 values (5) 2:19 67:22 94:9 118:14 130:18 valuing (1) 68:6 various (3) 47:12 56:18 153:20 vary (2) 118:7 132:1 vast (2) 2:8 19:10 vault (3) 55:18,21 56:2 vehicle (1) 80:3 ventured (1) 129:10 versus (1) 142:13 via (1) 52:17 victim (2) 4:17 146:8 views (3) 33:17 34:8 73:22 violations (2) 31:16,20 virtually (1) 24:23 volatility (2) 63:7,10 volume (1) 46:16 vote (69) 3:16,24 6:7,13,24 7:1,6,8,14,22,25,25 8:3,13 15:8,11,12,17,21 16:1,12 19:24 20:3,8,21 21:13 22:18 23:11.21.24 24:13 32:2 33:1 36:10,12 60:16,19,24 61:11 64:1 65.2 67.20 81.1 2 82:5.13.21 84:23 85:12 92:11,16 93:3 98:3 101:6 108:15 109:1,10 110:4.5.13 111:21 112:3 127:16 137:21 138:20 139:6 141:3,4,6 voted (25) 6:4,15 8:6 9:1 19:18 23:2 32:8 33:21.24 34:10.21.23 35:3.15 36:20 39:9 102:2.8.15.22 104:21,23 110:14 111:5 135:2 votes (1) 64:19 voting (28) 6:2 10:12 16:2 20:4 23:1,9 24:25 25:23,25 26:8.9.14.19.21.27:6.17 28:16.20 29:5 33:21 36:5 81:9.25 82:12.19 103:13,16 106:3 w wait (1) 83:11 waits (1) 13:20 waivered (1) 9:2 wake (1) 136:2 walk (2) 11:15 34:22 walking (2) 21:16 101:9 wall (1) 88:20 wants (1) 156:11 warranted (1) 79:5 wasnt (13) 25:19 26:22 27:3,8 28:8,9,10 31:25 33:5 35:14 38:18 121:6 129:1 watch (7) 69:21 121:16.22.22 122:3 125:14.14 wave (1) 88:6 way (38) 3:2,23 11:25 12:16 14:15 17:12,19 18:20 27:24 32:9 33:17 34:25 36:6 40:10 42:10 47:17 54:6 59:19,23 63:7 69:20 71:1 78:7 87:11.21 88:18 105:2.11 110:8.11 121:9

123:19 136:9 139:16

140:18 141:4 144:23

154:10

118:4.7.9.23

ways (1) 52:16

web (1) 93:6

120:12 124:7 week (6) 5:5 19:23 22:23 28:18 89:8 94:21 weekend (1) 157:8 weeks (15) 1:17,23 11:14 16:9,17 65:1 85:24 89:21 90:3 91:19 97:8 109:12 154:1 155:25 156:10 welcome (1) 83:9 welfare (5) 3:22 26:24 42:4,6 51:22 went (8) 63:4 89:9 100:23,25 114:21 128:16 131:18 140:6 werent (1) 22:22 weve (19) 7:23 12:19 21:19 22:7 27:23 34:19 64:24 81:10 91:25 95:22 97:7 98:18 101:23 130:21 134:16 138:17 153:20,24 155:20 whatever (2) 99:24 136:20 whats (1) 77:15 whatsoever (2) 126:22 129:3 whenever (1) 77:11 whereas (1) 119:6 whole (4) 141:10,15 142:13 143:17 wholly (8) 46:15 65:12 95:10.16 96:4 108:23 116:2 135:19 whom (1) 1:18 widely (3) 88:14,19,22 widening (2) 119:5,8 widespread (1) 68:14 willing (2) 8:21,24 win (2) 62:25 98:7 windfall (1) 116:11 window (3) 124:4,19,24 winwin (1) 13:8 wiped (1) 116:2 wisdom (1) 117:10 wish (3) 9:15 11:10 71:23 wished (2) 107:25,25 wishes (1) 46:14 withheld (5) 4:15 86:22 99:11 114:1 119:22 withholding (1) 122:9 witness (23) 14:11 19:25 20:2 29:12.15.17 30:1.8.14 33:16.22 66:23 77:8.12 78:4 105:9,10,15,15 106:20 107:3 114:12,13 won (22) 2:8 6:10 24:6 35:11 39:1 66:11,14 113:18 115:13 128:14 131:23,24 138:1 139:3,6,7,10 140:8,16 142:25 143:4,25 wonders (2) 33:25 36:15 wont (4) 36:2 37:1 134:19 154:4 work (5) 9:7 90:21,22,23 156:9 working (2) 72:14 155:20 works (2) 32:12 90:20 world (1) 136:19 worth (6) 5:14 63:25 64:6 72:15 118:10.24 worthy (1) 1:18 wouldnt (2) 123:5 154:13 write (2) 28:4 58:18 writing (11) 48:22 49:18 86:4 91:16 102:18 111:23 127:21 148:17.22 149:4.10 writings (3) 48:17 49:8,12 written (26) 48:17 49:3 69:12 76:21 78:23 81:3 82:2 86:8 90:1,18 91:9 94:20 100:18 115:15 140:17,21 141:7,22 142:2 144:5 146:19 147:15 150:21 151:6 156:13 157:4 wrong (6) 19:8 53:10,11 70:12 91:4 128:11

109:16 141:17.18 144:8

Day	9
-----	---

	L	I	I	1	I
wrongdoing (1) 68:13	16266 (1) 131:24	92:7,14,22 93:4 94:22	9		
wrongfulness (1) 98:23	17 (14) 6:2,4 8:1 21:13	126:15 150:17 153:21	9		
wrote (1) 27:19	23:21,25 29:7,9	40 (5) 30:3,15 73:25 142:24	9 (7) 2:8 6:10 11:11 49:5		
	81:12,18,21,23 107:10	153:25	66:11,14 128:14		
Х	111:20	41 (3) 30:25 130:1 158:5	90 (1) 67:16		
(1)	17th (1) 82:11	42 (2) 31:14 130:3	91 (1) 69:1		
xyz (1) 117:18	18 (7) 15:25 77:13 94:6 99:6	425 (1) 132:24	92 (1) 69:10		
	108:4 126:17 148:19	43 (1) 130:20	93 (1) 71:3		
Y	19 (3) 16:5 98:15 109:23	44 (5) 33:11,19 132:17	94 (1) 71:14		
	1998 (1) 46:16	133:19 134:13			
year (8) 14:6 16:8 17:11,18		446 (1) 132:24	95 (1) 73:11		
21:23 46:17 56:22 70:10	2	45 (4) 34:5 50:8 63:20	96 (1) 74:3		
yearbook (1) 46:17		134:12	97 (2) 49:25 74:17		
rears (7) 19:10 39:25 64:25	2 (13) 5:19 6:3 14:19 16:17	46 (3) 34:23 44:2 136:14	98 (1) 75:4		
68:21 79:14 80:9,9	18:15 35:17 43:6	47 (1) 137:3	98000odd (1) 143:4		
resterday (3) 137:19 152:2	90:4,16,24 103:15 112:8	48 (3) 35:16 137:15 142:18	99 (1) 75:13		
153:13	150:17	486314418 (1) 78:20			
ret (7) 17:16 29:12 30:8	20 (9) 16:18 74:24 111:16,24	49 (1) 142:11			
49:22 98:3 129:10 152:3	133:10,14,16,17 154:14	495 (1) 113:17			
ields (1) 60:4	2007 (1) 77:21	455 (1) 115.17			
ork (1) 117:20	2014 (11) 21:21 22:22 77:21	5			
(1) 19:23	80:7,11,15,18 97:4 139:23				
oure (4) 50:21 79:21	140:2 150:1	5 (28) 2:4 6:25 9:17 32:1			
80:14,22	2015 (25) 8:3 18:9 20:21	44:2,15 47:5,7,20 49:4,10			
		50:6 53:6,17 57:4,22			
ourselves (1) 51:1	22:24 23:14 36:20 37:20	75:11,11 76:6 78:24			
ouve (3) 1:23 25:13 144:3	38:20,24 60:14 74:20	93:14,23 96:12,15			
(2) 34:23 112:9	76:3,4 77:14 84:10 85:3	108:17,17 116:21 130:8			
	88:9 94:23 98:15 99:6	50 (1) 50:7			
Ζ	101:10 126:19 127:8	50000 (1) 15:13			
(2) 0 47	138:19,25	50000 (1) 15:15 5000odd (1) 139:6			
ero (3) 8:17,18 72:5	2016 (3) 17:14,17 70:10	.,			
	2017 (1) 49:3	51 (1) 35:25			
0	2018 (1) 31:5	515 (5) 61:22 62:14 76:10			
	2021 (1) 1:1	78:18 143:2			
548 (1) 138:24	208 (1) 13:4	52 (3) 37:19 44:16 89:4			
16 (1) 39:1	21 (4) 16:23 35:11 105:14	521 (1) 132:24			
64 (1) 37:22	111:7	53 (2) 37:24 44:16			
	214 (1) 13:5	54 (2) 38:3 44:2			
1	22 (6) 18:7 50:6 79:11 91:4	55 (1) 38:10			
	113:23 154:2	56 (1) 38:12			
(10) 5:25 11:17 18:15		57 (1) 38:19			
28:21 37:21 46:3 76:4	226 (1) 136:18	59 (2) 40:7 158:6			
135:23 158:3,4	23 (4) 18:23 19:22 78:4				
10 (15) 22:11 27:19 36:3	114:10	6			
74:12,20 78:9 81:9,15	24 (4) 20:5 22:24 23:1				
84:10 99:1 101:10 138:19	115:10	6 (9) 10:6 24:7 39:16 46:3			
139:1 142:3 148:4	242 (1) 46:18	53:17 54:4 96:18 105:15			
.00 (4) 18:17 77:20 83:8	243 (1) 46:18	108:17			
153:22	25 (6) 21:13 23:21 76:3	60 (1) 40:25			
	115:13 117:4 143:25	61621 (1) 138:1			
1000 (1) 1:2	25000 (1) 19:9	63 (1) 42:1			
01 (1) 55:1	26 (3) 1:1 57:4 117:13	64 (1) 43:24			
02 (2) 44:24 56:12	27 (3) 22:4 49:24 118:2	64400 (2) 139:3 142:4			
04 (1) 104:25	28 (1) 23:3	66 (1) 47:13			
05 (1) 83:5	29 (2) 24:2 120:3	66602 (2) 139:10 140:8			
08 (1) 125:2		6667 (2) 2:13 15:16			
09 (2) 125:8 158:10	3	67 (3) 45:25 50:14 79:9			
09622 (1) 143:4		68 (3) 14:10 50:20 102:10			
1 (11) 11:23 46:4 81:17,22	3 (7) 6:7 8:16 9:6 20:7 49:10	69 (1) 51:11			
85:3 100:7,15 112:6	91:1 94:5	69235 (1) 142:25			
114:12 128:7 138:25	30 (5) 24:14 37:20 76:6,7	69235 (1) 142:25 69300 (2) 139:7 142:4			
11 (2) 50:4 97:19	120:17	03300 (2) 139:1 142:4			
11232 (1) 131:23		7			
16 (1) 125:2	304 (1) 153:1	·			
17 (1) 84:11	31 (1) 120:25	7 (6) 10:14 24:6 51:11 77:16			
18 (1) 84:12	315 (2) 152:25 153:3	96:24 149:19			
19 (1) 84:19	32 (3) 25:11 121:1,4	70 (4) 48:15 51:11 53:13			
2 (7) 12:5 46:4 49:5 51:12	325 (1) 157:9	119:4			
	328 (4) 132:24 133:5,8,12	71 (1) 54:16			
101:20 115:12 128:2	33 (4) 26:2 57:22 121:15	72 (1) 57:24			
207 (1) 83:6	133:18	724 (1) 140:16			
25 (1) 44:24	3393148 (1) 138:12	77 (3) 88:8 89:5 98:12			
3 (3) 94:6 102:12 148:10	34 (8) 27:4 89:7,12 97:21	7732779 (1) 138:5			
34 (1) 102:10	98:2,10 122:2 132:18				
39 (1) 76:9	35 (3) 27:7 122:23,25	78 (2) 59:9 60:13			
4 (8) 13:24 28:17 30:6	355 (1) 134:8	79 (1) 61:3			
52:14 81:10 103:14,17	36 (2) 27:12 123:11	8			
106:5	37 (3) 27:18 124:5,7	0			
44 (1) 158:11		8 (6) 11:5 38:24 97:12			
46 (2) 131:17,25	379270999 (1) 78:19	103:15 122:15 153:25			
47 (1) 84:6	38 (4) 28:3 57:22 89:10	80 (1) 61:16			
	127:6				
l47f (1) 138:22	387 (1) 115:22	81 (2) 62:16 128:7			
5 (17) 14:3 21:11,18,21	39 (2) 28:15 128:2	82 (1) 63:14			
22:5 50:6 52:14 66:24		83 (4) 64:25 65:13 158:7,8			
75:11,11 104:2,6 106:5	4	84 (2) 55:24 65:6			
		86 (2) 65:19 94:6			
116:21 130:8 132:6 135:25			1		
	4 (20) 6:12 9:13 16:6 25:1	87 (2) 63:19 66:2			
151 (1) 158:12	4 (20) 6:12 9:13 16:6 25:1 31:22 47:8,21 48:15 51:12	87 (2) 63:19 66:2 88 (1) 66:7			
116:21 130:8 132:6 135:25 151 (1) 158:12 16 (7) 8:3 60:14 77:23 106:21 126:19 127:8 142:4					