In the arbitration proceeding between

**CUBE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND SICAV AND OTHERS**

Claimants

and

**KINGDOM OF SPAIN**

Respondent

ICSID Case No. ARB/15/20

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Separate and Partial Dissenting Opinion

Professor Christian Tomuschat
1. I concur to a large extent with my two colleagues who support the majority decision. Unfortunately, I am not able to share their views entirely. It is common ground between the three arbitrators that the issue of legitimate expectations is determinative for the assessment as to whether fair and equitable treatment (FET) was granted to the Claimants according to Article 10(1) ECT.

2. The three arbitrators also see the necessity of drawing a distinction between the different types of investment the Claimants have made.

3. When in 2008 the Claimants bought the PV installations, they could with a high degree of certainty assume that the tariffs established for the sale of electric energy from renewable sources would remain stable for the entire period of time indicated in RDL 661/2007. In 2007, the Spanish Government had affirmed through the press release of 25 May 2007 accompanying that Decree that investors could trust that the tariffs indicated in the Decree would not be affected by any new regulation with “retroactive” effect, as specifically provided for in Article 44(3) of the Decree itself. At that time, no serious concerns had arisen as yet as to whether such a promise could be maintained in the long run by the host country.

4. RDL 661/2007 was not specifically addressed to the Claimants. It was an act of general legislation subject to the general power of the law-making bodies of the Respondent to change the applicable legal rules according to the prevailing interests of the national community. As rightly pointed out in the Decision, the Spanish Supreme Court has consistently held, although not specifically with regard to RDL 661/2007, that no investor has a right to the unrestricted maintenance of a legal instrument providing for premiums under a subsidized remuneration system.\(^1\) In the full knowledge of this jurisprudence, the Spanish Government specified in the press release of 25 May 2007, published on the website of the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism and therefore not an accidental product of some press officer, that the indications in RDL 661/2007 concerning the modalities of the tariff regime would not be changed during the whole length of that period and could therefore be fully trusted. That representation came therefore within the scope of

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\(^1\) Decision, para. 299.
Article 10(1) ECT, engendering legitimate expectations as long as the essential features of the factual situation remained unchanged.

5. Although the text of Article 44(3) RDL 661/2007 and of the accompanying letter refers only to the regulated tariff and not to its duration, it must be interpreted as extending also to the relevant length of time. Any other perusal of the words would clearly undermine the indication of non-retroactivity.

6. The Claimants’ investments in the PV sector, made one year after the enactment of RDL 661/2007, enjoy therefore without any restriction the protection granted by Article 10(1) ECT.

7. When some years later, in 2011 and 2012, the Claimants enlarged their investment in the sector of renewable energy, acquiring installations for the production of hydro energy, the conditions of the electricity regime in Spain had changed significantly. To be sure, RDL 661/2007 was still in force. But some of its elements had been changed outside the review procedure provided for under its Article 44(3). Thus, it became clear that the amendment procedure provided for in Article 44(3) was not the only path that could be embarked upon for a modification of the legal regime of RDL 661/2007.

8. It should first of all be reiterated that in 2009 the deficit in the electricity system had reached critical major dimensions to which attention was drawn in the Preamble of RD 6/2009:

“The growing tariff deficit, i.e. the difference between that collected from the regulated tariffs set by the government and that which the consumers pay for their regulated supply and from the access tariffs set by the liberalised market, and the real costs associated with these tariffs, is producing serious problems, which in the current context of international financial crisis is profoundly affecting the system. This puts at risk not only the financial situation of companies in the electricity sector, but also the sustainability of that system. This maladjustment is unsustainable and has serious consequences, by deteriorating the security and capacity of the financing of investment needed for the supply of electricity at the levels of quality and security that Spanish society demands.”
It was clear as from that moment that the system needed some re-equilibration. It stands to reason that in principle, even in a regulated sector of the economy, the production costs must in principle be covered by the consumers. In order to halt a rising gap, two solutions can be found. Either the consumer prices have to be raised or the production costs lowered.²

In order to put a halt to the increasing deficit, some provisional measures were enacted by RD 6/2009 which constituted a first attempt to overcome the financial difficulties but did not yet go the heart of the problem, the structural deficit between revenues and expenditure.³

One year later, in November 2010, RD 1565/2010 removed the fixed tariffs payable after 25 years. This was the first significant curtailment of the original regime introduced by RDL 661/2007.

In December 2010, RDL 14/2010 set out further “urgent measures for the correction of the tariff deficit in the electricity sector.”⁴ Those measures included providing for a limitation on the number of operating hours each year for which a facility would be entitled to Special Regime payments, and charging producers an ‘access fee’ for using the network, while guaranteeing a ‘reasonable return’ to producers and extending the 25 year fixed tariff period for PV to 28 years as a kind of compensation for the reduction of the number of operating hours.

In the Preamble to RDL 14/2010, it was openly stated that the financial burden for the maintenance of the indicated tariffs had become exceedingly onerous and that accordingly measures had to be taken affecting both the producers and the consumers (increase of their access tariffs). Notwithstanding the measures taken, a reasonable return on the investments would remain guaranteed.⁵

These new regulations must have put on alert every investor. The three legislative acts officially recognized that the original scheme under RDL 661/2007 was at the brink of

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² Some years later, in 2013, the deficit had attained truly frightening dimensions, Decision, para. 368.
³ Decision, para. 323.
⁴ RDL 14/2010, R-58.
⁵ Decision, para. 325.
failure. The majority opinion acknowledges indeed that the different measures introduced in 2009 and 2010 were indicative of such grave disturbances in the financial regime of the sector of renewable energies that investors could not “reasonably rely on there being no change whatever to the Special Regime applicable to existing facilities.”

15. Indeed, Claimants’ Investment Committee was aware of the threatening regulatory risk as pointed out by the majority opinion, which aptly refers to the opinion voiced in the Committee that the ongoing developments had to be observed like “milk on a stove.” In other words, the heavy regulatory risk was clearly perceived.

16. It is true that the EC warned Spain by a letter of 22 February 2011 (joint action by the EU Commissioners for Energy and for Climate Action) of the negative effects of the retroactive amendment of the regime of RDL 661/2007 by RD 1565/2010 and RDL 14/2010. However, this was just an opinion that had no direct effect on the Respondent’s legislation and did not identify any other measures appropriate for dealing with the tariff deficit. Moreover, it has not been shown by Claimants that in taking their decisions they relied on the letter of 22 February 2011.

17. The measures determined by the Spanish Government and in particular the grounds publicized for their justification were so plainly reflective of an economic situation which had become unbearable that regarding the hydro sector the investors could not have any legitimate trust that the regime of RDL 661/2007 would be implemented for its full duration as originally planned in 2007. In particular, they could not ignore the fact that the Government, whose main concern must be to safeguard the welfare of its people, had to undertake serious efforts with a view to establishing a fair and equitable balance between the interests of the producers of electric energy from renewable sources and the interests of its consumers, not only the Spanish industry but the entire Spanish society. It is inherent in such a system of reciprocity that both sides are required to concede some sacrifices if major maladjustments arise.

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18. The four grounds adduced by the majority decision in order to show that, notwithstanding the economic pressure threatening the viability of the finances of the electricity system, the reliance of the Claimants on the continuity of the regime under RDL 661/2007 was justified holds little persuasive power.

19. First, it is true that the text of RDL 661/2007 was “clear and specific.” Yet since the issuance of that Decree four years had passed during which, as publicly announced by the Spanish Government, the deficit in the system had accumulated continuously. Time had begun to dismantle the original factual framework.

20. Second, the fact that the Claimants were professional investors tells the observer nothing about the diligence they applied in the instant case. Indeed, they handled the matter lightly by not even requesting a written report. They were clearly negligent in assessing the regulatory risks inherent in their planned investment decisions.

21. Third, the contention that more exhaustive legal analysis would probably not have led to another result amounts to pure speculation and grants too easily a blessing to a major management failure.

22. Fourth, it cannot be disputed that the significance of the Respondent’s representations as to the stability of RDL 661/2007 is ultimately not a matter of Spanish law but of international law, operating in the context of Article 10(1) ECT. However, the factual circumstances obtaining in the host country determine whether legitimate expectations have arisen for an investor. In this regard, the legal position is fundamentally different between the two types of investments. Through the legislative measures taken in 2009 and 2010, it had become clear that the financial stability of the electricity system was in erosion and that emergency measures were necessary to save it from collapse.

23. Eventually, it must be noted that departures from the regime of RDL 661/2007 did not mean that the investors were totally deprived of any guarantee. From the very start of the Special Regime of energy from renewable sources, the Spanish legislature had confirmed that

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8 Ibid., para. 401.
investors should enjoy “reasonable profitability” of their investments. The reasonable return on investments became also a key element of the regime established by RDL 661/2007. Likewise the later enactments stress the concept of “reasonable return” as a leitmotiv. There can be no doubt that this concept was not meant to operate as an upper limit on gains to be made in operating installations for the production of energy from renewable sources. But it served as a general reminder that the Special Regime had a specific purpose: on the one hand to ensure provision of an appropriate amount of electric energy through a (somewhat) regulated market mechanism, on the other hand to ensure for producers an adequate profitability. Investors knew that they were invited to contribute to an economic welfare program supposed to benefit all parties involved in a delicate balance.

24. The guarantee of a reasonable return could not be dislodged by the new regime that was subsequently introduced in 2012-2014. It has been acknowledged by the majority Decision that the Respondent made strenuous efforts to maintain that guarantee notwithstanding the replacement of a system based on volume of production by a system based on capacity. This was indeed a fundamental change. However, given the fact that the investors could not trust in the continuity of the regime of RDL 661/2007, the Claimants could have a right to compensation under Article 10(1) ECT only if it could be demonstrated that the new regime must be deemed to be in violation of the guarantee of a reasonable return.

25. In general, an investor cannot be deemed to have a vested right to the continuity of the administrative system according to which a promised advantage will be provided to it. The guarantee given is a guarantee of economic value. In what form the relevant advantage shall be granted is a matter to be determined primarily by the host State. Therefore, only if it could be shown that the transformation of the system went so far as to call into question the guarantee of a reasonable return would the Claimants have a claim to compensation pursuant to the general rules of responsibility. According to my analysis of the facts, that demonstration has not been made.

9 Law 54/1997, Article 30(4)(c), Exhibit R-59.
10 Preamble, para. 7, Exhibit R-71.
11 Decision, paras. 361-379.
26. Therefore, according to my assessment the Claimants are not entitled to claim compensation for the damage they allegedly suffered in relation to their hydro activities through the introduction of the new regime in 2012-2014.

27. Apart from my diverging views in respect of the claims asserted with regard to the hydro installations, I agree with the Decision. In particular, I support the considerations on jurisdiction and admissibility as well as the observations regarding the merits of the claims related to the PV installations.

Prof. Christian Tomuschat