International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes  
Washington, D.C.  

In the proceedings between  

Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.  
( Claimants )  

and  

The Argentine Republic  
( Respondent )  

ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19  

and  

In the arbitration under the Rules of the  
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law between  

AWG Group Ltd. (Claimant)  

and  

The Argentine Republic (Respondent)  

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DECISION ON JURISDICTION  

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Members of the Tribunal  
Professor Jeswald W. Salacuse, President  
Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitrator  
Professor Pedro Nikken, Arbitrator  

Secretary of the Tribunal  
Mr. Gonzalo Flores  

Representing the Claimants  
Messrs. Nigel Blackaby and  
Lluis Paradell and  
Ms. Noiana Marigo  
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP  

Representing the Respondent  
Dr. Osvaldo César Guglielmino  
Procurador del Tesoro de la Nación Argentina  
Dr. Jorge Barruguirre  
Dr. Ignacio Torderola  
Procuración del Tesoro de la Nación Argentina  
Buenos Aires  
República Argentina  

Date of Decision: August 3, 2006
I. Procedure

1. On April 17, 2003, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID” or “the Centre”) received a Request for Arbitration (“the Request”) against the Argentine Republic (“the Respondent” or “Argentina”) from Aguas Argentinas S.A. (“AASA”), Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. (“AGBAR”), Vivendi Universal S.A. (“Vivendi”) and AWG Group Ltd (“AWG”), (together, “the Claimants”). AASA is a company incorporated in Argentina. Suez, and Vivendi, both incorporated in France, AGBAR, incorporated in Spain, and AWG, incorporated in the United Kingdom, were shareholders in AASA. The Request concerned the Claimants’ investments in a concession for water distribution and waste water treatment services in the city of Buenos Aires and some surrounding municipalities and a series of alleged acts and omissions by Argentina, including Argentina’s alleged failure or refusal to apply previously agreed adjustments to the tariff calculation and adjustment mechanisms.1

2. In the Request, Claimants Suez and Vivendi, invoked Argentina’s consent to dispute settlement through ICSID arbitration provided in the 1991 Bilateral Investment Treaty between France and the Argentine Republic (the “Argentina–France BIT”)2 and AGBAR relied on Argentina’s consent in the 1991 Bilateral Investment Treaty between the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Spain (the “Argentina-Spain BIT”). Claimant AWG invoked Argentina’s consent to arbitrate investment disputes under the 1990 Bilateral Investment Treaty between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the “Argentina-UK BIT”)4, which provides in Article 8 (3) that in the event an investment dispute is subject to international arbitration Argentina and the investor concerned may agree to refer their dispute either to ICSID arbitration or to arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL Rules”) and that failing such agreement after a period of three months the parties are bound to submit their dispute to UNCITRAL Rules arbitration. Although the required three months had elapsed without agreement, AWG in its Request for Arbitration invited Argentina to agree to extend ICSID arbitration to AWG’s claims under the Argentina-UK BIT.
3. On April 17, 2003, the Centre, in accordance with Rule 5 of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings (Institution Rules), acknowledged receipt and transmitted a copy of the Request to the Argentine Republic and to the Argentine Embassy in Washington D.C.

4. On July 17, 2003, the Acting Secretary-General of the Centre registered the Request, pursuant to Article 36(3) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (the “ICSID Convention” or “the Convention”). The case was registered as ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 with the formal heading of Aguas Argentinas S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic. On that same date, the Acting Secretary-General, in accordance with Institution Rule 7, notified the parties of the registration of the Request and invited them to proceed, as soon as possible, to constitute an Arbitral Tribunal. Argentina did not agree to extend ICSID jurisdiction to the claims of AWG but it did agree to allow the case, although subject to UNCITRAL rules, to be administered by ICSID.

5. The parties could not reach an agreement on the number of arbitrators to comprise the arbitral tribunal nor on the method for their appointment. Accordingly, on September 22, 2003, the Claimants requested the Tribunal to be constituted in accordance with the formula set forth in Article 37(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention; i.e. one arbitrator appointed by each party, and the third arbitrator, who would serve as president of the tribunal, to be appointed by agreement of the parties. The Claimants appointed Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, a Swiss national, as arbitrator. The Argentine Republic in turn appointed as arbitrator Professor Pedro Nikken, a national of Venezuela.

6. In the absence of an agreement between the parties on the name of the presiding arbitrator, by letter of October 21, 2003 the Claimants, invoking Article 38 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 4 of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), requested the Centre to make this appointment. With the agreement of both parties, the Centre appointed Professor Jeswald W. Salacuse, a national of the United States of America, as the President of the Tribunal.
7. On February 17, 2004, the Deputy Secretary-General of ICSID, in accordance with ICSID Arbitration Rule 6(1), notified the parties that all three arbitrators had accepted their appointments and that the Tribunal was therefore deemed to be constituted and the proceedings to have begun on that date. On the same date, pursuant to ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation 25, the parties were informed that Mr. Gonzalo Flores, Senior Counsel, ICSID, would serve as Secretary of the Arbitral Tribunal. The parties agreed that the same tribunal would hear and decide ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and the UNCITRAL arbitration initiated by AWG, along with two other cases involving water concessions in the provinces of Santa Fe (ICSID Case No ARB/03/17) and Cordoba (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/18).

8. Under ICSID Arbitration Rule 13, the Tribunal shall hold its first session within 60 days after its constitution or such other period as the parties may agree. The parties could not agree on a suitable date for the first session within the prescribed time limits. The Tribunal accordingly held its first session without the parties via telephone conference on April 19, 2004.

9. On June 7, 2004, the Tribunal held a session with the parties at the seat of the Centre in Washington, D.C. During the session the parties in ICSID case No. ARB/03/19 confirmed their agreement that the Tribunal had been properly constituted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules and that they did not have any objections in this respect. Similarly, in the case governed by the UNCITRAL Rules, AWG and Argentina also agreed that the Tribunal had been properly constituted.

10. During the session the parties also agreed on a number of procedural matters reflected in written minutes signed by the President and the Secretary of the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after consultation with the parties, fixed the following timetable for the written and oral pleadings in this case:

\[(1) \textbf{Merits (in the event Argentina raised no objections to jurisdiction):}\]
The Claimants would file a memorial on the merits on January 1, 2005;

b. The Respondent would file a counter-memorial on the merits within one hundred and twenty (120) days from its receipt of the Claimants’ memorial;

c. The Claimants would file a reply on the merits within sixty (60) days from their receipt of the Respondent’s counter-memorial;

d. The Respondent would file its rejoinder on the merits within sixty (60) days from its receipt of the Claimants’ reply; and

e. The Tribunal would thereafter hold a hearing on the merits. The Tribunal envisaged holding this hearing on October 24-28, 2005 which dates the parties agreed to reserve for this purpose.

(2) Jurisdiction (in the event Argentina raised objections to jurisdiction):

a. If the Respondent decides to file objections to jurisdiction, it would do so within sixty (60) days from its receipt of the Claimants’ memorial on the merits;

b. Thereafter the proceedings on the merits would be suspended in accordance with ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(3);

c. The Claimants would file their counter-memorial on jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from their receipt of the Respondent’s objections to jurisdiction; and

d. The Tribunal would thereafter hold a hearing on jurisdiction. The Tribunal envisaged holding this hearing on May 11-12, 2005, which date the parties agreed to reserve for this purpose.
(3) If the Tribunal decides that it has jurisdiction or to join the question of jurisdiction to the merits of the dispute, the proceedings on the merits would be resumed and:

a. The Respondent would have for the filing of its counter-memorial on the merits the number of days equal to the original one hundred and twenty (120) less the number of days used for the filing of its objections to jurisdiction;

b. The Claimants would then file their reply on the merits within sixty (60) days from their receipt of the Respondent’s counter-memorial;

c. The Respondent would file its rejoinder on the merits within sixty (60) days from its receipt of the Claimants’ reply; and

d. The Tribunal would then, in consultation with the parties as far as possible, fix a date for a hearing.

11. In accordance with the agreed timetable, on January 1, 2005 the Claimants filed a joint Memorial on the Merits with accompanying documentation with respect to ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and the arbitration under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules relating to the AWG claims. On February 28, 2005 Argentina filed its Memorial with objections to jurisdiction with respect to these two cases.

12. By letter of March 17, 2005 the Tribunal confirmed the suspension of the proceedings on the merits in accordance with ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(3) and Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Rules. On April 6, 2005, the Claimants filed their Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction.

13. As agreed upon during the June 7, 2004 session, a hearing on jurisdiction was held at the seat of the Centre in Washington, D.C. on May 11, 2005. Messrs. Nigel Blackaby and Lluis Paradell and Ms. Noiana Marigo, from the law firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Mr. Bernardo Iriberri, from the Buenos Aires-based law firm
of Estudio Cardenas Cassagne y Asociados, Mr. Patrice Herbert from Suez Environnement and Mr. Miquel Griño, from AGBAR, attended the hearing on behalf of the Claimants. Mr. Ignacio Torterola from the Procuración del Tesoro de la Nación Argentina, attended the hearing on behalf of the Respondent. Also present on behalf of the Respondent were Messrs. Alejandro Labado, Emilio Lentini, and Carlos Rivera, representing the Ente Tripartito de Obras y Servicios (ETOSS). During the hearing Messrs. Blackaby and Paradell addressed the Tribunal on behalf of the Claimants. Mr. Torterola addressed the Tribunal on behalf of the Argentine Republic. The Tribunal posed questions to the parties, as provided in Rule 32(3) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and Article 25 of the UNCITRAL Rules.

14. On January 28, 2005, five non-governmental organizations, Asociación Civil por la Igualidad y la Justicia (ACIJ), Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisión de Servicios de Acción Comunitaria, and Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores, filed a “Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae” (the “Petition”) with the Secretary of the Tribunal. Following the filing of the Petition, the Tribunal invited the parties to make any observations they might have in this regard, and both parties submitted their views on this matter. On May 19, 2005, the Tribunal issued an Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae (available online at ICSID’s web site at www.worldbank.org/icsid) setting out the conditions under which the Tribunal would consider amicus curiae submissions.

15. Following the hearing on jurisdiction, the Respondent at various times filed unsolicited documents and arguments further contesting the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. On each occasion, the Tribunal requested the Claimants views on these arguments and documents, and the Claimants totally rejected them each time. Finding that the Respondents had a full and complete opportunity to present their objections to jurisdiction in their memorial and oral arguments at the hearing on jurisdiction and finding further that the arguments presented in these unsolicited filings duplicated those that the Respondents had submitted in their oral arguments and memorial, the Tribunal by
letter of March 24, 2006 requested the parties to refrain from making any new unsolicited submissions.

16. By letter of February 9, 2006, counsel for the Claimants informed the Tribunal that the Claimant shareholders of AASA were in the process of selling their interests in AASA to third parties and that “…in order to facilitate the required approval by the Republic of Argentina of such sale, AASA has decided to withdraw its claim in the above-referenced arbitration” but that such withdrawal was expressly without prejudice to the Claimant Shareholders’ claims in this proceeding. Upon invitation of the Tribunal, the Respondent filed its observations to this withdrawal by letter of February 15, 2006. The Respondent did not object to the withdrawal of AASA but requested that the Claimant AASA provide the Respondent copies of the minutes of the shareholders’ meeting (Asamblea de Accionistas de AASA) with respect to the decision authorizing such withdrawal. At the same time, Respondent advanced further arguments objecting to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and asserting that AASA’s decision to withdraw extinguished the claims of the other claimants in this case. At the invitation of the Tribunal, counsel for AASA provided copies of the minutes of the AASA’s shareholders’ meeting of February 8, 2006, authorizing the discontinuance of its claim before this Tribunal. At the same time, counsel for the Claimants rejected each of the Respondent’s arguments challenging the Tribunal’s jurisdiction with respect to the other Claimants. The Tribunal provided copies of these documents to the Respondent and requested its observation concerning AASA’s withdrawal. By letter of March 31, 2006, the Respondent informed the Tribunal that “…the Argentine Republic does not oppose the proposed cessation by the Concessionaire… AASA…” in ICSID arbitration ARB/03/19 (“…la República Argentina no se opone al desistimiento planteado por la[s] Concesionaria[s] AASA…”), (para. 9) but argued that such withdrawal had legal consequences with respect to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the shareholder Claimants and their claims.

17. In its deliberations on this request, the Tribunal found that neither the ICSID Convention nor the Rules specifically provide for the withdrawal of one party from an arbitration proceeding that is to continue thereafter. ICSID Arbitration Rule 44, the provision of closest relevance to the action requested by the Claimant AASA, allows the
discontinuation of an arbitration proceeding at the request of a party when the other party does not object. But Arbitration Rule 44 by a strict reading of its terms does not apply to the withdrawal of a single party. Nonetheless, the Tribunal, relying on Article 44 of the ICSID Convention, which grants ICSID tribunals the power to decide procedural questions not covered by the Convention or the Rules, concluded that it had the power to order the discontinuance of proceedings with respect to one party at its request when the other party did not object. The Tribunal found that permitting such discontinuance in the conditions presented by this case was in accordance with the basic objective of the ICSID Convention of facilitating the settlement of investment disputes, of which ICSID Arbitration Rule 44 is a specific manifestation. It also was of the view that the continued participation of AASA in this proceeding would serve no useful purpose in bringing about a fair and correct resolution of the present arbitration.

18. On April 14, 2006, the Tribunal therefore entered Procedural Order No. 1 Concerning the Discontinuance of Proceedings with Respect to Aguas Argentinas S.A. (available online at www.worldbank.org/icsid), directing that: (i) the proceedings in ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 with respect to the Claimant Aguas Argentinas S.A. be discontinued and that the said Claimant Aguas Argentinas S.A. cease to be a party with effect from April 14, 2006; and (ii) that the proceedings in ICSID Case No ARB/03/19 continue in all other respects. With respect to the Respondent’s arguments that the withdrawal of AASA from the case had implications for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the shareholder Claimants and their claims, the Tribunal concluded that these objections were more appropriately addressed in its decision on jurisdiction. They are in fact considered in subsequent sections of the present decision.

19. The Tribunal has deliberated on the parties’ written submissions on the question of jurisdiction and on the oral arguments delivered in the course of the May 11, 2005 hearing. Since the parties pleaded ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 jointly with the UNCITRAL case of AWG v. Argentina and filed joint memorials relating thereto and since the facts and the legal questions in both cases are virtually identical, the Tribunal has determined that it is appropriate to issue a single Decision on Jurisdiction covering both cases. Having considered the relevant facts and evidence, the ICSID Convention,
the UNCITRAL Rules, the Argentina–France BIT, the Argentina-Spain BIT, and the Argentina-U.K. BIT, as well as the written and oral submissions of the parties’ representatives, the Tribunal has reached the following decision on the question of jurisdiction with respect to both cases.

II. Factual Background

20. The Respondent is a federal republic consisting of the autonomous city of Buenos Aires and twenty-three provinces. Prior to the investment undertaken by the Claimants, the Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN), a state-owned company, had the responsibility of providing water and waste water services to City of Buenos Aires and certain surrounding municipalities.8

21. In 1989, Argentina enacted the State Reform Law9 that declared the country’s public services to be in a state of emergency and proposed to launch a broad program of privatization to remedy the situation, by which the Argentine government would transfer the assets, operations, and functions of various designated State-owned companies and entities to private and primarily foreign investors. The State Reform Law also invited the country’s provinces to participate in the privatization process. Subsequently, Argentina took certain other measures to attract private and foreign investment to its territory. Less than two years after the State Reform Law, Argentina adopted the Convertibility Law10 by which it tied or “pegged” the value of the Argentine Peso to the United States Dollar and established a currency board requiring that the amount of Argentine currency in circulation be equivalent to the foreign currency reserves held by the State. Starting in 1990, it also began to conclude bilateral treaties “for the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments” with various countries. By the year 2000, it had concluded 57 such bilateral investment treaties, commonly known as BITs, including the December 1990 Argentina-U.K. BIT, the July 1991 Argentina-France BIT, and the October 1991 Argentina-Spain BIT.

22. As part of its reform and privatization program, Argentina enacted Decree No. 2074/90 of October 5, 1990 to establish a regulatory framework by which various
designated public services, including OSN, would be privatized and transferred to private and foreign investors through a bidding process whereby they would be granted long-term concession agreements that would require the infusion by investors of new capital and technology. The federal government actively publicized its desire to privatize these services and made significant efforts, including a road show in Brussels, to interest particularly qualified foreign enterprises to invest in the privatized entities, preparing and distributing a prospectus toward this end. On June 30, 1992, the Argentine government issued Decree 999/92, known as the “Water Decree” to establish a regulatory framework for the privatization of OSN and to provide for the rights and obligations of the future concessionaire, the related regulatory bodies, and the users of the service. In order to attract the most experienced investors and to secure investment on the most favorable terms, the government established a rigorous international bidding process that included a prequalification procedure which would allow only the most financially and technically qualified enterprises to engage in actually bidding to take over the privatized public service. Based on the principles set down in the Water Decree, the Federal Ministry of Public Works and Services promulgated detailed Original Bidding Rules (Pliego de Bases y Conditiones) that stated the object, term and rules of the Concession, defined the bidding procedure, specified the rules concerning the concession contract, and also set out a model of the future Concession contract. These rules and the related model contract specified certain important provisions governing the financial aspects of the proposed concession, including investment commitments, tariff adjustments, and the equilibrium to be maintained between the costs of operation and the financial returns to the eventual successful concessionaire.

23. In response to these measures, Suez, AGBAR, Vivendi and AWG, together with Argentine companies Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires S.A., Sociedad Comercial del Plata S.A., and Meller S.A., formed a consortium in 1992 to participate in the bidding for the concession to operate specified water distribution and waste water systems in the city of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities. On December 9, 1992, the Government of Argentina awarded this consortium the concession to operate the water and waste water services system in the City of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities, at that time the largest privatized water concession in the world. Pursuant to the bidding rules,
the consortium subsequently formed an Argentine company, Aguas Argentinas S.A. (AASA) to hold and operate the concession. On April 28, AASA formally concluded a thirty-year concession contract with the Government, and on May 1, 1993 it assumed control and management of the designated water distribution and waste water systems. According to the Claimants’ Memorial on the Merits, by 2001 AASA had invested a total of US$ 1.7 billion in the concession, consisting of US$120 million in AASA’s initial capital, US$706.1 million primarily from multilateral lending institutions, and the remainder from cash flows generated by AASA.14

24. In 1999, the Argentine Republic began to experience a severe economic and financial crisis that had serious consequences for the country, its people, and its investors, both foreign and national. In response to this continuing crisis, the government adopted a variety of measures to deal with its effects in the following years. In 2002, it enacted a law15 that abolished the currency board that had linked the Argentine Peso to the U.S. dollar, resulting in a significant depreciation of the Argentine Peso. Claiming that these measures injured their investments in violation of the commitments made to them in securing the concession, the Claimants sought to obtain from the Argentine government adjustments in the tariffs that AASA could charge for water distribution and waste water services, as well as modifications of other operating conditions.

25. After a fruitless period of negotiations, the Claimants in April 2003 submitted their dispute with the Argentine Republic for settlement by arbitration to ICSID under the ICSID Convention pursuant to the Argentina-France and the Argentina-Spain BITs and, in the case of Claimant AWG, under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules pursuant to the Argentina-U.K BIT. In their Memorial, the Claimants allege that the Argentine Republic is legally responsible under the above-mentioned BITs for its wrongful actions, which expropriated Claimants’ investments in violation of Article 5(2) of the Argentina-France BIT, Article V of the Argentina-Spain BIT, and Article 5(1) of the Argentina-U.K. BIT and which failed to treat Claimants’ investments fairly and equitably in breach of Article 3 and 5(1) of the Argentina-France BIT, Article IV(1) of the Argentina-Spain BIT, and Article 2(2) of the Argentina-U.K. BIT. As a result, pursuant to the applicable BITs, Claimants seek compensation for their alleged loss. The Claimants at the initiation of
this proceeding consisted of AASA (now withdrawn), the concession company, and four of its non-Argentine shareholders: Suez, a French company holding 39.93% of AASA shares; Vivendi, also a French Company, holding 7.55% of AASA shares; AGBAR, a Spanish Company holding 25.01% of AASA shares, and AWG, a U.K. company holding 4.25% of AASA shares.¹⁶ In addition, the shareholders hold various other financial obligations made by AASA.

26. In response to the Claimants’ Memorial, the Respondent submitted a Memorial with objections to jurisdiction on February 28, 2005, alleging six specific grounds as to why ICSID and the present Tribunal are without jurisdiction to hear and decide Claimants’ claim for damages. Certain of these objections apply only to Claimants Suez, Vivendi, and AGBAR, which are asserting ICSID jurisdiction, while others are applicable to all the Claimants. The purpose of the present Decision is to consider and decide upon each of the objections to jurisdiction raised by the Respondent. In undertaking this task, the Tribunal is mindful of the fact that other ICSID tribunals in other cases involving the Respondent have decided similar, if not identical jurisdictional issues, in particular this Tribunal’s own Decision on Jurisdiction of May 16, 2006 in ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Intergrales del Agua S.A v. the Argentine Republic) relating to investments in the concession to operate water distribution and waste water services in the Argentine Province of Santa Fe. While these decisions are not binding upon the present Tribunal, they are nonetheless instructive.

III. Consideration of Jurisdictional Objections

First Jurisdictional Objection: The Dispute Does Not Arise Directly Out Of An Investment.

27. Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention provides:

“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a
The Respondent challenges ICSID’s and this Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the ground that the underlying dispute between the Claimants Suez, AGBAR, and Vivendi, on the one hand, and the Respondent Argentina, on the other, does not arise directly out of an investment, as the ICSID Convention requires. The Respondent argues that in reality this dispute is about the wisdom of general economic measures taken by the government of Argentina to deal with the economic and financial crisis it was facing. In that light, according to the Respondent, the dispute in this case does not arise directly out of an investment, but rather out of the general measures adopted by the government. Further, Respondent argues that the word “directly” could also be “translated” as meaning “specifically” and that since none of the measures complained of were directed specifically at the Claimants’ investments, but rather were measures of general applicability, it cannot be said that the dispute in the present case arises “directly” out of the Claimants’ investment. In support of its position, the Respondent cites certain language from the NAFTA/UNCITRAL case of Methanex Corporation v. United States of America.

Claimants Suez, AGBAR, and Vivendi assert that the Respondent errs when it states that they complain of general economic measures and that, in these circumstances, the dispute cannot arise directly out of investments as required by Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. Indeed, the Claimants complain that Argentina’s measures specifically, concretely and directly violated commitments made to them as foreign investors in the privatized water industry, in particular Argentina’s failure to reestablish the concession’s financial equilibrium and to adjust tariffs. The Claimants further argue that Methanex, though not directly relevant to this case, actually supports their position in that the words “relating to” in Article 1101(1) of the NAFTA were interpreted to mean that “there must be a legally significant connection between the measure and the claimant investor or its investment”. Moreover, this holding should be interpreted in conjunction with the rejection in Pope & Talbot v. Canada, another NAFTA case, of Canada’s submission that “a measure can only relate to an investment if it is primarily directed at
that investment and that a measure aimed at trade in goods ipso facto cannot be addressed as well under Chapter 11.”19

29. The Tribunal does not accept the Respondent’s interpretation of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. Article 25(1) requires a connection of a sufficient degree of directness between a dispute submitted to ICSID and a claimant’s investment.20 The International Court of Justice has defined the word “dispute” to mean “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between parties.”21 That a disagreement exists between the Claimants and the Respondent about law, facts, and legal views is beyond doubt. It is also beyond doubt (which the Respondent does not contest) that the Claimants have made an investment in certain water distribution and waste water systems in the city of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities. The disagreement between Claimants Suez, AGBAR and Vivendi and the Respondent arises directly out of Claimants’ investments in the water distribution and waste water systems in the city of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities since the disagreement is specifically about the legality under international law of the treatment accorded to those investments by the measures taken by the Respondent. The Claimants allege that the treatment they have received violates Argentina’s treaty obligations towards those investments, while the Respondent takes a different view. That disagreement arises directly out of the investment impacted by governmental measures, not out of the measures themselves. The Tribunal is not concerned with the wisdom, legality, or soundness of the policy measures taken by Argentina to deal with the economic crisis. Rather, the Tribunal’s task is to judge, at the merits stage of this case, whether the effect of Respondent’s actions on the Claimants’ investments violates the Respondent’s international legal obligations contained in the Argentina-France, the Argentina-Spain, and the Argentina-U.K. BITs. In short, the core of the dispute centers on a basic question: Did the Respondent by its actions violate the rights granted to the Claimants and their investments under international law?

30. The Respondent’s proposed interpretation of the ICSID treaty that jurisdiction only exists if the measure in question was aimed or directed “specifically” at the investment finds no basis in the plain language of the treaty. First, the jurisdictional
element demanded by the ICSID Convention is a dispute arising directly out of an investment. The Convention makes no reference to governmental measures as a jurisdictional element. To infer that requirement without justification in the face of the plain meaning of Article 25 of the Convention would do violence to the arbitral regime that was carefully put in place by its founders. Second, it would lead to results that were clearly not intended by the drafters of the Convention. For example, such an interpretation would exclude from ICSID jurisdiction disputes caused by a governmental act of general expropriation while a governmental act expropriating a specific investment would be within the jurisdiction of the Centre. The Respondent cites language from *Methanex v. United States of America* in support of its position. In the *Methanex* case, the tribunal was interpreting Article 1101(1) of the NAFTA whose fundamental jurisdictional requirement, unlike Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, applies the dispute settlement provisions of Chapter 11 to “measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to: (a) investors of another Party [or] investments of investors of another party in the territory of a Party” (emphasis supplied). An interpretation of that provision requires quite a different analysis from that required by Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. Whereas NAFTA requires by its terms a connection between the investments and contested governmental measures, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention requires a direct connection between the investment and the dispute. As a result, the language from the *Methanex* case advanced by the Respondent is not relevant to an interpretation of Article 25.

31. The Tribunal finds support for its conclusion that the dispute in the present case is directly related to an investment in the ICSID case of *CMS v. Argentina* which also addressed the question of whether the dispute in question arose directly out of an investment. In that case, the claimant, which had invested in the context of Argentina’s privatization program in a gas distribution system, brought a claim in ICSID arbitration under the Argentina-U.S. bilateral investment treaty on the grounds that various economic measures taken by the government violated its rights under that BIT. In that case, as in the present dispute, Argentina challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and ICSID on grounds, *inter alia*, that the dispute did not arise directly out of an investment and that the claimant was asking the tribunal to judge the validity of general economic
measures. The tribunal in *CMS v. Argentina* rejected that objection to jurisdiction, stating that while it does “not have jurisdiction over measures of general economic policy and could not pass judgment on whether they were right or wrong”, it did have jurisdiction “…to examine whether specific measures affecting Claimant’s investments or measures of general economic policy having a direct bearing on such investment have been adopted in violation of legally binding commitments given to the investor in treaties, legislation or contracts”23. It further clarified its position by stating: “[w]hat is brought under the jurisdiction of the Centre is not the general measures in themselves but the extent to which they may violate those specific commitments.”24

32. On the basis of its foregoing analysis, the Tribunal holds that the dispute between Claimants Suez, AGBAR, and Vivendi and the Respondent arises directly out of the Claimants’ investment in the water distribution and waste water systems of the city of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities and that therefore the Respondent’s first objection to jurisdiction must fail. Although the parties did not address the issue specifically, the Tribunal also affirms, for the reasons stated above, that AWG’s dispute with Argentina is a dispute with regard to an investment which arises within the terms of Article 8 of the Argentina-U.K. BIT, a necessary element for establishing UNCITRAL arbitration under the treaty.

**Second Jurisdictional Objection: The Dispute Is Not A Legal Dispute.**

33. Article 25 of the ICSID Convention not only requires as a jurisdictional element that a dispute arise directly out of an investment but it also requires that the dispute be a “legal” dispute (it is to be noted, with regard to AWG’s claim that neither the UNCITRAL Rules nor the Argentina-U.K. BIT specifically mention as a jurisdictional requirement to international arbitration that an investment dispute be “legal.”). The Respondent objects to the jurisdiction of ICSID and of the Tribunal on the grounds that the dispute which Claimants Suez, AGBAR, and Vivendi have submitted to arbitration is not “legal” in nature. It supports this position by pointing out that the Claimants’ case is based upon Argentina’s failure to adjust the tariff regime and to respect the equilibrium principle whereby Claimants would be assured a fair return on their investment, but that neither Argentine law nor the Respondent’s contract with the Claimants imposes a legal
obligation to do so. Consequently, the Respondent asserts that the dispute between the Claimants and the Respondent is a business or commercial dispute rather than a “legal” dispute required to establish ICSID jurisdiction. The Respondent further alleges that the dispute over the effects of the devaluation measures on the concession is one over policy and fairness (“una cuestión de política pública y de equidad”, Memorial on Jurisdiction, para. 52), hence not legal in nature.

34. A legal dispute, in the ordinary meaning of the term, is a disagreement about legal rights or obligations. In its Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, the Claimants assert that their claim is indeed based on legal rights – the legal rights granted to them under the Argentina-France and the Argentina-Spain BITs. They allege that, by failing to make tariff adjustments and to respect the equilibrium principle, the Respondent violated its legal obligations under the Argentina-France BIT to accord “just and equitable treatment, in accordance with the principles of international law” to the Claimants and their investments and “not [to] take, directly or indirectly, any expropriation or nationalization measures or any other equivalent measures having a similar effect of dispossession” without payment of prompt and adequate compensation (Art. 3, 5(1), and 5(2)). They further allege that the Respondent also violated its legal obligations under the Argentina-Spain BIT to guarantee “fair and equitable treatment of investments made” by the Claimants and to pay compensation for “the nationalization, expropriation or any other measures having similar characteristics or effects” taken by Respondent (Art. IV(1) and V).

35. At this stage of the proceedings, the task of the Tribunal is not to judge the merits of these claims but to determine whether the claims made by the Claimants Suez, AGBAR and Vivendi are legal in nature and therefore constitute a basis for establishing ICSID jurisdiction. Furthermore, although the ICSID Convention itself does not define the meaning of “legal dispute,” the accompanying Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank gives some clarification:

"The expression “legal dispute” has been used to make clear that while conflicts of rights are within the jurisdiction of the Centre, mere conflicts of interests are
not. The dispute must concern the existence or scope of a legal right or obligation, or the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for breach of a legal obligation."  

36. In his commentary on the ICSID Convention, Professor Schreuer characterizes legal disputes as follows:

“The dispute will only qualify as legal if legal remedies such as restitution or damages are sought and if legal rights based on, for example, treaties or legislation are claimed. Consequently, it is largely in the hands of the claimant to present the dispute in legal terms.”

37. In the present case, the Claimants Suez, AGBAR, and Vivendi clearly base their case on legal rights which they allege have been granted to them under the bilateral investment treaties that Argentina has concluded with France and Spain. In their written pleadings and oral arguments, the Claimants have consistently presented their case in legal terms. Bilateral investment treaties are not mere statements of good will or declarations of benevolent intent toward the investors and investments of the two countries concerned. They are international legal instruments by which sovereign states make firm commitments under international law concerning the treatment they will accord to investors and investments from the other State. A basic purpose of the Argentina-France BIT and the Argentina-Spain BIT, as their titles indicate, is the “protection of investments.” They seek to achieve this goal by granting investors and investments from the treaty partner certain legal rights and to provide a legal means for their enforcement. In the present case, the Claimants have invoked both BITs as a basis for their claim and have based their claims on the specific legal rights enumerated in specific treaty provisions, which they allege have been granted to them by the treaties in question. Whether they will prevail in establishing their legal rights and the Respondent’s violation thereof remains to be seen and is for a subsequent stage of this proceeding. What is certain at this stage, however, is that the dispute as presented by the Claimants is legal in nature. As a result, the Tribunal concludes that Respondent’s second objection to jurisdiction must also fail.
Third Jurisdictional Objection (now moot): AASA Does Not Qualify As A Foreign Investor Under The Applicable Treaty And, In Any Event, Has Not Consented To The Jurisdiction Of ICSID And Of The Tribunal.

38. AASA, one of the original Claimants in this dispute, is an Argentine corporation which formally holds the concession for water distribution and waste water treatment in the City of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities and through which the other Claimants made their investments. Since AASA is not a foreign entity, but a national entity, the Respondent asserted that AASA is not entitled to bring a case to ICSID.

39. In response, the Claimants argued that AASA must be deemed a French investor because Suez, a French company, effectively controls AASA and that therefore it is to be deemed a French investor according to Article (1)(2)(c) of the Argentina-France BIT.

40. Since the Tribunal, at the request of AASA and without opposition from the Respondent, has ordered the discontinuance of the proceedings in this case with respect to AASA in Procedural Order No. 1, discussed above, and since this third objection to jurisdiction relates to and affects only AASA and none of the other Claimants, the Tribunal has concluded that it need not consider and decide upon this objection to jurisdiction.

Fourth Jurisdictional Objection: Claimants’ Right To Bring An Action In Arbitration Is Precluded By The Dispute Resolution Clause in the Concession Contract Concluded By AASA.

41. The contract granting AASA a concession to operate the water distribution and waste water systems in the City of Buenos Aires and surrounding municipalities contained a dispute resolution clause whereby the parties to the contract agreed to submit all disputes relating to its interpretation and execution to the federal administrative courts in the City of Buenos Aires. From this fact, the Respondent draws two implications challenging ICSID and the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. First, the dispute resolution clause, according to the Respondent, shows that AASA did not agree to ICSID or UNCITRAL jurisdiction, thus vitiating a fundamental jurisdictional element of both arbitration systems: consent. Second, by agreeing to settle all disputes arising out of their
transaction, including those that are the basis for the present arbitration, in the courts of Argentina, not before an ICSID or UNCITRAL tribunal, both the Claimants and the Respondent agreed to settle their disputes in a manner which necessarily excludes recourse to international arbitration.

42. The Claimants object that arbitral tribunals have consistently rejected arguments relating to the preclusive effect of contractual dispute resolution clauses providing for the jurisdiction of local courts where breaches of the BITs were alleged and that they do not claim any contractual right or assert any cause of action under the concession contract. In support of their position, the Claimants rely in particular on decisions in other ICSID cases involving Argentina, namely CMS v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina, Azurix v. Argentina, Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argentina, as well as on other decisions such as Salini v. Morocco and CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic. The Claimants further specify that their claims are for breach of the treaty protection and not for breach of contract. In this respect, they gave particulars of the principles and provisions of the concession contract solely to explain the investment regime that Argentina established in order to attract foreign investments.

43. In order to assess the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection on this point, one must consider the nature and implications of the dispute settlement clause concluded by AASA and Argentina. By its terms, the dispute resolution clause covers all controversies arising out of the concession contract. The dispute resolution clause makes no mention of Claimants’ rights under the Argentina-France BIT, the Argentina-Spain BIT, the Argentina-U.K. BIT, or their right to seek recourse in international arbitration for violation of those rights. In the present case, the Claimants, as they rightly point out, do not allege any violation of their rights under the concession contract. Rather, the basis of their claim is that the Respondent has violated the Claimants’ rights under the applicable BIT. BIT claims and contractual claims are two different things. As the ICSID Annulment Committee stated in Vivendi, which involved one of the BITs at the center of the present dispute:
“A state may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and vice versa [...]”;

“[...] whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of contract are different questions. Each of these claims will be determined by reference to its own proper or applicable law – in the case of the BIT, by international law; in the case of the Concession Contract by the proper law of the contract [...]”.

44. Many other international arbitral tribunals have taken the position that a dispute resolution clause in an underlying contract whereby contractual disputes are within the exclusive jurisdiction of local courts or arbitrations does not preclude an investor who is a party to such contract from bringing an arbitration proceeding to enforce its rights under a bilateral investment treaty.

45. It follows from the above discussion that, contrary to Argentina’s argument, the execution of a dispute resolution clause in the concession agreement does not mean that the parties have waived ICSID or UNCITRAL jurisdiction. Certainly, the execution of a dispute settlement clause, like the one in the AASA concession contract, which makes no reference to the BIT or to the treatment that the BIT guarantees investors, cannot support any inference that such dispute resolution clause is a waiver of the investors’ rights under a BIT. The Tribunal concludes that the existence of the dispute resolution clause in the concession contract does not preclude the Claimants from bringing the present arbitration. Consequently, Respondent’s fourth objection to the ICSID’s and this Tribunal’s jurisdiction must fail.

Fifth Jurisdictional Objection: Suez, Vivendi, AGBAR, and AWG As Mere Shareholders Of AASA Are Not Legally Qualified To Bring Claims In International Arbitration For Alleged Injuries Done To AASA

46. The Respondent contends that the four AASA shareholders, Suez, Vivendi, AGBAR, and AWG, have no standing to bring a claim in arbitration for alleged injuries done to AASA. In support of this position, the Respondent, drawing analogies to domestic corporation law, argues that any injury to the shareholders is derivative of the
alleged injury to the company in which they hold shares, as opposed to a direct injury to the shareholders themselves. The alleged injury is done to the corporation, not to the shareholders whose shares, because of an alleged wrongful action done to the corporation, may have diminished in value. Thus, the shareholders have no right to bring an action on grounds that they have sustained a direct injury by virtue of the alleged wrongful actions of the Respondent. The right to bring an action for any alleged injury lies with the corporation itself, not its shareholders. The Respondent further pointed out that to award a monetary recovery to the Claimants in their capacity as shareholders, as well as to AASA as the entity directly wronged, would result in an unjust double recovery and moreover would grant a recovery to specific shareholders, thus prejudicing other shareholders as well as AASA creditors. The Respondent also reiterated this argument at the time that the Tribunal, at the request of AASA to withdraw from this case and without objection from the Respondent, ordered the discontinuance of the proceedings with respect to AASA. In its submissions of March 31, 2006, the Respondent argued that the shareholder Claimants’ claims were dependent or derivative of AASA’s claim and that since AASA was no longer a party, the Claimant shareholders had no right to bring a claim in ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration in the absence of AASA.

47. In response, the Claimants argue that the basis for a shareholder having standing to bring a case because of an alleged injury is to be found in international law, not domestic law. Specifically, it is to be found in the Argentina-France, the Argentina-Spain, and the Argentina-U.K. BITs which were concluded by the countries concerned to protect the investors and investments of one State in the territory of another State. Suez and Vivendi are French nationals under the Argentina-France BIT and as such fall within the definition of the term “investor” in Article 1(2)(b). Under Article 8 of the Argentina-France BIT, an “investor” may have recourse to ICSID arbitration with respect to “… any disputes relating to an investment under this Treaty.” Article 1(1) contains a quite detailed definition of investment. It provides in part:

1. The term “investment” shall apply to assets such as property, rights and interests in any category, and particularly but not exclusively to: ...
48. The Claimants likewise refer to Article I(2) of the Argentina-Spain BIT which defines investments as “any kind of assets, such as property and rights of every kind […]”, including “shares and other forms of participations in companies” and to Article 1(a) of the Argentina-U.K. BIT which states that “investment” means “every kind of asset defined in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment is made and admitted in accordance with this Agreement and in particular, though not exclusively, includes … (ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other form of participation in a company, established in the territory of either of the Contracting Parties;…” The Respondent has not suggested anywhere in its pleadings that shares in a company are not “assets” under its laws.

49. Accordingly, under the plain language of these BITs, the Tribunal finds that the AASA shares owned by all four Claimants were “investments” under the Argentina-France, Argentina-Spain, and the Argentina-U.K. BITs. These shareholders thus benefit from the treatment promised by Argentina to investments made by French, Spanish, and U.K. investors in its territory. Consequently, under Article 8 of the French treaty and Article X of the Spanish treaty, these shareholder Claimants are entitled to have recourse to ICSID arbitration to enforce their treaty rights. Similarly, under Article 8(3) of the Argentina-U.K. BIT, Claimant AWG is entitled to have recourse to UNCITRAL arbitration to enforce its treaty rights. Neither the Argentina-France BIT, the Argentina-Spain BIT, the Argentina-U.K. BIT, the ICSID Convention and Rules, nor the UNCITRAL Rules limit the rights of shareholders to bring actions for direct, as opposed to derivative, claims. This distinction, present in domestic corporate law of many countries, does not exist in any of the treaties applicable to this case.

50. During the oral arguments, the Respondent relied heavily on the International Court of Justice case Barcelona Traction, in which Belgium sought damages against
Spain for injuries done to Belgian shareholders in a Canadian corporation that was operating an electricity distribution system in Barcelona. The Court held that Belgium lacked *jus standi* to exercise diplomatic protection of shareholders in a Canadian company with respect to measures taken against that company in Spain. In the Tribunal’s opinion, *Barcelona Traction* is not controlling in the present case. That decision, which has been criticized by scholars over the years, concerned diplomatic protection of its nationals by a State, an issue that is in no way relevant to the current case. Unlike the present case, *Barcelona Traction* did not involve a bilateral treaty which specifically provides that shareholders are investors and as such are entitled to have recourse to international arbitration to protect their shares from host country actions that violate the treaty. In this regard, it is interesting to note the ICJ’s commentary on the underdeveloped state of international investment law in 1970, the year of the Barcelona Traction decision:

> "Considering the important developments of the last half-century, the growth of foreign investments and the expansion of international activities of corporations, in particular of holding companies, which are often multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests of states have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the evolution of the law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on the international plane."  

At that time, the movement to conclude bilateral investment treaties was in its infancy. Today, over 2200 bilateral investment treaties exist in the world, and Argentina alone has concluded fifty seven. Moreover, there exists today a growing jurisprudence of arbitral decisions interpreting investment treaty provisions, something which hardly existed in 1970. The applicable international law on investment between Argentina and France, Argentina and Spain, and Argentina and the United Kingdom found in the relevant BITs is much more specific and far reaching than was the case in 1970.

51. Relying on the specific language of each BIT, which gives shareholders the right to have recourse to arbitration to protect their shares, the Tribunal finds that Suez,
Vivendi, and AGBAR have standing to bring an ICSID arbitration and that AWG has standing to bring an UNCITRAL arbitration. Many other decisions in ICSID cases, including a good number involving Argentina, have made similar holdings. While the Respondent’s concern about the danger of double recovery to the corporation and to the shareholders for the same injury is to be noted, the Tribunal’s decision at this point relates only to jurisdiction. Moreover, the Tribunal believed that any eventual award in this case could be fashioned in such a way as to prevent double recovery. In any event, the withdrawal of AASA from the case vitiates any concerns about a possible double recovery to the shareholders and the corporation for the same injury in their proceedings. Finally, the Tribunal believes that the discontinuance of these proceedings with respect to AASA does not affect the rights of the shareholder Claimants to bring claims in arbitration under the three BITs in question. The Claimant shareholders would have had a right to bring such claims independently without the participation of AASA in first instance. The initial participation of AASA and its subsequent withdrawal do not alter the Claimant shareholders’ rights. According to Art.1(1)(b) of the Argentina-France BIT, Article 1(2) of the Argentina-Spain BIT, and Article 1(a) of the Argentina-U.K. BIT (quoted above, para. 47 and 48), shares fall within the definition of investments protected by the BITs. AASA’s withdrawal cannot erase the legal effects of the shareholders’ investment nor affect their ius standi under the BITs. As a consequence, the Tribunal concludes that the Respondent’s fifth objection to jurisdiction fails.

Sixth Jurisdictional Objection: Since Claimants AGBAR And AWG Respectively Have Not Complied With The Provisions Of The Argentina-Spain BIT And The Argentina-U.K. BIT Requiring Submission Of An Investment Dispute To Local Courts Before Invoking International Arbitration, They Have No Standing To Have Recourse To International Arbitration At This Time.

52. Claimant AGBAR, a national of Spain, seeks to assert its claims under the Argentina-Spain BIT, and Claimant AWG presses its claim under the Argentina-U.K. BIT. Unlike Article 8(2) of the Argentina-France BIT, which allows an investor to have recourse to international arbitration after a period of six months of negotiation from the time it asserts its claim, Article X of the Argentina-Spain BIT requires the investor, at the end of the same six month period, to bring a judicial proceeding in the local courts and
allows it to have recourse to arbitration only after a further period of eighteen months in the local courts. Similarly Article 8(2) of the Argentina-U.K BIT allows the investor to have recourse to international arbitration only after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from the time the dispute was submitted to a local court of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made. Neither AGBAR nor AWG has pursued their claims by litigation in Argentina’s courts. As a result, the Respondent argues that these two Claimants have no standing at the present time to pursue their cases before this tribunal. In response, the Claimants argue that by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT, AGBAR may take advantage of the more favorable treatment provided in the Argentina-France BIT with respect to dispute resolution and that therefore they may bring their action to ICSID without first pursuing their claims in the local courts of Argentina. Similarly, AWG asserts that it may have recourse to UNCITRAL arbitration because the most-favored-nation clause in the Argentina-U.K. BIT allows it to have the benefit the more favorable treatment provided in the Argentina-France BIT with respect to dispute resolution. The Respondent opposes this interpretation of the Argentina-Spain and Argentina-U.K. BITs, arguing that the most-favored-nation clause in both treaties does not include matters relating to investment dispute settlement.

53. A decision on this objection requires the Tribunal, as with Respondent’s other objections, to begin with an interpretation and analysis of the relevant BIT provisions. Article IV of the Argentina-Spain BIT, entitled “Tratamiento” (Treatment) is relied upon by AGBAR as obviating the need to have recourse to Argentine courts before bringing an international arbitration. The first three paragraphs of Article IV provide as follows:

1. Cada Parte garantizará en su territorio un tratamiento justo y equitativo a las inversiones por inversores de la otra Parte.

2. En todas las materias regidas por el presente Acuerdo, este tratamiento no será menos favorable que el otorgado por cada Parte a las inversiones realizadas en su territorio por inversores de un tercer país.
3. Este tratamiento no se extenderá, sin embargo, a los privilegios que una Parte conceda a los inversores de un tercer Estado en virtud de su participación en:

* Una zona de libre cambio
* Una unión aduanera
* Un mercado común
* Un acuerdo de integración regional, o
* Una organización de asistencia económica mutual en virtud de un acuerdo firmado antes de la entrada en vigor del presente Acuerdo que prevea disposiciones análogas a aquellas que son otorgadas por esa Parte a los participantes de dicha organización.”

The English translation of this provision in the United Nations Treaty Series is as follows:

1. Each Party shall guarantee in its territory fair and equitable treatment of investments made by investors of the other Party.

2. In all matters governed by this Agreement, such treatment shall be no less favorable than that accorded by each Party to investment made in its territory by investors of a third country.

3. Such treatment shall not, however, extend to the privileges which either Party may grant to investors of a third State by virtue of its participation in:

- A free trade area;
- A customs union:
- A common market;
- A regional integration agreement; or
- An organization of mutual economic assistance by virtue of an agreement concluded prior to the entry into force of this Agreement, containing terms similar to those accorded by that Party to participants of said organization.”
54. In interpreting these provisions, the Tribunal is guided by established principles of treaty interpretation as provided by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, pursuant to which treaty language is to be interpreted in accordance with its “ordinary meaning.” In that respect, the text of the treaty is presumed to be the authentic expression of the parties’ intentions. The starting place for any exercise in interpretation is therefore the treaty text itself.

55. The text quoted above clearly states that “in all matters” (en todas las materias) a Contracting party is to give a treatment no less favorable than that which it grants to investments made in its territory by investors from any third country. Article X of the Argentina-Spain BIT specifies in detail the processes for the “Settlement of Disputes between a Party and Investors of the other Party.” Consequently, dispute settlement is certainly a “matter” governed by the Argentina-Spain BIT. The word “treatment” is not defined in the treaty text. However, the ordinary meaning of that term within the context of investment includes the rights and privileges granted and the obligations and burdens imposed by a Contracting State on investments made by investors covered by the treaty. In the present situation, Argentina concluded a BIT with France which permits aggrieved investors, after six months’ of attempting to resolve their disputes to have recourse to international arbitration without the necessity of first bringing a case in the local courts of a Contracting State. Consequently, French investments in Argentina, as a result of the Argentina-France BIT, receive a more favorable treatment than do Spanish investments in Argentina under the Argentina-Spain BIT. That being the case, by virtue paragraph (2) of Article IV, Spanish investments are entitled to a treatment with respect to dispute settlement no less favorable than the one accorded to French investments. In specific terms, granting a treatment to Spanish investments that is no less favorable than that granted to French investments would mean that the holders of Spanish investments would be able to invoke international arbitration against Argentina on the same terms as the holders of French investments. That is to say, Spanish investors, like French investors, may have recourse to international arbitration, provided they comply with the six months negotiation period but without the need to proceed before the local courts of Argentina for a period of eighteen months.
56. The language of the most-favored-nation clause in the Argentina-U.K. BIT, relied upon by AWG, differs from that of the Argentina-Spain BIT. Article 3 of the Argentina-U.K. BIT provides:

National Treatment and Most-favored-nation Provisions

(1) *Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or returns of investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favorable than that which it accords to investments or returns of its own investors or to investments or returns of investors of any third state.*

(2) *Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investors of the other Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, to treatment less favorable than that which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third state.*

Like the Argentina-Spain BIT, Article 7 of the Argentina-U.K. BIT, contains a list of matters that are excepted from most-favored-nation treatment. Dispute resolution is not among them.

57. Despite the difference in language of the most-favored-nation clauses in the two BITs, the Tribunal believes an interpretation of each leads to the same result. The Argentina-U.K. BIT, like the Argentina-Spain BIT, does not define the word “treatment.” The Tribunal gives that word the same interpretation in the two treaties: the rights and privileges granted and the obligations and burdens imposed by a Contracting State on investments made by investors covered by the treaty. Paragraph (2) of Article 3 of the Argentina-UK BIT, quoted above, states that a Contracting state may not subject an investor to a treatment less favorable with respect to “the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investment” than it accords to investors from other countries. The right to have recourse to international arbitration is very much related to investors’ “management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, or disposal of their investments.” It is particularly related to the “maintenance” of an investment, a term which includes the
protection of an investment. Thus French investors by virtue of the Argentina-France
BIT having the right to proceed directly in international arbitration without the necessity
of first submitting their claims to local courts are treated more favorably with respect the
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and disposal of their investments than U.K.
investors who may not. That being the case, U.K. investors may invoke the most-
favored-nation clause in the Argentina-U.K. BIT to order to obtain the more favorable
treatment accord to French investors.

58. Argentina contests this interpretation on various grounds. First it argues that the
Contracting States did not intend the most-favored-nation clause in Article IV of the
Argentina-Spain BIT or Article 3 of the Argentina-U.K. BIT to cover dispute settlement.
The Tribunal finds no evidence in the BIT texts or elsewhere to support that conclusion.
The text of the both BITs strongly implies just the opposite. Paragraph 3 of Article IV in
the Argentina-Spain BIT and Article 7 of the Argentina-U.K. BIT contains a definite list
of matters that the Contracting States specifically excluded from the most-favored-nation
clause. Dispute settlement is not among them. The failure to refer among these excluded
items to any matter remotely connected to dispute settlement reinforces the interpretation
that the most-favored-nation clause includes dispute settlement. In negotiating the
Argentina-Spain BIT, the Contracting States considered and decided that certain matters
should be excluded. The fact that dispute settlement was not covered among the
excluded matters must be interpreted to mean that dispute settlement is included within
the term “all matters” in paragraph 2. A similar argument applies to the Argentina-U.K.
BIT which in its provisions excluding certain matters from its most-favored-nation clause
makes no mention of dispute settlement. Moreover subsequent U.K. BITs make clear
through express language that the United Kingdom’s intent is not to exclude dispute
settlement from the coverage of the U.K. BIT’s most-favored-nation clause. United
Kingdom BITs concluded after 1993, for example with Honduras, Albania, and
Venezuela, each add a third paragraph to the two paragraphs (quota above in para 56),
constituting its most-favored-nation clause:
(3) For the avoidance of doubt it is confirmed that the treatment provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) above shall apply to the provisions of Articles 1 to 11 of this Agreement.”

The inference to be drawn from this language is that this new paragraph, by its terms, is intended to clarify what had been the United Kingdom’s preexisting intention in negotiating its BITs: that the most-favored-nation clause is to cover all the articles (i.e. Articles 1 to 11) of the treaty.

59. After an analysis of the substantive provisions of the BITs in question, the Tribunal finds no basis for distinguishing dispute settlement matters from any other matters covered by a bilateral investment treaty. From the point of view of the promotion and protection of investments, the stated purposes of both the Argentina-Spain BIT and the Argentina-U.K. BIT, dispute settlement is as important as other matters governed by the BITs and is an integral part of the investment protection regime that the respective sovereign states have agreed upon. In this context, the Respondent further argues that this Tribunal should apply the principle of *ejusdem generis* in interpreting the BITs so as to exclude dispute settlement matters from the scope of the most-favored-nation clause, because the category “dispute settlement” is not of the same genus as the matters addressed in the clause. The Tribunal finds no basis for applying the *ejusdem generis* principle to arrive at that result.

60. Similarly, Argentina contends that the Tribunal should interpret the most-favored-nation clauses strictly because such an approach would restrict the principle of *res inter alios acta*, so as to limit the effects of the treaty to the parties. The Tribunal cannot follow this argument. The BITs in question contain mutual promises by Argentina and Spain and Argentina and the United Kingdom to treat each others’ nationals in the same way that they treat nationals from any third State. The principle of *res inter alios acta* has no application, because the Tribunal is not applying the Argentina-France BIT (presumably the alleged act between third parties) to this case. Rather it is applying the provisions on equality of treatment of the Argentina-Spain BIT and the Argentina-U.K. BIT.
61. Further, the Respondent seems to argue that the Tribunal should interpret a most-favored-nation provision strictly. Here too, the Tribunal finds no rule and no reason for interpreting the most-favored-nation treatment clause any differently from any other clause in the two BITs. The language of the two treaties is clear. Applying the normal interpretational methodology to Article IV of the Argentina-Spain BIT, the Tribunal finds that the ordinary meaning of that provision is that matters relating to dispute settlement are included within the term “all matters” and that therefore AGBAR may take advantage of the more favorable treatment provided to investors in the Argentina-France BIT with respect to dispute settlement. Similarly, in the case of the Argentina-U.K. BIT, rights with respect to dispute settlement “regard” the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and disposal of an investment as stated in Article 3 of the treaty; consequently, AWG may also take advantage of the more favorable treatment that the Argentina-France BIT accords to French investors.

62. The Tribunal finds strong support for its conclusions in previous ICSID cases. In particular, *Maffezini v. Spain* applied the Argentina-Spain BIT, the very treaty at issue in the present case, to find that the most favored-nation-clause allowed the Claimant, a national of Argentina, to take advantage of Spain’s BIT with Chile to avoid the necessity of having recourse to the local courts in Spain before bringing an ICSID action. The most relevant passages of Maffezini are worth quoting in full because they well show the rationale behind the application of the most-favored nation clause to dispute settlement:

"The Tribunal considers that there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors, as they are also related to the protection of rights of traders under treaties of commerce. Consular jurisdiction in the past, like other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, were considered essential for the protection of rights of trader and, hence, were regarded not merely as procedural devices but as arrangements designed to better protect the rights of such person abroad. It follows that such arrangements, even if not strictly a part of the material aspect of the trade and investment policy pursued by
treaties of commerce and navigation, were essential for the adequate protection of the rights they sought to guarantee.

*International arbitration and other dispute settlement arrangements have replaced these older and frequently abusive practices of the past. These modern developments are essential, however, to the protection of the rights envisaged under the pertinent treaties; they are also closely linked to the material aspects of the treatment accorded.*

These considerations then lead the *Maffezini* tribunal to conclude with the following words:

“[I]f a third-party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the protection of the investor's rights and interests than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the most favored nation clause as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis principle.”

63. Other cases that have considered and rejected arguments similar to the ones raised by Argentina in the present case and found that the most-favored-nation-clause allows a claimant to take advantage of more favorable dispute resolution provisions found in other treaties are in particular *Siemens A.G. v. the Argentine Republic* and *MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd and MTD Chile SA v. Republic of Chile.*

64. In opposition to this line of cases, the Respondent referred during oral argument to *Plama Consortium Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria.* In that case, the Claimant, a Cypriot company, sought to establish ICSID jurisdiction on the basis of the Energy Charter Treaty and of a BIT between Cyprus and Bulgaria. The tribunal affirmed ICSID jurisdiction under the Energy Charter Treaty; for various reasons, it also considered whether it had jurisdiction under the Bulgaria–Cyprus BIT. Such BIT contained a very limited international dispute settlement offer. In essence, it provided that only the measure of compensation for expropriation could be submitted to an UNCITRAL arbitration. It contained no offer for ICSID arbitration. It did, however, embody a most-
favored-nation clause. Since other BITs concluded by Bulgaria provide for ICSID arbitration, the Claimant relied upon such most-favored-nation clause to take advantage of the ICSID dispute settlement mechanism included in the other BITs. The tribunal did not follow the Claimant and ruled that it lacked jurisdiction under the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT.

65. Having duly considered the reasons set forth in the Plama decision, this Tribunal comes to the conclusion that, whatever their merits, that decision is in any event clearly distinguishable from the present case on a number of grounds. First, it must be noted that the most-favored-nation-clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT is much broader in scope than was the language of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT in Plama. Whereas the Argentina-Spain BIT states that “[i]n all matters governed by this Agreement, …treatment shall be no less favorable than that accorded by each Party to investment made in its territory by investors of a third country” (emphasis supplied), the comparable clause in the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT stated that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall apply to the investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting Party a treatment which is not less favorable than that accorded to investments by investors of third states.” The use of the expression “in all matters” when coupled with a list of specific exceptions that does not include dispute resolution, leaves no doubt that dispute resolution is covered by the most-favored-nation clause. Similarly, the most-favored-nation clause in the Argentina-U.K. BIT, expressly enumerating the matters which it covers (i.e. “management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments”) also provides greater specificity of coverage than does the clause being interpreted in Plama. Second, and perhaps more important, the Plama tribunal was guided by the actual intent of the contracting States. Subsequent negotiations between Bulgaria and Cyprus showed that the “two Contracting Parties to the BIT themselves did not consider that the MFN provision extends to the dispute settlement provisions in other BITs.” No evidence of any comparable intent has been suggested in this case. Indeed, in regard to the Argentina-U.K. BIT, the inference to be drawn from the evidence of subsequent negotiating behavior of the United Kingdom
Government, discussed in para. 58 above, is just the opposite of that in *Plama*. Third, as a further distinguishing factor, one may refer to the effect of the most-favored-nation provision. In *Plama*, the Claimant attempted to replace the dispute settlement provisions in the applicable Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT *in toto* by a dispute resolution mechanism incorporated from another treaty. Without expressing an opinion on whether a most-favored-nation clause may achieve such a result, this Tribunal distinguishes that radical effect from the much more limited one caused here, which merely consists in waiving a preliminary step in accessing a mechanism, i.e., international arbitration, offered in both the BITs under consideration in these cases.

66. The *Plama* tribunal also stated, in its reasons, that an arbitration agreement must be clear and unambiguous, especially where it is incorporated by reference to another text. This Tribunal does not share this view. As stated above, it believes that dispute resolution provisions are subject to interpretation like any other provisions of a treaty, neither more restrictive nor more liberal.

67. Be this as it may, at the end of its reasoning, the *Plama* tribunal suggested what could be called a “non-sense exception” to the non-application of the MFN clause. Addressing the very requirement at issue here, i.e., that the dispute be tried in local courts during eighteen months, which it called “a curious requirement,” the *Plama* tribunal said that it “sympathize[d] with a tribunal that attempts to neutralize such a provision that is nonsensical from a practical point of view” (emphasis supplied). It therefore concluded that “[t]he decision in Maffezini is perhaps understandable.”

68. For all these reasons, the Tribunal concludes that AGBAR, relying on Article IV of the Argentina-Spain BIT, and AWG, relying on Article 3 of the Argentina-U.K. BIT, may invoke the more favorable treatment afforded in the Argentina-France BIT and may therefore bring an international arbitration without the necessity of first having recourse to the local courts of Argentina. The Respondent’s sixth objection to jurisdiction therefore fails.
IV. Decision on Jurisdiction

69. After having considered each and every jurisdictional objection raised by the Respondent, the Tribunal finds that it must reject them all, except for the fourth objection based on the status of AASA as an Argentine corporation, which objection has now become moot because of the discontinuance of the proceedings in the case with respect to AASA. The Tribunal thus decides that ICSID and this Tribunal have jurisdiction over ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and that this Tribunal has jurisdiction over the UNCITRAL arbitration of AWG and the Argentine Republic. The Tribunal therefore directs that the former case proceed on the merits in accordance with the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Rules, and the applicable bilateral investment treaties and that the latter case proceed on the merits in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the applicable bilateral investment treaty. The Tribunal has, accordingly, made the necessary Orders for the continuation of the procedure pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(4) and Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Rules.

[Signature]
Prof. Jeswald W. Salacuse
President of the Tribunal

[Signature]
Prof. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler
Arbitrator

[Signature]
Prof. Pedro Nikken
Arbitrator
On the same date, the Centre received two further requests for arbitration under the ICSID Convention regarding water concessions in Argentina from (i) Aguas Cordobesas S.A., Suez, and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and (ii) Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Interagua Servicios Integrales del Agua, S.A. regarding similar investments and disputes. As explained below, these requests would later be registered by the Centre and submitted by agreement of the parties to one same Tribunal.

Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République Argentine sur l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements (Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of France for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments), signed on 3 July 1991 and in force since 3 March 1993; 1728 UNTS 298.

Acuerdo para la promoción y protección recíprocas de inversiones entre el Reino de España y la República Argentina (Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of Spain and the Argentine Republic), signed in Buenos Aires on 3 October 1991 and in force since 28 September 1992; 1699 UNTS 202.


As noted in footnote 1 supra, on this same date the Centre registered two further requests for arbitration regarding water concessions in Argentina: ICSID Case No. ARB/03/18 (Aguas Cordobesas S.A., Suez, and AGBAR v. Argentine Republic) and ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Interagua Servicios Integrales del Agua, S.A. v. Argentine Republic).

During the session the parties agreed on a series of procedural matters related to the present cases and ICSID Cases Nos. ARB/03/17 and ARB/03/18. These agreements included a staggered schedule of written and oral submissions. A copy of the minutes of the session is enclosed as Annex No.1 to this Decision.

A similar request was subsequently filed with the same tribunal by a nongovernmental organization and three named individuals in ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17. The Tribunal’s Order in Response to the Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae of March 17, 2006, in that case is available online at ICSID’s website www.worldbank.org/icsid.

Claimants’ Memorial on the Merits of 1 January 2005. para. 9 and Exhibit C2.

Law No. 23,696 of 18 August 1989 (the State Reform Law).

Law No. 23,928 of 27 March 1991.

Decreto Nro. 2074/1990, Bs. As., 03/10/1990.

See, e.g., The “Information Memorandum” issued by OSN, dated November 1991, Claimants’ Exhibit C-19

Claimants’ Memorial, paras. 23-24.

Law No. 25,561 (Ley de Emergencia Pública y de Reforma del Régimen Cambiario) of January 6, 2002.

Claimant’s Memorial, paras. 58-62.

Respondent’s Memorial on Jurisdiction, para. 18.


Claimants’ Counter Memorial on Jurisdiction, para. 67 with citation.


CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Republic of Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (July 17, 2003), 42 ILM 788 (2003); also available online at www.worldbank.org/icsid; Claimants’ Legal Authorities No. 85.

Ibid at para. 33.

Ibid at para. 27.

Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 1 ICSID Reports 28; also available online at www.worldbank.org/icsid.


Contrato de Concesión dated 28 April 1993, between the National State and Aguas Argentinas S.A. Artículo 15.4 (Jurisdicción): A los efectos de la interpretación y ejecución de este Contrato, las partes se someten a la jurisdicción exclusiva de los tribunales en lo contencioso administrativo federal de la Cuidad de Buenos Aires.


E.g., Lanco International Inc. v. The Argentine Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6), Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, at sections 39-40; Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, (23 July 2001) at para. 62; Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12), Decision on Jurisdiction (8 December 2003), at para. 76.

United Nations Treaty Series, volume 1728, p. 298. The official Spanish text of the above-quoted provisions is as follows:

1. El término “inversiones” designa los activos tales como los bienes, derechos e intereses de cualquier naturaleza y, en particular, aunque no exclusivamente:

   b) las acciones, primas de emisión y otras formas de participación aún minoritarias o indirectas, en las sociedades constituidas en el territorio de una de las Partes Contratantes.
The official French text of the quoted provision is as follows:

1. Le terme «investissement» désigne des avoirs tels que les biens, droits, et intérêts de toute nature, et plus particulièrement mais non exclusivement:

   b) Les actions, primes d’émission et autres, formes de participation, même minoritaires ou indirectes aux sociétés constituées sur le territoire de l’une des Parties contractantes;