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INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES

ICSID Case No ARB/20/7
between

Security Services LLC d/b/a Neustar Security senvices (formerly Neustar, Inc)

Caimant

- v-

Republic of Colombia
Respondent

The Arbitral Tribunal
Professor Julian DM Lew KC - President Professor Yves Derains - Arbitrator Professor Kaj Hobér - Arbitrator

ORAL HEARING
Wednesday, 29 March 2023

UST OF PARTICIPANTS
411
The Tribunal
The President:
PROFESSOR JULIAN DM LEW KC

Co-Arbitrators:
PROFESSOR YVES DERAINS
PROFESSOR KA HOBÉR
ICSID Secretariat:
MS VERONICA LAVISTA, Secretary of the Tribunal

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
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On behalf of Respondent:
In person:
Counsel:
Agencia Nacional de Defensa Juridica del Estado:
MS ANAMARIA ORDOÑEZ PUENTES
Remote:


In Person:
Hogan Lovells:


Witnesses:


On behalf of Non-Disputing Party:
US Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser, Office of International Claims and Investment Disputes:

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bys Ordoñez Puentes
(10.03 am, Wednesday 29 March 2023)

Closing Statements
Session for Tribunal Questions
PRESIDENT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This is the third day and the last day of our hearing on this matter between
Security Services and the government of Colombia. We are hereto hear closing arguments--

THE INTERPRETER: We have a crackle on the channel.
(Technical issue)
PRESIDENT: We are herefor the last day of our hearing largely to hear from counsel in response to questions the Tribunal has posed, and if there are any other additional matters that either party wants to raise at this final hour of this hearing.

We have seen the exchange of emails between the sides which have come through to us in the last 20 minutes or so. I think that we will just proceed on the basis that you will have opportunities, if you wish, to cover things in Post-Hearing Briefs anyway, so what we suggest is we turn, as we did previously, to Claimant to put his position, and then we will hear from Respondent.
Okay?
But before we do that, is there any other
issue that either side wishes to raise? Claimant's
side?
MR BALDWN: There is nothing from
Claimant's side, Mr President.
PRESIDENT: Respondent's side?
MR GONZÁLEZ: Thank you, and good morning,
members of the Tribunal. Welcomeall to the third
and final day of this hearing. It does feel longer
than three days, I must say, no matter how long
hearings are.
We do have one housekeeping matter,
I think we have been promising and we forgot to do
it yesterday, which was the point of clarification
that was asked for and the Tribunal asked that we
come back with that clarification, so we can deal
with that separately. It was a point of
clarification on the two slides from the opening
presentation, and my partner, Melissa Ordoñez, will
deal with that.
PRESIDENT: Shall we do that later,
please?
MR GONZÁLEZ: If you like, of course.
Mr Chairman, based on the rulings, we were side?

MR BALDWN: There is nothing from

PRESIDENT: Respondent's side?
MR GONZÁLEZ: Thank you, and good morning, members of the Tribunal. Welcomeall to the third final day of this hearing. It does feel longer than three days, I must say, no matter how long hearings are.

We do have one housekeeping matter, think we have been promising and we forgot to do it yesterday, which was the point of clarification that was asked for and the Tribunal asked that we with that separately. It was a point of clarification on the two slides from the opening presentation, and my partner, Melissa Ordoñez, will

PRESIDENT: Shall we do that later, please?

Mr Chairman, based on the rulings, we were
supposed, according to PO , have received the $10: 06$
presentation from Claimant 15 minutes before. We still have not received it, and we are now into the hearing.

PRESIDENT: Are we ready to proceed?
MR BALDWIN: Yes. Thank you.
PRESIDENT: Do you have a paper
presentation?
MR BALDWN: I am sorry, just one moment, if I could, Mr President. (Pause)

Yes, we will distribute the paper copies.
Please. (Same handed)
Closing Statement by Claimant
by Mr Baldwin
MR BALDWN: Good morning, members of the tribunal, counsel, parties. It is good to be here on the third day, and as the President says, the final day. So 1 think 30 minutes is not a lot of time, particularly to lawyers, to do argument like this, so we are going to focus mainly on the Tribunal's questions, which we feel is the most important part, and we may have time to get to some other issues, but certainly in our post-hearing brief we will cover more of the events that occurred at the hearing.

The first question is is there a hierarchy $\begin{array}{r}410: 08\end{array}$ in the jurisdictional objections or are they alternative?

I think as an initial matter, as
Ms Ordoñez stated yesterday, there are 7 jurisdictional objections from Respondent And I would just, as an initial matter, talk about proof and how much proof those things that common law lawyers get into and civil law lawyers don't as much. I am not going to talk about that, but I will say that the burden of proof, that the idea toprove these jurisdictional objections come on behalf of Respondent, and that means typically we would be heard, you know, second, after they present those, but more importantly, each of them has to be proven, each of them has to bedemonstrated, and it is their burden to do that. It is our view, and we know of nothing to the contrary, to state that these are cumulative somehow.

There are some that might share the same factual scenarios, but in terms of the cumulative nature, we don't think there is one We think each of these has to be examined on their own, and of course it is our view that an examination wouldn't cause the Tribunal to uphold any of these, and you
have seen that in our presentation, we will also 10:09 address it in our post-hearing brief.

Because the parties have given so much attention to the jurisdictional objections they have become half of this proceeding, and you can even see that from today. You will see that they occupy half of these, so we think they have been given an outsized part to this proceeding, because of the way Respondent has pled them and argued them, so we would just ask the Tribunal to keep that in mind

Question 2. How do the parties
respectively consider that the language of the 2009 contract "may be renewed" is affected by the reference to "the legislation in force at the time of the renewal"?

This is the language from Law 1065 of 2006 which was the legislation in place at the time the concession was entered into and the 2009 concession was entered into, and as you will see the highlighted portion here, it says: "In this case, the duration of the agreement may be for up to 10 years, renewable on one occasion only, for a term equal to the original term".

And then if you go to the concession, and this is exhibit C-17, 2009 of the concession, you
can see the paragraph that is underlined here. It $\quad \mathbf{1 0 : 1 1}$ says: "the agreed term may be renewed in the manner and terms established by the legislation in force at the time of the renewal". And then: "The term [of the renewal] may not be inferior to the term initially agreed [...]".

The lead-in paragraph of validity and term is: 'The present concession contract will have a term of ten years which will run from the date of the authorisation given by ICANN to the concessionaire for the carrying out of activities of the domain'. It goes on with something that is not as relevant to this conversation.

So the lead-in paragraph of article 4 memorialises an obligation on the part of both parties: a concession contract for ten years.

The obligation in the second paragraph of article 4 denotes an ability or power. And we are going to get to this automatic renewal issue in a moment that the Respondent has repeated, but it is an ability or power to do it in the manner and terms established by the legislation.

If the only thing that mattered was the legislation, this contract clause, the clause in the concession wouldn't have meaning, but obviously it
is meant to have meaning that is outside of the law 10:12 because otherwise the law would be what the law is. Everyone knows that the law applies if it applies. There is nothing about article 4 in the concession that would make the law apply. If the law applies it applies, so there is nothing about that part that says anything distinct.

Therefore we think that article 4 promises something reasonably concrete. It doesn't promise an automatic extension-we have not said it did -but it promises a one-time term extension of ten years and implies a means to get it, and subject to the limitation that it has exercised in accordance with the legislation.

And that means to get it is something that arises both under Colombian law and Colombian practice, and Colombian customs, the way they treat other investors. We are not before the constitutional court in Colombia arguing for a renewal. If we were, the rights that are afforded to other investors, the treatment that Colombia routinely gives investors would not be relevant before the constitutional court. But it is certainly relevant to this Tribunal under the TPA in terms of how other investors are treated, and
obviously we have the minimum standard of treatment, 10:14
but we also have national treatment and those other provisions which aren't relevant to an analysis of law in Colombia.

And we saw that with the witnesses, particularly yesterday. Ms Trujillo, former Minister Constaín, when asked about what they looked at in terms of the renewal, it was what does Colombian law say? And neither of themtalked about Colombian practice, and hopefully we will have time to get to a little of that

So, as you see from article 2 , going to the law now for a moment, the language of article 2 of Law 1065 provides for the possibility of renewal on one occasion 'for a term equal to the original term', and then this also reflects, as I said, the standard practice in Colombian law as recognised by the advisory committee on 18-19 March, where it says: "The Chief of the Legal Advisory Office, Dr Ricardo Arias, stated that 'although the legal and conventional norms have opened the possibility of extending or renewing' ..."

And I have hinted at this before but, just to be clear, we have never asked for an automatic renewal. There has been a lot of discussionabout
automatic renewal and assertions, statements by $\quad 424$
Respondent that automatic renewals are against the law, and as you can see from Ms Trujillo's answer yesterday, I asked, "Was .CO Internet asking for an automatic renewal of the 2009 concession?" and she said 'No.' So that is a red herring, it is not relevant.

The question is what is Colombian
practice? How does it treat - the question for this Tribunal is what is Colombia's practice, how does it administer this law, not a post-hoc analysis of its law in a hearing under the TPA in which they can argue that.

And I make this point, and I briefly made it the first day, but I think it bears repeating: Even when a state applies its law in a manner, let's say, as written, and we don't agree that they have even done that, but even if Colombia were to say the law says this, the concession says this, and so therefore we have a right to apply it that way, that might be the beginning of the analysis, even if they were correct, but it is certainly not the end of the analysis.

Again, that might be what the constitutional court in Bogotá would do, but it is
not what the Tribunal in this case does. You have to look at other factors, because the claims, the law, the way the law is applied, is completely different.

Question No 3: What is the applicable law to determine who is the proper Claimant in the arbitration?

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to make an award against Neustar Inc?

We have this quote up here from Daimler v Argentina making clear that jurisdiction -- this is fairly non-objectionable -- jurisdiction is determined by international law whether there is jurisdiction in this case, whether this Tribunal is competent to hear these claims. This is CL-106 in the record, quote from Daimler.

The TPA is rather clear about the jurisdiction -- both the TPA at article 10.28 and article 25 of the ICSID Convention -- both are clear in terms of 'the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment." There is a requirement. We don't think there is a big question that this requirement has been met. So jurisdiction is determined by international law.

The question of the effect of the unit $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10:18 }\end{aligned}$ purchase agreement and how that might affect the international lawjurisdictional analysis we believe is governed by the laws of Delaware, which is the state in the United States in which both Neustar Inc and Security Services LLC are both headquartered, as well as plenty of other US corporations. It is a very common place for US corporations to be domiciled, to be incorporated.

We believe that the Delaware law would govern the effect of the UPA, much like the existence of an entity. There was a question whether or not a corporation or a corporate entity existed, that even if it was in an international law proceeding, the question of its existence would likely go to the domestic law, the law of the incorporation of the entity.

And you can see from the Unit Purchase Agreement, which the Respondent has had for many months now, it says "Neustar Security Services retained the rights to this arbitration as Claimant". You can look at the transferred security assets in the definitions and it says that Neustar's group retains title to things and then it lists the items listed under Annex 1 of transferred security

Neustar has no rights and/or obligations 428
in this proceeding, unlike Neustar Security Services which retained the rights to the arbitration, which are the same owners, and therefore we don't believe that the Tribunal has competence to issue an award against Neustar. Again, this is an answer to a legal question and I do believe that is the correct answer.

In any event, Respondent's request for costs against Neustar, made for the first time at this hearing, we think are untimely, and you can see the relief requested from Respondent's Rejoinder. Remember, Respondent had a full opportunity to brief this in their Rejoinder, and that relief asked to order Claimant to pay all costs. And Claimant in the Rejoinder is defined, when you look at the capital C for the Claimant, and you look up in the Rejoinder, it lists Neustar Security Services or Security Services LLC d/b/a Neustar Security Services, that is the Claimant.

And recall this letter from ICSID,
8 August 2022, saying: "Unless we hear otherwise from the parties by 15 August 2022', they were going to proceed to update the record of the arbitration. They in fact did so, and that is where we are today
assets, and if we look at Annex 1 it talks about 10:20 this claim.

Now this is really a matter of law question, and the question is does the Tribunal have power to issue an award against Neustar Inc? I don't believe they do, and we are not arguing that as how dare they or anything else. It is a legal question that has been asked. I amgiving you a legal answer and the legal answer is that I do not believe the Tribunal has power to issue an award against Neustar Inc.

The owners of the Claimant, Golden Gate Capital, they owned Neustar Inc in the same percentage that they owned Security Services. Sold Neustar Inc and its fraud marketing and communication businesses, including the rights to the name Neustar to TransUnion, and this comes directly out of our letters here, the first one being on 29 July.

Although TransUnion now holds the rights to the name, Neustar is currently formulated as an independent, third party company. This is from our letter of 15 September 2022, and we included a link to SEC filings that reflect and talk about this sale.

I amgoing to turn this over, you have 10:23
heard from me too much the last three days, so I am going to turn this next question over to my colleague, Ms Baldwin.
by Ms Baldwin
MS BALDWI: Thank you. Good morning, everyone.

So I went through a couple of days ago the background of some of these issues in detail so I don't want to repeat myself, but I have just put a couple of slides up here so it is easier to reference.

The first is, as we discussed on Monday, article 10.18(3) deals with interim injunctive relief, and it specifies that the nature of the available relief is determined by domestic law, first and foremost, and as we mentioned this is confirmed by the United States in their non-disputing party submission. And I apologise, it has just been pointed out that I didn't statethat we are on Question 4 for the record. So my apologies, but we are on Question 4.

So in looking at domestic law, you will
recall that we looked at ChapterEleven of the
Colombian Code of Administrative Procedure which
the MinTIC－Republic of Colombia to formalise the $\begin{array}{r}431 \\ 10: 26\end{array}$ extension．And the reason for this was to preserve the Claimant＇s rights during the pendency of the arbitration．

As you can imagine，Claimant＇s rights would not be effectively preserved if Respondent were able to tender the concessionto another entity during the pendency of the arbitration Ms Trujillo in her witness statement talks about the complexity of the tender process in Colombia and unwindinga concession tendered to another entity would be extremely difficult，and perhaps impossible，whereas Neustar＇s request or the Claimant＇s request to preserve its investment pending the outcome of the arbitration could be revisited in light of the final award，and that is because interim measures ordered under Chapter Eleven of the CCAP are not permanent and may be revoked or modified．That is under article 235 of the CCAP，which is exhibit C－113

In that respect，if the Claimant really were making an election of a fork in the road provision，it would make little sense to use that mechanism as a final means of relief when it could be revoked or modified at any time，as the Respondent suggests．

Finally，in any event，request 5 is
separate from the claims in issue in these proceedings．Contractual claims，as we also discussed on Monday，are different from treaty claims，meaning that even if there had been or there currently was a recourse to thelocal courts for a breach of contract，which to be clear there is not， this would not prevent the submission of treaty claims to arbitration under afork in the road clause，being annex 10－G of the TPA．

Just to confirm，the Claimant has not requested that this Tribunal order the Respondent to formalise the concession or any other relief relating to that document．Instead，the Claimant asked for compensation and damages for the Respondent＇s violation of the TPA and principles of customary international law．

I will hand you back to Mr Baldwin．
by Mr Baldwin
MR BALDWIN：Thank you．
Now we are on Question 5 ，which is what is the effect on the parties＇positions of ．CO Internet SAS having been assigned a new contract on 3 April 2020？

As we have argued，and I think is clear，
the Respondent－－whether their actions are wrongful $10: 28$ we can debate－but the actions that were challenging commenced in late 2018， 18 months prior to the Award of the 2020 concession．Contrary to one of Respondent＇s jurisdictional arguments that this was brought too early，once Respondent stated that it was not going to renew the concession，and it was proceeding with the tender，putting aside all the deprivations of due process，the lack of candour and the administrative tribunal，all the other issues that we are talking about，the claims were finalised and concrete，so all this happened prior to the Award of the 2020 concession．

I point out one aspect of this，
I mentioned the other day，is that the new tender－－ pardon，my apologies to $⿴ 囗 ⿱ 一 一 厶 儿$ ，the car company，and I hope no one in our firm represents them，but a KIA and a Lamborghini are not the same car．If you promise someone a Lamborghini and you deliverthema used KIA，and you say＇I told you I＇d give you a car＇，it is just not the same．This is I think a most basic concept a ten－year concession versus a five－year contract，economic terms that are drastically different．This is not the same thing．

Now，is there some relevancy to it？Yes．

1 When we are back here in a year and a half in the 10:30 damages phase, I think that this becomes relevant at that point. This is a set-off. This is what you have, when your damages experts look at the profitability and they say this is what the profitability of this 5-year contract is, and this is the economics of this, this is what the profitability would have been under the10-year concession.

We can argue about that, and yes, of course, to the extent that profit is shown from this 5-year concession, that reduces the amount of damages. But it doesn't and it can't reduce the claim. Even when you have situations where some mining licences are wrongfully terminated or some permit is wrongfully denied in violation of these international obligations. And even if later that permit or that licence is granted, or returned, that doesn't erase the wrongful conduct of the actions.

Now it might erase damages, and there are cases -- my friend, José Alberro, a damages expert, probably known to you all, had a case where he was representing the Respondent and the Respondent was found liable, meaning they had wrongful acts, but the damages were zero. Now that is not the case
here but that can happen.
435
$10: 32$
So this issue is a question of damages and not a question of whether or not they are doing it, and I will point out that Neustar and .CO Internet were trying to mitigate these damages.

Had they not bid on that tender, even though the tender was in a much worse position for them, I have no doubt that the Respondent would be here stating well, they had an opportunity to bid on the tender but didn't, therefore they have waived the right to complain that they should have won the tender or they should have had the concession. That argument would have been made, so there was really no choice here, for reasons we have laid out in the pleading, for .CO Internet to bid on this. But they bid on a KIA and not a Lamborghini.

Please, Mr President?
PRESIDENT: Go ahead.
MR BALDWN: I have five minutes left and I will go through a few of these slides. As I mentioned, in our post-hearing brief we will lay out the full events that happened at this hearing, but the Respondent has given basically two reasons why their rights were --

Respondent has given two reasons why they
felt they had to do to a concession, two or three, 10:33
but one of those repeatedly was ICANN, that they were excluded from participating in ICANN, and you can see this transcript here where Respondent's counsel was saying this is in line with the total outsourcing model which I described before and what in many respect is quite extraordinary. .CO Internet even was responsible for managing the relationship with ICANN on behalf of Colombia, so you had an American company who was actually sitting at the ICANN international organisation on behalf of Colombia.

Well, and this is noted from Respondent's opening presentation, slide 10, this is their slide on the screen here, and they say the 2009 contract and accompanying documents granted .CO Internet extensive freedom of operation, and they list here that.CO Internet even responsible for managing the relationship with ICANN on behalf of Colombia.

But, if you look at the cite for that, it is a resolution. 1652 passed in July 2008, before the 2009 concession even started I believe that was even before.CO Internet had a bid on it. So the managing the relationship with ICANN that we have heard so much about as being a reason why the

[^0]this contingency payment. Now I know it is the end of the hearing and it is still morning, but I am going to do a little bit of math here. We can all do it in our heads, we don't have to calculate too much, but Neustar was buying 99 per cent of the shares of .CO Internet, so essentially the whole company. They bought essentially -- because they had owned one percent already -- they bought the whole company for 113 plus million, 114 million, they bought halfway through the concession, which means under the original concession there was half the life of that concession, and it was for 113 million.

This USD 6 million payment cannot be met to be compensation for not having a renewal of the contract. That math just does not work. If the value of the company is 114 for the remaining part of a 5-year concession, you can't value 10 years of a renewal of that concession at USD 6 million. So to say that was a contingency payment that was meant to show that Neustar didn't think they would win it is exactly the opposite. If you didn't think you would win it, you would have had an amount upwards of USD 50 million, USD 60-70 million as a clawback if you didn't get the concession.

But the fact is this was viewed -- what 10:38
this document shows - this was viewed as such a small likelihood that the concession wouldn't be had, that that risk which was a small risk, was priced in, and with that, and you checking your watch, Mr President --

PRESIDENT: I am just telling you I am watching my watch!

MR BALDWN: I will take that cue and we will conclude with these concluding remarks.

PRESIDENT: I do have a couple of questions for you, but to keep the momentum I am going to turn to Respondent to make his presentation, and then what questions I and my colleagues might have we will raise with you then.

Thank you very much, Mr Baldwin and
Ms Baldwin. We turn now to Respondent.
Closing Statement by Respondent
by Mr Gouiffès
MR GOUIFFÈS: So, we proceed
Our presentation will be in three parts and of course we will be short on each with the time we have. We will respond to the Tribunal questions first for 10,15 minutes. Then we make comments on the hearing for the same amount of time roughlyand
then there will be closing remarks of the Republic 10:41
of Colombia for two minutes max.
I will deal with the Tribunal questions, the first three, and my colleague, Melissa, will do the two others and then my colleague Dan will do the comments on the hearing, which is the second part. So I go straight to the first questions which is the hierarchy of the jurisdictional objections. Are there any?

Four points I would mention here briefly. The first one is we have seven jurisdictional objections, as you know, which are grouped in five categories. You can see here on the slide we put them again as they are and four points.

The first one is yes, from a legal point of view there is a hierarchy, and the first one, that there is no jurisdiction following the change of Claimant, is undoubtedly the main question. This is because this is linked to the integrity of the proceedings, this is in limine litis, and this is a very important question in itself.

Remember, I won't get to that, you have heard us just two days ago. We heard for the first time on 29 July 2022 that there was a change of name. There was no replacement of Claimant midway,
just a change of name. That is what has been $10: 42$
alleged. Then we were told, you have two documents
showing this, C-135 and C-136. C-135 is a press
release, which is absolutely nothing, and C-136 is
the UPA which does not say anything on the transfer
of the claim or who is the actual owner of that
claim.
Now, you remember, because it was after,
it was engineered we would say to be after the
document production process we asked a document
request to the Tribunal in September which you
dismissed, but saying that the burden of proof would
be entirely be on that question on the Claimant at
this hearing and I would submit you have heard
absolutely nothing in that regard. That is my first
point.
jurisdictional objection are alternatives. So you
have seven of them So the six others aregrouped
in five but are alternative and each of them
dispositive of the entirety of the case. So that is
it for the second point.
that is why they are in bold, that you have two
which are a bit more specific because there is a
alleged. Then we were told, you have two documents showing this, $\mathrm{C}-135$ and $\mathrm{C}-136$. $\mathrm{C}-135$ is a press release, which is absolutely nothing, and C-136 is the UPA which does not say anything on the transfer of the claim or who is the actual owner of that

Now, you remember, because it was after, t was engineered we would say to be after the document production process we asked a document request the Tribunal in September which you dismissed, but saying that the burden of proof would be entirely be on that question on the Claimant at his hearing and I would submit you have heard absolutely nothing in that regard. That is my first My second point is all the other urisdictional objection are alternatives. So you have seven of them So the six others aregrouped in five but are alternative and each of them dispositive of the entirety of the case. So that is

The third point is, we would suggest, and
which are a bit more specific because there is a
link here between the merits and the jurisdiction 10:44 that these claims are contractual in nature and therefore this Tribunal is not the proper forum.

More interestingly perhaps in this case is that there is an obvious abuse of process. Now that is what my colleague, Dan González, will present later, but there is an abuse of process, and in a case like this one that would be perhaps the first one in investment arbitration, but we would submit that is probably what it is today. But each of them again are dispositive.

My fourth point is we put here what Mr Bigge has said on behalf of the United States, is of course a state's consent is a paramount question and it has to be an unconditional consent and we submit here that article 10.17 of the TPA has not been respected. That is the answer to the first question.

The second question from the Tribunal is on the language of article 4 of the 2009 Contract and the law. So of course you know article 4, I won't read it again, it says "may be renewed". We put up again as you have just seen from the Claimant article 2 of the law.

What is interesting in what you have
heard, and I think that would answer your questions, 10:45 you had no pleadings on this question in the pleadings or yesterday, or the day before yesterday on Monday from the other side, but even more, if you look at slide 10 of what they just presented, they agree it is a possibility of a renewal according to that law. So they agree. There is no disagreement that there is only a possibility. The law does not say "shall", it does not say "automatically", of course. And the reason for that is you know already, the Constitutional Court decision of 2001 which you have heard already here and which we have put again highlighted "may not exceed ten years", which may be automatically renewed. Then it is illegal if that is what has happened here in the telecommunication sector in 2001

What we have done here is gone a bit more further, and we will do it in post-hearing briefs in more detail, but you have the reference here to $\mathrm{R}-2$, $R-35$ and $R-92$. $R-2$ is a decree which says exactly the same thing, there is no automatic renewal $R$-92 is a decision from the Council of State, so the Conseil d'Etât in Colombia, of 2022, and I would suggest R -35 is something interesting for the Tribunal to look at.

[^1][^2]have given their consent, no party may withdraw its 10:49 consent unilaterally."

And of course you remember when the Request for Arbitration was filed by Neustar Inc of course there were three months of tos and fros between the ICSID and Neustar, because their claim was defective in many aspect, but what's important is then when this really started and this Tribunal was constituted under that request forarbitration, it is clearly Neustar Inc and it has not changed since.

Now, the Tribunal, I put it simply, retained certain jurisdiction to render an award on costs against Neustar Inc, and we have put here a reference to a case,Adamakopoulos, which of course when you say you do not have jurisdiction, then there is a question of what you can do as a tribunal, and this is very clear: 'The Tribunal must dismiss jurisdiction vis-à-vis these Claimants [this is for this case] except with regard to any potential costs award against them'.

This is very clear that you have power to do so against Neustar Inc.

I will finish with this, because of the uncertainties of what we have had over the past few
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months or few weeks, and certainly even in the 10:50 presentation on Monday, as an alternative we have asked for the security for costs applications which we are going to deal with and presentto you on 14 April. But this is only an alternative. The award on costs will be against Neustar Inc. I pass the floor to my colleague,

## Melissa Ordoñez.

by Ms Ordoñez
MS MELISSA ORDOÑEZ: Thank you, Laurent. I will now address the fourth question of the Tribunal which is what is the consequence of Neustar's request to formalise the extension of the 2009 Contract until 2030 in its request before the Council of State proceedings.

So the consequence is actually very simple. The consequence is that this Council of State proceedings do not fall within the exception of article 10.18(3) of the TPA which allows an investor to initiate or continue proceedings before local courts in very limited conditions.

What are these limited conditions? Well, according to this exception, it is possible to continue if the action seeks injunctive relief, does not involve the payment of monetary damages, but
also, and this is very important and we have put it 10:52 in the slide, the action has to be brought "for the sole purpose of preserving the investor's rights [...] During the pendency of the arbitration'.

So it has to have the sole purpose of preserving rights and it should be limited to doing so during the pendency of thearbitration, and this exception is particularly restrictive as put by the US in their NDPS where they say clearly that this was a "very narrow carve-out".

So against this background, Neustar's request No 5 to the Council of State, and I quote, and you can see it here in the slide, that it formalise the extension of concession 019 of 2009 until 2030 clearly exceeds the permitted scope of this article and this is because you can see that they are asking for the contract to be extended until 2030.

So this is not just about preserving the status quo during the pendency of the arbitration. They are going beyond this and it goes far beyond the sole purpose of preserving the rights, the investor's rights, because of course they were trying to force a renewal of the 2009 contract and this would have been in practice impossible to

## unwind.

All of this has two further legal consequences. The first one is that this constitutes logically a breach of the waiver requirement. If these proceedings do not fall within the exception of article 10.18(3) they should have been waived under article 10.18(2) prior to the initiation of the proceedings, but this was not the case. Neustar actually continued these proceedings after initiating the present arbitration, so the waiver requirement was breached.

The second consequence is that this constitutes a definitiveforumselection because annex 10-G of the TPA in order to be triggered, only requires that the investor has alleged the breach of the TPA before any court, and this is exactly what happened here. They just allege breaches of the TPA before the Council of State and therefore the clause has been triggered, and you can see that they have alleged this at R-80, pages 11-17.

With this, I conclude this question.
So, moving now to the next one, what is the effect on the parties' positions of .CO Internet SAS having been assigned a new contract on

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$10: 53$

## 3 April 2020:

The award of the 2020 Contract has several consequences in this arbitration. They won the tender, right? Froma jurisdictional perspective, we submit that this confirms that when Neustar filed its notice of intent on 6 September 2019, its Request for Arbitration on 23 December 2019, or when its RfA was registered on 9 March 2020, it had not incurred any certain damage as the 2020tender process had not yet even been put in motion or was pending.

And this is problematic for them because article 10.16 of the TPA, which relates to consent actually, requires that the notice -- requires, sorry, I am quoting actually article 10.16(1) of AA of the TPA. It requires that the investor has incurred loss or damage at the time of submitting the Request for Arbitration, and therefore, as put by the US in its NDPS in AmecFoster, there can be no claim under article 10.16(1) until an investor has suffered harm from an alleged breach. "No claim based solely on speculation as to future breaches or future loss may be submitted'. And so the consequence is that Neustar failed to comply with this preliminary requirement.

Second, in relation to the merits, well $\begin{aligned} \text { 10:57 }\end{aligned}$
the attribution of the 2020 Contract confirms that
Neustar's discrimination, arbitrariness and corruption allegations are nothing more than a smokescreen. There can be no discrimination against them because they were actually chosen for the 2020 Contract, and there can be no favouritism from Colombia seeking to favour Afilias because Afilias did not even participate in the tender process and .CO Internet was selected for the 2020 contract

And third, regarding quantum, and this is related to the jurisdictional point before, Neustar has not incurred any certain damage, and so actually Neustar has incurred no damage at all because they got the contract and at the outset they actually said that they were ready to re-negotiate the whole compensation package, and in the circumstances we submit that there is actually no damage at all

PRESIDENT: Mr González.
by Mr González
MR GONZÁLEZ: Thank you. In addition to the questions of the Tribunal, we were really left with our own questions as well, and we think we should at least address some of those this morning. Of course we will address them further in our

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post-closing brief.
It really is à propos that during the Claimant's presentation this morning we went into the dark, because we are really are in the dark with regards to how this Claimant believes it has carried its burden in this case.
You see in front of you what I amgoing to talk about, and I know we were reminded by this Tribunal that we are not in a court of law, but frankly the proceedings here are referred to as a final hearing for a reason. They are very similar to a court of law in a final trial, in the sense that it is the moment in time when the parties are supposed to present their final evidence to either a tribunal, or a court, or a jury, to support their burden of proof, and that burden of proof again doesn't come through argument of counset it comes through either documents or vitness testimony.
That is the simple truth of how our system works. Lawyers' arguments do not count, and the fact that a lawyer puts their argument into a letter and then attaches it to a memorial, that doesn't make it evidence either. So let's talk about what was the evidence that we heard in the last two days
With regards to the Claimant's witnesses,
what did we hear? We had an empty chair. There were no Claimant's witnesses as well we know. And what we heard with regards to Claimant's counsel, they said, and it is another one of many outrageous comments made without any support at all for, but they said they basically didn't bring any witnesses because they were worried about the pressure on them, or that there would be reprisals or recriminations. That is what they said to you. Not any support of that whatsoever.

Let's assume for the moment that this amazing allegation of why they didn't bring any witnesses to this case were true. Well, why didn't they bring Nicolai? Nicolai has been Neustar's Senior Vice-President since 2014, throughout all the relevant time period. He is certainly beyond reproach. He certainly could have been brought here to testify. Neustar had no problem bringing a claim. If they think reprisal comes from sitting in a witness chair, they could have brought him. He is not subject to that.

They could have brought Charlie
Gottdiener, Neustar's President and CEO since 2018.
We would have loved to have talked to him and had cross-examination with regards the corporate
structures and all the other unanswered questions we 11:01 had.

And at least we could have had Kevin Hughes, who has sat here throughout these hearings, and still sitting here in front of us today, but he didn't take the chair. They didn't take the chair not because of any concern of reprisal. They didn't take the chair because they didn't want to be subjected to cross-examination, which was this process, as informal as it may be, it may not be a court of law, but we are entitled to that. We are entitled to cross-examine those who are putting forward evidence against our client. That is what the rules provide in this proceeding as in any other proceeding, and we were not given that opportunity because they are afraid to do that because they don't have the evidence

Now, what did Mr Baldwin tell you? Well, instead of providing you with witness testimony, I amgoing to provide you with people in Colombia. I talked to them, he says, and I can tell you, they assured me that these extensions are always granted.

Well, again, the formal rules, and I know the Tribunal will always remind me, the formal rules that I grew up with in terms of a court proceeding
of hearsay don't apply. Well, let's be frank. 11:02
Those rules exist for a reason. Out-of-court statements are not admissible in courtfor the reason that they are suspect, and likewise this sort of statement of the basis how I am carrying my case is very suspect.

Let's go further. They also had the opportunity to present documentary evidence. If they didn't feel the need, the desire or the fear that they had to present witness, they could have presented documentary evidence. And you have heard throughout these proceedings that we don't have it. We don't have the evidence on the GoDaddy transfer. We don't have the evidence on Security Services Inc, the lack of due process and the other factors. All of these things they could have presented and they didn't. In fact, on the reliance documentation we asked for it. It was asked for in Request No 2 and they refused to produce it. Sothis Tribunal, not only should they recognise they didn't provide information, but they are entitled to give us an adverse inference with regards to that

More dramatic yet is the fact that they also made allegations of corruption in this case. You heard that in the opening where they outright
accused my client of corruption, and yet they put 11:03 forward no single shred of evidence of any such corruption in this case

So what do we have? We areleft with just a lawyer's argument. That is all we have left.

Now, on the witness side, we did present three witness. We brought, and you will hear from Colombia about this, but we brought three of the highest level officials involved directly with this matter. Not individuals who didn't know, individuals who knew the whole story, the real story, not the Neustar story. We brought you Iván Castaño, the MinTlC's director, Sylvia Constaín, the actual Minister in charge at the time, and Luisa Trujillo, MinTlC's Secretary-General. They weren't afraid to take the chair. They sat in that chair. They were open to cross-examination and they were cross-examined for over three hours and 32 minutes.

Now, I will tell you that I have trained every associate that has ever worked with me, and now I train as a professor at the university students that when you are doing cross-examination the first thing you have to do is figure out what are going to be your objectives for that
cross-examination. What are you going totry to do 11:04 with that cross-examination?

And here they had three of the highest officials to question about all of these allegations that they have made in this case. Now, did we hear them question them about lack of legitimate policy? No. Did we hear about discrimination? No. Bad faith? Due process violations? Government representations? Did you hear a single question saying this is a fact, did you know representations were made at any time to our client. You heard the Minister say that she got a full briefing of what had happened even before her time as Minister. Did you hear any questions about whether at any of those briefings she inquired as to whether there had been any prior representations to Neustar different from what was in the Contract that they were provided? Not a single question with regards to that.

Now, with regards to Neustar, there may be an allegation of corruption, like I said. It is not anything we have to prove, he says, but we certainly think there is cause for concern about corruption or nefarious reasons. That is what he said in opening to you, gentlemen, but did he ask a single question to any of these witnesses whether they were aware of
any corruption before, during or after their time 11:06 serving for Colombia? Not a single question. They didn't dare ask those questions but they certainly dared to make those allegations to you

What did Mr Baldwin ask? Mr Baldwin asked repeatedly to all the witnesses whether in their view it was appropriate to exclude. CO Internet from the previous advisory meetings. That was the theme. That was the one objective, I guess, if you can ask whether there was an objective in his cross-examinations that was asked of the witnesses. But what you heard in response from each of the witnesses you'll see is each witness explained and justified why there was very good reasons in order to avoid conflict, in order to ensure transparency and in fact in order to protect. CO Internetitself for the purposes of apotential future tender not to include them in that process andto keep them out of that process for their very protection.

You can imagine the investment treaty we would have had had we allowed them into those early discussions and those discussions about the tender on the inside on the front endand then said to them sorry, you can't participate because now you are disqualified for conflict of interest. That would
have been the investment treaty case that they would \(\begin{aligned} 45907\end{aligned}\)
have brought. But instead now they accuse us of doing everything right to try to protect them and somehow that is our fault and that somehow should be an action for claim. It is not. It is their abuse of process in this.

What you heard the witnesses, and I won't belabour this point because you will have it from the transcripts is you will hear the witnesses tell you how there was legitimate policies throughout, how they didn't actarbitrarily. You heardthat from Ms Constaín, you heard it from Mr Castaño and you also heard it from Ms Trujillo. All three witnesses told you that.

So let's get to the third part of my presentation which is what is the correct interpretation of the Contract?

The Tribunal already asked specific questions about this, and so I don't need to repeat any of that, butwhat I will do is talk about the fact that, first of all, Mr Baldwin told you again at the outset that he was going to come back to this issue about that language and the Respondent seeks to read this clause that would render this clause meaningless.

That is simply not true. We do not read it meaninglessly. It does have meaning and it has the rightful meaning which is clear on its face and it is not to be re-interpretedas they are seeking, because what Claimants are trying to do is they are trying to take Article 4 and they are trying to re-interpret that clause as "shall"be renewed.

He says here todaythat it is not
automatic, that they are not seeking automatic. But they are. Even this morning, members of the Tribunal, if you look at their slide 29, where they answer your question as toabout well, how do you explain if you receive the new concession, how do you explain whether you have an actual claim, and what they say to you is well, we do, because now it is only five years instead of ten years and now we don't have all the same economic conditions we had in the original concession.

Well, exactly. That is what they wanted. They wanted it to be automatic, meaning the same terms. But the language was clear. The language didn't say "shall", the language said "may", and it said "may" for a very particular reason. Because Colombia had grabbed up, collected the constitutional law from 2001, the legislation that
applied at the time, and they knewthat it needed to say "may". Now, by the way, it is not left without meaning because if in fact we had gotten to 2019 and the same conditions existed in 2019that existed in 2009 in the market place and otherwise, this contract could have been renewed at the discretion of Colombia for another ten years, but that was not to be because things had dramatically changed

So, why are we still here? We are still here because you do need to make an important decision in this case. It is at the discretion of the Tribunal, for sure, but it is the decision to award fees and costs in this case to Colombia as a result of this completely frivolous case brought against them and truly an abuse of process.

Thank you. I will now turn the word over to Colombia.
by Ms Ordoñez Puentes
MS ORDOÑEZ PUENTES: Thank you, Dan.
Mr Chairman and members of the Tribunal, despite the fact that we are convinced of the frivolous nature of the claims brought before this Tribunal and that this case should not have gotten this far, at this point the Tribunal would appreciate that Colombia committed not only time but
also significant resources in this process and to 11:10 attend this hearing in London alongside three high profile witnesses to make sure that you could confirm first hand that Colombia is a state that abides by the rule of law, highly committed to complying with its international obligations, and actually convinced of the value and importance of the international arbitration system.

In fact, it is very satisfactory to see
how it was worth for them appearing before you, because each of themevidenced howtransparent, diligent, technical and informed were the decisions questioned in this arbitration. That is why I respectfully request to you not only to dismiss this case and grant this Respondent's full costs, but also to make of this decision a lesson to prevent the irresponsible use of international investment arbitration.

States encounter a lot of difficulties when facing baseless and speculative claims like the one before us, so it is just fair that investors also pay the price when this happens.

I always say that arbitrators are the guardians of the system so I respectfully request that you render an exemplary decision that
encourages the proper use of investment arbitration \(\underset{\text { 11:11 }}{463}\)
and prevents opportunistic claims unfairly impacting a state's reputation.

Members of the Tribunal, thank you for your attention and your time these past few days. Before I finish, I would also like to extend my gratitude to the ICSID team, our translators and court reporters, without whom this hearing would not have been possible, and also to our colleagues on the other side. Thank you.

PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. I am going to suggest we have a short break, let's say 20 minutes, so that everybody can have a coffee and then we will come back. I think we may have a few questions and of course there is one other matter that you wanted to raise, and we will hear about that later.

Let's take 20 minutes.
(Short break from 11.12 amto 11.47 am )
PRESIDENT: Very well. May we proceed? Thank you.

We have decided that we don't have questions. We think that the various issues that have been raised by the parties have been very well
briefed and argued, and we appreciate that, so we
 stage.

But what we would like to do is just, and I do this in the form of a ruling, what we do want some more information on is the question of the relevant Delaware law and the international rules for determining the Claimant in this arbitration And how we propose to do this is we are going to have within the context of where we go from here, we have 28 days from now, from the end of today, for the agreement of the transcript, and then, as was agreed yesterday, we are going to have one round of post-hearing briefs, and we ruled on that, and then we have the notice that we have been given on security for costs --

MR GOUIFFÈS: Sorry, Mr Chairman, on these dates, are they specific dates you have or you put this in an order afterwards?

PRESIDENT: On the post-hearing brief?
MR GOUIFFĖS: Yes. When do we need to agree?

PRESIDENT: That is going to be 29 May.
MR GOUIFFĖS: Thank you.
PRESIDENT: And on the post-hearing
briefs, and I indicated yesterday the length, that
will be a month after the transcript. You are able \(11: 49\)
to work on the transcript because I would expect
whilst there may be a little bit of things that
might need some finessing, it is not as if something
is going to be -- hopefully not -- anything
significant, that won't be there
MR GOUIFFĖS: So you mean 28 April for the
first, and if we take Fridays, 26 May for the
second? I am sorry, I am just asking for
clarification
PRESIDENT: The 26 May. Are you happy
with 26 May?
MR BALDWN: Yes.
PRESIDENT: It is better for the members
of your team, because if you have to file on a
Friday they get a weekend. If you are filing ona
Monday then the probability is they will all have to
work the weekend.
MR GOUIFFÈS: And this is a long weekend
too. I amsorry, I shouldn't have said this
PRESIDENT: So we will go for the 26th
MR BALDWN: Yes, please.
MR GOUIFFÈS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
PRESIDENT: Now we come to the question of
security for costs. You indicated yesterdaythat
to work on the transcript because I would expect whilst there may be a little bit of things that might need some finessing, it is not as if something is going to be -- hopefully not -- anything

MR GOUIFFĖS: So you mean 28 April for the first, and if we take Fridays, 26 May for the second? I am sorry, I am just asking for

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MR GOUIFFÈS: And this is a long weekend

PRESIDENT: So we will go for the 26th
RRALDWIN: Yes, please.
PRESIDENT: Now we come to the question of security for costs. You indicated yesterdaythat

\section*{466 \\ 11:50}
you had agreed on dates butyou were not agreed on
time. So we would expect the application for the security for costs from Respondent on 14 April, and the reply on the 28 April, but on all points, and we will deal with that then

Now, in the reply for security for costs we would like the Claimant to provide more details of the relevant Delaware law and the specific rules on international law as applicable to the transaction in relationship to the claim. And then if Respondent -- if Respondent -- feels they need to reply, they will then first apply to the Tribunal for opportunity to respond, on the Delaware question. If you then wish to reply to anything that has come from the Claimant, you will apply to the Tribunal for permission to do sa

MR GOUIFFÈS: We are all in a hearing today in London, so it is likely that, assuming they give you documents on 28 April, we will have seen this for the first time and it is very likely we are going to have to say something on this.
I understand you don't want to rule now, but by when do you want --

PRESIDENT: If you are making an application we would expect that within, say, ten
days. If you are replying to us to say we want to 11:52 reply, and we will reply within another week or whenever that is, because we could say seven days or ten days from the date you receive - 28 April is when you will receive the reply on the security for costs.

MR GOUIFFÈS: Could we say 10 or 11 May or something like that? The 7 th is a Sunday. So 10 or 11 of May, if that is okay, if it is ten days, if we take out the weekend. 10 May? Is that okay? 10 May, which is a Wednesday.

PRESIDENT: And the reply is only on the issue of Delaware law.

MR GOUIFFĖS: Understood, Mr Chairman.
MR GONZÁLEZ: I am sorry, but I understood 10 May is our date to indicate our intent to reply.

PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR GONZÁLEZ: Are we going to set the further briefing schedule now or wait?

PRESIDENT: No, we would expect you to say "we are going to reply", and by that time you will have had 12 days so you would be able to say "can we please have permission to reply because", and we will do so within seven days. You will have worked out what you want to say to us where you disagree or

\section*{you think something needs to be added.}

MR GONZÁLEZ: It is the word "permission" that I was confused by. So it is permission be granted in the sense that we will be giving actual notice that we do intend to reply and then we then reply thereafter.

In other words, I am asking if I am expecting an order from the Tribunal granting us the leave, or do we just proceed to go ahead and file-

PRESIDENT: You will get permission to make the application. You are asking us for permission to make a reply --

MR GONZÁLEZ: By 10 May we are going to ask you for permission to make a reply.

PRESIDENT: And you will tell us why you think it is important and how soon you will make that.

MR GONZÁLEZ: Okay. So in that request we will ask you for how much time we need to make that reply and then we will await the Tribunal's decision on that before our clock starts running on that reply.

PRESIDENT: Well, you will be working on your post-hearings hopefully anyway.

MR GONZÁLEZ: That is a separate issue.

I am just trying to be clear as to --
PRESIDENT: This particular issue -obviously it is a very important issue-- but it is also very specific. So to the extent that there is law, unless it is your view that they have not covered the Delaware law as it is, or you say there is a different application of the law -- we are not looking for anything other than that

MR GONZÁLEZ: Understood. It is just what is clear what we cannot set today is the ultimate date of when such reply by uswould be due because we will have to wait until we know there has been leave granted by the Tribunal.

PRESIDENT: Absolutely.
MR GONZÁLEZ: That is clear enough. Thank you.

PRESIDENT: We will confirm these in a post-hearing. After today we will confirm this in an order from the Tribunal.

MR GOUIFFÈS: Very practically, on 10 May, so we will do what you have just said, we have to file on 26 May the post-hearing briefs, so it is very clearly, because you are saying it is just one issue, it is very likely to be before 26 May that we will have to do something.

PRESIDENT: Yes.

\section*{470 \(11: 56\)}

MR GOUIFFÈS: That is very clear.
PRESIDENT: There are separate issues,
your application for the security for costs and there may be overlaps, and then of course the post-hearings.

MR GOUIFFÈS: Understood.
PRESIDENT: Anything I have left out?
PROFESSOR HOBÉR: No.
PROFESSOR DERAINS: No.
PRESIDENT: Very well. We had one further matter of clarification that Respondent wanted to make.

MR GONZÁLEZ: Yes. Mr Chairman, I am reminded of one clarification point. On the post-hearing briefs, and I think the Tribunal I believe made it clear yesterday but I think it is worth repeating and asking, that of course is not inviting the parties to present any new evidence that has not been presented.

PRESIDENT: No new evidence.
MR GONZÁLEZ: Correct. Thank you.
With that, I will turn the word over to my partner, Melissa Ordoñez, on the last issue

MS MELISSA ORDOÑEZ: Mr Chairman, members
of the Tribunal, we just wanted to address two quick 11:57 points following Claimant's comments on our slides 19 and 22 of our opening presentation.

PRESIDENT: This was your opening presentation?

MS MELISSA ORDOÑEZ: Yes.
First, counsel for Claimant commented on our slide 19 of our opening presentation which, as a reminder, presented the 2020 tender requirements Claimant complains about. So more specifically, daimant explained that the 70 per cent maximum level of indebtedness that you can see here was not based on ITU recommendations, but rather on Decree 1082 of 2015. This is incorrect.

If we can have a look at the relevant section of the ITU report, C-67, which we will project on screen. Here you can see section 4.3.4, page 110, and as you can see, the top of the table provides: "Financial indicators requested by Decree 1082/2015'. And then if you go on, you then have a list of these financial indicators actually on the left, including the level of indebtedness, in Spanish "nivel de endeudamiento", and then you have specific recommended values on the right.

So, to explain what is going on, you have

Decree 1082, which we can produce if the Tribunal 11:59 wishes so. This decree requires that any public tender - any public tender - include these financial indicators. However, and this is important, it does not set out the specific values of these indicators, which are evidently set out for each and every specific tender --

MR BALDWIN: I am sorry, Mr President, I find this whole presentation odd, that we are having additional argument at the end about something before. I find that odd and improper. But, more importantly, counsel is talking about a decree that is not in the record, so she is telling us what a decree says and doesn't say and that decree is not in the record.

PRESIDENT: I understand counsel is trying to clarify what this particular slide says, and if that is the case presumably there will be a replacement to that slide, if it is wrong

MR BALDWN: This is not a slide that she is showing, this is an exhibit, and in that exhibit, as you can see on table 4, it says Decree 1082/2015 and for the last minute MsOrdoñez has been talking about what that Decree 1082/2015 says and that decree is not in the record.
So we are here at the last bit of a 473
hearing having counsel talk about what a decree says
that is not in the record based on another document
in the record that is not related to the slides.
I find that whole exercise completely improper.
PRESIDENT: Let's hear what she has to
say, because if this is to say, as often happens
with a clarification, we added up the numbers and it
came to 100, we checked it and it is now 110 or is
90, that might be one situation where there is a
clarification. But let's see exactly what was being
discussed here, and then we will certainly hear from
you.
Please proceed.
MS MELISSA ORDONEZ: Thank you,
Mr Chairman. This is just a clarification on what
was said, so l just need to explain it.
Just to continue, the specific values that
you have here on the right, these are specific
values that were recommended by the ITU, and this is
why they are in the ITU report. And not only that,
but this requirement of 70 per cent was actually
adapted following a request of none other than .CO
Internet itself, and you will find the entire paper
trail of this at R-48, page 20.

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\(12: 00\) hearing having counsel talk about what a decree says nat is not in the record based on another document in the record that is not related to the slides.

PRESIDENT: Let's hear what she has to say, because if this is to say, as often happens with a clarification, we added up the numbers and it came to 100 , we checked it and it is now 110 or is 0 , that might be one situation where there is a clarication. But let's see exactly what was being discussed here, and then we will certainly hear from

Please proceed.
MS MELISSA ORDOÑEZ: Thank you, Mr Chairman. This is just a clarification on what

Just to continue, the specific values that you have here on the right, these are specific values that were recommended by the ITU, and this is why they are in the ITU report. And not only that, ut this requirement of 70 per cent was actually internet itself, and you will find the entire paper trail of this at R-48, page 20.

So this is for the first point
And then if we move on to the second point, counsel for Claimant also --

PRESIDENT: Could you just go back to that first slide? Based on this slide that we have, No 19, what is not clear to meis specifically what you are clarifying.

MS MELISSA ORDOÑEZ: Yes. So counsel for Claimant in their opening statement, I mean their submissions, they claim that these requirements, which are requirements which were included in the 2020 tender, show somehow that the tender was designed for Afilias, because these requirements could only be met by Afilias.

Our argument is to say well, no, these requirements were actually recommended by the ITU. There was no intention at all to favour Afilias, which by the way did not even participate. And these requirements were recommended by the ITU, and the proof is in their report C-67 that I showed you

However, during their opening
presentation, counsel for Claimant made the argument that -- well, during the clarifications -- said that these requirements were not recommended by the ITU but rather they were based on Decree 1082/2015
> because there is a reference in the ITU report, as 12.03
> you can see here, to this decree
> My point is just that this decree only sets out the financial indicators that every tender in Colombia has to comply with, but the specific values are of course different for every tender and they are set out here in the ITU report.

PRESIDENT: Aml right to understand that what you are saying is that this figure of 70 per cent, you say that was recommended by the TU?

MS MELISSA ORDONEEZ: That is correct.
PRESIDENT: And you have given the reason being this decree that you have mentioned.

MS MELISSA ORDONEEZ: The reason is that this specific value is included in the ITU report. The decree does not set out the number, 70 per cent --

PRESIDENT: And that is your response to the allegation that is made by the Claimant -

MS MELISSA ORDOÑEZ: Yes.
PRESIDENT: - that the tender figures initially were set out specifically for Afilias

MS MELISSA ORDOÑEZ: Exactly. Yes.
So the second point was on slide 22 of our
opening presentation, and in particular counsel for \(\underset{\text { 12:05 }}{476}\)
Claimant questioned the fact that while the number of domain names stalled in the last year of Neustar's ownership, it started growing again when Neustar exited the country, and this is because, and I quote my colleague, Teddy Baldwin, he said the new concession didn't start until October 2020, so the numbers from 2020 would be more than 70 per cent due to the earlier concession.

On this we would just like to say that this omits that Neustar sold its investment in April 2020 with a closure in August 2020, so at least half of the year was spent under GoDaddy ownership irrespective of which contract was in force, and we have also checked the current numbers of the .co domain and currently we have more than 3.3 million. So clearly there has been asteady increase under the new contract.

That is it, Mr Chairman.
PRESIDENT: Thank you. Mr Baldwin?
MR BALDWIN: I will again reiterate my objection, and even in this last portion Ms Ordoñez has told about more information not in the record that she is saying at the very end of the hearing about the current number of registrations.

\footnotetext{
I find this entire last segment to be
477 completely improper. It is continuing argument. It is rebuttal argument from the Respondent, and giving it to us where we are at the end of the hearing, and in both of those points -- neither of which was a clarification, it was argument and it was rebuttal -- in both of those points Ms Ordoñez has talked about evidence, said what things said, the 3.3 million registrations that she claimed are the current figures, and she talked about, and it is clear in the record, what this Decree 1082, I believe a decree from 2015 said. She said it didn't say 70 per cent, it said what you had to include That decree is not in the record So she was allowed to testify here and do rebuttal argument with things that are not in the record that weren't clarifications.

I will do my best to respond. I don't have the evidence in front of me

I will say with regard to one particular thing, I will start with the second point first, and the second point wasabout the domain registrations in 2020. Again, because there was a onesided preparation here of argument, I don't have the transcript in front of me and I didn't look at it
}
this morning to prepare for a rebuttal, but I will 12:08 say, and if we have enough space we will make a reference to this in our post-hearing brief, what Respondent said when they presented that slide, they didn't say -- now they are saying Neustar sold in April of 2020 and therefore it is only -- a portion of it is attributable to Neustar.
.CO Internet is the entity that runs and manages the thing. .CO was sold. The people at .CO were the same -- that is why coincidentally they are not witnesses here-- and Nicolai Bezsonoff, who was mentioned here, why isn't he here? He works for GoDaddy. He was with Neustar managing the .Co contract when it was soldto GoDaddy, now he works for GoDaddy in the same role, who are the current operators of that and subject to issues in Colombia. So I say all that to say that these were the same people.

A lot goes into this. It is like any sales you are doing in domains. It is not like the minute somebody takes over they have credit for all the new sales. It doesn't work that way. Because what happens is these are sales that you are developing over time. This is the process of building these domain registrations, so to act like
accordance with this decree.
I have looked at the decree. The decree in that section, since we are freely testifying about it, I will tell you that the decree in that section has a listing of 70 per cent, but it relates to financial guarantees and what kind of assets you need to have and everything else. So, you know, I don't know whether Mrs Ordoñez is right or wrong and that decree is certainly not a part of the record, but to state and to be able to present that testimony without having the decree in the recordin the way it was done, whether she is right or not, I think was completely improper. And the ITU report states what it states and that is what's in the record and that is what was discussed and argued in the opening, and now is being brought back at the very end of this proceeding.

So on that I will conclude.
PRESIDENT: Thank you. Well, as you say, the ITU record is there, the Tribunal will look at that and either party is welcome to make any other additional comments in their post-hearings should you feel it is appropriate.

We have nothing further from this end. Do either side want to raise any other matters?

\section*{Mr Baldwin?}

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MR BALDWIN: We have nothing particular to raise and I know you are going to thank the court reporters and the interpreters, but we would like to do so as well. It is extraordinarily hard work and the professionalism has been astounding. I would like to thank the Tribunal for their attention and obviously it has been a pleasure.

We have had a fairly good relationship, actually, with our colleagues over there during that time and we appreciate it and I would be remiss if I didn't give a special thank you to Ms Lavista and to the ICSID Secretariat for their work here. So that would be my remarks by way of conclusion.

PRESIDENT: Mr Gouiffès, any issues you wish to raise?

MR GOUIFFÈS: No issues to raise, Mr Chairman, and for once I agree with everything that has been presented by my colleague, so I don't need to repeat the same thing Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT: We will check the record. I am sure we will find other areas where you agreed. There may be many where you don't agree, but that will be for us to sort out.

MR GOUIFFĖS: Thank you very much.

I amgoing reiterate those thanks to our court 3 reporters and also to the translators, and I would 4 also like specifically to thank counsel for what has
5 been very well presented and prepared presentations,
6 which help us greatly, and the professionalism on
7 both sides. There has been a bit from time to time,
8 as one would anticipate, slight differences between counsel, but that is also recognised and respected, and finally again to our Tribunal secretary,
Ms Lavista, for all her efforts of keeping things on the road.

With that, I call the hearing to an end and for those who are leaving London andgoing back to wherever they are going, we wish you safe travels. Thank you very much.
(The hearing was concluded at 12.15 pm )
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\hline 463/6 463/8 464/3 465/2 466/2 & \\
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[^0]:    old concession wasn't any good was a resolution.
    437 And we can see from this resolution, this is exhibit R-25, it says:
    "The Ministry of Communications: entity known as 'Sponsoring Organisation' for the .co ccTLDs before ICANN. This means that the Ministry of Communications is responsible for defining and approving the policy for the delegation of domain names under the .CO ccTLDas well as exercising control and supervisionover the entire model, including the approval of procedures and registrars for their accreditation. Finally, the Ministry must lead the representation of the government of the Republic of Colombia before the ICANN Government Advisory Committee'.

    So the concession doesn't say look, the concessionaire gets all the rights to talk with ICANN, and we have shown previously -- the testimony, for example, of Mr Castaño -- that he went to an ICANN meeting, the Respondent had the rights to do that. So this idea of ICANN and how they were blocked out of it is fiction.

    Probably just to talk about this one last issue, the contingency payment. This is slide 11 from Respondent's presentation and they refered to

[^1]:    What is R-35? This is a document from.CO $\begin{gathered}\text { 10:46 }\end{gathered}$ which attached itself a legal opinion of Ricardo Hoyos Duque and so this is their lawyer answering on these questions which explains exactly that question, and in particular you have a reference in that opinion to a Council of State decision of 2 December 2015 -- this is page 7 of that opinion -- but if you read the entirety of that opinion, it says exactly what we are saying in this case in relation to the question asked by the Tribunal.

    On the third question, which is the question of the proper Claimant and jurisdiction over Neustar Inc, I think there are two questions here. The first question: what is the law applicable to the determination of the proper Claimant? I won't spend too much time. I think there seems to be an agreement here, but we would say it is a procedural issue. This is of course governed by international law here, ICSID Convention and the TPA. It is quite a common question.

    We have put just an ICSID case from Sumrain 2020. 'The rules of municipal laws have no application to the procedure of this arbitration, which is regulated by the ICSID Convention and the

[^2]:    ICSID Arbitration Rules'.
    Now you had a few things here before on what has happened in the US, but that is a question of fact, and of course there should have been a document put forward and things explained to this Tribunal, part of the document production exercise or spontaneously because they have the burden of proof to show this, and they haven't at all, so whether this has been done properlyor not, we don't know. We absolutely don't know

    Now if the Tribunal were to think that this is an issue on the merits actually here the TPA is very clear, 10.22, and we just highlighted that: 'The tribunal shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement (TPA) and applicable rules of international law."

    So the answer to that first question is quite clear.

    Now the question on the jurisdiction to render an award against Neustar Inc, here it is very clear too. There is no request in this arbitration to withdraw Neustar Inc from these proceedings. Again, it is important, they say it is just a change of name. And it is a very basic principle of ICSID Convention, article 25: "When the parties
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