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Fridman v. Netherlands, Procedural Order No. 2 (Seat of the Arbitration), May 25, 2026

25 May 2026
Mikhail Maratovich Fridman v. Kingdom of the Netherlands,  PCA Case No. 2026-30
Procedural Order No. 2 (Seat of the Arbitration)
Document Details:
LISTED PARTICIPANTS
Procedural Order No. 2 (Seat of the Arbitration)
Participants listed are for this document only and may not include all participants involved in the entire case. Always consult the original documents.
Claimant appointee
Respondent appointee
Tribunal/Panel chair
Arbitrator(s)
Sole Arbitrator
ICSID Annulment Committee president
ICSID Annulment Committee members
WTO Appellate Body members
WTO Appellate Body chair
Judges
Claimant's counsel
Claimant's law firm
Respondent's counsel
Respondent's law firm
Other counsel
Claimant's expert
Claimant's expert firm
Respondent's expert
Respondent's expert firm
Claimant's witness
Respondent's witness
Other witnesses
Tribunal secretary
Tribunal assistant
Third-party funder
Entities
Country
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Document Summary
Procedural Order No. 2 (Seat of the Arbitration)
This summary note is machine-generated. Always consult the original materials.

Procedural Background

In Procedural Order No. 2, the Arbitral Tribunal addressed the determination of the seat of the arbitration pursuant to Article 16(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Following the Parties' inability to reach an agreement on the seat, the Tribunal invited written submissions and convened a Case Management Conference to hear oral arguments. The Claimant subsequently requested a deferral of the decision, which the Respondent opposed. The Tribunal elected to proceed with the determination to ensure procedural stability.

Parties' Positions

The Claimant advocated for a functional assessment of the seat, emphasizing the need for a jurisdiction that would not allow unilateral economic sanctions to impede the fair resolution of the dispute. The Claimant opposed Switzerland, Singapore, and Barbados, proposing Hong Kong or, alternatively, the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The Respondent argued for established criteria, including judicial independence and arbitration experience, proposing Geneva, with Singapore and Barbados as alternatives. The Respondent strongly opposed Hong Kong and the DIFC, citing concerns over judicial independence, legal stability, and geopolitical alignments.

Tribunal's Analysis and Reasoning

The Tribunal agreed that the selection must consider both general arbitration-friendly characteristics and the specific circumstances of the case, notably the economic sanctions imposed against the Claimant. The Tribunal systematically excluded Panama and Stockholm based on the Parties' agreements, and Barbados due to its limited track record in treaty-based arbitration. Geneva was excluded because Switzerland had adopted sanctions similar to those at issue. Hong Kong was dismissed to preserve confidence in the arbitral process, given the Respondent's strong and pre-existing objections to its legal and institutional framework.

Comparing the remaining options of Singapore and the DIFC, the Tribunal acknowledged the Claimant's concerns regarding Singaporean courts' potential stance on economic sanctions and public policy. Conversely, it weighed the Respondent's concerns regarding the DIFC's legal stability and the absence of a host country agreement granting immunity. Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded that the DIFC's neutral position on sanctions, combined with its geographical accessibility and infrastructure, made it the most appropriate seat. The Tribunal also emphasized that under Article 16(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules, the locale of the hearings remains distinct from the legal seat and can be determined at a later stage.

Decision

The Tribunal formally fixed the DIFC as the seat of the arbitration. Furthermore, acknowledging the broader geopolitical context, the Tribunal expressly reserved its authority to modify the seat as a measure of last resort should exceptional circumstances arise that could not otherwise be adequately addressed.